G 1 NER Y SE E CU O R T I A T Y N

C E E C N T N R E E LL OF EXCE

Energy Security: Operational Highlights

No 11 2017

ENERGY SECURITY: OPERATIONAL HIGHLIGHTS No 11 2 3 Contents 4 Editorial

ARTURAS PETKUS

5 Energy Security: Eight Relevant Lessons

MICHAEL RÜHLE Relevant political and technological upheavals have brought about signif­cant changes in the global energy landscape. Eight lessons can be learnt from them.

Critical Energy infrastructure Protection 8 through Comprehensive Security

ANTI-PEKKA MANNINEN AND HEIKI JAKSON The Finnish security policy is an example of a good approach to protect the critical energy infrastructure of a state. Regional standardization efforts and the analysis of the issues related to critical energy infrastructure from which best practices can be drawn are the focus of this article.

The Role, Risks and the Strategic Importance 16 of Energy in Conflicts. The case of

EMANUELE NICOLA CECCHETTI AND HEIKI JAKSON A short historical overview from the ancient times to the in 2014 shows that the role of energy in conflicts has evolved throughout time.

The energy dimension of war. An overview 25 of the Ukrainian events in 2014-2016

OLEKSANDR SUKHODOLIA targeted critical energy infrastructure in its conflict with Ukraine. The analysis of the events that characterized the conflict between them shows that the ‘energy dimension’ has been incorporated into hybrid warfare.

35 Critical Energy Infrastructure: Identification and protection

MONIEK DE JONG AND LARRY HUGHES Several types of threats can affect critical energy infrastructure. Therefore, counter- measures are essential in order to increase the energy security of the energy system.

No 11 ENERGY SECURITY: OPERATIONAL HIGHLIGHTS ENERGY SECURITY: OPERATIONAL HIGHLIGHTS No 11 4 5 icant changes in the global energy landscape. In doing so, he illustrates eight main lessons Editorial that can be deduced from those changes and Energy Security: that must be taken into consideration when Dr Arturas Petkus evaluating the current geopolitical situation Head of Strategic Analysis Division with a focus on the energy sector. NATO Energy Security Centre of Excellence Eight Relevant Lessons Mr Antti-Pekka Manninen and Mr Heiki Jakson he protection of discuss the protection of CEI in the case of Fin- critical energy infra- land, arguing that its security policy can serve structure (CEI) and as an example for the protection of CEI in other Michael Rühle, NATO Headquarters, Belgium T its role in ensur- states at least in some respects. They link the ing the energy security of a Finnish case to the broader international con- he global energy landscape is trans- right lessons from the political and techno- state are the core topics of text with an emphasis on the approaches of forming. New energy suppliers are logical upheavals of recent years. this issue of ‘Energy Securi- NATO and the European Union (EU) to CEI. entering the market, new pipelines ty: Operational Highlights’. are connecting producers and con- Eight concrete lessons stand out: These topics are of utmost Mr Emanuele Nicola Cecchetti and Mr Heiki T sumers. Renewables, such as wind and solar importance in the NATO context because a dis- Jakson discuss the importance of energy in con- energy, are becoming economically viable. First, the Russia-Ukraine crisis has demon- ruption of energy supplies can negatively affect flicts by focusing on the destruction of CEI in the Deep offshore drilling, the “fracking” of gas strated that energy can be an element of “hy- both the well-functioning of its members’ socie- Ukrainian crisis of 2014. After providing a short from rock formations, and the liquefaction of brid warfare”. By annexing , Russia ties and its military operations. Therefore, pro- historical overview of the evolving role of en- natural gas are changing the global market. did not only illegally acquire Ukrainian terri- tecting CEI from all possible threats and increas- ergy in conflict throughout history, the authors LNG (Liquefed Natural Gas) tankers enable tory, but also seized Ukrainian energy infra- ing its resilience is crucial in order to achieve the analyse the main events of the Ukrainian crisis the transport of gas by ship, just like oil, thus structure on the peninsula as well as offshore goals of energy sustainability, economic and so- of 2014 showing that CEI was a major military becoming more independent from pipelines. installations in the . The annexation cial development. At the same time, it is neces- target for Russia. Also, they briefly discuss the New interconnectors and the “reverse flow” of Crimea also allowed Moscow to renege on sary to ensure that NATO implements its military measures that NATO adopted in order to protect of pipelines provide more flexibility for trans- previous agreements with Kiev on renting strategies and achieves its political objectives. its member states and the essential role played by its Centres of Excellence to support its work. porting energy across Europe way beyond its the naval base, such as granting Furthermore, the recent Russia-Ukraine crisis entry point, and encourage energy trade via Ukraine a lower gas price. Although Ukraine of 2014 has clearly demonstrated the impor- Prof Dr Oleksandr Sukhodolia analyses the con- dynamic “spot markets”. is not a NATO member, Russia’s skilful appli- tance of CEI for states. It has shown that CEI has flict between Russia and Ukraine in 2014 with a cation of military and non-military means to become a military target in conflicts and that focus on the Russian attacks on CEI in Ukraine. For European consumers, this could be good destabilise its neighbour has sparked a lively energy can be an element of “hybrid warfare”. The analysis shows that the Ukrainian crisis has news. A flexible energy market means lower debate in the West about how best to meet contributed to incorporate energy in hybrid war- prices and greater security of supply. How- the challenge of “hybrid warfare”. As the Consequently, the implementation of a risk man- fare and that threats to CEI are an essential part ever, turning such an optimistic scenario into Russia-Ukraine crisis shows, an effective an- agement programme, incorporating analysis of of it. Additionally, the author suggests that the reality requires considerable effort. Achiev- swer can only be found if the energy dimen- the vulnerabilities, risk assessment and imple- protection of CEI should be included into the na- ing true energy security requires drawing the sion is included in the analysis. mentation of hazard mitigation procedures is es- tional defence policy of states. At the same time, sential in order to protect CEI. In this context, the he stresses that the establishment of Public- establishment of a Public-Private Partnership Private Partnerships (PPPs) and civil-military (PPP) is important because coordinating the ef- cooperation are essential in order to ensure an Michael Rühle, NATO Headquarters, Brussels forts of stakeholders, bodies and institutions is effcient protection of CEI. necessary to ensure an effective protection of CEI. Michael Rühle is currently Head of the Energy Security Section, in the Emerging Security Finally, Ms Moniek de Jong and Prof Larry Challenges Division of NATO’s International Staff. Previously he was Head, Speechwrit- ing, and a Senior Political Advisor in the NATO Secretary General’s Policy Planning Unit. These factors are discussed in the four articles Hughes discuss the identifcation and the protec- Before joining NATO’s International Staff in 1991, Mr. Rühle was a Volkswagen-Fellow included in the current issue of this journal. tion of CEI. After defning CEI, the authors ana- at the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung think-tank in Sankt Augustin, Germany, and a Visiting lyse the types of threats that can affect its func- Fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Washington, D.C. Mr Michael Rühle provides an overview of the tioning and the necessary countermeasures that He holds an M.A. degree in Political Science from the University of Bonn, Germany. Mr. major changes occurred in the international can help protect CEI. Additionally, they outline the Rühle has published widely on international security issues in American Foreign Policy arena during the last years with a focus on various levels of CEI protection at which private Interests, Asia Times, Comparative Strategy, International Affairs (Chatham House), NATO Review, Parameters, Politico, and The World Today, as well as other titles. energy and geopolitics. More specifcally, he companies are willing and capable of protecting it focuses his analysis on the main political and by showing that states also contribute to provide technological upheavals that have led to signif- security in the form of police or military presence.

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Second, Europe’s energy dependence on to this percentage. Since these ships have to East China Sea clearly have an energy and Europe (and eliminate Ukraine as a transit Russia remains a strategic liability. For the pass important straits like Hormuz or Ma- resource dimension. Other examples where country), while at the same time seeking to foreseeable future, Russia will remain a ma- lacca, they are vulnerable to piracy and mili- energy issues could lead to conflict might compensate for its declining European mar- jor gas supplier to Europe, since Moscow can, tary blockades. In the Gulf of Aden NATO and include an oil discovery in a region claimed ket by exporting to Asia. However, the fact in principle, outbid almost any contender. But EU are already engaged in a counter piracy by two states, or a dam project in an arid that Russia failed to charge China European- the ritually invoked “mutual interdepend- mission that has resulted in a considerable region, which compromises the water sup- level prices indicates who will be the winner ence” of producer and consumer has not drop in the number of attacks on naval ves- ply of a neighbouring country. The “Islamic and who will be the loser in this new “energy tempered Russia’s determination to domi- sels. Although the energy security benefts State” has added another dimension to the partnership”. nate its immediate neighbourhood, including of such operations are only indirect, they do link between energy and (in)security: before by using gas as a political and economic tool. bring home that the protection of maritime US air strikes put an end to its economic ac- Eighth, NATO’s agenda needs to reflect the Moreover, the falling oil price has brought trade routes through the collective employ- tivities, the terrorist militia had succeeded different links between energy and security. home how much the Russian economy de- ment of naval power is bound to become an in amassing assets worth billions of Dollars NATO is neither an energy institution, nor do pends on the sale of fossil fuels, and how lit- integral part of a comprehensive energy se- via illegal oil production in the areas it had allies want to militarize the issue of energy tle has been done to diversify the country’s curity strategy. occupied. security. However, the relationship between economic foundations. This could spell bad energy and security is too obvious to be ig- news: Russia’s economic decline could tempt Fifth, the challenge of cyber attacks will in- Seventh, the changes in the global energy nored. Concretely, this means that allies its leadership to embark on foreign policy crease further. More than a third of all known landscape also mean geopolitical shifts. In must enhance their intelligence sharing on adventurism in order to solidify its power cyber attacks target energy infrastructure. the US, low energy prices have helped spark energy developments, add energy security at home. The West would then have to deal The increasing computerization of this in- a “second industrial revolution”. For the tra- into the curricula of its education and train- with an even less predictable Eurasian great frastructure, but also the increasing use ditional energy producers in the Middle East, ing facilities, and incorporate energy sce- power. of computerized control systems in private in turn, who used to “buy off” their popula- narios into its exercises. It also means that homes, open gateways for cyber attacks by tions through generous subsidies, the drop NATO must develop closer relations with Third, solidarity among European countries, private hackers as well as by state actors. in oil prices could translate into political the EU and the International Energy Agency as well as between Europe and North Ameri- Since most energy and cyber networks are in unrest. The same applies to the energy pro- (IEA), in order to beneft from the unique ex- ca, will no longer be measured exclusively in private hands, trustful cooperation both be- ducers in Latin America and West Africa: in pertise of both institutions. The fact that en- military terms, but also in the energy domain. tween private enterprises as well as between some states, the low oil price has resulted in ergy developments are now being discussed The role of the EU as an intermediary in the industry and government institutions will be domestic crises that push them to the brink at the level of the North Atlantic Council gas dispute between Russia and Ukraine, essential. Building such “communities of of state failure. While Russia will not be hit demonstrates that NATO has started adjust- the successful efforts to re-route Russian trust”, wherein one exchanges confdential quite as hard prices as, for example, Ven- ing to a world where energy and security gas through Poland, Hungary and Slovakia information, will be one of the major chal- ezuela, Moscow will also have to change its are inseparable. As former NATO Secretary to Ukraine, and the steps toward an Energy lenges in the years ahead. Companies will business model. Through projects such as General Manfred Wörner used to say, history Union are important signals: within Europe, a also have to develop a better understanding Nord Stream II Russia will continue to try to does not hold back its surprises until we feel new form of solidarity is emerging that ben- of the need for investing in cyber defence, and maintain its strong role as a gas supplier to ready for them. efts even non-EU countries such as Ukraine. not simply discard such fnancial investments Transatlantic solidarity, too, will acquire an as detrimental to one’s competitiveness. An- energy dimension: with the technical and le- other challenge is the training of energy in- gal conditions now in place, US LNG can now frastructure operators: the damage inflicted be exported not only to Asia but also to Eu- by the reckless handling of computers and rope. The lower demand for US LNG in Asia storage media could be much reduced by has made the European market more inter- better training. esting for the United States. In April 2016, the frst American LNG tanker left its Louisiana Sixth, more attention must be devoted to the port heading for Portugal. role of energy in regional conflicts. While the spectre of outright “resource wars” is still Fourth, the changes in the global energy distant, energy and natural resources are in- landscape will lead to a greater emphasis on creasingly becoming a factor of internation- maritime security. Today, two thirds of global al security policy. The territorial disputes oil shipments are transported by sea, and the between China and several neighbouring increase in LNG shipments will further add countries about islands in the South and

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Nowadays, the most imminent threats to en- ergy infrastructure protection (CEIP) should ergy systems in most countries are natural be prioritized in planning against threats in Critical Energy Infrastructure catastrophes such as storms and floods. Still, any modern state that is reliant on energy. as the energy transmission and distribution networks form a fundamental part of the crit- One approach to the threats described above Protection through ical infrastructure of a state, they are some is the Finnish comprehensive security ap- of the most serious vulnerabilities in modern proach, which aims to empower the whole societies. Therefore, they can become targets society to participate in the common security Comprehensive Security – of terrorist attacks or strategic strikes during agenda through the framework of functions hostilities. The existence and the seriousness that are vital to the society. Before describing of this risk means that disruptions caused by the national approach, a brief review of some The Finnish example intentional acts should be a key element in regional approaches to critical energy infra- threat scenarios concerning the protection structure protection will be provided. of energy infrastructure. The most probable Antti-Pekka Manninen, KPMG, Finland intentional attacks towards energy infra- This article is divided into fve sections. The Heiki Jakson, Elektrilevi, Estonia structure would most likely be the physical frst one discusses the notion of Critical En- destruction of transmission substations or ergy Infrastructure as defned by different cyber attacks targeting the supervisory con- international actors. The second section fo- This article discusses the Finnish comprehensive security policy as an example of a good trol and data acquisition (SCADA) systems cuses on the approaches taken by the North approach to protect the critical energy infrastructure of a state. After analysing the regional controlling the infrastructure. Sabotage, cy- Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the standardization efforts, the focus will be on the Finnish approach to the issue of critical en- ber attacks and other clandestine operations, European Union (EU) to address the issues ergy infrastructure protection and to the possible best practices that could be drawn from it. whether organized by a nation state or by related to CEIP. The third section analyses Even though cyber security is widely emphasized in the Finnish security strategy, this field is non-state actors, are the most viable threats the Finnish case example, where the com- knowingly left aside here, and the analysis focuses more generally on critical infrastructure especially during armed conflicts, and the prehensive security approach is used to en- protection. possible consequences of these threats must compass CEIP into the strategic planning. be included in the main priorities during the The fourth section will continue developing planning phase of any strategy addressing this topic by focusing on the actors which are INTRODUCTION energy infrastructure security (Jakson et al., tasked to implement these notions into prac- he conflict in Ukraine in 2014 clearly of the Kievsky district power station that was 2017). As these threats are often unforesee- tice. The ffth section will discuss the possible showed that energy security is – and damaged by artillery fre leaving hundreds of able and can have serious consequences, it is lessons learned from this kind of approach. should be – a major issue in the geo- people stranded underground in the Zasyadko not possible to prevent them by hardening the political strategies of states. It not only mine (Luhn, 2015). Although being reprehen- targets only, but resiliency measures are also THE NOTION OF CRITICAL ENERGY T sible from the international humanitarian law unveiled the risks of energy geopolitics, but required. Nevertheless, resiliency cannot be INFRASTRUCTURE also demonstrated the threats that attacks perspective, the possibility that these kinds of achieved only through technical solutions, on energy infrastructure can pose to civil- attacks against civilian electricity distribution but political and legal considerations are also The use of the expression ‘critical energy in- ian populations. During the conflict several networks can occur should not be neglected fundamental to ascertain the necessary soci- frastructure’ in this article is mainly based on incidents involving artillery fre on electricity when planning the necessary measures for etal context for a suffcient level of protection. the NATO and EU approaches to critical in- transmitters occurred. An example is the case the protection of the society. As the situation in Ukraine shows, critical en- frastructure protection in general. As there is

Antti-Pekka Manninen, KPMG, Helsinki Heiki Jakson, Estonian Electri­cal Distribution System Operator, Tallinn

Antti-Pekka Manninen is a cyber security specialist at KPMG Finland, advising public Heiki Jakson is currently working as electrical engineer for Elektrilevi (Estonian Electri- and private sector clients in wide range of data protection and cyber security issues. He cal Distribution System Operator - DSO). Previously, he was a Subject Matter Expert at has an academic background in law and international relations, focusing mainly on reg- NATO ENSEC COE working on Critical Energy Infrastructure Protection topics. He has ulatory issues relating to security in the information society. Before starting in his cur- also worked as an electrical engineer in the electrical infrastructure construction sector rent position, Antti-Pekka gained professional experience in the public sector, including and has a MSc degree in power engineering from the Tallinn University of Technology. the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Defense in Finland. He did his internship at Additionally, he has also been an infantry offcer in the Estonian Defence League (which the NATO ENSEC COE in the Strategic Analysis and Research Division in 2014. is a voluntary military national defence organisation) since 2003.

