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Buddhist Spiritual Practices Buddhist Spiritual Practices Thinking with Pierre Hadot on Buddhism, Philosophy, and the Path Edited by David V. Fiordalis Mangalam Press Berkeley, CA Mangalam Press 2018 Allston Way, Berkeley, CA USA www.mangalampress.org Copyright © 2018 by Mangalam Press. All rights reserved. No part of this work may be copied, reproduced, published, distributed, or stored electronically, photographically, or optically in any form without the prior written permission of the publisher. ISBN: 978-0-89800-117-4 Library of Congress Control Number: 2018930282 Mangalam Press is an imprint of Dharma Publishing. The cover image depicts a contemporary example of Tibetan Buddhist instructional art: the nine stages on the path of “calming” (śamatha) meditation. Courtesy of Exotic India, www.exoticindia.com. Used with permission. ♾ Printed on acid-free paper. This paper meets the requirements of ANSI/NISO Z39.48-1992 (Permanence of Paper). Printed in the USA by Dharma Press, Cazadero, CA 95421 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 Table of Contents Acknowledgments ix Introduction 1 David V. Fiordalis Comparisons with Buddhism Some Remarks on Hadot, Foucault, and 21 Steven Collins Schools, Schools, Schools—Or, Must a Philosopher be Like a Fish? 71 Sara L. McClintock The Spiritual Exercises of the Middle Way: Madhyamakopadeśa with Hadot Reading Atiśa’s 105 James B. Apple Spiritual Exercises and the Buddhist Path: An Exercise in Thinking with and against Hadot 147 Pierre-Julien Harter the Philosophy of “Incompletion” The “Fecundity of Dialogue” and 181 Maria Heim Philosophy as a Way to Die: Meditation, Memory, and Rebirth in Greece and Tibet 217 Davey K. Tomlinson Learning, Reasoning, Cultivating: The Practice of Wisdom and the Treasury of Abhidharma 245 David V. Fiordalis Bibliography 291 Contributors 327 Selected Titles from Dharma Publishing 331 Learning, Reasoning, Cultivating: The Practice of Wisdom and the Treasury of Abhidharma David V. Fiordalis How should we think about the place of philosophical discourse of philosophy, which just as obviously the Buddhist philosophers couldin notBuddhism? have shared, This atquestion, least not of in course, precisely assumes the same some terms, definition since they did not coin the term philosophy or borrow or translate it into their own languages, so far as we know, until the modern period (in Japan, for instance). It is clearly an etic question, a question “we” (contemporary persons, Buddhists or non-Buddhists, scholars, philosophers, students, inquirers) ask from outside the classical Buddhist philosophical tradition. We ask the question in order to understand something more about Buddhism, Buddhist philosophy, and philosophy itself. How should we answer it while still striving to appreciate and to convey an appreciation for classical Buddhist how particular Buddhist philosophers may themselves have concep- tualizedphilosophy and on answered its own terms?the question. We can In best this doessay, this weby willconsidering put the 1 question to Vasubandhu, an Indian Buddhist philosopher of the fourth-fifth century. in 1 Edward N. Zalta, ed., The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Spring 2017For Edition. an overview<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2017/entries/vasubandhu/>. of Vasubandhu, see Jonathan Gold, “Vasubandhu,” playfully as “perhaps the greatest Buddhist philosopher after the Buddha.” See (Lasthis Paving Accessed the GreatMarch Way 17, 2017.)(New York:Gold elsewhereColumbia describesUniversity Vasubandhu Press, 2015), somewhat 1. Some might argue whether the Buddha was a “philosopher” at all; others may have 245 246 Buddhist Spiritual Practices Since the essay engages in a thought experiment in translation hasand written,cross-cultural “we cannot interpretation, ask ourselves it begins what by Buddhistreflecting philosophy briefly on mightcertain be key without concepts, at the philosophy same time included. asking what“For,” itMatthew is that weKapstein mean 2 Readers will likely hold a variety of conceptions of philosophy; some may not see any difference between philosophy by ‘philosophy’.” attention to the distinction between a “problems and arguments” approachand philosophical to philosophy, discourse. which In he this says regard, still predominatesKapstein has indrawn aca- demic philosophy departments in the English-speaking world, and an alternative approach based on the work of Pierre Hadot, who argues for a more holistic conception of philosophy as a “way of life.” While the “problems and arguments” approach has gained currency in recent decades among western scholars as a means to engage the presentation of ancient philosophy provides a better model for understandingBuddhist philosophical Buddhist tradition, philosophy. Kapstein argues that