Russia’s East Asia Policy: New Opportunities and Challenges*

Anna KIREEVA** Abstract

Since the demise of the Soviet Union, Russia’s corresponds with Russia’s course on intensifying foreign policy has evolved from a Western- cooperation with East Asian countries in order oriented one to a multi-dimensional one, with to facilitate the development of Siberia and the substantial focus on East Asia. Russia’s East Russian Far East. Asian policy is stimulated by its bid for great power status in the region. Russian-Chinese relations have been the axis of Russia’s East Asian Key Words foreign policy, though the relations have not been without their challenges. Overdependence on China threatens Russia’s independent policy Russia, East Asia, Foreign Policy, Security. in the region and encourages Russia to search for ways to diversify its ties. The rise of China and the US counter-offensive have resulted in a Introduction changing strategic environment in East Asia. A need for balancing between the US and China Asia has every reason to view Russia has brought about ASEAN countries’ desire to as a crucial element of military welcome Russia as a “balancer” in the region. It and political stability as well as of sustainable development.… We may effectively contribute to solving the * The article is prepared with the support of region’s energy, transport, scientific, Russian Foundation for Humanities (grant technological and environmental project № 12-03-00538а). I would like to problems, and our partners are well express my gratitude to Professor Alexei D. Voskiressenski and Associate Professor aware of that. Regional military and Ekaterina V. Koldunova for their comments on political stability, collective efforts a draft of this article, and to Associate Professor to counter international terrorism, Natalia V. Rodoman for giving me a tool of emergency response cooperation, or English political vocabulary to write it. dialogue between civilizations are unimaginable without Russia.… We ** Anna Kireeva is a PhD candidate at MGIMO- accord priority to the development of University, the MFA of Russia. She is a Coordinator of the MA degree programme economic cooperation focusing on the in World Regional Studies and International areas where we have distinct advantages. Relations, “Politics and Economics of World I am primarily referring to the energy Regions”, and a Lecturer in Asian and African sector, including atomic energy, 1 Studies at MGIMO-University, the MFA of transport and space exploration. Russia. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov

49 PERCEPTIONS, Winter 2012, Volume XVII, Number 4, pp. 49-78. Anna Kireeva

influenced by both the West and the A need for balancing between East, in domestic discourse there has the US and China brings about never been clarity about what kind ASEAN’s desire to welcome of a country Russia actually is. One Russia as a “balancer” in the school of thought believes that Russia region. is a European power, and President Medvedev described Russia as one of As incumbent Russia’s Foreign the three main pillars of the European Minister Sergey Lavrov noted, Russia civilisation, alongside the European is not a newcomer in East Asia. Russia Union and the United States. As two has enjoyed contacts with the countries thirds of its territory lies in Asia and one there since the 17th century, and played third in Europe, Russia throughout its an important role in international history has been under the influence of relations in the region in the 19th and both Eastern and Western civilisations. 20th centuries. Although it might be a The Russian political system has differed disputed point, one cannot deny the role considerably from those in Europe, while of the Soviet Union in the victory of the Russian culture has been notably distinct national liberation movements in Asia.2 from Asian ones. Hence, according to Not to be overlooked is the fact that another long-standing tradition, Russia though a vast Russian empire was made is often regarded as both a Western and up of numerous peripheral territories Eastern country, a Eurasian one, whereas situated in Asia, including Siberia, the outside it is mostly perceived as neither Far East and Central Asia, they cannot a Western country nor an Eastern one. be regarded as classical colonies for There is a school of thought that holds a number of reasons. Firstly, Russia’s that Russia is an Asian power, although expansion was supported, or at least not this point of view is mostly rejected by opposed, by the local elites. Secondly, the majority of the Russians. The 2000s witnessed an attempt to overcome this Russia’s periphery, which was integrated dilemma of Russia’s ambivalence. A into the empire, was not plundered, newly emerging concept of Russian as in classical colonial model, but on geopolitical positioning being discussed the contrary subsidised. Thirdly, the at the moment argues that Russia is peripheral elites were not discriminated a Euro-Pacific power, which means it against, but incorporated into the has both European and Asia-Pacific national elite.3 dimensions in geographical terms, but in Since Russia has never been a classical terms of its political characteristics is a colonial power and has been significantly European power.4

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The existence of so many contradictory a desirable model of development for perceptions makes Russian foreign policy Russia.5 very complicated. Moreover, the Soviet However, before exploring the nature legacy has imposed certain limitations of Russia’s East Asia policy, it is necessary upon it. The Soviet bloc, which also to establish some conceptual clarity in included many Asian and African the use of the key concept, namely that countries, served as a self-contained of a “great power”. The meaning of this military, political and economic system. concept in Russia’s foreign policymaking After the collapse of the Soviet Union the cannot be underestimated, because main foreign policy goal of the Russian aspiring to a great power status has elite was to gain recognition and support been a unifying theme for the Russian from the developed Western world. The ruling elite from Yeltsin to Putin and to logic of this strategic course was quite Medvedev.6 There have been a number justified: with the collapse of the bipolar of studies concerning great powers in system the basic aim of those which “had history, but for the aims of this article lost” was to join the “winners” in order only the term itself and its criteria are to become a part of the international of actual importance, and it is worth political and economic system. However, dwelling on the approaches to define practical implementation of this Western- a great power. Paul Kennedy defines oriented policy in the mid-1990s clearly a great power as a state which is able demonstrated its imbalances and to stand up to any other state in war.7 contributed to re-launching the Eastern Robert Gilpin characterises great powers dimension of Russia’s foreign policy. as countries that are able to establish and Although such regions as the Middle enforce the basic rules that influence East, North and South Africa and others their behaviour and that of inferior states are of great importance to Russian in the system hierarchy.8 Kenneth Waltz foreign policy, its primary focus has been lays down five criteria for being a great on East Asia. Dwelling on the reasons power: population and territory, resource for such a decision, it could be argued endowment, economic capability, that a number of East Asian countries, political stability and competence, and including Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, military strength.9 Singapore and others, which are now perceived as sources of economic growth, Barry Buzan and Ole Weaver offer have quite successfully managed to a more coherent definition for and integrate Eastern and Western political criteria of a great power, which can be and economic models and represent explained by the fact that their regional

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security complex theory (RSCT)10 has Yeltsin to Putin and to Medvedev, with constructivist roots and is quite operable special reference to competing visions on both in the realist and liberal perspectives. Russia’s strategic goals within the political According to them, classifying any actor elite. The second part concentrates on as a great power requires a combination the achievements and blemishes of the of material capability (as understood by Russian-Chinese strategic partnership as Waltz), formal recognition of that status well as Russian relations with other East by others, and a response by the other Asian states and Russia’s accession to great powers on the basis of system- regional multilateral organisations. The level calculations about the present and third part is devoted to the analysis of the future distribution of power in world Russia’s new bid for great power status in politics. The last criterion is behavioural the East Asia region-the impediments to, in nature and means that great powers and prospects of-its implementation. are taken into consideration not only when dealing with the countries of the An Evolution of Russia’s East region they belong to, but also when Asian Policy from Yeltsin to operating in different regions and on the global political system level.11 This Putin and Medvedev understanding of a great power concept After the demise of the Soviet Union will serve as the methodological basis of and the emergence of a democratic but the article. considerably weaker Russian Federation a new foreign policy course was During the early 1990s the proclaimed by the political elite. In the primary direction of Russian early 1990s this course was put forward foreign policy was the Western by the Russian President Boris Yeltsin’s one, and the Eastern was (1991-1999) first team, which had little subordinate to the former. experience in foreign policymaking in a democratising country. Moreover, The objective of this article is to provide they could not rely on any historical an account of Russia’s foreign policy experiences. Foreign Minister Andrey evolution towards East Asia, its relations Kozyrev, who appeared to be an advocate with key partners, and the prospects of of a Western-oriented foreign policy, its role as one of the new poles in the and the President believed that good region. This article is structured around relations with Europe and the USA were three issues. The first part examines the important for Russia to become a part evolution of Russia’s foreign policy from of the international community. This