1 SCADA systems are a type of industrial control system used to monitor and control large systems remotely.

No 11 ENERGY SECURITY: OPERATIONAL HIGHLIGHTS ENERGY SECURITY: OPERATIONAL HIGHLIGHTS No 11 10 11 no single defnition available for the criticality These defnitions show that the criticality of can be found, duplication of efforts should be of the governmental strategy is monitored by of the infrastructure, the different defnitions the physical infrastructure is instrumental, avoided as far as possible. the Security Committee – a permanent and will be briefly presented here. as the defnitions mainly focus on the harm broad-based body in charge of assisting the caused by the inoperativeness of these sys- As the standardization efforts at the NATO government and the ministries in the feld of NATO’s approach to critical energy infrastruc- tems. In this study, Critical Energy Infrastruc- and EU level have been progressing slowly, comprehensive security. ture is strongly connected to civil prepared- ture means any function of the energy infra- NATO and EU member states have developed ness and Civil Emergency Planning (CEP). structure or a part thereof, which is critical their own defnitions and approaches regard- According to the Security Strategy for Soci- The approach towards critical infrastructure in a way that its incapacity would seriously ing CEIP. Critical infrastructure can be seen ety, the comprehensive concept of security protection adopted by NATO is not a regula- harm vital societal functions. as the blood veins of the nation, and thus they comprises the preparedness for dealing with tory one, but it is rather based on supporting are under national sovereignty. This means security issues, which may turn into threats the allied and partner countries in their na- CEIP STANDARDIZATION EFFORTS IN that it would be worth fnding a common way that can jeopardize or seriously harm Fin- tional planning and identifcation programs. NATO AND EU to cooperate to increase the resilience of land, its citizens or the functions vital to the Much of this is based on the work of the CEIP that would be acceptable for all. This is society. This approach takes into account the Senior Civil Emergency Planning Committee Energy infrastructure is primarily a respon- why both the EU and NATO initiatives in the potential of the whole society by offering the (SCEPC). In addition, the NATO Parliamentary sibility of national governments. However, feld aim at sharing best practices and les- possibility to use the resources of the differ- Assembly has drafted a Committee Report on it is worth discussing what a supranational sons learned. However, in the case of the EU, ent sectors of the society to ensure its secu- the Protection of Critical Infrastructures in (EU) or international (NATO) approach can member states mostly regarded the practical rity. The idea is to coordinate the activities of 2007, but the document refrains from sug- bring to the sphere of CEIP. Indeed, CEIP has effects of the aforementioned EU initiative the public and private sectors as well as the gesting a common defnition. been very much debated not only at the na- on security as ineffective. In the Commission voluntary activities of the citizens in order to tional level but also at the international one. Staff Working Document on the Review of the ensure that the society is functional under The EU defnes critical infrastructure as “an The reason for this is the fact that energy European Programme for Critical Infrastruc- all circumstances. The main focus of this ap- asset, system or part thereof located in Mem- infrastructure has various cross-border di- ture Protection it is stated that “Implementa- proach are the seven vital functions of the so- ber States which is essential for the mainte- mensions from acquiring the raw material to tion of the Directive has not resulted in suf- ciety outlined in the Security Strategy for So- nance of vital societal functions, health, safe- distributing the generated electricity through fciently clear and tangible improvements to ciety, which must be secured in all situations. ty, security, economic or social well-being the high voltage lines. Due to the systemic ECI security levels” (European Commission, These are specifed and divided into strategic of people, and the disruption or destruction nature of energy and electricity business, the 2012). tasks assigned to the respective ministries.2 of which would have a signifcant impact in network effects and the effciency benefts gained through cross-border harmonization a Member State as a result of the failure to THE FINNISH EXAMPLE: CEIP AS PART OF would be signifcant not only from an eco- maintain those functions” (Commission Di- THE COMPREHENSIVE SECURITY rective 2008/114/EC). nomic perspective but also from a security point of view. In this context, the approaches Finland is a EU member state and an active According to the Organization for Security and taken by the EU and NATO are quite relevant. NATO partner, being part of the Enhanced Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), Non-Nuclear The EU introduced CEIP in its legislation in Opportunities Partner programme since Critical Energy Infrastructure includes “the 2008 with the Council Directive on the Identi- 2014. In the NATO framework more specif- exploration, production, storage, refning, fcation and Designation of European Critical cally, Finland has been active in the context processing and distribution of fossil fuels and Infrastructures and the Assessment of the of the civil emergency planning, including se- supporting infrastructure systems such as Need to Improve their Protection. The energy curity of supply related issues. The approach electricity, as well as the extraction and pro- sector is one of the two infrastructure sec- that Finland has promoted in this feld, and cessing of new energy sources” (OSCE 2013). tors considered in the implementation of the towards critical infrastructure protection in Directive so far, the other being the transpor- general, is based on the concept of compre- Finally, it is also interesting to mention that tation sector. CEIP was inserted in the NATO hensive security as contained in the Security the Tallinn Manual on the International Law agenda of the Bucharest Summit in 2008 as Strategy for Society, which was enacted as a Applicable to Cyber Warfare (2013), drafted part of the broader topic of energy security. government resolution in 2010 and is to be by the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Cen- Later, at the Wales Summit of 2014, NATO updated in 2017. This document emphasizes tre of Excellence (CCDCOE), defnes Critical welcomed the “efforts both by NATO Allies the cooperation among the authorities at all Infrastructure as “Physical or virtual systems and EU members to enhance their defense levels and within the civil society, including Graph 1: Vital functions of the society as specified in and assets under the jurisdiction of a State capabilities” and supported the “continuing the business community. The implementation the Security Strategy for the Society 2010 that are so vital that their incapacitation or close cooperation and complementarity be- tween the two organizations.” (NATO, 2014) 2 The seven vital functions are the following: 1) Management of Government affairs, 2) International activity, 3) Finland’s defense capability, 4) Internal security, destruction may debilitate a State’s security, 5) Functioning of the economy and infrastructure, 6) The population’s income security and capability to function, and 7) Psychological resilience to crisis. economy, public health or safety, or the envi- This is a sound recommendation, and wher- (Ministry of Defense of Finland, 2010) ever synergies between the organizations 3 From a slideshow presentation, available from http://www.turvallisuuskomitea.f/index.php/fles/26/Downloadable%20Materials/39/Security%20Strat- ronment”. egy%20for%20Society%202010%20english.ppt

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It is interesting to note that although the of society” (Ministry of Defense of Finland, under all circumstances in such a way that Besides NESA, another important actor in “functioning of the economy and infrastruc- 2010). According to the Strategy, these involve the living conditions of the population and the the feld of CEIP is Fingrid – the national ture” does not directly translate into CEIP, both the physical facilities and structures and critical functions of the society are secured transmission grid operator, of which the state the energy aspect is strongly emphasized in the electronic functions and services neces- also in the event of disruptions and crises, in- owns a signifcant portion. Fingrid is mainly the document: sary to ensure the security of energy supply. cluding a state of emergency. The objectives responsible for the functioning of the national The document also highlights the relevance of the state are divided into two categories: electricity transmission grid, which is a high- “Energy availability is safeguarded with do- of specifc critical points or nodes in the in- securing critical infrastructure and securing voltage network covering entire Finland. The mestic solutions and international coopera- frastructure networks, which must be “found critical production and services. risks are managed on the base of the N-1 cri- tion. Availability and use of domestic, renew- and secured while at the same time paying terion, according to which the power system able, agriculture-based energy as well as close attention to the functioning of the infra- According to a study conducted by the Univer- withstands the normal individual faults and bio fuels will be increased. The share of en- structural entity” (Ministry of Defense of Fin- sity of Cologne titled “An Embargo of Russian the disconnection of a faulty component in ergy from renewable sources will have to be land, 2010). Thus, although lacking the pre- Gas and Security of Supply in Europe” (Heck- the network without an interruption in elec- raised to 38% by 2020; in practice this means cise defnition of CEIP, the Finnish Security ing, H. et al 2014), Finland would be the most tricity production or consumption and with- to a large extent that the use of bio fuels will Strategy for Society provides suffcient stra- vulnerable European country if gas imports out secondary failures (Fingrid, 2017). The be increased. The production of electricity tegic framework for addressing the issues from Russia were cut off. Although it provides cooperation between the public authorities and heating, the capacity of the electric grid, connected to it. food for thought, this study overestimates the is frequent, and constantly upheld through resilience of functions as well as the func- dependency on short term gas imports as the regular and nation-wide preparedness exer- tioning of technical systems are safeguarded. THE PUBLIC AUTHORITIES IN THE FIELD portion of natural gas in the Finnish energy cises. Electric power supply relies on a functioning OF CEIP production has been quite small over the last electricity market, an adequate electric grid, few years, as shown in the graph below (Graph THE STRENGTHS OF THE COMPREHENSIVE Although the Security Strategy for Society dispersed production facilities and multiple 2). Furthermore, natural gas is mostly used CONCEPT OF SECURITY sources of energy as well as the proper bal- is the main strategic document concerning for central heating and for industrial purpos- ance between peak demand and capacity” comprehensive security, it does not contain es, not for residential use, as it is the case The implementation of the comprehensive (Ministry of Defense of Finland, 2010). an exact defnition of CEIP, as stated above. in many countries. The amount of the natural security approach involves the coordination Therefore, it is necessary to take some other gas used for these purposes can be replaced of the measures of the government, the state Even though energy infrastructure is not spe- actors into consideration in order to get the by other energy sources, if necessary. This authorities, the municipalities, the private cifcally mentioned as one of these seven vital full grasp of the institutional framework con- also demonstrates the current importance of sector and non-governmental organizations functions, it is possible to state that it is given cerning CEIP. traditional storage. According to the Govern- (NGOs) to maintain the functions vital to the much relevance in the document. In fact, ac- ment Decision, the objective is to have fve society under all situations. The aforemen- cording to the Security Strategy for Society, in One of the main elements of national pre- months reserves available at any given time. tioned Security Committee is in charge of order to face the threat scenario defned as paredness traditionally is the national emer- Therefore, it is possible to state that the risk coordinating the strategic level of security “Serious disturbances in the power supply”, gency resource reserves, which in Finland is not as high as the study implies. policy implementation, based on close co- “undisturbed production and distribution of are managed by the National Emergency operation among the public authorities. In power is the precondition for the function- Supply Agency (NESA), whose history can be the Committee, all the Chiefs of Staff from ing of society and, in fact, for all vital func- traced back to the 1920s. Nowadays, NESA is each ministry and the chiefs of public secu- tions” (Ministry of Defense of Finland, 2010). in charge of various CEIP related tasks. For rity bodies such as the police and the border The document also stresses that “extensive example, according to the Act on Electricity guard meet regularly. Additionally, compre- and long-term failures in production and dis- Markets (588/2013), the network operators hensive security is not limited to cooperation tribution of power can seriously undermine are responsible of issuing a preparedness between the public offcials only, but it also society’s capability to function” (Ministry of plan, which has to be accepted by NESA. As concerns the cooperation between the pub- Defense of Finland, 2010). Thus, the strategy this example shows, the tasks assigned to the lic and the private sector. The Public-Private makes it clear that disturbances in the power agency go well beyond the traditional task of Partnerships (PPPs), which are nowadays supply can possibly endanger the whole so- managing emergency storages. the spearhead of critical infrastructure pro- ciety and that these risks must therefore be tection actions internationally, have a long addressed effectively. In this context, it is interesting to note that tradition in the Finnish security policy. They the 2013 Government Decision on Security imply the cooperation among the municipali- Additionally, the Security Strategy for Soci- of Supply (857/2013) states that the main ties, companies and NGOs as well as active ety states that Critical Infrastructure (CI) in- objective of the state in regards to Security contingency planning and preparedness. An- cludes “the structures and functions which of Supply is to ensure the continuity of pro- other good example of PPPs are the National are critical for the continuous functioning duction and infrastructure vital to the society Graph 2: Total primary energy source trend, Defense Courses, which train and prepare 1973-2012 (IEA 2014) both civilians and military personnel work-

No 11 ENERGY SECURITY: OPERATIONAL HIGHLIGHTS ENERGY SECURITY: OPERATIONAL HIGHLIGHTS No 11 14 15 ing in the key positions of the society. The Finland, which is a country with a long tra- BIBLIOGRAPHY Luhn, A. (2015). Ukraine miners rescued af- aim is to make them able to act in emergency dition in adopting measures aiming at pro- ter shelling left them trapped. The Guardian, European Commission. (2012). Commission situations under the rules and principles of tecting critical functions and infrastructure, 26 January. Retrieved from: http://www.the- staff working document on the Review of the the comprehensive security approach. Func- can be used as a good example at least in guardian.com/world/2015/jan/26/ukraine- European Programme for Critical Infrastruc- tioning PPPs are achieved through wide and some regards. Of course, as countries differ miners-trapped-freed-shelling- ture Protection SWD(2012) 190 Final. Brus- well-structured cooperation not just legally, in many respects, good results cannot be di- sels but most importantly by building a culture of rectly transferred from a country to another. Ministry of Defense of Finland. (2010). Se- trust between the various actors involved. Therefore, it is necessary to take into account curity Strategy for Society. Retrieved from Fingrid. (2017). Maintaining of security sys- the specifcities of each country when apply- http://www.defmin.f/en/publications/strat- tem. Retrieved from http://www.fngrid.f/ As for the critical energy infrastructure pro- ing the measures that have been success- egy_documents/the_security_strategy_for_ en/powersystem/Power%20system%20man- tection more specifcally, it is important to ful in other countries. Finland is a relatively society agement/Maintaining%20of%20system%20 defne what is actually being protected. The small country, with a long tradition of coop- security/Pages/default.aspx criticality of the infrastructure comes from eration (not of competition) among its au- NATO CCDCOE. (2013). The Tallinn Manual the societal functions, which the PPPs en- thorities. Nevertheless, cooperation between on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Hecking, H. et al. (2014). An Embargo of able, and this is where the Finnish example the different agencies and bodies should Warfare. Retrieved from: https://ccdcoe.org/ Russian Gas and Security of Supply in Eu- of vital functions to the society can be used to be something to strive for regardless of the tallinn-manual.html rope. Retrieved from: http://www.ewi. build a coherent framework of critical energy country, as should the wide participation of uni-koeln.de/fileadmin/user_upload/Pub- infrastructure protection, while promoting civil society and the private sector. In this NATO. (2014). The Wales Declaration on likationen/Studien/Politik_und_ Gesells- PPPs and a whole-of-society approach. context, much still needs to be done in order the Transatlantic Bond. Retrieved from: chaft/2014/2014-09__An_Embargo_of_Rus- to make societies ready to deal with the risks http://www.nato.int/cps/on/natohq/offcial_ sian_Gas_and_Security_of_Supply_in CONCLUSIONS connected to the protection of critical energy texts_112985.htm _Europe_0610.pdf Critical energy infrastructure protection boils infrastructure. Organization for Security and Co-operation in down to a basic problem: not everything can International Energy Agency. (2014). Energy As a general rule, consultations between the Europe. (2013). Guide on Non-Nuclear Criti- be protected, although in some regards the Supply Security 2014, Chapter 4: Emergency public and the private sector are of a grow- cal Energy Infrastructure Protection from hardening of the systems can bring good re- response systems of individual IEA countries. ing importance today as most of the critical Terrorist Attacks Focusing on Threats Ema- sults (like in cyber security) while in some Retrieved from: https://www.iea.org/media/ infrastructure is increasingly privately owned nating from Cyberspace. Retrieved from: other cases it is necessary to concentrate on freepublications/security/EnergySupplySe- and operated. Also, owners often have very http://www.osce.org/atu/103500 resilience and on the capability to recover. curity2014_fnland.pdf This is done through a combination of tech- little or no connection at all with the actual country where the physical operations are nical and administrative/regulatory aspects. Jakson, H. et al. (2017). Hybrid Warfare run. Overregulation must be avoided, but On the more technical side, it is necessary to against Critical Energy Infrastructures state interference is needed when markets develop new energy storage and smart grid Study. Retrieved from: https://enseccoe. and self-regulation do not provide the own- applications while encouraging controlled org/data/public/uploads/2017/05/irregular_ ers with incentives that are strong enough to and sustainable shift into renewables and warfare_176x250mm_20170411.pdf prepare for eventual problems. distributed generation. In addition to this, a functioning legal framework for these is- sues should be created taking into account As for the inter-organizational cooperation, the questions regarding preparedness and it is important to defne roles and responsi- operator responsibilities. In addition, secu- bilities as well as to fnd effective ways for rity of supply must be understood in a mod- collaborating and sharing information. The ern sense. It can no longer mean just having EU provides its member states for a political stocks of strategic resources, as it’s equally framework for discussion, for the establish- important to also have technical capabilities ment of a decision-making platform as well and know-how available during possible cri- as for the possibility of adopting a cross- ses. sectoral approach especially in the context of new regulations and policies. Additionally, Comprehensive security strategy is one of the NATO is complementary to the EU as it uses possible approaches to achieve these goals. its resources for civil protection and for deal- ing with the military aspects of CEIP.

