DOCSLIB.ORG

Dr Paikiasothy Saravanamuttu Military Victory, Though Yet Elusive, Is Still

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Dr Paikiasothy Saravanamuttu Military Victory, Though Yet Elusive, Is Still What is Happening to the East? Dr Paikiasothy Saravanamuttu Military victory, though yet elusive, is still being projected as imminent and certain amidst the massive and unprecedented rains and mud and misery of the north. Mr Prabhakaran’s annual speech gave no indications that he had the capacity to spring any surprises any more to reverse this and sounded pathetic in the main, passages of defiance notwithstanding. There is no shying away from the conclusion that even if this phase of war is to end up in yet another protracted stalemate, the LTTE has literally and metaphorically speaking, miles to claw back militarily, territorially and politically to regain the 2002 balance of power. Without the LTTE as the dominant political actor of yore, what happens to and in the north and east? This is why what is happening in the east is a cause for serious concern as to the prospects for post conflict peace, security and reconciliation. What needs to be reiterated as far as the east is concerned is that it is supposed to have been liberated from the LTTE a year ago; it also has a provincial council and chief minister, elected albeit in a contested election. Moreover, there is a large - scale development plan for the east under the title of the Eastern Awakening. On the face of it there should be no reason as to why it should not be glad, confident morning in the east again as the title of the development programme boldly proclaims. The prevailing situation in the province, however, is one of creeping anarchy and high levels of tension and insecurity. And the regime does not seem willing or able to do anything about it, apart from provide amateurish rebuttals of international human rights reports, like that of the Us based Human Rights Watch, spelling out the gravity of the situation in the province. The statistics of violence speak for themselves. In the month of November alone there were some 50 odd killings in the province that were recorded by the Police. On the 26 and 27th of November alone, 23 persons were killed, allegedly by persons on motor –bikes without number plates. The Police appear to be unable to do anything about this or to provide further information. According to some media reports, despite these motorbikes being seen by journalists, the Police deny their existence. However, in a telling reflection of the security situation in the province, one media report states that Police in Eravur on condition of anonymity, allege that the killings are being carried out by various Tamil political parties, including the Karuna faction of the TMVP. There are those in the Rajapakse regime that want to make out that this is the work of the LTTE. Were this to be the case, it is clear that the LTTE has a presence in the East and the ability to operate with impunity. Were it not to be the case, it is equally clear that the sustenance of the Karuna/Pillayan rivalry is creating a space for it. Whilst Pillayan launched a hunger strike in protest at the killings, the security forces in a massive operation in the Batticaloa district “screened” 12,000 persons and detained just over a 120 for suspected links with the LTTE. It is clear that the open and armed hostilities between the Karuna and Pillayan factions of the TMVP are a major source of the violence and instability. The Rajapaksa regime’s perverse stratagem of playing one off against the other, or of using one to balance the other, risks losing the political capital that could accrue from association with both of them. Pillayan is on record as saying that the assassination of his personal secretary was not the work of the LTTE, hinting broadly that it was the work of the Karuna faction and its associates. He is also on record as saying that he has not been given the power and resources due to him as Chief Minister of the Province. Consequently his ability to engage in any meaningful developmental work and contribute towards maintaining the rule of law and law and order in the province is negligible. As this column has warned before, he could be turned into a Perumal or be forced into the arms of the LTTE. Pillayan wants the full powers entitled to him as the Chief Minister of the Eastern Province, including the police powers that have never been devolved to any province. Karuna on the other hand, is of the opinion that this is not necessary. Is it the case that the regime is using Karuna to front it’s policy of undermining the Thirteenth Amendment and devolution at the same time as it claims to want to implement it, for the benefit of the international community and India in particular? On another front, Pillayan in protest at the killings withdrew TMVP participation in the APRC only to have Karuna insist that he would be sending TMVP representatives to the forum. Who leads the TMVP and which leader and faction does the Rajapaksa regime support? Compounding this violence is that which claimed the life of Dr Palitha Pathmakumara, resulting in Sinhala doctors withdrawing from duties in the east and a 30 % reduction in the number of doctors in the Batticaloa Teaching Hospital. The east it would seem, has reawakened to internecine warfare and renewed instability and insecurity. The President has declared that the pillars of his policy for peace and reconciliation and unity are democracy, demilitarization, disarmament and devolution. Is there any reason as to why the east has been excluded from this ? of the Rajapakse regime in sustaining the rivalry between Pillayan and Karuna in a perverse divide and .
