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Hankook Tire (Buy/TP: W61,000) Reinstate Market Cap (Wbn) Profits Starting to Improve Value KOSPI 1,095,619 LG Corp

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Hankook Tire (Buy/TP: W61,000) Reinstate Market Cap (Wbn) Profits Starting to Improve Value KOSPI 1,095,619 LG Corp November 2, 2012 KOREA Morning Company News & Analysis Major Indices Close Chg Chg (%) LS Industrial Systems (Buy/TP: W81,000) KOSPI 1,898.44 -13.62 -0.71 3Q review: Overseas performance lifts revenues and OP KOSPI 200 247.83 -2.35 -0.94 KOSDAQ 508.83 0.52 0.10 CJ Korea Express (Buy/TP: W150,000) Raise TP Expecting synergies from merger with CJ GLS in 2013 Turnover ('000 shares, Wbn) Volume Value DGB Financial Group (Buy/TP: W18,800) KOSPI 396,216 5,177 If only margins would recover… KOSPI 200 78,956 3,978 KOSDAQ 399,044 1,796 Hankook Tire (Buy/TP: W61,000) Reinstate Market Cap (Wbn) Profits starting to improve Value KOSPI 1,095,619 LG Corp. (Buy/TP: W90,000) KOSDAQ 111,196 Valuation likely to recover gradually KOSPI Turnover (Wbn) Buy Sell Net CJ CheilJedang (Buy/TP: W420,000) Foreign 1,285 1,104 181 Regaining industry leadership? Institutional 1,343 1,699 -355 Retail 2,514 2,352 162 Samsung C&T (Buy/TP: W77,000) Lower TP Lackluster earnings, but attractive valuation KOSDAQ Turnover (Wbn) Buy Sell Net Foreign 66 72 -7 Sector News & Analysis Institutional 107 76 31 Auto (Overweight) Retail 1,619 1,645 -25 October auto sales Program Buy / Sell (Wbn) Buy Sell Net KOSPI 903 821 83 Economy & Strategy Update KOSDAQ 13 13 0 Fixed Income Monthly (Factor) Advances & Declines The upside of yields should be limited Advances Declines Unchanged KOSPI 308 506 74 Economic Analysis KOSDAQ 378 534 73 Hard to find momentum KOSPI Top 5 Most Active Stocks by Value (Wbn) Price (W) Chg (W) Value Hyundai Motor 216,000 -8,500 482 KODEX LEVERAGE 11,345 -235 367 Samsung Electronics 1,297,000 -13,000 271 Hynix 25,500 650 211 Kia Motors 60,100 -500 192 KOSDAQ Top 5 Most Active Stocks by Value (Wbn) Price (W) Chg (W) Value Mobilians 12,350 1,600 109 Openbase 2,785 25 74 INICIS 12,600 900 71 Danal 12,750 1,400 60 KCP 13,400 950 26 Note: As of November 1, 2012 This document is a summary of a report prepared by Daewoo Securities Co., Ltd. („Daewoo‰) and published on our website. Please review the compliance notices contained in the original report. Information and opinions contained herein have been compiled in good faith from sources deemed to be reliable. However, the information has not been independently verified. Daewoo makes no guarantee, representation or warranty, express or implied, as to the fairness, accuracy or completeness of the information and opinions contained in this document. Daewoo accepts no responsibility or liability whatsoever for any loss arising from the use of this document or its contents or otherwise arising in connection therewith. Information and opinions contained herein are subject to change without notice. This document is for informational purposes only. It is not and should not be construed as an offer or solicitation of an offer to purchase or sell any securities or other financial instruments. This document may not be reproduced, further distributed or published in whole or in part for any purpose. Company November 1, 2012 Machinery (010120 KS) LS Industrial Systems Daewoo Securities Co., Ltd. Ki-jong Sung 3Q review: Overseas performance raised up revenues and OP +822-768-3263 [email protected] Maintain Buy call with TP of W81,000 Ryan Kang +822-768-3065 We reiterate our Buy rating on LS Industrial Systems (LSIS) with a target price of [email protected] W81,000. We are maintaining our Buy call because the company posted robust 3Q results in line with our estimates and as earnings are likely to stay solid through 4Q. Furthermore, the company boasts strong competitiveness, stable business operations, and rosy growth prospects. As such, we believe LSIS is a good defensive play amid an uncertain stock market. Buy (Maintain) Target Price (12M, W) 81,000 LSIS shares are trading at a 2013F P/E of 11.1x, which is lower than the average P/E Share Price (10/31/12, W) 68,200 (11.9x) of the companyÊs global peers (pure electric equipment players in their Expected Return (%) 18.8 respective countries). We believe LSIS shares deserve a premium to the KOSPI, EPS Growth (12F, %) 95.3 given that global peers are trading at a 20~30% premium to their respective stock Market EPS Growth (12F, %) 9.0 markets on the back of their monopolistic positions, noncyclical nature, and stability. P/E (12F, x) 14.9 Market P/E (12F, x) 10.2 3Q review: Revenues of W573.8bn (up 16.9% YoY); OP of W50.9bn (up 205.4% KOSPI 1,912.06 YoY) Market Cap (Wbn) 2,046 Shares Outstanding (mn) 30 In 3Q, LSIS posted revenues of W573.8bn (up 16.9% YoY), an operating profit of Avg Trading Volume (60D, '000) 80 W50.9bn (up 205.4% YoY), and a net profit of W34.9bn, under consolidated K-IFRS. Avg Trading Value (60D, Wbn) 5 OP margin rose 0.3%p QoQ and 5.5%p YoY to 8.9%, thanks to 1) enhanced Dividend Yield (12F, %) 0.0 profitability at LS MetalÊs thick stainless steel pipe business, and 2) improved Free Float (%) 51.8 product mix due to increased sales of high-end products. 