ARCID China Update Volume 1, No

Asian Research Center for International Development (ARCID), Mae Fah Luang University, Thailand

ARCID china update Volume 1, No. 1 January -June 2018

ISSN 2630-0885 ARCID China Update

Volume 1, No. 1 January - June 2018

Compiled by Tarida Baikasame Research Associate

Asian Research Center for International Development (ARCID) School of Social Innovation Mae Fah Luang University Thailand

ARCID CHINA UPDATE VOLUME 1, NO. 1 JANUARY-JUNE 2018

Compiled by Tarida Baikasame

ISSN: 2630-0885

First published in 2018 by

ASIAN RESEARCH CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT (ARCID) School of Social Innovation, Mae Fah Luang University 333 Moo1, Thasud, Muang, Chiang Rai 57100, Thailand Tel : +66 5391 7137 Fax : +66 5391 6685 Email : [email protected] Website : chinawatch.today, social-innovation.mfu.ac.th/arcid.php Facebook page : www.facebook.com/ARCIDTHAILAND www.facebook.com/chinawatch.arcid

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TECHNO PRINTING CENTER 643 Utarakit Road, Wiang, Muang, Chiang Rai 57000, Thailand Tel/ Fax : +66 5371 8841 Email : [email protected]

Contents

Preface ix

Part I: The Chronology (January-June 2018)

Foreign Affairs 3

Political Affairs 13

Economic Affairs 25

Socio-cultural Affairs 41

Part II: Selected Documentation (January-June 2018)

(A) Five-Year Plan of Action on Lancang-Mekong 53 Cooperation (2018-2022)

(B) Phnom Penh Declaration 62

(D) Report on the Work of the Government 68

(E) Joint Summit Declaration: 6th GMS Summit of Leaders 68

(F) The Hanoi Action Plan 2018-2022 75

(G) Greater Mekong Subregion Regional Investment 75 Framework 2022

(H) Siem Reap Declaration 75

(I) Xi Jinping’s Keynote Speech at the Boao Forum for 81 Asia Annual Conference 2018

(J) Bangkok Declaration of the 8th Ayeyawady – Chao 81 Phraya – Mekong Economic Cooperation Strategy Summit

(K) ACMECS Master Plan (2019-2023) 85

(L) The White Paper on China and the World Trade 85 Organization

Part III: Selected Analysis (January-June 2018)

Foreign Affairs

(A) Fresh impetus for China-Cambodia ties 89 Ge Hongliang

(B) Thailand’s place in the ‘Asian Century’ 91 The Nation

(D) Hanoi tactful in developing major power ties 93 Ge Hongliang

(E) China’s rapid development benefits ASEAN, gives 95 new impetus to world Huang Xilian

(F) Neighborhood diplomacy works wonders 97 Shi Yinhong

(G) Diplomacy with ‘correct conception’ 99 Chen Xiangyang

Political Affairs

(H) Mekong countries eye bold new future 101 Kavi Chongkittavorn

(I) Developing the Mekong 104 Editorial Bangkok Post

(J) Securing the future prosperity of the Greater Mekong 106 Subregion Takehiko Nakao

(K) Why Xi’s lifting of term limits is a good thing 108 Eric X. Li

(L) Belt and Road carrier of China’s new soft power 111 Fabio Massimo Parenti

(M) The Indo-Pacific and Asean centrality 113 Thitinan Pongsudhirak

(N) Mutual trust key to peaceful South China Sea 115 Liu Lin

Economic Affairs

(O) Let’s celebrate reform’s 40th anniversary 119 Martin Jacques

(P) Toeing Jack Ma’s line easier said than done 122 The Nation

(Q) Commentary: Why is China still a developing 124 country? Xinhua

(R) Chinese firms need caution when wading into 125 Southeast Asia’s nationalism Su Tan

Socio-cultural Affairs

(S) New Narrative On Human Rights 126 Lan Xinzhen

(T) Do Chinese tourists lack respect for local customs 128 and traditions? Chen Yang

Appendices 131

vii

Preface

With economic reforms and the opening up of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) to the outside world by Deng Xioaping and post-Deng leaders, China is now the largest economy (on a purchasing power parity basis). All indications show that China will be a superpower. The meteoric rise of China in the 21st century signals the successful comeback of China in regaining its respectful place in regional and international affairs. It also means challenges as well as opportunities for other parts of the world, especially for countries in the Asia Pacific region.

For many of us, the big question is: how should we deal with such a rising superpower? Other questions may include the following:

Is China’s rise going to be sustained? What are the new directions mapped out by Xi Jinping to develop China? What sort of developmental challenges will it face? Is China a threat according to some analysts? How can we promote a win- win relationship with China? How can we manage our problems, if any, with China in order to preserve peace and development?

To answer these questions, the Asian Research Center for International Development (ARCID) of the School of Social Innovation at Mae Fah Luang University has launched the China Watch Project with a grant from the Thailand Research Fund (TRF). We would like to express our thanks to the TRF for its funding support and suggestions in improving the project proposal.

As part and parcel of the China Watch Project, ARCID has established a Monitor and Analysis (M & A) Unit surveying and analyzing major developments in China. Located in Northern Thailand, ARCID would take advantage of its geography and focus its research more on the Mekong region and its relations with East Asia, including China. We hope this strategy could help a young research center to establish a niche in the academic, intellectual and policy community. In this regard, the ARCID China Update, a biannual publication, is produced by the M & A Unit to keep track of the developments in China with special reference to its interactions with the Mekong region. The publication includes a chronology, selected documentation, selected analysis, and at times,

appendices. Inaugurated in mid-2018, the ARCID China Update is published twice a year with each issue covering developments in China for the immediate past six months. Essentially, the publication is a record of the events and issues under review. It is meant to be providing up-to-date information about China, especially for those in Thailand and other states in the Mekong region.

Lee Lai To, Ph.D.

Senior Professor and Director ARCID

Part I

The Chronology

(January -June 2018)

ARCID China Update

Volume 1, No. 1 January - June 2018

(I) The Chronology (January-June 2018)

(A) Foreign Affairs

January 1 President Xi Jinping delivers a New Year speech. He pledges to boost reform and public welfare and world stability.

January 3 Chinese Ambassador to Laos Wang Wentian and Lao Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Khamphao Ernthavanh have signed an agreement on Lancang- Mekong Cooperation funding for Lao projects.

January 10-11 Premier Li Keqiang attends the 2nd Lancang-Mekong Cooperation (LMC) Leaders’ Meeting in Phnom Penh and pays his official visit to Cambodia.

(1) Premiere Li Keqiang meets with Prime Minister Hun Sen of Cambodia for expanding and strengthening bilateral cooperation. China and Cambodia sign 19 aid and investment pacts.

(2) Premiere Li Keqiang meets with Prime Minister Prayut Chan-o-cha of Thailand in order to strengthen the integration of the Belt and Road Initiative and Thailand’s Eastern Economic Corridor (EEC).