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Sri Lanka 2020 Human Rights Report
    SRI LANKA 2020 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Sri Lanka is a constitutional, multiparty democratic republic with a freely elected government. Presidential elections were held in 2019, and Gotabaya Rajapaksa won the presidency. He appointed former president Mahinda Rajapaksa, his brother, as prime minister. On August 5, Prime Minister Mahinda Rajapaksa led the Sri Lankan People’s Freedom Alliance and small allied parties to secure a two- thirds supermajority, winning 150 of 225 seats in parliamentary elections. COVID-19 travel restrictions prevented international observers and limited domestic election observation. Domestic observers described the election as peaceful, technically well managed, and safe considering the COVID-19 pandemic but noted that unregulated campaign spending, abuse of state resources, and media bias affected the level playing field. The Sri Lanka Police are responsible for maintaining internal security and are under the Ministry of Public Security, formed on November 20. The military, under the Ministry of Defense, may be called upon to handle specifically delineated domestic security responsibilities, but generally without arrest authority. The nearly 11,000-member paramilitary Special Task Force, a police entity that reports to the inspector general of police, coordinates internal security operations with the military. Civilian officials maintained control over the security forces. Members of the security forces committed some abuses. The Sri Lanka parliament passed the 20th Amendment to the constitution on October 22. Opposition political leaders and civil society groups widely criticized the amendment for its broad expansion of executive authority that activists said would undermine the independence of the judiciary and independent state institutions, such as the Human Rights Commission and the Elections Commission, by granting the president sole authority to make appointments to these bodies with parliament afforded only a consultative role.
    [Show full text]
  • Endgame in Sri Lanka Ajit Kumar Singh*
    Endgame in Sri Lanka Ajit Kumar Singh* If we do not end war – war will end us. Everybody says that, millions of people believe it, and nobody does anything. – H.G. Wells 1 The Sri Lankan President Mahinda Rajapakse finally ended the Eelam War2 in May 2009 – though, perhaps, not in the manner many would desire. So determined was the President that he had told Roland Buerk of the BBC in an interview published on February 21, 2007, “I don't want to pass this problem on to the next generation.”3 Though the final phase of open war4 began on January 16, 2008, following the January 2 unilateral withdrawal of the Government of Sri Lanka (GoSL) from the Norway-brokered * Ajit Kumar Singh, Research Fellow, Institute for Conflict Management 1 Things to Come (The film story), Part III, adapted from his 1933 novel The Shape of Things to Come, spoken by the character John Cabal. 2 The civil war in Sri Lanka can be divided into four phases: Eelam War I between 1983 and 1987, Eelam War II between 1990-1994, Eelam War III between 1995-2001, and Eelam War IV between 2006-2009. See Muttukrishna Sarvananthaa in “Economy of the Conflict Region in Sri Lanka: From Embargo to Repression”, Policy Studies 44, East-West Centre, http://www.eastwestcenter.org/fileadmin/stored/pdfs/ps044.pdf. 3 “No end in sight to Sri Lanka conflict”, February 21, 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/6382787.stm. 4 Amantha Perera, “Sri Lanka: Open War”, South Asia Intelligence Review, Volume 6, No.28, http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/sair/Archives/6_28.htm#assessment1.