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The Ukrainian crisis has also shown that get. Finally, the fourth section analyses NA- energy is an important dimension of war- TO’s strategies to react to the Ukrainian crisis The Role, Risks and the fare nowadays as it has become one of the in order to protect its member states of the major military targets. This is evident in the eastern flank. way Russia has conducted the war against Strategic Importance Ukraine to annex Crimea. The destruction of THE IMPORTANCE OF ENERGY IN critical energy infrastructure (CEI) was in- CONFLICTS THROUGHOUT HISTORY deed one of the strategies used by Russia in of Energy in Conflicts. the conflict with Ukraine. CEI is “the energy Energy has played a key role in man’s life infrastructure that is so essential that its fail- since the ancient times when it was essen- ure or destruction would have far reaching tially represented by food. Over time, tech- The case of Ukraine negative effects on economic and social se- nological development has allowed man to curity as well as on the defensive capabilities tap new forms of energy. Man passed from of the state”. This defnition of CEI refers to: exploiting large, strong animals providing Emanuele Nicola Cecchetti, SHAPE, Belgium an excellent source of energy for a limited Heiki Jakson, Estonian Electrical­ Distribution System Operator, Estonia (1) energy extraction facilities (oil and natural gas wells, mines); (2) energy transportation set of applications to extracting coal, which infrastructure (pipelines, train and road car- was necessary for industry and for the devel- th th The aim of the article is to discuss the key role that energy plays in conflicts by focusing on the riers, oil tankers, electric power lines); (3) opment of towns during the 18 and the 19 war between Ukraine and Russia in 2014. After discussing the evolving role of energy in con- energy conversion infrastructure (refneries, centuries. During the following two hundred flicts throughout history, this study analyses the main events of the conflict between Russia power plants) (NATO ENSEC COE, 2016). years, man learned to extract and produce and Ukraine showing that destroying critical energy infrastructure (CEI) was a major military more sophisticated forms of energy such as target for Russia. In this context, the strategies adopted by NATO in order to protect the na- This article analyses the role of energy in the natural gas, oil, nuclear power and sustain- tional security of its members and the support it receives from its Centres of Excellence and conflict between Russia and Ukraine in 2014 able energy resources like the wind and the in particular by NATO Energy Security Centre of Excellence are also discussed. by focusing on conventional warfare against sun (Khan Academy, 2015). The ability of man CEI. It is divided into four sections. The frst to exploit these energy resources due to tech- one briefly discusses the importance of en- nological development has changed the way INTRODUCTION ergy in conflicts throughout history in order wars are currently conducted not only be- he Ukrainian crisis in 2014 has clear- normally an adversary’s armed forces with to show that energy has played a key role in cause new kinds of weapons have been cre- ly shown that war can be effectively the objective of influencing the adversary’s all times but also that technological develop- fought with both conventional and government” (US Department of Defense, ment has changed the military targets in the T unconventional means. Conventional 2007). Unconventional warfare “means activ- energy sector passing from food to CEI. The warfare is “a form of warfare between states ities conducted to enable a resistance move- second section briefly discusses the main that employs direct military confrontation to ment or insurgency to coerce, disrupt, or events of the conflict between Russia and defeat an adversary’s armed forces, destroy overthrow a government or occupying power Ukraine by explaining why Ukraine is impor- an adversary’s war-making capacity, or seize by operating through or with an underground, tant for Russia in its ‘near abroad’. The third or retain territory in order to force a change auxiliary, or guerrilla force in a denied area” section focuses on the destruction of CEI in in an adversary’s government or policies. The (US Government, 2015). This article mainly Ukraine showing the relevance that it has in focus of conventional military operations is focuses on conventional warfare. conflicts nowadays both because it ensures energy supply and because it is a military tar- Figure 1 Operation Chastise 1943

Emanuele Nicola Cecchetti, NATO Supreme Headquarter Allied Powers Europe, Mons

Emanuele Nicola Cecchetti is currently undertaking an internship as a Junior Analyst Heiki Jakson, Estonian Electri­cal Distribution System Operator, Tallinn at the NATO Supreme Headquarter Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) in Mons (Belgium). Heiki Jakson is currently working as electrical engineer for Elektrilevi (Estonian Electri- He holds an MA degree in Interdisciplinary Research and Studies in Eastern Europe cal Distribution System Operator - DSO). Previously, he was a Subject Matter Expert at (MIREES) from the University of Bologna, and he has other two internship experiences NATO ENSEC COE working on Critical Energy Infrastructure Protection topics. He has as an analyst/researcher in the NATO Energy Security Centre of Excellence in Vilnius also worked as an electrical engineer in the electrical infrastructure construction sector and in the Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI) in Rome respectively. Emanuele Nicola and has a MSc degree in power engineering from the Tallinn University of Technology. Cecchetti is a co-author of the ‘Energy in Conventional Warfare’ and ‘Energy in Ir- Additionally, he has also been an infantry offcer in the Estonian Defence League (which regular Warfare’ volumes published by the NATO Energy Security Centre of Excellence is a voluntary military national defence organisation) since 2003. within the “Energy in Conflict” series.

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an offensive point of view. A good example is lustrate the case. The frst example concerns to Europe as well as in terms of defense as Nazi Germany’s seizure of the most impor- the STUXNET operation against the Iranian Russia has three naval bases on the coasts tant electricity systems, dams, oil felds, and nuclear power plants in 2010, which caused of the Black Sea, namely in Novorossiysk and refneries especially in Romania5. It secured serious malfunctioning of the systems for two in Ukraine, in Sebastopol and in Odessa. CEI with air defense systems, thus ensuring a several days (Melman, 2010). The second Additionally, the Black Sea plays an impor- constant flow and supply of energy for its mil- example concerns the Baku-Tbilisi-Cehyan tant role for Russia in its relations with Tur- itary actions. Some years later, CEI became pipeline in 2008, whose functioning was inter- key, its historical rival, as well as in its influ- the main targets of the Allies. More than six rupted by an “anonymous” hacking of power ence in the Middle East, Central Asia and the hundred attacks occurred from 1940 to 1945 plant system and by a suspicious hand-driven Caucasus. For these reasons, from Russia’s against CEI. Among them, the most success- malfunctioning of the security system lead- perspective, Ukraine’s approach to the EU ful one was the Operation Chastise in May ing to the explosion of part of the system in Figure 2. Baku - Tbilisi - Cehyan pipeline explosion in 2008 represents a challenge to its national secu- 1943 (Mason, 2017). The peculiarity of this at- Refahiye in the Eastern part of Turkey (Rob- rity. This means that Russia is willing to go tack was the weapon that was used, namely ertson, Riley, 2014). as far as it is necessary to defend its national 6 ated, but also because the strategies that it the “bouncing bomb” , which breached the interests (Milosevich, 2014). It is in this per- is possible to adopt to defeat the enemy have German Möhne and Edersee Dams leading to A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE UKRAINIAN spective that Russia invaded Ukraine. become very sophisticated. Additionally, the a catastrophic flood of the Ruhr and the Eder CONFLICT energy targets have also changed over time. valleys, and causing the destruction of roads, Ukraine is part of Russia’s ‘near abroad’, The crisis between Russia and Ukraine dates In the ancient times, for instance, commer- bridges and railways (School of Chemistry, which is a term originally used to refer to back to 2013 when mass protests against cial ships were sometimes a military target. 2001). the newly independent republics surround- then-president and The case of the Athenian ships ensuring the ing Russia after the dissolution of the Soviet against his decision to abandon the Asso- passage of grain carriers that were captured Over time, war tactics have continued devel- Union. Ukraine has very strong historical, ciation Agreement with the European Union by the Spartans in the Battle of Aegosopotami oping, so that both conventional and uncon- geopolitical, economic and geostrategic ties (EU) that would make the political and trade at the end of the Peloponnesian War in 405 ventional war strategies were planned, lead- with Russia. As Polish-American and political relations with Ukraine closer began (Curtin, BC is a good example.4 In the 20th century, ing energy infrastructure to become a major scientist Zbigniew Brzezinski stated, Russia Rahman, 2014). oil, gas and electricity products together with military target. For instance, during the Cold would never be a European empire without critical infrastructure necessary to trans- War the Soviet Union planned to attack oil Ukraine, which is Russia’s historical aspira- Strong clashes occurred in many cities port and distribute them became one of the and gas pipelines crossing Canada and Mex- tion. Indeed, by losing its political influence among which the harshest ones were in , military targets. In fact, they are essential ico, the North American dams, or the elec- on Ukraine, Russia would no longer control leading then president Viktor Yanukovych to not only for the well-being of societies but tricity system of New York City (Christopher, the trade route of also for military operations. During the First 1999). Of course, none of these plans was im- its products and hy- World War, for instance, Britain used oil- plemented. At the same time, the US planned drocarbons to the fred combustion engines for warships mak- attacks against the Urengoy–Surgut–Chely- EU that is Russia’s ing them lighter, more powerful and able to abinsk gas pipeline as countermeasure and largest economic transport a huge number of weapons. Conse- retaliation, by inserting a malicious code into partner. Additionally, quently, Britain became very much depend- the control system of the pipeline (Robert- Ukraine is important ent on external sources for iron ore and oil son, 2014). This sabotage allegedly resulted for Russia’s national coming through the Atlantic. Therefore, Ger- in the explosion of a portion of the pipeline security for its pecu- man U-Boats began attacking British ships (Rid, 2013). liar geographical po- causing an oil shortage that was fatal for the sition as its southern British fleet. The UK was forced to recognise Nowadays, serious threats to CEI come not border adjoins the the fragility and the importance of oil sup- only from physical destruction, but also from Black Sea. This lat- plies and look for alternative sources. Dur- cyber-attacks because many parts of energy ter plays a key role ing the Second World War, the importance infrastructure are automatized. In this con- in Russia’s exports of CEI increased, both from a defensive and text, two examples of cyber-attacks well il- Figure 3 Urengoi-Pomary-Uzhgorod gas pipeline explosion, in May 2014

6 4 The Athenian fleet was sent off to the Black Sea in order to protect the passage of grain carriers through the Dardanelles. The Spartans positioned their fleet The ‘bouncing bomb’ was a drum-shape that spun backwards at over 500 rpm and had to be dropped at a suffciently low altitude at the correct speed. In of 170 Peloponnesian ships at Lampsacus at the southern shore of the Dardanelles. When the Athenians arrived, they had to anchor at Aegospotami opposite this way, the mine skipped for a signifcant distance over the surface of the water in a series of bounces reaching the dam wall. Using a hydrostatic fuse, an Lampsacus, which was the only safe port in the area. Some days later, Lysander’s fleet made a sudden crash across the water, pounced on the anchored accurate drop could bypass the dam’s defenses and enable the bomb to explode against the dam. (Mason, 2017) Athenians, captured 160 ships and killed the crew. The decisive victory over the Athenian fleet broke the Athenian naval superiority that had been unchallenged 7 An association agreement is a bilateral agreement between the EU and a third country. In the context of accession to the EU, it serves as the basis for imple- until then and ended the Peloponnesian war. (Marine Solutions, 2015) mentation of the accession process. (European Commission, 2016) 5 Romania (in particular the county seat Ploiesti) which was a major power in oil industry since the 19th century, was one of the biggest producers in Europe. 8 In 2014, then French President François Holland and German Chancellor Angela Merkel brokered a ‘Package of Measures for the Implementation of the The oil refneries of Ploiesti supplied about the 30% of oil to Nazis and to the whole Axis (ANEIR, date not available). The whole Romania was the target of a Minsk Agreements’, known as Minsk II. The agreements included, inter alia, the Immediate and full ceasefre in particular districts of Donetsk and Luhansk strong Allies’ bombing campaign in 1943 aiming at cutting the oil supply to the Nazi regime. (Dugan, Stewart, 1998) and Pull-out of all heavy weapons by both sides to equal distance with the aim of creation of a security zone (The Telegraph, 2015)

No 11 ENERGY SECURITY: OPERATIONAL HIGHLIGHTS ENERGY SECURITY: OPERATIONAL HIGHLIGHTS No 11 20 21 resign. The crisis between international transiting pipelines, causing by Allies and is a tangible reminder that an Russia and Ukraine reached tensions on possible interruption of gas flows attack on one is an attack on all”.10 its peak in March 2014 when in the network International Analysis Centre, the former militarily occu- National Security of Ukraine (2014). Additionally, at the 2014 Wales Summit, NATO pied Crimea, at a frst stage began the Readiness Action Plan (RAP), which unoffcially through uncon- Additionally, Russia-backed separatists iso- “ensures the Alliance is ready to respond ventional means such as lated coalmines and coal storages in the swiftly and frmly to new security challenges protests and riots (Amos, eastern part of Ukraine providing coal to its from the east and the south” (NATO, 2017b). 2014), information and psy- Western part. Separatists did it through con- In so doing, NATO paved the way to the reac- chological operations (Yu- ventional attacks and sabotages against in- tivation of the Missile Defense System project has, 2014) and unidentifed frastructure like bridges, railways, and core in Poland, Czech Republic and Romania in fghters known as “little coal transportation systems (Bird, 2015). 2016, which produced strong reactions from green men” (Shevchenko, Russia leading the Alliance to suspend the 2014). Later, Russia off- In conclusion, Russia and the Ukrainian implementation of the project (Emmot, 2016). cially occupied Crimea with separatists that it supported were able to The Alliance aimed to increase its military its Armed Forces. The same Figure 4 Gas Compressor Station N1, Lugansk-Verbovka area divide Ukraine by attacking CEI with both presence and activities in certain countries month a disputed referen- conventional and unconventional tactics, as (Poland, Czech Republic and Romania) to dum took place in order to sabotages, riots and cyber-attacks (the latter deter Russia from military attacks. NATO’s decide whether Crimea should become part avoiding sufferings to the population (Baker, focused on governmental websites and sys- activities included military drills in different of Russia or not. 95,5% of voters supported 2014). Two months later, on May 14, 2014 tems). In this way, they managed to carry on felds (military, cyber, energy, search and res- joining Russia (BBC, 2014c). an explosion occurred near the Urengoi- the conflict against the central government cue, etc.), changes in its long-term military Pomary-Uzhgorod gas pipeline, which is also maintaining total control over the territory. posture and capabilities, as the “Spearhead Today, the situation in Ukraine is still diffcult. known as Brotherhood and which is the larg- Force” (Very High Readiness Joint Task Force The country is divided and corruption cor- est consumer gas pipeline in Europe. In ad- NATO’S STRATEGIES TO REACT TO THE - VHRJT) (NATO, 2017). dition to this, in the month of June, Russia rodes the economy and the society. Addition- UKRAINIAN CRISIS ally, in Donbass and Luhansk the Ukrainian cut off all gas supplies to Ukraine. Russia’s Furthermore, NATO can count on the exper- separatists continue feeding the conflict with state-owned gas giant Gazprom claimed that The conflict between Russia and Ukraine tise of its Centres of Excellence (COE) that are the Russian military support. It is thus clear Ukraine had to pay upfront for its gas sup- raised the Alliance’s worries for the national nationally or multi-nationally funded institu- that the Minsk II agreements of 20158 are not plies, after Kiev failed to settle its huge debt. security of its member states of the eastern tions supporting the Alliance in its work while being fully implemented. While Ukraine and According to Gazprom chief Alexei Miller, this flank. Therefore, after strongly condemning avoiding the duplication of assets, resources the West insist on a full ceasefre before mov- put the Russian gas supplies to the EU at Russian actions in Ukraine, NATO took steps and capabilities already present within the ing on with the political elements of the deal, risk (BBC, 2014b). On July 18, eighteen cit- aiming both at reassuring allies and partners NATO Command (NATO ENSEC COE, 2016). Russia accuses Ukraine of not respecting the ies around Donetsk and Lugansk were left in Central and Eastern Europe and at de- Thus, NATO Centres of Excellence provide agreement (The Economist, 2016). without electricity for many days due to casu- terring further Russian aggression (Belkin, support for facing current threats and chal- alties in the transformer substations during 2014). These steps include the reinforcement lenges. of its military troupes in its member states A BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE ENERGY the conflict between the separatists and the Ukrainian army (BBC, 2014d). During the in Eastern Europe. The frst nations where INFRASTRUCTURE DESTRUCTION DURING In this context, NATO Energy Security COE same month, there were serious diffculties NATO troops were strengthened were the THE CONFLICT BETWEEN UKRAINE AND (ENSEC COE) plays an important role in sup- in supplying water and electricity to the Slo- Baltic States (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania), RUSSIA IN 2014 porting the Alliance to ensure energy security viansk and Starobesheve thermal power sta- in order “to help bolster defenses of the Bal- in its member states. The protection of criti- The conflict between Russia and Ukraine tions because of damages in the pumping- tic states amid fears that Moscow may use cal energy infrastructure is one of the topics was characterized by the destruction of en- systems (KyivPost, 2014). the presence of substantial Russian minori- on which NATO ENSEC COE works. The Cen- ergy infrastructure, which is necessary for ties to destabilise Latvia, Lithuania and Es- tre conducts several projects on this issue the well-being of the society as well as for Furthermore, another relevant event in the tonia” (The Guardian, 2014). In this context, among which it is worth mentioning ‘Energy military operations. The frst attack against conflict between Russia and Ukraine oc- NATO’s Enhanced Forward Presence (EFP), in Conflict’. This is a publication series aim- energy infrastructure in Ukraine occurred curred in the area of Lugansk and Verbovka which was agreed at the 2016 Summit in ing at analyzing the impact that conflicts have on March 15, 2014 when the Russian Armed on July 2, 2014 when Russia-backed separa- Warsaw, is particularly important as it is part on energy infrastructure that has become Forces seized a gas distribution station on tists seized the gas compressor station N1 of NATO’s strategy to strengthen deterrence one of the main military targets. The ‘En- the north-eastern border of the peninsula, (red-circled in Figure 4), which maintained and defense posture in its eastern flank. In ergy in Conflict’ publication series provides thus ensuring the supply for the area and the necessary pressure to deliver gas through fact, “it represents a signifcant commitment a conceptual “toolbox” on the topic for NATO