(3) Premiere Li Keqiang meets with the leaders of Vietnam, Laos and Myanmar at the meeting.

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January 17 (1) China-Myanmar jointly conduct oceanographic research in Myanmar’s water with local experts for better understanding of the response to climate change and supporting the marine ecological protection in this area.

(2) China and Myanmar hold a new round of diplomacy and defense consultations. This talk is co- chaired by Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Kong Xuanyou and Deputy Chief of Joint Staff Department of the Central Military Commission Shao Yuanming from the Chinese side, and Minister of International Cooperation U Kyaw Tin and Commander-in-Chief of No.1 Bureau of Special Operations (Army) Tun Tun Naung from the Myanmar side, aiming to promote bilateral ties, maintain peace in the border area and exchange views on the situation in northern Myanmar.

January 18 Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte allows China to conduct research with the University of the Philippines at the Benham Rise in the Philippines area.

January 21 Chen Zhu, vice chairman of China’s National People’s Congress Standing Committee, and Pham Binh Minh, Vietnamese Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, attend a reception marking the 68th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and Vietnam. Both sides call for further advance political mutual trust and strengthen the development strategies and culture exchange.

January 29 ASEAN Secretary General Lim Jock Hoi received credentials presented by China’s new Ambassador to ASEAN Huang Xilian at the ASEAN Secretariat. He expresses that China is one of the most important partners with ASEAN and ASEAN values China’s regional role. ASEAN is willing to work with China to strengthen political mutual trust and deepen economic cooperation in various field.

January 30 Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi outlines China’s diplomacy in 2018 at the New Year Reception. He says

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that China would further promote the Belt and Road Initiative and prepare for hosting a series of diplomatic events such as the annual meeting of Boao Forum for Asia, and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit. China will also deepen its global partnership network in this year.

February 5-6 Vice Foreign Minister Kong Xuanyou holds consultation with Deputy Foreign Minister Lê Hoài Trung of Vietnam talking about the progress in China- Vietnam relations since last year. They try to promote key cooperation such as China’s Belt and Road Initiative and Vietnam’s Two Corridors and One Economic Circle. They will implement bilateral high- level consensus and the Agreement on the Basic Principles Guiding the Settlement of Sea-related Issues between China and Vietnam.

February 9 The 3rd Meeting of the Joint Commission on Bilateral Cooperation between the People’s Republic of China and the Republic of Indonesia is co-chaired by Foreign Minister Wang Yi and Foreign Minister Retno Marsudi of Indonesia in Beijing, China. They exchange views on international and regional topics of common interest, China-ASEAN relations and the Indo-Pacific Strategy. Foreign Minister Retno Marsudi also meets with Premier Li Keqiang. They agree to have closer develop relations and promote cooperation in key areas such as Belt and Road Initiative, infrastructure, and high- speed railway project.

February 16 Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte expresses his wish on the eve of the Chinese New Year for a stronger sense of solidary and goodwill between Filipinos and Chinese in the country.

March 6 Assistant Foreign Minister Chen Xiaodong meets with visiting Senior Officials for Lancang-Mekong Cooperation (LMC) and Director General of the Economic Affairs Department of the Lao Minister of Foreign Affairs, Songkane Luangmuninthone, exchanging views on China- Laos relations and the LMC.

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March 8 (1) Foreign Minister Wang Yi responds to questions on China’s foreign policy and international relations at a press conference on the sidelines of the First Session of the 13th National People’s Congress.

(2) China will host four major international events this year, including the annual conference of the Boao Forum for Asia, the Summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the Summit of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, and the China International Import Expo. Li Baodong, vice-foreign minister, said preparations for the events are progressing smoothly and the global community has responded warmly.

March 10 Chinese and the Philippine governments are set to sign the loan agreements for three infrastructure projects of the Philippines to be financed by China, namely, New Centennial Water Source-Kaliwa Dam, Chico River Pump Irrigation Facility, and Philippine National Railways-South Long Haul Railway by middle of this year.

March 10-12 Chinese Ambassador Lyu Jian visits the Southern Part of Thailand in order to promote China-Thailand cooperation under the scheme of the “21st Century Maritime Silk Road” Initiative.

March 14 Foreign Minister Wang Yi meets with Foreign Minister Don Pramudwinai of Thailand in Beijing, speaking positively of China-Thailand relations.

March 17 (1) China and Cambodia launch the second joint drill on counter-terrorism and humanitarian rescue at a training field in the Maras Prov Mountains.

(2) Ambassador Lyu Jian is invited to give a lecture on the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China and the future development of China- Thailand relations at the 9th Senior Security Management Training Course for the National Defense Academy of Thailand.

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March 20 China and Myanmar sign a letter for implementing the new China-aided Kunlong Bridge Project in Myanmar’s northern Shan state to replace the old one.

March 21 Chinese State Councilor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi meets with Philippine Foreign Secretary Alan Peter Cayetano in Beijing. Cayetano says that the China- Philippine relation is in a “golden era” and Wang Yi says that China will cooperate more with the Philippines in the future.

March 22 The Xinhua News Agency reported that the Communist Party of China (CPC) established a Central Committee for Foreign Affairs which further centralizes authority over diplomatic policy.

March 23 Wang Wentian, Chinese Ambassador to Laos says at the LMC Week in the Lao capital of Vientiane that the LMC has entered the phase of further growth and China and Laos will implement the consensus reached at the second leader’s meeting in Cambodia in January.

March 26 Cambodia inaugurates the first water quality monitoring station with China’s aid near the confluence of the Mekong and Tonle Sap rivers in the Diamond Island town.

March 29 Hong Xiaoyong, the newly-appointed Chinese Ambassador to Singapore says that China and Singapore have entered a new era featuring with greater opportunities and China is ready to work with Singapore to further political mutual trust, better connected development strategies and deepen the Belt and Road Initiative cooperation.

March 30-April 2 Chinese State Councilor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi attends the 6th Summit of the Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) Economic Cooperation, and pays an official visit to Vietnam.

April 1 Wang Yi, Chinese State Councilor and Foreign Minister meets with Pham Binh Minh, Vietnamese Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister at Hanoi,

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Vietnam, calling for steady and long-term development of relations between China and Vietnam.

April 2 (1) Wang Yi meets with Nguyen Phu Trong, General Secretary of the Central Committee of Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV), to convey warm greetings and maintain a positive momentum of development under “the Belt and Road Initiative” and “Two Corridors and One Economic Circle”.

(2) Wang Yi holds talks with Pham Binh Minh, Deputy Prime Minister of Foreign Affairs of Vietnam.

(3) The State Intellectual Property Office of China (SIPO) and Lao Ministry of Science and Technology sign a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on intellectual property cooperation to enhance cooperation, to facilitate the joint innovation and creativity projects, and to enrich the bilateral comprehensive strategic cooperative partnership.

