Buddhist Spiritual Practices
Thinking with Pierre Hadot on Buddhism, Philosophy, and the Path
Edited by David V. Fiordalis
Mangalam Press Berkeley, CA Mangalam Press 2018 Allston Way, Berkeley, CA USA www.mangalampress.org
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10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 Table of Contents
Acknowledgments ix Introduction
1 David V. Fiordalis
Comparisons with Buddhism Some Remarks on Hadot, Foucault, and 21 Steven Collins Schools, Schools, Schools—Or,
Must a Philosopher be Like a Fish? 71 Sara L. McClintock The Spiritual Exercises of the Middle Way: Madhyamakopadeśa with Hadot
Reading Atiśa’s 105 James B. Apple Spiritual Exercises and the Buddhist Path: An Exercise in Thinking with and against Hadot
147 Pierre-Julien Harter
the Philosophy of “Incompletion” The “Fecundity of Dialogue” and 181 Maria Heim Philosophy as a Way to Die: Meditation, Memory, and Rebirth in Greece and Tibet
217 Davey K. Tomlinson Learning, Reasoning, Cultivating: The Practice of Wisdom and the Treasury of Abhidharma
245 David V. Fiordalis Bibliography 291 Contributors 327 Selected Titles from Dharma Publishing 331
Learning, Reasoning, Cultivating: The Practice of Wisdom and the Treasury of Abhidharma
David V. Fiordalis
How should we think about the place of philosophical discourse of philosophy, which just as obviously the Buddhist philosophers couldin notBuddhism? have shared, This atquestion, least not of in course, precisely assumes the same some terms, definition since they did not coin the term philosophy or borrow or translate it into their own languages, so far as we know, until the modern period (in Japan, for instance). It is clearly an etic question, a question “we” (contemporary persons, Buddhists or non-Buddhists, scholars, philosophers, students, inquirers) ask from outside the classical Buddhist philosophical tradition. We ask the question in order to understand something more about Buddhism, Buddhist philosophy, and philosophy itself. How should we answer it while still striving to appreciate and to convey an appreciation for classical Buddhist
how particular Buddhist philosophers may themselves have concep- tualizedphilosophy and on answered its own terms?the question. We can In best this doessay, this we by will considering put the
1 question to Vasubandhu, an Indian Buddhist philosopher of the fourth-fifth century. in 1 Edward N. Zalta, ed., The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Spring 2017For Edition. an overview
playfully as “perhaps the greatest Buddhist philosopher after the Buddha.” See (Lasthis Paving Accessed the GreatMarch Way 17, 2017.)(New York:Gold elsewhereColumbia describesUniversity Vasubandhu Press, 2015), somewhat 1. Some might argue whether the Buddha was a “philosopher” at all; others may have
245 246
Buddhist Spiritual Practices Since the essay engages in a thought experiment in translation
hasand written, cross-cultural “we cannot interpretation, ask ourselves it begins what by Buddhist reflecting philosophy briefly on mightcertain be key without concepts, at the philosophy same time included. asking what“For,” itMatthew is that weKapstein mean 2 Readers will likely hold a variety of conceptions of philosophy; some may not see any difference between philosophy by ‘philosophy’.” attention to the distinction between a “problems and arguments” approachand philosophical to philosophy, discourse. which In he this says regard, still predominates Kapstein has in drawn aca- demic philosophy departments in the English-speaking world, and an alternative approach based on the work of Pierre Hadot, who argues for a more holistic conception of philosophy as a “way of life.” While the “problems and arguments” approach has gained currency in recent decades among western scholars as a means to engage the
presentation of ancient philosophy provides a better model for understandingBuddhist philosophical Buddhist tradition, philosophy. Kapstein argues that Pierre Hadot’s
essay on the value of philosophy. “Philosophy,” he says, “like all other studies,Consider aims primarily first whatat knowledge.” Bertrand3 In Russell this respect, writes philosophy, in a famous as
which Russell includes history), giving them “unity and system,” while helpinga field of to “study,” “diminish works the alongside dogmatic “the assurance body of which the sciences” closes the (among mind
different preferences. Many these days would seem to confer the title of “greatest
Buddhist philosopher” upon Dharmakīrti; others in the past and today might favor Nāgārjuna. If not entirely fruitless, at least the debate serves to highlight a- shortlistdard to the of Tibetan“influential” Buddhist Buddhist monastic writers curriculum whose work today, became constituting standard two in of onethe way or another. For instance, works by Vasubandhu and Dharmakīrti remain stan monastic education, though the root text for its study in Tibetan monasteries is five main subjectMadhyamakāvatāra areas. Nāgārjuna’s (Introduction philosophy to also Middle remains Way Philosophycentral to Tibetan account of Tibetan monastic education in general, see George Dreyfus, The Sound ofCandrakīrti’s Two Hands Clapping (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003). ). For an Reason’s Traces (Boston: Wisdom Publications, 2001), 4. 2 Bertrand Russell, The Problems of Philosophy (London: Oxford University Press,3 Matthew 1913), Kapstein,154. 247
Learning, Reasoning, Cultivating against speculation.”4 Now, others may draw different conclusions
In the same essay, he waxes eloquently upon “true philosophic contemplation”about Russell’s understandingof the universe of by philosophy which “the from mind his also body is rendered of work. great” and “becomes capable of that union with the universe which constitutes its highest good.”5
Yet, Russell’s vision of philosophy still academic,remains closely if speculative tied to scientific and theoretical, investigation exercise. and logical analysis, and thus forBy him contrast, philosophical Pierre activity Hadot appears has asserted largely that to be ancient a scientific philo- or sophers viewed philosophy as an all-encompassing way of life. Speaking at one point about the Stoics in particular, Hadot draws a contrast between philosophy as such and philosophical discourse, with the former being the “lived practice of the virtues of logic, physics, and ethics” and the latter being “discourse according to philosophy.”6 Although I have not seen Hadot cite it, the following passage from Manual aptly depicts the distinction Hadot wishes to attribute to the ancient philosophers: Epictetus’ topos) in philosophy is the use of theorems (precepts, theore- mataThe first), for andinstance, most that necessary we must place not (part,lie. The second part is that of demonstrations, for instance, how is it proved that we ought not to lie. The third is that
which is confirmatory of these two and explanatory,- for example, how is this a demonstration? For what is parta demonstration? (topic) is necessary What is consequence?on account of Whatthe second, is con tradiction, what is truth, what is falsehood? The third
Russell,and Problems the second, 154, 161. on account of the first; but the most 54 Russell, Problems, 160, 161. Pierre Hadot, What is Ancient Philosophy? Michael Chase, trans. (Cam- bridge,6 MA: Harvard Belknap, 2002), 172; Hadot, Qu’est-ce que la philosophie antique? (Paris: Gallimard, 1995), 265: Les stoïciens distinguaient la philo- sophie, c’est-à-dire la pratique vécue des vertus qu’étaient pour eux la logique, la physique et l’éthique, et le «discours selon la philosophie», c’est-à-dire l’enseignement théorique de la philosophie . . . 248
Buddhist Spiritual Practices necessary and that on which we ought to rest is the
the third topic, and all our earnestness is about it: but first. But we do the contrary. We spend our time on demonstration that we ought not to lie we have ready atwe hand. entirely7 neglect the first. Therefore, we lie, but the Here we see a different valuation of dogmatism and its assurances from what Russell seems to offer. Epictetus defends the central role dogmas or precepts play in living a philosophical life by invoking their practical application in situations of daily life. He contrasts this lived philosophy with philosophical discourse, and in doing so suggests that some kind of tension between what we might call “practice” and “theory” was alive even in his times. How then should we begin to conceptualize the relationship between philosophy, conceived, according to Hadot, as the Stoics did, as the lived practice of certain virtues, and philosophical discourse or - ing this relationship lies in the concept of “spiritual exercises.” Yet, preciselydiscourse whataccording Hadot to means philosophy? by the Forphrase Hadot, has the caused key to some understand debate.8
instance,When translated the English from word French “spiritual” into English, may the evoke phrase for takessome on readers a range a religiousof connotations dimension Hadot (a termmay ornot may without not have its own meant range to ofemphasize. connotations For in English), while others may sense a contrast with the physical body, whereas Hadot may intend something both broader and more ordinary.9
Epictetus, The Discourses of Epictetus; with the Encheiridion and Fragments. 7
GeorgeSee, Long, for instance, trans. (London: John Cooper, George PursuitsBell and ofSons, Wisdom 1890), (Princeton: 403. I have Princeton modified Long’s8 translation slightly for grammar and syntax. You Read: On Cooper, Hadot, Epictetus, and Stoicism as a Way of Life,” Philosophy TodayUniversity Press, 2012), but also Matthew Sharpe, “How It’s Not the Chrisippus Manual, only came to my attention in the latter58.3 (2014): stages of 367-392. editing thisThe chapter.latter article, which critiques Cooper’s reading of HadotOn this based point, on aI close believe reading that ofCooper Epictetus’ has done Hadot a disservice by dis- 9 for extending the term to cover “perfectly ordinary ways of getting oneself to allowingunderstand him the the real flexibility meaning of andhis usageimplications of the ofphrase. philosophical Cooper criticizesarguments Hadot and 249
Learning, Reasoning, Cultivating In his famous essay entitled “Spiritual Exercises,” Hadot settles on the term only after some deliberation. He entertains various alter- natives: thought exercises, intellectual exercises, ethical exercises, and chooses spiritual exercises, he later says, “because it leaves no doubt thatPaul weRabbow’s are dealing choice, with moral exercises exercises. which Dissatisfied engage the with totality them ofall, the he spirit.”10 entire psyche,” but also “the objective Spirit” or “the perspective of the Whole.”11 By It remainsspirit, he unclear earlier whethersays he means he wishes not toonly exclude “the individual’s the body or the individual and the universal. Perhaps he does, but elsewhere affirm a particular metaphysical position on the relationship between practices intended to bring about a transformation of the self.”12 Again,he defines with spiritual spirit and exercises self, we morerun into broadly questions as “voluntary, of translation personal and
apply them smoothly to situations in life as they may arise” and “activities of daily philosophical positions, to fix them in one’s mind and make oneself ready to physical theory, as well as Stoic ethical theory” (Pursuits, 402). Yet, re-envisioning lifesuch in “ordinary” which one practices infuses one’s and activitiesactions with as transformative one’s knowledge in lineof Stoic with logic a particular or Stoic setas “grounded of philosophical in sacred virtues texts isand precisely validated Hadot’s through point. intense And feelings notice ofhow conviction sharply Coopergenerated distinguishes in prayer or the in philosophicalthe sense of having from the a personal religious relationship life, defining to the a higher latter power” (Pursuits
Hadot, Philosophy, 21). Few as a scholars Way of Lifeof religion, much less Buddhism, would find suchMalden,10 a definition MA: Blackwell, adequate. 1995), 127; Hadot, Exercices spirituels et philosophie antique, 2nd Ed. (Paris: Études Augustiniennes,, Michael 1987), Chase, 60: trans.. . . parce (Oxford, qu’elle UK,marque and bien qu’il s’agit d’exercices que engagent tout l’esprit. See Hadot, Exercices spirituels, 14: tout le psychisme de l’individu latter11 phrases, Hadot has “l’Esprit objectif . . . la perspective du Tout . . . ” (14). Way of Life, 82. . For the Hadot, Ancient Philosophy, 179-180; La philosophie antique, 276: . . . des Chasepratiques12 has volontaires “the individual’s et personelles entire psychism.” destinées àSee opérer une transformation du moi. Rather than “spirit” for esprit, one might consider “character” or even “person.” Elsewhere Hadot replaces the word self with subject or individual. See, for in- stance, Ancient Philosophy, 6; La philosophie antique, 22: . . . une transformation du sujet . . . ; and Hadot, The Present Alone is our Happiness: Conversations with Jeannie Carlier and Arnold I. Davidson. Marc Djaballah, trans. (Stanford, CA: Stan- ford University Press, 2008), 87. 250
Buddhist Spiritual Practices interpretation, for as Steven Collins argues in his essay opening this
of the Self in an absolute or ontological sense, but rather often simply volume, Hadot’s French usage does not always clearly assert the idea body, mind, emotions, habits, and conceptions.13 refers to oneself, one’s whole person in a more quotidian sense, one’s the concept of spiritual exercises. He cites two ancient lists drawn from theBe works that as of itPhilo may, of Hadot Alexandria: also uses classical typologies to define One of these lists enumerates the following elements: inquiry (zetesis), thorough investigation (skepsis), reading, listening, attention (prosoche), self-mastery (enkrateia), and indifference to indifferent things. The other names successively: reading, meditations (meletai), therapies of the passions, remembrance of good things, self-mastery (enkrateia), and the accom- plishment of duties. Hadot uses these lists, he says, to help him describe “Stoic spiritual exercises,” which he proposes to study “in succession:”
of what is good,” then the more intellectual exercises: reading,First attention, listening, then inquiry,meditations and andthorough “remembrance investi- gation, and finally the more active exercises: self- mastery, accomplishment of duties, and indifference to indifferent things.14