52 Russia’s East Asia Policy idea in fact corresponded with Mikhail 60 % compared with 1990), by 1998 Gorbachev’s concept of building a Russia had lost its erstwhile role and common “European house”. The main almost all influence in East Asia.14 goal of this policy was quite pragmatic, however, and entailed enjoying Western Primakov voiced out a strategic support not only in the political triangle of three states: Russia, sphere, but also in gaining access to China and India with a stress financial assistance and credit lines in on a multipolar world, aimed order to ensure a Western-oriented development. Consequently, such a at counterbalancing American foreign policy course left little room unilateralism in world politics. for other dimensions. However, it is instructive to note that East Asia was not The mid-1990s saw a new figure completely forgotten during this period. in Russian foreign policy, Yevgeny The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Primakov, who epitomised an urgent (MFA) viewed major Asian countries need for altering the strategic course as the rear of Russia’s relations with the following Russia’s economic troubles, West. Above all China was considered political turbulence, and reduced a key country, and good neighbourly influence in the international arena. But and pragmatic relations, most notably one of the most important factors that border trade, were emphasised.12 A contributed to a change in the foreign reliable partner was of vital importance policy course was the dissolution of for Russia in its bid to ensure security Yugoslavia and the West’s unilateral through good relations with NATO decision to agree to the emergence and the USA, which was seen as the of new states after the collapse of the only way to stabilize Russia after the Soviet Union. By 1994 President Yeltsin collapse of the USSR.13 Therefore, we had begun reconsidering Russia’s lean can conclude that during the early towards the West, and partnership with 1990s the primary direction of Russian China was regarded as the centrepiece foreign policy was the Western one, and of Russian diplomacy. Primakov argued the East was subordinate to the former. that there was a strategic triangle of three Russian leaders were preoccupied with states, Russia, China and India, and the internal agenda, including reforming stressed a multipolar world, which was the political system and establishing a aimed at counterbalancing American market-based economy. As Russia’s GDP unilateralism in world politics.15 roughly declined in Yeltsin’s period (by However, as the changes took some time

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to implement, the 1990s are usually abandoned its pro-Western stance and characterised as a decade of degradation under Foreign Ministers Igor Ivanov in Russia’s role in East Asia. and Sergey Lavrov its Eastern dimension gained momentum. It became especially In 2010 Asia was named as an clear after the 2007 Munich speech by additional source for Russian Putin, which demonstrated divergence modernization, while previously in positions with the West and Russia’s more assertive foreign policy19. Emphasis these sources included only the has mostly been put on the Asia-Pacific EU and the USA. region, as only these countries could provide resources for the development 20 The late 1990s and the early 2000s of Siberia and the RFE. In 2008’s The witnessed a shift in Russian foreign Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian policy to a more pragmatic and balanced Federation’s list of regional priorities Asia- stance, better aimed at realising the Pacific held the fourth position after the country’s national interests. It was aimed Commonwealth of Independent States in general at providing the necessary (CIS), Europe and the USA. In addition safeguards on Russia’s borders in order to the region’s role in developing to pay attention to domestic concerns, Siberia and the RFE the government’s preventing conflicts in the proximity of concept of 2008 highlights “the need Russian territory, facilitating economic for strengthening regional cooperation cooperation with all Eastern countries in the fields of countering terrorism, notwithstanding their ideological ensuring security and maintaining a 21 standing if it proves profitable to Russia, dialogue between civilizations”. and ensuring the territorial integrity President Dmitry Medvedev (2008- and control over the Russian Far East 2012), Putin’s successor, proposed a (RFE).16 Under President Vladimir modernisation agenda as the strategy for Putin (2000-2008) Russia managed to Russia’s development.22 Some experts stop internal political and economic believe that despite the differences in chaos, to reduce armed conflicts inside the foreign policy strategies of the three the country, and to restore a decent level leaders- Yeltsin, Putin and Medvedev- of social and economic development. As the main goal has been to restore Russia’s Russia has returned as a strong state,17 status as one of the main actors in the many foreign policy experts called this world, a status it had lost with the phenomenon Russia’s resurgence.18 collapse of the Soviet Union. However, As a result, Russia’s foreign policy the end of the 2000s highlighted a

54 Russia’s East Asia Policy definite shift in Russia’s foreign policy many scholars as the main impediments priorities towards Asia. In 2010 Asia to a successful Russian foreign policy was named as an additional source for in the region.27 However, the latter is a Russian modernisation, while previously rather controversial point. There has been these sources included only the EU and a plethora of more recent studies that the USA.23 As the “centre of gravity” have cast doubt on the idea that aspiring of economic growth and geopolitics to great power status has had a negative is shifting to East Asia, Russia’s MFA impact on Russia’s policy towards the sees its priority in taking proactive region. Thus, the view that Putin’s aim measures to establish favourable external of restoring Russia’s great power status conditions for the modernisation and has led to a more coherent policy in East innovative development of Russia. The Asia seems to be more reasonable.28 East Asia region is described as one of In this respect, special reference should the key priorities in Russia’s foreign be made to the key actors in Russia’s policy. Moreover, the economic and East Asia policymaking. Determining technological rise of the region should the actual influence of various factions be used in order to facilitate economic in Russia’s foreign policymaking would and social development of Siberia and be a very thorny way, because the actual the Russian Far East. Two main tracks in process highly depends on personal this process include improving bilateral contacts, which are difficult to define relations and participation in multilateral and can differ considerably from those organisations.24 This is called multivector roles outlined in the constitution. cooperation in Russian foreign policy Finally, although the president has a discourse, and reflects a necessity to final say in foreign policy, the entities foster economic ties and take part in that influence his decisions remain shaping a new security architecture in obscure. This has lead to a scarcity of the Asia-Pacific region.25 literature on this topic, as researchers Analysing the effects of Russia’s foreign focus on more accessible subjects. policy, one can state that while there Moreover, a bulk of Western works are was a consensus over the main foreign dominated either by the stereotypes of policy goals in the 1990s, there were imperialistic thinking in Russia’s foreign many difficulties in shaping policies and policy or, in contrast, by the perceptions taking practical actions to attain these of genuine democratic transition in goals.26 Along with this, underestimating policymaking.29 However, this issue is economic security and “great-power of significant importance, because only overzealousness” has been viewed by a thorough insight into who the Russian

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foreign policy elite are can one make a foreign policy aide and there is a special substantiated assessment of this or that foreign policy division in the PA.34 policy and grasp the idea of who are the Nevertheless the role of these proponents and opponents of this or institutions was different during the that decision. The most influential actors terms of Presidents Yeltsin and Putin. comprise the President, the Presidential Some scholars argue that the profile Administration (PA), the Security of relations with East Asia was low in Council (SB), the Ministry of Foreign the 1990s as under Yeltsin there was a Affairs (MID), the intelligence services, marked dichotomy between aspirations both internal (FSB) and external (SVR, to assert a great power role in the and the GRU), the Defence Ministry region, to participate in the regional 30 (MO), and the Russian Armed Forces. decision-making process and regional fora on the one hand, and economic and Different factions competed political chaos in the country, resulting over the influence on the in confusion in foreign policy decision President, which turned out to making on the other. During that period be one of the reasons of Russia’s the role of Russia’s MFA was frequently sidelined because other domestic incoherent policy in the 1990s. actors, such as individual ministries and agencies, acted independently As Russia is a presidential republic and and without any central control.35 As a federation, it comes as no great surprise a result, different factions competed that the apex of executive authority lies over influence on the President, which within the institute of the president, turned out to be one of the reasons for with all the ministers and agencies Russia’s incoherent policy in the 1990s. directors reporting directly to him. The Vladimir Putin, in contrast, began by functions of the Security Council seem building his own team around him with to be quite significant since it is in charge his own people, mostly his colleagues of responding to security challenges and from St. Petersburg, including former oversees national security.31 While there President Dmitry Medvedev. Under is a view that it primarily acts as a forum Putin and Medvedev the bureaucratic and has no real influence,32 another rivalry became covert and the PA and outlook argues that it serves as a kind of foreign policy aide Sergey Prihod’ko president’s private council, where major enjoyed primacy in a more centralised foreign policy decisions are discussed and foreign policymaking process. However, decided upon.33 The president also has a the PA staff is relatively small and there

56 Russia’s East Asia Policy are few experts on East Asia, and their the MFA was, and still is, considered scope of responsibility is mostly limited to be the main actor in Russia’s East to organisation and protocol work. The Asian policy.37 Practically, the MFA relationship between the PA and MFA enjoys almost undisputable authority can be depicted in the following way: over specific foreign policy issues, for the president and the PA set out the example, Russia’s “strategic partnership” overall East Asia agenda, whereas the with China.38 MFA proposes more detailed initiatives As for sectoral actors, which include to be discussed with the PA.36 In economic and energy ministries, state addition to that, the prime minister can companies like Rosoboroneksport39 and be quite influential in the foreign policy Rostekhnologii40 and others, they have hierarchy, taking concrete measures enjoyed some kind of authority over the and steps, as was epitomised by Putin issues within their scope of responsibility, when he was the prime minister under but mostly have had to coordinate their President Medvedev. actions with the MFA.41 The Russian As far as the other “traditional” foreign parliament’s role in foreign policymaking policymakers are concerned, the main was reduced to a minimum under the function of the intelligence services, 1993 Constitution and includes the especially of the SVR, is to provide the ratification of international treaties. president with information and advice Under Putin it became a “mouthpiece on all major foreign policy security for views which Putin would like the decisions, including on East Asia. Its outside world to ponder, but which he role as the key source of information was would prefer not to express himself”.42 especially valued by President Yeltsin, Academic institutions and think-tanks and is still relatively high under Putin. specialising on Africa and Asia have been The functions of Russia’s Ministry playing quite a marginal role in foreign of Foreign Affairs are much more policymaking, and they diminished numerous and it can be regarded as the over time because they receive less state core foreign policy body, coordinating, support now. Most of the academic initiating and implementing foreign influence on Russian initiatives is policy in East Asia in practically all considered to be wielded through spheres. It is characterised as the most personal contacts with elites rather influential body in terms of resources, than through institutional methods.43 experience and specialists. Though its Deprived from any significant influence role as a foreign policy coordinator was on Russia’s foreign policy as a whole, frequently undermined under Yeltsin, the Russian Far East elite did have some