April 4 Sun Chunlan, Chinese Vice Premier meets with Thai crown princess Maha Chakri Sirindhorn in Beijing to deepen bilateral ties between China and Thailand.

April 8 (1) Premier Li Keqiang holds talks with Lee Hsien Loong, Prime Minister of Singapore in Beijing, China and agrees to deepen cooperation in key areas, develop China-Singapore ties and also strengthen coordination with ASEAN countries.

(2) Wang Yi meets with Vivian Balakrishnan, Foreign Minister of Singapore to develop Singapore-China relations and deepen cooperation under the Belt and Road Initiative.

April 9 President Xi Jinping meets a number of foreign leaders on the sidelines of the annual conference of the Boao Forum for Asia including the leaders of the Netherlands, Singapore, Pakistan, Mongolia, and the Philippines.

April 10 Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte praises China ties during his speech at the opening ceremony at the Boao Forum for Asia in South China’s Hainan

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province. He also meets with Chinese President Xi Jinping to call for elevating the ties between China and the Philippines.

April 17 Wang Qishan, Chinese Vice President, meets with a delegation from the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) led by Nguyen Van Binh, a member of the Political Bureau of the CPV Central Committee (CPVCC) and of the Secretariat of CPVCC in Beijing to implement the important consensus reached by leaders of both countries for further cooperation.

April 18 The China International Development Cooperation Agency is inaugurated in Beijing as a major measure to maintain world peace and promote common development. The decision to establish the agency is made by the CPC Central Committee.

April 19 The 15th meeting on the implementation of the Agreement on Management and Cooperation in China-Myanmar Border Areas at departmental level is held in Beijing by Yi Xianliang, Director General of the Department of Boundary and Ocean Affairs of the Foreign Ministry, and Maung Weik, Advisor at Myanmar President Office, to exchange in-depth views and reach extensive consensus on such topics as bilateral relations.

April 24-25 Song Tao, Visiting head of the International Department of the Communist Party of China (CPC) Central Committee, meets with U Win Myint, Myanmar President, and Aung San Suu Kyi, Myanmar State Counselor, in Nay Pyi Taw, Myanmar. They have pledged to further boost bilateral cooperation and party-to-party exchanges.

April 25-28 The 32nd Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Summit and Related Meetings under the theme ‘Resilient and Innovative’ are held in Singapore.

April 27 Ma Zhaoxu, China’s permanent representative to the United Nations, says that China is ready to work together with all parties to bring more openness and win-win outcomes and strengthen multilateralism at

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a high-level symposium themed “Strengthening Multilateralism and Multilateral Trading System in the Age of Globalization” at the United Nations Headquarters in New York. The symposium is jointly hosted by the Chinese Permanent Mission to the UN and the UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs.

May 6-8 (1) Premier Li Keqiang pays an official visit to Indonesia at the invitation of the Indonesian President as this year marks the 5th anniversary of the establishment of the China-Indonesia comprehensive strategic partnership and the 15th anniversary of the strategic partnership between China and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

(2) Premier Li Keqiang holds discussions with President Joko Widodo of Indonesia on May 7. Li suggests strategies to enhance bilateral ties as follows: first, to build three pillars of all-round cooperation at bilateral, regional and global levels, second, to deepen the integration of the Belt and Road Initiative of China and Global Maritime Fulcrum vision of Indonesia, third, to deepen trade and investment cooperation. Li also attends the China-Indonesia Business Summit and delivers a keynote speech.

(3) Premire Li Keqiang attends the launching ceremony of celebration activities marking the 15th anniversary of the strategic partnership between China and ASEAN and delivers a keynote speech at the ASEAN Secretariat in Jakarta, Indonesia. Li pledges to jointly promote trade and investment with ASEAN. He expresses that China is willing to be a partner of ASEAN and enhances bilateral cooperation with a shared future. He also meets with ASEAN Secretary- General Dato Lim Jock Hoi in this visit.

May 10 Some Chinese investors were concerned with the election victory of Malaysian politician Mahathir Mohamad as he was critical of Chinese investments in Malaysia. However, some analysts think that this situation will not reverse the relations between China and Malaysia because Mahathir expresses his support

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to China’s Belt and Road Initiative and China’s trade volume is very large and beneficial to Malaysia.

May 15 President Xi Jinping presides at the first meeting of the Foreign Affairs Commission and calls for enhancing the centralized leadership of the CPC Central Committee over foreign affairs, encouraging risk-prevention awareness in diplomacy, and protecting national sovereignty and security.

May 23 (1) Cambodia will be the Country of Honor of the 15th China-ASEAN Expo on September 12-15, 2018 in Nanning, Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region with 145 booths in the independent exhibition hall. This event marks the 60th anniversary of China-Cambodia relations and promotes trade between China and ASEAN.

(2) Majul Usman Gandamra, the mayor of the Philippine city of Marawi, thanks China for helping rebuild the southern city damaged by the Abu Sayyaf and Maute groups. China donated 47 sets of heavy equipment in 2017 and now continues providing post-conflict support for Marawi and other affected areas.

May 30-31 President Xi Jinping meets with President Bounnhang Vorachith of Laos in Beijing to advance benefits to both sides. Xi stresses that both sides should work together to form a new pattern of China-Laos cooperation, strengthen security cooperation, multilateral cooperation and engage in cultural and people-to-people exchanges. Bounnhang expresses Lao support on the projects under the Belt and Road Initiative framework and strengthen coordination in international and regional affairs. They attend the signing ceremony of a number of cooperation documents after the talks. Premier Li Keqiang also meets with Lao President on May 31.

June 3 China extends its influence to Cambodia’s press in the form of investment into state-run Cambodia media. Fresh News, a government-friendly website, is one of the media supporting by China in the form of sponsored trips to China. This website launched a

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Chinese language version with pro-Beijing content. Cambodia also uses the China model on media as it supports media that praise the government and work as a state mouthpiece while the opposite party media will be suppressed.

June 10 The Chinese embassy in Vietnam warns its citizen to pay attention to security when travelling in Vietnam as Vietnamese protest over economic zones and demonstrate anti-China content. Vietnam’s National Assembly agreed not to adopt the draft Law on the three special economic zones which could lease land up to 99 years for production and business. The National Assembly and the government decided to take into account the problems of the issue.

June 12 State Councilor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi meets with ASEAN Secretary-General Dato Lim Jock Hoi in Beijing. This year marks the 15th anniversary of the establishment of China-ASEAN strategic partnership. Both sides agree to formulate the China-ASEAN Strategic Partnership Vision 2030, hold the China- ASEAN Year of Innovation, and enhance the Belt and Road Initiative with Master Plan on ASEAN Connectivity 2025. They exchange views in the South China Sea issue and agree to speed up the consultations on the Code of Conduct in the South China Sea (COC).