Collins, pages 22-26 of the present volume. 13 Way of Life, 84; Exercices14 spirituels, 18-19: L’une de ces listes énumère: la recherché (zetesis), l’exa- men Againapprofondi my translation (skepsis), laslightly lecture, modifies l’audition, Chase’s. l’attention See Hadot, (prosochè), la maîtrise de soi (enkrateia), l’indifférence aux choses indifférentes. L’autre nomme successive- ment: les lectures, les meditations (meletai), les therapies des passions, les souvenirs de ce qui est bien, la maîtrise de soi (enkrateia), l’accomplissement des devoirs. A l’aide de ces listes, nous pourrons faire une brève description des exercices spirituels stoïciens en étudiant successivement les groups suivants: tout d’abord l’attention, puis les meditations et les «souvenirs de ce qui est bien», ensuite les exercices plus intellectuels que sont la lecture, l’audition, la recherche, l’examen approfondi, enfin les exercices plus actifs que sont la maîtrise de soi, l’accomplissement des devoirs, 251
Learning, Reasoning, Cultivating spiritual exercises, by which he divides his essay into four sections: learningThese lists to live, also learning point to to Hadot’sdialogue, own learning broader to die, classification and learning of how to read. Each of these sections describes a general type of spiritual exercise for Hadot, including the last one, which speaks to a more modern context.15 In this way, Hadot asserts that philo- sophical discourse should also be seen as a type of spiritual exercise or practice.16 Collins, in his essay in this volume, usefully refers to such practices as “regimens of truth,” emphasizing the fact that these
not just the truth of this or that, but a Truth which englobes and permeatespractices are the concernedentire universe, “with and finding, which and necessarily embodying involves the a Truth: total change in the knowing subject, not merely a changing in what he or she knows.”17 The idea that “spiritual exercises” or “regimens of truth” bring the individual face to face with an all-encompassing truth, the knowledge of which demands a total transformation in the knowing
aimsindividual, to bring including “unity and one’s system” values, to desires,disparate and bodies behaviors, of knowledge, invites whilecomparison somehow with uniting Russell’s the conception individual of with philosophy the universe, as a “study” but it alsothat evokes the Buddhist goal of seeing things as they really are and the transformative impact of such a vision of the truth. Hadot gives a central place to intellectual exercises in his conception of philosophy as a way of life, but he sets philosophy and
l’indifférence aux choses indifférentes. On learning how to read and the importance of genre, see Maria Heim, The Forerunner15 of All Things (London: Oxford University Press, 2014), and her essay
Hadot, Way of Life, 104: “As for philosophical theories: they were either asplaced 16 well explicitlyas McClintock’s in the andservice Harter’s of spiritual essays inpractice, the present as was volume. the case in Stoicism and Epicureanism, or else they were taken as objects of intellectual exercises, that is, of a practice of the contemplative life which, in the last analysis, was itself nothing other than a spiritual exercise;” Exercices spirituels, 51: Les theories philosophiques sont ou bien mises explicitement au service de la pratique spiri- tuelle, comme c’est le cas dans le stoïcisme et l’épicurisme, ou bien prise comme objects d’exercices intellectuels, c’est-à-dire d’une pratique de la vie contemplative qui n’est elle-même finalement rien d’autre qu’un exercice spirituel. Collins, page 45 above. 17 252
Buddhist Spiritual Practices philosophical discourse in an uneasy relation: “Philosophy and philosophical discourse . . . appear to be simultaneously incommen- surable and inseparable.”18 The indissoluble relationship Hadot sees between philosophy and philosophical discourse arises from a basic tension between knowledge and self-transformation, a tension also
discourse as a type of spiritual exercise becomes necessary but cannot embedded in the problem of defining spiritual exercise. Philosophical effect on the individual. At the same time, philosophy must somehow remainbe sufficient oriented for the toward practice an all-encompassingof philosophy to have truth, its and transformative not merely “the truth of this or that.” This all-encompassing truth must necessarily also involve the knowing individual. The tension here between the quest for truth, on the one hand, and for personal transformation or development, on the other, will remain in the background throughout what follows, and returns explicitly in the conclusion, when we consider what we can gain from comparative exercises like the current one. Thinking about Buddhist philosophy with Pierre Hadot, and focusing on the relationship between acquiring knowledge and personal transformation, not only helps us to understand better how Buddhist philosophers saw the place of reason in Buddhism. It may also help us to clarify our own relationship to knowledge, and thus begin to recognize its potential to transform our lives. So, how should we think about the place of philosophical
contains many voices, as does philosophy in general, we do bestdiscourse to focus on the our Buddhist question path? more And sincespecifically: the Buddhist how traditioncan we best apply what Pierre Hadot says about the Stoic under- standing of the role of philosophical discourse in philosophy to help us understand what a particular Buddhist philo- abhidharma and its prac-
sopher, Vasubandhu, says about place of statetice on its the main Buddhist claim and path? unpack Some a key reasons assumption are given built below into question for the choice to analyze Vasubandhu in this essay, but first we need to Hadot, Ancient Philosophy, 172; La philosophie antique, 266: Philo- sophie18 et discours philosophiques se présentent ainsi à la fois comme incommensurables et inséparables. 253
Learning, Reasoning, Cultivating understanding) abhidharma discourse is to the Buddhist path what as just stated. This assumption is the analogy that (on Vasubandhu’s discourse is to Stoic philosophy. The idea may be represented in (accordingformulaic fashion: to Hadot’s understanding of the Stoics) philosophical abhidharma : Buddhist path :: philosophical discourse : Stoic philosophy.
And now the thesis: just as the concept of spiritual exercise is a key discourse and the philosophical life in ancient philosophy, so the threeto Hadot’s types understandingor practices of wisdomof the relationship or discernment between (prajñā philosophical)—learning (śruta), thinking or reasoning (cintā), and cultivation (bhāvanā)— relationship between abhidharma and the Buddhist path. More provide the key to understanding how Vasubandhu perceives the pursuit of wisdom, with the rational practice of abhidharma provid- ingspecifically, an important then, pivotfor Vasubandhu, along a continuum these threeof practices practices from model learning the to cultivation.
Why Vasubandhu? Why his Treasury of Abhidharma? - pendently that Pierre Hadot provides a useful model for thinking aboutMatthew the Kapsteinplace of philosophical and Sara McClintock discourse have in Buddhism. both suggested In doing inde so, both have gone somewhat against recent trends in the academic study of Buddhist philosophy, and their suggestions have provoked healthy debate. Some scholars (including authors in the present volume)
Eltschinger has engaged them in a more challenging way, prompting have sought to apply, extend or test their suggestions, while Vincent
both Kapstein and McClintock to respond in more recent publications ofwith philosophy further clarification as a way andof life elaboration. to the Buddhist Much of philosophers the controversy of hasthe focused on the aptness of and challenges to applying Hadot’s model
logical or epistemological school, particularly Dharmakīrti, and to later Buddhist philosophers influenced by his methods, principally 254
Buddhist Spiritual Practices 19 It would be useful to extend the discus- sion to include a broader array of Buddhist philosophers, including Sāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla. - work for later developments. someone like Vasubandhu, who may have laid some of the ground - ing aboutA pointBuddhist on whichtheoretical Kapstein, discourses McClintock concerning and Eltschinger the path, and all seem to agree is the potential usefulness of Hadot’s model for think . . . anyone who has even a passing familiarity with here again Vasubandhu’s work comes to mind. Kapstein states, Visuddhimagga (Path of Purity BodhicaryāvatāraBuddhist path texts—works (Introduction such as to Buddhaghosa’s Enlightened Conduct Lam-rim-chen-mo), Śāntideva’s (Great Sequence of the Path)—will appreciate that there is ),a powerful or Tsong-kha-pa’s analogy to be explored here.20
writes,Both Kapstein “we can and point McClintock to the practices have also of studyemphasized (śruti) [sic],the centrality thought orof deliberationthe three types (cintā of ),wisdom and meditation to this analogy. or cultivation For instance, (bhāvanā McClintock), as three 21 In his own work, Eltsch- inger draws attention to the three types of wisdom, describing them crucialas “a three-fold ‘spiritual schema exercises’ of theof the Buddhist tradition.” path to nirvana and awaken- ing.”22 “Buddhism,” he writes, “readily presents itself as a gradation of
A second, related line of debate concerns the historical evidence available to 19 support the proposed connections between Buddhist philosophy, “spiritual exercises,” and Buddhism as a way of life. See the essays by Collins, McClintock
Asiatischeand Apple Studien in this volume, Études Asiatiques as well as LXII.2 Vincent (2008): Eltschinger, 485-544, “Pierre particularly Hadot et 526, les ‘Exercicesand Sara McClintock, Spirituels’: OmniscienceQuel Modèle and pour the la RhetoricPhilosophie of Reason: Boudddhique Śāntarakṣita Tardive?” and Kamalaśīla on Rationality, Argumentation, & Religious Authority (Boston: Wis- dom, 2010), 18. Reason’s Traces, 8. 20 McClintock, Omniscience and21 Kapstein,Buddhist Epistemologists in India and Tibet,” in Steven M. Emmanuel, ed., A Companion to Buddhist Philosophy, 17, n. 35., 270-289 See also, (Malden, Kapstein, MA: “‘Spiritual Wiley-Blackwell, Exercise’ 2013), 271 and n. 4.
22 Vincent Eltschinger, “Studies in Dharmakīrti’s Religious Philosophy: 4. The 255
Learning, Reasoning, Cultivating three successive types of discernment (prajñā).” 23 His doubts concern the straightforward application of this scheme—whose purpose he considers “soteriological” or “hermeneutical” (and by implication not truly “philosophical”)—to the Buddhist epistemological texts and the place of reason therein. But with respect to these latter texts, Eltschinger is still willing to recognize them as “spiritual exercises of the discursive type aimed at creating a methodological and doctrinal habitus.” 24 This agreement, both the general orientation toward the three types of wisdom as a model or framework for understanding cultivation or self-transformation, and the specific identification of greater detail.25 this orientation, seems significant and it deserves to be explored in Cintā-mayī Prajñā,” in Piotr Balcerowicz, ed., Logic and Belief in Indian Philosophy, unschéma- tisation ternaire du chemin bouddhique en direction du nirvāṇa et de l’éveil. 553-592 (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 2010),Le bouddhisme 562; “Quel se présentemodèle?,” volontiers 522: comme la 23 gradation de trois types successifs de discernement ( ). Eltschinger, “Quel modèle?,” 522: . . . reconnaissons donc en ces oeuvres [logico-épistémologiques24 bouddhiques] des exercises spirituelsprajñā de type discursive destinésEltschinger, à créer un “Quel habitus modèle?,” méthodologique 526: et doctrinal. In this way, Eltschinger contrasts his notion of “the acquisition of a methodological habitus” (l’acquisition d’un habitus méthodologique) with “a therapeutic (or soteriological) interpre- comme l’ont propose M. Kapstein et S. McClintock . . . une interprétation thérapeutique (voire sotériolo- tation,gique). suchThe precise as Kapstein difference and McClintockEltschinger seeshave betweenproposed” his ( notion of habituation unclear to me. and KapsteinDespite being or McClintock’s a well-known (or Hadot’s)and oft-cited usage formula, of spiritual the exercise three types remains of wisdom25 could stand to receive more scholarly analysis. So far, in addition to
Bhāvanākramathe above-citeds: work A Problem by Kapstein, of Translation,” McClintock, Buddhist and Eltschinger, Studies Review see 23.1 also (2006),Martin Adam,71-92, “Theespecially Concepts 82-83. of AdamMeditation also cites and S.Three N. Balagangadhara, Kinds of Wisdom “How in Kamalaśīla’sto Speak for the Indian Traditions,” Journal of the American Academy of Religion 73.4 (2005), 987-1013, especially 1005, and an unpublished conference paper from 2005 by Brian Nichols, entitled “A Consideration of the Relationship between Thinking and which Nichols has been kind enough to share with me. The former provides a Meditating:rather general The discussion, Threefold while Typology Nichols of Wisdom engages indirectly Vasubandhu with the and typology Kamalaśīla,” as it is
S. Lopez, Jr., ed., Buddhist Hermeneutics (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1993), 7-8, found in two actual Indian philosophers’ work. Nichols also usefully cites Donald 256
Buddhist Spiritual Practices I want to build upon the common ground suggested above by continuing to explore the three types of wisdom, their deployment
understanding how particular Buddhist philosophers conceptualized thein specific place of Buddhist reason and texts, its practical and their application usefulness on to the us Buddhist as a means path. of Abhidharmakośa (Treasury of Abhidharma, hereafter Treasury) and commentary (bhāṣya) can provideFor this a purpose, useful focus. Vasubandhu26 and his earliest Buddhist philosophers to employ these concepts in this particular way, and the foundational Vasubandhu character may have of been his amongwork thus the prompts closer analysis. The three types of wisdom also appear at
commentary attributed to him—on the Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra (variousAdornment points to the in Mahāyāna Vasubandhu’s Scriptures commentary—or, hereafter Adornment at least), a text the
27 sometimes said to have been composed by Vasubandhu’s elder brother, Asaṅga. While we find the same threefold classification of wisdom the Saṃdhinirmocana-sūtra about which more will be said below. specificallyIn what a follows,passage whenfrom theI refer introduction to the Treasury in which, I generally Lopez draws mean attention to include to its26 commentary as well. The following editions of the Sanskrit have been Abhidharm-Koshabhāṣya of Vasubandhu consulted forThe this Abhidharmakosaessay: (1) Prahlāda & Pradhan, Bhāṣya ed., of Acārya Vasubandhu with Sphutārthā Commentary (Patna: K. P. Jayaswalof Ācārya Research Yaśomittrā Institute, 1967); (2) Dwārikādās Bharati,Śāstrī, ed.,1998); and also based on the above two printed editions: (3) Paul Hackett and Dan Lusthaus, eds., Vasubandhu:, 2 vols.Abhidharmakosa-bhasya (Varanasi: Bauddha, Göttingen Register of Electronic Texts in Indian Languages (GRETIL).
