Technology has been both a boon and a bane to powered tanks. We go home at night to our satellite- commanders since someone organized the first transmitted newspaper and satellite TV. We might talk military unit. Each new development spawned reas- to the folks on a fiber-optic line about our new com- sessment and adaptation of thought, theory, and tac- pact laser disc player, video camera, or computer. If tics. For every technological advantage. there has al- we get sick, we can opt for orthoscopy, laser surgery, ways been and will continue to be a method or tech- or an artificial heart. nique to overcome it. This process has not always been quick, but eventual. How can leaders deal with or possibly keep up with what the microchip has done to our warfighting The Roman legionary's pilum and gladius capability? It seems that no sooner do we learn one dominated the world for centuries. But by the time of system, than another more advanced one takes its Hastings in 1066, the mailed rider rode supreme across place. While it took 20 years to go from the M4A3E8 Europe. The armored knight, in tum, proved vulnerable Sherman to the M60A1 Patton. some armored units to the crossbow in the next century. By 1346, English transitioned from the M60A1 to M60A3 to Mi to M1A1 longbowmen proved their weapons' superiority in ac- in only about five years. curacy, range, and penetration. At Crecy, they were able to dispatch six arrows for each one they received. The obvious answer is that we cannot keep up. The crossbow was obsolete. We cannot costeffectively fund and field the latest technological gizmo continually. We can master what Almost a century earlier, Roger Bacon announced we have this month, this year, this decade, and that the formula for gunpowder. But it took a generation for means training. (See "Commander's Hatch," page 5). it to be well known, 60 years for its application in mis- We do not have the time to divert a tank crewman sile propulsion, and nearly two hundred years until its from his job for long. There is too much to know, too use in the arquebus, the first matchlock am. which much to practice. was to dominate infantry tactics for two centuries. We can have a firm reliance on those principles For the last eight decades, technological develop- that have essentially changed little since the times of ment has moved at an exponentially increasing rate, Alexander or Caesar: readiness, surprise, ingenuity, outdistancing all that came before. Since World War 11, and leadership. When you strip away the steel, you we have witnessed an explosion of technology that was find the operating element that makes the weapons incomprehensible in 1940 to all but a few. That ex- system valuable: men. As a former military editor of plosion has compressed time and its corresponding the "New York Times," Hanson W. Baldwin, put it, learning curve to weeks and months instead of genera- "Neither policies nor machines will determine the his- tions and decades. tory of tomorrow. Man is the measure of all things ... This, then, is the ultimate battlefield: the hearts and Consider the impact of technology in just the last minds of men." ten years. In our profession we have laser rangefinding, stealth aircraft, SDI, helmet-mounted aircraft sights, - PJC robotics, multiple-warheadmunitions, and turbine-

_____ ~~ ~

By Order of the Secretary of the Army:

Official:

R. L. DILWORTH CARL E. VUONO Brigadier General, United States Army General, United States Army The Adjutant General Chief of Staff The Professional Development Bulletin of the Armor Branch PB 17-87-5 (Test)

FEATURES

Editor-in-Chief 8 First Honorary Professors Named MAJOR PATRICK J. COONEY 9 How is the UCOFT Working Out? Managing Editor by Major Mark C. Thomson JON T. CLEMENS 13 Push-Pull Logistics Commandant by Captain William Hedges MG THOMAS H. TAlT 16 A Light Set For the M577 CP Vehicle by Command and Staff Dept, USAARMS ARMOR (ISSN 0004-2420) is published bimonthly by the U.S. Army Armor Center, 4401 Vine Grove Road, Fort Knox, KY 40121. 17 On the Track of the CAT Disclaimer: The information contained In by the 3d AD and V Corps CAT Team ARMOR represents the professional opinions of the authors and does not necessarily reflect the official Army or TRADOC position, nor does it 21 Winners! change or supersede any information by Captain Lionel Ortiz and Captain Brian Butcher presented in other official Army publications. Official distribution is limited to one copy for 25 The Destruction of Task Force Baum each heavy brigade headquarters, armored cavalry regiment headquarters, armor battalion by Captain James B. Hickey headquarters, armored cavalry squadron head- quarters, reconnaissance squadron head- 1' quarters, armored cavalry troop, armor com- 33 Le Regiment de Hussards Parachutistes pany, and motorized brigade headquarters of by Captain Emmanuel Legendre the United States Army. In addition, Army libraries, Army and DOD schools, HQ DA and MACOM staff agencies with responsibility for ar- mored, direct fire, ground combat systems, or- DEPARTMENTS ganizatlons, and the training of personnel for such organizations may request two copies by Letters sending a military letter to the editor-inchief. 2 Authorized Content: ARMOR will print only 2 Points of Contact those materials for which the U.S. Army Armor 5 Commander's Hatch Center has proponency. That proponency in- 6 Driver's Seat cludes: all armored, direct-fire ground combat systems that do not sewe primarily as infantry 7 Recognition Quiz carriers; all weapons used exclusively in these 37 Professional Thoughts systems or by CMF 19-series enlisted soldiers: 48 Recognition Quiz Answers any miscellaneous items of equipment which armor and armored cavalry organizations use 49 The Bustle Rack exclusively; training for all SC 12A, 128. and 52 Books 12C officers and for all CMF-19series enlisted soldiers: and information concerning the train- ing, logistics, history, and leadership of armor and armored cavalry units at the brigadelregi- Second-class official mail postage paid at Fort Knox, KY, and ment level and below, to include Threat units at additional mailing offices. Send address changes to ARMOR, ATTN: those levels. ATSBMAG, Fort Knox, KY, 40121. Material may be reprinted, provided credit Is given to ARMOR and to the author, except where copyright is indicated. Distribution Restriction: Approved for public release; distribution is November-December 1987 Vol XClV No. 6 unlimited. Shermans Could Do the Job and anyone else who is interested In this out three Panthers while supporting the subject, read the history of the 740th Tank 119th Infantry Regiment, 30th Infantry Dear Sir: Battalion. Division.

Having read LTC Robert P. Kingsbury's My battalion entered combat on Decem- Later on, the 740th supported the 504th letter, "WWII Tank Deficiencies," (ARMOR, ber 19, 1944. three days after the Battle of Parachute Infantry Regiment, 82nd Air- September-October, 1987), I felt that LTC the Bulge began. As first action that day borne Division, in the Bulge, and was the Kingsbury was probably very sincere, but was at the Stoumont (Belgium) railway sta- only tank battalion to receive a much misinformed at the same time. While it is tion where, with war-weary used tanks coveted letter of thanks from the 82nd's true that the M4 Sherman was nowhere picked up at an ordnance depot, the CG, MG James Gavin. (Check our history near the German Tiger with its 88-mm 740th proceeded into combat without book, "Daredevil Tankers", by LTC Rubel. main gun, it certainly had no real problem radios and without much of the standard A's in the Patton Museum - I put it there.) with the Mark IV and the Mark V Panther. equipment that a Sherman was sup- posed to have. After exactly one half hour Sure, the Sherman had shortcomings, 1 would recommend that LTC Kingsbury, of combat, our Company C had knocked but so did the German tanks. What it all

(Note: Fort Knox AUTOVON prefix is 464. DIRECTORY - Points of Contact Commercial prefix is Area Code 502-624-m).

ARMOR Editorial Off ices U.S. Army Armor Center

Editor-in-Chief Commandant (ATZK-CG) Major Patrick .I. Cooney 2249 MG Thomas H. Tail 2121 Mnnaging Editor Assistant Commandant (ATSB-AC) Jon T. Clcmcns 2249 c'( )L (P) Dennis V. C'rumley 7555 Assistant Editor Deputy Assistant Commandant (ATSB-DAC) Rohert E. Rogge 2610 COL Clnude L. Clark 1050 Production Assistant Comniand Sergeant Major Vivian Thompson 2610 CSM .lohn M. Stephens 49.52 Contributing Artist Maintenance Dept. (ATSB-MA) SFC Robert Torsrud 2610 C'OL Garry P. Hivson 8346 Command and Sttiff kpt. (ATSB-CS) MAILING ADDRESS ARMOR, ATTN ATSB- COL A.W. Kremer 585s MA(;, Fort Knox, KY 40121-5210 Weapons Systems Dept. (ATSB-WP) LTC George R. Wallace 1055 ARTICLE SURMISSIONS: To improve speed and Dir. of Training & Doctrine (ATSB-DOTD) accuracy in editing, manuscripts should be origin.

2 ARMOR - November-December 7987 boiled down to was training. Our battalion losing one. A monument is standing in had the best training under our LTC that town in memory of our battalion. We Rubel. Other tank units did not have this then went on to the Battle of the Bulge, training and, because of this, many would and history speaks for itself of what we not advance when things got hot. Perhaps did there, along with the 4th AD and cigar- this was the problem LTC Kingsbury ran chewing COL Creighton Abrams (later, into. the M1 Abrams tank was named after him). The 704th was the constant point for While I'm at it, I'd like to comment on Abrams 37th Tk. Bn. of M4 Shermans. the "beret controversy." But to die at the hands of "Sergeant First of all, what is so wonderful about a York" in the Bannholtz Woods is a dis- beret? We never had them and, in fact, grace, to be lied to by a Silver Star-seek- used to laugh at the foreign armies that ing sergeant... I'd pay his fare and take wore them. We, as Armor troops, were M18 "Hellcat"Tank Destroyer him with us when we stand at the grave proud of the fact that we and Cavalry of my tank sergeant and his crew, at were the only troops authorized to wear pany commander was furious that we Hamm Cemetery, Luxembourg, when we our overseas caps on the LEFT side of the were being led by an infantry sergeant in go in 1989... head. while all other troops wore them on the attack. Well, the five M18s from the the -right side. When we wore the Fort first platoon of B Co. followed the ser- HARRY E. TRAYNOR Knox-style cap with the front peak lower geant - we'll call him Sergeant York here Erial. NJ than the back peak, we thought we - to our doom. looked pretty sharp. While we're at it, what ever happened to the branch colors? He led us to the edge of the woods and Author's Correction Green piped with white was Armor's color. said there were two dead Tigers at the edge of the woods that he and his men Dear Sir: Sure, I'm old-fashioned, and an old sol- had knocked out. We made one mistake: In reading through my article in your dier that wonl fade away, but gosh, tank we didn't ask him how or with what. September-October issue ("Combat Gun- troops look sharp with a crash helmet on nery: Observations from the NTC), I while in a tank and with a Fort Knox-style I went first, with at least 500 yards be- noticed that you listed me as chief of live overseas cap with green and white piping tween each tank. Our tank, called Blondie, fire for three years. I am not sure how 1 when in dress uniform. lurched forward, and we soon came managed to create that impression. I was abreast of the two Tigers. They seemed assigned to the NTC for 18 months, not Why do today's troops want to look like dead enough, at the time. We then almost three years. All other facts are correct. the British Army? Let them look like us. took one across our turret from a (Ger- man) bazooka team. We sent them to DOUGLAS B. CAMPBELL glory. Suddenly, a Panther tank came LTC, Armor HARRY F. MILLER upon us, but one shot with our armor- FRG Secy., 740 Tk. Bn. Assn. piercing shell, and we got him. Fort Worth TX We made it to the edge of the woods and locked ourselves in be- tween two large trees. Dead Tigers, Indeed! Looking down the slope, we Dear Sir: nailed a Tiger heading toward us in the woods, and suddenly, it A fellow tanker from the 704th Tank looked like the whole damn Ger- Destroyer Battalion, 4th AD, sent me a man army of panzers was coming copy of your September issue. He and I at us. are quite enraged over the letter from Robert Kingsbury about Wl tank Johnny, my tank commander, deficiencies. The letter referred to the ac- barked, "Let's get the hell out of tion at Bannholtz Woods. here!", but Blondie didn't respond (batteries were always her 1 was a Tech Four driver at the time, in downfall.) With that, the sleeping first platoon of B Co.,using M18 Hellcats. Tigers to our rear suddenly came We were called upon by the 94th Infantry to life (Thanks, Sarge!) and we to knock out a makeshift pillbox. One took a direct hit in the engine shot, and that pillbox was history. compartment. All the TDs to my rear also got nailed. The first platoon was then called upon to attack the Bannholtz Woods. As always, In 1989, the 704th TD Bn. is we responded, but a strange turn of going back to Europe, following events then took place: we were to take the route through the same towns our orders from none other than one of we fought through - Avranches, Kingsbury's famous sergeants that he for one, where the first platoon praises so loudly in his letter. Our com- destroyed 20 tanks while only

ARMOR - November-December 7987 3 I feel that this should continue as it adds tual turret armour, it must be something Two-man Tank both a personal and professional touch. fairly important. Perhaps the present "box" Not Offense-Oriented GARY H. PENDLETON is not in fact the actual item of equipment LTC, ARMOR for which this spot was created, but is Dear Sir: NCARNG merely something else which has been placed there for the time being as a mat- The article, "The Two-Man Tank" ter of convenience. One possibility might (January-February, 1987 ARMOR). is an in- Speculation on the AT-8 Kobra be a system intended to complement the teresting idea, but the design is highly im- smoke dischargers in their role of defend- practical. Here are just a few reasons why: Dear Sir: ing the tank. Perhaps something to con- fuse the seekers of top-attack weapons 0 In the two-man tank design, neither ...Cap tain Nimon's letter concerning the deployed by cargo-rounds and CBUs? crew member has clear observation of the AT4 system (MayJune ARMOR) struck a flanks or rear from his position in the hull. particular chord with me, although I Its forward position on the turret does, This is a critical flaw, as no tank battle will wonder if the system is not perhaps even however, suggest that it is intended to be fought with purely frontal engage- simpler than he suggests. deal with something which will be in front ments. Further, neither crewman has a of the tank at least some of the time. commanding view of the battlefield. Tar- *Does the projectile in fact need to Were this not so, it would surely have get acquisition time would be greatly in- guided? Might it not rather be a homing been placed in a less vulnerable position creased because of this, plus only two projectile for which the target can be more to the rear of the turret top. Let us sets of eyes are scanning, instead of four. designated by the rangefinding laser, per- see some more thoughts on the AT4 and Also, none of the crewmen are in a posi- haps operating in an additional mode? the mysterious box. tion to guide the tank through difficult ter- This would do away with the need to tie in rain (part of the TC's job presently). All- a sometimes-mounted, poorly-protected HELMOED-ROMER HEITMAN around observation would be poor, external box on the turret with an other- Lt South African Infantry Corps making command and control totally de- wise well-thoughtaut system. The idea of Cape Town, SA pendent on radio. that box forming part of the AT-8 system has never struck me as convincing. 0 Another point Is crew size. A two- Editor's Note man crew would be dogged in combat. *The concept of a homing rather than a Breaking track and other maintenance guided projectile would also fit in Well Because of a production fouiup in our would take considerably longer or be im- with firing by platoons. Only one tank of last issue, we placed the wrong unit crest possible if one man is to remain on radio the platoon would need to expose Itself to in the unit history of the 263d Armor, watch. In addition, security requirements, initiate effective engagements at long which appeared on the back cover. In this such as manning OPs, would reduce the range by designating targets for the other issue, we are re-running the unit history effectiveness of the two-man crew greatly two or three tanks, which could remain tur- with the proper crest. -Ed. over a short period of time. retdown. With two to four rounds homing on the designated target at the same AGS Obit Premature 0 The 15parcent weight reduction is time, the actual homing system would not not really enough to make this concept at- need to be particularly good - a 50-per- Dear Sir: tractive (considering that 15 percent from cent hit rate would be quite adequate. 60 tons is 51 tons, still a large vehicle). The designating tank might itself not fire This letter is in response to 1LT D.B. at all during this phase of the engage- Miller's letter in the July-August issue of 0 What this tank amounts to is a purely ment, thereby further reducing the chan- ARMOR. LT Miller makes a number of in- defensive weapons platform that would ces of being observed and engaged. teresting and cogent points. rely heavily on infantry support. Not only While certainly more suited to a defensive would this change AirLand Battle role, this approach could also have its I take issue with him on one critical Doctrine, which is offenseariented, it uses in taking out point targets in an at- Item, however. The Armored Gun System would limit the mobility of the tank (one tack and, of course, in dealing with is not dead. It is very much alive. The U.S. of the calling cards of Armor). counterattacks. Army Tank-Automotive Command (TACOM) has crafted a fine acquisition Personally, 1 would rather see the battle *Does the projectile need to be a sophis- strategy to place the AGS in the hands of and have a four-man crew, in lieu of a ticated HEAT top-attack one? Given the the troops in the 4th quarter of Fiscal Year less expensive, supposedly more surviv- very thin top armour of almost all ar- 1992. As late as 29 July, the Chief of able two-man tank. moured vehicles, would not HESHWEP or Staff of the Army was briefed. and he en- a simple forward firing HEAT round do the dorses it fully... JAMES P. MARSHALL job just as well, given only that its fusing 2LT, Armor can handle the very oblique impact I fully agree with 1LT Miller on the need FRG angle? Would a simple solid penetrator - for the system and share his frustration perhaps with a soft cap to reduce the over its seemingly interminable gestation He MiS8eS the Bio Photos chance of it glancing off - not in fact do period. US. industry is ready; all we need the job just as well once it has been are dollars. Dear Sir: homed to this vulnerable area? DOUGLAS R. BURGESS The new layout and text of ARMOR is *This leaves the turret-top box to be con- COL, Armor flne. except for the omission of the sidered. Given that a special spot has TRADOC System Mgr., Tank Systems authors' photograph. been created for it by reshaping the ac-

4 ARMOR - November-December 7987 MG Thomas H. Tait Commanding General U.S. Army Armor Center

Loving Soldiers

assignment, stating he owed his promotions to his prowess as a com- One of our great soldier Icadcrs, that will make him shine as a mem- pany clerk and knew little ahout in- the recently retired General Bill Liv- ber of your team. fantry weapons, tactics, or leader- sey, used to implore his subordinate ship. commanders to love their soldiers. However, the right training cn- It was also understood by those sub- vironmcnt is not always provided He was assigned anyway. The ordinates that some soldiers re- the soldiers we send you. For ex- chief had just seen the severely quired more loving than others. ample, if you have a soldier who has wounded sergeant at Camp Drake. been trained as a NK, and you are He had expressed his dismay at the Just what did he mean when he using him in the supply room, arms sergeant’s wounds (he had been asked his commanders to love their room, or wherever (many of our Ex- stitched across the chest with an soldiers? cellence in Armor soldiers wind up AK47). The sergeant replied that as a jecp or HMMV driver), his wounds didn‘t matter. What real- To most. it meant providing them good and justitiiihle reasons, what Iy hurt was the realization that the with the best training possible, at actions are you taking to insure he other members of his team were the same time treating the soldicr retains, sustains, and improves his killed because he didn‘t know what right; being fair and providing skills as a tanker? II you misusc the he was doing. mcchanisms and procedures to take soldier and don’t provide him with care of their families. the propcr trainins, the consequen- The point of this vignette is that ces can be catastrophic. our soldiers who are working out- At the Armor Center today, we side their primary MOS must be believe that loving soldiers means to 1 ran across a tragic example of trained. They must he given the op- provide them with tough, realistic, this while a patient at the Army portunity to not only sustain thcir meaningful training. If we provide hospital at Camp Drake, Japan. The skills, hut to improve them as well. you with untrained soldiers, we are division personnel warrant (25th In- If you love them, you’ll find a way to giving you a battlefield liability that fantry Division), a crusty CW4, had provide them the training they need can result in disaster for the trooper been evacuated from Vietnam he- and deserve. and his comrades. Hopefully, you cause of a very painful bout with understand that the trooper we kidney stones. He was depressed, As you have been told on provide you Irom our OSUT and upon inquiry, related the follow- numerous occasions, our most pre- brigade is highly motivated, but not ing tale. cious asset is our soldiers, and our fully trained. greatest advantage over all our A few weeks earlier, a young ser- potcntial enemies is the ability and geant of infantry had been assigned motivation of these soldiers. They We simply do not have him long to a battalion to lill a team Icadcr’s are entrusted to your care to lead, enough and are not provided sufli- slot. This was post-Tct, casualties train, and, to again quote General cient dollars to train him the way wcre high, and it was conceivahle Livsey, love them. Do it. you‘d like him. He is capable, and it that he might cntl up as a squad is up to you to provide the finish leader. The sergeant protestcd the Treat ’Em Rough!