June 13-14 Second Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade Dato Seri Paduka Haji Erywan bin Pehin Datu Pekerma Jaya Haji Mohd Yusof of Brunei pays an official visit to China. He holds talks with State Councilor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi to implement bilateral high-level consensus, deepen the integration of development strategies, and exchange views on the South China Sea issue.

June 22-23 President Xi Jinping delivers an address at the Central Conference on Work Relating to Foreign Affairs in Beijing. He calls for efforts to break new ground in major country diplomacy with Chinese characteristics, with the guidance of the thought on diplomacy of socialism with Chinese characteristics for a new era. He underscores the importance of

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keeping in mind both internal and international imperatives. He highlights major aspects including the Belt and Road Initiative, the global governance system, the path of peaceful development on the basis of mutual respect and win-win cooperation.

(B) Political Affairs

January 1 The Hong Kong-based South China Morning Post (SCMP) reports that China’s new hi-tech underwater surveillance network system project is for military propose. China denies the report and claims that it proposes to expand facilities for scientific research in the South China Sea.

January 9 (1) The 6th Lancang-Mekong Cooperation Senior Officials’ Meeting is held in Phnom Penh, Cambodia. The high-level officials from the six member countries attend this meeting to finalize the Five-year Action Plan and the Phnom Penh Declaration for the 2nd Lancang-Mekong Leaders’ Meeting.

(2) A Chinese expert said that Philippine politicians use the South China Sea issue to put pressure on the Duterte Administration to contain China as both sides try to strengthen relations by putting aside disputes.

(3) Indonesia government would like to lead an ASEAN attempt to get China to sign a code of conduct (COC) for the South China Sea according to Foreign Minister Retno Marsudi. She hopes the negotiation will start in this March in Vietnam and will conclude as soon as possible.

January 10-11 The 2nd Lancang-Mekong Cooperation Leaders’ Meeting is held in Phnom Penh, Cambodia. The member countries endorse the Five-Year Action Plan (2018-2022) and the Phnom Penh Declaration.

January 11 A Chinese sea expert says that China and Cambodia issued a joint communiqué calling for an early adoption of the Code of Conduct (COC) in the South China Sea after Premier Li Keqiang’s official visit to Cambodia.

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January 17 (1) The 3rd round of China-Myanmar 2+2 High-level Consultations co-chaired by Vice Foreign Kong Xuanyou, and Deputy Chief of the Joint Staff Department of the Central Military Commission Shao Yuanming from Chinese side and Union Minister of International Cooperation U Kyaw Tin and Chief of the No.1 Special Operations Bureau of the Tatmadaw Tun Tun Naung from the Myanmar side is held in Nay Pyi Taw, Myanmar to exchange views on the situation in northern Myanmar and agree to maintain peace and promote comprehensive strategic cooperation. Moreover, State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi and Commander-in-Chief of Defense Services Min Aung Hliang meet with the Chinese delegation.

(2) The USS Hopper sails within 12 nautical miles off Huangyan island of China at night without permission from the Chinese government. The Chinese navy carries out identification and verification procedures and warns the US vessel to leave Chinese waters. The Foreign Ministry Spokesman Lu Kang says that this action violates its sovereignty and security interest. However, the US military says that it is carried out based on freedom of navigation as usual.

January 18-19 The 2nd plenary session of the 19th CPC Central Committee is held in Beijing, China. Xi Jinping, general secretary of the Communist Party of China (CPC) Central Committee, presides over the meeting.

January 26 The Royal Thai Army conducts tests if the China-built VT4 main battle tank at the Royal Thai Army Cavalry Centre at Adisorn military camp in Saraburi. Thai government has purchased 28 VT4 tanks and has approved the repurchase of 10 additional tanks from China produced by China North Industries Corporation (NORINCO). China delivered these tanks in October 2017. The press open day was held at the end of January.

February 4-6 The ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Retreat is held in Singapore. ASEAN’s Foreign Ministers discuss on a draft document titled “ASEAN Leaders’ Vision for a Resilient and Innovative ASEAN”. The priorities are forging ASEAN to combat transnational crimes,

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concluding with China a code of conduct for the South China Sea, establishing an ASEAN smart cities network and taking initiatives to battle terrorism and radicalisation. They emphasise the importance of non-militarisation and self-restraint in all activities in the South China Sea.

February 5-6 (1) ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting Retreat is held in Singapore. The top issues are terrorism, maritime conflicts such as the South China Sea disputes, and emerging threats regarding nuclear, biological and chemical weapon.

(2) Chang Wanquan, Chinese Defense Minister and State Councilor, pays official visit to Singapore. He meets with Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong and Singaporean Defense Minister Ng Eng Hen to expand cooperation on national security and defense. He attends the 8th China-ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Informal Meeting. After the meeting, Ng Eng Hen announces that China and ASEAN will hold their first maritime exercise at the end of this year.

February 5 Chinese experts say that China will expand land reclamation and upgrade construction in the South China Sea for civilian not for military purposes. China’s deployment in this area is used for its security interests as the US, Japan, Australia and other allies will provoke China over the South China Sea disputes.

February 6 Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte has banned all foreign fishing and research vessels from the country’s Pacific coast especially Benham Rise which is renamed as “Philippine Rise” in 2017 despite earlier allowing Chinese oceanographers to conduct a scientific research here.

February 12 Malaysia agrees to send 11 Uighurs back to China only after the conclusion of a police investigation to check whether any of them is involved in the Islamic State (IS) terrorist group. This group of Uighurs was arrested after they escaped from a detention centre near the Malaysia-Thailand border in November 2017. The destination of these people is Turkey.

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February 13 China and the Philippines convene the 2nd Meeting of the Bilateral Consultation Mechanism on the South China Sea (BCM) in Manila, Philippines. The meeting is led by Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Kong Xuanyou and Philippine Foreign Undersecretary Enrique A. Manalo. They reiterate the importance of maintaining peace and stability in the region, implementing the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, and beginning negotiations on a Code of Conduct on the South China Sea in March.

February 13-23 The Cobra Gold kicks off in Chonburi Province with the participation of Japan, South Korea, Singapore, Indonesia and Malaysia. China and India have partial participation in the rescue and relief drills. The United States is seeking to strengthen the Cobra Gold, the largest regional joint military exercise that is annually hosted by Thailand in order to balance against the background of China’s increasing power and assertiveness in the Indo-Pacific.

February 14 President Xi Jinping, also general secretary of the Communist Party of China (CPC) Central Committee, delivers Spring Festival greetings to all Chinese people at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing.

February 19 The Philippines is concerned about the conflict of the South China Sea dispute between China and United States. This concern makes the Philippines to consider how to balance the powers and not get involved.

February 20 Malaysia’s Deputy Prime Minister Ahmad Zahid Hamidi says that Malaysia was in talks with Thailand over returning detained Uighur Muslims to China after an official request from China. Malaysia wants to find out the best action that will not upset any other country.

