Metaphors in Cognitive and Neurosciences Which Impact Have
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Metaphors in Cognitive and Neurosciences Which impact have metaphors on scientific theories and models? Juliana Goschler, Darmstadt ([email protected]) Abstract In this article, I am going to explain how the most frequent metaphor types used in cognitive and neurosciences – reification and spatial metaphors, personification, and technological metaphors – are connected to theoretical problems that occur in these scientific disciplines. These theoretical problems include the idea of memory as space, which is connected with the difficulty of a realistic description of the mental lexicon, the problem of free will, and the mind-body problem. Because of some obvious parallels between metaphorical language and arguments made in the scientific description of the mind, I will argue that certain metaphors used in scientific language are not merely linguistic problems but deeply rooted in scientific arguments. This holds for metaphors that scientists are aware of as well as for unconsciously used metaphors. My observations are intended to highlight some characteristics of meta- phors in science. Furthermore, they provide a possible approach to investigating the connec- tion between linguistic and conceptual metaphors in complex cases as scientific models. Ich werde in diesem Artikel beschreiben, wie die häufigsten Metapherntypen in den Kognitions- und Neurowissenschaften – Reifikation und Raummetaphern, Personifizierung und Technikmetaphern – mit theoretischen Problemen dieser Disziplinen verknüpft sind. Diese theoretischen Probleme sind die konzeptuelle Verbindung von Gedächtnis und „Raum“ (oder auch „Platz“), welches mit der Schwierigkeit einer realistischen Beschreibung des mentalen Lexikons verknüpft ist, das Problem des freien Willens und das Leib-Seele-Pro- blem. Da es einige offensichtliche Kohärenzen zwischen metaphorischer Sprache und wis- senschaftlichen Beschreibungen von Kognition und Gehirn gibt, werde ich zeigen, dass be- stimmte Metaphern in der Wissenschaftssprache nicht nur sprachliche Probleme darstellen, sondern grundlegend mit entsprechenden wissenschaftlichen Argumenten verknüpft sind. Das gilt sowohl für von Wissenschaftlern bewusst eingeführte als auch für unbewusst ver- wendete Metaphern. Meine Beobachtungen sollen einige Charakteristika von Metaphern in der Wissenschaft deutlich machen. Außerdem zeigen sie eine Möglichkeit, die Verbindung von sprachlichen und konzeptuellen Metaphern in komplexen Fällen wie wissenschaftlichen Modellen zu untersuchen. 1. Introduction: Metaphors in scientific language and thought The question of how to deal with metaphors and analogies in scientific argu- ments and theories is probably as old as the philosophy of science itself. Over the last two decades, different branches of research have been devoted to studies on metaphors in different discourses: everyday language, the media, politics, religion, and science. Interestingly, in the research on metaphors in 7 metaphorik.de 12/2007 science there are two strands of discussion: one is developing from Conceptual Metaphor Theory and focuses on the nature of language and thought, the other one is much older and dominated by philosophical arguments about the nature of truth and science. The aim of this article is to bring together the two questions that have been crucial for these discussions: How are metaphors used in scientific language? What does that mean for scientific arguments and theories? In order to com- bine these two questions one has to face a serious problem: How are meta- phorical language and metaphorical thought related? 1.1 Metaphors in science and Conceptual Metaphor Theory Conceptual Metaphor Theory offers a clear answer to this question: our thinking is metaphorically structured, and so is language. Thus, science has to be metaphoric, too. Another main assumption of Conceptual Metaphor Theory is that metaphoric mapping is experientially grounded, especially bodily ex- perience. Therefore, experience comes first. Our concepts are shaped by basic experiences, and these concepts are expressed in linguistic patterns. These as- sumptions are fleshed out in the work of George Lakoff and Mark Johnson (L&J) (1980, 1999). Yet L&J’s arguments, however convincing, rely heavily upon linguistic data and often lack other empirical evidence. For L&J, lan- guage serves mainly as a source of material for their arguments on conceptual mappings. Various scholars have tried to bridge the explanatory gap between the conceptual and the linguistic level and have presented important evidence of a close connection between linguistic and conceptual metaphor from lan- guage acquisition and experiments (Boroditsky 2000, 2001, Casasanto 2004, Clark 1973). In their work, the connection between concepts and linguistic pat- terns in language is shown to illustrate very basic concepts – spatial and tem- poral relations. If one doesn’t want to generalize these results and claim that this also holds for more complex concepts and metaphors, one faces the prob- lem that these experimental methods and this approach to language acquisi- tion are difficult to apply in the case of complex metaphors as they occur in scientific discourse (and others as well). For scientific metaphors, Gentner & Gentner present some evidence that metaphors used in scientific education can influence the student’s thinking and ability to solve certain problems (Gentner & Gentner 1983). 