Poussin, trans., L’Abhidharmakośa de Vasubandhu, 6 vols. (Paris: Paul Geuthner; translations have also been consulted. First and foremost: Louis de La Vallée with copious annotations, but with direct access only to fragments of the Louvain:verses in J.-B.the Istas,original 1923-1931), Sanskrit. Iwhich have translatesalso looked from at thethe followingChinese into annotated French
translation of the Sanskrit): Gelong Lodrö Sangpo, trans., Abhidharma- kośa-BhāṣyaEnglish translation of Vasubandhu of La Vallée, 4 vols. Poussin’s (Delhi: Motilal French Banarsidass, translation 2012). (of the Chinese
trans.,27 Mahāyāna-sūtrālaṃkāra (Paris: Librairie Honoré Champion, 1907); for an EnglishFor translation,an edition of see the L. Sanskrit Jamspal andet al., French trans., translation: The Universal Sylvain Vehicle Lévi, Discourse ed. and Literature (New York: American Institute of Buddhist Studies, 2004). 257
Learning, Reasoning, Cultivating Saṅgīti-sutta of the Dīgha-nikāya, the Vibhaṅga, and the Visuddhimagga, this scheme does not seem in certain Pāli sources, such as the 28 central to the way the Pāli sources conceive theSaṃdhinirmocana-sūtra stages of the path. (Instead,The Scripture the “scriptural” Revealing text the that True most Meaning closely, resembleshereafter VasubandhuTrue Mean- ingand). 29 Asaṅga’s usage appears to be the
reveal Themore historical contemporaneous relationship or between earlier thisBuddhist Mahāyāna texts, scripturesuch as theand Mahāvibhāṣā Asaṅga and Vasubandhu or other texts remains existing unclear; now other only studiesin Chinese may translation, which deploy the three types of wisdom in similar
Treasury, augmented by texts such as the Adornment and orthe distinctiveTrue Meaning ways., can Forprovide our a purposes, basis for looking however, at the Vasubandhu’s early usage
philosophical context. of the threeThe Treasury types of wisdomand its commentary, in a specific Buddhistcomposed theoretical as a single or text, conforms in subject matter and style to the unique Buddhist genre of abhidharma.30 It is a highly rationalist and scholastic
Saṅgīti-sutta, see T.W. Rhys Davids and J. E. Carpenter, eds., The Dīgha nikāya,28 3 vols. (London: Pali Text Society, 2006-2015), vol. 3, 220; for a digital For the preserves their page numbering, see GRETIL,
Buddhist Spiritual Practices presentation of the basic tenets and key concepts of the Buddhist teachings on the nature of reality and the path to awakening. Paul Griffiths considers it analogous to the Visuddhimagga, which 31 Although it is interesting to consider it as a path text—and this wasKapstein one motivating describes (infactor the behind quote above)the decision as a Buddhist to focus onpath it intext. this essay—the Treasury from the four noble truths.32 The four noble truths, of course, ’s basic structure may derive more directly of the Treasury. Yet, it is noteworthy that even his explanation of the pathincludes begins the with path, a discussionwhich Vasubandhu of the four treats noble in truths. detail Asin wechapter will see, six
relationship between the practice of the path, including the practice ofthis abhidharma section of , theand work the realizationprovides him of thean occasionfour truths, to reflectthat is, onof the true nature of reality. More generally, the work moves from ontology and cosmology to theories of action and mind, before outlining the negative qualities to be removed by practicing the path, the path itself,
true nature of reality,33 and the various other forms of knowledge itsand main meditative goal, awakening, attainment which achievable the text by definesfollowing as theknowledge path. The of textthe concludes with an independent treatise articulating and defending the key Buddhist doctrine of no-self. In its literary style and format, the Treasury traditional Indian genre of root verses and commentary thereupon, which is common to most Indian systematic treatises also or śāstrasfits into. Thethe commentary contains a largely dialectical format of question and answer, give and take of reasoned arguments. As Gold describes it, “The
commentary pits the Vaibhāṣika against a great many philosophical
Buddhist31 Spirituality I, 34-66 (New York: SCM Press, 1983), 64. PaulCharles Griffiths, Willemen, “Indian Bart Buddhist Dessein Meditation,”and Collett Cox, in Takeuchi Sarvāstivāda Yoshinori, Buddhist ed., Scholasticism32
(Leiden: Brill, 1998), 273. In this respect, Vasubandhu follows earlieronly in summariesChinese translation. or distillations of the Vaibhāṣika or Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma systemTreasury by such, chapter authors 6, as verse Dharmaśreṣṭhin 67a: anutpādakṣayajñāne and Dharmatrāta, bodhiḥ works (Pradhan, now extant 382; 33
Śāstrī, 795). 259
Learning, Reasoning, Cultivating opponents, and the winners of the debate are not always clear.” Many at certain points, and may sometimes be seen to defend what he calls have noted that Vasubandhu seems critical of the Vaibhāṣika system 34 Since it largely assumes a systematic Buddhist thevision Sautrāntika of the world, perspective the Treasury of those can who also take be described the Buddha’s as a teachingsdogmatic asphilosophical the final word. text in the sense Hadot gives to this term,35 and insofar as abhidharma body of teachings considered authentic by the school, it can also be described as an explicitly exegetical and project. intentionally Abhidharma depends interprets upon the the Buddha’s body of Buddhist teachings in a systematic fashion, draws out key concepts found in those teachings, and applies them systematically to a world
to describe for us the nature and purpose of abhidharma, and toof subjectivedescribe how experience. one does However, abhidharma we shouldas a type allow of Vasubandhupractice. It is also a key moment for his use of the three types of wisdom as a model for practice.
Abhidharma and the Practice of Wisdom
wisdom sounds like a felicitous expression, but what could it What is wisdom and how can one practice it? The practice of
anmean example to practice of the wisdom phrase or in engage a beautiful in practices line leadingthat recurs to wisdom? almost Opinions will vary, of course, even among Buddhists. One can find the Prajñāpāramitāratnaguṇasaṃcayagāthā (Verses Gathering the Preciouslike a refrain Virtues in several of the versesPerfection in the of firstWisdom and, secondhereafter chapters Precious of
Gold, Paving philosophical34 schools and would seem to correspond, at least to some degree, , 2. The name Vaibhāṣika refers to one of the ancient Buddhist to the early Buddhist institution and monastic lineage of the Sarvāstivāda. By contrast,been more the exclusively name Sautrāntika a school does of thought not seem or so what clearly McClintock to have corresponded usefully calls to a schoolany specificDox in her Buddhist essay in institution this volume. or monastic lineage. It may even initially have Hadot, Ancient Philosophy, 106-107; La philosophie antique, 168-170, where he35 usefully describes the methods of the dogmatic philosophies of the Epicureans and Stoics. 260
Buddhist Spiritual Practices Virtues): “This is the practice of wisdom, the highest perfection.”36 Here, wisdom must refer, in part, to understanding emptiness, while its practice might involve, among other things, learning the teachings
wisdomcontained here. in the In thePerfection second ofverse Wisdom of the literature. Treasury Yet, it is difficult not abhidharmato hear an echo as, above(and aall, critique) “pure wisdomof another (amalā prominent prajñā ),definition along with of its accompaniments.”37 , Vasubandhu defines Treasury Buddhist literature had While begun Vasubandhu to be established, most likely composedboth sources the would seem well to after indicate the Perfection a primary of concern Wisdom with and otherwisdom Mahāyāna and its
between abhidharma and wisdom, and what does it mean to say that abhidharmapractice. How do we understand the connection Vasubandhu makes
is “pure” wisdom? disciples,Recall but brieflyhe is also the among figure ofthe Śāriputra: most common the Pāli interlocutors scriptures foundrecognize in himthe asPerfection being “preeminent of Wisdom in wisdom”literature among and several the Buddha’s other
incomplete or inferior understanding. I take it to be no coincidence Mahāyāna scriptures, where he is often made to represent an key role in the production and promulgation of the Abhidharma literature.that several38 earlyAbhidharma Buddhist nevertheless traditions also came attribute to represent to Śāriputra an a
Precious Virtues, chapter 1, verse 12d: eṣā sa prajñāpāramitāya caryā. This line36 repeats in verses 14, 23, 24, 25 (with a minor variation), 26, and 28, and
Prajñāpāramitāratnaguṇasaṃcayagāthā (Cambridge: Cambridge University chapterPress, 1976). 2, verses While 1 and the 12. Precious For an Virtues edition isof a the verse Sanskrit, text that see mirrorsAkira Yuyama, the struc ed.,- ture of the Aṣṭasāhasrikāprajñāpāramitā (The Perfection of Wisdom Scripture in Eight-thousand Lines Buddhist scripture we possess, this fact does not mean the verse text, as a whole ), and the latter may be the earliest dateable Mahāyāna the prose and the verse texts, see Edward Conze, trans., The Perfection of Wisdom inor Eightin parts, Thousand is demonstrably Lines & its Versethe same Summary age as the prose. For a translation of both Treasury, chapter 1, verse 2a: prajñā malā sānucarā bhidharmaḥ (Pradhan, 37 (San Francisco: Four Seasons, 1973). ’ ’ 2;see, 38 Śāstrī, for instance, 9). Lamotte, History, 189-191. See also the article by Heim in the For the association between Śāriputra and the Abhidharma literature,
present volume. On Śāriputra and his depiction in Mahāyāna scriptures, see Sara 261
Learning, Reasoning, Cultivating if the Perfection of Wisdom literature may have sought to challenge expression or distillation of the Buddha’s “pure wisdom,” and even or redefine this association, it also may share certain attitudes ofconcerning articulating the and nature critiquing of wisdom in the and Treasury its practice.39 with Vasubandhu and the Vaibhāṣika Abhidharma system he sets himself the task prajñā, translated thus far as wisdom, and we must discern the range and nuancesVasubandhu of his usage, recognizes if we are several to understand types or senses how he of connects the word, it to abhidharma and its practice. Paul Williams cautions us, “Wisdom is, alas, all too rare; prajñā is not.” “Prajñā,” he explains, “is a mental event, a state of consciousness,” and here he seems to have in mind prajñā as one of the ten factors that accompany any moment of consciousness.40 While the fact that the Vaibhāṣika Abhidharma system lists account for the polysemy of the word. In a useful article on its usage, Padmanabhhe is correct Jaini so farhas as pointed he goes, out Williams’ that prajñā remark must doeshave notat least entirely two varieties in the Treasury
and the Vaibhāṣika Abhidharma system remarks in the introduction in Conze, Perfection, xii-xiii. McClintock’s essay in this volume, especially her footnote 20. See also the brief Abhidharma,”39 in Lewis Lancaster and Luis O. Gómez, eds., Prajñāpāramitā and RelatedOn Systems: this point, Studies see Padmanabhin Honor of Edward Jaini, “Prajñā Conze (Berkeley: and dṛṣṭi Berkeley in the Vaibhāṣika Buddhist Studies, 1977), 403-415. Paul Williams, Mahāyāna Buddhism: The Doctrinal Foundations, 2nd ed. 40 Treasury (London: Routledge, 2009), 49. Williams himself cites Jaini’s article to support his discussion. For the passage from the that supports Williams’ claim, seein fact, chapter always 2, verseand individually 24 and commentary accompany (Pradhan, every moment 54; Śāstrī, of 147).consciousness, It is unclear or fromthat some this passageof them whethermight be Vasubandhureducible to otherwishes factors. to affirm He usesthat allthe ten term, factors kila, “sodo, they say,” to tag the former position, and goes on to ask how we know that all ten exist distinctively in one and the same moment of thought. His response seems
(durlakṣana). Perhaps we see here an example of the style of reduction that recurs into bemany that sections thought and and argumentsits concomitants of the areTreasury distinguishable, including only some “with that difficulty” Jonathan Gold, Paving concern to carve away extraneous elements of the Abhidharma metaphysical system, or at ,least argues to show reflect that or they demonstrate do not all exist Vasubandhu’s substantially. core philosophical 262
Buddhist Spiritual Practices generally.41 One is common to all states of ordinary consciousness; the other is not. These two types of prajñā are also distinguished from one another insofar as the former, common type is said to “involve judgement” (santīraṇa) and the latter does not. In parallel fashion, the Treasury describes prajñā as being either impure or pure, and pure prajñā is so called because it is that rare form of knowing that is - sion, envy, or opinion, which would drive the creation of new karma andfree holdof any us latent in a state disposition of imperfection. or afflicting tendency, any passion, aver In his commentary on the second verse of the Treasury, prajñā as “the discernment of dharmas.” 42 Dharma here refers to the basic constituents of reality (or experience)Vasubandhu according defines to the the word Abhidharma system, but the term also suggests a correspondence between reality and the basic elements dharmas would involve a process of seeing the world purely in accordance ofwith the the Buddha’s basic elements teaching. of In reality, this passage, both outlined discernment in the Abhidharma of - mount to seeing the world as an awakened being does.43 This, system and reflected in the Buddha’s teaching.abhidharma It would in its beultimate tanta or absolute sense (paramārtha). Vasubandhu tells us, is the meaning of - 44 How can we attain such a rarified state of wisdom or discern ment? Vasubandhu begins to answer this question by immediately 41 Treasury, commentary on chapter 1, verse 2: tatra prajñā dharmapravicayaḥ 42 Jaini, “Prajñā and dṛṣṭi,” 406.