February 25 The Communist Party of China Central Committee makes public its proposal to amend China’s constitution to extend the tenure of the President and Vice-President to more than two consecutive terms. The proposal also proposes developing socialism with Chinese characteristics in the new era. This

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change allows Xi Jinping to push through key reforms and stabilise his continued rule. However, it raises concern on one-man rule as the horror of Mao Zedong’s Cultural Revolution and Great Leap Forward remains.

March 1-2 China and ASEAN holds the 23rd Joint Working Group Meeting on the Implementation of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC) in Nha Trang, Vietnam. They exchange views on implementing the DOC, promoting maritime cooperation and consulting on the Code of Conduct (COC) in the South China Sea.

March 3 The first session of the 13th National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) is held in Beijing, China.

March 4 (1) A decision by the Communist Party of China (CPC) Central Committee on deepening reform of Party and state institutions is made public after it was adopted at the third plenary session of the 19th CPC Central Committee on February 26-28, 2018.

(2) President Xi Jinping says that the system of multiparty cooperation and political consultation led by the Communist Party of China (CPC) is a great contribution to the political civilization of humanity which steers away from defects of the old fashion one.

March 5 (1) The first session of the13th National People’s Congress (NPC) is held in Beijing, China.

(2) Premier Li Keqiang delivers a report on the work of the government to the assembly, summarizing the government’s work over the past five years and laying out plans for work in 2018.

(3) The defense expenditure in 2017 was 1.0226 trillion yuan and China’s defense budget in 2018 will be 1.1069 trillion yuan, an 8.1 percent increase according to the budget report issued at the opening of the annual meeting of parliament.

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(4) The USS Carl Vinson, a US aircraft carrier, visits Vietnam for the first time since the beginning of the Vietnam War.

(5) China and the Philippines seek a way to deal with a joint exploration of the Reed Bank of the South China Sea as China has not recognized that area as the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone.

March 6 Deng Xiaogang, an NPC deputy and head of the Department of Ecology and Environment Protection of South China’s Hainan Province says on the sidelines of the annual session of the National People’s Congress (NPC) that a national park in the South China Sea is needed to better preserve the marine ecology in the region.

March 7 President Xi Jinping joins a panel discussion with the deputies to the 13th National People’s Congress from Guangdong province. He agrees with the draft amendment to China’s Constitution.

March 11 China votes at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing on the constitution amendment to lift the two five- year term limit for presidency, giving Xi Jinping almost total authority to administer the country.

March 17 (1) Xi Jinping is elected Chinese president and chairman of the Central Military Commission of the People’s Republic of China by a unanimous vote at the fifth plenary meeting of the first session of the 13th National People’s Congress (NPC). He takes the first public oath of allegiance to the Constitution in the Great Hall of the People in Beijing.

(2) China’s national legislature has approved a massive Cabinet restructuring plan that aims to improve government efficiency.

March 19 Chinese lawmakers endorse the new State Council nominated by Premier Li Keqiang at the ongoing national legislative session in Beijing.

March 20 The first session of the 13th National People’s Congress (NPC) holds its closing meeting. Premiere Li

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Keqiang meets and answers questions from the press after the conclusion of the meeting.

March 26 The Philippines will continue its aerial patrols of a Chinese-held shoal near the South China Sea despite protests from China, says the Philippine defense chief.

March 27 VN Express, Vietnamese newspaper, reports that the Vietnam Fisheries Society issued a statement protesting China’s fishing ban in the South China Sea for 11 weeks as it violates Vietnam’s rights and sovereignty.

March 28 President Xi Jinping presides over the first meeting of the central committee for deepening overall reform.

March 29-31 The 6th Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) Summit is held in Hanoi, Vietnam. The six nations’ leaders are expected to endorse three important documents including a joint statement, the Hanoi Action Plan covering the next five years, and a Regional Investment Framework over the same period.

April 2 Wang Yi, Chinese State Councilor and Foreign Minister, meets with Nguyen Phu Trong, General Secretary of the Communist Party of Vietnam Central Committee. Both sides vow to safeguard peace and stability in the South China Sea and pledge to implement all regulations concerning the agreement on basic principles guiding the settlement of maritime issues.

April 2-5 The 3rd Mekong River Commission (MRC) Summit is held at Siem Reap, Cambodia under the theme “Enhancing Joint Efforts and Partnerships towards Achievement of the SDGs in the Mekong River Basin”. The member countries pledge to continue implementing rules and procedures for water use and endorse the Siem Reap declaration.

April 9 The Philippines is working with China within a few months on joint exploration for oil and gas in a part of the South China Sea waterway claimed by both countries after they agreed to set up a special panel to work out how to jointly explore for oil and gas in the

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South China sea without addressing sovereignty issue in February, 2018.

April 12 President Xi Jinping reviews the Chinese People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) in the South China Sea which is the largest of its kind in the People’s Republic of China since its founding in 1949. He calls for efforts to build a first-class navy and speed up the modernization of the navy.

April 15 China has issued a set of revised regulations on the fundamental rules governing the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), including rules on military discipline, training management, soldier’s weight standards, use of mobile phones and the internet as well as the use of gun-firing salutes to pay respect to martyrs.

April 17 President Xi Jinping calls for efforts to strengthen the centralized, unified leadership of the Party over national security and break new ground in national security in the new era at the first meeting of the 19th CPC Central Committee National Security Commission.

April 18 China conducts live-fire military drills in the Taiwan Straits by the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) to serve as a strong deterrence to “Taiwan independence” forces, warning the US and Japan not to intervene in China’s internal affairs.

May 3 The US-based CNBC reports that China installed anti- ship cruise missiles and surface-to-air missile systems in the Spratly Islands, South China Sea. Foreign Ministry spokesperson Hua Chuying responds that China has the right to protect its sovereignty and security in the Spratly Islands and its nearby waters as the US has been increasing its navigations and conducting drills in the South China Sea. This report also concerns the Philippines as Foreign Secretary Alan Peter Cayetano stresses that the Philippines will use all diplomatic action to protect its interest and sovereignty.

May 9 A Vietnamese foreign ministry’s statement expressed its concern about China’s violation of Vietnamese

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sovereignty as China had installed missile systems on the Spratly Islands and asked China to withdraw military equipment from the South China Sea. China urges Vietnam to respect its sovereignty and understand the situation that some countries want to increase influence in the area.

May 13 Chinese tourists wearing the shirts featuring a map of China and its nine-dash line are asked to take the shirts off by security guards at the immigration desk in Cam Ranh airport, Vietnam. This issue becomes a burning issue in Vietnamese social media as Vietnamese want to deport and ban these Chinese tourists.

May 16 President Xi Jinping remarks in an inspection of the People’s Liberation Army Academy of Military Science calling for the development of modern military science, building high-level military research institutions and better integration of military theories and technologies, research and practices.

