Marc B. Shapiro – Responses to Comments and Elaborations of Previous Posts III

Responses to Comments and Elaborations of Previous Posts III by Marc B. Shapiro

This post is dedicated to the memory of Rabbi Chaim Flom, late rosh yeshiva of Yeshivat Ohr David in Jerusalem. I first met Rabbi Flom thirty years ago when he became my teacher at the Hebrew Youth Academy of Essex County (now known as the Joseph Kushner Hebrew Academy; unfortunately, another one of my teachers from those years also passed away much too young, Rabbi Yaakov Appel). When he first started teaching he was known as Mr. Flom, because he hadn’t yet received semikhah (Actually, he had some sort of semikhah but he told me that he didn’t think it was adequate to be called “Rabbi” by the students.) He was only at the school a couple of years and then decided to move to Israel to open his yeshiva. I still remember his first parlor meeting which was held at my house. Rabbi Flom was a very special man. Just to give some idea of this, ten years after leaving the United States he was still in touch with many of the students and even attended our weddings. He would always call me when he came to the U.S. and was genuinely interested to hear about my family and what I was working on. He will be greatly missed. 1. In a previous post I showed a picture of the hashgachah given by the OU to toilet bowl cleaner. This led to much discussion, and as I indicated, at a future time I hope to say more about the kashrut industry from a historical perspective.[1] I have to thank Stanley Emerson who sent me the following picture. It is toilet bowl cleaner in Israel that also has a hashgachah. Until Stanley called my attention to this, I was bothered that the kashrut standards in the U.S. had surpassed those of Israel. I am happy to see that this is not the case. (In fact, only in Israel can one buy a package of lettuce with no less than six (!) different hashgachot. See here) But in all seriousness, I think we must all be happy at the high level of kashrut standards provided by the OU and the other organizations. This, of course, doesn’t mean that we have to be happy with what has been going on at Agriprocessors. I realize that this is a huge contract, but it was very disappointing to see that the first response of the OU to the numerous Agriprocessors scandals, beginning with the PETA video, has been to circle the wagons and put out the spin. Any changes from the OU only came after public outrage, and if the hashgachah is eventually removed from Agriprocessors, it will once again be due to this outrage. To be sure, we no longer can imagine cases of meat producers locking the mashgiach in the freezer,[2] but it does seem that the company was being given pretty free reign in areas where the hashgachah could have been using more of its influence. (Let’s not forget that Agriprocessors needs the OU more than the reverse.) At the very least, we need some competition in the glatt kosher meat business. Agriprocessors has a near monopoly and as we all know, competition is what forces businesses to operate at a higher standard. In fact, the entire glatt kosher “standard” should be done away with and turned into an option for those who wish to be stringent. This has recently been tried in Los Angeles, with the support of local rabbis, but I don’t know how successful it has been. The only way this can happen on a large scale is if the OU once again starts certifying non-glatt. The masses have been so brainwashed in the last twenty years that they will not eat regular kosher unless it has an OU hashgachah. There is no good reason – there are reasons, but they aren’t good – why the OU does not certify non-glatt. As is the case with the Chief Rabbinate in Israel, the OU should certify both mehadrin (glatt) and non-mehadrin. It might be that people in Teaneck and the Five Towns don’t feel the bad economic times. Yet there are many people who are having difficulty making ends meet. It is simply not fair to create a system where people are being forced to pay more money for meat than they should have to. The biggest problem Orthodoxy faces, and the factor that makes it an impossible lifestyle for many who would otherwise be drawn to it, is the enormous costs entailed. Anything we can do to lower this burden, even if it is only a couple of hundred dollars a year–obviously significantly more for communal institutions–should be done. Returning to Agriprocessors, while the current issue focuses on the treatment of workers, the problem of a couple of years ago focused on the treatment of animals. Yet the two should not necessarily be seen as so far apart. According to R. Joseph Ibn Caspi (Mishneh Kesef [Pressburg, 1905], vol. 1, p. 36), the reason the Torah forbids inflicting pain on animals is “because we humans are very close to them and we both have one father”! This outlook is surprising enough (and very un- Maimonidean), but then he continues with the following incredible statement: “We and the vegetables, such as the cabbage and the horseradish, are brothers, with one father”! He ties this in with the command not to cut down a fruit tree .כי האדם עץ השדה Deut. 20:19), which is followed by the words) This is usually understood as a question: “for is the tree of the field man [that it should be besieged of thee?] Yet Caspi understands it as a statement, and adds the following, which together with what I have already quoted from him will make the Jewish eco-crowd very happy. כי האדם עץ השדה (דברים כ’ י”ט), כלומר שהאדם הוא עץ השדה שהוא מין אחד מסוג הצמח כאמרו כל הבשר חציר (ישעיה מ’ ו’) ואמרו רז”ל (בני אדם כעשבי השדה (עירובין נד ע”א Finally, in Rabbi Shmuel Herzfeld’s op-ed on Agriprocessors in the New York Times (see here) he wrote as follows: “Yisroel Salanter, the great 19th-century rabbi, is famously believed to have refused to certify a matzo factory as kosher on the grounds that the workers were being treated unfairly.” Herzfeld was attacked by people who claimed that there is no historical source to justify this statement. While the story has been garbled a bit, the substance indeed has a source. I refer to Dov Katz, Tenuat ha-Mussar, vol. 1, p. 358. Here R. Yisrael Salanter is quoted as saying that when it comes to the production of matzah, one must not only be concerned with the halakhot of Pesah, but also with the halakhot of Hoshen Mishpat, i.e., that one must have concern for the well-being of the woman making the matzah. אין כשרות המצות שלמה בהידוריהן שבהלכות פסח לבד, כי אם עם דקדוקיהן גם בדיני חשן משפט 2. In my previous post I wrote: “With regard to false ascription of critical views vis-à-vis the Torah’s authorship, I should also mention that Abarbanel, Commentary to Numbers 21:1, accuses both Ibn Ezra and Nahmanides of believing that the beginning verses of this chapter are post-Mosaic. Yet Abarbanel must have been citing from memory, since neither of them say this. In fact, Ibn Ezra specifically rejects the notion that the verses were written by Joshua.” I made a similar point in Limits of Orthodox Theology, p.106 n. 102. I looked at Abarbanel again and would like to revise what I wrote. I don’t think it is correct to say that Abarbanel was citing from memory, since he quotes Nahmanides’ words. With regard to Ibn Ezra, I now assume that Abarbanel thinks Ibn Ezra is being coy. In other words, although Ibn Ezra cites a view held by “many” that Joshua wrote the beginning of Numbers 21, and then goes on to reject this view, Abarbanel doesn’t trust Ibn Ezra. He thinks that Ibn Ezra really accepts the “critical” view. I see absolutely no evidence for this. Ibn Ezra has ways to hint to us when he favors a critical view, and he never does so with this section. Furthermore, I am aware of no evidence that the “many” who hold the critical view are Karaites, as is alleged by Abarbanel. What led Abarbanel to accuse Nahmanides of following Ibn Ezra in asserting that there are post-Mosaic verses in Numbers 21? As with Ibn Ezra, Abarbanel sees Nahmanides as hiding his critical view and only hinting to it. Numbers 21:3 reads: “And the Lord hearkened to the voice of Israel, and delivered up the Canaanites; and they utterly destroyed them and their cities; and the name of the place was called Hormah.” Yet as Nahmanides notes, it is in Judges 1:17 that we see the destruction of the Canaanites and the naming of the city Hormah. How, then, can the city be called Hormah in Deuteronomy when it won’t be conquered and named for many years? Nahmanides writes that the Torah here is relating “that Israel also laid their cities waste when they came into the land of Canaan, after the death of Joshua, in order to fulfill the vow which they had made, and they called the name of the cities Hormah.” In other words, the Torah is describing an event, including the naming of a place, which will only take place a number of years later. This event is described in the book of Judges. The verse in Numbers is written in the past tense, which would seem to render Nahmanides’ understanding problematic. Yet as Chavel points out in his notes to his English edition, this does not concern Nahmanides. “Since there is no difference in time for God, it is written in the past tense, for past, present, and future are all the same to Him.” This is certainly true with regard to God, but what about the Children of Israel? How are they supposed to read a section of the Torah that speaks about an event as having happened in the past but which in reality has not yet even taken place? These are problems that the traditional commentators deal with, but Abarbanel sees Nahmanides as departing from tradition and offering a heretical interpretation. He is led to this assumption because Nahmanides uses the ambiguous words “Scripture continued” and “Scripture, however, completed the account.” Why didn’t Nahmanides say that Moses wrote this? It must be, according to Abarbanel, that Nahmanides is hinting that this was written down after Moses’ death. In Abarbanel’s words: כי הרב כסתה כלימה פניו לכתוב שיהושע כתב זה. והניח הדבר בסתם שהכתוב השלימו אבל לא זכר מי היה הכותב כיון שלא היה משה עליו השלום והדעת הזה בכללו לקחהו הראב”ע מדברי הקראים שבפירושי התורה אשר להם נמנו וגמרו שלא כתב זה מזה והרמב”ן נטה אחרי הראב”ע והתימה משלימות תורתו וקדושתו שיצא מפיו שיש בתורה דבר שלא כתב .משה. והם אם כן בכלל כי דבר ה’ בזה From here, let me return for the third time to what some would see as an aspect of biblical criticism in Radak. To recap, in his commentary to I Sam. 4:1 Radak writes: על האבן העזר: כמו הארון הברי’ והכותב אמר זה כי כשהיתה זאת המלחמה אבן נגף היתה ולא אבן עזר ועדיין לא נקראה אבן העזר כי על המלחמה האחרת שעשה שמואל עם פלשתים בין המצפה ובין השן שקרא אותה שמואל אבן העזר שעזרם האל יתברך באותה מלחמה אבל מה שנכתב הנה .אבן העזר דברי הסופר הם וכן וירדף עד דן Dr. H. Norman Strickman convinced me that Radak means that the words “and pursued as far as Dan” are a later insertion, since the city was only named Dan after it was conquered in the days of Joshua (Joshua 19:47). In a comment to the post, Benny wrote: There is no reason to assume that Radak is not referring to Moses prophetically writing the word Dan. It just means that in the time that the story took place, the name was not Dan. . . . I think that it is definitely possible that Radak understood that Moshe is the one who wrote “Et HaGilad Ad Dan”. Dr. Yitzchak Berger wrote to me as follows: I think the commenter ‘Benny’ was right about Radak’s view of Gen. 14:14. At I Sam 4:1 he’s probably merely contrasting the author-narrator’s [i.e. “sofer’s”–MS] perspective with that of the players in the story, concerning the phrases in both Samuel and Genesis (in the case in Samuel there would be no reason for him to introduce a later editor).” As is often the case in these sorts of disputes, I find myself being moved by the last argument I hear. As I noted in the earlier post, Radak elsewhere insists on complete Mosaic authorship of the Pentateuch. Thus, it is certainly easier to read this text in a way that would not create a contradiction. While on the subject of Mosaic authorship, let me also add the following. David Singer recently wrote an interesting article on Rabbi Emanuel Rackman.[3] With the recent passing of Rabbi Moses Mescheloff,[4] Rackman, born in 1910, might be the oldest living musmach of RIETS. If this is so, don’t expect this to be acknowledged in any way by the powers at YU.[5] The ideological winds have blown rightward in the last thirty years, and Rackman has moved leftward. He is thus no longer regarded as representative of RIETS or worthy of any acknowledgment.[6]

A similar thing happened at Hebrew Theological College in Skokie. Rabbi Eliezer Berkovits (died 1992) was, in my opinion, the most significant and influential person ever to teach on its faculty. (Unfortunately, they didn’t let him teach Talmud, only philosophy.) Yet not only does HTC currently have no interest in recognizing him, in 2001, some eighteen years (!) after the appearance of Not in Heaven, a very negative review appeared in theAcademic Journal of Hebrew Theological College.[7] To show how insignificant Berkovits is in Skokie, neither the author, Rabbi Chaim Twerski, nor any of the editors, realized that his last name is not spelled Berkowitz! Were he alive today, can anyone imagine that HTC would allow him to speak? (It would be interesting to create a list of people who founded or taught at institutions and today would be persona non grata there. A few come to mind, and for now let me just mention R. Zev Gold, the outstanding Mizrachi leader who was one of the founders, and first president, of Yeshiva Torah Vodaas. Gold, who was also a rabbi in Scranton, was one of the signers of Israel’s declaration of independence.[8]) Some people pointed out that in Twerski’s negative review, Berkovits is never even referred to as Rabbi, only as Dr. (A cynic might add that in his zeal to use the title “Dr.” instead of “Rabbi” for those he doesn’t approve of, Twerski even gives R. Judah Leib Maimon a doctorate, referring to him as Dr. Maimon.) In the following issue, Twerski apologizes for any disrespect, noting that while some people took offense at how he referred to Berkovits, others “who know [!] him well have told me that he always preferred to be addressed as ‘Dr. Berkovits.'” I think this is a fair response. After all, would anyone criticize an author for referring to “Dr. Lamm”? Yet I must also say that someone reading the article will not learn that Berkovits was a great talmudic scholar, and I don’t even know if Twerski recognizes this. Returning to Singer, in his article he writes that Rackman accepted the Documentary Hypothesis. I discussed this issue with Rackman some years ago and this is definitely not what he told me. The most he would say was that he would not regard someone as a heretic if he accepted biblical criticism. Yet he personally was not a believer in the theory. In support of Singer’s assertion to the contrary, he quotes the following passage from Rackman: “The most definitive record of God’s encounters with man is contained in the Pentateuch. Much of it may have been written by people in different times, but at one point in history God not only made the people of Israel aware of his immediacy, but caused Moses to write the eternal evidence of the covenant between Him and His people.” He also quotes another statement by Rackman: “[T]he sanctity of the Pentateuch does not derive from God’s authorship of all of it, but rather from the fact that God’s is the final version. The final writing by Moses has the stamp of divinity – the kiss of immortality.” Singer misunderstands Rackman. There is no Higher Criticism here, no Documentary Hypothesis. What Rackman is saying is that the stories in the Pentateuch might have been recorded by various people before Moses, but that these stories were later included in the Torah at God’s command, with Moses being the final author. In both of these passages Rackman is explicit that the Torah was written by Moses. Rackman’s position in these quotations is very traditional, asserting that all that appears in the Torah is Mosaic. With this conception it doesn’t matter if, for example, the stories of Noah or the Patriarchs had earlier written versions passed down among the Israelites, since what makes them holy and part of the Torah is God’s command to Moses that they be included in the Holy Book. This was done by Moses’ “final writing.” I can’t see anyone, even the most traditional, finding a problem in this. While on the subject of Rackman, let me make a bibliographical point. R. Moshe Feinstein, Iggerot Moshe, Yoreh Deah IV, no. 50:2 refers to: המאמרים של רב אחד שמחשבים אותו לרב ארטאדקאקסי שנדפסו בעיתון שבשפת אנגלית . . . והנה ראינו שכולם דברי כפירה בתורה שבעל פה .המסורה לנו R. Moshe goes on to further attack the heresy of this unnamed rabbi, who is none other than Rackman. This can be seen by examining Ha-Pardes, May 1973, p. 7, where R. Moshe’s letter first appeared. It is not a private communication but is described as coming from Agudat ha-Rabbonim of the United States and Canada, and R. Moshe signs as president of the organization. Earlier in this issue (it is the lead article) and also in the April 1973Ha-Pardes , R. Simhah Elberg ראביי published his own attack on Rackman, referring to him as Elberg refers to Rackman’s articles which appeared .ר regularly in the American Examiner, and which so agitated the haredim – and also many of the centrist Orthodox. This paper then joined with the Jewish Week, and became known as the Jewish Week and American Examiner. Rackman continued to publish in the paper until around 2001. (His article discussing my biography of Weinberg was one of the last ones he would write, and it is reprinted in the second edition of One Man’s Judaism [Jerusalem, 2000], pp. 402-404.) 3. Many people were interested in the claim, quoted in an earlier post, that rabbis turned over their own children to become soldiers if these children were no longer observant. If something like this ever happened it would have been very heartless, and there were, of course, many children of gedolim who became non-religious. While in some cases the child choosing a different path led to estrangement with his father, in others, father and son remained close, and I think today everyone realizes that this is the only proper approach to take. R. Jehiel Jacob Weinberg thought that it might be a good idea for a father to attend his son’s intermarriage, in order not to break ties completely. (Believe it or not, this statement was published in Yated Neeman.) Yet to see how different things were in years past, at least among some parts of our community, consider the following responsum by the important Hungarian posek, R. Jacob Tenenbaum.[9] The case concerned an This means) בית האון Orthodox shochet whose son went to the the non-Orthodox rabbinical seminary in Budapest, against which the Orthodox rabbis carried on a crusade.) The problem was that during his vacations the son came home to his parents’ house. Tenenbaum was asked if this meant that the shochet was disqualified and could no longer serve the community. The father pleaded that he loved his son, and Tenenbaum also .התנצלות זה הוא הבל Tenenbaum replied that rejected the father’s claim that if he doesn’t show love to his son, the latter will go even further “off the derech.” Tenenbaum demanded that the father make a complete break with his son (that is, if the father wanted to be regarded as a Jew in good standing). The choice was clear: The father had to decide between loving his son and making a living (for if chose the former he would be blacklisted throughout the country): ואם אביו יתן לו מקום בביתו או יתמכהו באיזה דבר בזה יגלה דעתו שגם בו נזרקה מינות [!] ובזה אין חילוק בין שו”ב לאיש אחר . . . אם יחזיק ידו או יתן לו מקום בביתו הנה ידו במעל הזה אשר בנו פנה עורף לדת ה’ ועל כן צא טמא יאמר לו, ושלא יוסיף עוד ראות פניו אם .לא ישמע לדבריו לעזוב דרך רשע I know this sounds like a Hungarian extremist approach, but R. Kook had basically the same viewpoint. In Da’at Kohen no. 7, he too is asked about a shochet whose non-religious sons live at home. R. Kook replies that while technically the actions of the sons do not destroy the hezkat kashrut of the father, Even if .(מכוער) nevertheless, the matter is very distasteful the father could not be blamed at all in this matter, nevertheless, it is a hillul ha-shem. Since the beit din has the power to legislate in matters beyond the strict law, “there is no migdar milta greater than this.” He explains the reason for his uncompromising viewpoint: שלא ילמדו אחרים להפקירות עוד יותר, כשרואין שבניו של השו”ב הקבוע הם מחללים ש”ק, ע”כ לע”ד ברור הדבר, שכ”ז שבניו הם סמוכין על שולחנו, ואין פוסקין מחילול ש”ק, איננו ראוי להיות שו”ב קבוע, .ומה גם בעדה חרדית If this is said about a shochet, how much more would it apply to a rav of a community. It is therefore easy to understand why non-religious children of some well-known rabbis are no longer welcome in their parents’ home. (Other well-known rabbis have a completely different outlook, and reject what they would categorize as the conditional-love approach of Rabbis Tenenbaum and Kook). 4. Since I have mentioned R. Jehiel Jacob Weinberg a few times, I must call attention to something that was pointed out to me by Rabbi Chaim Miller. Miller might be known to some readers for his wonderful editions of the Chumash and Haggadah with a commentary based on writings of the Lubavitcher Rebbe. He has also published the first volume of a multi-volume work on the Thirteen Principles.[10] I have often been asked if Weinberg gave semikhah to the Lubavitcher Rebbe. There is such a story yet I always found it suspicious that it was never mentioned in the Rebbe’s lifetime. Furthermore, Weinberg never mentions this in his letters. (He does mention that R. Yosef Yitzhak Schneersohn loved him.) So when asked, I always replied that I didn’t believe the story to be correct, as there is no evidence. In fact, I thought that the story was created as a clever way of giving the Rebbe semikhah. There is no record of him receiving semikhah before he arrived in Germany or after he left, so it made sense to have him receive it during his time in Berlin. Once you assume that the semikhah is received in Berlin, who better than Weinberg to give it to the Rebbe? Yet I always assumed that that this was a legend and wondered if the Rebbe even had semikhah. Rabbi Miller called my attention to the new book,Admorei Habad ve-Yahadut Germanyah, pp. 103ff., where R. Avraham Abba Weingort, who is completely trustworthy (and far removed from Habad), records the testimony of two other reliable people from Switzerland who knew Weinberg well. Although there is probably some exaggeration in the details of the story they tell, they report being told by Weinberg that he indeed gave semikhah to the Rebbe, and the circumstances of how this came about (including requiring that the Rebbe come to some of his shiurim at the Berlin Rabbinical Seminary).[11] I can now better understand why the Rebbe’s contact information given to the University of Berlin was the address of the Berlin Rabbinical Seminary.[12] From now on, whenever I am asked if the Rebbe received semikhah from Weinberg, I will reply yes. 5. In recent years a few volumes from the writings of R. Yehudah Amital have been translated into English, allowing many new people to be exposed to his thoughts. Here is a provocative passage from his newest volume,Commitment and Complexity: Jewish Wisdom in an Age of Upheaval, p. 48: We live in an era in which educated religious circles like to emphasize the centrality of Halakha, and commitment to it, in Judaism. I can say that in my youth in pre- Holocaust Hungary, I didn’t hear people talking all the time about “Halakha.” People conducted themselves In the tradition of their forefathers, and where any halakhic problems arose, they consulted a rabbi. Reliance on Halakha and unconditional commitment to it mean, for many people, a stable anchor whose purpose is to maintain the purity of Judaism, even within the modern world. To my mind, this excessive emphasis of Halakha has exacted a high cost. The impression created is that there is nothing in Torah but that which exists in Halakha, and that in any confrontation with the new problems that arise in modern society, answers should be sought exclusively in books of Halakha. Many of the fundamental values of the Torah which are based on the general commandments of “You shall be holy” (Vayikra 19:2) and “You shall do what is upright and good in the eyes of God” (Devarim 6:18), which were not given formal, operative formulation, have not only lost some of their status, but they have also lost their validity in the eyes of a public that regards itself as committed to Halakha. This reminds me of the quip attributed to Heschel that unfortunately Orthodox Jews are not in awe of God, but in awe of the Shulhan Arukh. In truth, Heschel’s point is good hasidic teaching, and R. Jacob Leiner of Izbica notes that one can even make idols out of mitzvot.[13] He points out that the Second Commandment states that one is prohibited from making an image of what is in the heavens. R. Jacob claims that what the Torah refers to as being in the heavens is none other than the Sabbath. The Torah is telling us that we must not turn it into an idol. In this regard, R. Jacob cites the Talmud: “One does not revere the Sabbath but Him who ordered the observance of the Sabbath.”[14] I believe that the “halakho-centrism” that Amital criticizes has another pernicious influence, and that is the overpopulation of “halakhic” Jews who have been involved in all sorts of illegal activities. A major problem we have is that it is often the case that all sorts of halakhic justifications can be offered for these illegal activities. One whose only focus in on halakhah, without any interest in the broad ethical underpinnings of Judaism, and the Ramban’s conception of Kedoshim Tihyu, can entirely lose his bearings and turn into a “scoundrel with Torah license.” The Rav long ago commented that halakhah is the floor, not the ceiling. One starts with halakhah and moves up from there. Contrary to what so many feel today, halakhah, while required, is not all there is to being a Jew, and contrary to what so many Orthodox apologists claim, halakhah does not have “all the answers.” One of the most important themes in Weinberg’s writings is the fact that there are people in the Orthodox community who, while completely halakhic, are ethically challenged. Since I already mentioned Rabbi Rakow, let me tell a story that illustrates this. I went to Gateshead to interview him about his relationship with Weinberg. When I got there I had a few hours until our meeting so I paid a visit to the local seforim store. I found a book I wanted and asked the owner how much it cost. He gave me a price, and then added that if I was a yeshiva student there was a discount. When I later met with Rakow I asked him if it would have been OK for me to ask one of the yeshiva students to buy the book at discount, and then I could pay him for it. He replied that there was certainly no halakhic problem involved. After all, the first student acquires the book through a kinyan and then I buy it from him. But he then added: “Yet it would not be ethical.”