(Pradhan,means43 pure 2; Śāstrī,prajñā 9). “along with its accompaniments.” These accompaniments This also seems to be an implication of Vasubandhu saying thatdharmas Abhidharma, both physical and mental, which accompany pure wisdom in the body/mind complex refer,of an awakened the commentary being. On tells an us, alternate, to purified but I basic think elementscompatible, or representation of abhidharma
attention to the as omniscience reflecting the of the particular Buddha vision as the ofgoal the of omniscient the path. Buddha, see MariaIn Heim’s what essayfollows, in theI will present oscillate volume. between Note alsowisdom that Harter’sand discernment essay draws in reference44 to prajñā - ment implies a certain clear-sightedness, the ability to see things, even quite subtle things, for what, as generalthey really and are, more while specific wisdom meanings adds an of additionalthe term. Discern layer of 263
Learning, Reasoning, Cultivating contrasting abhidharma in this “higher” sense with other, more conventional and worldly senses of abhidharma and wisdom. “Speak- abhidharma refers to that wisdom, and that theoretical discourse (śāstra), by which one obtains wisdoming conventionally,” in its ultimate Vasubandhu sense.”45 Such says, wisdom “ or discernment will not yet be “pure,” because, being conventional, it remains enmeshed in the world of desire and conceptuality. Ordinary beings all possess wisdom in this ordinary sense to which Williams alluded above, and they use it in this sense will continue to generate new karma, both good and bad, holdingto discern beings the everyday rooted in world the mundane and gain confidenceworld.46 However, in it. Discernment it can also help to produce the pure wisdom of awakening, especially when one abhidharma tellsseeks us, to embodymay be generatedthe wisdom through reflected three in the interrelated theoretical processes discourse orof stages of practice:. This conventionallearning (śruta wisdom), reasoning or discernment, (cintā), and Vasubandhu cultivation (bhāvanā).47 In fact, these three “types” of wisdom are explicitly described as being “generated through practice” (prayogajā) in contrast to another type of conventional discernment of reality that is simply inborn.48 Hence, we can begin to speak of the practice of correct judgement concerning the particular course of action to be undertaken in whatever circumstances. Both terms carry an appropriate cognitive dimension of knowledge or correct understanding. In this way, I will avoid another common translation of prajñā as “discrimination” or “discriminative insight,” which brings to mind unnecessary negative associations in contemporary American English. Treasury, chapter 1, verse 2b: tatprāptaye yāpi ca yacca śāstram (Pradhan, 45
2; 46 Śāstrī, 10). sāsrava), which he contrasts with I take this to be the broader significance of Vasubandhuanāsrava saying). that such discernmentCommentary “comes on along chapter with defilements”1, verse 2b: ( yāpi ca śrutacintābhāvanāmayī puresāsrava47 wisdom, prajñā defined upapattipratilambhikā as being “without ca defilements” . . . ( conventional48 wisdom” (upapattipratilambhikā(Pradhan, prajñā 2; Śāstrī, 10). the threeWhile types Vasubandhu of wisdom clearly are “born intends of practice”this contrast (prayogajā when he) in speaks his subcommen of “inborn- tary on this passage. He uses the expression to explain), theYaśomitra meaning actually of the termsays mayī and cultivation” (śrutacintābhāvanāmayī prajñā Trea- sury , “consisting in,” in the expression “wisdom consistingdharma in hearing,s as prāyogika reflection, ) (Śāstrī, 10). Later in the , however, Vasubandhu will himself describe some 264
Buddhist Spiritual Practices wisdom as an actual concept in the Treasury abhidharma and , but how does Vasubandhu specifically connect these three practices to the - tion,its practice? it is helpful to stay for a bit longer with the terms abhidharma In order to understand how Vasubandhu makes this connec
Thisand practice.preference First, becomes we can manifest see a certain in several preference ways throughout for reason andhis work.rational In practicesthe opening in Vasubandhu’s verse of the Treasury presentation, for instance, of the Buddhist while paying path.
true nature of reality (yathārthaśāstṛ) who lifts the world from the mirehomage of saṃsārato the Buddha, Vasubandhu describes him as “teacher of the explains that “the Buddha lifts the world from the mire of saṃsāra through being a teacher.” In the of commentary teachings that on accord this passage, with the Vasubandhu true nature of reality, and not through his superhuman powers or his capacity to give the choicest gifts.”49 - ism and his preference for rational practices, which nonetheless have Here we get a hint of Vasubandhu’s rational abhidharma: soteriological value. In the third and final verse of the opening triad, Apart from discerning the basic constituents of reality Vasubandhu writes in this fashion about the purpose of
in accordance with the Buddha’s teaching, no other uponmethod the exists ocean whereby of existence. afflictions Hence, may for be quelled,that reason, and abhidharmaafflictions cause was taught,those in some the worldsay, by to the wander teacher. adrift50
“produced through practice,” and there he explicitly means factors generated by the three types or practices of wisdom. Chapter 2, verse 53ab and commentary Kośa, vol. 1, 264-265). Chapter 1, verse 1bc, and the following remark in the commentary: yathābhūtaśāsanācchāstā(Pradhan,49 87; Śāstrī, 240; see bhavann also La asau Vallée saṃsārapaṅkāj Poussin, jagad ujjahāra na tv ṛddhivarapradānaprabhāveneti Chapter 1, verse 3: dharmāṇāṃ pravicayam antareṇa nāsti kleśānāṃ yata upaśāntaye50 bhyupāyaḥ | kleśaś(Pradhan, ca bhramati 1; Śāstrī, bhavārṇave 10). tra lokas taddhetor ata uditaḥ kilaiṣa śāstrā the word dharma’ in the phrase, “discerning the dharmas,” ’in order to provide a clearer idea of the relationship (Pradhan, between 2; Śāstrī, its 14). two My main translation meanings elaborates operative onin 265
Learning, Reasoning, Cultivating the instructions of abhidharma, a student simply cannot discern the basicVasubandhu constituents states ofeven reality.” more51 directly in the commentary: “Without sentence of the verse with the word, kila, “some say,” and thereby indi- However, Vasubandhu tags the last argument for the centrality of abhidharma to the path. As an apparent cates a degree of ambivalence toward some aspect of this Vaibhāṣika
naturedefender of ofthe a SautrāntikaAbhidharma position and its thatdependency the Buddha’s upon discourses the Dharma, are that the final word, Vasubandhu may simply wish to highlight the derivative52 If
whichis, the bodyremains of the evident Buddha’s from teachings these opening contained passages in the and discourses. elsewhere in theso, thisTreasury would, nor neither reduce diminish the importance Vasubandhu’s of abhidharma apparent as rationalism, a key mode
While in its conventional sense abhidharma may offer an appropriateof reflecting rationallyanalogy uponfor our the conceptBuddha’s of teachings. “theoretical” discourse, the Treasury also challenges us to understand how abhidharma discourse works as a type of practice on the path culminating in a state of perfect wisdom (abhidharma in its ultimate sense). This brings us to practice. A survey of the Treasury, or Buddhist philos- ophy more generally, does not reveal a single, overarching concept for what we or Hadot might call “practice.” Instead, various terms express different aspects and meanings, and thereby form a picture of practice. Among the texts considered here, the Precious Virtues and the Adornment use caryā (from the root, car-) in a broad sense Treasury. In an intriguing and somewhat elliptical passage in his commentary of practice, but Vasubandhu does not use this term in the this context. I also make explicit that abhidharma is the implied referent for the pronoun eṣa. Commentary on chapter 1, verse 3: na hi vinā bhidharmopadeśena śiṣyaḥ śakto51 dharmān pravicetum iti ’ that52 the Buddha spoke abhidharma (Pradhan, in 3; aŚāstri, “scattered” 12). or “disorganized” way (prakīrṇaIn the uktocommentary, bhagavatā Vasubandhu attributes to the Vaibhāṣikas the position it into a single collection and established it” (piṇḍīkṛtya sthāpitaḥ), citing the case of the Udāna ), and others led by venerable Kātyāyanīpūtra “made Pav- ing, 265, note 19. for comparison. Yaśomitra interprets Vasubandhu’s stance here and aligns it with Sautrāntika (Pradhan, 3; Śāstri, 15). See also Gold, 266
Buddhist Spiritual Practices on the Adornment carita, a word derived from the same root and sometimes also translat- able as practice. His, however, commentary Vasubandhu there refers comments to “ten on practices associated with the Dharma” (daśadharmacarita). In the Chinese translation, these are enumerated: copying (lekhanā), worshipping (pūjanā), gifting (dānam), hearing (śravaṇam), speaking (vācanam), memorizing (udgrahaṇam), clarifying (prakāśanā), reciting (svādhyāyanam), reflecting (cintanā), and cultivating (bhāvanā).53 This fascinating list of Buddhist practices is broadly comparable with the lists Hadot quotes from Philo. To see how it helps us understand the Treasury and its discussion of the practice of wisdom, we must briefly look at one more Buddhist text. References to a list of “ten practices associated with the Dharma” are also found in the True Meaning, the well-known
theMahāyāna Treasury scripture. In fact, which, the True as statedMeaning above, explicitly also most links closely these tenreflects practices Vasubandhu’s to the three usage types of of the wisdom. three In types a passage of wisdom that dis in- cusses how the bodhisattva (someone on the path to becoming a Buddha) should train in the six “perfections” (pāramitā), a list which includes “wisdom” (prajñā), and connects the development of these perfections to several path schemes, the Buddha says to
Avalokiteśvara: theFirst teachings of all, bodhisattvas of the true Dharma gain firm concerning conviction the in perfections.the bodhisattvas’ After that, collection by means of scriptures, of the ten and prac in- tices associated with the Dharma, bodhisattvas
Adornment only53 to advancing upon the path “by engaging in ten practices associated with the Dharma” (daśasu, chapter dharmacariteṣu 20, verse vartanāt11 (Lévi,), 183).but the Lévi’s Chinese Sanskrit translation edition ofrefers the Adornment enumerates a list that parallels the one found as items 903-914 in the Mahāvyutpatti. The Sanskrit terms quoted in parentheses in the main text above
in the Adornment, see Jamspal et al., Universal Vehicle Discourse Literature, 333 correspondand n. 37; for to the this relevant list. For passage the fuller from translation the Mahāvyutpatti and a discussion, see Yumiko of this Ishihama passage A New Critical Edition of the Mahāvyutpatti (Tokyo: Toyo Bunko, 1989), 48-49. and Yoichi Fukuda, eds., 267
Learning, Reasoning, Cultivating acquire wisdom arising from learning, reasoning, and cultivation.54 While the passage does not elaborate on which practices are contained in this list of ten, it does explicitly connect them with the three types of wisdom. The ten practices thus seem to be an elaboration upon the list of three types of wisdom—the list of ten can itself include the three—or the latter is a distillation of the former. While the True Meaning nowhere clearly enumerates a straightforward list of ten practices associated with the Dharma, we find two key passages in the scripture, each containing a related list of practices. Some of them are found in the list cited above, others not. One passage includes “copying” (yi ger ’dri ba), “memorizing” (yi ger bris nas ’chang ba), “speaking” (klog pa), “distributing” (yang dag par ’gyed pa), “worshipping” (mchod pa), “explaining” (lung nod pa), “repeating” (’don par yang byed), and “reciting” (kha ton du byed). The other includes several of the same practices, but adds, significantly, both “reasoning” (sems pa) and “cultivation” (bsgom pa).55 Neither adds up to ten, nor are they explicitly called “practices associated with the Dharma,” but we can see in these lists the gradual formation of list-based definitions of practices broadly comparable with what Hadot finds in Philo, and more specifically connected with what we can find in the Adornment and the Treasury. In the Treasury,
Dharma, but he does use the term carita in the sense of conduct, Vasubandhu does not mention ten practices associated with the
True Meaning, chapter 9, paragraph 9: pha rol tu phyin pa dang ldan pa’i dam54 pa’i chos bstan pa | byang chub sems dpa’i sde snod la thog ma kho nar shin tu mos pa (adhimukti?) dang | de’i ’og tu chos spyad pa bcu po (daśadharma- carita?) dag gis thos pa dang | bsams pa dang | bsgoms pa las byung ba’i shes rab bsgrub pa dang (Lamotte, L’explication translation, see 243; alternate English translation in Powers, Wisdom, 239. This scripture is no longer extant in its original Sanskrit,, 131-132). but Forwe can Lamotte’s be reasonably French
Tibetan translation. confident about many (but notL’explication all) of the, 76, key 200; Sanskrit Powers, terms Wisdom underlying the second:55 Lamotte, L’explication, 86, 207; Powers, Wisdom, 141. For the first list: Lamotte, , 119. For the 268
Buddhist Spiritual Practices behavior, and even practice.56 At one point, he speaks about the “practice of the path” (mārgābhyāsa), and elsewhere uses abhyāsa in the sense of “repeated practice” or “implementation.”57 But Treasury to providing an overarch- ing conception of the practice of wisdom when he discusses wisdom andVasubandhu its three comes types, closestlearning in (theśruta ), reasoning (cintā), and cultiva- tion (bhāvanā), which, he says, are “born from practice” (prayogajā).