No 11 ENERGY SECURITY: OPERATIONAL HIGHLIGHTS ENERGY SECURITY: OPERATIONAL HIGHLIGHTS No 11 22 23 members with a twofold aim. Firstly, the Cen- ANEIR - Foreign Trade Promotion Centre S.A. Paradox”, TheBlackSea.eu, 10 December. KyivPost. (2014). Donbasenergo’s Sloviansk tre provides the necessary support to the Al- National Association of Romanian Exporters EUObserver. https://euobserver.com/investi- thermal power plant reports critical power liance in order to strengthen the protection of and Importers. (date not available). Romania- gations/13142 outage. 3 July. Retrieved from https://www. critical energy infrastructure in its member Brief Survey, History. Retrieved from http:// kyivpost.com/article/content/war-against- states. Secondly, the Centre analyses the role www.aneir-cpce.ro/chapter1/his1.htm Curtin, J., Rahman, A. (2014). The Ukrainian ukraine/donbasenergos-sloviansk-thermal- of energy in conflict, which is essential to de- Crisis. A Disputes Past and Present. Policy power-plant-reports-critical-power-out- cision makers and military planners. Amos. H 2014. Ukraine crisis fuels secession Brief. Harvard age-354571.html calls in pro-Russian south The Guardian, 23 CONCLUSION February. Retrieved from https://www.the- Emmot, R. (2016). U.S. activates Romanian Marine Solutions. (2015). A Remarkable Na- guardian.com/world/2014/feb/23/ukraine- missile defense site, angering Russia. Reu- val Battle at the Dardanelles: Battle of Ae- Energy has played an evolving role in conflicts crisis-secession-russian-crimea ters. 12 May. Retrieved from http://www. gospotami in 405 BC. Retrieved from http:// throughout time. While in the ancient times reuters.com/article/us-nato-shield-idUSKC- marinesol.org/a-remarkable-naval-battle- energy was represented by food, nowadays Baker. P., Herszenhorn, D. M., Kramer, A. E. N0Y30JX at-the-dardanelles-battle-of-aegospotami- technological development has made CEI one (2014). Russia seizes gas plant near Crimea in-405-bc/ of the major military targets. The reason is border, Ukraine says. The New York Times. 15 European Commission. (2016). Associa- that CEI is fundamental both for the well-be- March. Retrieved from https://www.nytimes. tion Agreement. Retrieved from https:// Mason, A. (2017). The Incredible Story of The ing of the society and for military operations. com/2014/03/16/world/europe/russian- ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/ Dambusters Raid, Imperial War Museum Therefore, destroying CEI means weaken the troops-seize-gas-plant-beyond-crimean- policy/glossary/terms/association-agree- United Kingdom. Retrieved from: http://www. enemy. This is evident in the conflict between border-ukraine-says.html?mcubz=3 ment_en iwm.org.uk/history/the-incredible-story-of- Russia and Ukraine in 2014 as the former de- the-dambusters-raid stroyed CEI in the latter as a strategy of war. BBC. (2014a). Major Ukraine gas pipeline hit Christopher, A., Mitrokhin, V. 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The Value of Science is sia and the European Union. Faes papers. N. several measures aiming at strengthening its BBC. (2014c). Crimea Referendum: Voters in the Foresight: New Challenges Demand 173. Madrid troupes in those states such as in the case ‘Back Russia union’. Retrieved from http:// Rethinking the Forms and Methods of Car- of the Baltic States that border Russia and at www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-26606097 rying out Combat Operations. Military-Indus- NATO. (2016). Enhanced Forward Presence. deterring further Russian aggression. trial Kurier. 27 February. The English version Retrieved from: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/ BBC. (2014d). Ukraine Conflict: Part of Lu- can be retrieved from: http://usacac.army. natohq/news_127834.htm Finally, it is worth mentioning the important hansk ‘retaken’ from rebels. 18 July. Re- mil/CAC2/MilitaryReview/Archives/English/ role played by the NATO Centres of Excel- trieved from http://www.bbc.com/news/ MilitaryReview_20160228_art008.pdf NATO. (2014). Readiness Action Plan. Re- lence that provide support to the Alliance in world-europe-28363086 trieved from: http://www.hq.nato.int/cps/en/ its work. NATO ENSEC COE is a good example International Analysis Centre, National Se- natohq/topics_119353.htm as it supports the Alliance in ensuring energy BBC. (2015). Russia examines 1991 recogni- curity of Ukraine. (2014). Consolidated news security in the member states. tion of Baltic States independence. 30 June. from the NSC News & Analysis Center. 2 July. NATO. (2016). Very High Readiness Joint BIBLIOGRAPHY Retrieved from http://www.bbc.com/news/ http://mediarnbo.org/2014/07/04/consoli- Task Force. Retrieved from:http://www. world-europe-33325842?SThisFB dated-news-from-the-nsc-news-analysis- hq.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49755. Aladashvili. I. (2014). Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan center-at-1200-july-2-2014/?lang=en htm?selectedLocale=en was blown up Not by Kurdish Bomb But Belkin, P. (2014). NATO: Response to the Cri- by Russian Laptop. Georgian Journal, 18 sis in Ukraine and Security Concerns in Cen- Khan Academy. (2015). Energy Through Time. NATO. (2017). NATO Response Force. Re- December. Retrieved from https://www. tral and Eastern Europe. Congressional Re- A Natural Flow From to Big Bang to the Mod- trieved from http://www.nato.int/cps/en/na- georgianjournal.ge/military/29027-baku- search Service ern Human Society. Retrieved from https:// tolive/topics_49755.htm tbilisi-ceyhan-was-blown-up-not-by-kur- www.khanacademy.org/partner-content/ dish-bomb-but-by-russian-laptop.html Bird, M., Tkachenko, Y., Vdovii, L . (2015). The big-history-project/acceleration/other- great looting of Donbass. In “The Donbass materials9/a/energy-through-time

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NATO. (2017a). Boosting NATO’s presence in Short, B., De Jong, M., Larry, H. (2016). Ener- the east and southeast. Retrieved from http:// gy in Conventional Warfare. Energy in Conflict www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_136388. Series. NATO Energy Centre of Excellence. htm?selectedLocale=en Vilnius The energy dimension of war. NATO. (2017b). Readiness Action Plan. Re- The Economist. (2016). What are the Minsk trieved from http://www.nato.int/cps/en/na- Agreements?. Retrieved from https:// tohq/topics_119353.htm www.economist.com/blogs/economist-ex- plains/2016/09/economist-explains-7 The Ukrainian experience NATO ENSEC COE. (2016). Centre of Excel- lence. Retrieved from https://www.enseccoe. The Guardian. (2014). NATO to bolster of Bal- org/en/about/6 tic states amid Ukraine crisis. Retrieved from An overview of the Ukrainian https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/ NATO ENSEC COE. (2016). Energy in Conven- mar/24/cameron-nato-baltics-states-de- tional Warfare. Vilnius fences-ukraine-crisis events in 2014-2016

Rid, T. (2013). Cyber War will not take place. The Telegraph. (2015). Minsk agreement on Oxford University Press. Oxford Ukrainian crisis: text in full. Retrieved from Oleksandr Sukhodolia, National Institute for Strategic Studies, Ukraine http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/world- Robertson, J., Riley, M. A. (2014). Mysteri- news/europe/ukraine/11408266/Minsk- ous ‘08 Turkey Pipeline Blast Opened New agreement-on-Ukraine-crisis-text-in-full. This article discusses the events related to the Russian attacks on critical energy infrastruc- Cyberwar, Bloomberg. 10 December. Re- html ture (CEI) in Ukraine between 2014 and 2016. The aim is to better understand the threats to trieved from https://www.bloomberg.com/ CEI in hybrid warfare by discussing the example of the Ukrainian events in 2014-2016. This amp/news/articles/2014-12-10/mysterious- US Department of Defence. (2007). Irregular allows the author to provide some inputs for developing the necessary measures to ensure 08-turkey-pipeline-blast-opened-new-cy- Warfare Joint Operating Concept (IW JOC) CEI resilience. Incorporation of the “energy dimension” into its hybrid warfare concept gave berwar Version 1.0. Washington Russia additional tools to influence Ukraine. Political and economic pressure was actively used by Russia up to 2014 and was supplemented by targeted physical actions against CEI Russia Today. (2014). Urengoi-Pomary-Uzh- US Government. (2015). Legislative Text and later on. Destruction, seizing and looting of CEI, cyber attacks as well as political, economic gorod gas pipeline explosion. Retrieved from Joint Explanatory Statement to accompany S. and psychological pressure have therefore become the main set of tools of the aggressor’s https://www.rt.com/news/166532-gas-pipe- 1356 Public Law 114-92. Washington strategy against its neighbor demonstrating that CEI damaging is an effective non-military line-blast-ukraine/ tool of warfare. The analysis of the events in Ukraine shows that CEI protection is a key is- Yuhas, A. (2014), ‘Russian propaganda over sue that should be included into national defense policy. This implies that governments and School of Chemistry (2001). The Bounc- Crimea and the Ukraine: how does it work?’, CEI operators need to implement their emergency preparedness planning while establishing ing Bomb. University of Bristol. Retrieved The Guardian, 17 March. Retrieved from close Public - Private Partnership (PPP) and strengthening civil-military cooperation at the from: http://www.chm.bris.ac.uk/webpro- https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/ same time in order to provide CEI resilience. jects2001/moorcraft/The%20Bouncing%20 mar/17/crimea-crisis-russia-propaganda- Bomb.htm media

Shevchenko, V. (2014) “Little Green Men” or Oleksandr Sukhodolia, National technical University, Kiev “Russian Invaders”?, BBC. 11 March. Re- trieved from http://www.bbc.com/news/ Oleksandr Sukhodolia graduated from the Department of Electrical Power Engineering world-europe-26532154 and Automatics of the National Technical University of Ukraine in 1994. He received his PhD in Electrical Engineering in 1999 and his PhD in Public Administration in 2007. He has extensive experience in energy security in the public service. Between 1998 and 2003, he served as Head of Department and Deputy Head of State Committee of Ukraine on Energy Conservation. Between 2007 and 2011, he was Deputy Head of Energy Security Department at the Secretariat of the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine. Since 2012, he has worked at the National Institute for Strategic Studies of Ukraine as Head of Energy Security and Techogenic Safety Department. His research interests focus on national energy security, and on critical energy infrastructure protection.

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INTRODUCTION economic terms without taking into consid- OVERVIEW OF THE EVENTS RELATED TO On June 8, a transformer substation in Mari- eration the political aspect of the crisis. By upol was blown down, causing the suspen- nsuring the uninterrupted function- CRITICAL ENERGY INFRASTRUCTURE contrast, in its relations with its neighbors sion of power supply to a TV station and its ing of energy infrastructure is not a The Russian use of energy as a foreign policy Russia has never focused on economic ra- tower. Consequently, the TV signals were in- new challenge for Ukraine. Russia weapon in the pre-crisis period (until 2014) tionality but on politics. Russia has often terrupted. has halted the normal functioning of contributed to including the energy dimen- E used the threat of energy supply disruption critical energy infrastructure (CEI) several sion in the current concept of warfare. In as an external policy tool instead of basing its In the same month, 11 power lines and 88 times since the last century. However, the fact, the sequence of energy related events policies towards its neighbors on economic transformer substations were damaged in Russian aggression in 2014 has had a huge between 2014 and 2016 represents the fur- considerations. the territory of the Slavyansk district, disrupt- impact on the way wars are conducted as ther set of policy intensifcation in order to ing power supply. On July 3, 2014 the Slavy- they have led to rethink the “energy dimen- setback Ukraine’s move towards democracy In the case of Ukraine, the history of its rela- ansk Thermal Power Plant (TPP) experienced sion” of war. and transparency. In other words, by using tions with Russia in the energy sector reflects shelling and two transformers and fuel tanks Clausewitz’s famous expression according the never-ending Ukrainian struggle for en- were damaged. This caused a shutdown of Russia used various tools to attack Ukraine to which war is a mere continuation of poli- ergy independence from Russia. In order to the last two working transmission lines. Fi- in 2014-2016. It applied sabotage against tics “with other means” it is possible to argue keep Ukraine in its sphere of influence, Rus- nally, after heavy shelling the work of the TPP energy infrastructure as well as psychologi- that Russia “continued its politics with other sia has been practicing a wide range of tools was stopped until the end of the year. cal, informational and other unconventional means” as it transformed its political actions in the energy sector. Some examples are the tools to disrupt the smooth functionality of into a hybrid war. A clear idea of this is giv- following: the monopolization of the energy Between 2014 and 2015, in the Luhansk the energy sector. This caught Ukraine un- en by the detailed overview of the following market (Russia tried to prevent suppliers of area the damages to transformer substa- prepared for proper resistance showing that cases in which critical energy infrastructure gas to Ukraine from entering the market; in tions and power lines separated some areas energy should be included into national se- (CEI) was damaged (see Table 1). fact, Russia denied them the access to the from the central system, leaving consumers curity threats analyses. pipelines passing through Russia from the dependent on a single source of electricity. Malicious actions against CEI East and through Slovakia, Poland and Hun- The situation could have easily become criti- Given this background, this paper discusses gary from the West); the corruption of gov- Malicious actions against CEI were initiated cal in case of damaging of this source. Since the events related to the attacks on energy ernment offcials and company managers in February-March 2014 in Crimea. As a re- the summer of 2014, the Luhansk Thermal infrastructure in some parts of Ukraine be- (the involvement of intermediaries in the gas sult of the temporary occupation of Crimea, Power Plant (TPP) came under fre regularly. tween 2014 and 2016 by defning the non-mil- trade between Russia and Ukraine created a Ukraine lost the control over a considerable Shelling repeatedly caused a complete shut- itary tools of warfare that could be perceived wide range of supporters for non-transparent part of its public and private assets in the en- down of the stations with the loss of gener- as part of the ‘hybrid war’ and by proposing gas market readily lobbing in favour of Rus- ergy sector (Horbulin, 2015). ating capacity and consequent disruption of the measures that could ensure the function- sian interests); the prevention of the reform electricity supply to the north part of the re- ing of the energy sector in the regions in- of Ukraine’s energy market through the in- In April-May, the physical damage of energy gion, which remained under the control of the volved in the conflict. clusion of long-term prices in the contracts, infrastructure started after the occupation of Ukrainian forces. the “take-or-pay” contract and re-export the administration buildings in the regions of The ‘energy dimension’ of warfare stems prohibition clauses; and offering discounts in Donetsk and Luhansk. In July and August 2015 the shelling of the from Russia’s policy of using the ‘energy exchange of political concessions. Uglegorsk TPP damaged critical elements weapon’ in its foreign policy in order to pur- Physical damage of the transformer station. That power sta- sue its national interests. Energy, especially The clearest example of the policy that Rus- On June 7, 2014 the transformer substation tion, which was the biggest one in the region, the natural gas sector, was used by Russia as sia pursues in order to keep Ukraine in its providing energy to the Luhansk airport was stopped generating power, thereby creating a a tool to achieve its objectives in its relations sphere of influence is the progressively tight- blown out. At that time, the Luhansk airport critical situation in the entire electricity sys- with Ukraine as well as with the European ening control of the Ukrainian gas market was a base for the Ukrainian armed forces. tem in Ukraine. This created a defcit of pow- Union already in the period before the crisis between 1998 and 2005 that led to the sign- in Ukraine. According to several reports, until ing of unfavorable contracts for natural gas 2006 Russia cut off energy exports about 40 11 The concept of “hybrid war” that we apply in this paper reflects the defnition given by Frank G. Hoffman, namely the “simultaneous and adaptive employment supplies in 2009. This was followed by an ex- times. (Reuters, 2008; Larsson, 2006) of a fused mix of conventional weapons, irregular tactics, terrorism and criminal behavior in the battle space to obtain political objectives”. (Hoffman, 2009) change of gas price discounts with the exten- 12 Some examples of how Russia used a threat or direct acts of an energy supply disruption as an external policy tool are the following: stoppage of gas supply sion of the long-term lease of the naval base to Ukraine in 2005 and 2009 (to press Ukraine to switch to unfavorable contract conditions); stoppage of oil supply from Russia to Mazeikiai refnery (try to force Although this aspect was repeatedly stressed Lithuania to sell refnery to Russian company); explosions of electricity and gas supply lines to Georgia in winter of 2006 (political and economic pressure on in the Ukrainian Black Sea port in 2010. An- Georgia); cutting the oil supply for Czech Republic in 2008 (demonstration of power of Russia after Czech agreed on antimissile radar placement); explosion by many experts in the feld, a large part of other consequence of the Russian policy to- of the main transit gas pipeline from Turkmenistan in 2009 (blocking direct supply of Turkmen gas to EU) and other cases (gas disputes: Russia-Ukraine in the Western political elite and of the indus- 1998, 2013-2015; Russia-Belarus in 2004 and 2007; Russia-Poland in 2010; Russia-Bulgaria in 1998 and 2010; Russia-Turkmenistan in 1997, 2005 and oil wards Ukraine was the Ukrainian rejection of disputes: Russia-Belarus in 2007 and 2010; Russia-Lithuania and Russia-Latvia in 1998, 2002, 2006). (Reuters, 2008; Larsson, 2006; Smith, 2008; Cienski, try experts prefer to have good relations with the Association Agreement with the EU while 2006; Sindelar, 2006) Russia as an important energy supplier, try- 13 securing additional loans from Russia for the These tools have been widely used in some EU countries as well. Non-transparent business culture and the politically motivated behavior of Gazprom did ing to interpret the situation exclusively in not prevent some high-ranking politicians in the EU member states from being involved in lobbying for implementing some Russian energy projects in the EU. purchase of gas in 2013. (Horbulin, 2017, p.103-105)

