The Emergence of a Global Infrastructure for Mass Registration and Surveillance

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The Emergence of a Global Infrastructure for Mass Registration and Surveillance International Campaign Against Mass Surveillance THE EMERGENCE OF A GLOBAL INFRASTRUCTURE FOR MASS REGISTRATION AND SURVEILLANCE THE EMERGENCE OF A GLOBAL INFRASTRUCTURE FOR MASS REGISTRATION AND SURVEILLANCE International Campaign Against Mass Surveillance THE EMERGENCE OF A GLOBAL INFRASTRUCTURE FOR MASS REGISTRATION AND SURVEILLANCE Published April 2005 For more information, contact: [email protected] International Campaign Against Mass Surveillance Table of Contents THE ROAD WE ARE HEADING DOWN . 1 Myth #1:We are merely being asked to sacrifice some of our privacy and convenience for greater security. 2 1st SIGNPOST: THE REGISTRATION OF POPULATIONS . 5 1. Mass Detentions of Muslim Immigrants and Registration through NSEERS . 5 2. US-VISIT and the E.U. Visa Information System . 5 a) Biometric Visas . 5 b) Linkage of Biometric Information to a Global Web of Databases . 6 c) U.S. Acquisition of Domestic and Foreign Databases . 6 d) The Template for the Global System of Mass Registration and Surveillance . 8 2nd SIGNPOST: THE CREATION OF A GLOBAL REGISTRATION SYSTEM . 8 1. Biometric Passports . 8 a) Policy Laundering – Referral to ICAO . 9 b) The Model: Carte Blanche . 9 c) RFID Chips . .10 d) Biometric Passports and the Democratic Deficit . .10 e) Flawed Technology and Assumptions . .11 f) Expansion to Other Transportation Systems . .12 g) Institutionalizing “Non-Personhood” . .12 3rd SIGNPOST: THE CREATION OF AN INFRASTRUCTURE FOR THE GLOBAL SURVEILLANCE OF MOVEMENT . .12 1. U.S. Demands for Sharing Passenger Name Records . .12 2. The Deals Made . .13 3. PNR and the Democratic Deficit – Another Referral to ICAO . .13 4. Expansion to Other Transportation Systems . .14 Myth #2: These initiatives facilitate travel. .14 4th SIGNPOST: THE CREATION OF AN INFRASTRUCTURE FOR THE GLOBAL SURVEILLANCE OF ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS AND FINANCIAL TRANSACTIONS . .14 1. “Building in Surveillance” and the Convention on Cybercrime . .15 2. Mandatory Data Retention . .16 3. Expansion of ECHELON . .16 4. Mandatory Information-Gathering and Reporting for Financial Transactions . .17 5th SIGNPOST: THE CONVERGENCE OF NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL DATABASES . .18 1. Radical Acceleration of Convergence Since 9/11 . .18 2. The “Black Box” of Information . .20 THE EMERGENCE OF A GLOBAL INFRASTRUCTURE FOR MASS REGISTRATION AND SURVEILLANCE 6th SIGNPOST: THE DANGERS OF A RISK ASSESSMENT MODEL – A WORLD THAT IS BOTH ORWELLIAN AND KAFKAESQUE . .20 1. Data Mining: The High-Tech “Solution” to Risk Assessment . .20 a) Orwell Revisited . .20 Myth #3: If one has nothing to hide, one has nothing to worry about. .20 b) TIA, MATRIX and Other Data Mining Projects in Implementation or Development . .21 c) CAPPS II . .22 d) Canadian Risk Assessment Centre . .23 e) German “Trawling” . .23 f) Data Mining and the Democratic Deficit . .23 g) Flawed Facts, Dirty Information, Guilt by Google, Ethnic Profiling . .24 Myth #4: The technology being used objective and reliable. .24 2. Low-Tech “Solutions” to Risk Assessment . .24 a) Guilt by Association and Indiscriminate Sharing of Information: The Story of Maher Arar . .24 b) Using Information Obtained by Torture and Tipping Off Torturers . .26 c) Sloppy Mistakes: The Madrid Investigation . .27 d) Getting People Off the Street: Arbitrary Detentions . .27 e) Broad Strokes: The U.N. list . .29 f) Disciplining Dissent . .29 i) Targeting the “Unpatriotic” in the U.S. .29 ii) The U.S. No Fly List . .30 iii) Open Season on Individuals and Groups Challenging Repressive Regimes . .31 g) A Plethora of Ballooning Watch Lists . .32 Myth #5: Terrorist watch lists are a reliable product of international intelligence cooperation and consensus. .32 3. Kafka . 33 7th SIGNPOST: DEEP INTEGRATION AND THE LOSS OF SOVEREIGN CHECKS AND BALANCES . .33 Myth #6: If one is mistakenly caught up in the global surveillance net, one’s government can protect one. .33 Myth #7: Governments want to implement these systems to protect their citizens from terrorists. .34 8th SIGNPOST: THE CORPORATE SECURITY COMPLEX . .35 9th SIGNPOST: THE EXPROPRIATION OF THE DEMOCRATIC COMMONS . .38 International Campaign Against Mass Surveillance 10th SIGNPOST: A LOSS OF MORAL COMPASS – RENDITION, TORTURE, DEATH . .39 1. The Global Gulag . .39 a) Detention Centres Used by The U.S. .39 b) The Practice of Rendition . .40 c) Disappearance . .41 d) The Assertion of a Legal Black Hole and Authority to Torture . .42 e) Torture Committed by U.S. Personnel . .44 f) The Plan to Build Permanent Prisons Outside the U.S. .44 g) The Participation of Other Western Democracies . .45 Myth #8: Western democracies are defending democracy and human rights around the world. .45 h) New License for Brutal Regimes . .46 THE ILLUSION OF SECURITY . .47 Myth #9: These initiatives make us safer. .47 Myth #10: Guaranteeing security is the paramount responsibility of governments. .48 Myth #11: At least, these initiatives are better than doing nothing. .49 RESISTING THE REGISTRATION AND SURVEILLANCE AGENDA . .49 1. Pockets of Resistance . .50 a) NGOs . .50 b) Democratic Institutions . .50 c) Courts . ..
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