Three Types of Wisdom
section of the Treasury while discussing the nature and purpose of abhidharmaVasubandhu first mentions the three types of wisdom in abhidharmathe opening in its conventional sense of theoretical discourse (and the genre of literature containing, and more such specifically discourse) when can indicating lead to how abhidharma in its ultimate sense: pure wisdom. He waits until the beginning of chapter six on the path (mārga - dom and explain the connections between them. This suggests that ) to define the three types of wis structure of the path. Importantly, however, they do not provide an Vasubandhu conceives a close connection between them and the- nation of the three types of wisdom with the following statement: exhaustive description of the path. Vasubandhu prefaces his expla Treasury, chapter 1, verse 26cd and commentary: living beings perform 80,00056 different behaviors (carita) the cure for which the Buddha has taught 80,000 different collocations of the Dharma (dharmaskandha) (Pradhan, 17;
practice of calming meditation (śamathacarita) with practice of insight med- itationŚāstrī, 58).(vipaśyanācarita See also chapter 6, verse 38b and commentary, which contrasts the commentary speak of good conduct (sucarita) and bad conduct (duścarita) in ) (Pradhan, 360; Śāstrī, 747). Chapter 4, verse 66 and carita is the most common in the Treasury and may be referencetraced to broad, to the earlierten types usage of good in the and Buddhist bad action discourses. (Pradhan, 237-238; Śāstī, 532- 533).Chapter This final 5, verse usage 5a of and commentary, where it is said that “four negative states are57 said to be removed by cultivation (bhāvanā), namely passion, hatred, pride
these states by practicing the path (mārgābhyāsa)” (catvāro bhāvanāheyāḥ | tadyathāand ignorance, rāgaḥ becausepratigho one māno who vidyā has firstca | dṛṣṭasatyasyaseen the truths paścāt would mārgābhyāsena then abandon prahāṇāt truths as preparation for practicing’ the path of cultivation, for more on which see the next two) (Pradhan, sections 280; of this Śāstī, essay. 602). Here we also find an instance of seeing the 269
Learning, Reasoning, Cultivating moral restraint (śīla).” 58 “Someoneremains a prerequisite who desires for to someone see the truths to achieve must success first of in all acquiring practice wisdom through any of Vasubandhuthe three types emphasizes of practice. that In moral this restraintway, the upon a specific set of practical rules and guidelines for behavior. Thesethree practices rules are of listed wisdom in fitthe into Buddhist a broader prātimokṣa path structure and discussed founded literature and elsewhere, including ritual manuals, handbooks, and stories. They are simply assumed here en masseat length in the Vinaya manuals,. On whichthis point, structure Vasubandu’s the path statement as a sequence brings hisor hierarchyvision of the of moralpath into restraint basic ( sīlaalignment), meditative with concentration the path scheme (samādhi found), and in thewisdom Pāli (paññā = prajñā).59 The True Meaning also gives this threefold scheme 60 We should recognize here that conceiving the Buddhist path as aas way a way of lifeof organizing founded upon five of practical the six perfections.rules and guidelines for behavior gives the path a clear ethical, social, and institutional dimension. As Sara McClintock and Steven Collins both argue in their essays
Eltschinger—we cannot simply ignore the social and institutional contextsin this volume—both in which Buddhist of them philosophical echoing concernsdiscourses voiced were articulated, by Vincent
Chapter 6, verse 5ab and commentary: satyāni hi ha58 ] draṣṭukāma ādita eva śīlaṃ pālayati The Visuddhimagga, for instance, is structured along [emended; this threefold Pradhan, scheme, Śāstrī: the59 canonical basis for which is probably (Pradhan, the Mahāparinibbāna-sutta 334; Śāstrī, 861). , where it
given to various congregations of monks on numerous occasions throughout the suttaprovides. See the Rhys structure Davids andand Carpenter,content of Dīgha-nikāyathe Buddha’s, “comprehensivevol. 2, 81, 84 and discourse,” following. Long Discourses, 234: “And then the
The following translation modifies Walshe, - Blesseditative concentration, One, while staying when at imbued Vultures’ with Peak, moral gave restraint,a comprehensive brings greatdiscourse: fruit ‘This is moral restraint; this is meditative concentration; this is wisdom. Med
and profit. Wisdom, when imbued with meditative concentration, brings great fruit and profit. The mind imbued with wisdomThe becomes Itivuttaka completely (Oxford: free Pali from Text afflictiveSociety, 2000), states, 51, that and is, thefrom references the afflictive in Lamotte, states of Historypassion,, 42. becoming, false belief and Lamotte,ignorance’.” L’explication See also Peter, 131, Masefield, 243; Powers, trans., Wisdom , 237. 60 270
Buddhist Spiritual Practices
61 Drawing onsimply Hadot, because we can such say contexts further arethat difficult philosophical for us to discourses determine aim or we to support,lack the enact, historical and evidencejustify, rationally, to make particular firm conclusions. choices of lifestyle,
practicewhich always of wisdom, reflect he particularseems to recognize social and this institutional implicitly. This contexts. may When Vasubandhu thus makes moral restraint the basis for the (or ideal persons) alongside his discussion of the structure of the pathexplain in whychapter he describessix of the the Treasury formation. The of normative specific types and ofsystematic persons
beginscoherence his thatexplanation is the aim of of the the three text reflectstypes of idealized wisdom structuresby placing ofthem the inethical, a clearly social, sequential and institutional relationship contexts founded it assumes. upon moral Vasubandhu restraint. thus He states, “One who is stable in moral conduct and possesses the wisdom derived from learning and reasoning becomes capable of practicing cultivation.”62 Thus, only a particular type of individual who has achieved stability in moral conduct, such as the (ideal) monk or nun, becomes eligible to practice wisdom through learning, reasoning,
and cultivation. “For,” Vasubandhu adds in his commentary on the describingabove, “one the who sequence desires orto hierarchysee the four of practicesnoble truths as follows: must first of all observeThen, moral after restraint.” attaining Vasubandhu moral stability, continues one his receivescommentary by the teachings that accord with seeing the truth, or one listens to their meaning. After learning them, one thinks about them. After coming to understand that they are not false, one becomes capable of practicing cultivation. Taken together, one produces the wisdom that arises through reasoning depend- ing on the wisdom that arises through learning,
James Apple also seeks to address this concern directly in his essay in the 61 in his essay, also uses the three types of wisdom as a means of framing practices presenton the path. volume, See pageand it 130 is worth and following. noting as well that Atiśa, on whom Apple focuses Treasury, chapter 6, verse 5ab: vṛttasthaḥ śrutacintāvān bhāvanāyāṃ prayujyate62
(Pradhan, 334; Śāstrī, 700). 271
Learning, Reasoning, Cultivating and one produces the wisdom that arises through cultivation depending on the wisdom that arises through reasoning.63 types of wisdom and their dependence upon one another. Each proceedsIn this passage in reliance Vasubandhu upon the previous affirms one; the all sequence of them ofdepend the threeupon the foundation of moral restraint; and their goal is seeing the truths.