Weinberg’s concerns in this area were not merely motivated by the distressing phenomenon of halakhically observant people who showed a lack of ethical sensitivity. His problem was much deeper in that he feared that this lack of sensitivity was tied into the halakhic system itself. In other words, he worried that halakhah, as generally practiced, sometimes led to a dulling of ethical sensitivity. Weinberg saw a way out of this for the enlightened souls, those who could walk the middle path between particularist and universal values. Yet in his darkest moments he despaired that the community as a whole could ever reach this point. This explains why he esteemed certain Reform and other non-Orthodox figures. Much like R. Kook saw the non-Orthodox as providing the necessary quality of physicality which was lacking among the Orthodox, Weinberg appreciated the refined nature of some of the non-Orthodox he knew and lamented that his own community was lacking in this area. It was precisely because of his own high standards that he had so little tolerance for ethical failures in the Orthodox community. Weinberg’s sentiments, which focused on inner-Orthodox behavior, were not motivated by fear of hillul ha-shem. It was simply an issue of Jews living the way they are supposed to. [15]

In his opposition to halakho-centrism, Amital finds a kindred spirit in R. Moses Samuel Glasner and cites the latter with regard to the following case. What should someone do if he has no food to eat, except non-kosher meat and human flesh. From a purely halakhic standpoint, eating non-kosher meat, which is a violation of a negative commandment, is worse than cannibalism. The latter is at most a violation of a positive commandment (Maimonides) or a rabbinic commandment according to others.[16] Yet Glasner sees it as obvious that one should not eat the human flesh, even though this is what the “pure” halakhah would require, for there are larger values at stake and the technical halakhah is not the be-all and end-all of Torah.[17] Glasner writes as follows in his introduction to Dor Revi’i: כל מה שנתקבל בעיני בני אדם הנאורים לתועבה, אפילו אינו מפורש בתורה לאיסור, העובר על זה גרע מן העובר על חוקי התורה . . . ועתה אמור נא, בחולה שיש בו סכנה ולפניו בשר בהמה נחורה או טרפה ובשר אדם, איזה בשר יאכל, הכי נאמר דיאכל בשר אדם שאין בו איסור תורה אע”פ שמחוק הנימוס שמקובל מכלל האנושי, כל האוכל או מאכיל בשר אדם מודח מלהיות נמנה בין האישים, ולא יאכל בשר שהתורה אסרו בלאו, היעלה על הדעת שאנו עם הנבחר עם חכם ונבון נעבור על חוק !הנימוס כזה להינצל מאיסור תורה? אתמהה In other words, the Torah has an overarching ethos (Natural Law?) which is not expressed in any specific legal text, and this can sometimes trump explicit prohibitions.[18] Glasner has another example of this: Someone is in bed naked and a fire breaks out. He can’t get to his clothes and has two choices: He can run outside naked or put on some women’s clothes. The pure halakhic perspective would, according to Glasner, require him to go outside naked, since there is no biblical violation in this. But Glasner rejects this out of hand: ובעיני פשוט הדבר דלצאת ערום עברה יותר גדולה . . . כי היא עברה המוסכמת אצל כל בעלי דעה, והעובר עליה יצא מכלל אדם הנברא בצלם .אלוקים While I don’t know if the Rav would agree with Glasner, he too acknowledged that ethical concerns are a part of halakhic determination, meaning that not everything is “pure” halakhah. “Since the halakhic gesture is not to be abstracted from the person engaged in it, I cannot see how it is possible to divorce halakhic cognition from axiological premises or from an ethical motif.” Yet he adds: “Of course, in speaking of an ethical moment implied in halakhic thinking, I am referring to the unique halakhic ethos which is another facet of the halakhic logos.”[19] I wonder, though, if the approach set out here stands in contradiction to how, in his famous essay, he portrays the Halakhic Man’s mode of thinking. Would Halakhic Man, whose values arise exclusively from the halakhic system, be able to write the following, which acknowledges a significant subjective element? Before I begin the halakhic discussion of the subject matter I wish to make three relevant observations . . . I cannot lay claim to objectivity if the latter should signify the absence of axiological premises and a completely detached attitude. The halakhic inquiry, like any other cognitive theoretical performance, does not start out form the point of absolute zero as to sentimental attitudes and value judgments. There always exists in the mind of the researcher an ethico-axiological background against which the contours of the subject matter in question stand out more clearly. . . . Hence this investigation was also undertaken in a similar subjective mood. From the very outset I was prejudiced in favor of the project of the Rabbinical Council of America and I could not imagine any halakhic authority rendering a decision against it. My inquiry consisted only in translating a vague intuitive feeling into fixed terms of halakhic discursive thinking.[20] How often have I seen Orthodox polemicists criticize this very approach? Finally, with regard to the issue of cannibalism mentioned above, let me point to one more relevant source (I can’t resist). In a previous post I mentioned that since every topic in halakhah has been dealt with in such detail, scholars today have to find new areas to focus on. Because of this, large books constantly appear about all sorts of things that are found in the sources, but to which no one ever gave much thought in previous years. The example I gave was an entire book dealing with the halakhot of sex change operations. The halakhot of cannibalism is one of the last areas which hasn’t yet been given a book-length treatment. However, R. Yosef Aryeh Lorincz has recently published Pelaot Edotekha.[21] The author is a rosh kollel whose previous book won an award from the municipality of Bnei Brak (see here). He is also the son of Shlomo Lorincz, one of the elders of haredi politics. He raises the following question (before reading any further, make sure the digitalis is in easy reach): Is it permitted to eat the flesh and drink the blood of demons?! Let me quote some of what he says on the topic: יש לעיין באותם השדים שיש להם דמות אדם ומתו מה דין בשרם ודמם האם אסורים באכילה, דפשוטו אינם אדם וגם אינם בהמה אלא בריה בפנ”ע ולא מצינו שאסרה תורה לבשר ודם דשדים, אולם להאמור לעיל דשד הוה מקצת אדם, א”כ הוה כעין חצי שעור ואסורים באכילה, עוד יש לעיין אם בשרו ודמו יש להם טומאה כמת עכו”ם, ואם אסורים בהנאה .לשיטות דמת עכו”ם אסור בהנאה Whatever you may think about hashgachot on candles and toilet bowl cleaner, I am fairly certain that even if Lorincz can prove that demon’s flesh and blood is kosher, none of the kashrut organizations will be rushing to add their symbol to this product. But in all seriousness, I know that I am not the only one who thinks that it is very unfortunate that we have Torah scholars spending time on this sort of thing. 6. I have been asked to say something about the current conversion controversy. The halakhic problems will be sorted out by the poskim, but let me make a few comments about the historical issue. There have been a number of people who have stated that the lenient approach often associated with R. Uziel is a singular opinion, or that this view was original to him. That this is mistaken can be seen by anyone who examines Avi Sagi’s and Zvi Zohar’s book Giyur u-Zehut Yehudit. In fact, throughout most of Jewish history a lenient approach to conversion was the mainstream approach. Now it is true that R. Herzog famously states that in earlier times one could be more lenient than today, because in a traditional society when someone converted he was immediately part of a community and was required to be observant.[22] Things are very different today when you can convert and move to a secular neighborhood in Tel Aviv. There is no communal pressure for you to be observant, and the convert can look around and see that the leaders of the Jewish people in Israel, Peres, Olmert and Livni, are not religious. In such a world, R. Herzog didn’t think we could rely on certain leniencies used in the past. However, despite R. Herzog’s opinion, the lenient approach, which didn’t insist on a convert’s complete observance of mitvot remained popular in modern times. (Contrary to what has often been stated, the lenient approach, and this includes R. Uziel, always insisted on kabbalat mitzvot. The dispute concerns what “kabbalat mitzvot” means, and whether a formal acceptance, without inner conviction, is sufficient.) Until recent years the lenient approach was even a mainstream position, alongside the more stringent (and widespread) approach. Among the adherents of the lenient approach one must mention R. David Zvi Hoffmann, who was the final halakhic authority in Germany until his death in 1921. Almost every Orthodox rabbi in that country, and many in other parts of Western Europe, looked to him as their authority. Others who held this position include R. Unterman and R. Goren. In addition, the Israeli Chief Rabbinate batei din, which were full of haredi dayanim, until recently followed the lenient approach. Many non-Jews were converted in Israel by dayanim who knew perfectly well that these people were not going to live an Orthodox life. Some of them were even intent on marrying people who were living on secular kibbutzim.[23] No one ever challenged the validity of these conversions. The situation was similar in places outside of Israel. See R. Yitzhak Yaakov Weiss, Minhat Yitzhak, vol. 6, no. 107: לצערנו הרב גם רבנים חרדיים ומומחים מגיירים כעין זה ומחשיבים .אותה כבדיעבד Unlike what goes on today, in previous generations there were never any classes for future converts. In fact, according to R. Akiva Eger, these classes are improper, since one is not permitted to teach Torah to a non-Jew.[24] Now obviously, this is not the position we accept, but it does illustrate that in reality converts don’t need to know much about Judaism. R. Malkiel Zvi Tenenbaum writes similarly in dealing with a case from England where a man was with a non-Jewish woman and wanted to convert her. The man had stopped eating non-kosher and attended synagogue on Rosh ha-Shanah and Yom Kippur, but he was obviously not a completely observant Jew. Tenenbaum notes that even though it is possible that the only reason the woman is converting is so that she can remain with her husband–apparently she thought that this was in doubt due to his new religiosity– nevertheless, one should not be too exacting with her, other than telling her a few weighty and light mitzvot. This approach should be adopted because ex post facto the conversion will be fine, “and by doing this, we will save the Jew from living with her in a forbidden manner . . . but it is best that she learn everything [relating to Judaism] after she converts, and in particular in this case when we have to hurry to save the husband from sin.”[25] Even R. Moshe Feinstein’s opinion regarding conversion is not uniform, and you can see changes in his view in the direction of leniency. But leaving that aside, although R. Moshe requires real kabbalat mitzvot, he acknowledges that a rejection of complete halakhic observance might not really be a rejection, because the person might not think that a particular law is really required. For example, what about a case where a woman converted in order to marry a Sabbath violator and was herself now a Sabbath violator? This is the exact sort of conversion that would be thrown out today. The fact that after the conversion she never observed Shabbat would suffice to show that there was no kabbalat mitzvot. Yet R. Moshe disagrees. He says that it depends on the woman’s mindset. In this case, perhaps she never intended on violating the halakhah, but she didn’t believe that Shabbat is really a law! And why should she, when she sees that most Jews don’t keep it? In R. Moshe’s words, she thought that observing Shabbat was hiddur be-alma, that is, something nice, but not required. This means that she never rejected the halakhah of Shabbat, she just didn’t know about it, and people are not required to know every halakhah before they convert. Therefore, R. Moshe concludes that the conversion is valid.[26] In another responsum,[27] R. Moshe explains that even if one rejects a particular mitzvah of the Torah, ex post facto the conversion is still valid: ולכן צריך לומר שכיון שאיכא עכ”פ קבלת מצות אף שלא בכולן הוא גר .ונתחייב בכולן אף שלא קבלם דהוה מתנה ע”מ שכתוב בתורה Anyone who reads responsa literature of the last hundred years often comes across cases where a man was intermarried and wanted to convert his wife, or wanted to convert his future wife. Often he had a child with the non-Jewish woman and wanted the child to be converted. A few different issues are discussed in these responsa, in particularnitan al ha- shifhah, but one thing you find very little discussion of is kabbalat mitzvot. The rabbis often give permission to convert the children even though the parents are not religious, and they give permission to convert the non-Jewish spouse even though there is no expectation that the person is going to lead a religious life. This obviously shows us that these rabbis had a different conception of conversion than what is today declared to be the only acceptable approach. Rabbi Yehudah Herzl Henkin[28] has recently called attention to Rabbi Abraham Price’s comments in this regard.[29] Price was the leading rav in Toronto, and he defends the lenient approach (which was being carried out all over the world). Yet today, these conversions would be thrown out. Here is the page from Price’s sefer.

In the recently published responsa of R. Eliezer David Rabinowitz-Teomim (the Aderet), Ma’aneh Eliyahu, no. 65, he discusses converting a Gentile who was involved with a Jewish woman. He raises the issue of whether it is proper to convert the man if he will not be observant. Even though the woman will be spared the sin of intermarriage, the man who is converted will now be violating the prohbitions of Niddah and Shabbat. This means that he was in a better place before he converted, as he was not obligated in these laws. The Aderet never assumes that the conversion won’t be valid because the man will be non-observant. Indeed, his entire responsum is based on the fact that it will be valid, which leads him to wonder if conversions like this are a good idea. אם הם מדור החדש, וקרוב הדבר שלא תשמור לטבול בזמנה, ויחללו שבת, ויכשלו באיסור נדה החמורה, רחמנא ליצלן, ועוד ועוד, באופן כזה .חלילה, צריך ישוב והתבוננות אם לטובלו לדת ישראל (There are many other responsa where halakhists show great annoyance that people who convert often don’t live a religious life, but very few of these halakhists mention anything about the conversions not being valid.) Here is another example that nicely illustrates what I am talking about. It has not been quoted in any of the numerous discussions of the issue and can be added to the lenient side. Yet as I indicated, there is nothing unusual in this case as the approach seen here was very popular. R. Shlomo Sadowsky was a rav in Rochester and in 1918 he published his sefer, Parparaot le-Hokhmah. On page 63 he discusses converting a non-Jewish woman who is married to a Jewish man. In this case, he turned to R. Gavriel Zev Margulies, one of the leading poskim in America. (Joshua Hoffman wrote a wonderful masters dissertation on him.) The decision is made to convert her, and there is no mention of authentic acceptance of mitzvot. The halakhic concern focuses on a different matter, and the two rabbis are guided by the desire to help the man get out of the sin of intermarriage. Here is the responsum.

A few pages prior to this, Sadowsky has a responsum from 1906, when he was a rav in Albany. Here he discusses converting the son of a Jewish father and a non-Jewish mother. The mother had no interest in converting. Sadowsky agrees to convert the child who would, of course, be raised in an intermarried home without any Torah or mitzvot. He sent his responsum to the great R. Moses Danishefsky, the rav of Slobodka, and Danishefsky agreed with him. There is absolutely no discussion about the fact that the boy will be brought up without Torah observance. Both Sadowsky and Danishefsky assume that there is a benefit to being Jewish, even if one is being brought up in an intermarried home.[30] Here are the responsa from Rabbis Sadowsky and Danishefsky. The technical issues are probably easier in this last case, as a child doesn’t need to have kabbalat mitzvot to be converted. Yet it is still significant that the issue of being raised in a non-religious home is not considered. There have been cases in Israel where the rabbinate refuses to convert children in situations like this, since the parents are not religious. The parents are thus forced to raise non-Jewish Hebrew speaking children, who of course will serve in the army and then marry Jewish Israelis. For another example of converting women where there is no real expectation that they will be “observant” (by current standards), since their husbands were themselves not religious, see this responsum by R. Judah Leib Zirelson, from his Atzei ha-Levanon, no. 63.