    [Show full text]
  • Cluster Report
    MONITORING FACTORS AFFECTING THE SRI LANKAN PEACE PROCESS CLUSTER REPORT THIRD QUARTERLY MAY 2008 – JULY 2008 CENTRE FOR POLICY ALTERNATIVES TABLE OF CONTENTS CLUSTER Page Number PEACE TALKS AND NEGOTIATIONS CLUSTER ……………………………………… 2 MILITARY BALANCE CLUSTER ........................................................................................................3 HUMAN SECURITY....................................................................................................................................7 POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT CLUSTER .....................................................................................11 INTERNATIONAL CLUSTER ............................................................................................................15 LEGAL & CONSTIIUTIONAL CLUSTER .....................................................................................18 ECONOMIC CLUSTER ..........................................................................................................................21 PUBLIC OPINION CLUSTER ............................................................................................................26 MEDIA ...........................................................................................................................................................30 ENDNOTES…..……………………………………………………………………………….34 METHODOLOGY The Centre for Policy Alternatives (CPA) has conducted the project “Monitoring the Factors Affecting the Peace Process” to provide an understanding of the current status of the peace
    [Show full text]
  • Report of the OHCHR Investigation on Sri Lanka (OISL)* **
    A/HRC/30/CRP.2 Advance Version Distr.: Restricted 16 September 2015 English only Human Rights Council Thirtieth session Agenda item 2 Annual report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and reports of the Office of the High Commissioner and the Secretary-General Report of the OHCHR Investigation on Sri Lanka (OISL)* ** * Reproduced as received ** The information contained in this document should be read in conjunction with the report of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights- Promoting reconciliation, accountability and human rights in Sri Lanka (A/HRC/30/61). A/HRC/30/CRP.2 Contents Paragraphs Page Part 1 I. Introduction ............................................................................................................. 1–13 5 II. Establishment of the OHCHR Investigation on Sri Lanka (OISL), mandate and methodology ............................................................................................................. 14–46 7 III. Contextual background ........................................................................................... 47–103 12 IV. Overview of Government, LTTE and other armed groups...................................... 104–170 22 V. Legal framework ..................................................................................................... 171–208 36 Part 2– Thematic Chapters VI. Unlawful killings ..................................................................................................... 209–325 47 VII. Violations related to the
    [Show full text]
  • Sri Lanka Country Information Report No. 3
    SRI LANKA COUNTRY INFORMATION REPORT NO. 3 15 June 2021 Combined Refugee Action Group, Geelong, Victoria For further information, contact: [email protected] The Combined Refugee Action Group is a network group that brings together people from a variety of backgrounds across the Geelong region in Victoria, (Refugee Support Groups, Church and Community Groups, Unions, Political Groups, Social Justice and Social Action Groups, students, and individuals). We are united by the shared aim of advocating for just, humane, and welcoming policies towards refugees and people seeking asylum. Table of Contents Purpose .................................................................................................................................. 3 Introduction ......................................................................................................................... 3 Legislative changes for greater control ...................................................................... 4 Rajapaksa family ................................................................................................................. 5 Attacks on journalists and human rights organisations ....................................... 6 Forced disappearances .................................................................................................... 9 The situation for Tamils ................................................................................................ 12 Election violence .............................................................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • Sri Lanka – Muslim – Politician – Sri Lanka Muslim Congress – Religion
    Refugee Review Tribunal AUSTRALIA RRT RESEARCH RESPONSE Research Response Number: LKA35710 Country: Sri Lanka Date: 16 November 2009 Keywords: Sri Lanka – Muslim – Politician – Sri Lanka Muslim Congress – Religion This response was prepared by the Research & Information Services Section of the Refugee Review Tribunal (RRT) after researching publicly accessible information currently available to the RRT within time constraints. This response is not, and does not purport to be, conclusive as to the merit of any particular claim to refugee status or asylum. This research response may not, under any circumstance, be cited in a decision or any other document. Anyone wishing to use this information may only cite the primary source material contained herein. Questions 1. Are there any reports of Muslim politicians facing ill-treatment by the government, or any other actor, for speaking out against the government/opposing the government? 2. Is it common for Muslims in Sri Lanka to speak Tamil? 3. Is there any information about Tamil-speaking Muslims being under suspicion by the government? RESPONSE 1. Are there any reports of Muslim politicians facing ill-treatment by the government, or any other actor, for speaking out against the government/opposing the government? Sources referred to did not mention ill treatment targeted at certain politicians because they were Muslim. Most painted Muslim politicians as speaking out in favor Muslim interests, sometimes against the government. A December 2007 LankaNewspapers article provides background information to the formation of Sri Lanka’s main Muslim party, the Sri Lanka Muslim Congress (SLMC) and its first leader stating that: The dominant Sinhala political class had been long used to pliable Muslim politicians of both green and blue hues.