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impact on the resolution of the border a confrontational period in the 1960- issues, especially as there was strong 1980s, and have now created a strategic opposition to a border resolution with partnership. Their foundation was laid Japan and China.44 down by Mikhail Gorbachev’s visit to China in 1989, and the 1990s saw the Summarising the above, Yeltsin mostly beginning of political and military- employed the “divide and rule” attitude technical cooperation between the to foreign policymaking, which resulted states. In 1996 a strategic partnership in chaos and factional rivalry, led to aimed at promoting cooperation in the an incoherent foreign policy course, 21st century was proclaimed. In 2001 a and the absence of a clear strategy at Treaty of Good-Neighbourliness and re-establishing a great power status. Friendly Cooperation was signed, which Russian policy during the 1990s is often paved the way for enhanced political, described as reactive, ad hoc, and often economic and military cooperation. In contradictory. On the contrary, power 2004 a border dispute was finally settled consolidation under Putin resulted in after long negotiations and there were a a more comprehensive and proactive number of border agreements. Russian approach towards the region. A bid for and Chinese leaders voiced a vision great power status made Russian foreign of a “new world order” in 2005 and a policy elite better define its interests and joint initiative on strengthening security goals in East Asia and understand that in the Asia-Pacific in 2010. The 2000s a substantial economic presence in the saw advanced energy cooperation, in region as well as internal strength are of particular in 2010 when a spur from vital importance in this respect.45 the East Siberia-Pacific Ocean (ESPO) pipeline was completed from Russian China and Beyond: Bilateral Skovordino to Chinese Daqing. As far and Multilateral Dimensions as regional framework is concerned, of Russia’s Foreign Policy 1996 saw the creation of Shanghai Five, including Russia, China, Kazakhstan, As China has been the core East Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan on the basis Asian country in Russia’s foreign policy of Treaty of Deepening Military Trust in towards the region, a special mention Border Regions. It laid foundations for should be made of the Russian-Chinese the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, strategic partnership as the “axis” of formed in 2001 after Uzbekistan’s Russian policy in the East. Russian- accedence, which comprises security and Chinese relations managed to overcome economic agenda.

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It is instructive to note that the fears”.48 While some experts emphasize rationale for the Russian-Chinese the benefits of Russian- Chinese strategic partnership included opposition cooperation, based on distinguishing to unilateral actions and support for a non-Western political systems, others polycentric world order, based on respect maintain that such policy could lead to a for mutual sovereignty. The concept more archaic and authoritarian regime in of a polycentric world was originally Russia, subordinate to Chinese strategic, proposed by Chinese policymakers and political and economic interests. China’s was then supported by Russian leaders.46 rise facilitated the discussion in Russia’s In this respect America’s unilateral political elite whether to pursue a policy actions in Kosovo and Iraq objectively aimed to foster a common political strengthened this partnership. There is space with Europe and the USA in a divergence of opinions whether the cooperation with China or to create a strategic partnership has an ultimate aim common anti-American, anti-Western to curb American unipolar preeminence and pro-authoritarian Chinese- centered 49 or has a pragmatic, non-confrontational economic, political and security space . side, which helps contain Western Nevertheless, present Russian-Chinese global politics.47 China’s rapid economic relations should be distinguished from an anti- US alliance, as both sides value development and Russia’s relative their relations with the world leader economic weakness in the 1990s too much to start such a rivalry. Even if stimulated Russia’s favourable policy despite all the problems such an alliance towards China as it was seen as best emerged, Russia would be likely to play serving Russia’s national interests. As far a subordinate role in it, which does not as the economic rationale is concerned, correspond to its national interests.50 China was in need of Russia’s high-tech exports, including arms, and there was A number of blemishes and challenges no distinguished asymmetry in the trade within Russian-Chinese relations should balance in the 1990s. Trade ties, military also be touched upon. First of all, at issue exchanges and diplomatic support vis-a- here is the imbalanced trade structure: vis the West was used in both countries though the 1990s saw a different to underpin their standing in the world, situation, since the beginning of the as direct competition with it would 2000s Russian exports have mostly have been difficult for both countries consisted of energy, raw materials, fishery if they acted separately. However, as and timber, while Chinese exports have Russian scholar Alexei Bogaturov notes, been to a large degree composed of China has been considered as both machinery and manufactured goods. The “a sea of potentials” and “an ocean of Chinese economic orientation generates

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a threat of Russia becoming a resource Chinese migration and Chinese business appendix, leaving it on the “other side of control over the RFE’s and Siberia’s the barricades” from the leading world, natural resources.56 including China itself.51 In this sense experts argue that China cannot serve as a “beacon of innovation-based model Russia’s relations with Japan of development” or supply Russia with were a top priority in Russia’s high-tech equipment, as it is interested Asian policy in the beginning only in Russia’s resources (except military of the 1990s as Japan was know-how to a certain extent) and itself considered as one of the leaders uses second-hand Western technologies of the developed world. purchased or copied outright from 52 the West. Secondly, there is a threat In this context special reference should to Russia’s independent policy in East be made to the development problems in Asia due to the concept of the “Beijing the Russian Far East. Despite several eco- consensus”, which entails restructuring nomic plans to foster development in the the world order with China in the RFE and to present the region as Russia’s 53 lead and, inevitably, accepting Chinese gate to the Asia-Pacific region, the real- 54 interests as priorities. Thirdly, many ity falls short of this idea. A new model experts believe that China is trying to of its development has not been devised “squeeze Russia out of” Central Asia, yet, and the region is currently facing an wielding “soft power” and enhancing array of problems: dwindling popula- energy cooperation through the tion, de-industrialisation, deforestation Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (due to a vast export to China), large- (SCO).55 Fourthly, the development of scale corruption, “black market” trad- the RFE should be regarded as the most ing schemes, and general degradation.57 important issue and goal, as far as Russia’s Some experts maintain that a Chinese East Asian policy is concerned. Only 7 takeover of the region is likely to take million people live to the east of Lake forms not of migration, but of trade and Baikal, while the Chinese population investment domination and that Russia in the neighbouring provinces totals is already increasingly showing signs of more than 280 million people. Such economic dependence on China.58 circumstances provide a breeding ground for perceptions of the so-called The Programme for Cooperation “yellow peril” (zheltaya ugroza), which between the Regions of the Far East is manifested in the fear of uncontrolled and Eastern Siberia and the Provinces of

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Northeast China up to 2018, adopted Russia “still owes” the Chinese part of in 2009, is aimed at constructing new the Far Eastern territories threaten the border crossings, boosting cooperation status of this partnership.62 in transportation, and developing Yet there is a strong belief that a strategic “cooperation zones” and other spheres partnership with China is a major of bilateral relations. Many Russian safeguard against Russia’s diminishing scholars have been especially critical of position in East Asia, and that despite all it since most of the projects planned the imbalances China is the most likely are connected with either developing country to facilitate modernisation and raw materials, timber harvesting and development in the RFE since it enjoys agriculture on the Russian territory priority in the region’s investment list. with increasing Chinese staff, or with Russia’s ability to promote multipolar producing final products on Chinese world order is heavily dependent on its territory. Labelled This in turn is likely to cooperation with China, which can be lead only to the economic and ecological regarded as a kind of force multiplier for deterioration of the RFE.59 The illegal Russia’s foreign policy. The strong point Russia-China trade is estimated at large of Russian-Chinese relations is that if sums, from one forth to a half of official a way to overcome their drawbacks is trade turnover, and only contributes found, they will significantly contribute to underdevelopment in the RFE.60 to the development of both countries Moreover, in exchange for US $15 and their standing in East Asia.63 The and US $10 billion Chinese credits new quality of China’s role and place for, respectively, Russian oil companies in world politics and global economy Rosneft and Transneft to complete the has made many Russian scholars ESPO oil pipeline, Russia guaranteed the suggest that Russian-Chinese relations supply of 300 million tons of oil over the need a complete restructuring and next 20 years at a fixed price (lower than even a “reload” in order to form a the average price level in recent years).61 mutually beneficial pragmatic strategic This means that despite proclaiming partnership.64 Russian-Chinese relations in the political sphere as strategic and enjoying It would also be unfair to say that convergent opinions on building a Russia’s government does not realise the “new world order”, economic disparity, urgent need to develop the RFE. For aggravated by China’s lack of interest in instance, even on the energy issue Russia buying more highly processed Russian has been trying to diversify its directions: goods, and ambivalent perceptions that despite China’s lobbying that the ESPO

