Hafez Al-Assad's Seizure of Power Despite the 1967
Strife Journal, Issue 11 (Autumn 2019) Hafez al-Assad’s Seizure of Power Despite the 1967 War Defeat: On the Importance of Friends, Loyalty, and Fear in the Ba’th Regimes Merve Kania* Abstract Some fifty years after the 1967-war, the former Defence Minister Hafez al-Assad’s role in Syria’s military tactics that lead to the loss of both the war and Syrian territory and which impacts these decisions had for Assad’s subsequent acquisition of power (usually dated at 1970) are still largely unknown. Drawing from the most rigorous secondary material on the former Syrian Ba’th regimes, this article argues that a post-defeat fear of regime break-down and frustration created conditions that allowed Assad to successively gain ruling power with the aid of loyal friends and family members over the course of the following five years. Keywords: 1967 war, Syria, regime formation, seizure group, loyalty, friendship, fear, emotions. Introduction The 1967 War (also known as ‘Six-Day War’, ‘June War’, or ‘Third Arab-Israeli War’) is considered as one of the, if not the, most impactful war in the history of the Middle East.1 The fact that Israel *Acknowledgements: I thank Dr. Reinoud Leenders for his guidance, support, and useful comments on an earlier version of this paper. 1 The 1967 War is also discussed for its impact on the demise of ‘Arab Nationalism’ and the rise of political Islam in the Middle East. For accounts that view the 1967 War as the primary cause of the two, see: B. Tibi, Arab Nationalism: Between Islam and the Nation-State, 3rd ed (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1997), p.
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