I could cite a number of other sources, but it should be obvious by now that the lenient approach is hardly adaat yahid, identified only with R. Uziel. I believe that an examination of the responsa literature reveals that until recently this was a mainstream approach among both rabbis doing conversions and poskim who dealt with this issue. I am not saying that it was the dominant approach, only that it was widespread. As we all know, however, many converts of years past would not be accepted by batei din today. (Nothing I have mentioned so far should imply that R. Druckman’s beit din followed any of the sources mentioned so far. From what I have been able to determine, his beit din required a lengthy instruction period as well as attachment to an Orthodox family during this period, and also complete acceptance of mitzvot. For one relevant article, see R. David Bass inTzohar 30, available here.) There is another important source, a pre-modern responsum that is not mentioned by Sagi and Zohar and is directly relevant to the issue of revoking of conversions. It is cited by the Shas member of Kenesset (and author of seforim), R. Hayyim Amselem,[31] as part of his responsum against the revoking of any conversions. R. Simeon ben Tzemach Duran, Tashbetz, vol. 3, no. 47, writes as follows: מי שלא נתגייר אלא שעה אחת וחזר לסורו לאלתר ועבד ע”ז וחלל שבתות בפרהסיא כמנהגו קודם שנתגייר ומין הוא ומן המורדים הוא, דלא קרינן ביה אחיך כמ”ש למעלה, ואפ”ה חשבינן ליה ישראל משומד וקידושין קידושין . . . וכן ראיתי בתשובה למורי חמי הרב רבנו יונה שכתב כן, וכן כתוב בספר העיטור ובספר אבן העזר, שמעשה הי’ בכותי שקידש ואצרכוה גיטא מר רב יהודה ומר רב שמואל רישי כו’, והדבר ידוע שגזרו עליהם להיות כעכו”ם גמורים כדאיתא בפרקא קמא .דחולין In other words, in a case where a convert immediately after the conversion practices idolatry and violates Shabbat, the rishonim mentioned hold that the conversion is valid and the person has the status of a sinning Jew. Today, we would be told that such a conversion is completely invalid, as it is obvious that the convert never intended to accept Judaism. The proof of this is that immediately following the conversion he continued in his old ways. Yet these rishonim hold that the conversion is binding. R. Shlomo Daichovsky, until recently a dayan on the Supreme Rabbinic Court, held this position. Eight years ago he expressed his opinion against R. Avraham Sherman and wrote as follows:[32] נשותיהן של שלמה ושמשון עבדו עבודה זרה – כך מפורש בתנ”ך. גירותן היתה מפוקפקת מלכתחילה, כלשון הרמב”ם: ‘והדבר ידוע שלא חזרו אלו, אלא בשביל דבר’. בנוסף: ‘הוכיח סופן על תחילתן שהן עובדות עבודה זרה שלהן’. ועוד יותר: ‘לא על פי בית דין גיירום’. יש כאן שלושה חסרונות גדולים. אין לי ספק, כי אם היתה באה גירות כזאת לפני בית הדין ברחובות, היו פוסלים אותה, ללא כל בעיה. יתכן, וגם אני הייתי מצטרף לכך. אף על פי כן, רואה אותן הרמב”ם כישראליות לכל דבר. ומוסיף בהלכה י”ד: ‘אל יעלה על דעתך ששמשון המושיע את ישראל או שלמה מלך ישראל שנקרא ידיד ה’ נשאו נשים נכריות בגיותן’. ?כלומר, אסור להעלות על הדעת, אפשרות כזו. ובעצם, למה לא אין מנוס ממסקנה כי בדיעבד, אינו כלכתחילה. ולא ניתן לפסול גיור .בדיעבד, לאחר שנעשתה R. Ovadiah Yosef believes that we can void a conversion, but only if there was (or should have been) a certainty before the conversion that the whole thing was a sham. But if there was no reason to think so, even if the convert did not become an observant Jew the conversion is valid. He writesMasa ( Ovadiah, p. 438[33]): אם באמת היה הדבר גלוי וידוע מראש שאינם מקבלים עליהם עול תורה“ ומצוות, רק ע”ד האמור: ‘בפיו ובשפתיו כבדוני ולבו רחק ממני’, ואנן סהדי שלא נתכוונו מעולם לקיים המצוות בפועל, אז גם בדיעבד י”ל שאינם גרים.אבל אם לא היה כאן אומדנא דמוכח בשעת הגיור, אע”ג דלבסוף אתגלי בהתייהו, דינם כישראל מומר, שאע”פ שחטא ישראל .הוא In the famous Seidman case, where R. Goren – based on R. David Zvi Hoffmann’s well-known responsum – converted a woman who was going to be living with a kohen after the conversion, R. Ovadiah agreed that the conversion was valid be-diavad. (See R. Shilo Rafael, “Giyur le-Lo Torah u-Mitzvot,” Torah she-Baal Peh 13 (1971), p. 131). R. Yitzhak Yaakov Weiss was opposed to voiding conversions carried out by a valid beit din (Minhat Yitzhak, vol. 6, no. 107): אם היה הגירות נעשה בפני בי”ד כשרים היינו מוכרחים לומר שהבי”ד בדקו היטב בשעת מעשה וראו שמקבלים בלב שלם, ע”כ אף שראינו שאח”כ אין מחזיקין במה שקבלו עליהם אמרינן דהדרו בהו ויש להם דין ישראל מומר The rabbis at Kollel Eretz Hemdah were asked from Karlsruhe, Germany, about people who convert and continue to violate Shabbat and act no differently than before the conversion.[34] In other words, they fooled the Beit Din. Are they to be regarded as converts? The reply is that while le-hatkhilah one cannot convert people unless they accept to observe the Torah אי-אפשר לבטל את הגירות של גרים שנתגיירו בבית-דין אורטודוקסי, אף על פי שלא היו כנים בבית-הדין ולא קיבלו על עצמם באמת לקיים את כל מצוות התורה, כל עוד שבאמת הם רוצים להיות יהודים, ורוצים .להשתייך לעם ישראל As mentioned already, this is a matter that will have to be decided by the halakhic authorities. But I think that what I have written so far is sufficient to establish that there has been a great deal of distortion regarding this issue, often by well-meaning people. (In particular, I noticed that a number of writers, including talmidei hakhamim, have mistakenly claimed that the Bah is the only one to say that the Rambam didn’t require kabbalat mitzvot be-diavad.) What is important to remember is that it is not just some modern Orthodox and religious Zionist rabbis who oppose the revoking of a conversion, but no less a figure than the Tashbetz. If today’s authorities disagree, that is their right, but it is simply wrong for haredi leaders to say that conversions have always required absolute commitment to mitzvah observance, and that lacking such commitment the conversions were always regarded as having no validity. As is often the case, there are different traditions. The adherents of the stricter approach are attempting to recreate the past, as if there has been only one approach. In fact, there is an even more radical view found in the rishonim. I refer to the Meiri’s position that be-diavad one can convert without a beit din. That is, following circumcision one can then accept the Torah and immerse all by oneself, and ex post facto it is a valid conversion.[35] I understand that all the discussions about the revoking of conversions have been very difficult for converts. After all, they were taught that once they convert they are as good as any other Jew. They have begun to learn that matters are not so simple. What is one of these converts supposed to think when they see the heading of R. Menasheh Klein’s responsum, גרים כשרים אין להם יחוס :Mishneh Halakhot vol. 9, no. 237 ? וראוי לזרע ישראל לרחק מהם He explains: וודאי שיש מצוה לקרב ולאהוב את הגרים אבל אין זה מחייב להתחתן עמהם והרי משה רבינו קבל כמה גרים דכתיב וגם ערב רב עלה אתם .ואפ”ה לא נתערבו בהם ולא התחתנו עמהם בני ישראל (By the way, the heading of the responsum following this is Maybe on another .בענין נשים בעצם אם הם במדרגה אחת עם אנשים occasion I will return to this, but I think everyone can predict what his conclusion is.) This is a theme that is found in a number of his responsa.[36] In fact, it appears that if he had his way there would be a complete ban on conversions.[37] Since not every convert will be able to find another convert to marry, I guess he would advise having them marry the community’s losers, as no self- respecting Jew should marry a convert, at least not if you want your children to turn out right.[38] As to why the children of converts don’t turn out properly, Klein has his own theory.[39] ודע דעלה בלבי מפני מה גרים לא יצליחו בניהם ע”פ רוב לפמ”ש דגר שנתגייר בידוע שנשמתו גם כן היתה מאותם שרצו לקבל התורה מסיני ולכן סופה שתתגייר, והנה כל זה נשמתו אבל נשמת זרעו שממשיך לא היו במעמד הר סיני ולכן אין זרעיו מצליחין . . . ומעתה מי פתי יסור הנה לישא אשה אשר יצאו ממנה בני סורר ומרה, ואם לפעמים ימצא שלא יצאו בדור הזה אולי עד עשרה דרי לא תבזה ארמאה ויחזרו ח”ו לסורם, ועכ”פ ע”פ רוב הכי הוא, והגע עצמך אם יאמרו לו שישא אשה חולנית שבעוד חמשה שנים תמות ורק על דרך נס יש אחת מיני אלף שתחיה או שע”פ רוב תלד בנים חולי גוף או רוח ודאי לא ישאנה . . . וכ”ש הכא שיצאו ממנו ח”ו דורות כאלו וכיוצא בה, מי הוא בעל .אחריות שייעץ לאדם לישא אשה כזו He then quotes some negative things said about converts in the Zohar, and concludes as follows, in words that the Eternal Jewish Family[40] will never include in its literature and which are very hurtful: ומעתה מי זה יכול ליעץ לאדם מישראל אשר נתחייבנו עליו ואהבת לרעך כמוך ואמרו ז”ל מה דסני לך לחברך לא תעבד והאיך נעבור על יעצנו רע ח”ו לזרע קודש משרשא קדישא וגזעא דקשוט להתערב ולתתגעל בגיורת המזוהמה בזוהמת הנחש . . . ולכן ודאי דכל מי שחש וחס על עצמו ועל .זרעו יראה להדבק בטובים It is interesting that R. Moshe Sternbuch expresses the exact opposite approach to converts.[41] We can see the same sort of dispute between them with regard to baalei teshuvah, with Klein having a suspicious and at times negative view toward them, and Sternbuch having the opposite approach. But before one assumes that Klein’s outlook is just another example of the far-out positions he often takes, take a look at the following from R. Kook,[42] commenting on Berakhot 8a which states: “Some say it means: Do not marry a proselyte woman”: כי ראוי לדאוג שיהיו תולדותיו זרע ברך ד’ בטבעם קשורים ג”כ בקשר טבעי עם ד’. אבל הגיורת, קשורה אינו כ”א בחירי ואיננו חזק כ”כ כהטבעי. ע”כ יש לחוש על קיומו, גם המדות הקדושות שהאומה הישראלית .מעוטרות בהן חסרות הנה בהכרח, והמזג פועל על הבנים Finally, let me say something about RCA’s agreement with the Chief Rabbinate that all conversions already recognized by the RCA will be accepted in Israel. Unfortunately, I don’t believe that the Chief Rabbinate can deliver on this. That is because, as we have seen in the latest controversy, the dayanim are not bound by the Chief Rabbinate’s agreements. The Chief Rabbinate can accept a convert for its own purposes, but local dayanim have the autonomy to issue their own rulings, as we saw Rabbi Sherman do. Furthermore, there is no guarantee that the agreement with the Chief Rabbinate will be upheld for a more fundamental reason: It violates the conscience and halakhic standards of the haredi world, which is currently taking over the religious court system. Let me explain what I mean. Many people who converted through RCA rabbis did not become completely observant. Some didn’t become observant at all. (I have already mentioned that this was the case with haredi rabbis as well.) If a dayan feels that such a conversion is invalid halakhically, the fact that the Chief Rabbinate made an agreement that all RCA conversions from previous years will be accepted is irrelevant. An agreement of this nature cannot override halakhah. So the dayan in question will be forced to reject this conversion no matter when it took place. To show how difficult the situation can become, take a look at this article from Yated Neeman that appeared a few years ago.[43] I think we can get a good sense from it where we are heading with regard to conversion, and why the only solution is to have two separate court systems dealing with this matter. Yes, it is true that people converted by the Religious Zionist courts might not be accepted by the haredim, but so what? In the unlikely event that one of these converts or their children will want to marry a haredi, they can undergo a second haredi conversion. This is hardly a big deal, and certainly not reason enough for the Religious Zionists to entirely abandon their vision of halakhah, all in order to satisfy the haredi demands for a “single standard,” which by definition always means the haredi approach. [1] In the meantime, see my article in the Forward. R. Menachem Genack responded here. Contrary to Genack, the Modern Orthodox world would unquestionably still be eating non-glatt if it was available under (what they viewed as) reliable hashgachah. I also think everyone understood that my comments about the D symbol was not in criticism of identifying a product as dairy, but that the OU does not use the DE symbol (Incidentally, neither of these symbols existed when I was growing up. You knew if a product was dairy by looking at the ingredients, and one does not need to be concerned with the equipment unless you are specifically told – as you now are – that a product was made on dairy equipment. Even then, there are poskim who hold that you can ignore the DE and eat the product with meat, since despite what it says on the label, we don’t actually know that the parve food we are eating was produced within 24 hours of a dairy run.) Why do I think the D symbol instead of DE reflects a turn to the right?: I called the OU on three separate occasions and spoke to three different rabbis, and all of them explained that the reason DE is not used is because they have a fear that some small bits of milk might still be in the product. This is an incredible chumra, which incidentally has no real basis, as companies have to be very careful about not allowing milk into products which are non-dairy. (The threat of major lawsuits from people who are allergic to milk is a constant concern for the companies.) Furthermore, to claim that any such milk might exist in large enough quantities not to be batel is incredibly far-fetched. Despite raising these points in all three conversations, I was told that the organization chooses to be strict. [2] R. Gedaliah Silverstone, who for many years was the leading rav in Washington, D.C. writes as follows Tokhahat( Hayyim, 1928, p. 14): מעשה היה בעירי שטבח אחד הסגיר את הרב המשגיח בתיבת המקרה לערך חצי שעה ולא נתן לו לצאת, ואמרתי אז בדרוש על הטבח הזה שלכל הפחות היה לו פעם אחת בתיבת המקרה (שנקרא איז באקס) שלו חתיכה של .בשר כשר For those who don’t read Hebrew: When the Mashgiach was locked in the freezer, Silverstone quipped that at least on one occasion there was a piece of kosher meat found there! See Yosef Goldman, Hebrew Printing in America 1735-1926 (Brooklyn, 2006), p. 765. [3] “Emanuel Rackman: Gadfly of Modern Orthodoxy,” Modern Judaism 28 (May 2008), pp. 134-148. [4] See here. [5] When planning its ninetieth anniversary celebration in 1976, Yeshiva University was upset to find that Mordecai Kaplan was its oldest living graduate. This squelched any plans to make a big to-do in honor of the graduate. See Jeffrey S. Gurock and Jacob J. Schacter, A Modern Heretic and a Traditional Community (New York, 1997), p. 1. [6] No one has yet written an article focusing on the Rackman- Lamm contest for election to the presidency of YU, and the historical significance of Lamm’s victory. I hope that a capable YU student takes upon himself this task. To do it right, he must interview the people still alive who were on the committee and can testify as to what led them to go with the younger and less distinguished Lamm. Until now, all we have had are rumors and fairy tales. One example of this is the following passage from R. Herschel Schachter’s Mi-Peninei ha-Rav (p. 170). לפני כעשרים וחמש שנים, לאחר שנפטר הר”ר שמואל בלקין, והיו צריכים לבחור נשיא חדש לישיבה אוניברסיטה, החליט רבנו שאחד מהמועמדים לא היה ראוי לאותה אצלטא בגלל דיעותיו הבלתי-מסורתיות. רבנו כינס את כל הרמי”ם ביחד, וערך וניסח מכתב לועד-הנאמנים של הישיבה שהוא מתנגד מאוד להתמנותו של פלוני, וחתם את שמו למטה, ומסר את המכתב לשאר הרמי”ם שאף הם יחתמו. אחד מהרמי”ם פתח ושאל לרבנו, ומה כל הרעש הזה, מה פשעו ומה חטאתו של אותו פלוני. ענה רבנו ואמר, שיהודי המדפיס במאמר בעתון שלפי דעתו שני חלקי ספר ישעיה נכתבו על ידי שני בני אדם נפרדים, אפיקורס הוא, ואי אפשר למנותו כנשיא של הישיבה. והמשיך הלה לטעון ואמר, דהלא אף באברבנאל גם כן מצינו לפעמים דברים זרים אשר הם נגד מסורות רז”ל חכמי התלמוד. וענה רבנו ואמר, שאף את האברבנאל לא היה רוצה לראות כנשיא ישיבה-אוניברסיטה. ובזה נסתיים הויכוח. כל הרמי”ם שהיו נוכחים בשעת מעשה חתמו על מכתבו של רבנו, המכתב נמסר לועד .הנאמנים, ונתבטלה מועמדותו של הלה I have it on very good authority (from conversations with two people who were intimately involved in the election process) that the event described here never happened. There might, however, be a kernel of truth in the story, as is often the case with such tales, and perhaps one of the readers can illuminate the matter. As for Rackman and Deutero-Isaiah, since he is not a Bible scholar I am certain that he never expressed his opinion in the way described here (I also hope that the Rav never said what is attributed to him. R Joseph הנשר Karo, Kesef Mishneh, Berakhot 3:8 refers to Abarbanel as (הגדול What Rackman does say is as follows (One Man’s Judaism, pp. 248-249): The Talmud itself was not dogmatic, but contemporary Orthodoxy always feels impelled to embrace eveery Tradition as dogma. The Talmud suggests that perhaps David did not write all the Psalms. Is one a heretic because one suggests that perhaps other books were authored by more than one person or that several books attributed by the Tradition to one author were in fact written by several at different times? A volume recently published makes an excellent argument for the position that there was but one Isaiah, but must one be shocked when it is opined that there may have been two or three prophets bearing the same name? No Sage of the past ever included in the articles of faith a dogma about the authorship of the books of the Bible other than the Pentateuch. . . . How material is it that one really believes that Solomon wrote all three Scrolls attributed to him? Is the value of the writings itself affected? And if the only purpose is to discourage critical Biblical scholarship, then, alas, Orthodoxy is declaring bankruptcy: it is saying that only the ignorant can be pious – a reversal of the Talmudic dictum. The book about Isaiah he refers to is Rachel Margalioth’s The Indivisible Isaiah: Evidence for the Single Authorship of the Prophetic Book, published in 1964 by Yeshiva University’s Sura Institute. (She was the wife of famed scholar Mordechai Margalioth.) [7] No one has yet written an article focusing on the Rackman- Lamm contest for election to the presidency of YU, and the historical significance of Lamm’s victory. I hope that a capable YU student takes upon himself this task. To do it right, he must interview the people still alive who were on the committee and can testify as to what led them to go with the younger and less distinguished Lamm. Until now, all we have had are rumors and fairy tales. One example of this is the following passage from R. Herschel Schachter’s Mi-Peninei ha-Rav (p. 170). לפני כעשרים וחמש שנים, לאחר שנפטר הר”ר שמואל בלקין, והיו צריכים לבחור נשיא חדש לישיבה אוניברסיטה, החליט רבנו שאחד מהמועמדים לא היה ראוי לאותה אצלטא בגלל דיעותיו הבלתי-מסורתיות. רבנו כינס את כל הרמי”ם ביחד, וערך וניסח מכתב לועד-הנאמנים של הישיבה שהוא מתנגד מאוד להתמנותו של פלוני, וחתם את שמו למטה, ומסר את המכתב לשאר הרמי”ם שאף הם יחתמו. אחד מהרמי”ם פתח ושאל לרבנו, ומה כל הרעש הזה, מה פשעו ומה חטאתו של אותו פלוני. ענה רבנו ואמר, שיהודי המדפיס במאמר בעתון שלפי דעתו שני חלקי ספר ישעיה נכתבו על ידי שני בני אדם נפרדים, אפיקורס הוא, ואי אפשר למנותו כנשיא של הישיבה. והמשיך הלה לטעון ואמר, דהלא אף באברבנאל גם כן מצינו לפעמים דברים זרים אשר הם נגד מסורות רז”ל חכמי התלמוד. וענה רבנו ואמר, שאף את האברבנאל לא היה רוצה לראות כנשיא ישיבה-אוניברסיטה. ובזה נסתיים הויכוח. כל הרמי”ם שהיו נוכחים בשעת מעשה חתמו על מכתבו של רבנו, המכתב נמסר לועד .הנאמנים, ונתבטלה מועמדותו של הלה I have it on very good authority (from conversations with two people who were intimately involved in the election process) that the event described here never happened. There might, however, be a kernel of truth in the story, as is often the case with such tales, and perhaps one of the readers can illuminate the matter. As for Rackman and Deutero-Isaiah, since he is not a Bible scholar I am certain that he never expressed his opinion in the way described here (I also hope that the Rav never said what is attributed to him. R Joseph הנשר Karo, Kesef Mishneh, Berakhot 3:8 refers to Abarbanel as (הגדול What Rackman does say is as follows (One Man’s Judaism, pp. 248-249): The Talmud itself was not dogmatic, but contemporary Orthodoxy always feels impelled to embrace eveery Tradition as dogma. The Talmud suggests that perhaps David did not write all the Psalms. Is one a heretic because one suggests that perhaps other books were authored by more than one person or that several books attributed by the Tradition to one author were in fact written by several at different times? A volume recently published makes an excellent argument for the position that there was but one Isaiah, but must one be shocked when it is opined that there may have been two or three prophets bearing the same name? No Sage of the past ever included in the articles of faith a dogma about the authorship of the books of the Bible other than the Pentateuch. . . . How material is it that one really believes that Solomon wrote all three Scrolls attributed to him? Is the value of the writings itself affected? And if the only purpose is to discourage critical Biblical scholarship, then, alas, Orthodoxy is declaring bankruptcy: it is saying that only the ignorant can be pious – a reversal of the Talmudic dictum. The book about Isaiah he refers to is Rachel Margalioth’s The Indivisible Isaiah: Evidence for the Single Authorship of the Prophetic Book, published in 1964 by Yeshiva University’s Sura Institute. (She was the wife of famed scholar Mordechai Margalioth.) [8] Here is a bit of Jewish Scranton trivia. Many people know that Harry Wolfson and R. Shraga Feivel Mendlowitz lived there. But did anyone know that R. Herschel Shachter was born in Scranton? [9] Naharei Afarsemon, mahadurah tinyana, no. 15. [10] See here. [11] R. Pini Dunner writes: “I asked him [R. Yosef Tzvi Dunner] if he remembered the Rebbe from his time in Berlin (1932-36). He smiled and said he remembered him well – he was the rather modern-dressed young man with the neatly trimmed beard who stood at the back of the shiur room and who would talk in learning after almost every shiur with Rav Yechiel Yaakov Weinberg z”l.” See here. [12] See Shaul Shimon Deutsch, Larger Than Life, vol. 2 (New York, 1997), p. 75. [13] Beit Yaakov, vol. 2, p. 256. [14] Yevamot 6b [15] I think an important point, which I have not seen anyone make, is that the entire concept of hillul ha-shem has basically disappeared in the United States. This perhaps has had some impact on Orthodox misconduct. What I mean is that in years past people were held back from doing things because of a fear of how it would look to the non-Jewish world, i.e., it would lead to Jews and Judaism being degraded in their eyes. Today, very few Jews think like that. We live in a great country. If a Jew, or an Orthodox Jew, does something illegal, even if he is on the front page of the newspaper, the typical non-Jew does not take this as a reflection on Jews as a whole or on the religion – and we have had many examples to illustrate the empirical truth of this statement. People know that there are scoundrels in every religious group, and one should not judge another person or religion based on the actions of individuals. When we have reached this wonderful point, what room is there for hillul ha-shem as a motivating factor? [16] See J. David Bleich, Contemporary Halakhic Problems, vol. 1 pp. 194-196. [17] Ve-Ha’aretz Natan li-Venei Adam (Alon Shvut, 2005), pp. 38ff. [18] In attempting to explain why there is no explicit prohibition against cannibalism in the Torah, R. Kook expresses a similar concept (Otzarot ha-Re’iyah [2002], vol. 2, p. 89): לא הוצרכה תורה לכתוב עליו איסור מפורש, שאין האדם צריך אזהרה על .מה שקנה לו כבר מושג טבעי בזה Weinberg speaks of cannibalism as being against “the will of the Torah,” even though not explicitly forbidden. See Seridei Esh, vol. 3, no. 127 (p. 342). See the discussion in Daniel Sinclair, “Musar u-Mishpat ha-Tiv’i be-Mishpat ha-Ivri: Akihlat Basar Adam ke-Mashal,” available here. [19] Community, Covenant and Commitment, ed. N. Helfgot (Jersey City, 2005), p. 276. [20] Ibid., pp. 24-25. [21] (Bnei Akiva, 2008). The passage I refer to comes from vol. 2, pp. 125-126. [22] See Pesakim u-Khetavim, Yoreh Deah nos.89, 92. R. Abraham Dov Ber Kahana Shapiro expressed the same sentiments. See Devar Avraham, vol. 3, no. 28. [23] In referring to such a case, where after conversion the woman would live on a secular kibbutz where she would not be able to observe mitzvot, R. Yehudah Herzl Henkin writes (Bnei Vanim, vol. 2, p. 135): אם היא סברה שסדורי החיים שבקבוץ לא איפשרו לה דהוי כעין אונס שעומד לבוא עליה לפי דעתה ואינו חסרון בקבלת המצוות אף על פי .שלדינא אינו אונס שהרי לא נאנסה להשאיר בקבוץ [24] Teshuvot, vol. 1, no. 41. [25] Divrei Malkiel, vol. 6, no. 19. [26] Iggerot Moshe, Yoreh Deah I, no. 160. This notion, that even apparently obvious Jewish laws could be viewed by some people as not binding, has all sorts of ramifications and has often dealt with by poskim. One interesting example is Teshuvot Maharam Lublin, no. 15, where R. Meir of Lublin was asked about a man who was caught having sex with a Christian prostitute, and he was sentenced to death. He could escape this sentence by converting to Christianity. (The responsum, which was sent to the city of Apta, deals with a young man held prisoner by the “Ishmaelites” because he was found with an “Ishmaelite” prostitute. Obviously, R. Meir is speaking in code, as Muslims were not in large supply in Apta. I will speak more about this sort of code in a future post.) The local community wanted to know if they had an obligation to ransom him, as it could be that the imprisoned man had the status of a mumar le-teavon. R. Meir rejects this point and offers the following incredible justification: ופרט בזמנינו זה בעו”ה שרבים נכשלים בעבירה זו שאין להחשיבה .כמומר לתיאבון See also the famous responsum of R. Akiva Eger (Teshuvot, vol. 1, no. 96), who deals with otherwise otherwise religious Jews who shave with a razor. (While reading his words ask yourself if the community he describes sounds more like a haredi community or a Modern Orthodox one.): י”ל דהשתחת בתער דנתפשט בעו”ה אצל הרבה לא חשב שזהו איסור כ”כ דלא משמע להו לאינשי דאסור, וכאשר באמת נזכר בג”ע שהשיב להמוכיח שהרבה אנשים חשובים עושים כן, וכיון דבאמת פשתה המספחת בזמנינו .גם לאותן הנזהרים בשאר דברים נדמה להם דאינו איסור כ”כ R. Eliezer Papo, Pele Yoetz, s. v. hov, writes: ע”פ מה דקיימא לן אומר מותר אנוס הוא ומאחר שדרך איש ישר בעיניו .נמצא שהוא אומר מותר ואנוס הוא The last three sources mentioned are quoted by R. Zvi Yehudah Kook, Li-Netivot Yisrael, vol. 1 pp. 154-155. [27] Iggerot Moshe, Yoreh Deah III, no. 106. [28] See here. [29] Mishnat Avraham, vol. 2, p. 274. [30] R. Moshe Feinstein recognized the logic of this approach. See Iggerot Moshe, Yoreh Deah I, no. 158: לא ברור הדבר במדינה זו שהוא זכות כיון שבעוה”ר קרוב שח”ו לא ישמור שבת וכדומה עוד איסורים. אך אפשר שמ”מ הוא זכות שאף רשעי .ישראל עדיפי מעכו”ם Iggerot Moshe, Even ha-Ezer IV, no. 26: וגם אף אם לא יתגדלו להיות שומרי תורה מסתבר שהוא זכות דרשעי ישראל שיש להם קדושת ישראל ומצותן שעושין הוא מצוה והעבירות הוא .להם כשגגה הוא ג”כ זכות מלהיות נכרים R. David Horowitz, Imrei David, no. 172, also permits the conversion of the child, and holds out hope that the parents will do teshuvah (apparently even including the non-Jewish mother in this): מה לנו להתחכם נגד מצות ד’ . . . מצינו כי אדם רע עשוי לעשות תשובה, וגם כאן נאמר כי עוד יבוא יום וישעה אדם אל עושהו ותפקחנה .עיני עורים וידעו כי ערומים הם והרבה לחטוא [31] Or Torah, Tamuz 5768. [32] See here. [33] In Yabia Omer, vol. 10, Yoreh Deah no. 26, he decides that a particular conversion can be voided, and one of the reasons is subsequent non-observance. Yet this was not the main justification for his decision. In addition, this was a special case as it concerned an agunah. [34] Be-Mar’eh ha-Bazak, vol. 3, p. 149 [35] Beit ha-Behirah, Shabbat 68a. [36] See e.g., Mishneh Halakhot, vol. 10, no. 239: ודאי דזרע אברהם יצחק ויעקב המיוחסים מתרחקים מן הגרים כפי האפשר הגם שמקרבים אותם מצד מצות ואהבתם את הגר אבל אין זה מצוה לנו .להתחתן עמהם I certainly think he is going overboard when he writes (ibid., ואין ממנים גר להיות שמש בביהכ”נ :(vol. 15, p. 151 ומשבח אני בזה מנהג הספרדים. :See ibid., vol. 16, p. 384 [37] He is referring to the Syrian ban שאין מקבלין בקהלותיהם גרים on converts, which has its own racist elements, as in both the popular and even in some of the rabbinic mind of this community there is a stress on “pure Jewish blood.” This latter point is far removed from opposition to converts in order to prevent intermarriage, and leads to a shunning of all converts, even those converted as babies, as well as a shunning of children and even grandchildren of converts. [38] ] See ibid., vol. 9, no. 239 [39] See ibid., vol. 10 no. 239. [40] See here. [41] Teshuvot ve-Hanhagot, Even ha-Ezer no. 728. See also עיקר היחוס הוא :ibid., vol. 2 no. 623, where he writes .כששומרים מצוות [42] Ein Ayah, Berakhot 8a. [43] Available here. The “so-called Orthodox rabbis” referred to in this article are Rabbis Gedaliah Dov Schwartz, Reuven Bulka and Shmuel Goldin. The RCA is described as an “organization of rabbis who call themselves Orthodox, but are known as modern.” The article also defames Rabbis Shear Yashuv Cohen and Shalom Messas. There are a number of falsehoods in the article, but let me just mention one: “The conversion was made for the purpose of marriage, and such types of converts are not to be accepted according to thehalocho .” Yet the almost unanimous opinion of poskim, from all circles, is that when confronted with a possible intermarriage, one should convert the non-Jewish partner if all all feasible. The only dispute is how observant the convert must be in order to be accepted.