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pipeline should end in Chinese Daqing, In addition to that, a recent decision the main pipeline extends to the Sea of to create a state-owned corporation in Japan without passing through Chinese charge of development in Siberia and territory, thus giving access to other the RFE with approximately US $60 consumers in the Asia-Pacific region billion in funds up to 202069 and the (Japan, Korea, etc) and making it creation of Ministry for Development of impossible for the Chinese to dictate oil Russian Far East in May, 2012 in charge prices.65 The Russian government also of the region’s development70 raises adopted a Federal Target Programme hopes of a new strategic course for the of Economic and Social Development modernisation of RFE. of the Far East and Transbaikalia 2008- 2013, which entails allocating large sums Russia’s official position is of money on development of the RFE, especially on developing Vladivostok’s primarily concerned with North infrastructure in the run-up to the 2012 Korea abandoning nuclear tests, Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation constructing a new security (APEC) Summit there. The plan drew architecture in the region and substantial criticism because although securing a place in the North it implied pouring extensive funds Korean talks. into several grandiose projects, such as building a bridge to Russky island, it As for other countries of East Asia, was believed to do little to promote good Russia’s relations with Japan were a top governance and tackle corruption and priority in Russia’s Asian policy in the bureaucratic impediments to developing beginning of the 1990s as Japan was business in the region.66 However, APEC considered one of the leaders of the Summit proved to be quite a success developed world. Mikhail Gorbachev’s for Russia’s bid to present Vladivostok visit to Japan in 1991 was considered as Russian gates to the Asia-Pacific and a breakthrough, as it inaugurated the Russia’s seriousness in becoming an beginning of a new era of normalisation integral part of the region, although in Russian-Japanese relations with a hope President Putin’s concept of Russia’s role of signing a peace treaty and settling in the integration of Eurasian common the territorial dispute, remnants from space was not widely appreciated.67 About the end of the Second World War. The 650 billion rubbles (US $ 21 billion) dispute over the Kuril Islands resulted were spent on developing the region’s from the Kuril Islands and Sakhalin infrastructure due to the summit.68 being passed from Japan to the Soviet

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Union under the terms that ended the cooperation in the Sakhalin-2 project, Second World War. However, Japan does and is a major consumer of Russian not recognise it owing to the fact that the liquefied natural gas (LNG). Japan is Soviet Union was not a signatory state to Russia’s second largest trading partner the 1951 San Francisco Treaty. in the region after China and ranks Japan’s ambition to settle the eighth as far as investment in Russia is 73 territorial dispute with an emerged concerned. democratic Russia promptly and on its Nevertheless, despite the fact that terms turned out to be unsuccessful, as economic cooperation has been on Japan failed to connect this issue with the rise, no progress has been made on economic cooperation and financial settling the territorial dispute so far and 71 assistance for Russian reforms. The President Medvedev’s visit to the Kuril Tokyo Declaration of 1993 brought Islands in 2010 evoked fierce criticism out divergent positions on the border from Japan’s leaders, exacerbating mutual issue and, in spite of numerous top-level perceptions of bilateral relations. The meetings in 1997 and 1998, where a goal territorial dispute is constantly raised was proclaimed to sign a peace treaty by as a domestic issue in Japan, serving 2000, nothing has been achieved on the goals of gaining internal support this matter. Economic and technical pending another forthcoming election.74 cooperation stagnated despite the Despite this, Russian- Japanese relations enormous potential of its development, have been progressing constructively and reaching a new low in 2002. This was have a huge potential for development. mainly due to Japan’s reluctance to invest in a Russia lacking economic The Soviet imbalance towards North transparency and having numerous Korea shifted in favour of South Korea bureaucratic impediments. In 2003 a in the 1990s. After recognising South joint action plan was signed, aimed at a Korea in 1990, Moscow put an emphasis comprehensive development of political, on developing economic relations and economic and cultural relations.72 technical cooperation with this country, In 2005 additional agreements were which is currently Russia’s third largest concluded, adding momentum to trading partner in East Asia after China economic cooperation between Russia and Japan, and a promising source of and Japan, and resulting in Japanese high technology. This had negative business entering the Russian market impact on Russian-North Korean (especially the automobile industry). relations as Russia became marginalised Japan also took an active part in energy in Korean affairs despite its valid claim

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of having a direct interest in the issue. border with North Korea. Russia’s Moscow was completely left out of the participation in the six-party talks was US-negotiated Agreed Framework in mainly perceived as an acknowledgement 1994, and negotiations in 1996, in of its great power status by the major which the USA, China and both Koreas northeast Asian players and that it had took part. Despite Russian initiatives to an ability to maintain the current balance promote multilateral talks on the North in the region between the US alliance Korean issue, its earlier disengagement system and China.76 Russia’s official from North Korea mainly for economic position is primarily concerned with reasons reduced its clout on the Korean North Korea abandoning nuclear tests, peninsula. However, as Moscow constructing a new security architecture supported the South Korean “sunshine in the region, and securing a place in policy” and took steps to improve the North Korean talks. The latter is of relations with North Korea, including utmost importance for Russia, since a Putin’s visit and the signing of the place in the talks is perceived as a way Russian-North Korean friendship treaty to wield its influence in the region and in 2000, Russia has tried to create the to establish itself as a reliable economic image of an active mediator in the nuclear partner for both Koreas. The breakdown issue. The friendship treaty replaced the of the talks owing to the third nuclear 1961 Friendship and Mutual Assistance crisis in 2009 is considered a major loss Treaty, although the provisions of for Russia from this perspective, and Russia’s military assistance in the case of stimulates Russia to promote the revival military attack were removed from the of the talks on North Korea.77 Russia new agreement. However, despite these made efforts to improve its position on successful steps and some improvements the Korean peninsula in the absence of 75 time had already been lost. the talks as the only available mechanism The second Korean nuclear crisis to make its words heard. In 2009- (2002-2006) gave Russia an opportunity 2010, Russia took steps to improve to exercise its influence over North its relations with North Korea (such Korea and to convene a multilateral as debt rescheduling and food aid in organisation, namely the six-party 2011), and proposed a number of major talks. Russia’s unofficial aim was also to trilateral economic projects including prevent the breakdown or collapse of the the linking of the Trans-Siberian railway North Korean regime as that would have to the Korean railroad infrastructure, unpredictable consequences for Russian constructing powerlines through North security with Russia’s 19- kilometer Korea to South Korea, and a natural

64 Russia’s East Asia Policy gas pipeline throughout the Korean institutional foundations for quasi- peninsula. Given the political risks of official relations with Russia: the their implementation, these projects Moscow-Taipei Economic and Cultural present a real opportunity to transform Coordination Commission and the South-North Korean relations into Taipei-Moscow Economic and Cultural constructive ones and thus strengthen Coordination Commission, which Russia’s standing on the Korean remain the main channels. Presumably, peninsula.78 In October 2011 a railway the decision to focus on China in its road connecting Russian Khasan with East Asian policy made the Russian North Korean Rajin port was completed government reject the Taiwan Relations with Russia developing a container pier Act, proposed by a marginal populist in Rajin.79 Liberal Democratic Party (LDPR), and possible arms sales to Taiwan. Russia has officially expressed “firm support” Russia’s relations with East for the “one China” principle since the Asian states vary from strategic early 1990s, and publicly adopted it in partnership and closer economic 2001 strategic partnership treaty with ties with China to developing China. This did not prevent Russia from economic cooperation with enjoying economic cooperation, mostly Japan, South Korea and ASEAN in importing Taiwanese machinery and states. electronics. It should also be noted that a complete resolution of the “Taiwanese issue” is not beneficial to Russia in terms The dissolution of the Soviet Union of geopolitics, as it would boost China’s augmented Taiwan’s interest in a new might dramatically, and thus have an democratic country not merely as an unpredictable impact on Russia’s role in 80 export market but as a potential ally the region. against China. Despite Taiwan’s attempts Though Russia became a dialogue to create a powerful lobby in favour of partner with the Association of Southeast establishing official diplomatic relations, Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 1996 and in it seemed a desperate goal because of a 2004 signed the Treaty of Amity and history of fierce political antagonism, Cooperation in Southeast Asia. Russia’s lack in pro-Taiwanese politicians, and regional role was initially perceived Russia’s objective interest in the vast mostly with great scepticism owing to potential of the Chinese market. In its inability to project economic and 1992 Taiwan successfully erected the military power in the region. It was