Buddhaghosa in the Visuddhimagga theIn this Adornment way, Vasubandhu’s and the True explanation Meaning.64 differs from the one given by One of two main passages , butin the it aligns Adornment with what on wethe find three in types of wisdom concerns the teachings (dharma) as an object of Treasury, the Adornment states that the three types of wisdom take the teachings investigation.as their object. Just Although as Vasubandhu the goal explains is seeing above the in truththe directly or non-conceptually, the Adornment explains that one must begin the process by learning the teachings discursively and conceptually: The basis for experiencing the teachings can be achieved through the three types of wisdom (jñāna),65
The whole passage in the commentary on chapter 6, verse 5ab, reads: satyāni hi 63 draṣṭukāma ādita eva śīlaṃ pālayati | tataḥ satyadarśanasyānulomaṃ śrutam udgṛhṇāti arthaṃ vā śṛṇoti | śrutvā cintayati | aviparītaṃ cintayitvā bhāvanāyāṃ prayujyate | samādhau tasya śrutamayīṃ prajñāṃ niśritya cintāmayī jāyate | cintāmayīṃ niśritya bhāvanāmayī jāyate Path of Purification, 438: “As64 regards the triads, wisdom acquired (Pradhan, without 334;learning Śāstrī, from 700). someone else The following translation modifies Ñāṇamoḷi, reasoning. Wisdom acquired by learning from someone else is wisdom consisting isin wisdomwhat is learned,consisting because in what it is is produced reasoned by because learning. it is Wisdom produced that by has one’s reached own absorption, having been somehow produced by cultivation, is wisdom consisting Visuddhimagga, 371: Tikesu paṭhamattike, parato asutvā paṭiladdhapaññā attano cintāvasena nipphannattā cintāmayā; inparato cultivation;” sutvā paṭiladdhapaññā Warren and Kosambi, sutavasena nipphannattā sutamayā; yathā tathā vā bhāvanāvasena nipphanā appanāpattā paññā bhāvanāmayā. An interesting elaboration on the wisdom arising from reasoning follows this passage. The Adornment uses jñāna here instead of prajñā, but the two terms are65 virtually synonyms in a variety of contexts, as they are, more or less, in the Treasury, as well. On the notion of jñāna in the Treasury, see particularly jñāna) with chapter seven. The Pāli path materials also tend to identify ñāna ( 272
Buddhist Spiritual Practices
with respect to the stated meaning through inves- tigationlearning, byand means so forth; of first,the conceptualizations by generating confidence of the mind; second, by realizing that objects arise through conceptualization; third, by focusing the mind on the conceptual as such. The achievement of these three bases for experience relies upon the teachings, as previously explained.66 The commentary on this passage describes how the practice of the three types of wisdom moves from a conceptual and discursive under- standing of the nature of reality, based on the teachings, to one that is ostensibly beyond the duality of language and reality: If one perceives that the object appears solely through mental conceptualization, and that there is nothing other than mental conceptualization . . . [then], by focusing the mind upon the conceptual, one should know the basis for experiencing the teachings with the wisdom born of cultivation, because no duality is then perceived . . . 67
wisdom to the discovery of a particular metaphysical position: The mindThe commentary’sproduces external explanation objects. Objects here might are nothing wed thebut practicemind. If so, of Treasury would not endorse the Adornment onthe the Vaibhāṣika sequence system of the outlined three types in the of wisdom, and that they begin by ’s metaphysical position, but the two sources still agree paññā (prajñā). See, for instance, Bhikkhu Bodhi, trans., Abhidhammattha Sangaha: A Comprehensive Manual of Abhidhamma (Seattle: Pariyatti, 2000), 90. If they are to be distinguished, then jñāna can be seen as the outcome of prajñā. Adornment, chapter 11, verses 6-7: manojalpairyathoktārtha-pra- sannasya66 pradhāraṇāt | arthakhyānasya jalpācca nāmni sthānācca cetasaḥ || dharmālambanalābhaḥ syāt tribhir jñānaiḥ śrutādibhiḥ |trividhālambanalābhaśca pūrvoktastatsamāśritaḥ Jamspal, Discourse Literature, 116-117. Yadi manojalpādevāyamarthaḥ (Lévi, 55-56). khyātīti For paśyatian alternate nānyanmanojalpād English translation, . . . cittasya see nāmni67 sthānāt bhāvanāmayena jñānena tallābho veditavyo dvayānupalambhād . . . (Lévi, 56). See Jamspal, Discourse Literature, 117. 273
Learning, Reasoning, Cultivating taking the discursive (the teachings) and conceptual (their meanings) as their primary objects. The True Meaning largely concurs as well. In its own explana- tion of the differences between the three types of wisdom, it has the Buddha say to Maitreya: With the wisdom arising from learning, Bodhisattvas rely upon words. They treat the words literally, and do not grasp their intent. They do not realize them directly. They conform to liberation, but they perceive objects that do not conform to liberation. Maitreya, with the wisdom arising from reasoning, they still rely upon words, but do not treat them literally. They grasp their intent and realize them directly. They highly conform to liberation, but still perceive objects that do not conform to liberation. Maitreya, with the wisdom arising from cultivation, bodhisattvas rely upon words and they do not rely upon words. They treat them literally and do not treat them literally. They grasp their intent. They perceive them directly through images arising in meditative concentration that accord with the objects to be known. They com- pletely conform to liberation, and perceive objects that also conform to liberation.68
True Meaning, chapter 8, paragraph 24: byang chub sems dpa’ thos pa las byung68 ba’i shes rab kyis ni tshig bru la gnas pa | sgra ji bzhin pa | dgongs pa med pa | mngon du ma gyur pa | sgra ji bzhin pa | rjes su thun pa | rnam par thar par byed pa ma yin pa’i don so so’ yang dag par rig par byed do | byams pa bsams pa las byung ba’i shes rab kyis ni tshig bru la gnas pa ’kho na ma yin la | sgra ji bzhin ma yin pa | dgongs pa can | mngon du gyur pa | rnams par thar par byed pa ma yin pa’i don so so yang dag par’ rig par byed do | byams pa byang chub sems dpa’ bsgoms pa las byung ba’i shes rab kyis ni tshig bru la gnas pa dang | tshig bru la gnas pa ma ying pa dang | sgra ji bzhin pa dang | sgra ji bzhin ma yin pa dang | dgongs pa can dang | shes bya’i dngos po dang’ cha thun pa’i ting nge dzin’ par thar pa’i rjes su ches shin tu thun pa | rnam par thar par byed pa’i don kyang so sor yang dag par rig par byed do (Lamotte, L’explication’ ’ ’ Powers, Wisdom, 183-184. , 105). For Lamotte’s French translation: 222-223. For an alternate English translation: 274
Buddhist Spiritual Practices In this passage, we can see how the practice of the three types of wisdom begins with the discursive and the conceptual. As before, learning here seems to involve rote learning, learning the teachings by heart, but also accepting a favored interpretation of their literal meaning. Reasoning would focus upon the discursive and conceptual, but involves moving past the literal or accepted interpretation to see intended meanings underlying the teachings. One begins to realize them directly, but remains grounded in the discursive and conceptual, and that explains why the practitioner does not yet perceive objects conducive to liberation. The practice of cultivation involves a greater degree of separation from the discursive and the conceptual, and thus the practitioner comes to see the truth directly and perceive objects that are conducive to liberation.
Treasury, largely resembles what we TheTrue Vaibhāṣika Meaning explanation and the Adornment of the three types of wisdom, alsowhich offers Vasubandhu a different gives explanation in the of the three types of wisdom and findtheir in relationship, the which he seems to prefer, and. However, this can tellVasubandhu us some- thing about the singular importance he attaches to rational practices
and their place on the path to pure wisdom. Vasubandhu introduces- videsthe second the answer: half of verse“The threefive, chapter types of six, wisdom by asking, born “And from what learning, is the reasoning,nature of theseand cultivating, three types respectively, of wisdom?” take The words, half-verse words thenand their pro
elaborates upon this answer in his commentary: objects,They and the say objects that the alone wisdom as their born respective from learning bases.” takesVasubandhu words as its conceptual basis. The wisdom born of reasoning takes both words and objects as its basis. Sometimes it grasps the object with the word; some- times it grasps the word with the object. The wisdom born of cultivation takes only objects as its basis, since it focuses upon the object without relying on its name.69
Treasury, chapter 6, verse 5cd and commentary: kiṃ punarāsāṃ prajñānāṃ lakṣaṇam69 | nāmobhayārthaviṣayā śrutamayyādikā dhiyaḥ | nāmālambanā kila 275
Learning, Reasoning, Cultivating This explanation echoes the Adornment and the True Meaning insofar as all three seek to differentiate the three types of wisdom, at least in part, by positing a distinction between words and the objects to which they refer.70 this explanation in the Treasury, because he again tags it with the word, kila Yet, Vasubandu does not seem to prefer
, “so they say.” Vasubandhu cites an analogy to support this thoseexplanation who have that learned he attributes how to to swim the aVaibhāṣikas: little may sometimes “To cross releasea river, thethose raft who and haven’t hold onto learned it at otherhow totimes; swim those must who keep have hold learned of the wellraft; how to swim may cross without the raft.”71 words are like rafts that help us cross the river of samsāra, but if Following the analogy,
mustrelied let upon go of exclusively, it from time they to timewon’t and enable swim us on to our learn own. how to swim across the river. For that we must use the raft correctly, that is, we
reasoningAs has clear no asobvious it may place seem, in the the scheme. problem Wisdom Vasubandhu arising from sees learningwith this takes Vaibhāṣika words explanationas its basis; iswisdom that the arising wisdom from arising cultivation from
reasoning is left without any distinctive basis or purpose.72 takes objects. According to Vasubandhu, wisdom arising from śrutamayī prajñā | nāmārthālambanā cintāmayī | kadācidvyañjanenārtham ākarṣati kadācidarthena vyañjanaṃ | arthālambanaiva bhāvanāmayī | sā hi vyañjananirapekṣā arthe pravartate Kośa Mahāvibhāṣaśāstra, now extant only in Chinese (Pradhan, translation. 334-335; Śāstrī, 700). La ValléeThis Poussin, alignment is, perhapsvol. 4, 143, vitiated identifies to some this extent passage by the as distinctiona paraphrase drawn of the in the70 True Meaning between literal and intended meaning, but at the same time we should remember that the same word, artha, is used in the sense of both object and meaning. Treasury, commentary on chapter 6, verse 5cd: tadyathā mbhasi plotum aśikṣitaḥ71 plavann eva muñcati | kiyacchikṣitaḥ kadācit muñcet kadācid ālambate | susikṣitaḥ plavan nirapekṣastaratītyeṣa dṛṣṭāntaḥ iti vaibhāṣikāḥ’ (Pradhan, Kośa as a citation from the Mahāvibhāṣaśāstra 335; Śāstrī, 700). La Vallée Poussin, , vol. 4, 143, also identifies this passage drawn from other sources, see Sangpo, Kośa. For, vol. an English3, 1893, translation 2047 and notes of La 76-83.Vallée Poussin’sTreasury annotated, continuing French commentary translation, on along chapter with 6, a bitverse more 5cd: information asyāṃ tu kalpanāyāṃ72 cintāmayī prajñā na siddhyatītyapare | yā hi nāmālambanā śrutamayī 276
Buddhist Spiritual Practices
Wisdom arising from learning provides certainty Therefore, Vasubandhu proposes a different explanation. He says, (niścaya) born from the testimony of an authoritative person (āpta), which is a valid means of knowledge. Wisdom arising from reasoning provides certainty born from rational analysis (yuktinidhyāna). Wisdom arising from cultivation provides certainty born from meditative concentration.73
throughSeveral pointswhich are one noteworthy attains the about wisdom this explanation.born from Firstreasoning. of all, Vasubandhu identifies rational analysis as cintā the ) uniquesimply means “rational analysis” (yuktinidhyāna).74 So,explanation “reasoning” agrees (or with thinking the second or reflection) main passage ( in the Adornment discussion of the three types of wisdom, In thiswhere respect, it is also Vasubandhu’s said that the wisdom born of reasoning arises from “rational analysis”’s (yuktinidhyāna).75 certainty, an epistemological concept, the key outcome for each of the three However,types of whereaswisdom, Vasubandhuthe Adornment also makes a separate outcome for each of the three practices: “Learning the teaching generates devotion (bhakti), that is, a strong conviction identifies (adhimukti saṃpratyaya) in the teaching. Reason- ing about the teaching brings joy (tuṣṭi ) and confidence ( ) at learning one’s potential prāpnoti yā rthālambanā bhāvanāmayīti | idam tu lakṣaṇaṃ nāniravidyaṃ vidyate | The commentary’ on chapter 6, verse 5, continues: āptavacana- prāmāṇyajātaniścayā73 (Pradhan, 335; śrutamayī Śāstrī, 700). yuktinidhyānajā cintāmayī samādhijā bhāvanā- mayīti hetau . . . 74 Thus, in regard to cintā here, we can see the broader problem of recognizing the semantic range(Pradhan, of certain 335; words, Śāstrī, which701). spans from ordinary, non-technical usages, determined mainly by context, to more decontextualized and technical
with both ordinary and technical senses, such as prajñā, abhijñā, jñāna, dharma, abhidharma,usages. We find this same problem when interpreting and translating terms Eltschinger, “Studies,” 554, where he notes this point among several pieces 75 and many more. interpretation of the wisdom born of reasoning. of evidence he gives for the influence of “Yogācāra literature” upon Vasubandhu’s 277
Learning, Reasoning, Cultivating for attainment. Cultivating the teaching produces understanding (buddhi) of the true nature of reality.”76 In the Treasury of wisdom instead places the emphasis on epistemic certainty, and in doing so carves out, Vasubandhu’s an independent explanation role for ofrational the three intellec- types to conceive an interdependent relationship between learning thetual teachingspractices onof the pathBuddha, to awakening. the most authoritativeVasubandhu alsoperson, appears and reasoning about them in a systematic, rational fashion. I would abhidharma, including the dialectical exchanges he provides in his commentary onsuggest the Treasury that Vasubandhu, as the proper conceives model for the and practice embodiment of of rational investigation or reasoning. The practice of abhidharma would seem to correspond most closely to the practice of wisdom born from rea- soning, which could not be performed in isolation from the practice of wisdom born from learning the teachings, just as the Abhidharma, teachings of the Buddha.77 for Vasubandhu, remains dependent upon the Dharma, that is, the the proper exercise of reason. In this However, way, Vasubandhu attaining not abhidharma only defends in itsthe ultimateBuddha’s sense teachings of pure as thewisdom final wouldword, butstill also seem makes to require space thefor practice of wisdom born from cultivating, through meditative con- centration, a direct, unmediated, non-discursive knowledge of the true nature of reality. It remains for us to consider once more how and cultivating, focusing now on the latter two types and locating Vasubandhu perceives the relationship between learning, reasoning, Adornment, chapter 12, verses 14-15 and commentary: ādimadhya- paryavasānakalyāṇo76 yathākramaṃ śrutacintābhāvanābhir bhaktituṣṭibuddhi- hetutvāt | tatra bhaktiradhimuktiḥ sampratyayaḥ tuṣṭiḥ prāmodyaṃ yuktinidhyānācchakyaprāptitām viditvā | buddhiḥ samāhitacittasya yathā- bhūtajñānaṃ (Lévi, 81-82.) See also Jamspal, Discourse Literature, 159-160. In this respect, the Adornment may disagree with the True Meaning, which identi- adhimukti) as a prerequisite for the practice of the three types of wisdom, and not one of its outcomes. See passage fiesin note the 55development above. of strong conviction (
77 “servile”For (Eltschinger, this reason, “Studies,” I do not 555). think it is entirely appropriate, at least from Vasubandhu’s perspective, to describe the wisdom born of learning as 278
Buddhist Spiritual Practices them on a continuum of practices from the discursive to the non- discursive and from the non-rational to the rational to the non-rational.