I ARMOR - November-December 1987 5 I TheNewANCOC: Are You PreDared? the critical tasks tested frequently at critical points. I needed to assume the The student must demonstrate most by MSG Harold R. Allen, Guest Columnist rnlc of a platoon tasks hands-on, using sand tables, leader in the troop or terrain boards, and innovative train- (IIfSGAll~11 is tlic first sergeant of the ANCOC company scenario." ing devices such as SIMNET, detaclintsit, NCO AcadenivlDrill Scrgeant School.) We cannot afford lo UCOFT, and other computer-based continue teaching instruction. The NCO must pass Starting in April 1988, there will lower skill levels in ANCOC. each critical test point or return to be a totally new advanced course his parent unit as an academic for t he Armor noncommissioned of- The tasks, all at skill lcvel 4, will failure. Iicer and, in August 1088, for the be taught in a combat scenario in to- cavalry NCO. The new course will tally integrated instruction. Soldiers This new course is a giant step for- stress the company/troop structure must demonstmte proficiency in ward for the NCO Corps. CMF 19 and small group instruction. Stu- the lower skill levels prior to atten- NCOs are developing and writing dents will fill various positions, in- dance in the new course. This must the course; they run it for themsel- cluding platoon sergeant, platoon be emphasized. The NCO who is ves. leader, lSG, and commander within not proficient at the tank com- the student company, and will per- mander level will have an extremely The course will produce a highly form these roles as they would in a hard time completing the course. trained noncommissioned officer, regular TO&E unit. As Icaders, Job proficiency is both a unit and in- one capable of assuming, if neces- they will rate subordinates. and will dividual responsibility. Unit leaders sary, leadership positions at the in turn receive ratings when others must ensure that their personnel platoon leader, company/troop com- rotate (approximatly every 14 days) can atlain and maintain this mander level with a greater con- to leadership positions. proficicncy. lidence and technical proficiency. With this increased flexibility. com- How is this course developed? But, what about NCOs coming niandcrs can train more realistically The right way - through the sys- from assignments outside the MOS, during pcacetime tactical exercises tems approach to training. such as drill sergeants or recruiting by simulating casualties in the unit NCOs? These students will have to leadership, thus forcing unit platoon Platoon sergeants from the Armor attend and successfully complcte sergeants to take charge, something force worldwide came to Fort Knox the Tank Commander's Certilica- which will surely happen during ac- and developed the initial task list tion Course (TC3) or the Scout tual conflicts. and job analysis for both the armor Commandcr Certification Course and cavalry platoon sergeants. This (SC3) before coming to ANCOC. method provided a wealth of job NCOs selected for ANCOC must comparisons, experience. and actual The success of the course will be able to pass the APn, must job requirements, whcther the in- depend on the ability of each staff meet the weight standards dividual was assigned to the 11th sergeant or sergeant first class to prescribed by AR 600-9, and must ACR in Europe; the 1st ID (Mech) work with his peers in the small be competent in skill levels 1 at Fort Riley, KS; tlic 3d ACR at group instruction method - 16 stu- through 3. The NCO's SQT should Fort Bliss, TX; or with the 2d ID in dents (platoon-size), in the mor reflect his job competence, and he Korea. course, or eight students (ap- should be prepared to instruct clas- proximate section size) in the caval- ses. He must have the willingness to The task list and interviews with ry ANCOC. Each NCO will put in long, hard hours of research the incumbents produced an prepare and present instruction to and review, as well as help sturlcnts ANCOC battle focus: "To train the his peers while his small group who fall behind. Make no mistake technically proficient noncommis- leader evaluates him. He will have about it; this will be a hard charging sioned officer in the skill level 4 to study hard and do more research course, a cliallcnge to the noncom- tasks he needs to function as a than the current course requires. missioned officer, both Pactically platoon sergeant, and provide him Performance and knowledge will be and technically.

ARMOR - November-December 7987 I

C'reighton Abram:s ouring me ww- II battle. ClOL L each subsequently commanded the 1 lth ACR in Viet- nam and served E IS Chief of Armor Branch. In July 1969, COL COL Leach ofk rs unique and im- James Leach, portant insights into the evolution of above, then com- Armor tactics, dc Ictrine, and tech- mander of the 11th nolog from WPdll through Viet- Armored Cavalry nani. A recipien11 ol the Distin- Regiment, walks guislicd Scrvice

8 ARMOR - November-December 7 98 7 How Is the UCOFT Working Out?

So far, UCOFT Crews Seem to Be Faster Getting First-Round Hits

by Major Mark C. Thomson The Unit Conduct of Fire Trainer (UCOFT) is reaching the field in in- creasing numbers and is proving to be a real asset to tank gunnery train- ing. In order to assess the impact and to gain insight into the best strategy for its use, the TRADOC Analysis Command (TRAC) and the Armor Center conducted a UCOFT Post Fielding Training Ef- fectiveness Analysis (PFTEA). The study is complete, the results com- piled and analyzed. The study showed the UCOFT to be a sig- nificant factor in improving and sus- USAREUR M1 tank battalions. from the USAARMS Weapons taining tank crews in gunnery perfor- Five of the participating battalions Department administered a mance. Crews trained on UCOFT had the UCOFT, and the sixth was UCOFT test to all tank com- tended to be faster with no loss in a baseline unit without the UCOFT. manders and gunncrs. This test con- accuracy than those who trained Unit officers, NCOs, and civilians sisted of 11 engagements, four of only with !he standard devices, and gathered training data throughout which closely resembled correspond- they carried that edge over to the the study, but three major events for ing tasks on Tank Table VIII. The sustainment of those skills. each battalion were the key drivers TRAC analysts administered ques- of the effort. tionnaires to the same group and The year-long study, a cooperative conducted interviews with key per- effort between Fort Knox and the The first major event was one sonnel in the battalion. The non- Grafenwoehr Field Office of TRAC- week of UCOFT testing, interviews, UCOFT battalion received a White Sands Missile Range, re- and questionnaires administered to shorter visit in which questionnaires quired a detailed examination of the each UCOFT-equipped battalion in and interviews were done in the tank gunnery programs of six the study. This took place ap- same manner. proximately 30 days before the unit’s qualification gunnery density. The second event was the bat- Table 1. Two UCOFT instructor/operalors talion’s scheduled qualification tank gunnery density, in which the crews fired Tank Table VI11 (‘IT VIII), Corn arison of Tank Table Wll Resutts for &OFT and Non-UCOFT Groups the tank crew qualification exercise. The range operation was the stand- Test Group Number Total Robability Opening Times ard VI11 conducted by the 7th of Crew Score of lsl Round Hit Offensive+ Defensive+ Overall* TT Army Training Command at Grafen- NonUCOFT Bn 56 763 78 7.3 4.1 5.7 woehr Training Area (Range 117). UCOFT Bns 291 792 77 5.9 3.4 4.7 SaUsUcdly aignilicml differsme. P-z.01. T-Test The last event was a return by 15

ARMOR - November-December 1987 9 Relationship Between Change in lTVlll Scores And UCOFT Matrix Status at Special TTVlll Table 2

>than100ptdrop tthan100pointdrop tthan100poMgain >than100pointgain

SIGNIFICANT CORRELATION FOR NON-UCOFT GROUP p .05 50- 45

41 40-

29 29 29 30-

20-

10 -

0

NON UCOFT GROUP RETICLE AIM GROUP RmcuAIM GROUP

(N=14) 1-2 (N=42) 3-7 (N=31)

crews from each hattalion to Grafen- The test had six ohjectives. These 1,000-point scale of the table, woehr to fire TT VI11 again. This were distilled from the original ques- UCOFT-trained crews in the upper event took place approximately tions posed by the undersecrctary of part of the matrix fired an average three months after their qualifica- the Army. of 50 points higher than the non- tion gunnery, in order to examine UCOFT crews, and did it with an the sustainment of the gunnery train- The first objective was to dcter- opening time that was nearly 1.2 ing. Six M1 tanks came from war mine how effective the UCOFT was seconds fastcr (Table 1). reserve stocks and moved to GTA in predicting crew performance on for the firing. Each crew fired the TT VIII. We made an engagement- Another objective was to deter- accuracy screening test immediately by-engagement comparison of four mine the contribution that the before the day run; no preliminary selected tasks fired on the UCOFT UCOR made to sustainment train- tables were allowed. Seventh ATC test with lour corresponding ones ing. A comparison between the first operated the range following stand- fired on TT V111. The results indi- and second qualification tables ard procedures and scoring. cated that there was no correlation provided the measures of effective- between performance on a ness for this issue. Again, matrix task fired on the UCOFT position achievement was the key test with its corresponding factor. While the non-UCOfl TEST DESIGN task fired on ?T VIII. group was evenly spread between However, when a crcw’s gaining and losing points on the UCOFr NO UCOFT progress on the UCOFT second TT VIII, the interesting Calibration 2 Bns 1 Bn matrix is compared to over- trend was established when the Table VI & VI1 all performance on TT UCOFf crews in the lower part of VIIJ, there is a significant the matrix and those in the uppcr Calibration 2 Bns X relationship. The farther a part of the matrix were examined. Table VI1 Only crew advanced in the More than 60 percent of the crews matrix, the better its score in the lower position lost points Table 3 and opening times on TT from one TT VI11 to the next. Near- VI11 tcnded to be. On the

70 ARMOR - November-December 7987 Comparison of Table VI1 Performance of Test Groups

TABLE Vlll RESULTS Number Table Vlll Probability Opening UCOFT Matrix Status of Crews Scores of 1st Rd. Hit Time* (secs.)

Non-UCOFT Bn. 56 762.7 80.4 5.72 Tables VI & VI1

UCOFT Bn. 174 784.3 78.6 4.86 Table VI1 Only

UCOFT Bn. 117 802.6 79.0 4.37 Tables VI & VI1

*Statistically Significant Difference. P.01

ly 75 percent of the crews in the restricted the amounts of ammuni- upper position gained points from tion allowed in thc preparatory tank Table 4. one iteration to the next, despite tahles fired before the first TT VIII. firing no preparatory tables before This was done by restricting those the more a crew fired in both the the second IT VI11 (Table 2). This units from firing IT VI, the main UCOFT and on the range, the indicated the UC'OFT to be an aid gun stationary table. No restrictions faster it was, with no loss in ac- to sustaining and improving crew were estahlished for TT VI1 or for curacy. The differences are par- proficiency. the other units. Again, the major dif- ticularly startling when comparing To answer the next ohjcctive, ference bctween groups occurred in offensive tasks, with a nearly two- three of the UCOFT battalions had opening times. As Table 4 shows, second average difference between the non-UCOFT battalion and the Relationship of Rounds Fired unit that used the UCOFT and U = UNQUALIFIED fired the complete preparatory Before TTVIII and TTVlll Q = QUALIFIED tables. S = SUPERIOR Qualification Status D = DISTINGUISHED As an adjunct to this ob.jective, we examined the rclationship between 35% the number or main gun rounds - 34% pg lired in the preparatory tables and the qualification rate. The general 30 - 28% 27% policy among all the battalions was that more ammunition went to the weaker crews in order to get them 9% of CREWS qualified. The test data found in 20 - Tnhlc 5 supports this. The addition- al rounds put a siglificant number of crews into the qualified or supe- rior areas, although it appears as 10 - though it was not enough to put more crews into the distinguished range.

CREWS THAT FIRED 0-20 ROUNDS CREWS THAT FIRED 21-54 ROUNDS Table 5. (N = 162) (N=185)