May 18 China has landed several bombers of various types on disputed South China Sea runway for the first time to strengthen its combat capability. It also carried out simulated strike training on targets at sea and landing and take off drills in the area.

May 19 Philippines Senator Panfilo Lacson calls on the government to act as China landed bombers in the South China Sea. President Rodrigo Duterte responds that he would not provoke China into war because the Philippines has less military strength to protect its territory. It also has no assurance from the US that it still remains on the side of the Southeast Asian countries.

May 21 US Pentagon spokesman accuses China that it has continued militarisation in the disputed area of the South China Sea. China rejects this condemnation stressing it is normal training for the Chinese military. As for Vietnam, the Vietnamese Foreign Ministry demands China immediately stop its military moves in the area and expresses that this action seriously

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violates Vietnam’s sovereignty and raises tensions in the region.

May 23 US Defense Secretary James Mattis in coordination with the White House uninvite China to join the world’s largest international maritime warfare exercises to be held in June after China landed bombers in South China Sea islands. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi criticizes this decision in the meeting with US Secretary of the State Mike Pompeo in Washington, D.C saying that it was unwise and unconstructive.

May 26-28 The Communist Party of China (CPC) holds high-level dialogues with world political parties in Shenzhen, Guangdong Province by the International Department of the Central Committee, aiming to share experiences and increase strategic trust in each other. This forum invites more than 200 parties from around the world.

May 27 US Navy’s warships USS Higgins and USS Antietam enter China’s territorial waters off the Paracel Islands without permission. The US military claims that its entry is based on freedom of navigation. However, the China’s Defense Ministry urges the US to stop this action and warns the US warships to leave.

May 30 The Philippines top security official says that the country is prepared to go to war if military personnel are harmed in the disputed South China Sea after China installed missile systems and bombers in this area. In addition, Chinese ships deploy a helicopter that fly dangerously close to a Philippine navy boat carrying supplies to marines based in a disputed shoal in the South China Sea. However, the Philippine Navy is one of the weakest maritime defense forces in Southeast Asia since 1970s as the government focused on internal security threats and relied on the US military to provide protection against external threats. At present, the Philippines wants to upgrade its navy amid Chinese maritime threat.

June 1-3 The 17th Shangri-La Dialogue, an annual international security forum, is held in Singapore. The meeting

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features sessions including US leadership and the challenges of Indo-Pacific security, de-escalating the crisis in North Korea, shaping new dimensions of terrorism and counter-terrorism, and raising the bar for regional security co-operation.

(1) US Defense Secretary Jim Mattis attends the Dialogue. He stresses that China is intimidating its neighbours as it built up and deployed a range of military hardware in the South China Sea. China also uses economics to exploit neighbours through projects such as Belt and Road Initiative and creates debts on them. Senior Colonel Zhao Xiaozhuo responds that US wants to provoke China’s national security by sailing its naval vessel close to Chinese territory in the South China Sea.

(2) Vietnam News Agency reports that the Vietnamese delegation led by Defense Minister Ngo Xuan Lich attends the third session of the Dialogue. It expresses its concern on military operations in the South China Sea and promotes the use of international law to resolve the disputes.

(3) Chinese delegate warns at the Dialogue that terrorism are increasingly moving from the Middle East into Southeast Asia such as the attack in Marawi city of Philippine last year. Therefore, Southeast Asian countries must cooperate with China on anti- terrorism. Some of ASEAN countries have begun joint anti-terrorism drills with China.

June 15-16 The 8th Ayeyawady-Chao Phraya-Mekong Economic Cooperation Strategy (ACMECS) Summit is held in Bangkok under the theme “Towards an Integrated and Connected Mekong Community”. ACMECS holds a CEO forum for leaders and representatives from the public and private sectors to exchange views on trade and investment under the theme “Connecting our Future: Enhancing ACMECS Cooperation and Integration”. This forum also invites governments and members of the business sector from China and Japan. The leaders of five Mekong countries comprising Thailand, Myanmar, Lao, Cambodia and Vietnam endorse a Bangkok Declaration and the

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ACMECS Master Plan (2019-2023) focusing on improving transport infrastructure, harmonizing trade and investment rules, and human resources development.

June 16-20 A delegation led by Chinese Defense Minister Wei Fenghe pays an official visit to Cambodia. Wei meets with Prime Minister Hun Sen and Defense Minister Tea Banh of Cambodia. China has agreed to provide more than US$ 100 million in military aid to Cambodia and will jointly conduct Golden Dragon Military Exercise in 2019 to strengthen military ties. Wei also attends a China-Cambodia military exhibition.

June 24 Bangkok Post had an exclusive interview with Pol Gen Wirachai Songmetta, a deputy national police chief, about e-waste problem in Thailand. He said that some politicians are involved in an illegal electronic waste recycling business operated by Chinese businessmen. They provided land and helped Chinese businessmen to construct the recycling plants with no licenses. The waste recycling machines were old and imported from China. The main obstacles of this problem are corruption and weak law enforcement.

June 25-27 China led by Vice Foreign Minister Kong Xuanyou and ASEAN countries hold the 15th Senior Officials’ Meeting on the Implementation of the Declaration on the Conduct (DOC) and the 24th Joint Working Group Meeting on the Implementation of the Declaration on the Conduct (DOC) in Changsha, Hunan Province. The officials update the DOC implementation plan for 2016-2018 and agree to advance the Code of Conduct (COC) consultations based on the established COC framework. They agree to resolve the disputes in the South China Sea through negotiations and maintain peace and stability in this area.

June 27 Cambodia’s National Election Committee (NEC) reports that Cambodia has invited 50,000 international observers including China, Myanmar and Singapore to monitor a general election on July 29. 800 foreign observers from non-governmental organisations also apply for monitoring this election.

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January 2 Experts say that China sets to bring more opening up in services industries including education, culture, healthcare and finance in 2018. Industries such as high-end manufacturing and modern services are directed to open up and the services industry will be a key area.

January 3 (1) Lao News Agency (KPL) reports that the Vientiane-Vangvieng expressway, a part of the mega Laos-China Express Way Project which link Vientiane with Boten in Luang Namtha on the Laos-China border will stretch 113.5 km. The project will be conducted by Yunnan Construction Engineering Group from China as a Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) project.

(2) A survey by the Institute of Industrial Economics (IIE) under Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) predicted that the growth rate of China’s economy will remain stable in 2018 at around 6.7 percent.

January 5 The 2016-2017 China National Image Global Survey conducted by the Academy for Contemporary China- World Studies and Kantar Millward Brown and Lightspeed shows that China scored 6.5 on a 10-point system for its performance in global affairs and 6.22 for its overall image. This survey included a total of 11,000 respondents in 22 countries in Asia, Europe, Africa, Oceania, and America.