Wisdom and the Continuum of Practice Among the many assumptions embedded in our contemporary dis- course is the idea that “practice” differs, somehow basically, from “theory.” By these terms, we usually mean something rather vague: “doing” something, rather than “thinking” or “talking” or “writing” about it. And the assertion that thinking and writing are also forms of activity does little to reduce the primacy of practice over theory. A number of scholars of South Asian intellectual systems have challenged this primacy by showing that intellectuals of classical South Asia saw the issue rather differently. Sheldon Pollock has written, for example: “The relationship of śāstra (“theory”) to prayoga (“practical activity”) in Sanskritic culture is shown to be diametrically opposed to that usually found in the West. Theory is held always and necessarily to precede and govern practice; there is no dialectical interaction between them.”78 While Pollock suggests that Indian thinkers placed theory above practice, other scholars have tried to show how “spiritual prac- tices” like meditation may have engendered specific Buddhist philosophical reflections.79 In both cases, however, a rather sharp distinction still emerges between theoretical discourse and practical activity. Pierre Hadot challenges this distinction when he asks readers of ancient philosophy to understand philo- sophical discourse as a type of practice on a continuum of so-called “spiritual exercises.”
Sheldon Pollock, “The Theory of Practice and the Practice of Theory in Indian Intellectual78 History,” Journal of the American Oriental Society 105.3 (1985): 499.
Seeeds., also Religion Charles and Hallisey, Practical “In Reason: Defense New of EssaysRather in Fragile the Comparative and Local Achievement:Philosophy of ReligionsReflections (New on theYork: Work SUNY of Press,Gurulugomi,” 1994), 121-160. in Frank E. Reynolds and David Tracy, A classic example is Lambert Schmithausen, “On the Problem of the Relation of 79 Spiritual Practice and Philosophical Theory in Buddhism,” in German Scholars on India, vol. 2 (Delhi: Nachiketa Publications, 1976), 235-250. 279
Learning, Reasoning, Cultivating in ways we might find familiar, using a variety of terms (śāstra, abhidharmaVasubandhu, yukti, cintā may // well prayoga conceive, carita of , “theory”abhyāsa , andbhāvanā “practice”, mār- ga), which stake out particular ground along the divide within the respective semantic fields approximated by our terms. He none- theless places “thinking” (cintā) and “cultivation” (bhāvanā) along a continuum of different practices rather than in strict opposition. While they are distinctive forms of practice, they build upon one another and work together to instill wisdom in the practitioner. Classifying reasoning as theory and cultivation as practice, and then opposing them as we are apt to do, can lead to misunderstand- ing their nature and scope. As is typical among Indian Buddhist - itative practices that are discursive or conceptual in nature or at leastwriters begin of his as ilk,discursive Vasubandhu or conceptual classifies practices.as “cultivation” Thus, manytheoretical med reflection shifts to meditative cultivation more gradually than we might assume. In order to understand the distinctive features of these different types of practice, however, we must take into account at least two other sets of distinctions found in the Treasury makes a sharper distinction between the mundane (laukika-) and the transcendent paths (lokottara-mārga), and between. Vasubandhu the three existential realms (lokadhātu), namely the realms of desire, pure form, and formlessness.80 The former distinguishes between different
prayoga), levelsvision or(darśana stages ),of cultivationthe path, which (bhāvanā the Vaibhāṣika), and completion system dividesor no more into thelearning. five successiveThis path system paths ofcuts accumulation, across the three preparation existential ( realms, which are largely distinguished by the presence or absence of ma- terial form, as well as the presence or absence of discursivity and other mental or emotional states said to accompany the mind at different levels of meditative concentration.
The three realms of existence and their natures are treated in detail in chap- ter80 3 of the Treasury Kośa accessible overview of the traditional Buddhist view of the cosmos that largely . See La ValléeTreasury Poussin,, see Rupert, vol. Gethin,3, 1 and The following. Foundations For an of Buddhism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 112-132. accords with what we find in the 280
Buddhist Spiritual Practices So, for example, practices done upon the paths of accumu- lation and preparation involve direct engagement with the material and discursive realm of desire, including the body, mind, thoughts,
mundane, as are the basic acts of moral restraint. So, too, are vari- feelings, and habits. Learning and reasoning are thus classified as mindfulness of breathing, meditation on the horrible, mindfulness ofous the meditative body, and practices, the three which other are applications classified as ofcultivation, mindfulness. such Allas these practices are mundane in that they still involve some degree of discursivity, or conceptuality, or an engagement with the mate- rial world.81 They are distinguished from more advanced practices one undertakes upon the world-transcending paths of vision, cultivation, and completion. These practices correspond to the
reserves for mental states wherein the mind has attained a level ofrealms concentration of pure form that and precludes formlessness, discursivity which Vasubandhu and engagement largely with the realm of the senses.82 includes four basic states or levels of meditative concentration (dhyāna), only the first of which For retains instance, some the degree realm of pureconscious form application of thought (vitarka-vicāra), even though the practitioner has already also attained one-pointedness of mind. As the practi- tioner reaches progressively higher levels of meditative concen- tration, however, conscious application of thought subsides, and eventually so, too, do feelings of joy and ease, and the practitioner comes to rest in what might be described as a state of pure, non- discursive awareness.83
See the Treasury explains81 how particular practices on one level of the path can act as causes for subsequent practices, chapterdone at two,a higher verse level 52 andof the commentary, path. where Vasubandhu
description82 of these stages of the path based on reading the sixth chapter of Griffiths, “IndianTreasury Buddhist. Another Meditation,”useful overview 54-60, is given provides in Gethin, a brief Foundations and lucid, 194-198. Vasubandhu’sIn the Treasury the83 four dhyānas, or states of meditative concentration in the realm of pure form, , chapter 8, verses 7-8 and commentary, Vasubandhu defines Poussin, Kośa, vol. 5, 147-149. and the factors that accompany them. See Pradhan, 438; Śāstrī, 888; La Vallée 281
Learning, Reasoning, Cultivating that includes both preparatory and more advanced practices, discursiveFrom practices this we as can well see as that ones cultivation that seem is not a complexto involve category discur- sive thought, and practices that may be classified as either mundane first verse of chapter six on the path, where he explains that the path ofor cultivationworld-transcending. is twofold: Vasubandhu mundane orwill world-transcending. make this explicit 84in This the distinction parallels the one he makes between impure and pure, which we saw him apply to wisdom in chapter one, at the very beginning of the Treasury. These distinctions rely less upon a clear opposition progressive development of insight (vipaśyanā). Through practicing wisdom,between thattheory is, andthrough practice, learning and insteadit, reasoning mark aboutstages it, of and an individual’s cultivating an individual progressively transforms him or herself, thoughts, moti- vations,it—first habits, discursively body, and or conceptually,mind, and comes and to then see graduallywhat the Buddha less so— is said to have seen: reality as it truly is. In order to bring about this transformative vision in accordance with the truth, Vasubandhu seems to prioritize meditative exercises processesinvolving what . . . or Paul . . . the Griffiths repeated has contemplation usefully described and asinternalization “observational of keyanalysis:” items of “close Buddhist observation doctrine.” of85 the practitioner’s psychophysical of mindfulness (smṛti) as the paradigm for this practice, and indeed, Griffiths identifies the cultivation path leading to the cultivation of insight. However, we must be careful mindfulness plays a central role in Vasubandhu’s description of the 86 Just as we saw above to clarify precisely what Vasubandhu means by mindfulness, given the term’s prevalence in contemporary parlance. Treasury, chapter 6, verse 1c and commentary: dvividho bhāvanāmārgo laukiko84 lokottaraś ca
(Pradhan, 327; Śāstrī, 685). 85 - porary86 Griffiths, usages “Indian and with Buddhist respect Meditation,” to the Buddhist 44. tradition, see Georges Dreyfus, For some help navigating the complexities of the term, both in its contem cognitive dimensions of mindfulness,” Contemporary Buddhism 12 (2011), 41-54; “Is mindfulness present-centered and non-judgmental?Contemporary A discussion Buddhism of the 12 (2011), 263-279; and the general overview found in Antoine Lutz, Amishi P. Jha, Rupert Gethin, “On some definitions of mindfulness,” 282
Buddhist Spiritual Practices for prajñā, mindfulness is listed in the Treasury as one of the ten basic
thatmental mindfulness factors said is the to basic accompany mental anyfactor mental by which state. the Vasubandhu mind holds ontoinitially its mentaldefines objectit as “not or maintains losing the its mental focus uponobject,” the which object. suggests87 But if mindfulness is a basic factor of attention, present in any mental state,
While mindfulness may be a basic mental factor, the four why must we cultivate it? and prepare the ground for seeing the truths. Here, again, we need to considerapplications the of distinctionmindfulness between gradually thesharpen mundane the practitioner’s and the world- focus
between mindfulness that is “contaminated” by exposure to the transcending, the impure and the pure. Vasubandhu distinguishes that remains present in a state of meditation even when discursivity hasmaterial subsided. world88 of The sense practice objects, of and cultivating a “purified mindfulness state of mindfulness” thus also
again with the concept of wisdom or discernment, conceived as a clear visionstraddles of reality,this divide, divided which into Vasubandhu its component seems factors. to want In tochapter bridge six once of the Treasury, while discussing the four “applications of mindfulness” (smṛtyupasthāna immediately answers, “It is wisdom (prajñā “it is the wisdom), Vasubandhuborn from learning, asks, “What reasoning, is their essence?”and cultivation.” And he ),” and more specifically, John D. Dunne, and Clifford D. Saron, “Investigating the Phenomenological Matrix American Psychologist 70.7 (2015), 632-658. of Mindfulness-RelatedTreasury, chapter 2, Practicesverse 24, andFrom commentary: a Neurocognitive smṛtir Perspective,”ālambanāsampramoṣa 87 Treasury, chapter 2, commentary on verse 26, which mentions the (Pradhan,concept88 of 54; “contaminated Śāstrī, 148). mindfulness” (kliṣṭa smṛti Kośa mindfulness” (smṛtipariśuddhi) in the fourth dhyāna )or (Pradhan, level of meditative 56; Śāstrī, concentration,152; La Vallée see Poussin, Treasury , chapter, vol. 1,8, 162).verse 7-8 For and the commentary presence of (Pradhan, “purified Kośa, vol. 5, 147-149). I take this dis- tinction more or less to parallel the one Jaini recognizes in the Treasury be- 438;tween Śāstrī, “discernment” 888; La ( Valléeprajñā Poussin,) and “poor discernment” (kuprajñā) (= opinion,” dṛṣti) (“Prajñā and dṛṣṭi
“correct opinion” (samyagdṛṣṭi,” 404-409).) plays Also a key noteworthy role on the for path our of purposescultivation is (409). Jaini’s understanding that, for the Vaibhāṣika Abhidharma system, the cultivation of 283
Learning, Reasoning, Cultivating are themselves threefold insofar as they arise through the practices of learning,Therefore, reasoning, Vasubandhu and asserts, cultivation. the 89four By applicationsidentifying wisdom of mindfulness as their
of learning the Dharma and reasoning about it might belong on a continuumcommon basis, of practices Vasubandhu alongside suggests the cultivation how the of discursive mindfulness. practices A few lines later he directly addresses the question of how we know that wisdom is the essence of the four appli-
word, the proper object of the practice of learning: “observing (cationsanupaśyanā of mindfulness.) the body in Vasubandhu the body is firstan application cites the Buddha’sof mind- fulness.” He then interprets the passage by identifying the act of observation with the exercise of wisdom or discernment: “for, indeed, wisdom/discernment makes one who possesses
itmindfulness into an is observer.” reducible Afterto wisdom, giving because an alternative it becomes established Vaibhāṣika throughexplanation the exercise with which of wisdom. he disagrees,90 The argument Vasubandhu seems asserts to be based that on causality, as it often is in the Treasury.91 multiple concepts (smṛti, anupaśyanā, vipaśyanā) to a common causal basis, grounded in the basic categories Vasubandhu of the Abhidharma reduces to attain “certainty” (niścaya) about the nature of mindfulness, but system. In this way, Vasubandhu employs learning and reasoning Treasury, chapter 6, verse 15a and commentary: atha smṛtyupasthānānāṃ kaḥ89 svabhāvaḥ . . . tatra svabhāvasmṛtyupasthānam | prajñā | kīdṛśī prajñā | śrutādimayī | śrutamayī cintāmayī bhāvanāmayī ca | trividhāni smṛ- typasthānāni śrutacintābhāvanāmayāni | The Adornment also links the practice of mindfulness to the three types of wisdom, claiming that mindfulness practice (Pradhan, is grounded 341-342; upon Śāstrī,the wisdom 709).