ARMOR - November-December 1987 17 I "....The UCOFT Post Fielding Test showed that UCOFT is a valuable training device that will enable our tankers to fire more quickly with no loss in accuracy..."

~~~ ~ The next objective was to deter- The UCOFT Post-Fielding Test them to get the most out of the mine the effects of turhulence. The completed its work in October 1986, device. To be faster on the draw, cgood news is that the UCOFT al- and the Defense Department and while maintaining or improving ac- leviated about 50 percent of the ef- major commands received briefings curacy, is a goal for which all fects of turhulence in tank gunnery. on the results from February titnkers constantly strive and seck The caveat to that is that turbulence through April J987. The test deter- better ways to attain. The UCOFT accounted for only about 1 to 2 per- mined four major findings: gives the Armor Force a first-rate cent of difference in results between training device that helps in working crews. This confirms what most toward that objective. tankers have always suspected: we can execute a crash program for tank gunnery with the troops we AUTHOR'S NOTE: The printan, have available, regardless of crew in- soiirces for this article are the wrtilts tegrity. Crew and unit cohesion is a briefing arid test report uvitteri by Mr. combat factor, hut is not necessarily Walt Biitler arid nk. C1iarIe.s Hiiglies a tank range problem. of tlte Grafeiiuveltr Field OJ3icc of TRAC-WSMR who were tlie lead The study was also intended IO arta!ysts for tlie test. Dr. Bnice Stirl- determine the perceptions that the ing arid hfr. Swede Berglririd of tlie crew and their leadership have of same ofice were also rtiajor con- the UCOW. The tcst found that tribiitors to tlte stud\' arid tlie report. the guys on the ground were ovcr- whelmingly positive about the 0 The UCOW substantially im- device - they use it and have found proves the quality of tank crew gun- it to be a valuable training tool. nery training. There are modilications the crews want to see, some of which have al- 0 More UCOFT training typically Major Mark C. Thomson ready led to implemented changes, results in improvcd gunnery pcrfor- was the Armor Center project hut the device was accepted as a mance. officer for the UCOFT PFTEA. very effective one. He was commissioned into 0 The UCOFT cannot be used as the Field Artillery in 1975. He The last study area was the units' an absolute predictor of TT VI11 served in howitzer batteries use of the UCOFT. At the time of performance. and, after a branch transfer the questionnaire and interview ad- to Armor, in a tank company ministration, there were restrictions 0 UCOFT users feel that the of the 3d ACR, with sub- on the amount of time a UCOFT UCOm substantially improves sequent assignments in could he used in a given wcck. The their home-station tank crew gun- USAREUR as BMO, tank use rate at that time was about two nery training. company commander, and hours pcr session, with each crew S3 in 1-35 Armor. He is cur- averaging one session per month. The UCOFT Post-Fielding Test rently assigned as an ORSA With modification of the main- showed that the UCOFT is a valu- analyst at the U.S. Army tenance agreement with the able training device that will enable Armor and Engineer Board. manufacturer, which increased the our tankers to fire more quickly, He received his BBA from number ol hours from 2,600 to 3,500 with no loss in accuracy. Recent Texas Christian University pcr year (with greater flexibility), Armor School UCOFT training and MSBA from Boston the overall use ratc has jumped con- strategy provides an effective guide University. He is a graduate siderably and continues lo climb. to commanders that will enable of the FAOBC and the AOAC.

I 72 ARMOR - November-December 7987 Push-Pull Logistics

by Captain William Hedges

The heavy task force crossed the This article outlines a technique, LD/LC at Ocil hours on the move- developed by the Third Battiilion, ment to contact. By 1300 hours, the 66th Armored Regiment, 2nd Ar- unit had attacked over 30 mored Division, that successfully kilometers. The MIS' fuel tanks suslained operations during its lY86 were down to 114 full; on-board am- rotation. munition was at 3-5 percent. The bat- talion would seize the objective Background within the hour, and a counterattack teams for the duration of the exer- was expected by nightfall. 3-66 Armor is a fully-modcrnized, cise. Resupply was on the way. The J-series, M1 tank battalion. Prior to prohlem was that the brigade sup- rotation, the unit had received and Prior to rotation, all the unit's port area (BSA) had not moved and fully integrated the Heavy Ex- leaders recognized that logistics was more than 50 kilometers away. panded Mobility Tactical Truck would play a key role in task force It would take the supply trucks a good 2-1/2 hours to reach the logistics release point (LRP), and a total of 5- 1/2 hours until resupply was completed. The S2 said that the enemy counterattack would occur within three hours of consolidation.

Is this an unlikely scenario? Probably not. At the National Training Center (NTC) this is an all-too-realistic situation, particularly during the live- fire portion ol t he exercise. The simple fact is that the supply of Class 111 (fuel), and Class V (ammunition) im- mediately available to the Newly issued HEMMT trucks played a role in unit's "push-pull logistics." task force from the combat trains is (HEMTT) fleet into the support operations even with the modern not sufficient to resupply the unit. It platoon. The support platoon (after HEMn fleet. The two major is merely intended to be an emer- task organization with an infantry obstacles to overcome in successful gency resupply available at critical battalion) had ten M998 fuel resupply operations would be: moments. H EMTTs (2,500-gallon capacity A wealth of information is avail- each) and ten MY97 cargo 0 Extendcd supply lines from the able concerning the difliculties of HEMTTs (12-ton load each). The BSA to the Forward Line of Troops sustaining the heavy task force in support platoon command and con- (FLOT)(in some cases 50 + km.). the attack, particularly at the Na- trol vehicle was a Wton M151A2 tional Training Center. This infor- with AN-VRC 47 radio set. 0 The impact that continuous mation does not appear to give any 3-66 Armor would cross-attach opcrations would have on resupply. easy, workable solutions to the with an intantry battalion for the problem of timely resupply in such rotation and would primarily consist Both of these factors would im- situations. of two tank and two mechanized pact heavily on timely resupply of

ARMOR - November-December 7987 13 the task force. To solve these land Battlefield, the need for CO/XO, would dclivcr this push problems, and to insure adequate routine resupply diminishes as the package to a forward LRP and lo and timely resupply, a concept task force participates in continuous the element with the most critical called "push-pull" logistics was operations. The supply systcm then need. developed. shifts emphasis from routine opera- tions to the sustainment of the task It is evident, under this system and Push-pull logistics is a relatively force and to the preparation for the with this mix, that the possibility ex- simple concept. The battalion S4 next battle. ists that class V delivery to a com- pushes supplies forward from the pany team may be short on one TF trains prior to receiving con- A push package is normally lo- item and over on another. This solidation reports from the units. cated in both the combat and field problem would Ti itself with the These same consolidation reports, trains. It is configured according to delivery of the next push package when received, serve to pull addi- the specific mission that the hat- and an ALC reconciliation. But tional supplies forward and to talion is conducting. In general remember, the central idea is that reconcile quantities of supplies al- resupply must reach the teams as ready received. The main idea be- quickly as possible. hind this concept is to resupply as much as possible, as quickly as pos- "...The major ad- The reconciliation between a com- sible, without having to wait for vantage of this system pany team's request for Class V and reports or requests from the units. is that no time is lost actual delivery in a push package is downloading and re- done at the ALC and transmitted to 3-66 Armor's primary concern was configuring the load to the support platoon leader/HHC with the time factor involved in correspond to an exact commander. logistics requests. That is, the time request for ammuni- consumed (lost) as units formu- tion ..." This is done primarily for account- lated requests, as the Admin-Log ing purposes, as, ideally, all Center (ALC) collated them, and HEMTT loads of Class V are con- the time involved as the support figured exactly the same for all platoon leader or sergeant con- mechanized teams and armor figured the request and brought it tcrms, the push package consists of teams. The major advantage of this forward from the BSA. a generic load of Class V, con- system is that no time is lost figured to a mech- or tank-heavy downloading and reconfiguring the The push-pull logistics system team or a scout/mortar platoon mix. load to correspond to an exact re- designed by 3-66 Armor went a long In the case of 3-66 Armor, during quest for ammunition. It requires way towards solving that problem. the conduct of the attack, three that the unit and the support The standard Logistics Package cargo HEM'ITs were positioned in platoon leader ensure that only the (LOGPAC) system, as outlined in the combat trains for immediate quantity of ammunition requested is chapter 8 of FM 71-21, calls for the resupply. One was configured for unloaded. This system also demands support platoon leader to build each of the elements outlined that the ALC, the unit, and the sup- LOGPAC in the ficld trains, after above. Specific loads are not dis- port platoon leader reconcile the re- the ALC has consolidated com- cussed here, hut a typical push pack- quest with the delivered amount. pany/team requests. FM 71-2.l em- age for a tank-heavy team on one The push systcm also requires a phasizes that LOGPAC are for HEMTT might consist of roughly change in thinking as to the location routine resupply, and that "special five pallets of 10-5-mm ammunition, of the support platoon leader and LOGPAC" would serve to meet two pallets of TOW ammunition, his vehicles. other needs. and the rest a small arms and 25- A key point here is that, given the mm mix. The battalion S4, undcr Recognizing that the BSA may lo- nature of hid actions on the Air- the guidance of the battalion cate some 50 or more kilometers I 1 14 ARMOR - November-December 1987 "...Positioning the support platoon leader and his assets midway between the combat trains and the BSA makes resupply much more

responsive to the units....I'

from the lront, 3-66 Armor moved leader and his assets midwav he- evcnt that he must "run" the routine the support platoon leader to a loa- tween the combat trains ani the (Class I) LOGPAC. tion hctween the combat trains and BSA makes resupply much more Consideration must be given to the the BSA. responsive to units. The vast Fact that once the support platoon majority of Class V packages need leader departs for his "midway" loca- Given that the 50 + km. distance to be standard load packages, even tion he is a "shot fired" and not easi- may exist, the support plittoon though the HEMTT allows for ly recalled to the BSA. Commo with leader and his available assets might more rapid loading and unloading the support platoon sergeant fixes locatc 15 to 30 kilometers from the than the oldcr -5-ton series of trucks. that problem. FLOT, just outside artillery range. The standard load (for mech-heavy, tank-heavy or scouVmortar) allows Units can easily train to this Immediately after the Class I11 the support platoon to configure the concept during normal field training and V in the combat trains is loads rapidly and to reach that "mid- exercises. It requires key leaders to released or delivered to company way" location to be responsive. IC do some additional planning and a teams. the ALC notifies the support the units allow the support platoon realimtion by all that timely resupp- platoon leader. The support platoon leader to remain in the BSA and to ly is paramount to the success of leader then begins his march from configure loads to suit actual re- continuous operations. the intermediate location to the quests, then resupply 14411 occur at LRP. Being much closer to the the mercy of the location of the FLOT than to the BSA proper, the BSA, so to speak. If the BSA is out liming of this resupply is much bet- of position, then timely resupply ter. may be out of position also.

Stopping by the combat trains There are two additional areas of Captain William Hedges is a briefly, the support platoon leader concern with the implementation of 1982 graduate of the USMA drops off fully-loaded vehicles to this system. Thc first is that the sup- currently assigned as the 3-66 replace the ones that recently port platoon lcadcr and his vehicles Armor's battalion motor of- moved forward, and then proceeds represent a lucrative target. As a ficer. He has also sewed as a to the LRP himself. After resupply minimum, it will require some type tank platoon leader, battalion at the LRP is complcted, thc sup- of air dcfensc to protcct it. The S1, tank company XO, and port platoon leader goes back to the second area is that this system re- battalion S4. He is a graduate BSA to reconligure the remainder quires that either a second com- of the Armor Officer Basic of his loads to "generic"packages. mand and control vehicle with radio Course, the Infantry Officer Ad- bc allocated to the support platoon, vanced Course, the Junior Of- This system, when tactically or a HEMTT be outfitted with a ficer Maintenance Course, the employed, will solve the major radio set. M3 Scout Commander's resupply problems associated with Qualification Course, the Air- units in the attack. borne School, and Jungle This permits communication with Warfare Training Center. To position the support platoon the support platoon sergeant in the

I ARMOR - November-December 198 7 15 How to Build It: A Light Set forthe M577 CPVehicle

(Submitted by the C&S Dept., USAARMS, with drawings by the Fort Knox TASC.)

During the Armor School's ef- forts to develop the Heavy Brigade Standardized Tactical Operational Center (TOC), for- mer 3d Armored Cavalry Regi- List of Materials ment troopers demonstrated how they solved the problem of These light sets are durable be- 2 2441 fluorescent light fixtures poor lighting within the TOC cause they combine to form 4 plywood pieces, 1/2"xn"x;r" with fluorescent light fixtures. their own protective box during 2 pine boards, 3/4'xVx6" movement. The light sets hang 2 luggage catches (2-1/2") Their ideas are used in the from the attached chains above 8 5/32"screwhooks standardized TOC set up in the the map boards of the TOC. 1 1/4" dowel rod SIMNET Warfighting Complex at 4 chains; 1" links, 26' long Fort Knox and are a vast im- Shooks, washers and nuts, wire provement over past light sets for the M577. m

hf::: hf::: - - LEFT SIDE MALE BOX HALF --- 112' PLYWOOD,

FEMALE BOX HALF

76 ARMOR - November-December 7987 On theTrackof the CAT ... 'r Team Concept and a Return to the Basics Wins Canadian Army Trophy

by the 3d AD and V Corps CAT Team

On June 191h, 1987, 1st platoon, Unfortunately, the past Delta Company, 4th Battalion, 8th failures of the United Cavalry (formerly 3-33 Armor, "The States to win CAT have Pickles"), did what no other U.S. had the effect of trans- Army unit has been able to do in 24 forming the competition years of international tank gunnery into a test. This is not a competition: we won the Canadian phenomenon peculiar to Army Trophy (CAT)! the United States. The showing of the Royal Hus- Out of a possible 21,800 points, 1st sars at this year's competi- platoon posted a final score of tion was the subject of a 20,490, which was 800 points higher front page story in Lon- than its closest competitors, 2nd don's Siatda?, Telegraph, platoon, 4th Company, 124th Panzcr June 21, 1987, titled Battalion (19,6%)points). "NATO Allies Outgun The winning platoon's battle run Britain's New Battle was the last of the five-day competi- Tanks". Critics have used tion, making this first-time U.S. vic- the results of past CATS tory as dramatic as a World Series to slam the way the Army Game Seven grand slam homerun trains, the quality of its with two outs in the bottom of the all-volunteer force, and ninth inning. The achievement its procurement policies. The Canadian Army Trophy, a silver Cen- capped months of intense training These criticisms are as turion tank, won by a U.S. unit for the first by Delta Company and verified a su- baseless as those who time in 24 years. perb training program. would claim that our use of the Unit Conduct of Fire Trainer possible to bring together the neces- Every two years, the CAT tank (UCOFT) and Simulation Network sary number of troops with CAT ex- gunnery competition brings together (SIMNET) proves that simulators pcrience. Many experts were con- 10 teams, consisting of 24 platoons, can be used to further reduce yearly vinced that stabilized crews were from NATO's Central Army Group training ammunition allocations. the answer lo German dominance (CENTAG) and Northern Army Our victory does not prove that the at past competitions. The 1987 CAT Group (NORTHAG). Nations rep- M1 is a better tank than the Committee of Control requirement, resented at this year's CAT were Leopard 11, nor that US. volunteers for each sponsor (in our case, V Canada, Belgium, Great Britain, the are superior to West German con- Corps) to train two companies prior Netherlands, West Germany (3 scripts. Our victory did prove that, to an April 1 blind-draw selection, teams), and the United States (3 given a capable piece of equipment made the pool of experienced CAT teams). In recent years, the official and a solid training program, U.S. tankers even smaller. The other top prize has been awarded to the soldiers, not "gladiator troops" (a company was made up of members army group with the highest total label pinned on us by a member of of 3d Battalion, 8th Cavalry. (There points at the end of the competi- one of the other competing teams) is no doubt in our minds that they tion; however every team hopes that are among the firnest tankers in the would have enjoyed the same suc- one of its platoons will have the world. cess we did, had they been chosen highest battle run score of the com- to represent 3AD and V Corps.) petition. That platoon and its team, The most often cited reason why battalion, division, corps, army - U.S. teams had been unsuccessful in Veterans of CAT scoffed at a 3rd and the tank it used - become the their attempts to win CAT was that Armored Division team that said it real winners of CAT. Army personnel policies made it im- was going to win without a single

ARMOR - November-December 7987 17 "Cat Fever"

Above, 1/D/4-8 Cav begins its winning battle run at bound 1, range 301, at Grafenwoehr.

At left, 1LT Pierre E. Massar, platoon leader of 1st Platoon, returns to Gelnhausen for the vic- tory celebration followina this year's "World Series of Tank Gun- nery."

At left, the members of 1st Platoon, D Co., 4-8 Cav, stand at ease at Gelnhausen upon return from the CAT competition. The platoon was the first U.S. unit to win the competition in 24 years, and did it with the pressure on. The final battle run decided the com- petition between 10 teams from six NATO nations.

18 ARMOR - November-December 1987 tank commander, gunner, loader, or need to treat training and logistics driver that had ever competed in as a team. High-tech and relatively CAT. The team that we fielded was new systems like the MI tend to had hindered units. A careful read- not a group of super tankers; blur the distinction between main- ing of their after-action reports indi- rather, it was representative of tenance problems, systems prob- cated that they had concentrated al- today’s armor force. The company lems, and training problems. The most exclusively on major densities was made up of the most qualified following situation illustrates this and seemed to view the time they volunteers that one battalion had lo lack of distinction: You have a main- were not on the range as disfunc- offer. Even so, given the talent that tenance problem when a shortline tional, maybe even wasted. CAT was available, it was clearly repre- round is due to a laser that is over- teams are allocated so much range sentative of the battalion as a whole. heated or improperly installed. You time during their preparation phase have a systems problcm when a that there seemed to be a tendcncy Training is the key to winning crew shoots shortline because the to view time at home station as but CAT; however, logistics is a most number five circuit card comes a respite between densities. significant element of any training loose in the computer-electronics plan. In today’s Army we tend to unit (which happened frequently). Our training strategy did not view training and logistics as two You have a training problem when revolve around any single training separate activities, primarily be- a shortline is caused by improper event or device. Instead, we cause of our desire to assign func- lasing techniques. In all these ex- designed a total program that tional areas of responsibility. While amples, the result is a shortline, and stressed innovative training at home this distinction makes it easier for leaders know that shortlines must station as well as making maximum the commander and his executive of- be eliminated to win CAT. use of scarce range time and main ficer to write OER support forms, it gun ammunition. The keystones of also tends to cause leaders to view If the leader does not understand that training strategy were: training and logistics as related, but the intricacies of the MI, and the not dependent on each other. Our bond between logistician and 0 We constructed a Tank Crew experience during CAT vindidated a trainer is not strong, the trainer Proficiency Course (TCPC) at a strong belief we took into CAT blames maintenance, and logis- local training area that was a 1/4- logistics and training are mutually ticians blame training. (We had very scale duplicate of the competition supportive. Many pay lip servicc to few maintenance problems; the M1 range. Platoons maneuvered their that simple statement; our challenge had some systems problems.) At a own tanks, equipped with the Multi- was to implement a system that minimum, valuable preparation time ple Integrated Laser Engagement would make it a reality in our CAT is either lost or wasted before the System (MILES), along the scaled- company. To win we knew that we real cause is determined. In worst- down course roads and engaged would have to train and maintain case situations, the real cause is not remote-controlled targets outfitted significantly better than U.S. units identified, and the problem persists. with the Target Interface Device had done in previous CATS. We were successful because we System (TIDS). MlLES and TIDS were able to determine the cause created target effect (the target fell It is noteworthy that we broke with quickly and apply the needed when hit) and we were able to score the Army of Excellence MTOStE remedy. A strong team gave us that CAT battle runs. All the tasks, con- when we moved support personnel abi My. ditions, and standards of CAT train- from HHC to the CAT company. ing were integrated into this course. We viewed that restructuring as a If the MI is one of the finest tanks It was so realistic that crews were critical stcp in building a CAT team in NATO, and the quality of U.S. able to practice target acquisition rather than a gunnery company. soldiers was as good as those in our and range memorization. Our team, not any one platoon or allies’ armies, then the key to win- 16 tankers, won CAT. The team ning CAT for the first time had to 0 Not all of our training was this concept ensured that training and be training. Our analysis of past glamorous. We stressed platoon logistics were not viewed as U.S. efforts to win CAT indicated basics by spending countless hours separate entities. that the lack of a stable, coherent, in the classroom gathered around a The M1 system exacerbates the and a well-thought-out training plan terrain board. We developed range