January 7 China Center for National Accounting and Economic Growth under Peking University reports that China is expected to get over “middle-income trap” around 2023. It forecasts that China will have an average economic growth of 6.5 percent from 2017 to 2021 and cross US$ 12,500, the World Bank’s boundary dividing middle-income and high-income economies.

January 8 The Bank of Thailand and People’s Bank of China has agreed to extend the swap for another 3 years which

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allows the Chinese central bank to swap 70 billion yuan for 370 billion baht.

January 10 China News reports that the booming fruit trade between China and ASEAN countries encourages the fruit processing industry in the border areas such as in Pingxiang, the border between China and Vietnam in Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region. Chinese fruit processing enterprises have set up branches in Pingxiang. 1,730 food enterprise from ASEAN countries have registered in China. A total of 950,000 tons of fruits were imported through Guangxi in 2017, according to Guangxi Entry-Exit Inspection and Quarantine Bureau’s statistics.

January 10-11 The 2nd Lancang-Mekong Cooperation Leaders’ Meeting is held in Phnom Penh, Cambodia. (See Political Affairs)

January 12 The spokesperson for the General Administration of Customs Huang Songping reports that China reached 7.37 trillion yuan on the value of imports and exports to Belt and Road countries in 2017, up 17.8 percent year on year.

January 15 Thai Industry Minister Uttama Savanayana said that Thai government wants to push the Eastern Economic Corridor (EEC) to support China’s Belt and Road Initiative and attract more Chinese investors to EEC in order to get out of the middle-income trap. The government expects that investment in EEC will help increase the country’s GDP by 5 percent a year.

January 18 Data from the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) shows that China beats the economic growth target of around 6.5 percent with 6.9 percent year on year of growth in 2017. The consumption was the major growth area and GDP totaled 82.71 trillion yuan (about US$ 12.84 trillion).

January 22 Official Global New Light of Myanmar reports that bilateral trade between China and Myanmar is US$ 7.42 billion in April-November of the fiscal year 2017- 2018. Myanmar exports agricultural and animal products to China and imports machinery, plastic raw

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materials, consumer products and electronic devices from China.

January 22-26 ASEAN Tourism Forum is held in Chiang Mai, including the meetings of ASEAN Tourism Ministers, tourism stakeholders and bilateral meetings with dialogue partners such as China, Japan, India and South Korea. Some 275 tourism organisations and companies showcase their products and services at this event.

January 23-26 Annual meeting of the 48th World Economic Forum (WEF) is held in Davos, Switzerland. Liu He, Member of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and Director of the General Office of the Central Leading Group for Financial and Economic Affairs, attends the meeting on January 24. He delivers a speech to pledge that China will open wider to the world, and transit the Chinese economy from a phase of rapid growth to high-quality development.

January 28 According to the Chinese Ministry of Commerce, bilateral trade between China and ASEAN countries totaled US$ 514.68 billion in 2017, up 13.8 percent year on year. China’s exports to ASEAN countries were US$ 279.1 billion, up 9 percent year on year, and imports were US$ 235.7 billion, up 20 percent year on year. China’s top trading partners are Vietnam, Malaysia and Thailand.

January 30 Xi Jinping, general secretary of the Communist Party of China (CPC) Central Committee, calls for developing a modernized economy while presiding over the third group study of the Political Bureau of 19th CPC Central Committee. Aspects of the modernized economy include an open economy of higher standards, innovation-driven industries, and coordinated urban-rural and regional development.

February 2 Laos-China Belt and Road Cooperation Forum is held in Vientiane under the theme “Opportunities and Outlook of Laos-China Cooperation-Strategic Integration of Laos’ Strategy of Transformation from a Landlocked to a Land-linked Country and the Belt

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and Road Initiative”. This forum is jointly organized by the Commission for Propaganda and Training of the Lao People’s Revolutionary Party, the Lao Ministry of Information, Culture and Tourism, China’s Xinhua News Agency, the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China and the Lao Chinese Chamber of Commerce aiming to push for the implementation of the results and enhance bilateral cooperation.

February 4 China releases Document no. 1 of the year from the central government which is the roadmap for the country’s rural vitalization strategy.

February 5 (1) Premiere Li Keqiang has a discussion with more than 60 foreign experts working in China and states that China will remain committed to the policy of reform and opening-up.

(2) During the Lunar New Year holidays, the Tourism Authority of Thailand (TAT) expects 300,000 visitors from China, up nearly 18 percent from 2017 according to Santi Chudintra, a TAT deputy governor.

February 6 Cambodia’s spokesperson of Commerce Ministry says that Cambodia is considering a proposal by Ouyang Weimin, the vice-governor of Guangdong Province to use the yuan instead of the US dollar for bilateral trade during the visit of Cambodia Minister of Commerce Pan Sorasak in China.

February 12 The Singapore Tourism Board (STB) reports that China is the top visitor arrivals in Singapore with more than 3.2 million visitors in 2017 beating Indonesia off the top spot.

February 14 China is the top visitor by nationality of Cambodia, with 1.2 million Chinese tourists visiting the Kingdom in 2017. Chinese Ambassador to Cambodia Xiong Bo said that Cambodia enacted the right policies such as “China Ready” policy to facilitate tourists and increase in Chinese-speaking tour guides.

February 26 The China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC) published policies over the weekend in opening up

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the finance industry. The CBRC will continue to support foreign banks to enter the Chinese market, loosen restrictions for foreign banks to invest, establish new branches, and follow the same standards as domestic banks.

February 27 The report, jointly released by Xiamen University and business newspaper Economic Information Daily, forecast that China will likely maintain a steady growth rate of above 6.5 percent in the next two years. The report predicted export volume would grow by 9.65 percent in 2018, up 1.75 percent from 2017. The report also urged the government to pay more attention to consumption as it can drive China’s economic growth.

March 1 The State Oceanic Administration (SOA) announces that China’s gross oceanic product exceed US$ 1.22 trillion in 2017, increasing 6.9 percent year on year.

March 5 (1) President Xi Jinping stresses the focus of high- quality economic development on transforming and upgrading industries at the first session of the 13th National People’s Congress in Beijing.

(2) Premier Li Keqiang delivers a report on the work of the government to the assembly at the first session of the 13th National People’s Congress. China’s GDP growth for this year is set at 6.5 percent reflecting the country’s demand for a high-quality economic growth. He pledges to strengthen the fundamental role of consumption in driving economic growth, open China’s market wider and defend free and fair trade.

(3) China Tourism Academy (CTA) and the online travel service Ctrip released the report showing that Chinese tourists travelling abroad hit a record high of over 130 million and spent US$ 115.29 billion in 2017.

March 7 (1) Xiao Jie, Finance Minister of China, reports at a press conference on the sidelines of the annual parliament session that China’s debt-to-GDP ratio has decreased to 36.2 percent by the end of 2017 from

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36.7 percent in 2016, far below the international alert line of 60 percent.