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not until 2005 that the first ASEAN- while forging new ones. Russia also took Russia summit took place. The main steps to assure that it acceded to all regional problem, however, was that Russian- multilateral institutions. Russia has been ASEAN relations were far from being a member of the ASEAN Regional characterised as “substantive” because Forum (ARF) since its establishment in of poor trade turnover as well as a low 1993, promoting preventive diplomacy investment rate. On these grounds and conflict resolution mechanisms in 2005 Russia was rejected for both and a multipolarity vision. In 1998 making these meetings regular and Russia joined APEC and hosted its joining the East Asia Summit (EAS).81 2012 summit, with an aim to make Above all, Vietnam is considered to be Vladivostok Russia’s economic outpost a reliable traditional friend in Southeast in the Asia-Pacific region.84 In 2010 Asia, making it one of Russia’s strategic Russia joined the Asia-Europe Meeting partners in East Asia.82 Besides joint (ASEM) and in 2011 the newly projects on oil and gas exploration with established East Asia Summit (EAS) to Vietnam and other Southeast Asian integrate itself into the world economy states, Russia is also enjoying growing and to take part in building the regional cooperation in the arms trade (for security architecture. instance with Indonesia and Vietnam), biotechnologies, pharmaceuticals, infor- mation and education technologies, Strategic partnership with China space exploration, natural disaster gives Russia opportunities to relief, tourism, civil aviation, and in influence China by means implementing a number of infrastructure of bilateral contacts more projects, including the construction successfully than any agreements of electric power plants (for example or negotiations in the China-US with Cambodia) and nuclear power relations can. stations (for example with Vietnam and Myanmar).83 A prior analysis of Russia’s foreign Taking all the aforesaid into policy in East Asia shows that Russia’s consideration, Russia has worked hard aspirations to become a great power have on joining virtually all regional fora and been manifested through establishing has become an ASEAN dialogue partner. the country as an indispensible and Russia’s relations with East Asian states unalienable part of the region, and in vary from the strategic partnership strengthening existing bilateral relations and close economic ties with China,

66 Russia’s East Asia Policy to developing economic cooperation economic policy, aimed at pursuing with Japan, South Korea and ASEAN achievable goals reflecting the national states. Despite various impediments, interests of Russia. Moreover, developing Russia is currently implementing large- economic ties were perceived as a means scale projects with regional partners of matching words with deeds in Russia’s and Russia’s economic relations with foreign policy.86 East Asia will undoubtedly have a huge Trade dynamics in the 2000s (See Table potential. 2) show that Putin’s course to improve investment conditions, legal protection, Russia’s New Role as a and developing infrastructure did have Balancer in East Asia: Perils a positive effect as far as economic and Prospects relations with East Asia are concerned. Japan, South Korea, China and other All in all, Russia’s relations with East states initiated substantial investment Asia have improved steadily over the last projects in Russia in the late 2000s,87 decade, not only in political, but also in President Medvedev’s modernisation economic and industrial domains. For agenda also contributed to advancing instance, successful joint projects, such economic ties, as the emphasis has been as Sakhalin-1 and Sakhalin-2, are being put on developing high-tech production. implemented.85 In the 1990s Russia’s Though Russia’s trade turnover with East trade with East Asian countries (see Asia significantly decreased in 2009 on Table 1) amounted to approximately account of the global economic crisis, it one fifth of Russia’s total turnover, but managed to restore its pre-crisis level in Russia’s share in the total trade of the 2010 and achieved new heights in 2011. region was absurdly small, less than 1 In the 12 years since 2000 Russia’s trade %. Experts consider weak infrastructure figures with East Asia have grown more and unfavourable legal conditions as than tenfold, although East Asia’s share the major reason for limited economic still roughly equals one fifth of the total links. Another distinguishing feature Russian trade turnover. An interesting of this period was overdependence on fact is that the Russian trade with East exporting raw materials and natural Asia saw faster restoration rates than that resources, labelled the “primitivisation” with other countries. It should also be of trade. The late 1990s witnessed a noted that during the economic crisis consensus over the necessity to boost Western investment in Russian economy economic engagement with the region. dropped by 20 %, while investment Putin launched a more pragmatic from East Asia tripled over the last two

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years.88 However, despite this favourable economic growth has made it the new dynamics it should be taken into centre of economic gravity and turned consideration that Russia still ranks low it into a regional superpower as well, in East Asian countries’ external trade especially given the fact that China has and investment list. become the main trade partner of the majority of regional economies.90 The economic rise of China has contributed Those pursuing pragmatic to its political rise and its more assertive economic policies stress foreign policy in East Asia.91 This in turn energy supply or energy has provoked the US counter-offensive, interdependence or arms export namely the US ambition to strengthen its alliances with key partners and to as principal means to enhance remain an inherent part of the region, its Russia’s standing in the region. self-proclaimed “back to Asia” strategy.92 These circumstances have created a Hence, here arises a question: why has new environment in East Asia: a need for Russia been recognised as a regional actor balancing between a rising China and the and invited into regional institutions, US. A strategic partnership with China such as ASEM and the EAS, despite gives Russia opportunities to influence the fact that relations with the region China by means of bilateral contacts were not regarded as “substantive” a more successfully than any agreements little more than half a decade ago, when or negotiations in the Chinese-US Russia’s application into the EAS was relations can. Russia, whose foreign politely rejected? Apparently, enhanced policy towards the region has always economic cooperation was not a reason, been a peaceful one due to the fact that because, for example, while Russia’s it is a relatively weak regional player total trade turnover with the ASEAN and any conflict in the region is able to countries has more than doubled since downplay Russia’s role in the region even 2005, from about US$5 billion dollars more, was regarded by the ASEAN and to about US$12.5 billion dollars in the other countries in the region as a 2010 in sheer numbers, this accounts good power, capable of counterbalancing for less than 1 % of ASEAN’s total Chinese and the American influence. In trade turnover, which is not meaningful other words, a change in the balance at all.89 The answer is that the regional of power in the region brought about balance of power changed dramatically at the need for Russia’s more vigorous st participation as a balancer (in other the beginning of the 21 century. If just 93 recently Japan was East Asia’s economic words as a counterweight). leader and the main source of investment ASEAN countries find it beneficial and economic trends, China’s vibrant to sustain competition among China,

68 Russia’s East Asia Policy the US and other major actors, since that of the Chinese or the American, and it helps them develop economically it is seriously interested in broadening and retain political autonomy as well.94 its economic presence. Thus, ASEAN This trend coincides with Russia’s desire countries feel freer in economic relations to play a “balancer role”: the Russian with Russia than they do with China political elite believes that despite its or the USA, which makes them natural reduced influence in the world arena, partners. it still possesses “assets for exerting Russia is facing many challenges in its influence” as a “variable force” or “honest bid for a great power status in East Asia. intermediary” when addressing regional Some of them are quite objective: Russia conflicts (especially the Korean crisis), has not got enough resources to alone the China-Japan-US strategic triangle, 95 boost the RFE in the long term. Though and ASEAN’s response to China’s rise. the MFA sees East Asian states as potential Surprisingly, at first sight Russia’s options means for the development of the RFE, in East Asia resemble that of ASEAN: it remains only a future possibility and if Russia is to play a substantial role in prospects remain unclear.98 Internal the politics and security in East Asia challenges to Russia’s policy towards East and develop economic cooperation with Asia also include competing schools of dynamically growing economies, under thought and ideological perspectives. no circumstances should it take sides They comprise liberal and balance-of- between the US and China. If Russia power approaches, Russia’s identity or ASEAN decided to choose between as a European or a Eurasian country these two centres, the region would be as well as many others. A challenge seriously polarised and would spiral into to Russian foreign policy has been to 96 chaos. navigate among competing perceptions To elaborate on this point, it can be of East Asia, including a free-for-all added that Russia and ASEAN are also competition among the great powers and facing the same problems of the so- the consequent need to play the balance called unfinished modernisation, which of power game; East Asia as a “field of defines their subordinate position in dreams”, ripe for economic integration the world economy. Creating a more and cooperation; and misgivings stable regional security architecture will that sparse population and economic definitely foster economic cooperation deterioration in Asiatic Russia may lead as well.97 Moreover, Russia is a very to grave consequences and that the best advantageous partner for ASEAN, strategy would be to shield itself behind because as a strong modernising military a “fortress mentality”. The latter has its state and a weak economic one it manifestation in an alarmist worldview. possesses military capability but does not Firstly, it is directed at the USA, which wield an economic influence equal to is perceived to be masterminding an