8 Goschler, Metaphors in Cognitive and Neurosciences But what is the impact of metaphors on scientific research? How important are they for the scientists’ own concepts? This has been the concern of many philo- sophers of science. 1.2 Philosophical views on metaphor in science The other strand of the discussion about metaphors in science has a very long tradition in the philosophy of science. The question that guided most of the scholars concerned about metaphors in science was: What role do metaphors play in science? Are they dangerous errors which divert from scientific truth, as has been argued by Aristotle or Locke? Or are they useful as heuristic tools in generating scientific questions, but also dangerous traps and obstacles which can lead to initial progress but later stagnation in science, which was Kuhn’s argument in his theory of scientific revolutions (1967), where meta- phors are an important part of scientific paradigms. Or are metaphors un- avoidable in science, as various scholars (Brown 2003, Lakoff & Johnson 1999, Machamer 2000) claim? And if so, can science be truthful at all? The linguistic aspect of metaphors in science has been of minor importance in this debate, as the focus has been on science and scientific ideas. Language came into the picture when it was argued that science couldn’t possibly exist without language as a device for communicating scientific ideas. Therefore, some have claimed that the problem lies in the unbreakable bond between sci- entific facts and the description of them in language (Schneider 1997). From this point of view one could argue that scientific facts could be totally unmeta- phoric when described not in language, but in pictures, tables, and figures. But this standpoint is hard to defend if one takes into account the fact that analogy can take place not only in the modus of language but also in pictures, tables, and figures. In fact, in recent years there has been increasing interest in the problem of pictures in science. This is partly due to new technology making it possible to generate pictures of things formerly not accessible to the human eye. These technologies do not show reality, but construct a certain view of sci- entific objects – and in this respect they are not unlike language. Nanophysics and neurosciences, in particular, are fields in which these new methods have changed the possibilities for research and the popularization of scientific ob- servations. In neurosciences, pictures from ERP, PET, and fMRI studies are shown widely in newspapers, magazines, the internet, and on TV. At the same 9 metaphorik.de 12/2007 time, a critical view of these images and the conclusions drawn from them has been taken in the philosophy of science, as a great number of recent confer- ences and publications (Beyer & Lohoff 2005, Heßler 2006) on pictures and im- ages in science show. Language and linguistic metaphors, however, are not as intensively discussed at the moment. What do these two strands have in common? It is widely agreed that meta- phors are ubiquitous in science. Conceptual Metaphor Theory predicts the ubi- quity of metaphors in scientific language and thought: since it is a major claim of this theory that metaphors are used to structure things which are not part of our direct experience, they are necessary for every scientific explanation. Since we don’t have direct experiental access to the structure of the brain or brain processes, it comes as no surprise that cognitive and neuroscientists use meta- phors to explain their research subject. The classic positions in the philosophy of science do not predict but observe the ubiquity of metaphors in science. The reasons they see for the frequent use of metaphors in scientific language are the metaphoric nature of language and/or the suggestive (and sometimes deceptive) power of metaphor and ana- logy. Putting these two different points of view together, the ubiquity of metaphors in science seems obvious. But either way there are explanatory gaps: looking at scientific language, as cognitive linguists do, and drawing direct conclu- sions about the nature of scientific