Pierre Hadot’s essay on the value of philosophy. “Philosophy,” he says, “like all other studies,Consider aims primarily first whatat knowledge.” Bertrand3 InRussell this respect, writes philosophy,in a famous as which Russell includes history), giving them “unity and system,” while helpinga field of to “study,” “diminish works the alongside dogmatic “the assurance body of which the sciences” closes the (among mind different preferences. Many these days would seem to confer the title of “greatest Buddhist philosopher” upon Dharmakīrti; others in the past and today might favor Nāgārjuna. If not entirely fruitless, at least the debate serves to highlight a- shortlistdard to the of Tibetan“influential” Buddhist Buddhist monastic writers curriculum whose work today, became constituting standard two in of onethe way or another. For instance, works by Vasubandhu and Dharmakīrti remain stan monastic education, though the root text for its study in Tibetan monasteries is five main subjectMadhyamakāvatāra areas. Nāgārjuna’s (Introduction philosophy to also Middle remains Way Philosophycentral to Tibetan account of Tibetan monastic education in general, see George Dreyfus, The Sound ofCandrakīrti’s Two Hands Clapping (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003). ). For an Reason’s Traces (Boston: Wisdom Publications, 2001), 4. 2 Bertrand Russell, The Problems of Philosophy (London: Oxford University Press,3 Matthew 1913), Kapstein,154. 247 Learning, Reasoning, Cultivating against speculation.”4 Now, others may draw different conclusions In the same essay, he waxes eloquently upon “true philosophic contemplation”about Russell’s understandingof the universe of by philosophy which “the from mind his also body is rendered of work. great” and “becomes capable of that union with the universe which constitutes its highest good.”5 Yet, Russell’s vision of philosophy still academic,remains closely if speculative tied to scientific and theoretical, investigation exercise. and logical analysis, and thus forBy him contrast, philosophical Pierre activity Hadot appears has asserted largely that to be ancient a scientific philo- or sophers viewed philosophy as an all-encompassing way of life. Speaking at one point about the Stoics in particular, Hadot draws a contrast between philosophy as such and philosophical discourse, with the former being the “lived practice of the virtues of logic, physics, and ethics” and the latter being “discourse according to philosophy.”6 Although I have not seen Hadot cite it, the following passage from Manual aptly depicts the distinction Hadot wishes to attribute to the ancient philosophers: Epictetus’ topos) in philosophy is the use of theorems (precepts, theore- mataThe first), for and instance, most thatnecessary we must place not (part,lie. The second part is that of demonstrations, for instance, how is it proved that we ought not to lie. The third is that which is confirmatory of these two and explanatory,- for example, how is this a demonstration? For what is parta demonstration? (topic) is necessary What is consequence?on account of Whatthe second, is con tradiction, what is truth, what is falsehood? The third Russell,and Problems the second, 154, 161. on account of the first; but the most 54 Russell, Problems, 160, 161. Pierre Hadot, What is Ancient Philosophy? Michael Chase, trans. (Cam- bridge,6 MA: Harvard Belknap, 2002), 172; Hadot, Qu’est-ce que la philosophie antique? (Paris: Gallimard, 1995), 265: Les stoïciens distinguaient la philo- sophie, c’est-à-dire la pratique vécue des vertus qu’étaient pour eux la logique, la physique et l’éthique, et le «discours selon la philosophie», c’est-à-dire l’enseignement théorique de la philosophie . 248 Buddhist Spiritual Practices necessary and that on which we ought to rest is the the third topic, and all our earnestness is about it: but first. But we do the contrary. We spend our time on demonstration that we ought not to lie we have ready atwe hand. entirely7 neglect the first. Therefore, we lie, but the Here we see a different valuation of dogmatism and its assurances from what Russell seems to offer. Epictetus defends the central role dogmas or precepts play in living a philosophical life by invoking their practical application in situations of daily life. He contrasts this lived philosophy with philosophical discourse, and in doing so suggests that some kind of tension between what we might call “practice” and “theory” was alive even in his times. How then should we begin to conceptualize the relationship between philosophy, conceived, according to Hadot, as the Stoics did, as the lived practice of certain virtues, and philosophical discourse or - ing this relationship lies in the concept of “spiritual exercises.” Yet, preciselydiscourse whataccording Hadot to means philosophy? by
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