    [Show full text]
  • SRI LANKA COUNTRY of ORIGIN INFORMATION (COI) REPORT COI Service
    SRI LANKA COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION (COI) REPORT COI Service 4 July 2011 SRI LANKA 4 JULY 2011 Contents Preface Latest News EVENTS IN SRI LANKA FROM 2 TO 27 JUNE 2011 Useful news sources for further information REPORTS ON SRI LANKA PUBLISHED OR ACCESSED BETWEEN 2 TO 27 JUNE 2011 Paragraphs Background Information 1. GEOGRAPHY ............................................................................................................ 1.01 Map ........................................................................................................................ 1.06 Public holidays ..................................................................................................... 1.07 2. ECONOMY ................................................................................................................ 2.01 3. HISTORY .................................................................................................................. 3.01 Key political events (1948 to December 2010) ............................................... 3.01 The internal conflict (1984 to May 2009) ......................................................... 3.15 Government treatment of (suspected) members of the LTTE ........................ 3.28 The conflict's impact: casualties and displaced persons ................................ 3.43 4. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS ........................................................................................... 4.01 Key recent developments (January – May 2011) ........................................... 4.01 Situation
    [Show full text]
  • And Other Non-LTTE Tamil Political Parties in Sri Lanka 1 April 2010
    DIAC‐IN‐CONFIDENCE FOCUS BRIEF SRI LANKA Issue: The TMVP (Karuna and Pillayan Factions), Eelam People’s Democratic Party (EPDP) and other non-LTTE Tamil political parties in Sri Lanka 1 April 2010 This document has been prepared by the Country Research Section (CRS), Onshore Protection Branch of the Department of Immigration and Citizenship, Canberra ACT. It is current at the time of completion only. The document does not purport to represent the view of the Department of Immigration and Citizenship on any matter with which it deals. Original source documents should be cited in preference to quoting this document directly. Decision makers and others should form their own views based on the original information and their own research. The document provides government and publicly available material without forming a departmental position. The information is compiled from Government and publicly available sources. However, CRS does not guarantee that the information is exhaustive or conclusive as country conditions are subject to change. Further updates of country conditions will be incorporated into CISNET in the normal way. This document must not be cited directly. Case managers must form their own views based on the original information and refer to the original source documentation. Any request to access this document under the Freedom of Information Act 1982, should be referred to CRS for decision on release. 1 DIAC‐IN‐CONFIDENCE 1 GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS..................................................3 2 PURPOSE..............................................................................................4
    [Show full text]
  • Loan Halt Creates Further Delay
    DISPLACED BY LONG-TERM Govt. sets agenda: DEVELOPMENT THE LONG 20A gets priority WAIT CONTINUES RS. 70.00 PAGES 64 / SECTIONS 6 VOL. 02 – NO. 47 SUNDAY, AUGUST 16, 2020 TNA RECEDES IMF SUPPORT ONLY POLITICAL IF UNCONDITIONAL LEADERSHIP – GOVERNOR »SEE PAGE 6 »SEE PAGE 7 »SEE BUSINESS PAGE 1 »SEE PAGES 8 & 9 For verified information on the GENERAL PREVENTIVE GUIDELINES COVID-19 LOCAL CASES COVID-19 CASES coronavirus (Covid-19) contact any of the IN THE WORLD following authorities ACTIVE CASES TOTAL CASES 1999 TOTAL CASES Health Promotion Bureau 2,886 Suwasariya Quarantine Unit 0112 112 705 21,154,001 Ambulance Service Epidemiology Unit 0112 695 112 DEATHS RECOVERED Govt. coronavirus hotline 0113071073 Wash hands with soap Wear a commercially Maintain a minimum Use gloves when shopping, Use traditional Sri Lankan Always wear a mask, avoid DEATHS RECOVERD 1990 for 40-60 seconds, or rub available mask/cloth mask distance of 1 metre using public transport, etc. greeting at all times crowded vehicles, maintain 2,658 PRESIDENTIAL SPECIAL TASK FORCE FOR ESSENTIAL SERVICES hands with alcohol-based or a surgical mask if showing from others, especially in and discard into a lidded instead of handshaking, distance, and wash hands 11 758,942 13,980,941 Telephone 0114354854, 0114733600 Fax 0112333066, 0114354882 handrub for 20-30 seconds respiratory symptoms public places bin lined with a bag hugging, and/or kissing before and after travelling 217 Hotline 0113456200-4 Email [email protected] THE ABOVE STATISTICS ARE CONFIRMED UP UNTIL 6.00 P.M. ON 14 AUGUST 2020 No UNP in the House BY OUR POLITICAL EDITOR z National List slot vacant z Working Committee undecided The United National Party (UNP) has decided to seek The decision to seek more time to Sunday Morning that the party would possible to not name the National List ended on Friday (14).