ARMOR - November-December 7987 79 the first time they saw a-German months. Even though- the battalion's cross painted on the side of a Leo other companies had conducted - I1 was not at the actual competi- ARTEP training, Delta Company's attack procedures, drilled C", and tion. MG Griffii was right. We across-the-board performance at reviewed lessons learned during feared no one. Hohenfels was superior to every CAT training at Grafenwwhr and other company in the battalion. It is Baumholder. 0 As part of our program to en- noteworthy that the battalion as a sure that our soldiers could handle whole had an excellent ARTEP, Normal division densities at the stress of the actual competition, with some observers rating it as one Grafenwoehr and Baumholder were we asked the United States Military of the top two performances in the used for CAT training. Before we Academy for the services of Dr. division. The key to understanding fired a single main gun round, we Dennis Forbes, a member of the Delta Company's performance is ensured that the target scenarios faculty. Dr. Forbes was no stranger clear when we look at the process and the range configuration dupli- to CAT. He had been part of the rather than the prodiict of CAT cated what we knew about CAT bat- 3AD team in IY8 I. Dr. Forbes came training. tle runs. We developed an accurate to Grafenwoehr in the third week of scoring method that provided May and remained with the team The product of our CAT training detailed firing data which we used through the last run of the competi- program was the first victory for a to attack known weaknesses. tion. His method of controlling U.S. Army platoon in the history of stress was accepted by the troops the competition. Team-building and 0 Mr. Doug Watters, AMCCOM, and paid immediate dividends. Dr. development of the company chain developed a new procedure for Forbes gave us a team of com- of command were the critical ele- zeroing the M1. Watters used a grid petitors rather than participants. ments of the process that allowed us target panel, in conjunction with a to successfully implement our train- correction matrix, to produce a zero Everything we did for many ing plan. The individual skills that that allowed us to consistently put months preceding CAT was were honed during CAT went far rounds through an 8-inch bullseye directed towards winning. Critics of beyond those required for gunnery. at 2,000 meters. We feel strong the competition have argued the the They were the kind of skills that sup- about replacing calibration with CAT mission is detrimental to a port the accomplishment of any mis- zeroing. Whatever extra rounds are unit because it focuses all its assets sion and make a good unit a great used to zero will be saved with and training to the attainment of a combat team. more first-round hits during the sub- single goal for up to a year. Many sequent training tables. would carry the argument even fur- It may seem trite to point out that ther and add that CAT gunnery CAT training must stress quality 0 During two of our densities at training does not support the and not quantity; however, it's true. Grafenwoehr, we invited teams Army's gunnery program, e.g., the A successful day on the range is not From both NORTHAG and CEN- competition does not require crew a function of how many battle runs TAG to attended a pre-competition commands, night firing, or de- are made, or even the platoon's per- training camp. The so-called "Kitty graded gunnery. Our experience is formance. A good day on a CAT CAT training camps were the that these critics are wrong. CAT range is when the trainers know brainstorm of our Commanding training supports the mission of a what targets they missed and why Gcneral, MG Thomas Griffin. As a forward-deployed armor battalion they misscd. A great day on a CAT licutenant, he had competed in a in Central Europe. range is when the crews have full contest similar to CAT and remem- confidence in their equipment and bered the pressure of international Delta Company deployed to the scoring system and believe they competition. The CG wanted every- Hohenfels one month after CAT for missed those targets. Whcn both of thing possible done to duplicate the participation in the battalion's task these things occur, platoons (helped pressurized atmosphere which, if force ARTEP. The company had no by trainers) can go through the not handled properly, can humble field time between CAT and Hohen- process of determining whether mis- the best trained platoon. He in- Eels to brush up on rusty field skills ses were due to individual or sisted that our soldiers would have and conduct the tactical training platoon weaknesses. They identify a better chance of winning CAT if that had been ignored for up to ten problems, and trainers must design

20 ARMOR - November-December 1987 WINNERS! U.S. Cavalry Squadrons Win and Place in Gruelin NATO Reconnaissance CompeB ition by Captain Lionel Ortiz and Captain Brian Butcher

Every year since 1978, teams from ticipation. This article is intended to NATO's premier reconnnissance familiarize the reader with the com- units have gathered to compete for petition's history and eight events, the Bundeswehr's Boeselager Chal- the training for the events, and the lenge Cup. For five days, these benefits derived from the competi- teams compete fiercely in a wide tion. range of grueling events to prove The competition is named in each having its own point value. The themselves to be the best reconnais- honor of Colonel Baron (ieorg von events are armored reconnaissance sance team in NATO. This little- Boeselager, considered to be the (550), night orienteering (NK)), known event has become the most last and greatest horse cavalry com- enemy identification (250), shooting challenging military skills competi- mander in the Wehrmacht. A cap- (2IK)), obstacle course (200), tactical tion in NATO. tain of cavalry at the outset of swimming (150), skilled driving WWII, he was an innovator in the (lSO), and aerial reconnaissance In the past, some have used the deployment of large cavalry,forma- (150). German tactics and methods U.S. teams' performances as a tions. A brave, audacious, and affect every event, especially the ar- measure of our readiness in Europe. resourceful officer, he was mored and aerial reconnaissance Interest in the results peaked with decorated with the Knight's Cross and the night orienteering courses. this year's competition in Hessisch- with swords and diamonds, and be- Scoring is done by multiplying the Lichtenau, FRG, from 11-15 May. came a brigade commander of caval- team's placing from the bottom by The team from 1st Squadron, 11th ry at age 29. Colonel von Boe- the event multiplier. For example, Armored Cavalry Regiment, won selager was directly involved in the in a field of 20 teams, the third- first place overall in a field of 23 plot to kill Adolf Hiller. He was place team in the shooting event teams from 10 different nations. killed in action in September 1944, would receive 18 X 200, or 3,600 First Squadron, 1st Cavalry took while leading his cavalry brigade in points. Additionally, bonus points second place in the allied category, an attack against Soviet forces. are awarded to the top six teams in completing the first 1-2 sweep by the What exactly is Boeselager? The armored reconnaissance, emphasiz- U.S. Army in its eight years of par- competition includes eight events, ing the importance ol this event in

CAT Competition (cont'd)

new scenarios to test the correc- tion to detail, state of the art tions. training devices, and the kind of quality soldicrs that are found If the problem persists, both everywhere in today's Army. must look at the attack SOP to Yet, if we were asked to cite the see whcther there is a better way single most important element in of doing things. our overall strategy it would have to be that we fielded a The UCOR and SIMNET team, in every sense of the word. facilities were an integral part of our training program, however, On June 19, if anyone in Delta they alone are not responsible for Company was asked who won our victory. Our training strategy CAT, he would not reply "1st can best be described as a blend Platoon". He would proudly of basic training methods, atten- reply, "We Did!"

ARMOR - November-December 1987 21 Team members sprint to firing Below, a Bradley crew prac- positions after the "alarm post" tices for the height clearance engages the first targets. Below, training for small arms. 1

One team member gives another a hand negotiating "The Wall", one of the obstacles along the 3,500-meter course. I

the competition. Teams are com- are well choreographed and mounted navigational exercise. Com- posed of one lieutenant (patrol rehearsed, with OPFOR locations petitors use many unique and im- leader), one sergeant (assistant and actions matching the rcporting aginative navigation methods, rang- patrol leader), and six troopers. solutions for the course. ing from aerial photography to map Two full crews by TO&E (in our Training for this event begins with sections to route memorizztion. The case, a total of 10 men) may com- classroom instruction on German patrol leader has the use of a map pete in the armored reconnaissance reconnaissance tactics, which are about 10 percent of the time. Units event. vastly diffcrent from our own. Next, receive special tasks at the stations, the crews progress to sand table to include Warsaw Pact weapons, The heavily-weighted armored re- drills, and finally, mounted recon- equipment, and uniform identifica- connaissance course is the premier naissance exercises. Perhaps the tion, first aid, engineer tasks, and as- event of the Boeselager competi- greatest challcnge here was to in- semhly/disassembly of Soviet tion. A two-vehicle recon patrol grain stealth (vehicle camouflage, weapons. Mistakes in these tasks, must conduct a 30-kilometer route covering tracks in assembly areas, and failure to reach stations, result reconnaissance to establish an obser- and not breaking cover with in penalty times. Overall placing is vation post within 3-1/2 hours. vehicles), and teach our soldiers not determinined by time, with shortest Along the course, the patrol en- to engage the enemy every time they times for the most stations winning. counters numerous enemy forces of see him. German-style armored re- For this event, the 1-llth ACR con- varying strength and disposition. connaissance requires intensive ducted twenty-seven night orienteer- Evaluation results are a combina- preparation and practice in entirely ing exercises to Boeselager stand- tion of tactical conduct (in accord- diffcrent mtics. ards, the majority of these in severe ance with Bundeswehr standards) The night orienteering course is a winter conditions. and reporting points. The courses 10-station, 15-20-kilometer dis- During the enemy identification

22 ARMOR - November-December 7987 event, the patrol tests at three sta- in seven groupings. One soldier, ac- tions. First, the entire patrol tests in ting as an “alarm post,“ fires at the vehicle recognition from bunker first grouping, and then the remain- positions in total darkness. A light- ing three soldiers must run 50 ing system that simulated muzzle mctcrs to assume their firing posi- flashes, fires, and illumination tions. Targets are hcavily rounds briefly illuminates Warsaw camouflaged, with some visible to Pact vehicle models (scale 1/20), ap- only one member of the patrol. proximiitely 30 meters distant. The Scorcs are based on target hits, plus team members have the aid of Bun- bonus points for groupings hit, and deswehr-issue binoculars to identify rounds turned in (if all 20 targets the vehicles. Next, the patrol arc hit). Training involved personal- route reconnaissance for a rcin- reviews mannequins of Warsaw ized instruction for team members forced German reconnaissance com- Pact soldiers. Patrol members must by the U.S. Army Marksmanship pany. OPFOR and obstacles along identify country of origin, rank, Team from Ft. Benning, and weekly the route test his ability to navigate branch and weapons. At the final shooting on ranges set up to com- and observe simultaneously, as well station, the patrol leader and assis- petition standards. as select suitable detours along the tant patrol leader must interpret planned route. Scoring is based sole- Soviet operational graphics in order The tactical swim entails a 200- ly on the graphics portrayed on his to analyze the tactical situation meter swim in neoprene suits with map, with emphasis on bridge depicted on a captured Soviet map. 304 packs and UZI sub- MLCs, detour suitability, enemy We conducted an immense amount machineguns. Patrols are required locations, and positions for the com- of classroom training and practical to make these packs (similar to pany at the final assembly area. U.S. exercise in preparation for this poncho rafts), maintain three-man patrol leaders flew in excess of 1W event. In 1987, I-Jlth ACR was the security and swim the course within hours in preparation for this event winner in enemy identification. 45 minutes. Penalties are awarded with both U.S. and Bundeswehr lor exceeding the allotted time, wet pilots and aircraft. or lost equipment, and inadequate The most grueling physical event security. Training for this event also Training for the Boeselager Cup is of the competition is the obstacle required personalized instruction both challenging and different from course. The entire patrol runs the and complemented overall physical U.S. methods. Intense physical con- 3,S(K)-meter, cross-country course. conditioning. ditioning is the foundation of the All enlisted soldiers carry UZ1 sub- program, with the goal to have a 10- machineguns, while the patrol man team of NCAA-caliber athlctes leader and assistant patrol leadcr Only the assistant patrol leader that can run, shoot, and swim to in- carry pistols. They must negotiate and his driver participate in the tercollegiate standards. But raw five man-made obstacles and two skillcd driving event. Their vehicle physical talent is not enough to hand grenade target positions. must travel through, around, and form a winning team. To become Failure to hit all hand grenade tar- over obstacles on a cross-country knowledgeable in German tactics, gets at each station forces the patrol course. At these obstacles, the goal identification of all Warsaw Pact to run a detour around the position. is to minimize clearances, which are weapons, equipment, and personnel Training for this event required measured and converted into penal- requires intelligent soldiers willing rigorous workouts and a nutrition ty points. Although the size of the to spend long hours studying. program that supplemented rcgular Bradley put the I-11th ACR team Perhaps the most rewarding Army chow. We ran practice cour- at a disadvantage against the Ger- aspect of Boeselager, from a train- ses weekly and practiced throwing man Luchs, British Scorpions, and ing viewpoint, is the close interac- hand grenades daily. ML13s of the other teams, the team tion with our Allies. Through managed to place sixth overall in partnership training, we exchanged The shooting event is on a stand- this event. many ideas about reconnaissance ard 300-nieter German shooting and other training. The end result is range. The patrol breaks into four- The only individual event is aerial a better understanding of each man teams and each man receives reconnaissance, which is done by other’s men, equipment and tactics. two six-round magazines. For each the patrol leader. Within 90 The Boeselager competition itself group, there are 20 targets exposed minutes, he must plan and execute a provides an accurate measure of

ARMOR - November-December 7987 23 U.S. soldiers’ recon skills. Even though German tactics are used in most events, basic individual skills are tested, and results have proved the values of cavalry scout in- dividual training. More important, the competition serves as a forum for the exchange of ideas among some of the finest reconnaissance troops in NATO. The U.S. team’s observers benefit, too, not only from this exchange, but also in the cor- responding increase io the con- fidence in our own and Allied readi- ness. American soldiers can point to the superb performance of both U.S. teams in 1987 as ample evidence of our outstanding soldiers and the readiness of the cavalry force in Europe.

CPT Lionel Ortiz is a 1983 USMA graduate. After attend- ing AOBC, he was assigned to 2nd Squadron, 11th Ar- mored Cavalry Regiment. He served as scout platoon leader, liasion officer, and the Super vwvwcv 1986 Boeselager patrol leader for V Corps. In 1987, he was transferred to 1st Squadron to serve as armored and aerial The best scouts In all of reconnaissance trainer for the NATO’s armies in Europe, lronhorse Boeselager team. and the Boeselager Cup win- ners for 1987, is the team CPT Brian Butcher is a 1983 from 1st Squadron, 11th Ar- USMA graduate. After attend- mored Cavalry Regiment. The ing AOBC, he was assigned team is seen on one of the to 1st Squadron, 11th Ar- M3s it used in the strenuous Bradley R. Scott, and SP4 mored Cavalry Regiment. He and exacting five-day com- Christopher P. Downey. served as tank platoon leader, petition. troop executive officer,sup Second row - SP4 John E. port platoon leader and Standing tall and proud are: Mullen, PFC John Hynd, PFC Boeselager Patrol Leader. In James T. Black, and PFC 1987, he was assigned as Front row (leR to right) - SP4 Jimmy Davis. Boeselager team trainer for Steven L Meints, PFC night orienteering and tactical Thomas D. Blake, SGT Char- Third row - PFC William L swimming. He is currently at- les L. Ross, 1LT William V. Lyons, SP4 Robert Turner, SP4 tending the Amphibious War- Hill, 1LT Scotl D. Zegler, SP4 Donald E. Manley, and SP4 fare College in Quantico, Vir- Shannon R. Thomas, PFC Leonard B. Adams. ginia.

24 1- ARMOR - November-December 7987 The Destruction Of Task Force Baum

This WWII"Deep Strike" Raid on Hammelburg N Hammelburg To Liberate a POW Camp Burgslnn ~ Offers Lessons ~ ~ ntereschenbach for AirLand Battle 1 . Graffendor1 " by Captain James B. Hickey

~ AschaHenburg ::::====~!rriIIj~

Approximately three kilometers eKeliburg~ southwest of the lower Bavarian city of Aschnffcnburg, along Ihe River Main, stands a single-tracked rail­ way bridge. This trestled sran con­ nects the east and west banks of the northward-flowing river. It now pea<.:t:fully serves with other modern bridges to link the Odenw31d on lhe we!;t 10 the mountainous region of the Spessart to the easl.

But more than 4() years ago, in a less Iban peacerul environment, (his same bridge servetl as a baddrop [or the assembly area of a haml­ munition. The armored infantrymen year-okl meuje was [hat he anti his picketl force of almost 300 checked their Ml Garands and en­ assistant, Andy Demchak, were to American soldiers. They were seleci sured they had washed and changctl be the only medics assigned to the members of the 10th Armored In­ inlo clean underwear to prevcnt in­ force: "Res ponsible [or [he healt h fantry and (he 37(h Tank Battalion fcction in the unfortllnate event of and welfare of 300 lighting men ... of Comnat Command B, 4th Ar­ being wounded. 'The young replace­ Ju .~t the (wo of [hem. No special mo(ed Division. mcnts ... (alked anti joked a supplies. No doc. What if they took IOI...(onc) woultl have noticcd that beavy casualties?'.4 Posit ioncd along a sunken wad they wellt over the edge (\f the road Ihal ran due south from Aschafrcn­ [0 urinate prelly frcquently:2 Over the years, I he exploi(s of this burg, along the east bunk of (he task force have enjoyed unofficial in­ Main, "The lillie force prepared for Regardless of the volume or pur­ quiry and historical analysis from the tremendous adventure that lay poseful activity that characterized both soldiers and historians. The aheuu 0[" them."t EX(ra cans of tbis forward assembly area 011 [he controversy that has dis(inctly gasoline Ii lied the hulfLracks. evening of 26 MLlfch 1945, most o[ marked these studies has bt:en the Tankers and armored artillerymen the men <..lid not know where they question of the profes$ional and filled the ~t(lrage racks of their Sher­ were going.) One of the few who moml j us[ i fieat ion of t he COOl Olan d mans anti self-propdk:tI M7 howit­ did was Technician 5 Dave Uno. decision that senl (hese men into ac­ zers with 75-mm and lOS-om1 am- Whal particularly bothered this 30- lion. The uestruction o[ Task Force

ARMOR - November-December 1987 25 " ... The supporting tanks and armored infantry of the two 'B' companies suffered heavy losses securing a partial passage through the village ... "

BlIIlm was indirectly the result of thc directing command's f.tilurc to ensure that it received the minimum necess;try com hut. combat SUpPllrl, and logi.~ tical means to sustain itself in thc execution of its assignetl mis­ sion.

The relevancy of the Icsson5 that .m: pre5entcd here is especially im­ pnTlant in context of Ihe stated in­ tent of the U.S. Army's prcsent operational doctrine:

"T he Airlantl Bailie ... is hased on securing or rctaining the initiative jeeps of a reconnaissance platoon: suppo rt bases over ext ended Manton Eduy, to form a task force and a he;ldqu;l rter5 section cun<;i5t· pcriocJs of lime. Between 25-26 10 go to Hammclburg and liberate a ing of command. maintenance. and Mardi 1945. full planning considera­ POW Cilmp containing;1Il cstillliitcu medical clements. tiuns, such as dose air support, ef­ 300 Amcriean oflieet's. Eddy, in fective f(wward n:5upply, anu com­ turn, ordl'red BCi Will iam M. Hoge, Its commander was 24-yea r·old municatiuns, were abbrevialeu in an commander of Ihe 4th Armored C IPl. Ahe Billtlll , the S3 of the 10 effort tu save time. These shurtcuts Division. 10 execute the order. He A I Bn. His mission was to raid the were further rationalized with an un­ organized a task force of ap· POW C'1Il1p of Hammclburg and derestimation of the enemy's cap­ proximately 30U men frOm cle ments liberate the esti matctl 31.M) American abilities. The results of this pl'lIlning uf the IOlh Armored Infantry ( 10 ufficers.(' c1im

26 ARMOR - November-December 1987 tit-ipat eu in the intdligence cs­ timat es. The !'i upporting t:1I1ks and ,,,.,,,,,,,<1 ;"f,,,,,, y "r tho tw" "B" companies suffered heavy lusses in securing a parti:,1 p;.,ssage Ihl"Ough the dllage Ihal pn... se.~se u ., "m.,in street (Ihat) llleasun.:tI :lpprct'iahly mure than hair .. mile.-III Ctlllcc rn cd "huut lime. Caplain B;nllll nrtlered his ta ~ k fmee through thc SUPI"lll rt ­ ing elemenls in Schweinheim jWiI "ncr midnight. "It was :, dangc r\lll .~ taoic maue wurse hy the ha:tanls in ­ herent in tra\'clin~ over unknuwn lernlor. y .III II Ie "l Iar k." " Baum .... for ce ex ited Ihe village witlHltll a loss and made its way mirth :,lllIlg a se ries or secondary roads hi High­ way 2h. ReganHes!l. -Ahe Ballm sud ­ denl v feh .. .that Ihe (;erman line h.,d cut I·ifill· \} fl· :I Ir eat Iy. "P-

· Pa!ls ing through Haihaeh­ (irul11orsbach, Stra .s.~ hcssc nha c h . Kcilhurg. Frohenhofc.n. Lallf;Kh, unu Huin, Ihe force met light resis· tance. When lire was received, all weilpo ns we re 1ircd ... No hi gh ex­ plu ~ i \'e s hcll.~ were lired from Ihe tanks at night while pas.si ng through the town hecause the column would have 10 stup:1l

However light Ihe initial resis­ link Opposilion. bUI .. I.~ o mentioned the planncd route passed through tance, the task force began to sus­ that the e1c.mcnt s (Ir tW(l (icrman the village of Sehweinheim south Ilf tain c:lsua1ties. Medics took C

ARMOR - November-December 1987 27 Breakoutfrom Hkmmelburg

Burgsinn and eastward toward Graf- fendorf on the Frankische Salle Hammel burg River. Liberating 700 Russian Training Area prisoners who were working in the fields outside Graffendorf, Task Dorfstelle Force Baum continued along the 2 northern bank of the Frankische Sade amd crossed it at the town of Michelau. At this point, an enemy by Koehl’s AT Gunners reconnaissance plane spotted the ar- mored column. The plane was one of the efforts of von Obstfelder to determine the disposition and des- tination of the American force. did indeed expect them.” At first troop trains moving westward along Baum realized the enemy certainly light of 27 March, Baum’s column the railway line that paralleled the knew of his force’s exact size and came upon a group of German sol- highway from the Gemunden rail- location?’ Even so, he lead his for- diers doing morning calisthenics in road yards. These actions served to mation eastward through Weick- a clearin at Bishornerhof in the alarm the two platoons of naval ersgruben to the intersection of a Spessart.” The task force, without recruits that were charged with the narrow country road and Highway halting, engaged with machine guns. responsibility of defending the 27. The task force continued north Donald Yoerk, a commander of one bridge over the Sinn and Frankische on Highway 27 toward Hammelburg of the MSAls, thought, “This sure Saale Rivers in the center of the in the early afternoon of 27 March. isn’t a secret mission anymore.nl’ city. In the vicinity of the small town of Untereschenhach on the west side Baum ran into the enemy’s first or- Under the skilled direction of of the highway, Baum’s vehicles ganized resistance on the western Eugen Zoller, an experienced 25- came under the direct fire of Ger- approaches to Lohr am Main, the year-old NCO of the German Army man forces in the railroad yards of command post of Gen. Hans von Pioneers, the teen-age defenders, Hammelburg to the north. This Obstfelder, commander of all armed with more than 200 partier- force, under the command of ground forces in southern Germany. fairsten, aggressively counterattack- Hauptmann Richard Koehl, con- The armored force lost its first ed the American armored column’s sisted of eight ptieqager armed M4A3 to patiieflaiist fire at a drive for the bridge. Before Baum’s with 75-mm cannon.22 roadblock. The task force quickly first Sherman reached the western suppressed and bypassed the light edge of the bridge, Germans These fires inflicted additional los- resistance.’* By Oyoo, the task force destroyed the bridge with a preposi- ses on Baum’s force and forced it to cleared Lohr am Main, engaged its tioned demolition charge.” move southwest to the high ground lightly-armed defenders with over- overlooking Hammelburg. It was at whelming firepower, and continued The Germans’ fierce resistance, this point that Baum sighted the its advance eastward to the critical the loss of three mcdium tanks, and, POW camp. Baum “kept pushing town of Gemunden.” Located at the loss of the bridge forced Baum the task force over the ridge onto the confluence of the Sinn, Main, to withdraw westward and move the high ground where two com- and Frankische Saale Rivers, northward toward the town of panies of Kraut infantry (the camp’s Gemunden’s bridge had to be cap- Burgsinn and its bridge, which guards) were dug in. It took us two tured intact to facilitate Baum’s spanned the Sinn River. and a half hours to clean it up so movement east along Highway 20 to that the infantry and tanks could Karlstadt and its intersection with Without rest, and suffering from move in.n23 Highway 27. Unfortunately, Baum’s multiple shrapnel wounds, Capt. By 1700 hours, 27 March, Task men energetically engaged several Baum lead his force north through Force Baum had seized and