52-Week Low (W) 50,200 52-Week High (W) 71,800 3Q revenues jumped YoY, driven by: 1) surges in domestic revenues and exports at Beta (12M, Daily Rate of Return) 1.13 the electric equipment division and the automation division (flagship business), 2) Price Return Volatility (12M Daily, %, SD) 2.1 the continuous hyper growth of overseas electric systems division, and 3) robust Foreign Ownership (%) 10.1 Major Shareholder(s) solar PV revenues in Japan. In addition, the companyÊs margin improvement was LS (46%) aided by: 1) greater sales of high-margin electric equipment and EPC, 2) stable raw NPS (8.83%) material prices, and 3) LS MetalÊs robust earnings. Capital Research and Management Company (CRMC) et al. (5.12%) 4Q preview: Earnings to stay robust Price Performance (%) 1M 6M 12M At end-3Q, LSISÊ order backlog stood at W1.1tr (vs. W720bn of 2011). The company Absolute -2.3 18.0 23.1 is projected to record favorable earnings in 4Q, from the recognition of growing Relative 1.9 21.5 22.9 exports to Iraq and a surge in thick stainless steel (a new product) orders. It should Key Business be noted that LSIS is displaying robust growth despite the economic slump, thanks LS Industrial Systems is diversifying its to its strong product competitiveness, high market share, and preemptive capacity business areas to include electric power equipments, electric power systems, ramp-ups. transportation system, and automation equipments. The company owns LS Metal and offshore electric power equipment facilities in China. FY Revenues OP OP Margin NP EPS EBITDA FCF ROE P/E P/B EV/EBITDA Share price (Wbn) (Wbn) (%) (Wbn) (Won) (Wbn) (Wbn) (%) (X) (X) (X) 130 KOSPI 12/10 1,835 174 9.5 123 4,112 222 -121 17.9 22.0 4.1 14.0 120 12/11 2,071 128 6.2 70 2,346 201 -43 9.4 28.4 3.0 12.2 110 12/12F 2,305 203 8.8 138 4,582 265 -17 16.6 14.9 2.7 9.7 100 12/13F 2,698 251 9.3 184 6,123 318 64 18.9 11.1 2.3 8.0 90 12/14F 3,157 322 10.2 241 8,036 388 168 21.0 8.5 2.0 6.2 80 Note: All figures are based on consolidated K-IFRS; NP refers to net profit attributable to controlling interests 10/11 2/12 6/12 10/12 Source: Company data, KDB Daewoo Securities Research estimates This document is a summary of a report prepared by Daewoo Securities Co., Ltd. („Daewoo‰) and published on our website. Please review the compliance notices contained in the original report. Information and opinions contained herein have been compiled in good faith from sources deemed to be reliable. However, the information has not been independently verified. Daewoo makes no guarantee, representation or warranty, express or implied, as to the fairness, accuracy or completeness of the information and opinions contained in this document. Daewoo accepts no responsibility or liability whatsoever for any loss arising from the use of this document or its contents or otherwise arising in connection therewith. Information and opinions contained herein are subject to change without notice. This document is for informational purposes only. It is not and should not be construed as an offer or solicitation of an offer to purchase or sell any securities or other financial instruments. This document may not be reproduced, further distributed or published in whole or in part for any purpose. Company November 2, 2012 Transportation CJ Korea Express (000120 KS) Daewoo Securities Co., Ltd. Jay JH Ryu Expecting synergies from merger with CJ GLS in 2013 +822-768-4175 [email protected] Raise TP to W150,000; Maintain Buy call We maintain our Buy call on CJ Korea Express (Korex), and raise our target price to W150,000 (from W105,000). We expect KorexÊs parcel delivery market share to continue to rise because top-tier firms remain dominant in this market. We also expect the company to create synergies from its merger with CJ GLS scheduled for 2013. From a long-term perspective, the companyÊs international expansion is expected to fuel top-line growth. Our target price, which was derived using a Buy (Maintain) residual income model (RIM), corresponds to a 2013F P/B of 1.6x and a 2013F P/E Target Price (12M, W) 150,000 of 24.9x.
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