R’ Orenstein, Author of the Yesuos Yaakov: The Controversy Over Publication of his Works

R’ Orenstein, Author of the Yesuos Yaakov: The Controversy Over Publication of his Works by R. Yosaif M. DubovickR. Y. Dubovick has published many articles on diverse topics. He is currently working on many projects including a critical edition of the Rabbenu Hananel’s commentary on Bava Kama. Additionally, he has published a critical edition of the Mahrashal on hilchot shehita and Yoreh Deah (discussed here ) and R. Dubovick is working on some of the Mahrashal’s other works. As R. Orenstein’s yarhzeit is the 25th of Av, Tuesday, Aug. 26, R. Dubovick provides the following information on this personage and his works. Biographical Sketch of R’ Orenstein Perhaps the crown of pre-war Polish Jewry was the city of Lvov (Lviv, Lemberg). Settled in the dawn of our history in Poland, the city was renowned as a center of learning and piety, drawing from the elite of scholarship to its helm. The mere mention of the city’s name draws to mind those Gaonim, such as R’ Yehoshua, author of Shut Pnei Yehoshua, Sefer Maginei Shlomo (grandfather of the author of the noted Pnei Yehoshua on Shas), as well as R’ Shmuel HaLevi author of Turei Zahav on Shulchan Aruch [1](son-in-law of R’ Yoel Sirkes[2] the author of Bayis Chodosh on Tur)[3]. R’ Zvi Ashkenazi (author of Chacham Tzvi, father of R’ Yaakov Emden), R’ Shlomo of Chelm, author of Merkeves haMishnah on Rambam (as well as homilies on the haftorot and a volume of responsa[4]), and R’ Chayim Hakohen Rappoport[5] all held the position of Av Beis Din and Rav of Lvov. The subject of Toldos Anshei Shem by R’ Shlomo Buber, Lvov has had its history well written and studied. R’ Buber went so far as to personally request from the Rav of Krakow, the noted historian and author, R’ Noson Chayim Dembitzer to collate his own findings; the result, a sefer of immense value to any student of history and genealogy, Klillat Yofe.[6] These seforim list prominent men of stature and renown, leaders of the kehillot, their works and ancestors, shedding valuable light on the city’s history. From the beginning of the 5th century, (1640) Lvov’s two communities [‘inner’ Lvov, and ‘outer’ Lvov] united under the leadership of one Rav. This period of grace between the communities lasted for close to two hundred years, and ended with the passing of the famed Gaon of Lvov, R’ Yaakov Meshulem Orenstein in 5599 (1839), the focus of this article. Much has been written regarding this sage, with numerous accounts detailing his biography. Klillat Yofe details his father’s position as Rav of Lvov, R’ Mordechai Zeev, who took office after R’ Shlomo of Chelm stepped down as Rav in order to embark on a journey to Eretz Israel.[7] In 5547 (1787) R’ Mordechai Zeev was taken suddenly from this world, leaving a young twelve year old Yaakov Meshulem an orphan. The youth’s best interests in mind, whilst still in the shiva period he was betrothed to the daughter of R’ Tzvi Hirsch of Yaruslav, who was financially well off and would support his son-in- law.[8] As such, the young man developed in his studies, and gained repute as a scholar of stature. His opinion was sought in many difficult matters, and elders as well as his contemporaries flocked to his doorstep in Yaruslav to discuss various issues with him. Notably, R’ Aharon Moshe Tobias of Satnin, author of Shut Toafos Reem, would spend much time conversing with R’ Yaakov Meshulem.[9] Additionally, he was friends with R’ Yehonosan Shimon Frankel, author of Etz Pri Kodesh, Lember, 1838. See his haskmah where he referrs to him as “yidid nafshe.” He was also friendly with R’ Yaakov Tzvi Yalish, author of Melo haRoim who he refers to as “hu yedidi min’noar.” R’ Yaakov Meshulem mentions having been Rav AB”D of Zhalkov for a period, but the exact dates aren’t clear. Later, he was appointed to take his father’s seat as Rav AB”D of Lvov, and we find witness that in 5566 (1806) was already serving Lvov as its spiritual head, a position he held for over 30 years, until his passing. The hub of religious activity in Poland, R’ Yaakov’s opinion on halachic matters was sought out by the leading sages of his time. Halachic authorities such as R’ Moshe Sofer (author of Shut Chasam Sofer), and R’ Akiva Eiger, R’ Aryeh Leibish of Stanislaw (as well as with his son and successor R’ Meshulem Yissocher, author of Shut Bar Levai), as well as R’ Yaakov’s relative, R’ Chaim Halberstam of Sanz all queried him on matters of grave importance. His opinions regarding rulings issued by R’ Shlomo Kluger of Brody versus his dissenters are collected in sefer Shivas Eynayim, along with those of his son, R’ Mordechai Zeev. While himself not a member of the Chassidic camp, R’ Yaakov showed no animosity towards Chassidim and their leaders, and is purported to have met with Rebbe Yisroel Freidman of Ruzhin, as well as Rebbe Meir of Premshlyn. As the head of the most prestigious community in the area, R’ Yaakov also held the position of Nasi or president of Eretz Israel, and was responsible for the collation and distribution of all tzedakah funds earmarked for the Holy Land’s poor.[10] In addition, being financially secure, R’ Yaakov established a personal free-loan organization, a gemach. The apple of his eye, his only son R’ Mordechai Zeev was taken from him at an early age on the 17th of MarCheshvan 5597 (Oct 28, 1836). Less than three years later, R’ Yaakov passed away on the 25th day of Av, 5599 (Aug 5, 1839), and was buried next to R’ Shmuel Halevi, author of Turei Zahav. Out of respect for their venerable leader, it was agreed upon that no longer would there be one Rav heading both communities, rather a new title called ‘Rosh Bais Din’, with less authority was implemented. In the succeeding line of leaders, Lvov called R’ Yaakov’s grandson, R’ Tzvi Hirsch to take his rightful place. In turn, R’ Tzvi Hirsch’s son-n-law, R’ Aryeh Leib Broide[11] succeeded him. R’ Orenstein’s Works & the Controversy Over Their PublicationA prolific writer, R’ Yaakov is best known for his magnum opus,Yeshuos Yaakov, novella covering all four sections of the Shulchan Aruch. Published in his lifetime, R’ Yaakov is said to have danced with a copy of a second edition, stating that he is now assured that this work is considered by heaven to be ‘prophetic’ in nature.[12] He also penned chiddushim on the Torah in the order of the parshiyos, at first printed together with the chumash entitled ‘Ein Yaakov‘, and later published as a separate volume. A new edition of these chiddushim was re- typeset in 5764 (2004), with a two page biographical sketch. Throughout Yeshuos Yaakov, R’ Yaakov cites numerous times his chiddushim on Shas, Rambam as well as his teshuvos, responsa. Seemingly, these works remained in manuscript form, and over the course of the years were lost. Recently, an attempt was made to ‘reconstruct’ those chiddushim on Shas based on chiddushim and references gleaned from sefer Yeshuos Yaakov. Chiddushei Yeshuos Yaakov al Seder haShas, 7 volumes, printed by Machon leCheker Kisvei Yad – Chochmas Shlomoh, Yerushalayim, 5757-60/1997-2000. In the last months of 5666 (1906), R’ Avraham Yosef Fisher, a well-known publisher, printed R’ Yaakov’s teshuvos from manuscript, in Peterkov. According to R’ Fisher, he was given the autograph from the then Gerrer Rebbe, R’ Avraham Mordechai Alter (author of Imrei Emes) for printing. The responsa were reordered according to the Shulchan Aruch, and in the end of the sefer, a table of contents as well as a list of errata and annotation was added. For reasons not fully explained, R’ Fisher printed the book sans approbations that he claimed to have received from various leaders. He had applied to several sages for their approval, and while waiting for their response, decided to publish without them. In deference to those letters not at hand, he chose to omit those he did have, citing his desire to publish as taking precedence. This printing of the sefer was photo-mechanically reproduced in New York some forty years ago. Several months after his sefer was printed, R’ Aryeh Leib Broide, the son-in-law of R’ Yaakov’s grandson and heir, R’ Tzvi Hirsch, issued a variant title page, and introduction. Claiming that the book had been in his personal possession to date, he alone had sent it to a printer, one Shimon Neiman for publication. Seemingly, the book changed hands, R’ Fisher took possession of the printed volumes, selling them under his name, with R’ Aryeh Leib Broide receiving a mere thirty volumes. As rightful owner, R’ Aryeh Leib decried this act, and wondered how the name of the Gerrer Rebbe had been brought in to the fray. The variant pages were then bound to these thirty volumes. Speculation as the behind the scenes reasoning would be an exercise in futility, as no word of it was mentioned by the Gerrer Rebbe himself.[13] While it is possible that R’ Aryeh Leib’s claims are accurate, R’ Fisher was a respected publisher, and would only stand to lose by stooping to theft. Further, the silence of the Gerrer Rebbe on the issue is deafening in its own right. What cause could he have had be still regarding this issue? If he did give the book along with a letter, why remain silent? On the other hand, if his name was simply being used, why did he allow himself to remain an accessory to theft, even if only a defacto one? One might postulate based upon the religious leanings of those involved. Lvov at the time was torn between the haskalah movement, and the majority of its opposition, the Chassidim. While R’ Yaakov stood strong against the waves of the enlightenment, after his passing those safeguards he passed began to lose potency. The Rabbinate in Lvov became politically controlled by those with positions of power and wealth, and sentiment among the Chassidic community in Lvov was that even R’ Tzvi Hirsch was suspect of leaning towards the maskilim.[14]> Certainly R’ Aryeh Leib was considered controversial. His son Mordechai (Marcus) studied in Polish schools, received a doctorate, and married Martin Buber’s sister, Gila. It is possible that R’ Neiman had suspicions as to the religious opinion of the book, seeing how the main buyers market were Chassidim. Should the book be published under R’ Aryeh Leib’s name, it might not sell. Moreover, it could be he suspected R’ Aryeh Leib of wanting to edit the text, based on his personal leanings. Perhaps he sent it to the Gerrer Rebbe, who in turn allowed for R’ Fisher to print it, and use his name. In the event of exposure, R’ Fisher would take the blame, while the Gerrer Rebbe would remain silent, thereby obfuscating the facts. This year, a new edition of this controversy-fraught sefer has been published. Completely re-typeset, with the annotations and corrections penned by R’ Fisher added in their rightful locations. Additionally, an index has been set up, to reference the standard ensemble of basic halachic texts; Shas Bavli and Yerushalmi, Rambam, Tur and Shulchan Aruch. Many of the responsa are those alluded to by R’ Yaakov in his Yeshuos Yaakov; some of the letters are replies to expound his thoughts in Yeshuos Yaakov. A veritable ‘who’s who’ of Galitzian Rabbis can be listed among those querying R’ Yaakov; R’ Chayim Halberstam of Sanz, R’ Aryeh Leibish of Stanislaw, and R’ Moshe Sofer, to name a few. The current publisher did not feel the edition would be complete without scouring the available literature and storehouses for those novella and letters that are not readily available. Such, an addendum was appended to the sefer, with additional responsa, derashos, chiddushim and even witticisms and anecdotes not found in the more common seforim. Of note, is a particularly interesting piece R’ Yaakov expounded upon in the main beis medrash of Lvov in honor of Kaiser Franz Joseph [Emperor Franz II], on June 29 1814 (the 11th of Tamuz 5). The spirit of the derashah is the miraculous victory the Emperor had over Napoleon Bonaparte, and how he was Divinely aided in battle. A lone copy of this sermon survived, and Dr. M. Balaban reproduced it in his volume in honor of Dr. Mordechai (Marcus) Broide. Other curios include novella that elaborate on those posed in Yeshuos Yaakov, and anecdotes from obscure works of that period. In one incident, while speaking with a local Rav of lesser standing, R’ Yaakov offered a very insightful thought. The Rav, realizing the potential use of this thought in a personal derashah, asked of R’ Yaakov to ‘present’ him with this thought and make it his “own”. Understanding the Rav’s motive, R’ Yaakov agreed under one condition: that upon using the thought as his own, he must announce that he received it as a gift from R’ Yaakov. As a final touch, the publisher added a photo of the original title page, as well as the variant pages printed by R’ Aryeh Leib. The ability to locate an extant copy of one of thirty copies ever bound testifies to the sheer effort expended in this edition.[Available at Girsa Books, Jerusalem; Biegeleisen Books, Brooklyn NY USA, and fine bookstores worldwide]

