To Make Assurance Double Sure W.T

Journal of Air Law and Commerce Volume 34 | Issue 3 Article 7 1968 To Make Assurance Double Sure W.T. Seawell Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.smu.edu/jalc Recommended Citation W.T. Seawell, To Make Assurance Double Sure, 34 J. Air L. & Com. 371 (1968) https://scholar.smu.edu/jalc/vol34/iss3/7 This Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at SMU Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Air Law and Commerce by an authorized administrator of SMU Scholar. For more information, please visit http://digitalrepository.smu.edu. TO MAKE ASSURANCE DOUBLE SURE By W. T. SEAWELLt I. INTRODUCTION S AFETY IS one of those peculiar terms that connotes an absolute, but because of its unattainability, it ends up having to be defined in nega- tive terms, such as, "condition of being safe; freedom from danger or haz- ard; quality of being devoid of whatever exposes one to danger or harm." By definition, the terms of human existence include risk or a system of relative dangers. One of the aims of existence thus becomes the attempt to reduce risk to its lowest possible level. When aeronautical engineers, for example, discuss a new airplane, they often talk about designing safety into the airplane. They are really discussing an attempt to make the airplane as invulnerable as possible when its machinery or operators fail, as they in- evitably will. They attempt, in the words of Shakespeare, to "make assurance double sure." Making assurance doubly sure has been the cardinal rule of airline operating philosophy from the earliest days of the business. It had to be. The airline founders realized that the public would never use the new form of transportation until it became convinced of its reliability. Unlike other ve- hicles in public transportation, airplanes operate in a three dimensional environment-an environment that seems alien to some even today. "To fly without feathers is not easy," the Roman dramatist Plautus observed. It was some 1900 years before the Wright Brothers demonstrated that, if fly- ing without feathers was perhaps not exactly easy, it was at any rate possible. It then became the mission to prove that it was not only possible but also practical and safe for mass transportation. Reduction of inherent risk became and remains the primary concern not only of airline top management, but also of any engineer, any pilot, any mechanic, in fact, any per- son involved in the operation of an airline, acting of course in cooperation with the appropriate government agencies. The first generation leadership of major airlines has pretty well given way to the second generation management. But as more of the public de- pend on air to satisfy their transportation needs, airline responsibility for overcoming risk becomes, if possible, more crucial. In the 1930's airline managers thought in terms of hundreds and thousands of customers; today it is millions and billions. In 1936, the year American Airlines introduced the DC-3, the United States airline industry served just over 1 million passengers; last year, passengers numbered more than 133 million. Moreover, revenue passenger miles have soared from 480 million to just under 100 billion. Employment has climbed from under 10,000 to more than 270,- tB.S., U.S.M.C.; LL.B., Harvard; Commandant of Cadets, U.S.A.F. Academy; Brig. Gen., U.S.A.F. (Ret.); Senior Vice President, Operations, American Airlines. JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE [Vol. 34 000. Aircraft in 1936 totaled 374, of which the DC-3 was the most advanced; the airline fleet at 1967's end numbered 2,169, of which 80 percent were turbine powered, and the biggest was the 234 passenger, 600 mph long body DC-8. Despite inflation and despite huge outlays of capital, passengers enjoy a lower fare level today than they did in 1936, when the per mile fare was 5.7 cents compared with 5.5 cents last year. This record was attainable because the massive expenditures the industry has been willing to make have allowed the airlines to operate increasingly productive airplanes which carry more people further, faster. The airlines in 1934 had a total investment of less than $30 million. The airlines are currently in the midst of the second reequipment cycle of the jet age; during the years 1967 through 1971 the airlines will add more than 1,100 airplanes to their fleets with a price tag of some $8.5 billion. Coming next year will be the 350 plus passenger Boeing 747. Two years later the industry will introduce the jumbo trijet, a 250 passenger, wide-bodied airplane with three advanced technology engines which will allow it to operate from smaller airports, such as New York's LaGuardia. The airlines are making these commitments because all of our projections indicate we will need these new airplanes, and more, to meet the demands for service. By 1975 it is conservatively predicted that United States airlines will serve 200 million passengers; within another decade the total should top 500 million. Airfreight should grow even faster, increasing some 20 times over today's tonnage by 1985. The industry would not be where it is today, if the airlines had not con- tinuously strived to eliminate risk. The industry will not get where it hopes to go tomorrow, if the airlines do not continue to strive to do so. I would like to describe some of the specific programs we undertook in the past and the key projects of the present. I shall talk primarily about American Air- lines which for several decades has directed considerable effort and re- sources to elimination of risk. Let me hasten to add that other major airlines have distinguished records in this area, as do manufacturers, government agencies, and private groups such as the Flight Safety Foundation. On a day-to-day basis in the operating area, there are no secrets among airlines. Information is freely shared through regular channels. For example, what may seem to one airline to be an isolated mechanical difficulty, may be detected as a potential problem area when airline experience is pooled. When this happens, the experts correct the difficulty and prevent a minor problem from developing into a major one. II. AMERICAN AIRLINES AND SAFETY HISTORY American Airlines (hereinafter American) started out in the mid-1920's as a hodgepodge of airlines which were brought together in 1929 by a hold- ing company, Aviation Corporation. The following year, the airline hold- ings were separated from other investments and became American Airways. That same year, American hired its first safety officer, William Littlewood, who was to gain fame a few years later as the father of the DC-3. 1968 ] AIR SAFETY SYMPOSIUM There had recently been a bad hanger fire at Chicago and lesser ones around the country. Littlewood's first assignment was to make a survey of the system and to recommend ways to prevent and combat fires. Word of Littlewood's mission spread across the country. One day he arrived at El Paso, Texas, and was waiting in the manager's office when a wire came which said, "Littlewood is coming; clean the place up." The mere fact someone was checking provided motivation to improve standards. At any rate, after Littlewood equipped each station with rules and regulations for preventing and fighting fires, the number of fires decreased noticeably. An organized safety program was born. Littlewood shortly thereafter was responsible for establishing another tradition that is still followed, and probably has had more to do with guar- anteeing United States airline technical superiority than any other single factor. The airlines then had fleets of little airplanes such as Wacos and huge airplanes such as Ford Tri-Motors. Neither could make money. Little- wood set down the first specifications for an airline airplane which, it was hoped, would be economical. Aviation Corporation laid out the then startling sum of $35,000 for this work. A single-engine, nine passenger airplane called the Pilgrim emerged from this effort. It did not make money either, but the first step had been taken. From then on the major airlines worked closely with manufacturers on development of new airplanes designed specifically to airline needs, which included the need to minimize risk. The second major step brilliantly succeeded. American bought a dozen DC-2's which, though a decided improvement over previous planes, were still money losers. American convinced Douglas it should build something bigger and better. Though the airline thought originally the new plane could be 85 percent DC-2 and 15 percent new, in the end the percentages turned out to be reversed. The airplane had a 50 percent increase in pay- load, from 14 to 21 seats, but operated at the same per mile cost. American also specified a number of technical improvements, such as, stronger land- ing gear, stronger engine mounts, and a larger fin with a dorsal fin added to solve a fishtailing problem. The new airplane, the DC-3, went into service in June, 1936. It was a money-maker, and its place in aviation history is well-known. Research and development aimed at risk control extends to systems. The early development work on airborne radar is a case in point. At the end of World War II, C. R. Smith, who had iust returned to American as chairman following wartime service in the Air Transport Command, wrote a characteristically terse note to the engineering department: "Find out ways of using wartime devices to avoid collisions with mountains." An engineering team acquired a Navy radar system and installed it on a DC-3.

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