128 ARMOR - November-December 1987 "...In hindsight, it is difficult to fault the planned intent of the command decision that put Task Force Baum into action..." liberated the camp. Baum "had Hauptmann Koehl's parrzejager after Koehl's attack by fire. Within come to carry home 300 or 400 men company into tiring positions south hours, the Germans swept the arca and found instead 1,5W eager for of Hill 427, after the Americans con- clean of residual American resis- freedom. The sheer numbers stag- solidated on its slopes. At OS10 tance and, ironically, intcrned the gered him."'4 hours, after first light, Baum's force vast majority of Baum's men in the By 2oo(l hours, the Americans came under direct antitank fires POW camp that they had come to were on the move again, liberate. carrying "approximately 200'' POWs on the sides In hindsight, it is dif- and tops of their tanks ficult to fault the planned in an attempt to find a intent of the command passa e back to friendly decision that put Task lines! Unfortunately, Force Baum into action. the force met stiff and On 25 March, General well-organized resis- Patton wrote, "1 do not tance under the leader- believe that fear of ship of Oherst Hoepple, criticism should prevent t he commanding officer my getting back of the Hammelburg American prisoners, par- area. Throughout the ticularly as in the last night, Baum's men were death struggles of the thwarted in the south at Germans, our POWs Bonnland and stopped might be murdered."" in Hessdorf and Hollrich to the west. At What can be legitimate- about 0300 hours, 28 ly questioned today, as it March, Baum ordered had indeed been ques- his forces to consolidate tioned by a number of on Hill 427 on the soldicrs prior to the western boundary of the movement of Baum's Hammelburg training force, is the size and com- area, ten kilometers position of the forces al- west of the POW camp. located to carry out the At WOO, the task fbrce mission. commander ordered his suhordinates to prepare Although originally to move out at 0830 for prepared to send the a second breakout at- equivalent of a brigade- tempt. In the meantime, size force, the Third the men cross-loaded Armv commandcr al- fuel, ammunition, and lowed MG Eddy, X1I from the southeast at a rangev of . .. food onto the vehicles that were to 1,500 meters. Within three minutes, Corps commander, to persuade him be used for the trip home, and the the ~~~~i~~~ ltSeemed to to reduce the size of the organiia- balance was prepared for destruc- be one single sheet of flame... it oc- tion 10 3oi) men.28 The 4th AD com- tion. curred to B~~~ that he had lost mander did not receive this crucial Throughout the evening, however, control of the situation, he had decision well. BG William M. Hoge Oberst Hoepple skillfully main- lost the task force.J6 c;~~~~in- feared his division, which consisted tained contact with Baum's force fantry quickly Overran the ~~~~i~~~ of "exhausted troops who had just and expeditiously positioned position in the minutes finished 36 hours of intense com- I I ARMOR - November-December 1987 29 1 bat," would not be capable of Additionally, the allocation of com- proper signal equipment to support providing a task force capable of ac- bat support assets to Task Force its extended movemcnts dcep into complishing a raid 60 kilometers be- Baum was insufficient. Beyond the the enemy's rear. When not in FM hind German This concern supporting fires that were initially radio contact with his aerial relay was certainly justified because the provided to assist Baum's forward station, Baum's only contact with 4th AD commander had simul- passage at the enemy line of contact his parent organization was via his taneously received orders for his in Schweinheim, therc were no addi- single Morse key-powered AM division to continue its attack north tional planned combat support ef- radio carried in a M3A1 halftrack.36 of Aschaffenburg. The greatest chal- forts. In effect, the raiding force's This signal arrangement was totally lenge to the order was finally combat power within enemy-control- inadequate to responsively support provided by LTC Creighton Abrams of CCB, 4th AD, when he stated to Hoge, "Fifty miles is a long way to go, sir, for that small force. If we have to go that far, I want my whole command to go. Hell, a com- bat command can go anywhere."30

Gen. Patton made his final inten- tions clear at loo0 hours, 26 March, at Abrams' command post, when he told him that he would not take his entire command lo Hammelburg, but would send only a "small force.31 The authority of this final decision was not, nor can it be today, questioned on the grounds of legitimacy. It was well within Pat- ton's authority to place a ceiling on the size of the force. But with that authority came, however, the com- mand responsibility to ensure that the task force was of sufticient size to accomplish its mission. In this particular instance, Gen. Patton was later proved to be in violation of the first principle of war. In its strictest definition, today's modern principle of objective states, "Every military operation should be directcd toward a clearly defined, decisive, ganic ana attacneu elemenis. 1 he lack of Gwelul IogIstical plan- and attainable objective... The selec- ning and its effects on the success tion of objectives is based on con- Surprisingly, the only close air sup of the mission are also major points siderations of the mission, the port that Baum received during his of concern. Specifically, the lack of means and time available, the mission was in the form of a single realistic planning centered on for- enemy, and the operational area?' L-5 reconnaissance plane that ward fuel supply, adequate transpor- served solely as a communications tation assets, medical supplies, and In acknowledgement of this error, relay station.W There were no maps. For a force of more than SO Gen. Patton later admitted "I can specific provisions to provide the combat vehicles that did not have say this, that throughout the cam- task force with timely close air sup- the range to travel to Hammelhurg paign in Europe I know of no error port or forward aerial reconnais- and back, the only provision for I made except that of failing to send sance?' These peculiar comhat sup- POL replenishment was to load as a combat command to Hammel- port deficiencies accentuated by much extra fuel as possible on burg?3 Task Force Baum's deficiencies in board before departure and hope to

I30 ARMOR - November-December 1987 capture enem fuel supplics near and dctail, thcse maps werc only ef- tion of Baum’s combat powcr as he the ob.jective?’This type of plan is fective if the force did not have to moved away from his support base less than adequate, except under deviate from its planned direction was the product of incomplete lacti- the best of circumstances. of attack or execute any off-road cal planning. The task force’s lack of transport maneuver!’ This situation specifi- vehicles and additional medical sup- cally aggravated Baum’s problems The failure of Task Force Baum plies was particularly surprising. It when he was not able to pass serves as a valuable and sobering is hard to imagine that Baum through Gemundcn to Highway 27. lesson as our Army develops an received this rescue and evacuation He was forced, however, to move operational and tactical doctrine north on secondary roads and that emphasizes agility, initiative, navigate through uncharted terrain dcpth, and synchronization. These relying entirely on information from tenets will be practically realized on “...Within hours, the Germans captured German soldiers and the future battlefield with fast- swept the area clean of residual civilians. This process did not moving, hard-hitting task forces and American resistance and, facilitate flcxibility and speed, teams operating, at times, well ironically, interned the vast characteristics that were essential to within the enemy’s rear area. These majority of Baum’s men in the survivability of the force. anticipated conditions are not un- the POW camp that they like the conditions that a had come to liberate...” The failure of the directing com- courageous and experienced 24- mand to provide proper levels of year-old captain and his force of combat, combat support, and logisti- 300 faced in the closing days of (The weapon at lower right of cal means to Task Force Baum WWII. the illustration is a panzerfaust directly affected its ability to sustain However, what will be decidedly hand-held antitank weapon.) its initial speed, surprise, and dissimilar in future operations, com- flexibility. This loss of initiative and pared to our Army’s experiences in momentum was critical, but in itself WWII, will be our numerical in- was not decisive. feriority in equipment and men. We will not have the luxury to learn Maximizing upon the naturally con- from mistakes that will result in the strictive characteristics of the road complete destruction of critical com- network between Aschaffenburg bat assets. We must avoid incom- and Hammelburg, the Germans plete staff planning and hasty com- were quickly able to use their mand estimates in the AirLand Bat- limited resources to overcome their tle. initial surprise and regain contact with Baum’s penetration. These Notes mission without any uncommitted skillful actions proved to be 1. transportation and medical assets decisive. By successfully determin- Charles Whiting, 48 Hours to Ham- above and beyond that provided to ing the disposition, location, and melburg (New York: Ballantine Books, support his normal combat ele- destination of Task Force Baum, 1970) p.76 2. ments. To assist him in moving and the Germans were able to begin Ibid., pp.76-77. caring for the expected 300 POWs shaping the battlefield to meet their 3* Ibid., p.76. at Hammelburg, Baum was to own ends. 4’ Ibid., pp.77-78. 5’ secure enemy vehicles enroute to These defensive actions, predi- FM 100-5. Operations, 1982, p.2-1. the camp or load as many of the cated on the encniy’s inherent “ Richard Baron, Major Abe Baum! and prisoners as possible onto the sides ability to tritde space for time in Richard Goldhurst, Raid: The Untold of his combat vehicles!38 order to intelligently mass available Story of Patton’s Secret Mission (New To further complicate the task strengths at a place and time of York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1981), p.21. force commander’s problems, his their own choosing, were comple- ’. Whiting, p.75. force received only 15 maps of the mented by the reality that Baum’s *‘ Ibid., p.74. area between Aschaffenburg and force intrinsically weakened as time 9’ Ibid., pp.78-79. Hammelb~rg.3~Limited in coverage passed. This progressive deteriora- lo’ Baron, Baum, and Goldhurst, p.46.

I ARMOR - November-December 7987 37 I One of Camp's Captives Was LTC John K. Waters, Patton's Son-in-Law the only enemy armor that was used 11' Ibid., p.55. was limited to Koehl's Czech-made &&- On 27 June 12. Whiting, p. 86. -zers. 1Y34, Lieuten- Ibid., p.88. ant John K. 14. Ibid. 23. Whiting, p.130. Waters mar- 24* Baron, Baum, and Goldhurst, p.177. 15' Baron, Baum, and Goidhurst, pp. 25' Ibid., p.183. 114-116. Ibid., p.219. 27* Ibid., p.10. Dr. Alois Stadtmuller, "Die waghai- 28* Whiting, p.70. Colonel and Mrs. Gcorge s. sige Operation der Task Force Baum", 29' Baron, bum, and Goldhurst, p.14. Patton, Jr. The lieutenant had Soessart, 1985, March 1985, p.6. 30* Ibid., p.16. graduated from West Point in 31' Ibid., p. 19. 1931. In Fehruary, 1943, as a 17* Baron, Baum, and Goidhurst, p.117. licutenant colonel and XO of 32' John 1. Alger, The Quest for Victow: the 1st Armored Regiment, 1st 18* The panzerfaust was a highly effec- The Historv of the Princbies of War Armored Division, Waters was tive, hand-held, single-shot, antiarmor (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood captured at Sidi-Bou-Zid. weapon that was roughly equivalent to Press, 1982), p.268. Tunisia, North Africa, and held the US. bazooka. as a prisoner of war in Gcr- 33. Whiting, p. xvii. many. Word of his imprison- 19' Stadtmuller states that hum's men Baron, Baum, and Goldhurst, p.126. ment reached the Patton and encountered elements of a lightly-armed 35' lbid., p.95. Waters families soon after. column of state laborers on the east side 36* Ibid.... D. 30. On 25 March 1945, Gcneral of Lohr am Main in "Die waghalsige 37' Ibid., p.22. Patton wrote to his wife, Operation der Task Force Baum," sees- Ibid. Beatrice, "Hope to send expedi- =@1985, March 1985, p.6. This is con- tion tomorrow to get John." trary to popular assumptions that Baum 39* Maj. Martin Wumenson, "The Ham Patton was almost certain that ran into a heavily-armed tank column. melburg Affair," Armv. October, 1965, his son-in-law was among the p.20. American omcer prisoners 20* Herr Eugen Zoller, interview held in held at Hammelhurg. Gemunden, West Germany, November 40. The quality of these maps were During the lighting at Ham- 1985. roughly equivalent to our present-day melhurg, Watcrs was severely 1:250,000-scale map sheet series. wounded and later (when the "* Baron, Baum, and Goldhurst, p.142. POW camp was finally What Baum did not know was that the liberated) sent to hospital in German defenders of Gemunden cap- Paris and then LO Walter Reed tured one of his maps from his point Hospital, Washington, D.C. He M4A3, which was immobilized at the foot recovered from his wounds and of the destroyed bridge. That map il- Captain James 6. Hickey continued his military service lustrated his planned route and destina- was commissioned in Armor that included, in Scptcmbcr tion. from the Virginia Military In- 1953, his assignment as deputy stitute in 1982 and has commanding gcncral of the Ar- Or. Alois Stadtmuller and uniden- served with the 3d Sqn., 7th mored Center at Ft. box, KY. tified citizens of Hammelburg who wlt- Cavalry, 3d ID as a platoon Following other distinguished nessed the action of 27 March 1945. Inter- leader, troop XO, and ad- assignments, General Waters view held in Gemunden, West Germany, jutant. This article originated was named Commander, U.S. November 1985. Contrary to many as a military arts essay when Continental Army Command at popular accounts of the battle around the author attended the In- Ft. Monroe, VA in 1063 and Lager Hammelburg, where the German fantry Officers Advanced was promoted to the rank of forces were credited to have been Course at Fort Benning, GA. gencral that year. He retired equipped with heavily-armed Tiger tanks from active duty in August 1W. and Panzeriaaer Elephant (heavy tank destroyers armed with 8&mm cannons),

I 32 ARMOR - November-December 7987 Le 1O Regiment de Hussards Parachutistes

A RealTool of Counter-surprise.

by Captain Emmanuel Legendre

lntruductlon

Most soldiers assigned to USAREUR have some knowledge of their French comrades. They meet them during field exercises and social functions in various parts of Germany. They know the French units represent France’s commit- ment to a common defense in Europe, particularly the armored divisions of the 1st French Army.

Less known to American person- An ERC 90 armored car in front of the unit HQ at Tarbes, France nel is another part of the French Army forces called: La Force dXc- sions as well as the ones peculiar to tion Rapide (rapid action force or the 11th Airborne Division. By The 11th Airborne DMsion FAR). This force includes 5 cavalry TO&E, it is capable of swift deploy- regiments (larger than a U.S. ment to support an airborne assault squadron, but much smaller than an and can dcploy to action quickly. ACR). One of these regiments is a very particular and unique one: An airborne cavalry airborne regiment, About the FAR le 1’ Reginrent de Hiissards Para- clirrtistes. This article deals with the The Force d’tlctio~i Rapide is a missions, capabilities, equipment, or- strategic asset and, thus, an instru- ganization, and training of this ment of national policy. The FAR’S famous cavalry unit. main roles are: to participate in operations in the European theater Le Premier Reginrent de Hiissards in coordination with the 1st Army; Pamcliiitistes is an old cavalry regi- to deploy forces overseas; and to ment, established in 1720 by a Hun- participate in the territorial defense garian patriot, Count Ladislas de of France. FAR is made up of 5 Bercheny. Involved in all of divisions: airborne, marine, light France’s main battles of the last two armor, alpine, and airmobile. centuries, the regiment was reor- ganized as airborne in 1946. Lo- cated in Tarbes on the Pyrenees bor- Totilling 47,000 soldiers, mainly der, (between France and Spain) it volunteers and not draftees, it is is the cavalry unit of the 11th Air- capable of conducting amphibious, borne Division. (see figure 1). airborne, or airmobile operations. It This light armored regiment con- may be task-organized for specific ducts most of the classic cavalry mis- missions. It may be employed inde-

ARMOR - November-December 7987 33 I BASIC TRAINING

pendently or in support.. of Frcnch and security for the or allied forces. commander, operat- ing in a completely Missions and Capabilities new area of opcra- Of the 1" Regiment lions, by giving de Hussards Parachutistes early warning of enemy forces Le 10 Regirlrent de Hiissurds ahead, by screening, covering, and Central Africa in July 1987. Paracltutistes is the airborne helping to support offensive and 0 I tactical HU spent five months division's tool of counter-surprise, defensive operations. as TF, HV in Chad (Epcn&r Opera- providing freedom of maneuver to lion). the division commander. It is used Le Io Regiiiterrt de Htissards as the combined instantaneous an- Paracltiitistes can carry out these Organization and Equipment titank reserve, with 36 ERC 90-mm missions in Europe as well as over- (see Fig 3). guns and 24 ATGM Milan (4 seas; for example: With its 800 men, 270 vehicles, 3G rounddminute, 1,800-m range). Em- ERC, 24 ATGM, 20 pathfinders, 20 ployed in a large area of operations, 0 Reinforcement the regiment must be able to quick- of the 1st French ly engage an enemy up to a tank hat- Army if needed. talion in strength. The regiment also 0 Protection of provides reconnaissance in depth vital interests of any country with which France is linked by defense agreements. 0 Participation in an international peacekeeping force.

Fig. 2 Recent Missions TheRa id Action pore Here are some ex- amples of the unit's overseas missions in 1986-1987: 0 2 armored troops (ERC 90) spent 4 months in 6 Central Africa. 0 1 armored troop (ERC W) 11 served 4 months in C h a d (Eyervier Operation). 27 0 1 armored The unit is also equipped with Jeepmounted troop went to Milan ATGMs.

~~

34 ARMOR - November-December 7987 An ERC armored car patrols in Central Africa.

stantial commitment to wheeled combat vehicles. The main combat asset is the ERC Suguie vehicles (Eiigiit Roues Caiiuii), fitted with a 90-mm gun and a 7.62-mm machinegun. Crewed by three men, this 8-ton vehicle mounts a laser ran- geGnder and can lire an APFS-DS or HEAT round with a high prob- ability of lirst-round hit up to 1,800 meters. It is amphibious, and its low fuel consumption allows it to run 450 km without refueling. The main antitank weapon is the well-known Milan; the use of the MlRA night sight enables the missile to be fired by night at a range of 1,800 meters. An older type vehicle, the AML 90 (Aiitoiiiilrailleuse lcgere), is some- F times pre-positioned overseas and tactically employed like the ERC YO when our soldiers are deployed . _.d overseas without their T0&E vehicles.

Training

Our missions demand top-quality soldiers and training. All the Hiis- sards Parac1ii1tis1e.s are volunteers. The training requires the con- tinuous pursuit of excellence, excel- lence as paratroopers, excellence as gunners, loaders, and drivers. All the soldiers of this airborne cavalry unit must reach optimum readiness airborne instructors, and 6 forward consists of four platoons with six to be involved in the shortest time air controllers, Le 1' Regiiiiciit de ATGM mounted on jeeps; the either in Central Europe or over- Hiissards Puracliiitisles is a true com- HU/Svc troop supports one ADA seas. For instance, when a troop is bined-arms unit made up of seven platoon (20-mm guns); and one under the systems of alert called troops ahle to conduct operations long-range pathfinder and recon- Giiepwd, it must be able to move with optimum efliciency. The regi- naissance airbornc platoon. 5,000 kms from its garrison in less ment consists of: three light ar- than 72 hours, fully equipped. mored cavalry troops, ERC 90-mm All the troops are designed to equipped; one antitank troop dcploy easily, therefore they use The regiment conducts specific ATGM Milan vehicles; two basic light, wheeled vehicles which re- training focused on airborne and training troops (instruction of new quire minimum logistic support, and armor skills. As paratroopers, sol- enlisted soldiers), and one HO & are capable of air, land, or air-drop diers and leaders train for air-drop Services troop. Each ERC troop delivery. This is one of the reasons and air-land operations, with or has four platoons with three ERC why France is the only major without vehicles. They train to use and three jeeps. The antitank troop Western nation that has made a sub- sling techniques, prepare drop

ARMOR - November-December 7987 35 Two AML 90 armored cars patrol a desert area in Chad (see map at left), where French troops have been supporting the local government in its con- tinuing fight against Libyan troops in the Aozou Strip (shaded area along Chadian-Libyan border).

men or ATtiM be effectively emploved-- from the team members, first minute of an airborne opera- they are tion. Because of its strategic and evaluated during tactical mobility and firepower, the National Live regiment increases the division's Gunnery exer- ability to deploy rapidly with the op- cises Five times a timum force structure to accomplish year. the mission.

The ERC crew- Le 1' Regiment de Himard.y men also train in Paraclttitistes is the best among river-crossing cavalry because it is a parachute operations and unit and is the best among are proficient in parachute units because it is cavalry. amphibious tech- niques. Le 1" Regirttent de Htis- sares Paracltiitis- CPT Emmanuel Legendre tes, in 2986, per- graduated from France's St. formed 8,fH)o Cyr military academy in zones, and serve as forward control- parachute jumps, drove 100,OOO km, 1980. He was assigned to lers (FAC). The French FAC serves and fired 1,()0 !IO-mm rounds. 415 the 1 Regiment de Hussards the same function as the U.S. FAC men were deployed overseas. Parachutistes in 1985 and in the combined arms team. The served as XO of an French FAC, however, is not com- EBR- This continuous training is the equipped troop, serving 4 posed of air force oflicers, but usual- guaranty of our capacity to be com- months in Central Africa with ly the troop executive officers. mitted anytime, anywhcre. With its this troop in 1986. He is a .three gun troops, its antitank troop, 1987 graduate of the AOAC Every man jumps 10 times a year and its 18 professional platoons, le at Fort Knox and has been (minimum) by day or night. The 1" Reginrent de Hirssards Paracltiitis- chosen to assume a com- men train in commando techniques tes provides the needed reconnais- mand next spring. and mountain techniques, both in sance, security, and antitank power winter and summer. As ERC crew- for the airborne division, which can