[1] Originally, the sefer was written as glosses and comments on Tur, much like the work by his father-in-law. [One might correlate the two works even more closely, and claim both emanated from marginal notes. See Prof. Y. S. Speigel, Amudim bToldot Hasefer haIvri, vol. 1, p. 297.] Later these notes were edited to form the present commentary.[2] R’ Shmuel married R’ Yoel’s widowed daughter-in-law (m. R’ Shmuel Tzvi Hertz, son of the Bach), and raised her orphan R’ Aryeh Leib, author of Shut Shagas Aryeh (w/ Kol Shachal). R’ Aryeh Leib was sent along with his brother by his stepfather to investigate the issue of Shabbtai Zvi.[3] During the outbreaks of 5424, two of his sons were massacred along with hundreds of the cities inhabitants. See D. Kahane, Sinai, 100 (Jubilee Volume), pp. 492-508.[4] Both published by Mossad HaRav Kook from manuscript.[5] Author of Shut R’ Chayim HaKohen.[6] Indexed by Jacob B. Mandelbaum.[7] Unfortunately, he never made it to E. Israel, having passed away along with his wife in the city of Salonika, Greece, and is entombed there. See A. Brick, Sinai 61, pp. 168-84.[8] Introduction to Yeshuos Yaakov.[9] Citation in Klillat Yofe and see here as well.[10] Called “the charities of R’ Meir Baal Hanes”. There is uncertainty regarding the true name of this charity. Historically, the tanna Rebbi Meir was never called “Baal HaNes” and the name is not found in neither Geonic literature or in works by the Rishonim. Furthermore, geographical guidebooks that list gravesites in E. Israel mention TWO R’ Meirs, one in Teveryah (this is the grave of the well known tanna, the student of R’ Akiva and friend of R’ Yehuda and R’ Shimon Bar Yochai) and one in Gush Chalav, the second bearing the name “Baal Hanes”. This would seem to distance the moniker from the well known R’ Meir even further despite his ability to perform miraculous accounts (see A”Z 18b. see also Petach Eynayim by R’ Chida ad loc). In his pamphlet biography of Ramban, R’ Reuven Margolis notes the above discrepancies. Based on Ramban’s final sermon in Spain, extolling the urgency to support those dwelling in the Holy Land, as well as Ramban’s personal activities in founding a house of worship along with a yeshiva in the then desolate Yerushalayim, R’ Margolis offers a novel theory. He is of the opinion that at one point, whether while heading his personal yeshiva in Yerushalyaim, or perhaps as the subsequent head of the Yeshiva of R’ Yechiel of Paris in Acco, Ramban established a central organization charged with soliciting and collecting funding from the Diaspora. As the years passed, the fund was named after its founder, Charities of Ramban. In all likelihood, at the fall of Acco to the Mamelukes, the Yeshiva was dismantled, and the funding dwindled, the name falling into disuse. At the rebirth of E. Israel settlement, perhaps in the times of R’ Chayim Abulefia in Tiveryah, the acronym forming the name RMB”N was reinstated as an antique fund, and further misinterpreted to be read R’ Meir Baal haNes.[11] Father of Dr. Marcus Broide. Out of respect for his grandfather, who opposed secular studies, Marcus did not attend university. See M. Balaban, Shalshelet haYachas shel Mispachat Orenstein- Broide, Warsaw, 1931.[12] Intro to Y”Y al hatorah[13] Rosh Gulat Ariel (A.M. Segal, Yerushalayim, 1990) page 378 citing an article in Ner Yisroel by the late R’ Tzvi Yizchok Abromovitz, rabbi of Chatzor HaGalilit.[14] Balaban. The Modern Custom of Standing for the Ten Commandments

Many mitvot require that one stand. One of which is reading the Torah. Thus, the ba’al koreh and the person making the blessing stand. When it comes to those who are just listening, there is a debate whether they are required to stand as well. Some hold that the listeners are required to stand while others require the listeners to stand only for the blessings, and finally others don’t there is a nearly universal custom to stand during the recitation of the Ten Commandments. Tracing the history of this custom, however, uncovers that not only is this a fairly recent custom, it is also a highly problematic one. The earliest possible source for this custom, as with many of today’s “universal” customs, is the Hemdat Yamim. The Hemdat Yamim, records that: According to the Hemdat Yamim, the custom of the Ari (most of his customs the Hemdat Yamim attributes to the Ari, see this post discussing the spurious nature of the Meron custom also attributed to the Ari,) was to not stand for the recitation of the Torah with the exception of the Ten Commandments. Importantly, the Hemdat Yamim is only proposing this custom, not attempting to justify an already existing custom. Moreover, as we shall see, most who discuss the custom of standing for the ten commandments do so in an effort to reconcile this custom with the prohibition of elevating or highlighting the ten commandments as proscribed by the Talmud.

For instance, R. Shmuel Aboab discusses the custom of standing for the Ten Commandments. R. Aboab was asked “about the custom of some to stand for the Ten Commandments, what is the reason for this custom and should others follow it?” In his response, R. Aboab first questions the custom in light of the well-known passage in the Berachot where the Talmud records that the custom to read the Ten Commandments was abolished in the “gevulot” due to the “minim.” Thus, according to the Talmud, highlighting the Ten Commandments or, in this case, standing specifically for their reading may run afoul of this passage. Ultimately, R. Aboab defends the custom of standing and distinguishes the Talmudic passage and claims that the Talmudic restriction is only applicable “when it is unclear why one is favoring the Ten Commandments over the rest of the Torah, i.e. when one reads the Ten Commandments daily. But, here, [merely standing on Shavout or ParshatYitro or Vethanan] the purpose is clear in that we are reenacting the acceptance of the Divine Glory and thus there is no fear of the minim. The standing for the Ten Commandments is thus akin to standing when we recite the blessing on the new moon, . . . as Abbai states we need to do it standing and Rashi explains that since we are greeting the Divine Glory we are required to make the blessing standing out of respect for the Divine Glory. Therefore, we stand when the Ten Commandments are read and it poses no problem.”[1] The Hida also defends the custom of standing and argues the Talmudic fear of minim is not applicable as the Ten Commandments are read as part of a larger Torah reading thereby demonstrating that although we may stand for part we believe in it all.[2]

In fact, it is not an exaggeration to say, from the early 18th century there has been a virtual explosion of commentaries attempting to justify this custom in light of the Talmud. [3]

Of course, as with most Jewish customs, not everyone agrees that standing for the Ten Commandments is appropriate. R. Y. Emden (additions to the Siddur, Laws of Shavout) holds that one should not stand for the Ten Commandments as does R. Gieger in Divrei Keholot (p. 466).

Returning now to the origins, the earliest and most likely source is the Hemdat Yamim, which dates to sometime in the 17th century. That said, he is not actually the earliest person to discuss this custom. Rather, the Rambam discusses this custom, however, the Rambam cannot be the source for the custom of standing for two reasons. First, this passage of the Rambam was unknown until the 20th century. Second, the Rambam was against the custom of standing for the Ten Commandments.

The Rambam’s statement appears in two editions of his responsa, first in the Freimann edition and then again, with small differences, in the Blau edition. The first, Freimann was published in 1934, and Blau’s was published in 1971. Consequently, these can not be the sources for the custom discussed in the 17th century as these were still in manuscript and unknown in the 17th century – that is, no one mentions the Rambam until the publication of these editions. Moreover, as we have seen, this is not a inconsequential custom, rather, on its face this custom runs counter to the Talmud and thus if in fact this custom pre-dated the Hemdat Yamim why is there no one who raises the conflict with the Talmud in Berchot. As we have seen, once the custom is discussed it is almost always in the context of justifying the custom in light of the Talmudic passage.

The Rambam, contrary to the position of those discussed above, takes issue with standing during the Ten Commandments. Specifically, unlike those above, he is unwilling to distinguish the Talmudic passage and in fact expands on what the Talmud prohibits. According to the Rambam, based on the Talmud, it is prohibited from elevating any part of the Torah over any other part. As the Rambam discusses at length in his Commentary on the Mishna, the introduction to Perek Helek, it is heresy to claim any one part of the Torah is more important than any other. Similarly, the Rambam holds that to stand for one part of the Torah and not another part is akin to heresy as it shows that the Ten Commandments are somehow worthy of standing to the exclusion of the rest of the Torah.

To recap, the custom of standing seems to have become popular with the Hemdat Yamim in the early 18th century and the Rambam was against this practice ruling that it skirted the line of heresy. R. Ovadiah Yosef, basing himself on the Rambam (R. Yosef doesn’t trace the lack of historical basis for the custom), rules that it is prohibited to stand. Surprisingly, this is not the conclusion reached by all his contemporaries. Instead, R. Waldenberg, takes the position that since this is well-established “minhag yisrael” standing for the ten commandments is permitted. R. Waldenberg raises the possibility that this custom falls in the category of those customs which are so powerful they override law.

R. Waldenberg then deals with the Rambam, and essentially dismisses the Rambam as unimportant because this responsum was unknown. R. Waldenberg then throws in for good measure the controversial statement of the Hazon Ish regarding using recently discovered manuscripts. [4]

R. Waldenberg is not the only one to dismiss this responsum. R. Feinstein also discusses standing for the Ten commandments and offers his own justification. In doing so he never mentions the Rambam’s position. R. David Feinstein was asked if his father was aware of this responsum and R. D. Feinstein said that his father was not. But, R. Dovid continued, “knowing his father’s position on newly discovered manuscripts – [that he took a dim view?]- the Rambam’s responsum doesn’t affect the analysis.”Feldman, Yisrael be-Mamadam, p . 1051. Thus, rather then dealing with the Rambam in a meaningful manner many appear to be willing to dismiss the entire position of the Rambam. Furthermore, the reason for this pithy dismissal is not based on substance but, instead, by alleging without any basis in fact that this responsum is a forgery.In sum, the custom of standing is based on the Hemdat Yamim and is not older than the 18th century. The Rambam had serious reservations about establishing such a custom, but some are willing to ignore the Rambam on questionable grounds.

Sources: See Y. Goldhaver, Minhagei Kehilot, vol. 1 227-36 where the majority of the above is taken from. See also, Sperber, Minhagei Yisrael, vol. 2, 109-11, n.63 (he discusses among other things, the meaning of “minim”); E. Brodt, Yeruschasanu, vol. 2, p. 208; G. Oberlander,Minhag Avotanu be-Yadanu, Nissan-Av, chapter 27; S.Y. Feldman, Yisrael be-Mamadam, vol. 2, 1040-51.

See also, Goitein, A Mediterranean Society, vol. II, 340 where he records the custom that to take an oath one had to swear “in the name of God, and the Ten Commandments.” And that a document from Syracuse, Sicily, it records that “the party giving the oath was even obliged to read the Ten Commandments aloud from the Torah Scroll.”

[1] R. Aboab’s distinction is far from certain. Specifically, why it is clear on Shavout one is standing for a particular purpose as opposed to the daily recitation of the Ten Commandments?[2] This reasoning is also not convincing as the proposed daily recitation of the ten commandments was also in a larger context where other Torah passages are recited, Shema, Az Yashir, and Tehilim. If reading the ten commandments during Yitro obviates the minim issue why doesn’t reading it with the Shema or the Monday and Thursday Torah readings obviate the minim issue?[3] See R. Ovadiah Yosef, Yeheva Da’at, vol. 1 no. 29 where in his typical fashion cites almost all the relevant literature.[4] R. Waldenberg is not the first, nor presumably will he be the last, to question the authenticity of a particular responsum of the Rambam. For other examples, see Y.S. Speigel, Amudim be-Tolodot Sefer ha- Ivri, Kiteva ve-Hatakah, 264-65. Marc B. Shapiro: A Tale of Two Lost Archives

A Tale of Two Lost Archives by Marc B. Shapiro I have spent much of my professional life rummaging through collections of documents, mostly in well-kept archives, but sometimes also in hard-to-reach places in basements and attics. Fortunately, I have made some great discoveries in these places, but I will now tell you a story that doesn’t have a happy ending. It begins around fifteen years ago, when I was researching the life of R. Jehiel Jacob Weinberg. With the strength that only someone in his twenties has, I traveled around the world, knocking on doors, and tracking down every letter I could find written by Weinberg.[1] During this time I was in touch with the widow of R Hillel Medalie. While not a student of Weinberg, Medalie became close to him after the war. During this time he was serving as rabbi of Leeds, a tenure which incidentally led to a terrible dispute with R. Solomon Fisch, another rabbi in Leeds.[2] The dispute was so bad that Fisch refused to serve with Medalie on the Leeds beit din, and R. Joseph Apfel was appointed a dayan in Fisch’s place. Apfel was a student of Weinberg, and more responsa in Seridei Esh are addressed to him than anyone else. At this time, he was serving as a hazan in Leeds, but after being appointed to the beit din his impressive learning was able to come to the fore. In 1996 Apfel published Yad Yosef, which contains his collected writings. It also contains letters from numerous great Torah scholars including R. Jehiel Jacob Weinberg, R. Dov Berish Wiedenfeld, the Lubavitcher Rebbe, R. Isaac Jacob Weiss and R. Nachum Eliezer Rabinovitch. Among the most interesting teshuvot is one that is written by R. Pinhas Toledano, the Sephardic Av Beit Din of London. Apfel turned to him with the following problem: In Leeds there is a Jewish old age home and a non-Jew cooks for the residents on Shabbat. Is this permissible? Apfel had argued that the elderly residents are regarded as holeh she-ein bo sakanah, and it is permissible for a non-Jew to cook for aholeh she-ein bo sakanah. Others disagreed and Apfel turned to Toledano for his opinion.[3] Toledano points out that while Apfel is correct that a non-Jew may cook for a holeh she-ein bo sakanah, (see Shulhan Arukh, Orah Hayyim 328:19), it is not at all clear that all old people have this status. Nowhere in the poskim do we find such a notion. So apparently, only for those elderly who suffer from diabetes, asthma or the like can the non-Jew cook. Yet Toledano concludes that the cooking is nevertheless permissible. Since the non-Jew is hired for the entire year, i.e., a contract worker, and can miss some days (vacation, etc.), there is room for leniency. While normallymelakhah cannot be done in the house of a Jew because people will assume that the worker was hired to do the labor on Shabbat, in this case everyone knows that the cook is not hired on a daily basis. Toledano supports this contention by pointing out that in London everyone has milk delivered to the house on Shabbat and no one has raised any problems with this. I am too young to remember milk delivery, but I assume that this was the case in the U.S. as well, and the parallel is the daily delivery of newspapers. Toledano therefore concludes that it is permissible to have the non-Jew cook in the old age home. Yet he adds that even though halakhically this is OK, since it is very strange to permit such a thing in a Jewish old age home, the best thing to do is to cook the food on Friday and put it on a hot plate on Shabbat. Returning to Medalie, from Leeds he went on to become the rabbi of the Antwerp community. After his death in 1977, a very nice memorial volume appeared honoring both him and his father, R. Shemariah Judah Leib Medalie.[4] Here is a picture of R. Hillel. Here is R. Shemariah. Although he came from a Chabad background, I don’t know how strong Medalie’s connection was to the movement throughout his life. His father, R. Shemariah, was close to the Rebbe, R. Yosef Yitzhak, and was a very important figure in Chabad spiritual activities in the Soviet Union.[5] He was also a major figure in the political activities that took place in Russian Orthodoxy after the fall of the Czar.[6] In 1933 he was appointed rabbi of the Moscow synagogue, which meant that he was regarded as the rav of the entire city, and also made him the most important rabbi in the Soviet Union. Before he left the country, R Hillel Medalie studied in a secret yeshiva that was headed by R. Mordechai Feinstein, R. Moshe’s brother, who was the rav of Shklov. R. Moshe Zvi Neriyah was also a student here. The communists would later exile R. Mordechai to Siberia, where he died.[7] In the 1950’s Medalie wrote to Weinberg about his attempts to secure his father’s release from the Soviet Union. It had been years since he had communicated with his father and he did not know that in 1938 R. Shemariah was arrested, accused of counter- revolutionary activities, and shot.[8] R. Shemariah was one of many great talmidei hakhamim who were stuck behind the Iron Curtain, and even if not killed by the regime, lived out their days in what can only be described as a living hell.[9] While it was bad for everyone in the Soviet Union, for those whose lives revolved around Torah it was even worse. In accordance with the Lubavitcher Rebbe’s wishes, the elder Medalie did not attempt to leave the Soviet Union. While other rebbes and great rabbis were fleeing the country, the Rebbe told his followers to stay, as it was their responsibility to bring Torah to the Jewish people, even in times and places of darkness. He told them that they should not only think about their own physical and spiritual well- being but that of the Jewish people as a whole. The Rebbe only changed his position in 1930 “when Stalinist terror was unleashed against rabbis and religious functionaries. But by then the difficulties connected with leaving the USSR were formidable and large scale emigration was impossible.”[10] What this meant was that virtually all of the children and grandchildren of these hasidim ended up completely assimilating, and I think that in retrospect we can say that it was a terrible misjudgment. However, it must also be stated that when communism fell, there were still Habad families that had remained religious throughout all this time. The next time someone complains about how Habad is now dominating religious life in the former Soviet Union, he should remember this. This reluctance towards leaving the galut, even to go to Israel, is tied in with the Habad ideology that stresses the need to keep Judaism alive throughout the world. While this is generally a very good thing, as all world travelers can attest, sometimes the way it is expressed can be maddening for a religious Zionist to read. For example, in 1955, a few years after he became Rebbe, R. Menahem Mendel Schneersohn said as follows to his followers (Sihah for 20 Av, 5715): גם כאשר נמצאים בחוץ לארץ הרי זה המקום אשר יבחר ה’ אלקיך בו, וגם כאן יכולה להיות עבודת הקרבנות ברוחניות . . . וזוהי ההוראה שצריכים להפיק מפרשת היום – ש”בכל המקום אשר אזכיר את שמי” הרי זה ארץ ישראל This downplaying of the Land of Israel was too much for R. Zvi Yehudah Kook, and he responded as follows (Le-Hilkhot Tzibur, p. 33):

התואר “המקום אשר יבחר ד’ א-להיך בו” נאמר בתורת ד’ מן השמים רק על קדושת ארץ ישראל וירושלים שאיננה ניתנת להעברה וחלופין ח”ו על שום מקום בעולם . . . עבודת הקודש של העסק בתורה, שקידתה, הגדלתה והאדרתה וחרדת קודש של קיום מצוותיה הקדושות באמונה שלימה, ולדבקה בד’ א-להים חיים ללכת בדרכיו, והחיוב על כל אדם מישראל לחזור כל ימיו בתשובה, לעולם לא תעקור, לא תמלא את המקום ולא תחליף את מצוות ד’ של עבודת הקרבנות, שמקומה רק בפנים ולא מבחוץ. “בכל מקום אשר אזכיר שמי, שם ארץ ישראל” – ארץ ישראל מוגדרת ומוגבלת ומסומנת לקדושתה וסגולתה ולהגדרות חיובי מצוותיה ממקורות תורה שבכתב ותורה שבע”פ מקורות חז”ל דברי רבותינו גדולי ישראל ראשונים ואחרונים. וזה לשון הגמרא ברכות דף נז. “העומד ערום בחלום, בבבל עומד בלא חטא, בארץ ישראל ערום בלא מצוות” ולשון קדשו של רש”י שם: “בבבל עומד בלא חטא, לפי שחו”ל אין לה זכיות, אלא עוון יש בישבתה וזה עומד ערום בלא אותם עוונות.” ע”כ Returning to Medalie, he also had a very good secular education, having received an MA from the University of Manchester and a doctorate from Trinity College in Dublin. In fact, Moshe Sharett, who was Israel’s first foreign minister, wanted Medalie to serve as Israel’s ambassador to Great Britain. Medalie declined the request after discussing the matter with the Hazon Ish.[11] Knowing of his closeness to Weinberg, I was anxious to examine his papers to find any letters from him, as well as from other great rabbis. His widow told me that all of his papers had been deposited at Machon Ariel in Jerusalem. No one had gone through them; they had simply been thrown into boxes and taken away.