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assault on Russia’s great power standing East Asia is likely to increase gradually, and aiming at turning the Asian part although the forms of this increase are of Russia into a cheap source of raw still under discussion. In any way, it materials and energy supplies. Secondly, rests upon Russia’s ability to foster the it is aimed at China, which is seen as development of Siberia and the Far East. scheming for a quiet expansion into Siberia and the Far East, masquerading Conclusion the seizure of Russian territory with its resources and massive migration as Drawing on statistical evidence and border trade, and thirdly at Japan, which the above analysis, we can conclude is believed to be reiterating its territorial that Russia still cannot be regarded as demands in order to take control of a full-fledged great power in East Asia, Russian resources and venting its revived though its presence in the region has 99 nationalism. stabilised and gained prominence if Moreover, notwithstanding the fact compared to the 1990s.101 The reason that there is a consensus both within for this is primarily economic: of all Russian society and the political elite the criteria proposed by Buzan and that Russia actually is a great power and Weaver, Russia undoubtedly satisfies should act accordingly, there has been all the material criteria, if taking into no consent as to what characteristics this consideration Russia’s largest territory, great power should possess and what ample resources, considerable political means should be employed to realise this stability under Putin and Medvedev, and goal. For instance, the advocates of Russia military strength as Russia is one of the as a Eurasian power place emphasis on five official nuclear states. Russia also Russia’s role as a bridge between the East meets the criterion of formal recognition of its status, which can be seen from and the West in both civilisational and Russia’s successful accession to ASEM in economic aspects, though this is not 2010 and the EAS in 2011. The Russian- clearly defined. Those pursuing pragmatic Chinese strategic partnership can be economic policies stress energy supply or considered an issue of system-level energy interdependence or arms export calculations in international relations, as principal means to enhance Russia’s though its influence on the existing world standing in the region.100 order is still unclear. However, Russia’s The abovementioned factors present economic involvement in the region a challenge to Russia’s foreign policy in still leaves much to be desired. Russia East Asia. It is instructive to note that fails to actively participate in banking given stable political and economic and investment cooperation and the development and active participation number of joint ventures is still relatively in the regional agenda, Russia’s role in small. This is primarily due to the fact

70 Russia’s East Asia Policy that the Russian business community is Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, relatively weak in the world and cannot which implies flexible and mutually boast a freedom of functioning as it is beneficial interaction of different states still controlled by the government in to promote coinciding interests,103 can many respects. The Russian Federation be regarded as a reasonable course. accounts for 0-1 % of East Asian However, one has to bear in mind countries’ exports and 0-3 % of their imports, except for Mongolia and North the fact that in order to qualify as a Korea.102 Despite its economic weakness, great power a country has to possess Russia can still aspire to a great power considerable economic might in the first status in East Asia since recent events place, as economic factor comes to the have demonstrated that it is taken into fore when defining core actors in world consideration by the regional powers. politics. There is an ongoing debate Thus, fostering economic cooperation is whether Russia should concentrate on the most logical way to increase Russia’s relations with key partners like China, influence in the region. Japan, Vietnam and others, or develop economic relations with relatively Consequently, it is no exaggeration new partners. Some scholars view a to say that Russia’s involvement in more vibrant economic cooperation the region needs to be amplified and between ASEAN and Russia as a good strengthened. Russia’s future rests upon opportunity to improve Russia’s standing its standing in East Asia, both in security in the region. Not without its problems and economy. Its political standing in East Asia should be well secured, which due to geographical remoteness and implies that Russia must be a member of often called fragile as far as trade all prominent regional organisations and turnover is concerned, Russian-ASEAN conduct a flexible policy on multiple cooperation could be advanced through 104 regional fora. As contemporary Russia’s joint projects and mutual investment. economic positions in East Asia are Others put a premium on selective considerably weak and Russia is far from partnerships with key regional actors being characterised as a systemic factor in in the most promising spheres, such as the region, it is evident that a too strong the debt problem and its historic legacy focus on the Chinese vector in its Asian with Vietnam, military and technical policy is a major threat to independence cooperation with Malaysia, tourism of Russia’s relations with East Asia. In this with Thailand, high-tech cooperation respect developing multi-vector network with Japan and South Korea, and joint diplomacy in East Asia, proposed by ventures with China.105

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Table 1: Russia’s Total Trade Turnover with East Asia (1996-2012) (US$ million) Country 1996 1999 2000 2005 2012

China 5,724.5 4,495 6,335 20,664 89,008.4

Japan 3,890.7 2,564 3,336 9,581 31,220

North Korea 64.8 55.7 46 233 81

South Korea 1,984 1,142 1,330.8 6,363 24,880.4

Taiwan 568 325.3 492.6 1,931 5,338.2

Indonesia 135.6 57.3 108 551 2,871.8

Malaysia 167.3 475.2 388 823 1,745.6

Vietnam 154 183 204.7 913 3,660.6

Singapore 798.7 220 520.5 626 2,004.1

Thailand 274.8 163 170 998 3,381

Philippines 155.3 77.3 58.4 271 1,647.2

Laos 68.8 2.2 1.6 11 n/a

Cambodia 19.4 n/a 1.5 8 n/a

Myanmar 13.4 n/a 3.8 3 146 Total trade with East 14,019.3 9,760.7 12,997 42,976 165,984.3 Asia Total trade with the 131,141 102,003 136,971 339,857 837,294.9 World Source: Figures compiled from: Paradorn Rangsimaporn, Russia as an Aspiring Great Power in East Asia: Perceptions and Policies from Yeltsin to Putin, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2009, p. 62 and p. 66; Russian Federal Custom Service Statistics, at http://www.customs.ru/index.php?option=com_newsfts&view=categor y&id=125&Itemid=1976 [last visited 29 April 2012]; Ministry of Economic Development of the Russian Federation, Ekonomicheskoe sotrudnichestvo so stranami Azii i Afriki (Economic Cooperation with Asian and African Countries), at http://www.economy.gov.ru/minec/activity/sections/foreignEconomicActivity/ cooperation/economicAA/ [last visited 30 April 2012]. *Total Trade with East Asia has to be larger in fact, as trade turnover figures with a number of countries (North Korea, Laos, Cambodia, and Myanmar) are currently unavailable.

72 Russia’s East Asia Policy 2012 89,008.4 31,220 81 24,880.4 5,338.2 2,871.8 1,745.6 3,660.6 2,004.1 3,381 1,647.2 n/a n/a 146 165,984.3 837,294.9 2011 84,560.7 29,705 113.7 24,979,6 4,159,5 2,166,5 1,935,1 3,061,0 2,636,1 4,117,3 1,643,2 45.9 73.5 n/a 159,197.4* 821,353.1 2010 60,160.6 23,120.8 95.2 17,694.6 3,332 1,912.3 1,711.5 2,445.1 2,340.2 2,904.5 1,067.6 8.7 36.3 n/a 116,829.4 625,395.1 2009 40,251.4 14,515.6 49.4 10,554.3 1,712.5 974.2 1,632.6 1,561.8 2,019.6 1,369.8 573 11.4 38.5 n/a 65,754.1 469,014.5 2008 56,344 28,913.5 110.8 18,383.4 2,859.5 1,409.7 2,442.6 1,432.9 1,655.2 2,729.5 414.4 6.8 34.1 n/a 116,733.4 734,681.3 2007 40,744 20,094 159,8 14,986 2,109 916 1,903 1,092 1,540 1,336 241 3.2 29 n/a 84,993.2 552,181 2006 29,108 12,244 210 9,515 1,687 607 1,134 653 1,227 907 167 4 10 9.5 57,482 439,051 2005 20,664 9,581 233 6,363 1,931 551 823 913 626 998 271 11 8 3 42,976 339,857 2004 15,180 7,345 210 3,989 2,330 366 537 808 351 728 267 6.7 4 25 32,146.7 257,232 2003 11,875 4,296 113.6 2,650 1,099 418 725 433 248 431 222.5 2.4 1.6 11 22,526 190,713 2002 9,432 2,783 79.6 2,201 672 193 577 403 610 323 128.6 4.2 3.6 100.8 17,510.8 152,885 2001 7,292.7 3,219 78.3 1,593 418.6 125.8 424.6 241 682.5 177 67 3.8 4.8 33.5 14,362 140,725 2000 6,335 3,336 46 1,330.8 492.6 108 388 204.7 520.5 170 58.4 1.6 1.5 3.8 12,997 136,971 Country China Japan North Korea North South Korea South Taiwan Indonesia Malaysia Vietnam Singapore Thailand Philippines Laos Cambodia Myanmar Total trade with Total East Asia Total trade with Total the World Table 2: Russia’s Total Trade Turnover with East Asia (2000-2012) (US$ million) Turnover Trade Total 2: Russia’s Table , to Putin Yeltsin from and Policies Asia: Perceptions in East Power as an Aspiring Great Rangsimaporn, Russia Paradorn compiled from: Figures Source: , at http://www.customs.ru/index.php?option=com_newsfts& Service Statistics Custom Federal 66; Russian 2009, p. Macmillan, Palgrave Basingstoke, Ekonomicheskoe Federation, of the Russian 2012]; MinistryDevelopment of Economic view=category&id=125&Itemid=1976 [last visited 29 April Asianwith http://www.economy.gov.ru/minec/activity/sections/ at Countries) , African and Cooperation Azii (Economic Afriki i stranami sotrudnichestvo so 2012]. [last visited 30 April foreignEconomicActivity/cooperation/economicAA/ in 2011 and Laos Cambodia with a number of countries (Myanmar figures trade with East Asia has to be larger in fact, as turnover *Total unavailable. currently 2012) are