I36 ARMOR - November-December 7987 I lnteropera bility: The Buzzword and the Reality When one hears of CJerman- two companies, and the reconnais- bigger interoperability problem. American interoperahility training, sance plittoon, located in assembly The difliculty of supplying both 105- the images which often to come areas close to each othcr to mm and 120-mm main gun rounds mind arc REFORGER, high level facilitate face-to-face coordination. will be greatly edscd when the staff exercises, or individual skills The company first sergeants en- MlAl is fully deployed in Europe. training. Rarely do battalion and sured that Class 1 supply was coor- company-sized units get the oppor- dinated by cross-attaching several Command, control, and com- tunity to train together in realistic, mess personnel. The aim was to munications needed more effort to tactical operations. share ideas and to help the 3/141 coordinate and master. The lan- cooks prepare U.S. MRE and B-ra- guage barrier was only one aspect In the event of a war in Europe, lions. The D/4-67 mess team of the problcm; radio compatability many German and American units hcnelited as well, learning to supple- will light alongside one anothcr. It ment their rations with food from will be imperative that the platoon the local economy. The Bundeswehr leaders and company commanders has a truck configured much like who will do the close-in lighting the American mobile kitchen "...The Leopards and have some experience working with trailer, itnd had no difficulty using Marders did not need each other. U.S-issucd food and supplies. As as much fuel, or need it the week progressed, the first ser- as often as the thirsty Last spring, the 4th Bn., 67th geants coordinated their water runs, MlS Of D/4-67...." Armor conducted a week-long, tacti- Class I issue, and trash removal, cal mancuver exercise in the Gcr- and exchanged mess equipment on man statcs of Hesse and Rhincland- occasion. Pfiilli. Attached to 4-67 Armor was the 3rd Kompanie, 142st Panzer Bat- The 4-67 commander and staff ad- talion, a Leopard I1 unit, and the dressed the llow of Class 111 and V was another. In order to communi- 1st platoon, 2nd Kompanie, 142st supplies. The Leopards and Mar- cate with the Bundeswehr radios, Pitnzer Grenadier Battalion, equip- ders did not necd as much fuel, or U.S. radios had to be on the "Old ped with the Marder IFV. need it as often as the thirsty Mls Squelch On" position, and the KY- of D/467. 57 secure devices turned off. The One of the goals of the exercise Bundeswehr radios, which employ Wits interoperability training. Spccifi- The Leopard and Marder mount a frequency hopping, had to be "lock- cally, the battalion wantcd to see if flash simulator that uses Hoffmdnn ed on" to the single frequency of the the Bundeswehr units could operate charges like the M1 MILES system, American radios. effectively as part of the American making Class V resupply more task force. 3/141 and 1/2/242 realistic. When fuel or ammunition This solution worked well for com- deployed to the maneuver rights was needed, the 3/141 contactcd munications between U.S. ANNRC- area with only their organic assets; the D/4-67 first sergeant, or the bat- 12/46/47 radios and the Bundeswehr they would be totally dependent on Lalion S4, and the D Company logis- radios. It did not work well, 4-67 for all their logistical needs. tics package was increased to supp- however, with other U.S. radios, From the start, interoperability had ly both units. The LOGPAC con- like the AN/VRC-64/160 or PRC- to be a reality, not a buznvord. cept was new to the panzer crew- 77. The problem was not significant men of Y141 and 2/2/142, but they on the company and battalion com- To sustain the force was the first rcadily adapted to it. They were par- mand nets where few -64/77/1C# arca addressed by the 4-67 com- ticularily impressed by the MY78 radios were in use. The problcm mander and staff. D/4-67 and 3/141 Fuel HEMT, the 5-gallon can is was more severe on the battalion had worked with each other before still the norm in the Bundeswchr. logistics net and on the tank/in- on various partnership events, and Of course, in a wartime scenario, fantry platoon nets. The single were test tlie battalion's gods. The Class V resupply would present a squelch setting of the -64/77/100

ARMOR - November-December 7987 37 "...The radio systems of the Leopard and Marder

have several advantages over American radio systems....I'

radios proved incompatihlc with the other kcy personnel. avenucs, and had little difficultv un- "Old Squclch On" -setting of the derstanding the orders or intent of 12/4/47 U.S. radios, and incom- In one scenario during the week, their new commanders. D/4-67 and patible with the Bundeswehr radios. the 4-67 commander wanted to tcst 3141 maneuvered in a sector 10- Prior planning in the makeup of the ability of D/4-67 and 3/141 to kilometers deep and 10-kilometers joint U.S.-German radio nets will be coordinate a common boundary, wide, falling back and launching vital to the success of any joint and gave thc two companies the mis- counterattacks, while never losing operations. sion to defend a sector against the the coherency of the defcnse. At the attack of the remainder of thc hat- end of the day, D/467 and 3/14] The radio systems or the Leopard talion. To make matters more inter- still held the ground between the at- and Marder have several ad- esting, one platoon of each com- packers and their ohjective. vantages over American radio sys- pany was cross-attachcd to the tems. These advantages were clearly other. The attacking forces con- On the hattlcfield, where harsh evident in the electronic warfare sisted of two M1 companies and a reality soon ovenvhelms hu~mords, aspect of the exercise. All the "karitpfgnippe"of MIS and the Mar- 4-67 Armor and the 141sl Panzcr Leopards and Marders had dual der platoon. lf either side was to proved that interoperability can receive/transmit capability; the fight and maneuver as a cohesive work, and work well. Obviously, the radios were compact; frequency- force, the language barrier would fog of war and the friction of real hopping eliminates the need for have to be breached. combat would magnify the diflicul- secure devices; and they appeared ties overcome on the exercise. In ad- to he infinitely more reliable than As previously mcntioned, English dition, Class II and V resupply, as the U.S. radios. The frequency-hop- was the common language of the well as maintenance problems, ping charactcristics of the German two cornmandcrs. The platoon would multiply with time and losses. radios made them immune to direc- leaders of the cross-attached pla- The solutions discussed here are tion finding, jamming, and intercep- toons, however, spoke very little of only one battalion's answers to the tion. Throughout the week, an ele- their new commander's language. interoperability dilemma. Other hat- ment of the 533 MI Battalion was To translate orders and messages, talions, in other situations, may lind able to DF and jam "locked-on" Gcr- thc loader of each platoon leader's diffcrcnt solutions. man, and unsecured U.S. radio tank was rcplaced by a bilingual sol- transmissions. (SINGGARS or its dier or the parent company. Again, There will he a time, however, replacement cannot come too soon!) the importance of bilingual soldicrs when German and American units was evidcnt. Although the combat will have to light together to win the We overcame the language harrier power of a tank with a mixed- day. When that day comes, com- in different ways at different levels. nationality crew may be less than manders will have to act quickly As is the case with most Bundes- lot) percent, the benefits in 6 great- and decisively to destroy the enemv. wehr officers, the commander of ly outweigh any losses. There will be no time to pondcr 3/141 was fluent in English. 4-67 The American tankers and Ger- solutions, no time to train to niastcr Armor was lucky to have several of- man panzer crewmen proved quite the myriad of tasks required for ficers and senior non-commissioned adcpt at planning and lighting the units to light and win. Exercises like officers who spoke German. Plan- battle together. Graphic symbols the one described here may be as ning for the WXand the issuing of and control measures were readily vital to the outcome of a battle in OPORDS was thus made easy. In shared, and both companies uscd Germany as REFORGER is to the this case, good fortune made the U.S. OPORD. During the success of NATO in Europe! thorough planning unnecessary. ln defend-in-sector mission, D/4-67 other scenerios, however, the selec- and 3/14] defended in depth along CPT TJMOTHY R. REESE tion of units to light togethcr may several high-speed avenues of ap- CO, HHO, 4-67 Armor be partially based on the language proach. The platoons of both units FRG skills of their commanders and fought by sections along these

I38 ARMOR - November-December 1987 Determining a Successful Command

Company command is undouhted- 0Comhine arms and sister ser- developed and refined through com- ly the highlight of any officer’s vices to coniplemcnt and reinforce. mander’s seminars and a solid of- carecr. At no other time can a ficer professional development leader so positively influence the 0 Undcrstand the effects of battle program. The ability to put one’s lives of so many young men and on soldiers, units, and leaders. thoughts on paper checks and balan- women. The closcness that can ces the rcccption of oral com- develop between a commander and These ten imperatives apply to the munications. his soldiers is hard to explain, but 1 Army in peacetime, just as in war will attempt to qualify that feeling. and can be adapted to most any Concentrate Combat Power thought process. Against Enemy Vulnerabilities What determines the command success? To some, it’s a “one block Ensure Unity of Effort Before communicating to his sol- on an OER; to others, it’s measured diers, the commander must under- by the awards they receive. A few This process must st:irt at the top. stand his own objective. After consider it successful if they survive Properly planned operations, hand- taking command, he should attempt the change of command inventory led by competent learlcrs, will make to identify the unit’s strengths and without a report of survey. the effort uniform. Thc commandcr weaknesses. He develops a plan to must be the director of this process, tackle the weak areas, often hy I’d like to present a different con- and his first sergeant the ad- using some of the unit’s strengths. cept for determining the success of ministrator. Proper training of The commander must also identify command. We’ll look at the coni- junior leaders, the main purpose of those individuals in the unit who mand through use of the ten impera- the commander and first sergeant, possess skills necessary to ac- tives of Airland Battle: is a must. Channels of communica- complish the designated objeclives. tion should be left opcn, while bcing 0 Ensure unity of effort. stressed, developed, and strength- Thcre is no shame in tapping the ened. Prioritize workloads and ex- expertise of a young noncommis- 0Anticipate events on the bat- ecute training events uniformly to sioned officer or lieutenant, if he tleficld. meld all efforts to a common goal. possesses a skill that will enhance unit growth and effectiveness. 0 Concentrate comhat power Anticipate Events against enemy Vulnerabilities. On the Battlefield While some soldiers will be great planners, othcrs will be great ex- 0 Designate, sustain, and shift the The commander must develop ecutors. To find the right blend of main effort. clear, concise guidance for his sub- these personnel and cause them to ordinates. He must look well ahcad mesh, will make possible a much 0 Press thc fight. at the long-range training plan and smoother command climate. identify prohlcm areas for early 0 Move Fast, strike hard, and resolution. Just as the commander’s Designate, Sustain, finish rapidly. intcnt is vital to the operations and Shift the Main Effort order. his intcnt in all training must 0 Use terrain, weather, deception, be clear and understnndable. The Many young commanders are and OPSEC. commander must develop this in his hampered by the inability to change junior ofiicers so that their ability to gears in midstream. Once a project 0 Conserve strength for decisive “push-to-talk becomes second na- or task has been interrupted, it is action. ture. Writtcn conimunication is as often hard to regain the momentum. imnortant as oral and should be This is especially true of peacetime

ARMOR - Novernber-December 7987 39 I training. Right in the middle of a order. The commander gathers his families. visited their homes. and fre- gunnery or ARTEP training subject matter experts and together qucntei their off-duty hangouts. program, there is a surprise inspec- they develop a course of action to The intent here was lo blend into tion or visit. The commandcr must accomplish the new tasking. IT no al- their environment, as you would divert eMorts to the new project and teration of the current plan is have them operate in yours. The sol- the training plan falls into a rut. necessary, business continues as dicr’s welfare is the commander’s developed. charter. You must allow the soldiers There is an easy remedy by using to get ”into” your personality and the minimum manpower and maxi- Whcn a distractor of a more per- character. This, in and of itself, will mum talent available, the leadership sonal nature arises, the commandcr lcnd credence to your openness. can develop a rotation plan. Once has a myriad of agencies within the again, the commander must revert Army structure at his disposal to as- The weather can be a friend or to his strengths. Use the soldiers sist and give guidance. Many com- cncmy, as the commandcr chooses. who prcpare well, rotate duties manders choose to work at the Training must continue in all types among platoons, and continue to problem themselves, without any as- of weather, until it hccomes train the program. sistance, and the problem mush- detrimental to the effectiveness of rooms, quite often at the expense of continuance. The leadcr must give Remember, the small distractors the soldier involved. When in doubt, the health and wellare 01 his sol- take care of themselves. Don’t lose don’t hesitate to call in a specialist. diers first priority. Forcing soldiers sight of the primary objectives. to run in a freezing rain because it Use Terrain, Weather, is the policy to run on that par- Press the Fight Deception and OPSEC ticular day has far less benefit than a like exercise conducted indoors. Continue to develop your junior This application in peacetime can leaders. These officers and NCOs be hard or simple to use, and often Deception can have positive are the commander’s greatest asset. determines the climiite 01 com- rewards. The commander must first The commandcr‘s ability to hone in- mand. The commander must estab- detail what it is he expects of his itiative in his junior leaders will lish himsclf in his working environ- men. His policies must be clear, con- allow the unit to get away from the ment, much as he will command his cise, and realistic. The commander reactionary role. The commander unit on the battlefield. niust then outline his plans to check must allow his subordinates the adherence to those policies. He freedom to err and aid them in First and foremost, he should must also explain the consequences houncing back. He can best en- make his surroundings workable. of noncompliance, without estab- hance this by face-to-face com- Personnel and facilities must be ad- lishing a particular type punishment munication. The commandcr cannot justed to his style. The unit that es- for each different violation. Each allow himself to become desk- tablishes and practices organization soldier is different and his cir- bound. He must be where the sol- in garrison, will more easily execute cumstances cannot be generalized diers are, and be personally in- a tactical plan in the field than the with all others. Treat individuals as volved in what they are doing. Noth- unit that operates in chaos. individuals and you may gain their ing will gain the respect of a young collective respect. soldier Faster than seeing his com- Locating well forward to ”see” the mander in the motor pool during battlefield can be likened to an Conserve Strength maintenance periods, working on open door policy in garrison. Many for Decisive Action his own vehicle and equipment. commanders meet the responsihility Command is truly a team effort, of having such a policy, but are the Leaders must give soldiers time to from the coach down to his players. hardest people in the world to lo- relax and unwind. No other profes- cate and talk to. As a commander, sion requires of its personnel what Move Fast, Strike Hard, any time, any place, was my policy leaders in the military require of and Finish Rapidly and, io garrison, my office door was their soldiers. Soldicrs can’t call in always physically open. sick, can’t always take a vacation at When the commander receives a I spent many nights in the har- their Icisure, don’t get as many tasking from higher headquarters, racks visiting and talking with the holidays as the civilian sector would he niust act immediately. A re- soldiers. I attended all of their so- believe, and very few professions re- evaluation of priorities may be in cial functions, dined with their quire their employees to be avail-

40 ARMOR - November-December 7987 able 24 hours a day. will bolster working rclations in best friend and counselor. A continuous schedule, with few field operations. All things con- breaks lor family and friends, will sidered, when coopcration is mini- Montgomery said it best in his quickly deteriorate a unit's morale. mal. the commander must not allow hook, "A History Of WarJam": Situations will occur whcn mission his leaders to develop a "payback accomplishment must take pre- mentality. Disagreemcnts between ',4 coiiiriiaiidcr mist iiiidemtnitd cedence, but commanders can ex- commanders may satisfy their own that boiiled iip iriside liis iiieii are plain thesc instances and troops will desires, but hurt the unit and sol- great eiiiotioiial foms wlticli have to understand. The commander who diers involved. be girw ai1 oirtlct, in a wm9 tliat is drives his men through a gunnery both positive arid coiistnrcrirv, arid training program seven days a week This cooperation can be ac- wliicli waniis ilic hean arid crcites fw three months may have some- complished within the unit or with the iiiiagiiratiori. Iii iitodeni times, iJ thing to prove to his peers, and he higher command. Cross-training is the approach to tlicse pmbleiiis is may win his point, but he may also one of the best methods of estab- cold and iiiipersorial, a coiiiriiaiidcr lose his most important asset, the lishing confidence among soldiers will gain litik; bur if lie caii gain tlie respect of his men. Getting soldiers and their supporting arms. A com- mist arid coiijidciicc or Itis iiieii, arid to perform out of fear and spite is a mander should develop a system al- tliev feel tlieir best iiitesls are safe sad testimony to the whole concept lowing time lor these cross-training iii liis liarids, tlieii lie has iii liis pos- of leadership. programs. A unit Job Swap Day is a sessioii a priceless assct arid the good training tool. Mechanics train greatest acliier~eiiieirtsbccoiiic pos- On the other side of the spectrum as armor crewmcn; cooks fire mor- sible. This is vital becmise iii [lie aid, is the commander who exercises tars or howitzers; tankers become a battle is woii bv tlte figlitiiig spirit of sound judgenicnt. He rewards per- personnel clerks; lcaders become jiiriior oflcers arid iiieii - wliaterer formance with time off, unit hnc- workers; and soldiers perform (lie qiialiy of liiglier coiiiiiiarrdcrs. tions, and trips, and he tclls his sol- duties of the leaders. All skills are diers how he fcels. The unit has a properly supervised and conducted This developmcnt requires time strong wives' organization. The com- with safcty the kcy. The soldiers and great skill. Some commandcrs mander develops and participates in gain an appreciation for one believe that this "touchy-feely" ap- a well-rounded physical training another, and the commander has proach shows them to be soft and program. He places soldicrs in solid once again gained a measure of easy going. That is where the com- educational programs and counsels their respect and loyalty. mander's control of the situation be- them on their future. In time, the comes essential. He is the one who commander gains not only the ad- Understand the Effects will allow the boundaries of good miration of the soldiers, hut also of Battle on Soldiers, order and discipline to be violated that of their families. With all these Units, and Leaders or obeyed. things going for it, the unit wlll have more than enough strength to pcr- After a decade of peace, there is a One of the hardest thins a com- form its wartime missions. shortage of small unit commanders mander must do is to punish his sol- with combat experience. Under- diers. If the soldiers clearly under- Combine Arms standing the effect of battle is a dif- stand the commander - the man and Sister Services ficult task. The commander who is and his policies - it becomes easicr to Complement and Reinforce well read in the history of war and to adjust to each situation. can adapt those lessons to The commander must not work peacetime training, will make his alone. He must not be too proud to job simplcr and safer. Understand- No two soldiers are alike in per- ask for help from fellow corn- ing stress and its causes, reading sonality or character, and trying to manders. Command positions in the current doctrine in FMs, and prac- administer justice as if they were unit will not all change at once, so ticing proper management tcchni- will dcgradc the commander's crcd- there is always a conimander with ques will greatly reduce the detrac- ihility with his men. Dillerent sol- the knowledge and experience avail- tors of unit effectiveness. dicrs require help from different able for counsel and guidance. The sources. To understand each soldier ability to work closely with sister These points are important to suc- and his background will make the companies will develop a bond of cess in small unit leadership. A coni- conimander more effective in his understanding and cooperation and niander must become his soldiers' role as guide and counselor.

I ARMOR - November-December 1987 41 1 The commander must act as the the commander and his men must ful, rcspcctcd, and repeated. buffer for all higher policics and know each othcr. The commander programs that affect his mcn. When must not use his rank or position as Don’t measure the success of the he estahlishes a training program, the sole motivational force for his command by the material rewards he must clearly state its purpose to unit. Trust, confidcnce, and the available. Measure it by the feeling be sure it is understood. Each event desire to do the best for the sol- you get when, in years to come, you or task has a basis supported by diers, will allow the commander to see the familiar face and out- doctrine or history. To allow the sol- be effective and respected, while stretched hand of a soldier you have dier to have this knowledge will growing and maturing in his own led and hclped dcveIop. Measure it help him understand the ”why” of leadership skills. in the pleasant memories of training what he is accomplishing. The com- long days in heat and cold. Or it mander must prevent training from The training must be tough, realis- may come in an unexpected phone being viewed as, We’re only doing tic, and demanding of the soldicr’s call or letter. Jt is the inner peace of this because it’s mandatory”. mental and plivsical atlrihutes. knowing you did it for the soldiers, Above all. it should be safe and en- not yourself, and they admired you 1 have used all of the principles joyable. The soldier who is happy for the person you were. and ideas stated here in past leader- and comfortable in his job will allow ship positions. I’ve addressed them that atmosphere to flow over into WAYNE K. HAMBERGER from a commander’s view, but they his personal life. His contentment, CPT, Armor can be applied at all levels. The key added to the unit’s, will breed a Richmond, VA point I’ve tried to emphasize is that climate of command that is success-

Selection Board Schedules Announced by MILPERCEN

The following officer selection boards have been announced for the remainder of FY 8tk

5-29 Jan. - COL, Army 9-26 Feb. - LTC, Combat Arms Command 8 Mar-1 Apr - CPT, Army and CVI 6 Apr-6 May - LTC, Army 17-20 May - Regular Army Integration Assignment Officer Updates 6 Jul-5 Aug - Senior Service College At MILPERCEN Armor Branch 23 Aug-30 Sep - Command Sr Staff College 7-23 Sep - CPT, Army and CVI LTC Tom Abbcnante is the new LTC assip- ments officer, assisted by Mr. Joe Kuntze. MILPERCEN encourages officers to prepare MA.1 Ken Dryden has taken over the majors for upcoming selection boards by having a new desk, assisted by Mr. Darvis Alfred. photo taken. Once it has been mailed to Armor CPT Bill Johnson and CPT Don Campbell, as- Branch, verify that it has been received. Visit sisted by Ms. Jackie Paramore will assign your MILPC) or RPC and review your ORB. branch-qualified captains. Changes can be made at any time. You do not CPT Terry Wolff, assisted by Mr. Gene have to wait for your Kith month. Joseph, will handle OAC assignments of A copy of your performance microfiche can he lieutenants. requested by writing: USA MILPERCEN, CPT Terry Wolff, assisted hy Ms. Bcrtagnolli, AITN: DAPC-MSR-S, 200 Stovall Street, will handle OAC assignments of captains. Alexandria, VA 22332-0400.

42 ARMOR - November-December 7987 Activation With a Smile

The formation of a new unit pens to come up is the first priority. begins when the adjutant announces When other things come up they be- the orders and the commander un- come the first priority. This will furls the guidon. The accompanying leave the former first priorities to ceremony requires, as a minimum, be done tomorrow. By tomorrow, the presence of the new unit com- most people forget all hut the last mander, his commander, the ser- first priority, so just don’t worry geant-major, the adjutant, the guid- about it. Simply do whatever comes on, and a photographer. UP.