Around twelve years ago I went to Machon Ariel to try to find out something about the papers. No one could tell me anything and I almost despaired. Fortunately, with the help of a janitor I found two giant boxes in a storage room in the basement. This contained all the materials taken from Medalie’s home. There was no light in the storage room or even in the basement (something was wrong with the electricity that day). The only light I had was from the windows on the top of the basement walls. I took the boxes, one at a time, and emptied them on the floor. I then spent a number of hours going through all the papers, putting aside everything that came from Weinberg. The rest of the material, including letters, speeches, and pictures, was of great interest and documented many years in the rabbinate. But this would have to wait until another day. For now, my focus was on in finding the Weinberg material, and I was able to make copies of whatever I located. I used a number of the Weinberg letters in my book and also published some of them inKitvei ha-Rav Weinberg, vols. 1 and 2. I was leaving for the U.S. on the following day, so I made a note to myself to come back to Machon Ariel and carefully go through both large boxes. I knew that there was all sorts of fascinating material in these boxes and was very excited about a return trip. Shortly before I left, I looked at another large box (or maybe even two or three; I can no longer recall). This was full of Pinchas Peli’s papers. Peli, who was a distinguished person in his own right, played a major role in bringing knowledge of R. Soloveitchik’s thought to Israel, with the publication in 1975 of Al ha-Teshuvah. Here is his picture. Peli had a nice relationship with the Rav and I had no doubt that there were letters from the him among the Peli papers, but this too have to await a return trip. I was certain that no one would beat me to this, as no one cared, or even know, about the dusty boxes in the basement storage room, which had dishes and glasses in front of them. (There was a small catering business in the basement.) I had seen it before – boxes placed in some far-removed place where they remain for years and years, out of sight and out of mind, much like the Cairo Geniza. There is no doubt that when the Medalie and Peli papers were donated, the survivors didn’t expect that they would be put in some far away place where no one could examine them. They thought that the papers would be catalogued and kept in some sort of archive. Since Machon Ariel had not done anything in this direction, I figured that on a future visit I would take out all of the important material and then speak to the people in charge, alerting them to whatever treasures I had found and asking that they be kept in some sort of archive. Mrs. Medalie told me that when the papers were at her home, some Chabad people had already looked through them for material from the Rebbe. She asked me to keep an eye out for any letters from him. Unfortunately, I didn’t see anything, and presumably the material had already been removed. There are some letters to Medalie in the Rebbe’s published correspondence. However, there are also many that do not appear there, but are found in R. Shalom Dov Ber Wolpo’s Shemen Sason le-Haverekha,[12] which has a lengthy chapter on Medalie and the Rebbe. I assume that the new letters published here are what that the Chabad people found at the Medalie home. While I was working in the basement no one was watching me. No one even knew I was there. I could have walked off with anything. I considered the possibility that all this precious material would one day be lost, since Machon Ariel had no interest in it. (They probably accepted it in order to do the families a favor, but didn’t have the resources to do anything with the boxes). I rationalized to myself that since the material wasn’t being taken care of properly, something should be done. I thought that since I could watch over it and give the material a good “home,” that it would be OK for me to walk off with it. But I immediately squelched the thought, since stealing is always improper. Although there is a long list of people who have pilfered books and manuscripts, I didn’t want to join the list, even for the best possible reason. In January 2007 I finally had the opportunity to return to Machon Ariel to pick up where I left off. I saw that the basement is now a nursery school. Everything that used to be there was removed a number of years ago. There was no one there to talk to about this at the time, but in June 2008 I returned and had the janitor take me around. The boxes were nowhere to be seen. None of the administrators had any idea what I was talking about. I was shown the library, which is undergoing renovations. It was a mess and there were a bunch of boxes that were set to be taken to genizah the following day. What a story it could have been if I had been able to save the Peli and Medalie boxes one day before they were to be lost? But unfortunately, the material was not there. I assume that when the new construction happened in the basement, the boxes were thrown out like so much other garbage. For an average person looking at a large box with old papers, it certainly would have looked like garbage. Yet how much precious material is now lost forever. For all the great and important material found in archives around the world, much more has been lost. In fact, only a few years ago the son of one of Weinberg’s students contacted me about getting copies of the letters of Weinberg to his father, since they can’t find the originals. The father gave me copies many years ago and now they are lost. After he passed away and his house was cleaned, the letters were mistakenly thrown out. Such was probably the fate of many of the Weinberg letters that I was given copies of. It is the way of the world and there is little we can do about it, but it is frustrating nonetheless. The visit to Machon Ariel was noteworthy in at least one respect. On the floor of the library, waiting to be sent to the genizah, was a large pile of issues of Panim el Panim. This was a weekly that appeared in the 1950’s and 1960’s, edited by Peli, which covered the entire range of Orthodox life, and included interviews with leading figures from all camps. Unfortunately, it is not available online. One of its outstanding features were the numerous pictures of gedolim, rabbis, scholars, and public figures, many of which are found nowhere else. I grabbed one issue (20 Elul 5724), in order to have something to read in the hotel, and in it one finds the following pictures of Abraham Berliner and Jacob Barth, which as far as I know do not appear anywhere else.

Here is a picture of R. Aaron Walkin of Pinsk, which I don’t recall ever having seen. While on the theme of pictures of gedolim, let me note what appears in the recent volume focusing on the life of R. Bezalel Rakow, the Rav of Gateshead.[13] Rabbi Rakow thought very highly of such pictures and had them all over his house. He felt that today, when there are so many inappropriate pictures everywhere we look, it is important to have pictures of great rabbis to act as a counter. Here is a picture of Rabbi Rakow, from the beginning of the volume. Getting back to Panim el Panim, one of the cover stories in the issue I took is about how R. Yehezkel Sarne visited Heichal Shlomo and the conflict this created, since by so doing R. Sarne was violating the Brisker Rav’s ban against the institution. Some believe that it was the Brisker Rav’s harsh stance that prevented his nephew, R. Joseph B. Soloveitchik, from accepting the offer to become Chief Rabbi of the State of Israel. In general, the views of R. Sarne, and his Chevron Yeshiva, were more moderate than much of the haredi world (although he was known to be very anti-Habad). A glance at the names of those who attended the yeshiva shows that there are outstanding figures from all across the religious spectrum.[14] It is because of this that I was a little surprised when I read in a biography of R. Shakh[15] that R. Sarne once spoke very negatively to R. Shlomo Yosef Zevin about the Lubavitcher Rebbe. In fact, according to this source when R. Sarne was ill and R. Zevin visited him, R. Sarne told R. Zevin that his hasidut is heresy, his Rebbe is a heretic, and he is a heretic. When his health improved he went to R. Zevin’s house and apologized for treating him that way when the latter came to visit him. But now that he is at Zevin’s house, he wants to reaffirm that his hasidut is heresy, his rebbe is a heretic, and he is a heretic! The story as it appears is obviously a yeshiva fairy tale. But I asked R. Hayyim Sarne, R. Yehezkel’s son and current Rosh Yeshiva of Hevron (the Geula branch) if it is true that his father once spoke harshly to R. Zevin about Habad. He told me that it is true but that his father later apologized to R. Zevin, i.e., a real apology. Since I mentioned R. Sarne and his inappropriate comments, let me tell another story that relates to the fact that he would sometimes say things that perhaps he shouldn’t have. Those who have read my book no doubt recall the funeral scene that I describe right at the beginning.[16] That, more than anything else, really shows the difficulty in placing Weinberg in any particular category. I actually feel that it was appropriate that he was buried in Har ha-Menuhot with all the other great rabbis, rather than the place chosen by the Mizrachi leaders (even if R. Herzog is also buried there). I say this for the following reason: R. Weinberg could not live in the haredi world. His views were too different from them. In fact, as my friend Shlomo Tikochinski has correctly pointed out, Weinberg is the only great sage respected in the haredi world whose views are so much at variance with it. Yet while Weinberg wanted to live as a more modern type of rabbi, one who was a Zionist and academic scholar in addition to being a Torah sage, he wanted to be remembered as a gadol be-Yisrael. At the end of the day, he wanted his Torah works to be studied, and the only place for this was in the great yeshivot. So although he couldn’t live in their world, for posterity he would have wanted his legacy to be with them. However, I must also add the following: When Weinberg passed away all the great yeshivot were in the haredi orbit, so it would be natural that this is where he would want to be remembered. At that time, high level Torah study could hardly be found in the Mizrachi world. However, things are very different now, with the flowering of religious Zionist yeshivot of all sorts. If Weinberg were alive today, he would be able to feel fully comfortable in the religious Zionist world, since he would see the intensive Torah study and openness to secular learning of places like Maaleh Adumim, Har Etzion, and the like. Yet these yeshivot simply didn’t exist in his lifetime. Not long after my book appeared, I was in a bookstore in New York City (does anyone remember Ideal Books?). I started talking to a certain fellow who happened to be a rav in Brooklyn and a son of one of the great Torah scholars of the previous generation. He told me that he is the only one alive who can testify as to what was said in the conversation between R. Yehezkel Sarne and the men who were in charge of the funeral, after R. Sarne and his students stopped the procession. (At the time, he was a student at the Chevron yeshiva.) Before he told me the story, he noted that one should remember that in his old age R. Sarne sometimes said things that were not appropriate. He gave one example of this: R. Sarne once went into the Brisk yeshiva and started screaming at the students that they should start learning mussar (Brisk being a place where they don’t do this). Only after telling me this story was he ready to inform me what was said at the funeral. According to him, after arguing with R. Sarne about where to bury Weinberg, Zorah Warhaftig, the Minister of Religions, was exasperated and declared: “But we have already dug the grave.” To this, R. Sarne replied (in Yiddish): “Put yourself in it!” The yeshiva students then took the coffin and proceeded to Har ha-Menuhot. Returning to my conversation with R. Hayyim Sarne, which began with a discussion on Weinberg and moved into other areas, I was at his home for a good while and asked him many things. I even got into a disagreement with him on one issue. I am sure this surprised him, since roshei yeshiva are not used to young men challenging something they say. He insisted that it was better for people to be secularists than to identify with one of the non-Orthodox denominations. I responded that the opposite was the case, as the non-Orthodox groups at least add some Jewish content to people’s lives. They also help slow down assimilation. (Of course, all this is valuable in and of itself, but from a purely utilitarian standpoint it also makes the job of the kiruv organizations easier.) Yet he didn’t buy it and couldn’t even see my point, which I think is shared by virtually all thinking people in the Diaspora. I used the conversation to ask him why the haredim have such a negative view of R. Kook’s philosophical writings, and his answer was very enlightening. To this day I have never seen it anywhere in print. He told me that one can turn pages and pages in R. Kook’s philosophical works without coming across a rabbinic text (ma’amar hazal). He insisted that a “kosher” work of Jewish thought must be constantly citing rabbinic texts. I had never thought of this point before, but I think it is quite significant. As all who study R. Kook know, he writes in such an original fashion that he becomes the primary text, and one can indeed turn many pages before seeing a ma’amar hazal. In the new biography of the Brisker Rav (R. Velvel Soloveitchik), there is a very nice picture of R. Hayyim Sarne and his father in Switzerland, together with R. Jehiel Jacob Weinberg and R. Wolf Rosengarten of Zurich.[17] This has nothing at all to do with R. Velvel. It is included because the picture was taken in Switzerland and the biography discusses R. Velvel’s few trips there for health reasons. I assume that the author had this nice picture which he wanted to include, so he found some tenuous connection, even though, as I mentioned, it has nothing to do with R. Velvel. While R. Velvel was in Switzerland, he was taken care of by Rosengarten, who appears prominently in the biography. R. Velvel also spent a lot of time with his nephew, R. Moshe Soloveitchik of Zurich. Both Rosengarten and Soloveitchik were also close to Weinberg. It has fascinated me that in all of the hundreds of letters that I have, Weinberg never mentions the Brisker Rav’s trips to Switzerland. He also had no interest in going to meet R. Velvel, even though the distance between them was no more than a few hours. I get the feeling that Weinberg felt that R. Velvel was in such a different world that it would be hard for them to even have a pleasant conversation. It might be that he was even intimidated by the Brisker Rav’s extremism. What makes this more interesting is that R. Moshe Sternbuch, who had become a great follower of the Brisker Rav, was also close to Weinberg. R. Bezalel Rakow taught at the Montreux yeshiva in the 1950’s, and he too had a very close relationship with Weinberg. As with so many other Torah scholars in Switzerland, Rakow too went to see the Brisker Rav. I think we might get a sense of why Weinberg made no effort to meet R. Velvel from the following story:[18] When Rakow went to meet R. Velvel, the latter refused to see him after he heard that he taught at the yeshiva in Montreux. This yeshiva was founded in 1927 and drew students from all over Western Europe. While R. Elijah Botchko, the Rosh Yeshiva, was a member of Agudah and the yeshiva was viewed as part of this world (R. Aharon Leib Steinman even studied there during World War II), he didn’t tow the party line and was certainly more positive towards Zionism than the typical Agudist. Both he and his son and successor, R. Moshe Botchko, were also not opposed to the students getting a secular education. In the 1950’s there was even a plan to for the yeshiva to provide this. It is this issue in particular that is mentioned in explaining why the Brisker Rav refused to see Rakow: דאפשר שגם הוא בין אלו שרצו להכניס בישיבה לימודי חול בין כותלי הישיבה

Only after Rakow was able to convince the Brisker Rav’s son that he had the proper hashkafot was he permitted to meet the Brisker Rav. He later recalled that the reason he was able to develop a good relationship with R. Velvel was because the latter valued his efforts in “fighting at the yeshiva so that they not incorporate secular studies.” I think it is likely that knowing how different his outlook was from that of R. Velvel, and that R. Velvel had no hesitation in speaking his mind, Weinberg decided to avoid what might turn into a difficult meeting. Whereas other gedolim from the yeshiva world wouldn’t dream of getting into an argument with Weinberg or telling him why his outlook was mistaken, the Brisker Rav, who always spoke his mind, would have had no such compunctions. As for the Montreux yeshiva, in 1985 it relocated to Israel and is now a hesder yeshiva.[19] This shows that even apart from the issue of secular studies, the yeshiva did not share the Brisker Rav’s approach. [1] Since my book appeared I have also discovered many more letters, including a collection sent to one of the leaders of the yeshiva world (whose identity I am not at present able to divulge). In my Note on Sources, found after the preface, I mentioned that while such letters might cause me to reevaluate some of my conclusions, I was confident that the picture I presented would not be substantially altered. I was happy to see that nothing in these letters caused me to change any of my earlier thoughts. [2] See Fisch’s Yeriot Shlomo (Jerusalem, 1983). Among Fisch’s contributions to Jewish scholarship are his editions of Midrash ha-Gadol on Numbers and Deuteronomy and his commentary to Ezekiel in the Soncino Books of the Bible. [3] Incidentally, I think that the standard position is that bishul akum for a holeh she-ein bo sakanah is only permitted on Shabbat, but not during the week. See e.g., Kaf ha-Hayyim, Orah Hayyim 328:119. Halakhic experts, please correct me if I am mistaken. [4] Shiloh, ed. R. Shlomo Yosef Zevin (Jerusalem, 1983). [5] When the non-Hasidim and Chabad were finally able to agree on a joint political front in the Soviet Union, the plan was for a group of four non-hasidic and three hasidic rabbis to form a sort of Moetzet Gedolei ha-Torah, the members of which did not have to actually live in the Soviet Union. The four non-hasidim chosen were R. Chaim Ozer Grodzinski, R. Isser Zalman Meltzer, R. Isaac Jacob Rabinowitz, and R. Avraham Dov Baer Kahana Shapiro. The hasidic side was to be represented by R. Yosef Yitzhak Schneersohn (the Lubavitcher Rebbe), R. Menahem Mendel Schneersohn (the son of the Bobruisker Rebbe, R. Shemariah Noah), and R. Shemariah Medalie. See Mordechai Altschuler, “Ha-Politikah shel ha-Mahaneh ha-Dati ve-ha-Haredi be-Rusyah bi-Shenat 1917,” Shvut 15 (1992), p. 22. [6] I mean, of course, Russian Jewish Orthodoxy, but I think it is worth noting that in pictures of rabbis from Old Russia one sometimes has trouble telling them apart from the Russian Orthodox priests, as they both work black and had beards. In fact, I found one such example with an American Orthodox rabbi. See here. [7] See Iggerot Moshe, vol. 8, introduction, p. 18. [8] See Avraham Greenbaum, Rabbanei Berit ha-Moatzot bein Milhamot ha-Olam (Jerusalem, 1994), p. 36. Greenbaum also notes that in 1937 R. Hillel Medalie’s brother, R. Moshe, was exiled to Siberia where he was killed. Unfortunately, this helpful book is not available online. However, I would like to call readers’ attention to another book which is also quite valuable and is online: Peninah Meizlish’s Rabanim she-Nispu be-Shoah. This book contains an enormous list of rabbis who perished in the Holocaust. Available here. Speaking of online resources, it amazes me that there are still people who buy the Bar Ilan Responsa CD. Apparently, they don’t know that one can access this through the Spertus College library for very little money. [9] Another example is R. Levi Yitzhak Schneersohn, the father of R. Menahem Mendel, the last Lubavitcher Rebbe. R. Levi Yitzhak died in 1944 after having been exiled to Kazakhstan. See Avraham Greenbaum, “Rabbi Shlomo (Solomon) Schlifer and Jewish Religious Life in the Soviet Union 1943-1957,” Shvut 8 (1999),p. 126 n. 10. Another example is R. Shaul Yisraeli’s father, R. Binyamin, who was rav of Koidanovo, a town near Minsk (see R. Shaul’s introduction to his Amud ha-Yemini). He was exiled to Siberia where he died. R. Shaul writes that his grave site is unknown, and therefore he called his first book .R .למען יהא לעמוד זכרון על קברו אשר לא נודע ,Amud ha-Yemini Shaul and two others escaped from the Soviet Union by illegally crossing the border into Poland, which would have meant the death penalty if they were caught (as no doubt many others were). This dangerous step was taken only after Moscow’s Chief Rabbi, R. Yaakov Klemes, performed the Goral ha-Gra. See here. Before setting out for the border, R. Shaul spent time in R. Yehezkel Abramsky’s apartment in Moscow. See Aharon Sorasky, Melekh be-Yofyo (Jerusalem, 2004), vol. 1, p. 199. R. Shaul made his way to Jerusalem where he became one of the leading Torah scholars in Israel. Because of his religious Zionist outlook, he is another figure who is scrupulously ignored by the Frankel Rambam, even though he was an expert in the agricultural halakhot and should have been cited repeatedly in the Frankel index to Sefer Zeraim. See R. Yaakov Ariel’s introduction to R. Shaul’s Havot Binyamin. In Sorasky’s book, cited previously in this note, R. Shaul is not referred to as But we should be .זצ”ל Gaon” and his name is not affixed with“ thankful that at least R. Kook and R. Herzog are given the proper titles (but not R. Soloveitchik!) [10] David E. Fishman, “Preserving Tradition in the Land of Revolution: The Religious Leadership of Soviet Jewry, 1917-1930,” in Jack Wertheimer, ed., The Uses of Tradtion (New York, 1992), p. 106 n. 48. Fishman also notes that R. Yosef Yitzhak repeated the advice that his great-grandfather had given to one who wanted to go on aliyah in the 1850’s: “We should make this the Land of Israel. Create a Land of Israel here.” This remained the Habad approach and is one of the reasons why the movement never stressed aliyah. [11] See Nitzan Kedar, “Ha-Medinai she-Nishkah,” Ha-Tzofeh, Nov. 18, 2007, available here. [12] This book claims that Medalie was born in 1918. Yet this is incorrect. In 1938 Medalie came to England to start his university studies. The Jewish Chronicle of May 20, 1938, has an entire story on this, complete with a picture of the young man. According to the paper, he was twenty-four years old at the time and had received semikhah from R. Isaac Herzog and R. Isser Zalman Meltzer. In Shiloh, pp. 15-16, semikhot from R. Isser Zalman and R. Moses Avigdor Amiel are printed. [13] Be-Tzel ha-Kodesh (Jerusalem, 2007), p. 131. [14] See here. A number of distinguished people are missing from this list, and the following come to mind: R. Eliezer Waldenberg, R. Yitzhak Abadi, R. Aryeh Ralbag, R. Zev Segal, Prof. Yaakov Sussmann, Prof. Reuven Kimelman, and Dr. David Lando. [15] Moshe Horovitz, She-ha-Maftehot be-Yado (Jerusalem, 1989), p. 94. [16] Here is a little quiz: What classic book by a woman historian also begins with a funeral scene? Hint: The book is devoted to an event that is often related to the Ninth of Av. I don’t mean the Spanish Expulsion, which contrary to popular belief–a belief popularized by Abarbanel–did not take place on this date. See Yitzhak Baer, A History of the Jews of Christian Spain (Philadelphia, 1978), vol. 2, p. 439. [17] Shimon Yosef Meller, Ha-Rav mi-Brisk (Jerusalem, 2006), p. 368. I wrote to Meller asking his permission to post the picture, but I haven’t yet heard back from him. [18] See Be-Tzel ha-Kodesh, p. 118. [19] See here. Some Literary, Scholarly & Halachic Perspectives on Medieval Ash