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Endnotes

1 Sergey Lavrov, “Russia’s Policy in Asia Pacific: Towards Peace, Security and Sustainable Development”, at http://www.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/0/0783A1264F6F63FA442579D70052 5C04 [last visited 22 December 2012]. 2 Ibid. 3 Alexei D. Voskressenski, “Istoricheskie Omuty Knigi Professora Akihiro Iwashita” (Historic Whirlpools of Professor Akihiro Iwashita’s Book), in Akihiro Iwashita (ed.), 4000 Kilometrov Problem: Kitaisko-Rossiyasksya Granitsa (4000 Kilometres of Troubles: The Russia-China Border), Moscow, AST, 2006, pp. 15-16. 4 Vyacheslav Nikonov, “Article”, Russia as a Euro-Pacific Power: New Trends in Asian Regional Architecture and Russia’s Role in Asia- Proceedings of the International Conference of the Russian National Committee of the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific (CSCAP), Moscow, Moscow University Press, 2011, pp. 85-87. 5 Vyacheslav Y. Belokrenitsky and Alexei D. Voskressenski, “Vneshnaya Politika Rossii Na Aziatskom Napravlenii” (The Asian Dimension of Russia’s Foreign Policy), in Anatoly V. Torkunov (ed.), Sovremennye Mejdunarodnye Otnosheniya i Mirovaya Politika (Contemporary International Relations and World Politics), Moscow, Prosveshenie, MGIMO, 2004, pp. 858- 860, 881. 6 Paradorn Rangsimaporn, Russia as an Aspiring Great Power in East Asia: Perceptions and Policies from Yeltsin to Putin, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2009, p. 156. 7 Paul M. Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000, New York, Vintage Books, 1989, p. 539. 8 Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1981, p. 30. 9 Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, New York, McGraw Hill, 1979, p. 131. 10 RSCT implies a complication of leadership in world politics and offers a view of the world order with one superpower (the USA), four great powers (China, Russia, Japan and the EU), and a number of regional powers composing poles of influence in regional subsystems of international relations. 11 Barry Buzan and Ole Weaver, Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2003, pp. 32-35. 12 Alexei Voskressenski, “‘Sterzhen’ Aziatskogo Azimuta Vneshney Politiki Rossii” (The Axis of Russia’s Asian Foreign Policy), Pro et Contra, Vol. 6, No. 4 (Fall 2001), p. 75. 13 Alexei D. Voskressenski, “The Three Structural Changes of Russo-Chinese Cooperation after the Collapse of the USSR and Prospects for the Emergence of a Fourth Stage”, Eurasian Review, Vol. 5 (November 2012),p. 3, 14 Vladimir N. Kolotov, “Main Trends of Russia’s Foreign Policy in Transforming East and Southeast Asia”, Brookings Northeast Asia Commentary, at http://www.brookings.edu/ opinions/2008/04_asia_kolotov.aspx?p=1 [last visited 18 April 2012]. 15 Gilbert Rozman, Mikhail G. Nosov and Koji Watanabe (eds.), Russia and East Asia: The 21st Century Security Environment, New York, East West Institute, 1999, p. 5.

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16 Voskressenski, “‘Sterzhen’ Aziatskogo Azimuta Vneshney Politiki Rossii”, p. 90; Rozman, Nosov and Watanabe (eds.), Russia and East Asia, pp. 5-6. 17 Kolotov, Main Trends of Russia’s Foreign Policy in Transforming East and Southeast Asia. 18 Among others, see: “Eye on Russia: Russia’s Resurgence”, CNN, at http://edition.cnn. com/2007/WORLD/europe/06/18/chance.intro/ [last visited 22 April 2012]; Alex Palmer, “Russia Rising: Moscow’s Quiet Resurgence”, Harvard International Review, Vol. 33, No. 3 (Fall 2011), pp. 32-35. 19 Andrey P. Tsygankov, Russia’s Foreign Policy: Change and Continuity in National Identity, Plymouth, Rowman & Littlefield, 2013, p.175. 20 “The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation”, at http://www.mid.ru/Bl.nsf/ar h/1EC8DC08180306614325699C003B5FF0?OpenDocument [last visited 21 December 2012]. 21 “The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation”, at http://archive.kremlin.ru/eng/ text/docs/2008/07/204750.shtml [last visited 21 December 2012]. 22 Dmitry Medvedev, “Go Russia!”, at http://archive.kremlin.ru/eng/text/ speeches/2009/09/10/1534_type104017_221527.shtml [last visited 22 December 2012]. 23 Fedor Lukyanov, “Article”, Russia as a Euro-Pacific Power: New Trends in Asian Regional Architecture and Russia’s Role in Asia, p. 121. 24 Alexey Borodavkin, “Article”, Russia as a Euro-Pacific Power: New Trends in Asian Regional Architecture and Russia’s Role in Asia, p. 88. 25 Vladimir N. Kotlov, Main Trends of Russia’s Foreign Policy in Transforming East and Southeast Asia, Brookings Northeast Asia Commentary. 26 Rozman, Nosov and Watanabe (eds.), Russia and East Asia, pp. 6-7. 27 Ibid., p. 217. 28 Rangsimaporn, Russia as an Aspiring Great Power in East Asia, pp. 155-156. 29 Dmitry Trenin and Bobo Lo, The Landscape of Russian Foreign Policy Decision-Making, Washington, DC, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005, p. 6. 30 Rangsimaporn, Russia as an Aspiring Great Power in East Asia, pp. 11-12. 31 “The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation”. 32 Rangsimaporn, Russia as an Aspiring Great Power in East Asia, p. 13. 33 Trenin and Lo, The Landscape of Russian Foreign Policy Decision-Making,p. 11. 34 Rangsimaporn, Russia as an Aspiring Great Power in East Asia, pp. 13-14. 35 Leszek Buszynski, “Russia and Northeast Asia: Aspirations and Reality”, The Pacific Review, Vol. 13, No. 3 (2000), p. 400. 36 Rangsimaporn, Russia as an Aspiring Great Power in East Asia, pp. 14-15. 37 Ibid., pp. 15-16. 38 Trenin and Lo, The Landscape of Russian Foreign Policy Decision-Making,p. 12. 39 Rosoboroneksport is an agency in charge of import and export of defence-related products. 40 Rostekhnologii is an agency in charge of high-tech development. 41 Rangsimaporn, Russia as an Aspiring Great Power in East Asia, pp. 17-18.