No 11 ENERGY SECURITY: OPERATIONAL HIGHLIGHTS ENERGY SECURITY: OPERATIONAL HIGHLIGHTS No 11 28 29 er that put at risk the stable functioning of Kramatorsk-Donetsk- main gas Cyber-attack tance of CEI, despite the fact that the Russian the central electricity system that threatened pipeline was damaged. Considering the fact Cyber-attacks are considered as the frst troops were only few kilometers away. blackouts throughout the entire country. The that this route has no backup pipelines and ever known external intrusion in the CEI sys- other TPPs were not able to timely provide that Mariupol has no other gas supply routes, tem causing outages.14 An example is the The shortage of anthracite coal, mined main- backup power because of the shortage of the region experienced a curtailment of gas case occurred on December 23, 2015 when ly in the occupied territory of Donbas, threat- coal caused by the territory occupation. supply. The same happened in Berdyansk and some regional electricity distribution com- ened to stop half of Ukraine’s thermal pow- in other cities located nearby. Also, a number panies became objects of cyber-attack (Lee, er plants and some municipal boilers that In 2014-2015, the transformer substations of municipal energy companies of these cit- Assante, Conway, 2016). The attackers used could endanger the stability of energy supply were repeatedly de-energized because of ies were forced to cut off gas consumption. malware in order to get direct remote access throughout the country. Ukraine was there- the several blackouts in large cities such as Consequently, the production of goods was to Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition fore forced to face an emergency situation in Luhansk and Donetsk. In general, during the reduced leaving the economy without revenue (SCADA) systems, to blind its operators with the electricity sector, restricting the normal frst year of the warfare only, over 1,000 pow- and people with limited services at disposal. the aim to cause undesirable changes in the functioning of industries and imposing a limi- er outages were reported just in the Donetsk distribution infrastructure and to delay the tation of the electricity supply to consumers. region due to the damages to 35-110 kV pow- During the fercest phase of the conflict, restoration of power supply by deleting the er lines. Over 10,000 damages were in 6-10 militants repeatedly attacked water canals software of SCADA servers. Furthermore, an informational warfare cam- kV lines and transformer substations. On and pumping stations necessary for water paign conducted by Russia threatened the January 7, 2015 in the Donetsk and Lugansk supply as well as power lines. The militants The attack caused the switching off of the stability of citizens’ support to the newly regions 55 towns were de-energized (partial- also prevented pumping stations from being power distribution substations (seven 110 kV elected Government of Ukraine. This situa- ly or completely); 28 transmission lines 220- repaired by fring on the people in charge of and 23 35 kV substations). This led to the dis- tion forced Ukraine to make concessions on 330 kV, 3 transformer substation 220-330 kV, the repairs. As a result, some in the connection of consumers from the system and the question of electricity supply to occupied 44 lines 110-150 kV, 20 substation 110 kV, Donetsk area had no water supply and elec- forced several companies to use manual op- Crimea as well as to import electricity or coal 86 lines 35 kV, 31 substation 35 kV, 149 lines tricity for several weeks. Also, between June erations. Power outages lasted up to 4 hours from Russia in order to ensure the “habitual 6-10 kV, and 780 substation were disabled. 2014 and June 2015, 10 people from the staff and affected more than 220, 000 customers. life standards” of the population. During the of Donetskoblenerho (that is the electricity periods of electricity disruption caused by the Since the beginning of the conflict, natural distribution system operator – DSO) died and Seizure of the Ukrainian CEI damage of the TPP, Ukraine had to buy very gas infrastructure has been repeatedly at- 16 were wounded while working to repair the expensive electricity from Russia as an emer- Apart from destruction, critical energy infra- tacked, too. In May and June 2014 three explo- electrical system. gency measure. structure was seized by the Russian military sions occurred along the Urengoy-Pomary- units. For example, two offshore drills and Uzhgorod high pressure gas pipeline in the In this context, some other types of malicious Furthermore, the stopping of the delivery of pipelines as well as the infrastructure on Ivano-Frankivsk region. On June 17, 2014 an actions should be mentioned. In June 2015, coal because of the disruption of transporta- the shore providing production and gas sup- explosion occurred along the same pipeline the Troitske in the Luhansk region was tion routes forced Ukraine to purchase coal ply from the offshore felds in the Black Sea in the Poltava region. However, the gas supply left without electricity because of the fghting. from Russia, which had been stolen from the (the Odessa feld) were captured. Also, a gas was not interrupted thanks to Ukraine’s ex- It was not possible to restore the power sup- Ukrainian mines by the separatists (OSCE compressor station, which pumps gas from tensive pipeline system and to the existence ply because the transformers were turned into Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine 2015). a feld in the Azov Sea shelf (), was of reserve pipelines and roundabout routes. scrap by militants and locals. Several reports This means that the war against Ukraine was taken under control by Russia in the Kherson Such confgurations show the high level of on the dismantling of power lines around fnanced with Ukrainian resources. In addi- region. the resilience of the Ukrainian gas transit Donetsk, Horlivka, Luhansk, and the Stakh- tion, blockade of coal supply was among the system and its preparedness for emergency. anov area show that this is a criminal dimen- means of Russia to force Ukraine to agree on Ukraine did not react to the seizures ade- sion of warfare (as well as dismantling of tram requirements of self-proclaimed authorities quately. After capturing the and Unfortunately, the internal distributional gas lines in Luhansk, some railroads lines around and forming a basis information manipula- the Government buildings of the Autono- network of Ukraine has some weaknesses Donetsk, industry plants supply lines etc). tions and pressure on Ukraine. mous on February 27, that were highlighted by the war. On Febru- 2014, it took only two weeks to also capture ary 17, 2015 the Uglegorsk TPP and the con- Dismantling of industrial plants equipment Based on the analysis of the events, the ac- the Chornomornoftogaz energy company and sumers in the Donetsk region were left with- with consequent shipment to Russia as well tions against CEI could be divided into two expensive drilling rigs including felds in the out gas because the Novopskov-Kramatorsk as scrapping energy infrastructure became a main groups. The frst one includes uninten- Black Sea on March 4, 2014. During this pe- pipeline was damaged. On August 23, 2014 very widespread and lucrative business in the tional actions, where disruption of CEI is a riod, Ukraine failed to respond because the the gas distribution station was damaged occupied territory. In fact, in Donbass, sever- kind of “accidental” consequence of the fght- government did not understand the impor- near Alchevsk, causing suspension of gas al cases of massive destruction of infrastruc- supply to Alchevsk, Perevalsk and Alchevsk ture eventually occurred because of both the 14 Later investigations revealed that the attackers were from the Internet sector, belonging to Russian internet providers. (Ministry of Energy of Ukraine, 2016) Iron and Steel Works. On June 12, 2015 the fghting and of robbery and looting. 15 “Habitual life standards” is the style of livelihood and everyday routine to which people become accustomed. 16 Unintentional actions represent the main cause of the damages to CEI in the Luhansk and the Donetsk regions.

No 11 ENERGY SECURITY: OPERATIONAL HIGHLIGHTS ENERGY SECURITY: OPERATIONAL HIGHLIGHTS No 11 30 31 ing. The second one refers to the targeted population and to provoke social and politi- acts aiming at the deliberate disruption of the cal unrest. From this point of view, these at- Psychological pressure Economic losses Tactical benefits functionality of various CEIs. tempts can be considered as part of the non- Protection against possible military “energy dimension” of warfare and The threat to rupture the attacks by means of position- In general, targeted actions, which could be should consequently be taken into considera- sustainable functionality Seizure of energy produc- ing military troops nearby the of the Ukrainian unifed tion units and infrastructure classifed as means of “hybrid warfare” (see tion in the planning of the national defense infrastructure that is dangerous energy system (due to lack (industry, resources, infra- Table 1), create serious problems to every policy. to attack (chemical plants or of fuel- coal, natural gas- structure) power plants and supply net- country. for power generation) works, gas pipelines)

ACTION EXAMPLES Payment for stolen resources, Getting advantages in military Seizure of CEI in Crimea, in the Kherson region and in some territo- Stopping power supply goods and services (Ukraine operations (inability to leave the ries of Donbass. (damage to TPP and trans- compensates bills for energy site of defense because of the former substations, gas supply to the occupied ter- need to protect infrastructure Hindering the functioning Blocking the delivery of coal from coal mines with the disruption of pipelines disruption) ritories, while consumers in units such as power plants, of and/or seizing CEI transportation routes these areas do not pay) transportation hubs, airports) Cyber-attacks against electrical energy networks that lead to black- outs in Western Ukraine Getting advantages in political Termination of water sup- Robbery at the Ukrainian negotiation processes (ensuring Destruction of the Shelling thermal power plants (TPP) ply to towns because of the state coal mines and sales favorable conditions for con- power supply system breakdown of the pumping Disabling power station equipment, power lines, and transformers of the stolen coal to Ukraine tracts to supply electric power stations (damage of elec- under the guise of Russian to Crimea, exerting pressure to trical networks, pipelines, contracts be in a better position during Destruction of the Repeated damage of gas networks and distribution stations that preventing repairs) gas supply system provide gas to consumers in the Luhansk and Donetsk regions peace talks)

Dismantling of industrial enterprises, mines, tram- and railways, Table 2: Energy tools of war Demolition of industrial power lines. units and infrastructure Repeated damage of water canals and pumping stations of water supply The second lesson is that big part of the dam- infrastructure and be realized through “pre- age to CEI in Ukraine was caused by “unin- ventive action planning”, by giving special at- Preventing the Militants repeatedly shelled the pumping station for water supply, tentional” actions that resulted in unplanned tention to ensuring physical protection, inter- restoration of CEI power lines and transformers and prevented its repair with fring. and peripheral harm to CEI. However, the connectivity of CEI and availability of reserve consequences were the same as in the case capacities. Table 1: Typical targeted actions against energy infrastructure of intentional targeted actions, namely the disruption of the energy flow. These actions “Targeted acts” against CEI require the ne- should be taken into consideration in the de- cessity of predicting the possible intentional THE ENERGY DIMENSION OF WARFARE IN The analysis has shown that the targeted velopment of emergency response and de- attacks. This means the necessity to imple- THE NATIONAL SECURITY AND DEFENSE actions against CEI in Ukraine can also be fense policies. ment procedures concerning the evaluation POLICY identifed as non-military means of warfare of the risks to face both for the government because of the following effects (see Table 2): It is necessary to have a two-level set of and for the CEI operators, but also to es- Given the analysis above, two important les- (1) psychological pressure, in order to spread measures to ensure CEI protection, namely tablish a close Public - Private Partnership sons for national security can be identifed. panic, social tension and discontent with the measures aiming at reducing the number of (PPP). An important aspect of this system is government; (2) economic losses, due to the possible threats and measures aiming at re- that targeted malicious acts require the ex- The frst lesson is that energy infrastructure seizure of CEI and energy resources, thus sponding to crises. change of sensitive information between the is a very attractive target in modern warfare. imposing an additional economic burden on involved actors as well as the readiness of Thanks to the high level of technological de- the country or getting additional resource for The frst set of measures, which are used to the military and law enforcement personnel velopment, modern societies have become war; and (3) local advantages, by achieving a manage “unintended acts”, could be imple- to activate additional measures. These ac- excessively dependent on stable energy sup- better position to conduct certain operations mented in some cases within the prepared- tions too should be included in the national plies. Therefore, the intentional destruction (e.g. combat collision, terms of contracts, ness system designed for peacetime. The defense policy. of energy infrastructure and the disruption of ceasefre negotiation) or by forcing the gov- system of CEI protection should be designed energy supply could be interpreted as a de- ernment to undergo certain actions (e.g. pay- to ensure the continuity of the functions of an Furthermore, the analysis of the events con- liberate attempt to spread discontent in the ments, sale or purchase of resources).