Some Literary, Scholarly & Halachic Perspectives on Medieval Ashkenazi Attitudes Toward Martyrdom

בין דין לדין by Yitzhak of

Prose

George Eliot, in Daniel Deronda, depicts the ineffable, exquisite Mirah Lapidoth contemplating her recent abortive suicide attempt: She went on musingly– “I thought it was not wicked. Death and life are one before the Eternal. I know our fathers slew their children and then slew themselves, to keep their souls pure. I meant it so. (George Eliot, Daniel Deronda, Chapter XVII)

She elaborates, several chapters later: Then I thought of my people, how they had been driven from land to land and been afflicted, and multitudes had died of misery in their wandering–was I the first? And in the wars and troubles when Christians were cruelest, our fathers had sometimes slain their children and afterward themselves: it was to save them from being false apostates. That seemed to make it right for me to put an end to my life; for calamity had closed me in too, and I saw no pathway but to evil. But my mind got into war with itself, for there were contrary things in it. I knew that some had held it wrong to hasten their own death, though they were in the midst of flames; and while I had some strength left it was a longing to bear if I ought to bear–else where was the good of all my life? (ibid. XX) The one who “held it wrong to hasten [his] own death, though [he was] in the midst of flames” may be R. Hanina B. Tradyon: מצאוהו לרבי חנינא בן תרדיון שהיה יושב ועוסק בתורה ומקהיל קהלות ברבים וספר תורה מונח לו בחיקו הביאוהו וכרכוהו בספר תורה והקיפוהו בחבילי זמורות והציתו בהן את האור והביאו ספוגין של צמר … ושראום במים והניחום על לבו כדי שלא תצא נשמתו מהרה אמרו לו תלמידיו … אף אתה פתח פיך ותכנס [בך] האש אמר להן מוטב שיטלנה מי שנתנה ועל יחבל הוא בעצמו אמר לו קלצטונירי רבי אם אני מרבה בשלהבת ונוטל ספוגין של צמר מעל לבך אתה מביאני לחיי העולם הבא אמר לו הן השבע לי נשבע לו מיד הרבה בשלהבת ונטל ספוגין של צמר מעל לבו יצאה נשמתו במהרה אף הוא קפץ ונפל לתוך האור יצאה בת קול ואמרה רבי חנינא בן תרדיון וקלצטונירי מזומנין הן לחיי העולם (הבא … (גמרא עבודה זרה דף י”ח ע”א

Poetry References to suicides and murders of children by their parents (and occasionally teachers) to avoid apostasy abound in both the Halachic and liturgical medieval Ashkenazic literature. A classic example from the former: ואך את דמכם וגו’. אזהרה לחונק עצמו. ואמרו בבראשית רבה (ל”ד י”ג) יכול אפילו כחנניה מישאל ועזריה, תלמוד לומר אך. פירוש יכול אפילו כמו אלו שמסרו עצמן לקידוש השם שלא יוכל לחבול בעצמו אם הוא ירא שלא יוכל בעצמו לעמוד בנסיון, תלמוד לומר אך, כי בשעת השמד יכול למסור עצמו למיתה ולהרוג עצמו. וכן בשאול בן קיש שאמר לנערו שלוף חרבך ודקרני בה וגו’ (שמואל א’ פרק ל”א פסוק ד’). …ומכאן מביאין ראיה אותן ששוחטין התינוק בשעת הגזירה ומעשה ברב אחד ששחט הרבה תינוקות בשעת השמד כי היה ירא שיעבירום על דת, והיה רב אחד עמו והיה כועס עליו ביותר וקראו רוצח והוא לא היה חושש. ואמר אותו רב אם כדברי יהרג אותו רב במיתה משונה, וכן היה שתפסוהו עכו”ם והיו פושטין עורו ונותנין חול בין העור והבשר, ואחר כך נתבטלה הגזירה, ואם לא שחט אותן התינוקות היו ניצולין: (דעת זקנים מבעלי התוספות בראשית פרק ט’ פסוק ה’, וכעין דבריהם (עם קצת שינויים הובאו בבדק הבית יו”ד סימן קנ”ז בשם ארחות חיים Here are two poignant references, from the Kinos of Tishah B’Av, to suicide and the slaughter of children to avoid conversion and sin: אראלים צאו וצעקו מרה / ספוד תמרור האגדו בחבורה קול כחולה צרה כמבכירה / התאוננו על עדת שה פזורה עלימו כי נגזרה גזרה / בחרי אף וזעם ועברה ונתועדו בפרישות ובטהרה / לקדש שם הגדול והנורא ואיש את אחיו חזקו בעזרה / לדבק [בו] ביראה טהורה בלי לכרוע לעבודה זרה / ולא חסו על-גבר וגבירה על פנים צפירת תפארה / אבל אזרו גבורה יתרה להלום ראש ולקרץ שזרה / ואלימו דברו באמירה לא זכינו לגדלכם לתורה / נקריבכם כעולה והקטרה ונזכה עמכם לאורה / הצפונה מעין כל ועלומה אז הסכימו גדולים וקטנים / לקבל באהבה דין שוכן מעונים וזקנים דשנים ורעננים / הם היו תחלה נדונים ויצאו לקראתם עזי פנים / ונהרגו המונים המונים ונתערבו פדרים עם פרשדונים / והאבות אשר היו רחמנים נהפכו לאכזר כיענים / והפיסו על אבות ועל בנים ומי שגורל עלה-לו ראשונים / הוא נשחט בחלפות וסכינים ובחורים עלי תולע אמונים / הם לחכו עפר כתנינים והכלות לבושות שנים / מעלפות בזרועות חתנים מנתחות בחרב וכידונים / זכרו זאת קהל עדת נבונים ואל תחשו מהרבות קינים / והספידו על חסידים והגונים אשר צללו במים הזידונים / לזכר זאת נפשי עגומה (קינות לתשעה באב כמנהג פולין (מהדורת גולדשמידט)), “החרישו ממני ואדברה”, מספר כ”ג

Professors Simon Schwartzfuchs and Avraham Grossman disagree both on the quantity and significance of the liturgical poetry composed contemporaneously to the events of the First Crusade, and their divergent views on this question yield different inferences as to the magnitude of the Crusade’s impact on the ravaged German communities. Grossman details Schwartzfuchs’ position: שוורצפוקס ממעיט ביותר ברישומן של גזירות אלה על הדורות הסמוכים ולאחריהם, וזאת הוא מסיק בעיקר ממיעוט העיסוק בהן ביצירה הרוחנית לענפיה ולסוגיה. עניין מיוחד יש בדבריו על הפיוטים. באותם ימים תפסו הפיוטים מקום נכבד בחיי הקהילות ולהדי הזמן ניתן בהם ביטוי מובהק. אם אכן לא נותר רישום הגזירות בהם, כי אז היה הדבר מעיד :על מיעוט העניין בהן ועל הרושם הזעום שעשו על בני אותם דורות אשר לפיוטים שעניינם מסע הצלב הראשון, אשר ליקטו הברמן וקודמיו, מספרם הזעום מפתיע. הברמן הביא שניים שלושה פיוטים בני זמנו של מסע הצלב הראשון. יתרה מזאת, לא ברור כלל אם כולם דנים במסע הצלב. וכבר העיר ברון, שפיוטים אלה חוזרים על עצמם ועל ניסוחם, המעורפל במידה רבה, בכל הנוגע למאורעות שהם אמורים לתאר ולהזכיר (שוורצפוקס, “מקומם של מסעי הצלב בדברי ימי ישראל”, בתוך: ר’ בונפיל, מ’ בן-ששון, י’ הקר (עורכים), תרבות וחברה בתולדות ישראל בימי-הביניים, קובץ מאמרים לזכרו של ח”ה בן-ששון, ירושלים תשמ”ט, (עמוד 257

Yet Grossman himself disagrees: קשה להסכים עם קביעות אלה מהטעמים דלהלן: מספר הפיוטים הקדומים המתייחסים אל גזירות תתנ”ו שהובאו בספרו של הברמן איננו ‘שניים או שלושה’. הוא הביא בספרו שבעה פיוטים כאלה, ועליהם יש להוסיף ארבע קינות של ר’ אלעזר ב”ר נתן (הראב”ן) המשולבות בתיאור הגזירות. למעשה, כבר כתב הברמן במפורש, כי הוא מביא לקט ומבחר מן הפיוטים על גזירות תתנ”ו, וכי הוא לא ירד למנות את כולם. בין אלה שלא הובאו על ידו יש לציין במיוחד את הקינה על חורבנה של קהילת וורמייזא שחוברה סמוך מאוד לאותן הגזירות, ואולי מיד עם סיומן, …על ידי ר’ יעקב בר’ יצחק הלוי, בנו של ראש ישיבת וורמייזא בקינות אלה אין תיאורים כלליים של הגזירות אלא התייחסות מפורשת אל האירועים בשנת תתנ”ו. עליהם יש להוסיף פיוטים אחרים שנתחברו לאחר מסע הצלב השני וגזירות אחרות, אשר בהם תינו הכותבים את הצרות שתכפו עליהם מבלי להתייחס דווקא אל תתנ”ו, אך ניתן לחוש בבירור כי גם הן נלקחו בחשבון מניין הצרות. מדרך הטבע ישלב כותב מאוחר את פרעות זמנו עם אלה שקדמו להן ולא יסתפק בהזכרת הראשונות בלבד, ואין בעובדא זו כדי ללמד שנחלש או נעלם רישומן של הצרות .הראשונות

כללו של דבר, בתחום הפיוט נשארו הדים מרובים וקשים לגזירות תתנ”ו, ולכך יש חשיבות מרובה. הפיוט שימש באותם ימים ככלי הביטוי העיקרי להגיגיהם של בני הקהילות, ובו ביטאו את שמחותיהם ובעיקר את מכאוביהם ויגונם. יתר על כן, מסורות שונות היו מצויות בידי חכמי אשכנז שלאחר הגזירות, והן הועברו מדור לדור, תוך שמירת משמעותם של פרטים שונים הנמצאים באותם פיוטים שנתחברו על גזירות תתנ”ו. לפי מסורות אלה, אף שחלק מדברי הפייטנים נראים כתיאורים כלליים בלבד, נתכוונו בהם הכותבים לרמוז אל אירועים ממשיים שהתרחשו באותן גזירות. (אברהם גרוסמן, ‘שורשיו של קידוש השם באשכנז הקדומה’, בתוך: ישעיהו גפני, אביעזר רביצקי (עורכים), ‘קדושת החיים וחירוף הנפש, קובץ מאמרים לזכרו של אמיר יקותיאל’, (עמודים 101 – 103

Scholarship

Suicide and Infanticide in Halachah: A critique of Soloveitchik, Halbertal, and Berkovitz

All of this serves as an appropriate introduction to an analysis of Professor Haym Soloveitchik’s provocative discussion of medieval Ashkenazic halachic attitudes toward martydom in Halakhah, Hermeneutics and Martyrdom in Medieval Ashkenaz (Part I of II) (Jewish Quarterly Review, Volume 94 Number 1 Winter 2004 p. 77) [I am greatly indebted to Andy for drawing my attention to, and providing me with copies of Soloveitchik’s article, as well as the previously cited article by Grossman]. Soloveitchik opens by arguing: Some fifteen years ago, I argued that there are occasions when cultural norms shape the perception of Halakhah, even on the part of its greatest thinkers. There is no pure empiricism in Halakhah, any more than in any other discipline. The simplest text, if it leads to unbelievable conclusions, will be either discounted or reinterpreted. The more outlandish the conclusions of the straightforward interpretation, the less plausible need be the reinterpretation. Despite its improbability, it will carry the air of verisimilitude to those who share the shock at the alternative. This does not happen often, but it does happen – even in such important areas of Jewish law as martyrdom. The strange reasoning of the Tosafists on the subject of martyrdom does not, I contended, bear legal scrutiny. Both their justification of suicide when fearing that one might yield to torture and apostasize and their even more surprising defense of parents slaughtering infants to prevent them from being reared as Christians were post facto justifications of the conduct of Jewish communities during the first Crusade. …

The matter seemed fairly obvious to me, and I contented myself with one long footnote of documentation. This was evidently a mistake. Much to my surprise, this claim stirred considerable controversy. …

Clearly the matter needs to be treated in far greater detail. Let us turn to the Tosafist writings on martyrdom, examine them carefully, and see whether their hermeneutical sins on this topic are indeed so scarlet. … Soloveitchik follows with an intricately detailed and closely reasoned argumentation showing that the Tosafists’ reasoning in this area is not compelling and arbitrary, but that, on the other hand, the dilemmas faced by the Jewish victims of the Crusades had been unbearably agonizing. [In a recent, brief post, Wolf2191 is dismissive of Soloveitchik’s entire argument, but I think it has more merit than he concedes, and that it is, in any event, worthy of a more detailed discussion.] Soloveitchik eloquently concludes: The choice that now confronted the Jews probed the limits of the halakhah. The laws of martyrdom treat the issue of when one is obliged to lay down one’s life. What happens after one is dead is irrelevant legally, but only too relevant in real life. The fate of the child of the now-dead martyr was out of the purview of halakhah, but remained at the very center of Jewish concerns for their Jewish continuance. Halakhah could not adequately address that burning question, so Jews addressed it on their own. Halakhists endorsed their solution, some even rationalized it after a fashion. The inadequacy of their answers was not simply because they were given after the bloody fact, but also because the received halakhah was inadequate to resolve the tragic question raised by their present condition: What was the point of Jewish martyrdom if the children would be reared as Christians? Although Soloveitchik’s arguments are, as I mentioned before, generally quite cogent, I believe that a couple of his points are erroneous. He writes: Let us now turn to the issue of killing one’s children rather than allowing them to fall into the hands of the idolators (i.e. Christians). … Perhaps nothing better illustrates the factors at work than [R. Meir of Rothenberg’s] responsum. It reads: יהודי אחד שאל את ר’ מאיר שיחיה, אם צריך כפרה על ששחט(א) אשתו וד’ בניו ביום הרג רב בקופלינש עיר הדמים, כי כן ביקשוהו יען ראו כי יצא הקצף מלפני ד’ והתחילו האויבים להרוג בני קל חי הנהרגים על קדוש השם. וגם הוא רצה להרוג את עצמו במית(ו)תם אלא שהיצילו .ד’ על ידי גויים וכתב לו: לא ידענא שפיר מה אידון ביה, כי ודאי ההורג את עצמו על ייחוד ד’ רשאי לחבול בעצמו, ואמר יכול כשאול, ת”ל אך. … אבל לשחוט אחרים צריך עיון למצוא ראייה להתיר, ומשאול אין ראייה לאיסור אחרי שצווה דוד להרוג אותו (וכן) בן איש גר העמלקי, שנאמר … .אנכ[י] מות(ו)תתי משיח ד’, [דדילמא משיח ד’] שאני

מיהו דבר זה פשט היתירו, כי שמענו ומצאנו שהרבה גדולים שהיו שוחטין את בניהם ואת בנותיהן. … ונראה להביא ראייה להתיר, דכי היכי דאמר יכול כשאול? ת”ל אך, ה”נ [הכי נמי] נימא דההורג את חבירו על קידוש השם מותר, דבההוא קרא כתיב ומיד האדם ומיד איש … .’וגו

ומי (שמטעינן) [שמטעינו] כפרה, הוא מוציא לעז על החסידים הראשונים. ואחרי שכוונתו היה טובה, מרוב אהבת יוצרינו יתברך שמו פגע ונגע (במעמד) [במחמד] עיניו, וגם הם חילו פניו על ככה … וצור ישראל ינקום את נקמתינו ונקמת תורתו ונקמת דם עבדיו השפוך [בימינו ויראו (עינו) [עינינו] [וישמח לבינו

… [R. Meir’s] arguments are shot through with inconsistencies. … When confronted with a proof against the practice of slaughtering others from the Saul narrative, R. Meir points out immediately, and quite correctly, that nothing can be inferred from Saul as he was God’s anointed king. Yet a line later, he advances the permissibility of suicide for anyone confronting religious persecution from that very same narrative. R. Meir perceives the noncomparability of royalty and commoners when the argument is against the killing of others but not when the argument is in its favor. (p. 98) This objection is specious; Maharam’s logic is perfectly clear and consistent. The enormity of killing God’s anointed king is greater than that of killing a commoner, so we cannot extend a stringency found in the context of the former to the latter. A leniency found in the context of the former, however, must a fortiori apply to the latter! Perhaps Soloveitchik is suggesting that just as Maharam distinguishes between royalty and commoners as the objects of suicide, so too ought he to distinguish between them as the perpetrators, and grant more latitude to the former, but this is a non-sequitur. A subsequent argument made by Soloveitchik is more profoundly flawed. He cites the following remarks of Rav Moshe of Zurich (Hagahos S’mak): ואותם הקדושים ששחטו עצמם וזרעם כשבאו לידי ניסיון מפני שלא רצו לסמוך על דעתן … והיו יראים שיעבירום הגויים על דת ויהיו שם שמים מתחלל על ידיהם, כולם יש להם חלק לעולם הבא וקדושים גמורים הם … ומכאן סמכו לשחוט הילדים בשעת הגזירה שאינם יודעים בין טוב לרעה לפי שאנו יראים פן ישתקעו בין הגויים בגיותן כשיגדלו, מוטב שימותו זכאים ואל ימותו חייבים, שכן מצינו גבי בן סורר ומורה שעל שם סופם ללסטם את הבריות ומחלל שבתות, לפיכך הוא בסקילה, עד כאן .לשון האבי העזרי and proceeds to challenge them: The problem with his analogy is simply that the law of the rebellious son was declared inoperative by the Oral Law, a declaration which found expression in the famous talmudic dictum “there never was nor could there ever have been a case of the rebellious son” (lo’ haya ve-lo ‘atid lihiyot). The inconceivability of punishing someone – and capital punishment at that – not for the commission of a crime but on the basis of a prognosis of crime was an halakhic impossibility. If the Palestinian sages of the first and second century could not condemn a rebellious son to death as the Pentateuch had ordered, how could a medieval parent condemn an innocent babe to death on its basis?!… Soloveitchik then proceeds to eloquently explicate how inconceivably horrific to a medieval Jewish parent would the thought of his child growing up Christian have been, and then concludes: Of all the arguments, that of the rebellious son is the most absurd and at the same time the truest. What had been inconceivable to the Palestinian sages of the first and second century – How could one predict with absolute certainty that a child would become a murderer?! – had become only too real for the tiny Jewish minority in medieval Europe. They could predict with frightening accuracy that a child would live a life of crime and infamy. Death in this world was a small price to pay to forestall a life of sin and death for an eternity; any caring parent would pay that price willingly. The fundamental problem with Soloveitchik’s argument here is that the Palestinian sages of the first and second centuries said no such thing! The passage in question states: מתניתין: … רבי יהודה אומר אם לא היתה אמו ראויה לאביו אינו נעשה בן סורר ומורה: מאי אינה ראויה … אלא בשוה לאביו קאמר תניא נמי הכי רבי יהודה אומר אם לא היתה אמו שוה לאביו בקול ובמראה ובקומה אינו נעשה בן סורר ומורה מאי טעמא דאמר קרא איננו שומע בקלנו מדקול בעינן שוין מראה וקומה נמי בעינן שוין כמאן אזלא הא דתניא בן סורר ומורה לא היה ולא עתיד להיות ולמה נכתב דרוש וקבל שכר כמאן כרבי יהודה איבעית אימא רבי שמעון היא דתניא אמר רבי שמעון וכי מפני שאכל זה תרטימר בשר ושתה חצי לוג יין האיטלקי אביו ואמו מוציאין אותו לסקלו אלא לא היה ולא עתיד להיות ולמה נכתב דרוש וקבל שכר אמר רבי יונתן אני ראיתיו וישבתי …על קברו