44 and commentary: niśrayāt . . . bodhisattvānāṃ smṛtyupasthānabhāvanā viśiṣyateborn from | hearing, katham reflection āśrayato and mahāyāne cultivation. śrutacintābhāvanāmayīṃ See chapter 18, verses prajñā 43- māśritya (Lévi, 140). The Adornment further connects the three practices of wisdom to meditative cultivation in chapter 8, verse 7, and chapter 11, verse 9. Treasury, chapter 6, commentary on verse 15b: kāye kāyānupaśyanā smṛtyu- pasthānam90 iti vacanāt | kā punar anupaśyanā | prajñā | tayā hi tadvān anupaśyaḥ kriyate . . . smṛtiranayopatiṣṭhata iti smṛtyupasthānaṃ prajñā yathādṛṣṭasyābhi- lapanāt | See note 41 above and also Gold, Paving, especially chapters 2 and 3. 91 (Pradhan, 342; Śāstrī, 710-711). 284
Buddhist Spiritual Practices such certitude would still seem to be quite different from what one achieves by actually cultivating the four applications of mindfulness. - ties and perception to accord with learned and reasoned Buddhist Cultivating wisdom transforms a person’s cognitive facul After repeatedly practicing the applications of mind- doctrines.fulness As Vasubandhu in this way, says, taking the body and the other three applications as the cognitive basis, one becomes established in the application of mindfulness to the dharmas, which is the cognitive basis for all of them, and one sees that they are impermanent, unsatisfying, empty, and without self.92
discourse,Vasubandhu embodied describes in how the theteaching practitioner of the cultivates four applications mindfulness of by repeatedly applying the specific body of learned and reasoned
mindfulness, to the world of one’s subjective experiences. This practiceAs seemingly mentioned then above, provides the Treasurya different is kind structured of confirmation around the or fourcertainty noble that truths, the basic and the teachings four truths do, in are fact, rehearsed apply to one’s at the experience. beginning
path, the crucial pivot from the mundane path of preparation to theof Vasubandhu’s world-transcending discussion path ofof thecultivation path. In occurs his presentation upon the path of the of - ing. Although called a path, it is more aptly conceived as a singular experiencevision, which of is insight itself classified into the trueas entirely nature pure of reality, and world-transcend that is, the four noble truths in their various aspects. In order to produce this moment of insight (or series of moments), the practitioner progressively cultivates the four applications of mindfulness to produce the four “pathways to penetrating insight” (nirvedhabhāgīya), four higher but still preliminary meditative states that precede the experience of the 93
pathTreasury of vision,, chapter and which6, verse Vasubandhu 16: evaṃ kāyādyālambanāni also identifies smṛtyupasthānānywith wisdom. abhyasya92 | sa dharmasmṛtyupasthāne samastālambane sthitaḥ | anityaduḥkhataḥ śūnyānātmatas tān vipaśyati || Treasury, chapter 6, the framing commentary around verse 19c, as well as verse93 20b. (Pradhan, 343; Śāstrī, 712). 285
Learning, Reasoning, Cultivating of cultivation whereupon the practitioner works to consolidate the visionFollowing of the the truths. path of vision comes the transcendent part of the path In his discussion of the four noble truths at the beginning of throw into sharp relief this relationship between grasping the teach- ingschapter intellectually six, Vasubandhu and preliminarily, includes a strikingand then image, slowly which training seems to see to them experientially in a brief moment of clarity, before gradually coming to view oneself and the world around one completely through the lens they provide. He compares the practitioner on the transcendent path of cultivation to a horse running freely over ground it has already seen.94 Seeing the ground, of course, symbolizes seeing the truths, the path of vision, but a horse knows the ground quite differently from simply seeing or knowing it intellectually or by following a map. The horse knows by having gone over the ground already, just as the path of seeing is the culmination of a gradual process of development, based on repetition and not just representation. In fact, the word “seen,” dṛṣṭa, is itself quite close to dṛḍha commentators attest to this as an alternate reading. Nonetheless, the preliminary practices could well be said, “firm, to build stable,” a stable though ground no for the advanced practice of cultivation, symbolized by the image of various physical and mental exercises—including memorization techniques,running without rational difficulty. practices, This and metaphor other discursive thus aptly exercises,conveys the work way- ing together with the cultivation of mindfulness and other types of cultivation, all set upon on a continuum of practices—prepare one to internalize a particular vision of reality, thus transforming “an tout le psychisme de l’individu), as Hadot might say.95 individual’s entire psyche” (
Treasury, chapter 6, commentary on verse 2: dṛṣṭabhūminiḥ- saṅgāśvadhāvanavat94 - uscript reading as -dhānavat prasaraṇavat on the (Pradhan, 328; Śāstrī, 687). Pradhan reportsdhāvanavat the as man an , while Śāstrī emends to – mybasis attention of Yaśomitra’s to this metaphor,commentary, and but for Yaśomitraencouraging also remarks gives - on a prior draft of thisalternate essay. reading. My appreciation goes to Sonam Kachru for first drawing See note 11 above. 95 286
Buddhist Spiritual Practices Conclusion By reading his Treasury of Abhidharma, studied in close com- parison with the Adornment to the Mahāyāna Scriptures and the Scripture Revealing the True Meaning, I have sought to show how,
and cultivation) exemplify the practice of wisdom. By employing for Vasubandhu, three main types of activity (learning, reasoning, the rational, intellectual practice of abhidharma (in its conventional sense),this typology, a practice Vasubandhu he models finds in his a own place treatise on the and Buddhist its commentary. path for The Treasury itself embodies the discursive practices of learning and
work and applies in his discussion of the four applications of mindfulness,reasoning, a pointbut the Vasubandhu work also points makes beyond in the openingitself to a verses broader of theset of embodied practices of self-cultivation. And just as Pierre Hadot has urged modern readers to understand the practice of wisdom as the central motivation of ancient philosophy, the comparative exercise
practice of wisdom as the central motivating concern of the Buddhist undertaken here has sought to reveal Vasubandhu’s portrayal of the of wisdom articulated by the Stoics, for instance, with that of the Bud- path. This exercise has focused less on comparing a specific concept- izes wisdom and frames its practice. In response to the question of dhists, but instead on how a specific Buddhist philosopher character of practices, all of them grounded upon habituating oneself to a spe- how one can practice wisdom, Vasubandhu identifies a threefold set and self-cultivation, but also rational practices, including the practice ofcific abhidharma mode of life,. Thus, and like including Hadot with not onlyhis notion techniques of “spiritual of rote exercises,” learning
practices of wisdom on a continuum of development, resisting the urgeVasubandhu to draw challengessharp oppositions the reader between to understand rule-based these behavior, different rote learning, theoretical reflection, and both “discursive” and “non- discursive” practices of self-cultivation. A sharper distinction is drawn between mundane and world-transcending practices. The Buddhist practices of wisdom seek to liberate the practitioner in some fundamental way from a world characterized by suffering, and this may seem to diverge from 287
Learning, Reasoning, Cultivating certain Hellenistic notions of philosophy as therapy, at least as Hadot portrays them.96 Some of this divergence may end up being more rhetorical than real, however. The Buddhist path is also framed in terms of acquiring knowledge (omniscience, even, and I would add other attainments: power, wellness, and so on). Regarding knowledge, the intellectual practice of knowing the Buddhist truths, of seeing the true nature of reality, is placed within the practical context of discovering or coming to realize for oneself the reality of what one has learned to be true. This practice of wisdom thus remains con- nected to an all-encompassing truth thought to have a transformative entails knowledge. effect upon the practitioner. Knowledge is liberating and liberation emphasizes the epistemic outcome of all three types of practice. They all bringVasubandhu’s certitude (niścaya particular), he discussionsays. His explanation of the practice thus of contrasts wisdom with the Adornment, which speaks of devotion or conviction, joy, and understanding as the respective outcomes of the three practices of wisdom, but it may agree with the True Meaning, which places conviction as a necessary precondition for the practice of wisdom. This divergence opens another avenue for comparison with Hadot, who argues that ancient philosophers saw the philosophical way of life and its attendant practices as necessarily preceded by an existential choice of life.97 If Buddhist philosophers also recognized an existential commitment as a prerequisite for practicing the Buddhist wisdompath, how aligns is such with a thecommitment rationalist itselfreading to ofbe him learned pursued or cultivated? here. Vasubandhu’sIf we acceptfocus on that certitude the three as the practices basic outcome serve anof practicingepistemic function, we still should ask what epistemic weight they carry, both
96 Exercises spirituelsFor example,, 15-29; Waythe lists of Life Hadot, 82-89. cites Thus, from we Philo may are want included to ask under whether the the heading Bud- dhistof spiritual practices exercises under consideration Hadot classifies are intended as “learning to help to live.”us live Hadot, or escape from the realm of death and rebirth (or both). We would also want to consider the divergence concerning the meditation on death discussed in several chapters in
Hadot, Ancient Philosophy, 3, 102; La philosophie antique, 17, 161. this97 volume, especially Tomlinson’s. 288
Buddhist Spiritual Practices individually and collectively. How and when does conviction become
emerges again between self-cultivation and acquiring knowledge. In certitude, and certitude become knowledge? Here the tension positions on the question of the relationship between philosophical reasoningthis respect, and Tom meditative Tillemans cultivation, has identified represented two traditional by the “continuity Buddhist thesis” and the “independence thesis.”98 His prototypical exemplars
theof these early twoend positionsof a span areof Indian Kamalaśīla Buddhist and philosophers, Heshang, respectively. including So, philologically, the essay has shown that Vasubandhu belongs on continuity between the rational and non-rational practices of reason- Dharmakīrti and Kamalaśīla, who sought to emphasize the epistemic out ground for the practice of reasoning, and meditative cultivation ing and cultivation. As we saw, Vasubandhu’s concern was to stake and reasoning. In regard to the continuity thesis, however, Tillemans would then seem to confirm the insights reached through learning epistemic contribution over and above philosophical reasoning. has argued that meditative cultivation would not make a significant already shown to be true. On such a position, Tillemans acknowledges, meditativeMeditation cultivation would simply could confirm well bring the truthabout of the what transformation reasoning has of the individual, but he argues that one is still faced with the problem of autosuggestion when the insights of meditative cultivation simply 99 Philosophically, then, this essay has illumined an active tensionconfirm learnedembedded and reasonedin the relationship discourse, and between vice versa. self-cultivation and acquiring knowledge. If philosophy aims at knowledge, what
philosophy aims at therapy, why must it remain focused upon would be its direct impact on our lives? If, on the other hand,
antruth? awareness How should that we we embody, understand rationalize, the relationship or justify our between own social the production of knowledge and self-transformation? And how does
98 How do MādhyamikasTom J. F. Tillemans, Think? “Yogic(Boston: Perception, Wisdom, 2016),Meditation, especially and Enlightenment: 189-194. Thanks The to EpistemologicalDavey Tomlinson Issues and Luis in a GómezKey Debate for drawing between my Madhyamaka attention to and this Chan,” article. in Tillemans, “Yogic Perception,” 190-191 and notes 21-24. 99 289
Learning, Reasoning, Cultivating and institutional embeddedness with our own rational and non- therational answers, practices but Charles change Hallisey our relationship has suggested to that knowledge? the comparative These philosophicalremain living questionsexercise “creates to which dispositions Vasubandhu within may or us may to preserve,not have and if necessary to defend, the rather fragile and local achievements it presumes to examine.”100 In this respect, our comparative exercise philosophy does aim “to understand how things . . . hang together,” as Wilfridhas remained Sellars famously focused on put learning it,101 then how there to is read value Vasubandhu, in understanding but if a different analogy for how various practices hang together to form
and philosophical exercises to encompass an even wider range of topicsa specific and wayexercises, of life. we And can if also we expandsee the tension our notions between of philosophy acquiring - porary systems of education, where we commonly require learning “theknowledge truth of and this personalor that,” circumscribed transformation bodies reflected of knowledge in our contem about ourselves and the world, like anatomy or physiology, without always
shape us into particular types of people. As we learn to discern better theencouraging relationship reflection between on the how intellectual the various practices elements and other of education types of practices we undertake in our lives, including both non-rational and non-discursive ones, we provide ourselves new tools with which to think about our own relationship to knowledge.
Hallisey, “In Defense of Achievement,” 151. 100 Science, Perception101 and Reality Wilfrid Sellars, “Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man,” in (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1963), 1.