No 11 ENERGY SECURITY: OPERATIONAL HIGHLIGHTS ENERGY SECURITY: OPERATIONAL HIGHLIGHTS No 11 32 33 cerning the functioning of CEI in Ukraine base for the implementation of its critical geted actions should be intended not only Larsson, R. (2006). Russia’s Energy Policy: clearly shows that a number of tools could infrastructure protection policy. Examples of as acts of armed terrorist groups with light Dimensions and Russia’s Reliability as an En- be useful to protect it. The following ones are practical measures are: weapons but also as policies of terrorist ergy Supplier. Scientifc Report. FOI. Stock- some examples: a) enacting an “emergency states using heavy armory. It is also funda- holm preparedness plan” including the involve- • revising the system of territorial defense, mental to include the energy dimension of ment of law enforcement and Army forces for where some parts of the infrastructures warfare into the national defense policy and Lee, R. L., Assante, M. J., Conway, T. (2016). CEI protection according to an established were put under protection; to raise the awareness of the Army and of the Analysis of the cyber Attack on the Ukrain- level of threats; b) increasing the aware- law enforcement forces on energy security. ian Power Grid. Defense Use Case. E-ISAC. • reestablishing the National Guard of ness of the armed forces and of the law en- Washington Ukraine as a law enforcement unit with forcement units on the importance of energy At the same time, most measures support- heavy weaponry, that was able to repel the security, including the resilience of CEI; c) ing a smooth functioning of CEI should be Ministry of Energy of Ukraine. (2016). Infor- attack against protected objects and was strengthening civil-military cooperation and implemented through the “emergency pre- mation of Ministry of Energy of Ukraine. 12 tasked to take critical infrastructure under encouraging the voluntary support in secur- paredness planning”. In this context, one of February. Retrieved from http://mpe.kmu. protection; ing energy supply to households; d) creating the priorities is the development of a system gov.ua/minugol/control/uk/publish/print- reserves of energy resources and generat- • strengthening the physical protection of for critical infrastructure protection. Ukraine able_article?art_id=245086886 ing capacities (mobile generators and fuel), transport and energy infrastructure with started working in that direction by concep- e) using the technical capabilities of the special agencies; tualizing a policy on CEI protection and on Offcial Journal of the European Union. (2010). armed forces f) introducing additional or- the development of a legislation framework Regulation (EU) No 994/2010 of the European • improving the cooperation of local au- ganizational and technical measures to pro- (, 2016b; President of Parliament and of the Council of 20 October thorities with military and law enforce- tect CEI against accidental damage caused Ukraine, 2017). 2010 concerning measures to safeguard se- ment forces (State Service of Ukraine for by the fghting; g) establishing a communi- curity of gas supply and repealing Council Emergency Situations, Army Forces, Na- cation channel between the fghting parties Directive 2004/67/EC. Retrieved from http:// tional Guard, Security Service) in order to BIBLIOGRAPHY with the help of third parties if necessary (the eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do strengthen the protection and recovery of Biriukov, D., Kondratov, S., Nasvit, O. Suk- third party is needed in order to overcome ?uri=OJ:L:2010:295:0001:0022:EN:PDF critical infrastructure. hodolia, O. (2015). Green Paper on Critical In- distrust between the fghting parties); h) se- frastructure Protection Paper. The NISS Ana- curing the ceasefre during the repair work OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine. Additionally, some legislation concerning lytical Report. Retrieved from http://en.niss. to restore the infrastructure (electricity, gas (2015). Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring critical energy infrastructure protection was gov.ua/content/articles/files/Green-Paper- and water supply); i) establishing an interna- Mission (SMM) to Ukraine, based on informa- approved (President of Ukraine, 2015; Presi- engl-4bd7c.pdf tional monitoring mission to prevent deliber- tion received as of 19:30hrs, 12 October 2015. dent of Ukraine, 2016). ate infrastructure damage and obstruction of Retrieved from http://www.osce.org/press- Cienski, J. (2006). Baltic lessons for EU in CEI restoration ; j) avoiding the positioning of releases CONCLUSION dealing with a resurgent Russia. Financial the military units nearby CEI if possible (fr- Times. 24 November. Retrieved from http:// ing against the military positioned nearby In conclusion, the Ukrainian experience in OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine. www.ft.com/cms/s/0/05ff71f8-7b60-11db- CEI could be extremely dangerous for CEI); the context of the “hybrid war” demonstrates (2016). Latest from OSCE Special Monitor- bf9b-0000779e2340.html#axzz4KzXdkUYa k) coordinating the CEI protection in the ar- that it is necessary to implement a proactive ing Mission to Ukraine, based on information eas of the conflict between the armed forces energy security policy in order to resist the received as of 19:30hrs, 13 March 2016. Re- Hoffman, Frank G. (2009). Hybrid vs. Com- and the law enforcement agencies to prevent attempts of an aggressor aiming at negatively trieved from http://www.osce.org/ukraine- pound War. Armed Forces Journal. 1 October. looting. affecting the functioning of the energy sector. smm/227321 Retrieved from http://www.armedforcesjour- nal.com/hybrid-vs-compound-war/ Today, Ukraine is in the process of translat- As for the CEI protection policy in particu- President of Ukraine. (2015). Decree of the ing the lessons learned into practical tasks. lar, it is necessary to rethink the paradigm of President of Ukraine № 555/2015 that enacts Horbulin, V. (2015). Donbas and Crimea: the Ukraine has taken some steps forward to protection and to include those threats that the Decision of the National Security and De- price of return. NISS. Kiev. Retrieved from modernizing its physical protection of CEI had not been previously considered by the fense Council of Ukraine. Military Doctrine of http://www.niss.gov.ua/content/articles/ and modernizing its legal and institutional “peacetime” system. The reality of the tar- Ukraine. 2 September. Retrieved from http:// fles/Razom_kRym_donbas-4ab2b.pdf zakon2.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/555/2015/ paran17#n17 17 As for the energy sector, the requirements for such system are contained in the EU regulation №994/2010 on measures to ensure the security of gas supply, Horbulin, V. (2017). The World Hybrid War: which requires that national governments develop a Preventive Action Plan and an Emergency Plan in the area of gas supply. (Offcial Journal of the European Ukrainian Forefront. NISS. Kiev. Retrieved Union, 2010) President of Ukraine. (2016). Decree of the from http://www.niss.gov.ua/public/File/ 18 An example of international monitoring is the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine that facilitated the ceasefre and monitored the process President of Ukraine № 92/2016 that enacts of demining and of repairing a major water-supply pipelines as well as power lines. The SMM team was in close contact with the Ukrainian and Russian rep- book_2017/HW_druk_fn+site_changed.rar resentatives of the Joint Coordination Centre as well as with the Ukrainian Armed Forces and the “DPR” “commanders” on site to help keeping the ceasefre the Decision of the National Security and De- (OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine, 2016)

No 11 ENERGY SECURITY: OPERATIONAL HIGHLIGHTS ENERGY SECURITY: OPERATIONAL HIGHLIGHTS No 11 34 35 fense Council of Ukraine. Concept for the De- the Decision of the National Security and velopment of the Defense and Security Sec- Defense Council of Ukraine. About urgent tor. 4 March. Retrieved from http://zakon2. measures on neutralization of energy se- rada.gov.ua/laws/show/92/2016 curity threats and strengthening of critical infrastructure protection. 16 February. Re- President of Ukraine. (2016a). Decree of the trieved from http://www.president.gov.ua/ Critical Energy President of Ukraine № 96/2016 on the Cy- documents/372017-21302 ber Security Strategy of Ukraine. 27 January. Retrieved from http://www.president.gov.ua/ Reuters. (2008). FACTBOX: Russian oil and documents/962016-19836 gas export interruptions. 28 August. Re- Infrastructure: trieved from http://www.reuters.com/article/ President of Ukraine. (2016b). Decree of idUSLS57897220080828 President of Ukraine № 8/2017 that enacts Identification and Protection the Decision of the National Security and Sindelar, D. (2006). Georgia: Tbilisi Accuses Defense Council of Ukraine. About the im- Moscow Of Energy Sabotage. 13 January. Ra- provement of measures on providing criti- dio Free Europe. Retrieved from http://www. Moniek de Jong, NATO Energy Security Centre of Excellence, Lithuania cal infrastructure protection. 29 December. rferl.org/content/article/1064976.html Larry Hughes, Dalhousie University, Canada Retrieved from http://www.president.gov.ua/ documents/82017-21058 Smith, K. C. (2008). Russia and European En- ergy Security. Divide and Dominate. Center Infrastructure is essential to modern societies. Some infrastructure, such as that for water President of Ukraine. (2017). Decree of for Strategic and International Studies. CSIS supply and communications, is considered critical because its disruption would affect most, President of Ukraine № 37/2017 that enacts Press. Washington. if not all, of society. The importance of energy to modern society means its infrastructure is considered “uniquely critical” as most other infrastructure relies on it, directly or indirectly. A society’s energy infrastructure is organized into an energy system, a hierarchical network of processes responsible for the transportation and conversion of energy, from suppliers to the services meeting the energy demands of end-users. As with infrastructure in general, some energy infrastructure is also considered critical. In order to effectively and efficiently protect critical energy infrastructure, the critical processes in the energy system must be identified. To assist the energy analyst, this paper describes several methods that are avail- able to facilitate the identification process. After identifying the critical entities, an inventory of the possible threats should be the next priority. The paper shows how each threat can be assessed according to its likelihood and the system’s vulnerability to it. Given the importance of critical energy infrastructure, the paper describes how countermeasures can be developed for the protection of infrastructure from threats without the unnecessary allocation of assets or funds. Importantly, it explains how protection measures can increase the energy security of the energy system.

Moniek de Jong, NATO Energy Security Centre of Excellence, Vilnius

Moniek de Jong is a Dutch energy researcher. She is engaged in independent energy security research dealing with topics like European Union natural gas diversifcation, energy policy, energy risks and climate change. She has collaborated with Professor Larry Hughes from Dalhousie University, in Halifax, Canada, on several papers dealing with energy security, European and Canadian climate change goals and risks in energy systems. Ms. De Jong holds a Master in International Relations and Organizations from the University of Groningen, in Groningen, the Netherlands and a Master in Energy Se- curity Studies from the Masaryk University, in Brno, the Czech Republic. Previously, she was an intern at the NATO Energy Security Centre of Excellence in Vilnius, Lithuania.

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INTRODUCTION Secondary Secondary to Secondary Service Example rior to the widespread availability of ergy needs of the energy service, examples of energy source tertiary conversion energy source high-density energy sources such which are shown in Table 1. Internal as coal and crude oil in the 19th and Aircraft Jet fuel Distance travelled combustion engine P early parts of the 20th centuries, Although great changes have taken place Transportation almost all of the world’s energy was sup- over the past 250 years in the types of energy Elevator Electricity Electric motor Vertical motion plied from various forms of biomass: woody consumed and how they are consumed, there biomass for cooking and heating, agricul- are three common activities. First, whatever Space heating Natural gas Furnace Heat (hot air) tural biomass for transportation (fodder source (e.g., tallow or natural gas), it must Heating for horses and other draught animals), and be extracted, second, it must be converted fats, such as tallow and whale oil, for light- from one form to another (e.g., wood to heat Hot water Electricity Electric kettle Heat (boiled water) ing (Malanima, 2013; Malanima, 2010). By or coal to electricity), and third, it must be the middle of the 20th century, new sources transported (e.g., wood from the forest to Lighting Electricity Light bulb Light (Lumens) of high-density energy were being made the farm or natural gas from an offshore gas available, such as natural gas and uranium feld to storage). Electricity to Transportation Mobile phone Electricity Sound (Decibels) (IEA, 2015). radio waves These activities are not energy, they are the However, before these high-density sources physical entities organized into an energy Computer Electricity Electricity to data Information of primary energy could be used to meet the system that extracts energy from nature, fundamental anthropogenic energy needs of converts it from one form to another, and Table 1: Examples of energy services and tertiary energy heat (for low- and high-temperature energy transports it from one location to another applications), transportation, and light, they without changing it. To function, these enti- • The person using the service should be able Points ‘1’ and ‘2’ deal with the identifcation had to be extracted from the earth and moved ties consume energy to perform their tasks. to pay for the cost of the energy required to of the risks faced by part of the system, while to where they could be converted into a us- This raises an important point: in order to meet its energy requirements. ‘3’ refers to existing and future protection of able form of secondary energy, such as petrol beneft from an energy service, it is neces- the system. and diesel in oil refneries and electricity in sary that the following conditions be met • The energy supplied meets certain stand- power stations. (Hughes, 2012): ards, usually environmental, to protect both Given the importance of the entities or in- humans and the environment. frastructure that comprise a jurisdiction’s Since sources of secondary energy produc- • There needs to be a supply of secondary energy system, a focus of governments and tion are often hundreds of kilometres from energy (which implies that there is a prima- If any of these conditions cannot be met, the energy providers has been to maintain and where the energy will be used, transportation ry energy source available for conversion). energy service may not function, potentially improve the energy security of the jurisdic- networks have been developed to carry the However, if the source of primary energy is affecting those using the service. In other tion. This paper is an introduction to energy energy to where it will be consumed. Howev- lost or any of the entities are unable to func- words, the availability of affordable and envi- systems, energy security, and explains how er, in most cases, secondary energy requires tion, it may not be possible to meet the en- ronmentally acceptable supplies of energy is risks to the infrastructure can be identifed one fnal conversion to meet the tertiary en- ergy requirements of the energy service. essential to the social and economic wellbe- and how the infrastructure can be protected. ing that is, the energy security, of any society. The paper is organized as follows. In the next To ensure the continuation of our way of life, section, some of the concepts associated it is important for those responsible for the with critical infrastructure are discussed, in- Dr. Larry Hughes, Dalhousie University, Halifax energy security of an energy system or the cluding what critical infrastructure can mean Dr. Larry Hughes is a professor in the Department of Electrical and Computer Engi- entities that comprise the system: to supranational and national governments neering at Dalhousie University in Halifax, Nova Scotia, Canada. His research focuss- as well as to individuals. The third section in- es on energy security in energy systems, energy transformation, and climate change. 1. To know which parts of a system are criti- troduces energy systems and energy security Dr. Hughes has published widely, both in academic journals such as Applied Energy, cal to its operation before defning critical energy infrastructure. Energy, and Energy Policy, and in the mainstream media, such as the Globe and Mail Methods of identifying the risks and threats and Policy Options. He is often quoted in the mainstream media and his research has 2. To understand the risks associated with facing an energy system’s infrastructure are influenced corporate and government energy policy in Nova Scotia. Between Septem- each part of the system ber 2015 and March 2016, he was a Visiting Professional at NATO ENSECCOE. described in the fourth section, while tech- 3. To adapt the system and its internal struc- niques for protecting the infrastructure are ture so that it is resilient to these risks covered in the ffth section. The paper con-

No 11 ENERGY SECURITY: OPERATIONAL HIGHLIGHTS ENERGY SECURITY: OPERATIONAL HIGHLIGHTS No 11 38 39 cludes with a brief review of what has been • Whereas the United Kingdom’s definition level and not on lower levels, many aspects is the software and digital framework to sup- presented. Two appendices are included; the includes anything that has an “impact on de- are excluded and give an unrealistic overview port the physical infrastructure, or in some frst presents a method that can be used to livery of the nation’s essential services; eco- of the potential risks facing the infrastructure cases it is part of the supply system (in case identify critical infrastructure in energy sys- nomic impact (arising from loss of essential within the jurisdiction. of information and communications infra- tems, while the second summarizes the mili- service) and impact on life (arising from loss structure). tary’s role in critical infrastructure and criti- of essential service)” (Centre for the Protec- The fgure can also be used to demonstrate cal energy infrastructure protection. tion of National Infrastructure, n.d.). the hierarchy of levels by using the example CRITICAL ENERGY INFRASTRUCTURE of water service to a building. For example, Energy has many meanings, such as the “ca- CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE • Others have defined critical infrastructure should the water supply be disrupted by ac- pacity of a body or system to do work” or “a as “all assets that are so vital for any country cidently damaging the building’s connection Infrastructure is defned by the Collins Eng- source of usable power, as fossil fuel or elec- that their destruction or degradation would to the water main, then water distribution in lish Dictionary as “the basic structure of an tricity” (energy, n.d.). have a debilitating effect on the essential the building is disrupted. The water connec- organization, system, etc.” (infrastructure, functions of the government, national securi- tion to the building can be considered critical 2014), while the American Heritage Diction- For the purposes of this report, energy can ty, national economy or public health” (Yusta, infrastructure to anyone associated with the ary defnes it as, “The basic facilities, ser- refer to primary energy (such as coal, crude Correa, & Lacal-Arantegui, 2011; Hull, Bel- building. However, if the neighbouring build- vices, and installations needed for the func- oil, natural gas, water, uranium, biomass, luck, & Lipchin, 2006). ings are unaffected by the broken connection, wind, or sunlight), secondary energy (primary tioning of a community or society, such as then the water main connection is not criti- transportation and communications systems, energy that has been converted into, for ex- Based on the defnitions, critical infrastruc- cal infrastructure to them as they continue to water and power lines, and public institutions ample, electricity, diesel, or kerosene), and ture can thus be considered as being any receive water. Thus, the local infrastructure including schools, post offces, and prisons” tertiary energy (secondary converted into a infrastructure that is essential for the na- is still intact (minus one building). The higher (infrastructure, 2011). From these two defni- service, such as transportation, heating and tion’s functioning, and its people’s safety you get the smaller the non-functioning of tions, infrastructure can be thought of as the cooling, and lighting). and health. These defnitions all focus on the the water supply to the building gets. One basic physical facilities that are needed for national or supranational scale of critical in- building without water supply does not have the functioning of society. Energy systems frastructure, but infrastructure can also be a debilitating effect on the country’s water

critical within these jurisdictions (see Figure supply, the critical water infrastructure is Energy infrastructure is any facility or entity Critical is defned as “forming or having the 1). For example, if the national infrastructure functioning normally. All the other buildings that converts one type of energy to another or nature of a turning point; crucial or decisive” is still working, but for some reason an indi- have access to water. In order to restore wa- transports a flow of energy from one entity to or “extremely important or essential” (criti- vidual’s or a region’s infrastructure is not. In ter service the broken connection needs to be another. It can also refer to energy manage- cal, 2011). this case, the infrastructure is still critical to replaced. ment technology, such as metering and mod- the individual or the region, but is not critical ern power plant controls. An energy system Some infrastructure is considered to be criti- on the national level. As critical infrastruc- The other way, “top-to-bottom” view shows consists of entities linked together forming cal and is therefore referred to as critical in- ture is normally only reviewed on the national that if the national critical infrastructure is chains from energy sources to end-users frastructure. The term is used widely: not working, for example because of droughts (Ikeonu, 2014; Vasenin, 2013; Hughes, 2012). there is no supply water left in the reservoirs, An example of a system’s infrastructure and • The European Union defines critical infra- then everybody below the national layer is af- chains include electricity infrastructure (gen- structure as “an asset, system or part thereof fected. The regional infrastructure, local in- erating station, transmission and distribution located in Member States which is essential frastructure and the individual layers are also grids, substations, and transformers), natu- for the maintenance of vital societal func- left without water services. In this case, in ral gas infrastructure (storage, transmission, tions, health, safety, security, economic or order to restore water supply, the water res- distribution, and furnaces), and petroleum social well-being of people, and the disrup- ervoirs need to be flled (rain or transporting infrastructure (refneries, tank farms, pipe- tion or destruction of which would have a sig- water to the reservoir). lines, and fuel stations) (OSCE, 2013). nifcant impact in a Member State as a result of the failure to maintain those functions” The increasing use of information and com- The American Heritage Dictionary defnes (European Union, 2008). munications technology (ICT) in critical in- system as “a group of interacting, interre- frastructure in recent years, means that lated, or interdependent elements forming • In the United States, it is described as any- critical infrastructure can be discussed on a complex whole” (system, 2011). An energy thing that provides “the essential services two different levels, the physical and the cy- system is one that is responsible for trans- that underpin American society and serve as ber (Genge, Kiss, & Haller, 2015). An entity’s porting and converting primary or secondary the backbone of our nation’s economy, secu- physical infrastructure is, for example, the energy to meet the energy needs of an end- rity, and health” (Homeland Security, 2016). pipes, pumps, and wires, that are needed to user, such as a sector or a service (as ter- Figure 1: An example of levels and critical energy infrastructure supply the service. The cyber infrastructure tiary energy) within the sector. The end-user