While a simple reading of the Gemara indicates merely that R. Yehudah and R. Shimon are setting forth technical reasons for the impossibility, or at least implausibility, of an actual Soloveitchik apparently ,בן סורר ומורה occurrence of a understands that they are actually objecting in principle to and are therefore finding ,בן סורר ומורה the very idea of the excuses to empty the law of practical significance. He, however, marshals not a shred of evidence for this reading. Moreover, we have seen that the Gemara subsequently cites a Beraisa which makes an identically worded assertion about the Is there some overwhelming .בית המנוגע impossibility of a ethical objection to that law, too? It is important to note that the issue is not the plausibility or even correctness of Soloveitchik’s reading of the Gemara; the key question is merely whether Rav Moshe of Zurich (and the Ra’aviyah, if the attribution to him is correct) could have reasonably understood it in the way they did without a need to arrive at a predetermined conclusion. Insofar as the answer is in the affirmative, there is no basis whatsoever for terming the argument ‘absurd.’ Additionally, Soloveitchik neglects to mention the fact that are apparently minority בן סורר ומורה these statements about opinions and not normative! Rambam (Commentary to the Mishnah ibid. 71b), Meiri (ibid.) and Rav Ovadyah of Bartenura (ibid. 8:4) all state that the Halachah does not follow R. Yehudah. [I have not seen them, or anyone else, discuss whether the Halachah follows R. Shimon, perhaps for the very reason that his statement, contra Soloveitchik, is not prescriptive in the first place, and is merely expressing an assessment of the This .בן סורר ומורה unlikelihood of an actual occurence of a is indeed the understanding of Remah, as we shall see below.] בן סורר ומורה Moreover, Rambam’s codification of the laws of does not include the statements of R. Yehudah and R. Shimon, and it does not contain the slightest indication that the laws .(יד החזקה ממרים פרק ז) have no practical application The only clue that Soloveitchik gives as to the basis of his reading of the Gemara is a footnote reference to Professor Moshe Halbertal’s Interpretative Revolutions in the Making: Values as Interpretative Considerations in Midrashei Halakhah. Here is how Halbertal understands R. Yehudah’s statement: תשובה אחרת והפוכה לדגם של גזרת מלך מצויה בתוספתא בדברי התנא קמא: ‘בן סורר ומורה לא היה ולא עתיד להיות’. כמו רבי שמעון בן אלעזר, תנא זה אינו מקבל את טענת ‘נדון על שם סופו’, אלא מציע לשאלת ‘וכי מפני…’ תשובה שונה לחלוטין מגזרת הכתוב. תשובה זו היא הקיצונית ביותר מבחינת המשקל שהיא מייחסת לטיעון מוסרי בפרשנות, … .ומהווה מודל שלישי של תגובה לבעיה המוסרית הטבועה בסוגייתינו מדרשו של רבי יהודה … ודאי אינו נובע מהבנת הצמידות ‘אביו ואמו’ כפשוטה, שהרי צמידות זאת אינו מחייבת זהות מוחלטת בין ההורים אלא …השתתפות שניהם בפעולת התפיסה

בגישת רבי יהודה התנאים וההגבלות שנוצרו הם שרירותיים מבחינת תוכנם: אין כל טעם פנימי בדרישה שהוריו של הבן יהיו זהים בקולם, במראם ובקומתם. מטרתן של הגבלות אלו היא אפוא ביטול מימושה של (p. 59) .הפרשה

That which is self-evident to Professor Halbertal appears quite dubious to me; what evidence is there that R. Yehudah’s requirement of physical identity between the parents stems from anything other than technical textual, exegetical considerations? Indeed, the Gemara actually states similar requirements for the two Se’irim of Yom Ha’Kippurim and the יומא דף ס”ב ע”א – ע”ב, ועיין תוספות) two Zipporim of a Mezora Although Halbertal .(ישנים שם, ציינו בגליון הש”ס בסנהדרין might argue that the derivations of the Gemara for those laws (inferences from linguistic superfluities) are more compelling than R. Yehudah’s, I think that anyone familiar with Talmudic exegesis must concede that it often involves textual arguments that we would not consider particularly compelling. Rav Meir Ha’Levi Abulafia (Remah) elaborates slightly on R. :(יד רמה סנהדרין שם ד”ה מתניתין) Yehudah’s exegesis מאי טעמא דאמר קרא איננו שומע בקולינו משמע שני גופין וקול אחד ומאי קאמר קרא על כרחיך שוין קאמר ומדקול בעינן שוין מראה וקומה :נמי בעינן שוין Remah seems to assume that R. Yehudah is engaged in typical and straightforward textual exegesis. Halbertal continues with an analysis of R. Shimon’s position: בהמשך מציע התלמוד זיהוי אחר לתנא הגורס ‘לא היה ולא עתיד :’להיות אי בעית אימא רבי שמעון היא, דתניא אמר רבי שמעון וכי מפני שאכל זה תרטימר בשר ושתה חצי לוג יין האיטלקי אביו ואמו מוציאים אותו לסקלו? אלא לא היה ולא עתיד להיות, ולמה נכתכ, דרוש וקבל שכר. .אמר רבי יונתן אני ראיתיו וישבתי על קברו

ישנן שני דרכים להבין את שאלת רבי שמעון ותשובתו. אפשר ששאלת רבי שמעון היא הבעיה המוסרית ‘וכי מפני …’, ותשובתו – הפרשה לא ניתנה ליישום אלא ‘דרוש וקבל שכר’. לפי פירוש זה, בפנינו מתודה פרשנות מרחיקת לכת. שלא כרבי יהודה, שדורש את הביטוי ‘אביו ואמו’ ובאמצעיתו יוצר תנאים המונעים את חלות הפרשה, רבי שמעון אינו נזקק לדרשת הפסוקים אלא קובע מתוך הערכה כוללת שאין הם ישימים. לפי רבי שמעון, אין הפרשה עצמה קובעת את התנאים ההופכים אותה לבלתי אפשרית. לדעתו, העובדה שקיימת פה בעיה מוסרית מלמדת שאין ליישם פרשה זאת. הפרשן אינו נתלה בכתוב כלשהו כדי לבטל את הפרשה מתוכה: דיו בהעלאת השאלה ובהכרעה שהיא ניתנה ללימוד ולא למעשה, טיעון שגם אותו אין הוא מוכיח מהכתובים עצמם…מובן שאפשרות זאת בדברי רבי שמעון יוצרת תקדיש מדהים של חירות פרשנות שעל פיו אין .כלל צורך בפירוש, אך קיימת אפשרות אחרת בהבנת דבריו

האפשרות השנייה היא ששאלת ‘וכי מפני שאכל תרטימר בשר ושתה חצי לוג יין האיטלקי אביו ואמו מוציאין אותו לסקלו?!’ אינה שאלה מוסרית אלא שאלה אמפירית. לפי הפירוש האמפירי, לא ייתכן שהורים יקשו את לבם ויוציאו את בנם להיסקל בגלל מעשים כאלו, ומתוך כך אפשר להסיק שהפרשה ניתנה ללימוד ולא לעשייה. פירוש זה נסמך על כך ששאלת ‘וכי מפני …’ בנוסחה זאת אינה גורסת: ‘אמרה תורה יוציאוהו בית דין ליסקל’, אלא במקום ‘בית דין’ מופיע הביטוי ‘הוריו’. בדבריו של רבי שמעון אין אפוא בעיה מוסרית אלא קביעה אמפירית – שלא מצויים הורים כאלה שיוציאו את בנם להיסקל. עמדתו של רבי שמעון אינה משקפת אפוא שינוי ערכים אלא שינוי חברתי, ומה שנראה …באפשרות מעשית במקרא נהפך לגביו לדבר אשר לא ייעשה

Halbertal himself concedes that his former interpretation of R. Shimon is quite radical, and indeed, entirely uncompelled by the text, since he admits that there is an alternative reading, which he offers no reason for rejecting, and for which he actually suggests some support from the Gemara’s language. Moreover, he himself notes that Remah understands the Gemara according to this latter ’empirical’ interpretation: ואיבעית תימא רבי שמעון דסבירא ליה דמילתא דלא שכיחא היא דליתו ליה אבוה ואמיה לבי דינא למרגמניה משום דאכל תרטימר בשר ושתה חצי לוג יין אבל לרבנן אף על גב דאינו נעשה בן סורר ומורה עד שיהו שניהם רוצים קסברי רבנן דלאו מילתא דלאו שכיחא היא דליתו ליה למרגמניה משום דמסקי אדעתייהו מאי סלקא ליה לבסוף: (יד רמה (סנהדרין שם ד”ה מתניתין Rabbi Eliezer Berkovitz apparently also understands the Gemara similarly to Professors Halbertal and Soloveitchik … occasionally the ethical conscience of Halakha weakened the very purpose of the law and even declared it completely nonoperative. … There was the case of the “stubborn and rebellious son” who was a “glutton and a drunkard” and did not listen to the voice of his parents. If his father and mother together agreed that there was no other course for them but to hand him over to “the elders of the city,” then – says the Bible – he should be put to death. “So shalt thou put away the evil from the midst of thee; and all Israel shall hear, and fear”…

One may judge such a law rather cruel. From the beginning it required a justifying explanation. It was said that the “stubborn and rebellious son” was put to death because of his threatening end. … The regulations attached to the law by the teachers of the Halakha were so numerous and so meticulous that even if one had followed the biblical injunction, in practice the law would have been implemented very seldom. In fact, Rabbi Shimeon, one of the halakhic authorities of the Mishnaic period, declared that a case of the “stubborn and rebellious son” never happened and would never happen. The reason he gave had nothing to do with Halakha. For, “because this son ate meat to the value of a Tartemor [an old Greek coin] and drank half a Log [a large liquid measure] of good Italian wine, his parents would hand him over to be stoned to death!” Such things do not happen. The law may say what it pleases; it has no application in human experience. Another Mishnaic teacher, Rabbi Y’huda, went even further. He “interpreted” the biblical text in such a manner as to show that if you followed its literal meaning, it would hardly be possible to make any use of this law. …

And now follows the most surprising conclusion of this entire discussion. “If so, why was it written [i.e. why was the law given at all]?” The answer is: “To interpret it [showing that it was not meant to be implemented] and to receive reward [from God] for its study.” As if it had been a test for the intelligence and the conscience of the student and the teacher.

A similar “interpretation” was also placed on another law of the Torah. The Bible decreed that if an entire city is led astray to idol worship by some of its inhabitants, it should be destroyed, including its inhabitants and all of their property. The law was an expression of Judaism’s desperate struggle against polytheism. Faith in the One God was the raison d’etre of Jewish existence. Without monotheism there could be no Jewish people. Yet to destroy an entire city was not an easy matter. Thus we hear that this law was never enacted. “Ir Ha’Nidahat [the destruction of the city led astray] – it never was, nor will it ever be.” How so? The answer is that the Bible says: “And thou shalt gather all the spoil of it into the midst of the broad place thereof and shalt burn with fire the city …” … Therefore, this Mitsva was given “in order to be ‘interpreted’ and to be rewarded” for an interpretation that shows that the law was never meant to be applied. (Not In Heaven, pp. 28 – 31. I am indebted to Michael Makovi for bringing this passage to my attention.).

Rabbi Berkovitz, too, fails to provide any convincing argument for these rather dubious readings of the Gemara (and he, too, conveniently neglects to address the third Halachah about the law of ,לא היה ולא עתיד להיות which the Gemara declares Mezora). Returning to Soloveitchik, I reiterate that it is crucial to remember that the issue at hand is not the modern academic understanding of the Gemara, or even the correct interpretation of the Gemara. [I absolutely refuse to bracket the word ‘correct’ with irony quotes.] The issue is simply how medieval scholars would have naturally, in the absence of a “perception shaped by cultural norms”, understood the Gemara. I have argued that neither Halbertal, nor Soloveitchik, nor Berkovitz have provided any basis, other than their own judgments, for their fairly radical reading of the Gemara in the first place, let alone for Soloveitchik’s assumption that the Rishonim read (or should have read) it that way. Additionally, as I mentioned earlier, Soloveitchik ignores the fact that the positions of R. Yehudah and R. Shimon are not normative (a point not denied by Halbertal). In summary, it is unacceptable to dismiss out of hand the reasoning of the Rishonim on the basis of speculative and uncompelling interpretations of what are anyway non-normative Talmudic statements.

Jews, Drinking & Kiddush Clubs

The popular press, in this case Newsweek, does not always get Jewish practices correct. Newsweek just published ashort piece on Jewish drinking and specifically mention “Kiddush clubs.” While the article makes it appear that this is a new problem, (and to be fair, it seems that is what they were erronously told by those they spoke with), in fact, as is almost always the case, ain hadash tachas ha-shemesh – there is nothing new under the sun. First, the article claims that “Jews don’t drink – much. Historically, Jews have not had alcohol problems to the extent as some other religious groups.” This claim, that Jews don’t drink, echos the erroneous assertions of some non-Jews, especially during the temperance movement of the 19th and early 20th century in the United States. Much of the temperance movement was lead by certain Christians and pointed to Jews or more specifically the Old Testament in suport of banning alcohol. One particularly egregious mistake in doing so was to misinterpret the prohibitions of Passover. That is, the problem that some in the temperance movement were required to deal with is if Jesus drank wine at the Last Supper, then how can wine be bad? To answer this, some pointed to “Jewish” practice. Specifically, they noted that the Last Supper took place on Passover, “and we know that the Jews were scrupulous in using at this ceremony none but unleavened bread andunfermented wine.” Of course, while leavened bread is prohibited there is no related prohibition on fermented wine.[1] Professor Hayim Solovetick has shown that historically Jews were involved in the wine business and drank as much as their non-Jewish neighbors. These facts may have affected certain halachik rulings. This does not mean that Jews must drink alcoholic beverages. Although wine is mandated for numerous rituals, according to most, grape juice suffices. For this point we again turn back to the temperance movement and this time the effect of the 18th Amendment. The 18th Amendment prohibited the consumption of alcohol. However, the National Prohibition Act carved out an exemption that allowed for consumption for “religious rites.” As a consequence, there was a market for fraudulent rabbis and other religious figures that would permit the otherwise prohibited. To counter these scofflaws, R. Levi Ginzburg,[2] penned a responsum arguing that grape juice sufficed to Jewish religious purposes. This responsum remains the most comprehensive discussion of grape juice in Jewish law. Isaac Wise, authored an essay discussing the topic of how Judaism views being a teetotaler. Wise rejects this practice. Wise notes that “Isaiah, upbraiding the weakness of his people says: ‘Thy wine is adulterated with water.’ and the Psalmist sings: ‘And wine gladdens the heart of man.'” Wise continues and highlights the use of mishteh“ , ‘a drinking occasion.” Accordingly, Wise explains that since “Moses and the Talmud are not opposed to the use of wine or strong drink. The Jew might consider it superfluous to be more orthodox than Moses, the prophets, or the rabbis of old.” Wise further argues that if the reason for prohibiting drink is due to the harm that may come from overindulging, there is a much more pernicious “evil” that of the amassment of wealth. Wise claims that “the wildest imagination [is] too feeble to depict a mere fraction of the woes and crimes caused by money. It makes rogues of honest men, and villains of generous souls . . . Money makes slaves, hypocrites, gamblers, thieves . . . [it] ruins virtue, beguiles innocences.” Thus, Wise concludes that “the use of wine or strong drink as a beverage is no moral wrong . . . the abuse of religion and prayer is worse than the abuse of liquor, [and] the present crusade [of temperance] will not remedy the evil; it is contrary to law and liberty, and it makes us ridiculous in the eyes of the civilized world.” As was the case with Wise, there can be no doubt that drinking has been a controversial topic for one reason or another. One of the more well-known cases of censorship relates to a ruling on wine. The Rama’s responsum on the consumption of ya’yin nesach was removed in most of the editions of his responsa. This responsum was so unknown that some charged the Rama never authored it and it was a forgery.[3] But we need not go so far afield as ya’yin nesach to find controversy. As is mentioned in the article, there are those who participate in Kiddush clubs and, (as would be expected), there are those who question such gatherings. What no one appears to mention is that the Kiddush club is not a recent invention. Instead, from at least mid-sixteenth century, such gatherings took place. Specifically, R. Moshe Yitzhak M’zia (1530-1600, most of his responsa were authored between 1560-80) in his Yefeh Nof was asked About the custom of the bachurim on Shabbat to leave the synagogue after the Torah is removed from the ark to drink whisky before the mussaf, is this permitted? If they do not sit down for a meal this is permitted because the law does not follow Rav Huna who prohibits tasting prior to mussaf.[4] According to this responsum, groups would leave to drink during the prayers.[5][5] From this responsum we can glean a few important facts about the custom during that period. First, such gatherings probably would not be called Kiddush clubs because they did not make Kiddush at all. Second, R. M’zia does not condemn the practice and expresses no outrage or suggestion that it stop. Instead, it appears so long as it was halachikally ok, R. M’zia was unwilling to challenge this practice. [1] For more on the topic of unfermented wine (raisin wine) on Passover and its connection with the temperance movement see Jonathan Sarna, “Passover Raisin Wine, The American Temperance Movement, and Mordechai Noah,” HUCA, 59 (1988), 269-88. Additionally, see the fascinating article by Hannah Sprecher, “‘Let Them Drink and Forget Our Poverty’: Orthodox Rabbis React to Prohibition,” American Jewish Archives 43:2 (Fall- Winter, 1991): 134–179. Sprecher discusses the one Orthodox response to Ginzberg. Id. at 158. See, as well, Marni Davis, “‘On the Side of Liquor’: American Jews and the Politics of Alcohol, 1870-1936,” (PhD dissertation, Emory University, 2006), esp. chap. five (“‘A House Divided Against Itself’: American Jews Respond to Prohibition”), 190-250. Finally, see J. David Bleich, Contemporary Halakhic Problems, vol. V, 2005, chap. viii, “The Whiskey Brouhaha,” where he takes issue with the monkier used by a drinking club – the Glatt Cigar Society. Aside from actually drinking, Jews also authored parodies on drinking. One such parody is devoted to prohibition Gerson Kiss, Massekhet Prohibishon (Brooklyn, 1929), a description of which is found in in Sharon Liberman Mintz & Gabriel M. Goldstein, eds., Printing the Talmud: From Bomberg to Schottenstein (New York: Yeshiva University Museum, 2005), 300. And, Y. Friedlander, the possible author of the well- known forgery Yerushalim on Seder Kodshim, also authored a drinking parody. This parody, however, focused on the hassidic custom of drinking for the purposes of tikkun. The parody is titled Sefer ha-Tikkun and is a “Shulhan Orakh” on all the various times and occasions to make atikkun . See Baruch Oberlander, “Ha-Yerushalmi le-Seder Kodshim vehaMotzei le-Or Shelo,” Or Yisrael 15 (1999), 174-75; see also Boaz Haas, Ke- Zohar ha-Rakiyah, Jerusalem, 2008, 353 n.330 who also discusses the Sefer ha-Tikkun. For other examples of parodies see Eliezer Brodt’s post on the topic here. [2] As an aside, it worth noting that Ginzburg was originally a student of Telz Yeshiva and later in life went on to teach at JTS. However, after Telz relocated to the United States, he helped with the publication of the Teshuvot R. Eliezer from R. Eliezer Gordon, Rosh ha-Yeshiva of Telz. Ginsburg was thanked in the back of this edition in a full page, it appears that in some copies, (perhaps those disturbed to Telz students) Ginzberg’s name was pasted over. Additionally, on the topic of Ginzburg and Telz Yeshiva, Ginzburg authored an excellent five volume work on the Yerushalmi, Pirushim ve-Hiddushim al ha-Yerushalmi. R. Gifter and Ginzberg carried on a correspondence regarding this work which still remains in manuscript – but is facinating in its content.[3] See Y.S. Speigel, Amudim be-Tolodot Sefer ha- Ivri Ketivah ve-haTakah, Ramat Gan, 2005, 273 and the notes therein.[4] This responsum was first published by Assaf in his Mekorot l’Tolodot ha-Hinukh be-Yisrael, (in the original version it appears in vol. 4. no. 39:6, p. 43 and in the latest version, edited by Shmuel Glick, Jerusalem, 2002, it appears in vol. 1. P. 111). R. M’zia’s responsa remained in manuscript until 1986 when Mechon Yerushalim published them. This edition includes a biography of R. M’zia by Professor Eric Zimmer. Additionally, Zimmer authored an article on M’zia. See E. Zimmer, “The book Yefeh Nof of R. Yitzhak M’zia,” Kiryat Sefer 56 (1981), 529-545; E. Zimmer, Gahalaton shel Hakhamim, Jerusalem, 1999, 84-105.[5] This is distinct from the custom of stopping the prayers and everyone, not just the bachurim, going home to eat a snack and then study prior to the start of the Torah reading; this custom is discussed at length by R. Y Goldhaver. See R. Y. Goldhaver, Minhagei ha- Kehilot, Jerusalem, 2005, vol. 1, 200-208. R. Goldhaver’s work includes notes by the prolific and encyclopedic R. Shmuel Ashkenazi. On this topic of taking a break during services, Ashkenazi notes that Goldhaver made a common bibliographic mistake of attributing the Shu”t Hut ha-Meshulush to the author of the Tashbetz, R. Shimon b. Tzemach Duran, because both works were published together. See R. Shmuel Ashkenazi comments id., vol. 2, 316.