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42 Cited in Rangsimaporn, Russia as an Aspiring Great Power in East Asia, p. 19; Trenin and Lo, The Landscape of Russian Foreign Policy Decision-Making,p. 13. 43 Rangsimaporn, Russia as an Aspiring Great Power in East Asia, p. 20. 44 Ibid., p. 21. 45 Ibid., pp. 153-154. 46 Alexey Vosskresenski, “‘Sterzhen’ aziatskogo azimuta vneshney politiki Rossii”, pp. 74-75, 83. 47 Voskressenski, “The Three Structural Changes of Russo-Chinese Cooperation after the Collapse of the USSR”, pp. 1-2. 48 Ibid, p.4; Rangsimaporn, Russia as an Aspiring Great Power in East Asia, p. 111-112. 49 Voskressenski, “The Three Structural Changes of Russo-Chinese Cooperation after the Collapse of the USSR”, pp. 5-7. 50 Yomg Deng, “Remolding Great Power Politics: China’s Strategic Partnerships with Russia, the European Union and India”, The Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 30, No. 4-5 (August- October 2007), pp. 878-880. 51 Vasili Mikheev, “Russia-China: ‘Reloading’ the Relationship”, Russian Politics and Law, Vol. 49, No. 6 (November-December 2011), p. 79. 52 Evgenii Verlin and Vladislav Inozemtsev, “Russia-China: Time for a Course Correction”, Russian Politics and Law, Vol. 49, No. 6 (November-December 2011), pp. 63, 66. 53 Joshua Cooper Ramo, The Beijing Consensus, The Foreign Policy Centre, pp. 3-4, at http:// fpc.org.uk/fsblob/244.pdf [last visited 5 December 2012]. 54 Voskressenski, “The Three Structural Changes of Russo-Chinese Cooperation after the Collapse of the USSR”, p. 11. 55 Mikheev, “Russia-China: ‘Reloading’ the Relationship”, pp. 79-80. 56 Rangsimaporn, Russia as an Aspiring Great Power in East Asia, pp. 74-75. 57 Gilbert Rozman, “Strategic Thinking about the Russian Far East”, Problems of Post- Communism, Vol. 55, No. 1 (January/February 2008), p. 37. 58 Stephen Blank, “At a Dead End: Russian Policy and the Russian Far East”, Demokratizatsiya, Vol. 17, No. 2 (Spring 2009), pp. 123-124, 130. 59 Vilya G.Gelbras, “Rossiya i Kitay v Usloviyah Global’nogo Krizisa” (Russia and China Amidst the Global Crisis), Mirovaya Ekonomika I Mejdunarodnye Otnosheniya, No. 11 (2011), pp. 68-70. 60 Ibid., p. 67. 61 Verlin and Inozemtsev, “Russia-China: Time for a Course Correction”, p. 62. 62 Ibid., p. 86; Alexey D. Vosskresenski, “Osnovnye vyzovy i riski vostochnoaziatskih regional’nyh otnosheny Rossii” (Major Challenges and Risks to Russian Regions’ Relations with East Asia), in Alexey D. Vosskresenski (ed.), Bol’shaya Vostochnaya Aziya: Mirovaya Politica i Regionalnye Transformatsii (Greater East Asia: World Politics and Regional Transformations), Moscow, MGIMO-University, 2011, pp. 254-258. 63 Alexei D. Voskressenski, “Perspektivy rossiyskoy vneshney politiki na vostochnoaziatskom napravlenii” (Russia’s East Asia Foreign Policy Prospects), in Alexei D. Voskressenski (ed.),

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Bol’shaya Vostochnaya Aziya: Mirovaya Politica i Regionalnye Transformatsii (Greater East Asia: World Politics and Regional Transformations), Moscow, MGIMO-University, 2011, pp. 312, 317; Jeffry Mankoff, Russian Foreign Policy: The Return of Great Power Politics, Plymoth, Rowman & Littlefield, 2011, p. 178, 209. 64 Among others, see: Voskressenski, “The Three Structural Changes of Russo-Chinese Cooperation”, pp. 1-13, Mikheev, “Russia-China: ‘Reloading’ the Relationship,” pp. 74-93, Verlin and Inozemtsev, “Russia-China: Time for a Course Correction”, pp. 54-73. 65 Verlin and Inozemtsev, “Russia-China: Time for a Course Correction”, p. 62. 66 Rozman, “Strategic Thinking about the Russian Far East”, p. 41. 67 Alexei Fenenko, “APEC Remains an American Project”, at http://valdaiclub.com/asia/48800. html [last visited 28 February 2013]. 68 Expert Journal, at http://expert.ru/2012/09/10/sammit-na-vyirost/ [last visited 6 March 2013]. 69 Ria-novosti News Agency, at http://www.ria.ru/economy/20120428/637185553.html [last visited 1 May 2012]. 70 Ministry for Development of Russian Far East, at http://minvostokrazvitia.ru/ [last visited 28 February 2013]. 71 Alexandr Panov, Rossiya i Yaponiya: Stanovlenie i Razvitie Otnosheniy v Kontse XX – Nachale XXI Veka (Russia and Japan: The Establishment and Development of Bilateral Relations at the end of the 20th – beginning of the 21st century), Moscow, Izvestiya, 2007, p. 76. 72 Ibid., p. 144. 73 Ministry of Economic Development of the Russian Federation, Ekonomicheskoe Sotrudnichestvo so Stranami Azii i Afriki (Economic Cooperation with Asian and African countries), at http://www.economy.gov.ru/minec/activity/sections/foreignEconomicActivity/ cooperation/economicAA/ [last visited 30 November 2012]. 74 Dmitry Streltsov, “Moskva I Tokio: vyiti iz spyachki” (Moscow and Tokyo: how to end hibernation), Rossiya v Global’noi Politike (Russia in Global Politics), at http://www. globalaffairs.ru/number/Moskva-i-Tokio-vyiti-iz-spyachki-15365 [last visited 28 February 2013]. 75 Rangsimaporn, Russia as an Aspiring Great Power in East Asia, pp. 125-128. 76 Younkyoo Kim and Stephen Blank, “Russia and the Six-Party Process in Korea: Moscow’s Quest for Great Power Status”, Problems of Post-Communism, Vol. 57, No. 4 (July/August 2010), pp. 38-39. 77 Ibid., pp. 41-42. 78 Georgy Toloraya, “The Security Crisis in Korea and its International Context: Sources and Lessons from a Russian Perspective”, The Korean Journal of Defence Analysis, Vol. 23, No. 3 (September 2011), pp. 347-348. 79 “Rail Link Between Russia and North Korea Repaired”, at ajw.asahi.com/article/asia/ korean_peninsula/AJ2011101414514 [last visited 8 December 2012]. 80 Czeslaw Tubilewicz, “The Little Dragon and the Bear: Russian-Taiwanese Relations in the Post-Cold War Period”, The Russian Review, Vol. 61 (April 2002), pp. 296-297. 81 Rangsimaporn, Russia as an Aspiring Great Power in East Asia, p. 111.

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82 Kolotov, Main Trends of Russia’s Foreign Policy in Transforming East and Southeast Asia. 83 Evgeny Kanaev, “Fenomen ‘Driver’s Seat’”, Mejdunarodnaya Jizn (International Affairs), No.10 (October 2010), pp. 33-34. 84 Rangsimaporn, Russia as an Aspiring Great Power in East Asia, p. 157. 85 Ekaterina Koldunova, “Post-Crisis Regional Cooperation in East Asia: New Trends and Developments”, in Lorenzo Fioramonti (ed.), Regions and Crises: New Challenges to Contemporary Regionalisms, Basingstoke, Palgrave, 2012, p. 205. 86 Rangsimaporn, Russia as an Aspiring Great Power in East Asia, pp. 62-65. 87 Ibid., p. 67. 88 Vyacheslav Nikonov, “Article”, Russia as a Euro-Pacific Power: New Trends in Asian Regional Architecture and Russia’s Role in Asia, p. 86. 89 Victor Sumsky, “The Enlargement of the East Asia Summit: the Reasons and Implications of Bringing Russia in”, in Victor Sumsky, Mark Hong, and Amy Hugg (eds.), ASEAN- Russia: Foundations and Future Prospects, Singapore, ISEAS, 2012, pp. 68-69. 90 Koldunova, “Post-Crisis Regional Cooperation in East Asia”, pp. 202-204. 91 Ekaterina Koldunova, “Defitsit Liderstva v Vostochnoy Azii: Shansy Dlya Maluh I Srednih Stran” (Leadership Deficit in East Asia: Chances for Small and Middle States), Mezhdunarodnye Protsessy (International Trends), Vol. 9, No. 2 (May-August 2011). 92 Sumsky, “The Enlargement of the East Asia Summit”, p. 71-72. 93 Ibid., p. 75-76. 94 Koldunova, “Defitsit liderstva v Vostochnoy Azii”. 95 Rangsimaporn, Russia as an Aspiring Great Power in East Asia, p. 109. 96 Viktor Sumskiy, “Article”, Russia as a Euro-Pacific Power: New Trends in Asian Regional Architecture and Russia’s Role in Asia, pp. 124-125. 97 Ekaterina Koldinova, “Article”, Russia as a Euro-Pacific Power: New Trends in Asian Regional Architecture and Russia’s Role in Asia, p. 109. 98 Rozman, “Strategic Thinking about the Russian Far East”, p. 36. 99 Rozman, Nosov and Watanabe (eds.), Russia and East Asia, p. 5. 100 Rangsimaporn, Russia as an Aspiring Great Power in East Asia, p. 156. 101 Koldunova, “Defitsit liderstva v Vostochnoy Azii”. 102 Voskressenski, “Perspektivy Rossiyskoy Vneshney Politiki Na Vostochnoaziatskom Napravlenii”, p. 314. 103 For more details, see, Sergey Lavrov, “O Predmete I Metode Sovremennoi Diplomatii” (About the Subject and Method of Contemporary Diplomacy), at http://interaffairs.ru/ print.php?item=377 [last visited 10 November 2012]. 104 Koldinova, “Article”, pp. 109-110. 105 Voskressenski, “Perspektivy Rossiyskoy Vneshney Politiki Na Vostochnoaziatskom Napravlenii”, pp. 316-317.

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