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ergyOUT, in this case, equal or all of jurisdiction’s energy services or en- to DemandIN. The entity’s ergy suppliers, or both.” actions are dictated by its internal structure and a set Energy infrastructure is important because of of rules, PolicyIN, which it is its function in society and its effect on the op- expected to follow. The en- eration of other critical infrastructure (Lauge, tity typically accesses the Hernantes, & Sarriegi, 2014; Yusta, Correa, & environment: using those Lacal-Arantegui, 2011). Other sectors that things it requires, Environ- depend on electricity are emergency servic- mentIN, and emitting waste es, military services, communications sector, or other byproducts, Envi- water, health care and other energy sectors ronmentOUT. Figure 3 is an like oil and gas (Homeland Security, 2017). example of a linear energy The United States Department of Homeland Figure 5: Yamal pipeline (Gazprom, 2017) Figure 2: An energy system and its external entities chain. Different entities Security also underscores the importance of (from (Hughes, 2012) have different functions. energy to other critical infrastructure with the observation that “the Energy Sector [is] In a non-linear chain, at least one entity has and the holder of the natural resource can A jurisdiction relies on an energy system to as uniquely critical because it provides an two or more upstream or downstream neigh- be considered external actors. Figure 2 is a meet its energy requirements and the en- ‘enabling function’ across all critical infra- bours: the flows either converge to a single representation of an energy system with its ergy system is responsible for a jurisdiction’s structure sectors” (DHS, n.d.). Quite simply, entity from its upstream neighbours or di- external actors. energy security (Hughes, de Jong, & Wang, without energy, the operation of many other verge from a single entity to its downstream 2016). Combining the previously established sectors cannot be sustained. The energy sec- neighbours (see Figure 6). Non-linear chains An energy system is comprised of multiple defnition of critical infrastructure and the tor has been declared “uniquely critical” by have the advantage of diversity, allowing the entities, some of which are responsible for above discussed overview of energy systems Presidential Policy Directive 21, because it convergent entity (such as ‘D’ in Figure 6) to energy conversion and others energy trans- has led to the following defnition of critical has the ability to affect ffteen other critical potentially reduce the risk associated with the portation. An energy entity receives a request energy infrastructure “any infrastructure infrastructure sectors (Hemme, 2014). The loss of an upstream neighbour. Similarly, the risk associated with the loss of a downstream for energy, the DemandIN flow, from a down- that, if experiencing an increase in stress, energy sector is thus of crucial importance to stream entity (either another converting or either by itself or in combination with other society, making its infrastructure critical. neighbour can be reduced for a divergent en- transporting entity) process or a service). In infrastructure, results in a disruption of some tity (such as ‘P’ in Figure 6). However, despite turn, it requests an Identifying critical energy infrastructure these advantages, ‘D’ and ‘P’ are examples of potential single-points-of-failure – should ei- amount of energy, The entities in an energy chain can be rep- specifed in a De- resented as a directed graph of edges and mandOUT flow, from an nodes. In such a representation, a node is an upstream entity (ei- energy entity and the edge is a flow from one ther a process or an entity to another. A system can consist of lin- energy source); the ear and non-linear chains of entities. effciency of the entity determines Demand- A linear chain is one in which the EnergyOUT OUT. The upstream flow from one entity is also the EnergyIN flow entity is expected to a single, downstream neighbour, as shown to respond with the in Figure 4. Remove one of the entities and requested amount the flow is disrupted. An example of a linear of energy, EnergyIN, system is the Yamal natural gas pipeline that which should equal transports natural gas from Russia to Europe DemandOUT. The en- (see Figure 5). tity then converts or transports this flow of energy, making it available to the down- stream entity as En- Figure 3: A linear energy chain (1°, 2°, 3° denote primary, Figure 6: Non-linear chain with converging flows (left) secondary, and tertiary, respectively) Figure 4: Linear chain and diverging flows (right)

No 11 ENERGY SECURITY: OPERATIONAL HIGHLIGHTS ENERGY SECURITY: OPERATIONAL HIGHLIGHTS No 11 42 43 ther fail, the flow of energy through the chain the reverse flow of natural gas from the Eu- This can also be done manually when dealing Adversarial internal threats can be a dis- will be disrupted (Ulbrich, et al., 2012); they ropean Union to Ukraine. In this case every with smaller systems to analyze the effect of gruntled employee that has access to the in- are considered critical. entity has the option of two in- and out- flow the removal of each entity from the system; frastructure and also knows the structure. from both sides. Natural gas can flow from however, when dealing with more complex Converging flows are for example the sup- east to west or from west to east. systems software might be necessary to ana- Structural threats can be ageing equipment, ply of electricity generated through different lyze the infrastructure. Other options are to for example the East Harlem gas explosion power plants and sources. Consider a coun- Critical energy infrastructure part look at combinations of nodes that can be that was attributed to a 127-year old gas main try with a wide variety of power plants (e.g., After identifying what kind of system the en- critical for the functioning of the infrastruc- and led to the termination of gas services to coal, natural gas and nuclear) and that has ergy infrastructure is, the next step is the ture. As in some cases the non-functioning part of the city (Sanchez, 2014). additional renewable energy sources. They identifcation of the specifc parts of the ener- of two nodes in the infrastructure can have all supply the electricity grid, but when one gy infrastructure that ensure continued func- more consequences for the service than the External threats of the plants is taken offline, the electricity tioning. In order to effectively and effciently non-functioning of one node. Appendix 1 External threats can be divided into four cat- is still being supplied to the grid by the other implement countermeasures to reduce the presents one such method and its software egories; accidental, adversarial, natural dis- generators. An example of a diverging flow is risks facing the infrastructure. implementation is applied to a hypothetical asters and resource (Robles, et al., n.d.; Far- the distribution of refned oil products to dif- energy system. rell, Zerriff, & Dowlatabadi, 2004; European ferent fuel stations, one refnery will supply The critical path method (CPM) can be used Commission, 2016). An example of natural multiple fuel stations. Should one fuel sta- to determine how infrastructure functions THREATS disaster is the 2011 earthquake and subse- tion disappear from the infrastructure, the and which nodes are the most critical. In Approaches to determining which entities quent tsunami that led to the shut-down of refnery and the other fuel stations will still CPM every activity in the chain is described the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant function. are critical to the energy system was shown and also the time required to fulfll its task above. After deciding if the entity is critical, (Hayashi & Hughes, 2013) or hurricanes Kat- is indicated (Santiago & Magallon, 2009). For rina and Rita that destroyed offshore rigs and Non-linear chains meet the EU’s N-1 rule: it is necessary to identify the threats posed example, when talking about getting crude to an entity and the entity’s vulnerability to caused a shortage of fuel in the United States An entity must survive the loss of one of its oil from producer to consumer there are dif- (Parfomak, 2008). Other natural disasters ‘N’ input flows (European Parliament, 2010). the threat (Hughes, de Jong, & Wang, 2016). ferent routes to take. The United States can Assessing the threats should lead to the de- that can pose a threat to energy infrastruc- In this case, the entity has two flows, losing import crude oil from Canada and transport ture are floods, extreme weather events and one of them does not result in its shutdown. velopment of countermeasures to reduce the it to its refneries, but should Canadian oil likelihood of disruption of the infrastructure. tornadoes. Multiple neighbours are not a guarantee of production stop (for whatever reason) then energy security either, especially if the flows If there are insuffcient countermeasures and the United States will have to import more there is a high likelihood of the threat oc- Critical energy infrastructure failure induced between entities are unequal – the loss of a crude oil from Venezuela or the Middle East. by adversarial threats are occurring more flow could result in disruption of the chain, curring, the entity—and hence those relying These crudes will have a longer transport on the entity—may be disrupted. The loss of frequently in recent years, especially cyber- despite the apparent advantage of diversity time than the Canadian crude. The same ap- attacks. The Shamoon malware was used in (Ranjan & Hughes, 2014). For example, in Fig- an energy supply or the failure of an entity – plies to Europe; Middle Eastern crude will within a chain can result in a deterioration of 2012 to disable and paralyze computers of ure 6, one, or some combination, of the nodes reach a European refnery the fastest when Saudi Aramco (OSCE, 2013). Of course, ad- ‘A’, ‘B’, ‘C’, ‘Q’, ‘R’ and ‘S’ could also be critical the jurisdiction’s energy security (Hughes, transported through the Suez canal. Should 2012). versarial threats are not only cyber-attacks, to the functioning of the infrastructure. the canal be blocked, the crude would have but also terrorist actions, sabotage, product to travel around Africa to reach its European tampering and bombings (Robles, et al., n.d.; In some cases, a non-linear chain can be Threats to energy infrastructure can be divid- market. This would lead to delays of delivery ed into two categories: internal and external. Li, Rosenwald, Jung, & Liu, 2005). External circular, with EnergyIN flows available from and could lead to the non-functioning of the accidents can also threaten the operations both sets of neighbours and EnergyOUT system for a certain period of time. Internal threats of the energy infrastructure (Robles, et al., flows to both. There are also circular flows, n.d.). An example is the 1996 black-out in Internal threats can be further divided into an example of a circular chain is Amber Grid, In order to identify what part of the energy in- fourteen states in the United States, caused accidental, adversarial and structural threats Lithuania’s natural gas pipeline system (Am- frastructure is critical an analysis of the sys- by a high voltage line touching a tree branch (Robles, et al., n.d.; Farrell, Zerriff, & Dow- ber Grid, 2014). Amber grid is an interesting tem needs to be done. Augutis et al. discuss (Amin, 2005). The resource threat is that the latabadi, 2004; European Commission, 2016). example of critical energy infrastructure pro- identifying critical energy infrastructure in source of the resource has been completely Examples of internal accidental threats to tection. Any entity in Amber grid has two con- Lithuania. They focus on a single point in the explored, such as the fears surrounding peak energy infrastructure are inadvertently read- vergent flows, a linear left-flow and a linear infrastructure that is critical for its function- oil around 2008. right-flow. Breaking an entity (a flow) on one ing (Augutis, Martišauskas, & Krikštolaitis, ing a meter incorrectly - consequently letting pressure build-up too high - and could lead to side is of no consequence, because the flow 2015). Cyber threats exists on the other side. Another example is terminating operations; not following securi- ty protocols, or bringing an infected memory Because of the dual-layer of critical energy stick into the entity. infrastructure - the physical and the cy-

No 11 ENERGY SECURITY: OPERATIONAL HIGHLIGHTS ENERGY SECURITY: OPERATIONAL HIGHLIGHTS No 11 44 45 ber structure (Genge, Kiss, & Haller, 2015) PROTECTION interdependence between ICT and electric- the exact location for the use of the protec- - critical energy infrastructure has received ity transmission networks, and the creation tion measures. Critical energy infrastructure protection is an additional set of threats. The increased of a ‘good practices’ manual for policy mak- measures taken to ensure that critical energy and continued automatization of many parts ers (European Commission, 2016), and there Protection is more than barriers; having infrastructure can continue normal function- of the energy infrastructure in recent years are different journals that deal with critical spare parts in stock or plans for how to mini- ing. Critical energy infrastructure protection have made energy infrastructure vulnerable infrastructure protection – such as the In- mize the down-time of a critical energy in- is an important aspect of critical energy in- to cyberthreats (OSCE, 2013; Cazorla, Alcar- ternational Journal of Critical Infrastructure frastructure is also protection. This can be frastructure. Without taking measures to az, & Lopez, 2015). Malware is the weapon Protection. Not only countries are involved done when the likelihood of a threat materi- protect it, the infrastructure would remain as of choice for cyber-attacks on energy infra- in critical energy infrastructure protection, alizing is high, but you cannot stop it because critical as it was during the initial analysis. structure; see previously mentioned Sham- inter-governmental organizations like NATO of uncertainty over the exact location (e.g. an In that case stress in the form of threats can oon malware (JangJaccard & Nepal, 2014; are also involved. In Appendix 2, the military electricity transmission network). Or it is f- cause an infrastructure to stop functioning. OSCE, 2013). However, other forms of cyber- and its relations to critical energy infrastruc- nancially a sound option to repair the trans- Stress occurs when an event or threat influ- intrusion have taken place in critical energy ture are discussed in more detail. mission wires when faulty, instead of spend- ences the functioning of one or more enti- infrastructure, the Slammer worm for exam- ing large sums of money on protecting the ties. An entity can become more resilient by ple clogged the Davis-Besse nuclear power Most energy infrastructure tends to be oper- wires from breaking in the frst place. changing its functioning or structure (adapt- plant network in 2003 and made safety read- ated by private companies and no longer by ing leads to more resilience). Resilience is ings inaccessible to employees (Kesler, 2011). the state. This has added to the complexity of As mentioned before there are internal and “the ability of a system to resist, absorb, re- Also, the case of the Symantec’s Dragonfly/ protection of critical energy infrastructure as external threats and different threats de- cover from, or successfully adapt to a change Energetic Bear attacks on energy suppliers states rely on the critical infrastructure for mand different protection measures. Threats in environment or conditions” (Moteff, 2012). have proven that energy infrastructure is be- the functioning of society and private com- from a disgruntled employee (internal ad- Resilience can be divided into four different ing targeted through cyber-attacks and not panies rely on them for revenue to continue versarial) are the most diffcult to counter, dimensions: technical, organizational, eco- just physical attacks (Bronk, 2015). In some their operations. Both have different incen- because they have access to the infrastruc- nomic, and social (Labaka, Hernantes, & Sar- cases an employee of the entity is the unwit- tives for ensuring the functioning of critical ture, have extensive knowledge of the sys- riegi, 2016). ting accomplice of the culprit, by innocently energy infrastructure, but states still exert tem’s functioning and will more easily fnd opening an e-mail attachment from a seem- some control by imposing regulations on the critical part of the system. These threats The goal of critical energy infrastructure pro- ingly authorized source (Jouini, Rabai, & Ais- energy entities for their functioning and pro- are therefore diffcult to prevent (Liu, Wang, tection is to address threats pre-emptively sa, 2014). tection. The operators of the entity have in- & Camp, 2008). There are limited options to instead of reactively protecting energy infra- depth knowledge of the infrastructure and preventing insider threats: increased security structure (Hemme, 2014). Countermeasures Also, cyber threats appear on different lev- are therefore better at determining the weak profling of employees and ensuring limited to these threats will increase the resilience els. The implementation of smart grids could points than outsiders (Giannopoulos, Filip- access to systems could help decrease the of the system and decrease the likelihood of lead to new threats on the individual level. pini, & Schimmer, 2012). risks of insider attacks. these threats happening. Governments have Electronic devices could be regulated and created different institutions, and programs monitored by outsiders and used to manip- Countermeasures With the cyber-dimensions, different forms dealing solely with the protection of critical ulate energy demand from private homes of protections have increased as well. The infrastructure; for example, the United States There are different ways to protect critical (Wang & Lu, 2013). Also, the applications to countermeasures are focused on protecting Department of Homeland Security – their energy infrastructure. Physical and cyber regulate energy usage through mobile devic- sensitive information, system integrity and suggestions for critical infrastructure pro- protection like creating barriers to the in- es is exposing homeowners to cyber-threats. also proving access to the system for those tection are: invest in physical and cyber risk frastructure, such as the ”guns, gates and Transmitting and receiving information digi- who should have access to it (Jang-Jaccard management products and plans, educate guards” approach (Englefeld, 2014). This tally can offer cyber criminals another route & Nepal, 2014; Jouini, Rabai, & Aissa, 2014). employees about critical infrastructure se- approach entails protecting critical energy to threaten the electricity system. This could Cyber-attacks can be done by an adversary curity and resilience, plan for business con- infrastructure by closing off certain areas potentially lead to the national electric grid with limited resources and no physical access tinuity, share threat and incident information, and thereby restricting their access through being disabled. to the infrastructure. They have a lower risk report suspicious activity and prepare for all gates, placing guards at these gates and in of detection and can, in theory, be done from hazards at home and at work (DHS, n.d.), or addition guards can carry guns to further In order to minimize these threats from ma- the comfort of the adversary’s home. The the European Union’s Programme for Euro- protect the infrastructure. Since it is fnan- terializing there has to be some form of pro- examples of cyberthreats mentioned before pean Critical Infrastructure – their sugges- cially and physically impossible to completely tection in place to counter these threats or make cyber protection of critical energy in- tions are identifying critical infrastructures protect infrastructure (e.g., a pipeline that is to completely remove the possibility of them frastructure not only relevant on the national and learning how to better protect them, thousands of kilometers long) (OSCE, 2013), from happening. level, but at the individual level as well. Risk funding information sharing and alerting or to manually control/observe every process analysis will help determine the most suit- systems, the development of ways to assess in a power plant, choices need to be made. Hence, the identifcation process to locate able countermeasure for a specifc threat.