    [Show full text]
  • Commission of Inquiry on Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation
    Report of the COMMISSION OF INQUIRY ON LESSONS LEARNT AND RECONCILIATION November 2011 Members of the Commission Chitta Ranjan de Silva Esquire, P.C. Chairman Dr. Amrith Rohan Perera Esquire, P.C. Professor Karunaratne Hangawatte Esquire, Chandirapal Chanmugam Esquire, Hewa Matara Gamage Siripala Palihakkara Esquire, Mrs. Manohari Ramanathan Maxwell Parakrama Paranagama Esquire, Mohamed Thowfeek Mohamed Bafiq Esquire. i ii iii iv v vi vii mÍCIK fldñIka iNd mkf;a 2 jk j.ka;sh hgf;a w;s.re ckdêm;s;=uka úiska m;alrk ,o W.;a mdvï iy m%;sikaOdkh ms<sn| jq ckdêm;s mÍCIK fldñIka iNdj tprhuiz Mizf;FOf;fs; rl;lj;jpd; 2 Mk; gphptpd; fPo; mjpNkjF rdhjpgjp mth;fspdhy; epakpf;fg;gl;l fw;Wf;nfhz;l ghlq;fSk; ey;ypzf;fKk; gw;wpa rdhjpgjp tprhuiz Mizf;FO COMMISSION OF INQUIRY ON LESSONS LEARNT AND RECONCILIATION APPOINTED BY HIS EXCELLENCY THE PRESIDENT IN TERMS OF SECTION 2 OF THE COMMISSIONS OF INQUIRY ACT uf.a wxlh Tfí wxlh oskh jpfjp vdJ ,y ckJ ,y th My No Your No. Date. 15 November, 2011 Mr. C.R de Silva, PC (Chairman) Dr. A. Rohan Perera, PC His Excellency Mahinda Rajapaksa (Member) President of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka Prof. Karu Hangawatte Colombo. (Member) Mr. C.Chanmugam (Member) Your Excellency, Mr. H.M.G.S Palihakkara (Member) Mrs. Manohari Ramanathan We have the honour to refer to the Proclamation issued by Your Excellency on (Member) 15th May 2010 in pursuance of the provisions of Section 2 of the Commissions of Mr. M.P Paranagama Inquiry Act (Chapter 393) and letter of 7th September 2010, appointing the (Member) undersigned as Your Excellency’s Commissioners for the purpose of inquiring into Mr.
    [Show full text]
  • Sri Lanka 2015 Human Rights Report
    SRI LANKA 2015 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Sri Lanka is a constitutional, multiparty republic with a freely elected government. Rejecting the re-election bid of Mahinda Rajapaksa, in January voters elected President Maithripala Sirisena to a five-year term. Parliament, elected in August, shares constitutional power with the president. The EU Election Observation Mission characterized the August parliamentary elections as the “most peaceful and efficiently conducted elections in the country’s recent history.” Although polling was free and fair, the former Rajapaksa government utilized state resources for its own advantage during the presidential election campaign. Civilian authorities maintained effective control over the security forces. In steps designed to enhance national unity following years of civil war, on August 29, the government closed the Omanthai military checkpoint, which previously divided government-held territory from former Liberation Tiger of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)-controlled territory. In March the government adopted the constitution’s 19th amendment, which limits the powers of the presidency and begins a process of restoring the independence of government commissions. In September the government cosponsored a resolution on human rights at the UN Human Rights Council and welcomed visits by the UN special rapporteur on transitional justice, the UN Working Group on Enforced and Involuntary Disappearances, and the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) Office of Legal Affairs team. The president established the Office of National Unity and Reconciliation to play a key role in the government’s reconciliation efforts. Following the August parliamentary elections, the government established the Ministry of National Dialogue to further advance the government’s reconciliation initiatives.
    [Show full text]
  • 8. Crime–War in Sri Lanka
    8 Crime–war in Sri Lanka A least likely case with dozens of degrees of freedom1 In this chapter, three armed conflicts in Sri Lanka since independence are used to provide a particularly strong focus on Proposition 9: crime as a cause of war and war as a cause of crime. The Marxist revolutionary party Janathā Vimukthi Peramuņa (JVP, People’s Liberation Front) first led an insurgency in the 1970s and 1980s, which overlapped with the more deadly ethnic Tamil insurgency (which also encompassed class and caste resentments) starting in the 1980s. In the context of an analysis of our other propositions, the recent history of Sri Lanka is used to illustrate three cascade dynamics: crime cascades to war, war cascades to more war and to crime and crime and war both cascade to state violence such as torture, enforced disappearances and extrajudicial execution. Sri Lanka is also a case that cascaded new technologies of crime–war globally, such as suicide-bomb vests. The criminological lens for looking at cascades of warfare is not the most important one, but it is a profoundly neglected one. To put it dynamically, Chapter 4 argued that war has a propensity to morph into extreme crime problems that can be a cause of violence greater than the war. But crime can also morph into war. Hence, war prevention is crime prevention. And crime prevention—community policing that works—can interrupt cascades of warfare. For the past half-century, 1 This chapter is an expanded version of considerable portions of Braithwaite and D’Costa (2015).
    [Show full text]