It is traditional on these occasions Jf a task that comes up appears to for the photographer to be in need be critical, then set it aside for a of a haircut. Additional members of week. If it is actually critical, thcn the new unit (who usually do not the squadron commander will turn ing at the new unit will know what exist), a band, and a parade field red the next time he sees you. This they are supposed to do. Therefore, are optional. will confirm that it is a critical task, the next step in the activation process is to use CLUES to estab- Next, after the ceremony, a lot of lish a few procedures. well-foundcd questions find thcir Policy letters help at this point. way into the mind of the new unit “...By tomorrow, most people commander. Why are there no Here is the recommended sequence forget all but the last first of letters: troops assigned to my unit yet? priority, so just don’t wony What barracks will they stay in about it. Simply do whatever when they arrive? When is my first Policy Letter 1 - Location and Ad- comes up....‘I formation? Where is my parking ministration of the Commander’s space? What training areas should I Parking Space. request for six weeks from now? (The last question is the most criti- Policy Letter 2 - Wall Locker cal, as any assistant S3 will tell you.) and it now becomes the first priority. Labeling Procedures and Other Critical Things. To answer these and other ques- In summary, do today‘s first tions, the commander needs an ef- priority today; do yesterday’s and Policy Letter 3 - Privately-owned fective problem-solving method. today’s former first priorities tomor- Vehicle Parking Procedures. Since the unique problems en- row. If left totally CLUE-less, apply countered during the formation of a the rule of thumb thdt everything is Policy Letter 4 - Change to Policy unit require a well-formulated ap at least as important as everything Letter 1. poach, let us take a moment aside else. The first correlary to the rule to address problem-solving. A is that you must please everyone all Policy Letter 5 - Change to Policy method with which the author has of the time. Once the commander kttcr 2. had much experience is the Crisis understands these simple principles, Lcadership Unsolved-problem Eval- he has effectively grasped the Policy Letter 6 - Recovery uation System, hereafter referred to management style required for the Procedures Alter Field Exercises as CLUES. complicated activation process. Through CLUES policy letters, By employing CLUES, the com- With those principles in mind, the the unit knows what it is doing long mander prioritizes and acts upon commander must now take alTirm- before anyone realizes it. Once the required activation tasks alive action to effectively organize policies are sort of well in hand (or without ever resorting to common his newly-formed unit. At this point, rather, less out of hand). it is time sense. The first CLUE is that tasks of course, thcre will be no estab- to get into the meat of the activa- are prioritized using last-in, first-out lished opcrating procedures. As a tion. This begins with the Equip- logic. In other words, whatever hap- result, none of the personnel arriv- ment Acquisition Phase. The unit

I ARMOR - November-December 7987 43 I will need a bunch-of equipment. (A them from beginning most senten- school, exccpt that there is no test "bunch' hcre means lots and lots.) ces (and all &npl&s) with, "In at the end of class. my last un it....' A god candidate It is preferable, but not necessary, for this task is a person with per- The whole activation process takes that all equipment acquired distant- suasive communication skills, a win- seven to ten months. With CLUES ly resembles the unit MTOE re- ning smile, and who is not a mem- and intestinal fortitude, it can be quirements. In newly-activated ber of the unit. They will not listen cut down to 12 months, unless of units, the MTOE usually changes lo anyone in the unit. A weightlifter often anyway, so basically just col- or a karate cxpcrt is actually best lect a lot of general, gd, Army for this task. equipment, like weapons and stuff. "...Plan ahead with standard The Property Book Office people Another important part of the in- operating procedures; set prior- and the S4 office will assist in the processing step is to retrain the new ities and stick to them; have collection process, but a little initia- unit members to stop using inbred, plenty of prepared hand receipts tive in coordinating for lateral trans- respected former unit mottos, such on hand...." fers from the excess of other units as "Red Devils", "Black Horse", or somewhere in your theater of opra- "Anyone not in the 77th is a Loser." tions is beneficial. This, too, helps the personnel as- course you have plenty of junior similation process. Prepare an excit- second lieutenants without supply Believe it or not, a supply sergeant ing new unit motto, such as We sergeants, in which case it can be is not very important in facilitating Are The Best," in advance. cut down even further. In con- this step. A junior second lieutenant clusion, the seriously important ad- is actually better at it. (The author The final step in the long activa- vice for those required to par- speaks with authority in this mat- tion process is training. It works ticipate in the formation of a new ter). A supply sergeant would mere- well to use CLUES by training dif- unit is: plan ahead with standard ly complicate the process with un- ficult collective tasks first, then operating procedures; set prioritics necessary paperwork, or even hand working towards the basics. Do not and stick to them; have plenty of receipts. There is no need to worry worry that many of the new unit prepared hand receipts on hand about hand receipts or account- members have never been trained (along with a good supply sergeant): ability, as Genghis Khan once said, on some of your newly-acquired be quick to assimilate, motivate, and The S4 will understand ... Eventual- equipment. They probably will not train the soldiers; keep marathon ly." If the S4 does not undersland, use it anyway. That is about all you meetings as rare and concise as pos- then it is a good idea to memorize will ever need to know about train- sible; and learn from mistakes the amount of your base pay. The ing. There is no time for training (hopefully others'). If your unit is survey officer asks about that sort of anyway. Who needs it? (Cough, scheduled to receive recently- thing. cough.) procured equipment, do not en- courage high hopes. When and if The next, and easiest, step in the Before concluding, a special note that equipment arrives, it may not activation process is to get some sol- concerning marathon unit activation be exactly what you expected. Also, diers for the unit. MILPERCEN is meetings deserves mention. Activa- do not confuse CLUES with clues. pretty helpful in this. They have tion meetings are inherently long, Remcmbcr: somcday you will look plenty of bodies floating around. mundane, and boring since there is back at it all as Good Army Train- See the SI (If MILPERCEN has always so much coordination going ing. And even if the unit soon for- sent you an Sl). on all of the time. To cope propcrly gets your name, you are still an in- with these meetings, slouch in your tegral part of its institutional What comes next is more diflicult. chair, find a bug on the wall to stare memory. Maybe, just maybe, you You must find somcone who is at, and tap your pencil incessantly. made an impact on this old world. capable of telling the newly-arriving If you find yourself asleep, ensure And maybe not. soldiers that this new unit will not that your eyes are shielded from the necessarily be exactly identical in group leader by a discreetely placed 1LT G.P. Field Rowe every aspect to their former unit. object, and continue to move your Fort Ord, CA. -This step is intended to preclude pencil. 11 is just like being back at 44 ARMOR - November-December 1987 Jurisdiction, Responsibility, and the Commissioned Manual Laborer

The relationship between officers getting any closcr to being unloaded and non-commissioned officers is as the moments went by. an issue of continual interest in our Army. While of particular interest A more mature officer would have adage of "If you want something to young officers just coming on ac- easily handled this problem by call- done right, do it yourself," has no tive duty, the problems associated ing the two sergeants aside, sorting greater group of adherents than the with this relationship concern all out priorities, issuing the ap- American officer corps. Ouract ions, ranks on both sides. Two old Army propriate orders, and then presiding however, can cause serious damage saws exacerbate the problems: "Ac- over a private "division of the to the morale of good NCOs who complish the mission" and "Let your kingdoms" session later. I took a dif- work for us. We face resentment non-commissioned ofIicers do their ferent approach I would teach my from these sergeants who feel jobs". I fully support both these NCOs a lesson about their silly bick- frustrated in their attempts to do goals, hut I admit that I have on oc- ering and the importance of their jobs. We also face possible casion, like many other officers, priorities and teamwork. Above all estrangement at home as we con- found these two goals in conflict. else, I would "accomplish the mis- tinue to work extra long hours to ac- sion." complish our own tasks and I especially recall an incident at everyone else's. There is always Fort Hood while I was a second I walked out lo the truck, past the more than enough work to go lieutenant. 1 was the battalion's sup two still-bickering sergeants, and around. Officers must learn to port platoon leader. One day, grabbed the first three men I saw. I during tank gunnery, 1 was in the climbed into the truck bed and we platoon office in the motor pool bcgan to unload the boxes, bucket- when the ammunition sergeant brigade style. By the time the two returned from the range with a sheepish-looking and angry NCOs truckload of empty ammo boxes. joined us, the truck was already half- "...My ammo sergeant The truck had to be unloaded for empty. later complained to me another mission and the ammo that I had embarassed him." NCO approached my POL section My ammo sergeant later com- leader for help. plained to me that I had embar- rassed him and the POL section I could not help hearing the leader by usurping their respon- heated argument in the other room. sibility and authority in front of the These two ordinarily outstanding enlisted men. Later I admitted to respect the division of labor be- and dependable sergeants were myself that 1 was probably guilty of tween thcmselves and their NCOs if fighting over who owed what favors unnecessarily shaming these two the Army is to be run most efficient- to whom, who took orders from good sergeants. I vowed once again ly. whom, and who "owned what ter- that I would try not to meddle in ritorial rights over the enlisted men. NCO work in the future. Rather, I At this point, many people - espe- The ammo NCO, having no help of would try to ensure that the NCOs cially NCOs - are probably cheer- his own besides the truck driver, did the work. ing me on, even if this seems a had apparently crossed jurisdiction- repeat of what has already been al lines without permission. This vow, however, is not an easy said many times before. But not so one to uphold, and I and many fast! If officers do take over their Several enlisted men had stopped other officers have strayed from the sergeant's duties, thcre must be whrk to watch the show. Even more goal from time to lime. How easy it reasons worth deeper contempla- distressing to me was the loaded is to just do what has to be done in tion. I would suggest that these truck, which did not appear to be the press of the moment. The old reasons may include a different out-

I ARMOR - November-December 7987 45 look toward authority and its use. the mission, but officers seem less While putting-. up a breastwork at Trained from the beginning in the patient in adhering to custom, Lechmere Point, a squad of men un- use of authority, officers tend to preferring in the end to examine covered a rather large stone, which take it for granted. We more easily questions of responsibility or juris- they left at the side of the ditch. assume the mantle of authority and diction later, after the job is done. While the squad continued to work, its attendant respect because we OI course, by then, there may be General Israel Putnam, American have always had it in some degree. another mission to occupy our atten- commander of the sector, rode by Even as cadets, we were intentionial- on an inspection. ly and continually in situations that tested our leadership capacities. Seeing the stone, the general "...As long as there are mis- turned to the non-commissioned or- Officer cadets, constantly re- sions to be done, officers will ficer who was supervising the squad, minded of the responsibilities that show impatience, and sergeants and said, "My lad, throw that stone accompany the commission, prac- will understandably try to protect up on the middle of the breastwork." tice the judicious use of authority their prerogatives..." through their chains of command The NCO, recognizing General and various tactical and classroom Putnam, saluted and replied, "Sir, 1 problems. Even the most junior and am a corporal." unsure second lieutenant begins his career with immediate respon- General Putnam then responded, sibilities and authority, and more tion. If problems over jurisdiction "Oh, I ask your pardon, sir," and get- are quickly added. He must exercise are to be avoided, officers and ting off his horse, immediately pick- authority because it is expected, and NCOs need to discuss their respec- ed up the stone himself and heaved most officers, trained as they are, tive responsibilities at the beginning it up on the brcastwork. Then, adapt to those expectations. Author- of their association. Periodic discus- without further words, the general ity then becomes more a means by sions are also needed to resolve remounted and rode on. which oflicers accomplish their mis- new conflicts as they arise. sions than something to guard Upon reading this, I felt bettcr jealously. Will this completely alleviate of- about my own impatience. At least I ficer/NCO conflicts over mission was in good company. Perhaps Non-commissioned officers, on the and responsibilities? Probably not, there is a lesson here for non-com- other hand, work hard to achieve hut hopefully we can bettcr undcr- missioned officers as well. Fore- their rank with its concomitant stand where each side is coming warned is forearmed, and this warn- authority and respect. They enter from. The mission must come first. ing places a premium upon good the Army at the lowest level and. But as long as there are missions, of- communication and a good working despite the best efforts of basic and ficers will show impatience, and ser- relationship between officer and primary NCO courses,(and ser- geants will understandably try to NCO. Sergeants also must work to geants major), many soldiers enter protect their prerogatives. Given establish that relationship with their the NCO ranks without any other that conflicts may occur even in the officers. And, of course, also be preparation than their experience best of working relationships, of- prepared to see a truck or two un- and the examples they see in other ficers and NCOs need to keep the loaded. sergeants they have known. Perhaps net open to resolve them in an because they are from the ranks, honest and forthright manner. CPT STEVEN GRAVLIN NCOs need to protect the authority Instructor, USMA and responsibility they have earned. Such impatience is actually part of NCOs thus tend to be more bound our military tradition, with roots in by tradition and precedent. the earliest days of our Army. In the nte inciderit cited is dated in a winter of 1776, for example, when Rev0 tiitiona~War veteran 's pertsiort These are, of course, gross the British Army was under siege at application, fourid in The Revohitiort generalizations, hut 1 believe they Boston, the Continental Army un- Reiiteritbered, Jolt~t C. Dam, Ed have some merit. Both officers and dertook to improve and strengthen Chicago: Unirvmity of Chicago Press, NCOs feel the need to accomplish its fortifications surrounding the city. 1980, pp. 392-393.

I46 ARMOR - November-December 1987 I M88 "BattlefieldWorkhorse" Is Upgraded to Support MI-SeriesTanks

The M88AX tows an M1 at Aberdeen Proving Ground during tests in 1985.

The M88-series armored tracked with more power, more traction, im- 1,050-horsepower AVDS-1790 en- recovery vehicle has been with the proved ballistic protection, and gine, without the MS8's power take- U.S. Army for more than 20 years. greater lifting and winching off and cooling package, had al- During this period, the Sfi-ton capabilities. ready passed the Army's 400-hour vehicle has provided outstanding NATO dyna-mometer lest cycle. In recovery support for the Ma- and Recognizing that the Army would 1985, the Army borrowed this MMl-series tanks. It has become af- need data on potential improve- M88AX vehicle for testing at Aber- fectionately known as the "Bat- ments in order to make meaningful deen Proving Ground, MD. In con- tlefield Workhorse". decisions, BMY embarked on an in- trolled tests, it demonstrated that dependent research and develop- such an up-powered and up- BMY of York, PA., designs and ment program in 1984 to investigate weighted vehicle could actually tow builds the M88. Although initially potential power trains and other im- 65-ton M1 tanks at speeds substan- produced with a gasoline engine of provements necessary for recovery tially greater than the M88A1 had some 1,050 horsepower, the design support of MI-series tanks. This ef- been able to attain while towing the was converted to diesel power in fort received strong support from lighter M6U tank. Mobility analysis the late 1970s, gave the vehicle an Teledyne Conlincntal Motors by the Army's Corps of Engineers improved operating range and com- (makers of the M88A1 engine) and Waterways Experiment Station fur- monality of fuel, although it did not Detroit Diesel Allison (makers of ther predicted that this vehicle increase the system's ability to hand- the M88A1 transmission). would actually have better mobility le heavier tank systems. In fact, the in Europe, even while it was towing change in engines slightly reduced The result was a test-bed vehicle, a tank some nine tons heavier than the vehicle's top speed. designated the MfBAX. The the MGO. M88AX was a basic M88A1 chassis, Time marches on, and the current which had the engine's power in- To bring this program to fruition M8XA1 vehicle, while slill repre- creased from 750 horsepower to and to expeditiously resolve today's senting an efficient and well- 1,050 horsepower, the transmission unsafe and extremely constrained balanced design, is overtaxed in its tailored to the engine's power curve operating conditions, the Army has efforts to effectively and safely hand- and ballast weight to provide a recently initiated a research and le the new, heavier armored systems vehicle with a test weight of 65 tons. development contract with BMY to which are moving onto the modern The power train modifications were incorporate necessary improve- battlefield. To support these new relatively simple upgrades, using ments into the basic M88 design. systems, the Army needs a vehicle today's technology. A variant of the The contract calls for the construc-

ARMOR - Novernber-December 7987 47 tion of five prototype vehicles, desig- 140,OOO pounds, which will be avail- would be phased in at the end of nated as MmAlELs, which are to able over the new winch's 328 feet MMAL production and provide undergo developmental and opera- of cable, which is 128 feet longer deliveries of the M88A2 beginning tional testing in 1988. than the M88Al's cable. in latc 1989. Because of a need to transfer M88AI assets to support From the automotive aspect, the The hoist system will also receive new, heavier variants of the Bradley M88AlE1 prototype design will a significant upgrade, from 25-ton Fighting Vehicle System and the im- build on technology demonstrated capacity to 35 tons. The hoist sys- proved MZOS, howitzer, the Army by BMY's M88AX. It will use an up- tem will retain the field-proven A- does not plan to convert MBAls rated Teledyne Continental Motors frame design, which provides the into M88A2s. Instead, its initial (TCM) AVDS-1790 engine and an ruggedness necessary for recovery plans call for the purchase of some improved version of the MWs operations; however, it will be 850 units over a multi-year period. Detroit Diesel Allison (DDA) XT- lengthened 34 inches to allow a 1410 transmission, which will greater lift height. The M88 product improvement receive necessary durability up- program is an example of how the grades. It will also have significantly In order to gain the eleven or Army and industry can work in improved brakes. BMY and DDA more additional tons of weight unison to make timely and cost-effi- developed and tested an upgrade necessary for sufficient tractive cf- cient upgrades of existing systems. package that uses the same friction fort, and to meet a significantly The result will be the expeditious material used for the MlAl's more severe ballistic threat, the fielding of an upgraded system that brakes. The upgraded system will Army has added an armor plate will remove serious operational and also incorporate a power-booster overlay to the existing M88A1 hull . salety problems. system, which provides a brake pedal feel similar to the M1. The The Army's plan is to complete main winch system will receive a sig- the necessary testing in 1988 to sup- BURT S. BOUDINOT nificant upgrade, with line pull in- port an initial production contract LTC (Ret.) creasing from 90,O pounds to in early 1YN. This production Radcliff, KY.

Recognition Quiz Answers

1. M88Al ARV (us). Crew, 4; combat weight, 50,803 4. T-62 MBT (USSR). Crew, 4: combat weight, kg (60 tons); maximum road speed, 42 kmhr; maximum 40,OOO kg (44 tons); maximum road speed, 50 kmhr; range, 450 km; engine, Continental AVDS17902DR, 12- maximum road range (w/aux tanks), 650 km; armament, cylinder, aircooled, 750-h~diesel: armament, 1 x .50 caliber 1 x 115mm main gun, 1 x 7.62-mm coax machinegun, 1 machinegun: auxiliary power, Onan 10.8hp. 2cylinder, 4- x 12.7-mm AA machinegun. cycle diesel; maximum A-frame lift, 22,680 kg (51 tons). 5. Upgraded M60 MET (Israel). Crew, 4; weight 2. M9 ACE (us). Crew, 1; weight, loaded, 24,500 kg unknown due to applique armor added to turret and hull; (27 tons): weight, empty, 15,800 kg (17 tons): maximum armament, 1 x 105-mm main gun, 1 x 7.62-mm coax road speed, 48.3 kmhr; maximum water speed, 4.8 kmhr; machinegun, 1 x 7.62-mm and 1 x 12.7-mm maximum range, 322 km; maximum gradient climb, 60 per- machineguns on turret. cent; maximum side slope workable, 35 percent; engine, 6. M6OAVLB (Us). Crew, 2; weight, (wlbridge) Cummins V903 295-hp diesel; air-portable. 55,205 kg (60 tons); length (wbridge), 11.28 m; maxi- 3. T-55 MET (USSR). Crew, 4; combat weight, 36,000 mum road speed, 48.28 kmhr; maximum range, 500 kg (40 tons), maximum road speed, 48 kmhr; maximum km; engine, Continental AVDS 1790 2A or AVDS 1790 2D, range (w/aux tanks), 600 km; armament, 1 x 100-mm main 12cylinder, 750-hp diesel; bridge weight, 13,380 kg (14 gun, 1 x 7.62-mm coax machinegun, 1 x 7.62-mm bow tons); bridge gap span, 18.288 m; bridge maximum machinegun. capacity, 54,431 kg (SO tons).

48 ARMOR - November-December 1987 I General Dynamics Develops Recovery Vehicle I Based on Abrams Chassis The Bustle Ra, Developed as a private venture produced. Offi- by General Dynamics, a new M1- cials cited the based recovery vehicle uses the M60’s nearly basic MlAl hull with a new super- 30 years of ser- structure for the recovery equip- vice in the ment. There is a three-man crew defense of the with space for a fourth man. A nation’s con- hydraulic jib crane on the stitution. vehicle’s left side has a 35-tOn lift The special capacity and also enables the M1A1 has a six-inch- square brass diem of the brigade presented him vehicle to change its own power plaque mounted inside the turret with a silver cup upon relinquish- pack. A hydraulic dozerlstabilizing near the commander’s station. ing his command. This cup was blade is at the front along with a The plaque reads: passed on to his son, George S. 70-ton capacity winch that can be “The production of this tank was Patton 111. upgraded to 140 tons. There is an completed on the 200th anniver- auxiliary 4401-1winch. sary of the signing of the Consriru- When MG Patton commanded rion of the United States of the 2nd Armored Division in 1975- Other features include an over- America. Detroit Arsenal Tank 1977, he passed on the cup to the pressure NBC system, automatic Plant, Warren, Michigan, Sept 17.” 2nd AD, where it is now presented Halon fire detection and suppres- annually to the outstanding com- sion, a 350-hp auxiliary power Lt. Col. Michael J. Neuman, corn pany, battery, or troop, as deter- unit. Over 80 percent of the mander of the tank plant, turned mined by the Commanding Abrams RV is common to the the ‘Constitution Tank” over to General. It is the 2nd AD’S highest MlA1. according to a GDLS an- visiting tankers of the 3d Armored company-level award. nouncement. Division’s 4th battalion, 8th Caval- ry who had come from Germany This year’s winner was D Com- The Army has placed an order for the ceremony. Neuman noted pany, 1st Battalion, 67th Armor with BMY for an updated M88A1 that Company D, 1st platoon, 4/8 Regiment. The unit’s 100% first- called the M88AlE1 (see Profes- Cavalry, the unit that recently won run qualification during its recent sional Thoughts, this issue. -Ed.) . the CAT trophy, will become the Tank Table Vlll Gunnery live fire tank‘s new owner. exercise, combined with the supe- rior results during platoon and Constitution M1 Dedicated company ARTEPS, were sig- nificant factors in the awarding of In keeping with ceremonies to this cup, according to an article in honor the 200th anniversary of the MlAl Units Growing the Ft. Hood Sentinel. signing of the Constitution, the U.S. Army Tank-Automotive Com- TRADOC’s Tank Systems Man- mand (TACOM) in Warren, MI, ager reports there are now 7 bat- dedicated an MlAl Abrams main talions and 3 squadrons of M1A1 New MBT Unveiled In Japan battle tank completed on 17 Sep- main battle tanks in the field. tember 1987 as ‘The Constitution A new, 50-ton main battle tank Bicentennial Tank,“ according to has been unveiled in Japan, ac- ARNEWS. cording to. “Jane’s Defence Week- D Co., 1st Bn., 67th Armor ly,” 12 Sept 87. To date, some During the ceremonies attended Wins 304th Light Tank Award $212 million has been spent on by representatives from General the new tank‘s development. It is Dynamics Land Systems, the In the early 1920s. when COL armed with the West German prime contractor for Army tank George S. Patton Jr commanded Rheinmetall 120-mm smoothbore systems, the Army also accepted the 304th Light Tank Bde, the sol- main gun, one 7.62-mm coax the last MGO-series tank to be