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Risk analysis companies, such as nuclear facilities (one of ence off the Horn of Africa protected critical The protection of critical energy infrastruc- By doing a risk analysis the operator of the in- the reasons for the heavy regulatory system energy infrastructure as no single energy ture requires the detailed study and analysis frastructure can assess the different threats associated with nuclear power). Private com- company had the fnancial means to provide of the energy system and the jurisdiction it the infrastructure is exposed to, the vulner- panies are also willing to provide protection, the necessary countermeasures to protect serves. Different threats demand different ability to the threat, the impact of the threat but at a limited cost. It is likely that states will shipping. Without NATO the availability of countermeasures and different systems and and the likelihood of the threat occurring. It take the responsibility where private compa- global energy would have been put at risk. entities also require different countermeas- is also important to repeat this analysis peri- nies are ending theirs – this is the company’s This would have subsequently put lower lay- ures. Implementing countermeasures at one odically, because circumstances can change. boundary. States will provide security in the ers at risk of non-functioning critical energy location might lead to the exposure of anoth- form of police or military presence for critical infrastructure. Disrupted supply of crude oil er. There is no “one-size fts-all” solution. There are many methods available for the energy infrastructure or enforce regulation to refneries would lead to a disruption of analysis of risk to energy infrastructure (Ang, to force private companies to take the neces- refned goods to the markets (e.g., petrol or CONCLUDING REMARKS sary countermeasures. Examples are nuclear diesel). In the end the individual would be af- Choong, & Ng, 2015; Jun, Kim, & Chang, Energy has been a crucial part of our lives. power plants that have the potential to cause fected by the disruption on the global layer. 2009; Checchi, Behrens, & Egenhofer, 2009; In the 20th century, essential energy sources disruption of society in case of breaching its Figure 1 shows the way the responsibility of Gupta, 2008; Marrero, Puch, & Ramos-Real, were found in areas that were far away from structure and refneries that could negatively protection of critical energy infrastructure is 2015; Matsumoto & Andriosopoulos, 2016; their consumers. These resources needed to affect a country’s economy and the availabil- transferred from individual to the highest ac- Weisser, 2007; Wu, Wei, & Liu, 2007; Zhang, be transported to their consumers and con- ity of fuel should it be damaged. tor. Indirectly, the global protection measures Ji, & Fan, 2013). The impact on the infra- verted into usable products (from primary to also positively influence the individual’s en- structure is usually assessed by the fnancial secondary and tertiary).The system of con- Similar to the scaling of critical infrastruc- ergy security. losses, as this provides the operator of the verting and transporting energy sources has ture, the protection of critical energy infra- infrastructure with a costbeneft comparison become more complex. The system became structure can also be scaled. Protection can Also, climate change can be considered a for countermeasures. Assessments are often important for the functioning of society, as take place on different levels. A light bulb in threat to critical energy infrastructure. Ex- limited to a specifc part of the infrastructure, energy was used for different sectors. The a residence is critical energy infrastructure isting offshore rigs might need to be re- reflecting the requirements of the opera- functioning of the energy system has been to the resident. The resident unknowingly structured, nuclear power plants, refneries tors (Giannopoulos, Filippini, & Schimmer, defned by governments as critical infra- does a risk analysis, determining the neces- and LNG terminals will need to be moved or 2012). When countermeasures are taken and structure. Critical infrastructure also exists sary countermeasures; for example, buying protected, because rising sea levels could a threat still materializes, the affected entity on lower and higher layers than the national a spare light bulb or having an emergency endanger their functioning. Also rising sea should recover as quickly as possible and re- (individual, or global level). In order to en- supply of candles. This is critical energy in- levels might negatively affect existing ship- turn to normal functioning (Hughes, 2015). sure proper functioning of the energy infra- frastructure protection on the individual ping lanes. In order to protect against these After recovery, the system should re-assess structure, governments demand protection – home – level. The protection of individual events happening, international cooperation the threat, its vulnerability, and likelihood of measures to be taken. The protection meas- critical energy infrastructure is typically the is taking place to ensure these threats do not occurrence, and if necessary take the appro- ures increase the security of the system and individual’s responsibility. The state usually materialize. priate steps to minimize the threat from hap- in turn increase energy security. In order to does not provide people with a spare light pening again - adapt to protect itself from the effectively and effciently implement protec- bulb or candles in case the bulb burns out. As the examples have shown critical energy same threat (Hutchison, Waage, & Bennett, tion measures, the critical part of the system, On a higher layer, for example, local, electric- infrastructure protection is not only a case 2016). or entity needed to be identifed for the func- ity supply to a city might be disrupted and de- of protection on the national level, it is much tioning of the system. This can be done using spite a back-up light bulb, the lights will not more. Individuals are part of protecting criti- Layers of critical energy infrastructure simple to more complex methods of elimi- come on. A back-up generator might protect cal energy infrastructure. protection nation. Multiple methods have proven their an individual from black-outs, but in the end Unlike Assaf (2008) - who divided the critical value for identifcation. The system can take it is the electricity company that should re- Counter intuitively, the implementation of infrastructure protection regulatory contin- different forms (e.g., linear, converging), this store service to the city. The countermeasure countermeasures on a specifc part or en- uum into governmental ownership to regu- can also influence the critical nodes within should be taken by the company and not by tity of the critical energy infrastructure might lations to market-based approaches - our the system. the individual. make other parts or entities more vulnerable. approach shows that critical infrastructure For example, protecting the most important protection is divided into different levels and After identifying the critical infrastructure, The highest level is when critical energy in- node in a natural gas pipeline system might that markets (private companies) are will- an assessment of the threats that could po- frastructure is protected by an international cause adversaries to shift their attention to ing and capable of protecting their critical tentially lead to the non-functioning of the in- alliance, such as NATO’s presence off of the other nodes in the system that are not that as infrastructure to a certain level. But in the frastructure should be performed. There are Horn of Africa to protect, amongst other well protected. Targeting a certain combina- end, it is the government that picks up where different kinds of threats the infrastructure things, shipments of energy products (Rühle tion of nodes might also be a more effective the market ends or in cases where protec- could be exposed to. They should be ranked, & Grubliauskas, 2012). NATO’s naval pres- strategy for adversaries. tion is too important to leave to the private the vulnerability of the infrastructure to the

No 11 ENERGY SECURITY: OPERATIONAL HIGHLIGHTS ENERGY SECURITY: OPERATIONAL HIGHLIGHTS No 11 48 49 threat and likelihood of the threat material- 6. An entity with convergent flows, combin- ergy flow(s) can be implemented in software. izing should be reviewed. After the assess- ing two flows of 5 and 25 units of energy from Each entity can be represented in terms of ment it is necessary to examine the different entities 4 and 5, respectively, into a single 30 a number of attributes common to all enti- options for protection of critical energy infra- unit flow for entity 7. ties, such as its upstream neighbours (i.e., structure. The diversity of the systems and the entities supplying it with energy), the de- threats is translated into a plethora of pro- 7. The end-use energy service entity. Two mand from its downstream neighbour, and tection measures that could be implemented. 30 unit flows converge to meet its demand its current state (i.e., Normal, if operating Also, the acceptance that some threats are (from entities 3 and 6). For the purposes of correctly, or Disruption, if an event has oc- unavoidable is discussed. The preparedness this example, entity 7 only requires 35 units curred to stop it from operating). The soft- of the critical energy infrastructure to ad- of energy. ware can then “walk” through the system, dress threats, even unavoidable, are key in determining whether those entities operat- their recovery to normal functioning. 8. An entity taking 15 units of energy from en- ing correctly are able to produce suffcient tity 1 and supplying it to entity 3. energy to meet the energy demands of the Besides national critical energy infrastruc- energy service. ture protection, there are also lower layers For the purposes of this example, the entities of critical infrastructure. The protection of are assumed to have no losses and, with the This method has been implemented in a pro- critical energy infrastructure on higher lay- exception of the energy service, have no mini- gramming language known as VBA. The data ers helps make lower layers more secure and mum operational threshold. is supplied in an Excel spreadsheet. The pro- increase energy security. This does not mean gram reads the data from the spreadsheet that no protection measures need to be taken The problem confronting the energy analyst and writes the results to the same spread- on the lower layer, as an individual risk analy- is deciding which of the entities is critical to sheet. sis might expose more threats. the uninterrupted operation of the energy service, entity 7. The removal of nodes and RESULTS This paper has examined the basic principles edges can be analyzed using static or dynam- The example energy system shown in Figure of energy systems, critical energy infrastruc- ic analysis. Static analysis being the removal Figure 7: Representation of a hypothetical energy 7 was encoded in an Excel spreadsheet and ture and its identifcation and subsequent of a node or edge without the need for redis- system the program was executed, the resulting out- protection. The importance of continued risk tribution and dynamic analysis requires the put is listed here (in bold): analysis of critical energy infrastructure can- distribution of the flow through other nodes not be overstated. (Rosas-Casals, Valverde, & Sole, 2006). In our The entities are defned as follows: First test is not critical infrastructure - Ein: 35 example dynamic analysis will be applied. APPENDIX 1: EXAMPLE OF CRITICAL The software first determines if the sys- 1. The source or supplying entity with diver- INFRASTRUCTURE IDENTIFICATION METHOD tem can supply the energy service with the gent flows to its three downstream neigh- energy it needs. If so, no part of the infra- Most methods that focus on identifcation bours. It can supply up to 60 units of energy. The method used to determine the critical structure is found to be critical. The energy use some form of elimination of nodes and parts of Figure 7 is described in this appen- to the energy service (Ein) is 35 units, which edges. In this appendix an example method 2. An entity with a divergent flow, taking 20 dix. is the minimum required by the energy ser- is given to identify critical entities of critical units of energy from the upstream and sup- vice. infrastructure. First, the hypothetical energy plying 15 units to entity 3 and 5 units to entity Determining if an entity is critical involves system is discussed. In the second part the 4. stopping all or part of its output flows of en- 1 - Source is critical infrastructure - Ein: 0 method used to determine what part is criti- ergy and, from this, deciding whether suff- The source (entity 1) is considered critical cal is explained. And fnally the results have 3. An example of an entity with a convergent cient energy would reach the energy service – its removal results in zero units of energy will be discussed. flow, combining two flows of 15 units (from to allow it to continue operating. While this is reaching the energy service. entities 2 and 8) into a single 30 unit flow to a trivial exercise for a simple energy system Figure 7 is a representation of a hypothetical entity 7. consisting of a limited number of entities, it 2 - Fork is not critical infrastructure - Ein: 35 energy system. The numbered boxes are the can be overwhelming, tedious, and error- entities responsible for the conversion and 4. An entity taking 5 units of energy from 2 prone when the system is comprised of tens The disruption of entity 2 (fork) does not af- transportation of energy, while the arrows and supplying it to entity 6. or hundreds of entities. fect the operation of the energy service as it connecting the boxes indicate the maximum will still have 40 units of energy available to it possible energy flow from one entity to an- 5. An entity taking 25 units of energy from 1 A method for determining the effects on the (25 units from entity 6 and 15 units from en- other. and supplying it to entity 6. energy service of each entity stopping its en- tity 3).

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3 - Join is critical infrastructure - Ein: 30 of course energy infrastructure) (Lynn, 1994). Ang, B., Choong, W., & Ng, T. (2015). A frame- http://ec.europa.eu/energy/en/topics/infra- If entity 3 (join) is disrupted, the energy ser- Considering the privatization of energy in- work for evaluating Singapore’s energy secu- structure/protection-criticalinfrastructure vice stops because a maximum of only 30 en- frastructure, the usage of military assets for rity. Applied Energy 148, 314–325. ergy units can reach it (from entity 6). Entity 3 protecting them is not likely. Private compa- European Parliament. (2010, October 20). is therefore critical. nies hire private security and cannot hire the Assaf, D. (2008). Models of critical informa- Regulation (EU) No 994/2010 concerning military. In some energy entities, for exam- tion infrastructure protection. International measures to safeguard security of gas supply 4 - Entity is not critical infrastructure - Ein: 35 ple nuclear power plants, military personnel Journal of Critical Infrastructure Protection and repealing Council Directive. Brussels. might be used for protection, but their pres- 1, 6-14. Disrupting entity 4 does not disrupt the op- ence would have to be regulated by the gov- European Union. (2008). The Council of the eration of the energy service, meaning it is ernment. Their presence would be because Augutis, J., Martišauskas, L., & Krikštolaitis, European Union, Council Directive 2008/114/ not critical. There are still 55 units of energy of the presence of radio-active material and R. (2015). Energy mix optimization from an EC of 8 December 2008. Offcial Journal of available to the energy service. the scale of the harm that could be done by energy security perspective. Energy Conver- the European Union. it. Important shipping channels, like Suez sion and Management 90, 300-314. 5 - Entity is not critical infrastructure - Ein: 35 and Panama, might also get national military Farrell, A. E., Zerriff, H., & Dowlatabadi, H. Disrupting entity 5 does not disrupt the oper- protection. Bronk, C. (2015). Two securities: How contem- (2004). Energy infrastructure and security. ation of the energy service, meaning it is not porary cyber geopolitics impacts critical infra- Annual Review of Environment and Resourc- critical since the energy service has 35 units When the military is used for protecting structure protection. International Journal of es 29, 421-469. of energy available to it. critical energy infrastructure, it is on the na- Critical Infrastructure Protection 8, 24-26. tional or international level. As Rühle and Gazprom. (2017). Yamal. Retrieved from 6 - Join is critical infrastructure - Ein: 30 Grubliauskas have indicated, NATO can en- Cazorla, L., Alcaraz, C., & Lopez, J. (2015). Gazprom: http://www.gazprom.com/about/ Entity 6 (a join) is critical because if it is dis- sure safe shipping routes for energy ship- Awareness and reaction strategies for criti- production/projects/pipelines/active/yamal- rupted, 30 units of energy are no longer avail- ments in order to maintain stable interna- cal infrastructure protection . Computers & evropa/ able to the end-user. tional energy markets (2012). NATO can be Electrical Engineering 47, 299–317. a facilitator in protecting critical energy in- Genge, B., Kiss, I., & Haller, P. (2015). A sys- 7 - End-user is critical infrastructure - Ein: 0 frastructure for NATO-members and partner Checchi, A., Behrens, A., & Egenhofer, C. tem dynamics approach for assessing the Not surprisingly, disrupting the end-user countries. Also, in times of conflict the mili- (2009). Long-Term Energy Security Risks for impact of cyber attacks on critical infrastruc- means it has no energy to operate. 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