ARMOR - November-December 1987 49 1 ~ machine gun and one 12.7-mm Staff Officers Coursewhen they training required for mission ac- AA machine gun. apply early in the Fail term; must complishment and are laid out in be in the grade of captain (P) , a scenario or situational environ- The new tank has a three-man major, or major (P), when they ment. Specific guidance is pro- crew, an automatic loader for the apply; must meet DA height and vided to conduct and evaluate the main gun, a fire-control system weight standards and have suc- training. similar to US and NATO tanks, a cessfully passed the APRT within Worldwide distribution will be thermal vision sighting unit, a TAG the last six months. made soon. Limited quantities can laser rangefinder, and digital ballis- be requested in approximately 60 tic computers and sensors. A board of colonels, headed by days from: the deputy commandant, reviews Commander The commander sits on the right applications and interviews ap USAARMC & Ft. Knox side of the turret, his cupola fitted plicants about their aptitude for ATTN: ATZK-DPT-NRT-AWS with large vision blocks. The new and interest in warfighting at the Fort Knox, KY 401 21 -5000 tank has an on-the-move target tactical and operational levels, engagement/firing capability and ability to complete a rigorous For more Information. contact automatic target tracking. Probab- graduate-level education program CPT Jussel or MAJ Ockrassa at ly to be named Type 90, the tank in the science and art of war, an AUTOVON 464-6235/3154, Com- has composite armor, and is 9.7 assignmentlspecialty career pat- mercial (502) 624-6235/3154, or meters long, 3.4 meters wide, and tern making likely future assign- write: Commandant, USAARMS, 2.3 meters high. Its diesel engine ments to principal staff positions ATTN: ATSB-CS-ACT, Fort Knox, produces 1,500 hp, and the tank at division and corps levels, and KY 40121-5200. has a claimed top speed of 70 ability to meet availability criteria km/hr. A hybrid hydropneumatic as outlined in AR 604-100, dated suspension on the first and sixth 15 July 1984. road wheels, and torsion bars on Armor Correspondence the second through fifth road Final approval of selected of- Courses Ready for Field wheels, gives good cross-country ficers is made prior to the maneuver-ability. Christmas break. The Army Institute for Profes- sional Development is accepting applications for the course, "lntro- duction to the Abrams Tank". Advanced Military Studies New Mission Training Plan Program Selectees For M3 Scout Platoons Curriculum: 9 subcourses, 27 credit hours. The following armor officers A new mission training plan has have been selected to attend next been designed for M3-equipped Subcourse No. Title Cr Hr year's Advanced Military Studies scout platoons organized under AR 0615 Maint of M1 Tank 2 Program (AMSP) at the Command the following TOE'S: 07246LOOO AR 0651 Mi Turret Famii. 4 and General Staff College, Fort HHC, Mech Inf Bn; 17376LOOO AR0544 M1 Fire Control Sys 3 Leavenworth, KS: Majors Albert HHC, Tank Bn; 17387L100 Cav AR 0477 M1 TCs Duties 3 Bryant, Jr., Michael D. Heredia, Trp, Div Cav Sqdn; 17487LOOO AR 0442 Boresighting the M1 3 Michael R. Matheny, Henry S. Cav Trp, Re@ Cav Sqdn. It is also AR 0445 M1 Ammunition 2 Scharpenbert, Charles D. Franklin, applicable to scout platoons not AR 0446 M1 Loading & Misfire Mark P. Hertllng, DavM C. Mock equipped with the M3. Procedures 3 and Kent Thomas. AR 0580 M1 Tac Operations 4 The MTP presents descriptive ex- AR 0590 M1 Tac Considerations 3 THE AMSP provides selected ercises based on two operations volunteer officers with an addition- that are critical to all mechanized al year of concentrated study in scout platoons: Re-connaissance This course Is not listed in the the art and science of war. To Operations (Route, Zone, Area), current edition (1 Apr 87) of DA apply for the AMSP program, of- and Security Operations (Screen). Pamphlet 351-20, but will appear ficers must be a resident student in the Jan 88 edition. For lnforma- of the Command and General These exercises contain leader tion on how to enroll, write: Com-

I50 ARMOR - November-December 7987 I mander, USATSC, ATTN: ATIC- USAARMS Commander Says Loop" newsletter. IPD-SS (171), Newport News, VA Some Candidates Unprepared The chief cause of academlc/skill 23628-0001. For Master Gunner Course proficiency failure has been the Tank Commander's Gunnery Skills During normal duty hours, call MG Thomas H. Tait, Chief of Test (TCGST) and course Exam commercial (804) 878-2079, or Armor and Commander of the IV, which evaluates technical skills AUTOVON 927-2079. For informa- U.S. Army Armor Center, has sent on machineguns, gun tube tech- tion Concerning the Armor Cor- a message to armor commanders nology, ammunition, fire control, respondence Program, contact worldwide cltlng the continued conduct of fire, and armored the Armor Correspondence high failure rate (20-25%) among vehicle ID. TCGST failure Indicates Course Liaison Officer at master gunner course students, that the students are having dif- AUTOVON 464-5430. according to a notice In the "Hot ficulty with the test, which is ad- ministered in strict compliance with manual guidelines, while Exam IV failures are primarily a X-Ring Xperts result of problems concerning gun tube technology and conduct of The public affairs officer at HQ, 2d ACR writes that a tank crew fire. from Troop F, 2/2 ACR in Germany fired back-to-back perfect MG Tait has encouraged all com- scores in March and August at Grafenwohr. Average score for manders to select master gunner the 2/2 ACR was 896 with 95 of 96 tanks qualifying on the first candidates who demonstrate a run. high level of proficiency/aptitude in gunnery skills, and to see that The crew of A-21 (M3 CFV), A Troop, 4th Sqdn, 4th Cav, 310, these NCOs are actively prepared fired a perfect score of 1,000 points on Bradley Table VIII, ac- and coached by local unit master cording to a letter from the 4th Sqn adjutant. One hundred per- gunners prior to departing their cent of Alpha Troop's vehicles qualified on the first run with home station. For more lnforma- seven M3s rated as distinguished. A Troop's 3d platoon scored tion, contact CPT Stuck at highest with an average of 903 points. The squadron average AUTOVON 464-8355. commerical was 838. (502) 624-8355, or write Comman- dant, U.S. Army Armor School, A tank crew of A Co. 2d En, 67th Armor fired a perfect run ATTN: ATSB-DOTD-CD, Fort even though two crew members left the tank for outprocessing. Knox. KY 401 21 -5200. When SGT Mclntyre Jr., loader, and SP4 Bologna, driver, had to leave to outprocess, SP4 Humphrey and SP4 Kemp were sub- stituted as driver and loader and the crew went on to finish a perfect run, according to the company commander. Armor Hot Line Is More Than a Publication Service The unit training NCO of Company My3d Sqdn, 116th ACR, Oregon Army National Guard, reports that a crew shot a perfect Since its establishment, the 1,000 while on annual training at Gowen Field, Idaho. The crew, ARMOR HOT LINE at Fort Knox SSG ViMor Kubat, TC; SGT James Rouell, gunner; SGT Dale has fulfilled numerous requests for Gilbert, driver; and SGT Chris Gulden, replacement loader; tied publications, but the 24-hour-a- for top honors with the crew of another troop. All 15 crews of day recording service also affords the unit qualified, with 7 as distinguished, 7 superior, and 1 personnel in the field an oppor- qualified. tunity to ask questions, raise is- sues, and identify problems con- The "Iron Knights" of the 1st Bn, 35th Armor fired their last cerning training, personnel and M60A3 gunnery and topped the 1st AD in all tank gunnery logistics in Armor. categories during IRON THUNDER I in March, according to the All records are transcribed dally battalion adjutant. The battalion qualified all 58 tanks on TT Vlll and acted on as rapidly as pos- and claims a tie with the USAREUR record with 55 first-run sible. The ARMOR HOT LINE num- qualifications, producing a battalion superior rating per tank. bers are: AUTOVON 646-TANK; The "Iron Knights" transition to the M1 A1 this fall. Commercial (502) 624-TANK.

ARMOR - November-December 1987 57 Team Yankee, by Harold Coyte, lied Tanks in ltalv Durina World War Ii. patrols. used the five-paragraph opera- Presidio Press, CA, 313 pages. $17.95 and Allied Tanks North Africa) and ex- tions order, essentially all the little thlngs panded appendices provide the reader - lieutenants learn. A novel of tank company combat in WW and researcher - with voluminous 111. The nitty-gritty of out-foxing, out- material for study and contemplation. Attention to detail in these items kept his maneuvering, out-shooting people who platoon together as a functioning fighting are shooting back. The word is survival. Other branches learned from armor, even force. These same details are still critical How does a captain steel himself to his as far back as between the World Wars. to the functioning of our small units: from dead men? How do the senior NCOs General Heinz Guderian, a former infantry infantry/scout/tank platoons to main- react when the chips are down? How do officer and the epitome of German armor tenance companies. In demonstrating his the troopers fend for themselves in the tur- development officers, states that he tactical competence, LTC McDonough did moil of combat? learned the basics of his trade from the not spare himself when he made an error. British tankers, Fuller, Liddel-Hart, and He made mistakes, but ensured that Here are strategy, tactics, movement to Martel. He learned well, as his successes everyone In his platoon learned from contact - and deadly contact with an over- on the battlefield showed. From Guderian them. Hand in hand with technical and whelmingly numerically superior enemy. came the concept of combined armored tactical competence, he insisted upon per- Here are the basics of what tankers do divisions - tanks, artillery and infantry, fect discipline. when the shooting stops for the moment. that served the Wehrmacht so well. The Here are the thoughts and the actions of tactics were based on the fundamentals Patton said that the only acceptable dls- the leaders and the soldiers in the fury of of a bold advance, an enveloping attack, cipline was perfect discipline. McDonough buttoneddown combat and the tentative and full initiative in the commanders of had the courage to demand this from his relaxation of a staging area. minor units - the tactics that completely men. He made them wash, shave, change annihilated the Roman legions at Cannae, socks, account for their equipment, etc. Sketch maps help to follow the actions and left every home in Roman Italy in He inspected them, and ensured his and maneuvers of Team Yankee as it mourning. platoon sergeant and squad leaders did slogs into the Russians. An extensive glos- Perrett states that the German armor the same. He did not tolerate drug sary defines the multitude of acronyms so leaders were not solely concerned with abusers. He relates an incident in which beloved by the Army. the attack: the problems of defense were one of his soldiers "accidently" fired an M- to be countered by the tactic that would 79 round past him as a warning. LTC The psychology of the combat team make the attack to effective - mobility. McDonough's solution to that leadership leader is explored here, as is that of the Unfortunately, in France during 1944-45, challenge was unique. Read the book to senior noncoms who are the direct, per- the practice of a mobile defense was find out what he did. sonal links between command and dominated by the Allied air power supe- troops. The age-old dictum that the wait- riority, and German armor was effectively The experiences related in the book rein- ing is worse than the action is pulled out tied to a static defense role that destroyed force what we learn: disciplined soldiers and realistically proved right. it. will fight well, win, and survive to fight again. Time and again, McDonough con- This is good reading and educational, as The appendices are succinct and provide cludes paragraphs with, "He was unhap- well, for those who want to try to get an much background material for reference py, ...(but) He followed my orders." idea of what the small unit leader might and research. McDonough established discipline within go through in battle. Major Coyle does a his platoon, and his men accepted that good job in his first novel. He is a tanker. This is almost a must book for the profes- standard. Worth the price. sional armor/cavalry soldier. Officers and senior NCOs can learn much here. Addi- LTC McDonough's story is also about the ARMOR STAFF tionally, it is fascinating history. American soldier. The soldiers of the platoon were not Rambos or John Knights of the Black Cross, Bryan ROBERT E. ROGGE Waynes. There were tough guys, scared Perrett, St. Martin's Press, NY., 251 pages, Assistant Editor guys, and laid-back soldiers. They were including appendices. $17.95 also men who fought for their friends, and Platoon Leader, by James for their country. The last line of the book "Annihilation was possible, only when the R.McDonough. Bantam Books, Inc., New says it all, "I was proud to have served attacker initiated a mobile battle with the York, NY. 197 pages. $3.50 (Paperback). with them." object of falling upon the enemy's flank or of encircling and destroying piecemeal." This book deserves a place in your library Such was the premise on which the Ger- next to MacDonald's ComDanv Com- Thankfully, many of us junior offlcers have man Armored Corps -the Panzenvaffe - mander. and S.L.A. Marshall's Men not been to war. We owe it to ourselves was instrumental in the gigantic Nazi vlc- Aaainst Fire. It's a classic account of small- and the soldiers we have the honor of tories between 1939 and 1942. unit leadership during war. The author, leading to study war. In this book, we can LTC James R. McDonough, relates his ex- see war through another's eyes and ask The titanic struggles that took place on periences as a platoon leader during the ourselves if we have the courage to do the Eastern Front proved the German tank Wetnam War. LTC McDonough also rein- the same things LTC McDonough did. soldier's superior tactical abilities and forces leadership techniques that are gave the Soviets much to learn. That they taught in our schools, and should be en- My guess is that the book Is also a final did learn is proved by their present armor forced: technical and tactical competence salute to the men of his platoon. li is a organization within the Warsaw Pact, and insistence on discipline, worthy tribute to his soldiers. which faces NATO in Europe. LTC McDonough established his ieader- KMNC. M. BENSON This Is a book for the professional tanker. ship by demonstrating his technical and CPT, Armor The author's meticulous research (he has tactical competence. He insisted on day HHC, 2d Me, 1AD and night patrolling and he accompanied these patrols. He personally critiqued the

52 ARMOR - November-December 7987 The Evolution of Blitzkri for the novice in this period of history. The no idea of the limitations or potential of Tactics. Germany Defen7 s It- specific focus on German defense their equipment took over. Even Rommel self Against Poland, 1921-1933. strategy on the eastern border with had problems, but he was making fewer By Robert M. Citino. Greenwood Press, Poland, as well as the depth of detail mistakes! Armor stayed tied to infantry so Inc., Westport, CT, 1987, 209 pages, regarding German wargames and the German tanks wouldn't destroy the in- $32.95. maneuvers, makes this book appropriate fantry. Yet, when the British armor tore for military historians and persons into German positions, the famous 88 tore This book provides a tactical, operational, knowledgeable in German military and the British to pieces, while the Germans and strategic view of the German Army be- diplomatic history, and military officers. It had freed their tanks to raise havoc. tween WWI and WWII, with emphasis on is dry reading at times and rather expen- Demands were made for advances. its fighting organization. Robert Citino sive. Politicians wanted lines on newspaper describes the process by which the maps to show advances when one feature Reichswehr accomplished its principal CPT DAVID ANDERSSON of war might be to hobble an enemy by task, that of defending Germany's bor- Mil. History Instructor stretching him to his limits and hitting ders, especially those to the east, from USAARMS, Fort Knox, KY with massed strength. (Imagine someone the end of WI to Hitler's rise to power in writing a memoir titled "Retreating into Vie January 1933. tory"!). The author shows that many of these problems in the succession of com- The author closely examines the period Dilemmas of the Desert War: A manders were caused by individuals and from the end of WI to the reduction of New Look at the Libyan Cam- unfamiliarity with the new arm of warfare - the German Army to 100,OOO men in early paign 1940-1942, by Michael Carver. armored forces. 1921, the reorganization of the German Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, Army under General von Seekt between 1986, 160 pages, $20.00 hardcover. PETER CHARLES UNSINGER 1921 and 1926, and the process by which San Jose State University, CA. General von Seekt attempted to improve The former Chief of the Defence Staff German security. He considers the Polish (UK) in the 70s, and a former armored Napoleon's Marshals. Davld G. threat to Germany, based on German brigade commander in WWII, has written Chandler, editor. Macmillan, New York, military intelligence records and on the ac- one of those books for a very specialized 1987. 560 pages. $35.95. tual condition of the Polish Army and audience. Dilemmas of the Desert War is arms industry under Pilsudski, and discus- for the military history reader who finds David Chandler is probably the greatest ses the period from 1927 to 1933 under either the reality or armchair world of the living authority on Napoleon. Chandler's defense minister Groener, during which great African littoral home. The reader works, The Campaians of Napoleon and the German armed forces began to plan who is going into a first-time study of this Dictionarv of the Napoleonic Wars, are seriously for a possible war with Poland. first truly armored war (unfettered armor- classics. In this new work, Chandler has vs-armor) will have a difficult time, despite called upon many well-known military his- The book consists of seven parts: Field Marshal Carver's crisp and to-the- torians, several of them retired military of- Preface: The Uncertain Years,19181921; point style. Background reading helps. ficers, to write about the men who put An Army Restored: General Seekt, the into action the strategic genius of Reichswehr, and the East, 1921-1926; The Lord Carver enters a debate that has Napoleon: his marshals. Polish Army in the Eyes of the German raged since the guns went silent. The Military Intelligence, 1921-1933: The Era British faced the Italian and German ar- In a chapter devoted to each of of Planning: The German Army and Navy mies on the Western Desert of Libya. The Napoleon's twenty-six marshals, the During the Groener Era, 1927-1933; Con- Italians fought first and later were aug- writers describe the marshal's life: his for- clusion, and Bibliography. mented by the Germans under Rommel. mative years, his military training and The battles raged and "lines" rolled west, education, and his battlefield experience. The author makes the point that the re- and east, and west, and east, etc. Such Then, at the conclusion of each chapter, quirements made on the German Army was the tendency in this fluid armor- the reader views, in detail, one particular and its organization by General von Seekt against-armor war. With each Rommel battle in which the marshal played a laid the essential groundwork for the rapid drive east toward the Suez there was a central role. and effective expansion of the Wehrmacht vast succession of British commanders. after 1933. He stresses that if General von Naturally, with so many coming and The value of this book rests in the lessons Seekt had opted for a conventional or- going, the post-war memoirs were a the reader takes from each of the mar- ganization in 1921, that the environment growth industry as finger after finger was shals' lives. One learns how Murat used that fostered the development of the pointed at one another as the cause of the aggressiveness and initiative of his Blitzkrieg would not have existed in the failure. The author enters the fray once force to become one of the greatest caval- German military, and the Blitzkrieg again (it is not unknown ground to him: ry leaders in history. We see the personal doctrine would not have been imple- he has written before on the theater). leadership of Oudinot, "The Father of the mented effectively in Germany. There have been several commanders Grenadiers," who led from the front of his who have taken "bum raps" for their per- forces. Marshal Macdonald's ability to The author is assistant professor of his- formances. Correlli Barnet labeled Ritchie give even unpopular views to Napoleon is tory at Lake Erie College and has worked as staggering into tactical victory. Auchin- a lesson in candor to us as well. as a civilian historian for the U.S. Army. leck and Montgomery schools vie for who While one wishes for more maps (only He has no personal military background. really understood armored war. The one appears in each chapter), the writing The work appears to be a thesis reworked author here brings the Ritchie papers, is excellent, and the appendices (includ- and prepared for public consumption. recently released and made available by ing "Notes on Military Organization and the family. and other information into Tactics") are superb. I recommend this Overall, 1 would recommend this book to reinterpreting the battles in the Western book to you. It is well-researchedand the anyone with a thorough grounding in the Desert from the start until Alamein. bibliographic work will provide hours of fu- events surrounding WWI and WWII. The ture reading. author at times assumes the reader is A key problem that many of these early familiar with the events prior to the Armis- commanders faced was their lack of ex- G. PATRICK RITTER tice of 1921 and the events in Germany perience. Commanders who had no com- Major, Armor after 1933. This book emphatically is not bat experience, no tank experience, and FRG I 1 I ARMOR - November-December 1987 53 I 263dArmor Never Surrendered

Lineage and Honors

Organized in eastern South Carolina and Federally recognized 6 March 1947 in the South Carolina Army National Guard as the 263d Coast Artillery Battalion with Headquarters at Florence.

Converted and redesignated 1 February 1949 as the 263d Heavy Tank Bat- talion and assigned to the 51st Infantry Division. Location of Headquarters changed 17 March 1949 to Mullins. Redesignated 1 September 1950 as the 263d Tank Battalion.

Consolidated 1 April 1959 with the 2d Battalion, 218th Infantry (organized and Federally recognized 7 February 1947 with Headquarters at Rock Hill); con- solidated unit reorganized and redesignated as the 2634 Armor, a parent regi- ment under the Combat Arms Regimental System, to consist of the 1st Medium Tank Battalion and the 2d Reconnaissance Squadron, elements of the 51st Infantry Division. Reorganized 1 April 1963 to consist of the 1st Medium Tank Battalion and the 2d Battalion, nondivisional units. Reorganized 30 April 1964 to consist of the lst, 2d, and 3d Battalions, nondivisional units. Reor- ganized 1 January 1968 to consist of the 1st Battalion, a nondivisional unit, and the 2d Battalion, an element of the 30th Infantry Division.

Campaign Participation Credit

Company E, 1st Battalion (Dillon), entitled to: World War I1 - EAME Tunisia Northern France Symbolism Siciliy (with arrowhead) Southern France (with arrowhead) Rome-Arno Rhineland The red line of the chief and Normandy Central Europe wavy partition line allude to the England 1944 unit’s origin as coast artillery. Cam- paign participation credit by ele- Headquarters Company, 2d Battalion (Rock Hill [Catawba Rifles]), and Com- ments of the regiment are shown pany B, 2d Battalion (Fort Mill), each entitled to: by the gold fleursde-lis, denoting campaigns in Wwll in France, and World War I World War I1 the dragon, representing Wll cam- Somme offensive Northem France paigns in Europe and Africa. The Ypres-Lys Rhineland barbs on tongue and tail of the Flanders 1918 dragon, symbolic of arrowheads, signify assault landings in Sicily and Southern France by certain ele- ments of the regiment. Decorations

Distinctive Insignia None

The distinctive insignia is the shield and motto of the coat of arms.

* U.S. GOVERNMENT YHINTING OFFICE 1987 748-05W8.