(2) Shi Yaobin, the Deputy Finance Minister, tells a press conference on the sidelines of the annual parliament session that China will strengthen financing and tax support to better serve the Belt and Road Initiative and the Ministry of Finance is forming an international financing cooperation center.

(3) Liu Yongfu, director of the State Council Leading Group Office of Poverty Alleviation and Development, reports that China has vowed to make increased efforts to eliminate poverty and will allocate about US$ 16.8 billion in funding for poverty alleviation work in 2018 during the first session of the 13th National People’s Congress.

(4) Alibaba Group, Chinese e-commerce giant group, will settle an investment plan for the smart digital hub in the Eastern Economic Corridor (EEC) in Thailand in March and the investment possibly starts in April, says Angel Zhao, head of the globalization leadership group at Alibaba.

March 10 Xiao Yaqing, Minister of the State-Owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council (SASAC), says at a news conference during the first session of the 13th National People’s Congress that state-owned enterprises (SOEs) welcome foreign capital and are open to all kinds of businesses, including foreign companies, to participate in China’s SOE mixed-ownership reform.

March 11 Zhong Shan, Minister of Commerce, tells a press conference that trade volume between China and countries along the Belt and Road amounted to US$ 1.1 trillion, up 14.8 percent year on year.

March 15 Transport Ministers from six GMS countries sign a memorandum of understanding (MoU) on the “Early Harvest” Implementation of the Cross Border Transport Agreement (CBTA) at the sixth meeting of the joint committee for the CBTA, co-hosted by the

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Ministry of Transport of Vietnam and the Asia Development Bank (ADB) in Hanoi, Vietnam.

March 16 Yunnan Province will speed up construction of the Trans-Asian Railway within the province and aims to complete a railway network connecting China with Vietnam, Laos and Myanmar according to Wang Gengjie, general manager of China Railway Kunming Group Co.

March 20 (1) China plans to set up a State immigration administration under the Ministry of Public Security, according to a document on an institutional reform plan of the State Council.

(2) Premier Li Keqiang notes at a press conference that an increasing number of outbound tourists have been the major feature of China’s tourism trends. According to a report co-released by China Tourism Academy and Ctrip, a domestic online travel service provider, showed that Chinese tourists spent an average of 5,800 yuan on outbound travel in 2017, up 7 percent over from 2016.

March 21 (1) The Nanjing Business Association in Thailand took a delegation of Thai investors to meet leading investors in Nanjing, China to seek opportunities from mainland China and bring about initial deals between Thai investors and Chinese companies and individuals for business expansion in both countries.

(2) Tourism Ministry of Thailand data shows that visitors from China reached 1.2 million in February during the Lunar New Year holiday period.

March 22 Thanin Somboon, Director-General of Thailand’s Department of Highways says that the first section of Thailand-China High Speed Train project has been completed 7 percent. This project began in December 2016.

March 26 (1) China launches the crude oil futures contract at the Shanghai International Energy Exchange, which is the first futures listed in China to overseas investors.

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(2) China will further open up its massive manufacturing sector to foreign investors and favorable policies under the country’s ambitious “Made in China 2025”, says Miao Wei, head of the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology.

March 27 The National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) of China reports that China’s major industrial firms had stronger profit growth in the first two months of this year. The growth is a 16.1 percent increase from a year earlier.

April 1 China Development Bank (CDB) plans to give loans of about US$ 63.8 million to support poverty alleviation projects in this year as the Chinese government aims to lift over 10 million people out of poverty in 2018 and eliminate poverty in 2020.

April 5 Mae Sot (the border district in Northern part of Thailand) customs chief reported that trade value across the Mae Sot-Myawaddy border fell 9.8 percent in the first three months of this year after China has limited sugar imports affecting Thai sugar exports.

April 8-11 The Boao Forum for Asia Annual Conference 2018 is held in Hainan Province, China. The major events are as follows:

(1) President Xi Jinping attends the Boao Forum for Asia Annual Conference 2018 under the theme “An Open and Innovative Asia for a World of Greater Prosperity” in Boao, South China’s Hainan Province and delivers a keynote speech.

(2) International representatives praise China for its pursuit of the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road, which facilitate investment in island countries, improve connectivity and bring huge opportunities.

(3) Justin Yifu Lin, former chief economist of the World Bank, stresses that China is able to maintain annual GDP growth of 6 percent in the next ten years. To make that possible, China has to do three things: (1) build a comparatively prosperous society in a

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short term, (2) eliminate poverty, (3) avoid financial crisis.

(4) Xi’s keynote speech at the opening ceremony of the Boao Forum, promises to further open up China to the world. The four highlights are as follows: to further widen market access, to improve the investment environment for foreign investors, to strengthen protection of intellectual property rights, and to take the initiative to expand imports.

April 17 (1) Data from the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) showed that China’s GDP reached 19.88 trillion yuan (about US$ 3.2 trillion) in the first three months, up 6.8 percent year on year at comparable prices.

(2) The World Economic Outlook report released by the IMF forecasts China’s growth at 6.6 percent in 2018 and 6.4 percent in 2019. The global economic growth will up to 3.9 percent for the next two years.

April 18 (1) Yan Pengcheng, spokesperson for the National Development and Reform Commission, says that China’s cooperation with countries and regions along the routes of the Belt and Road Initiative is based on complete equality, joint discussion and shared benefits, refuting overseas media reports saying that the Belt and Road Initiative is a form of new colonialism by China.

(2) The Thai Ministry of Commerce and the Chinese Embassy in Thailand and the Mekong Institute sign a memorandums of understanding (MoU) on the LMC Special Fund projects proposed by the Thai side as a commitment for China to provide financial support worth US$ 1.7 million for three years to help enhance intra-regional economic links among the Mekong region.

April 19 Jack Ma, Alibaba Group executive chairman, visits Thailand and meets with Prime Minister Prayut Chan- o-cha and Deputy Prime Minister Somkid Jatusripituk. He signs memorandums of understanding (MoU) on investment, e-commerce and tourism with the Thai side and would invest

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about 11 billion baht, especially in the Eastern Economic Corridor (EEC).

April 25 The Khmer Times, reports that representatives from Pagoda, a Chinese fruit retailer, met with Veng Sakhon, Agriculture Minister of Cambodia to discuss investment plans as Pagoda is seeking business opportunities aiming to send Cambodian agricultural goods to China to support the rapidly increased demand for fruits in China.

April 26 The Ministry of Natural Resources reported that China’s gross oceanic product rose 7 percent year on year to 1.8 trillion yuan (about US$ 285 billion) in the first three months, slightly faster than the 6.9 percent increase for the full year of 2017.

April 28 According to domestic news site cs.com.cn, Chinese authorities are planning to unveil guidelines for increasing China’s imports and seeking a trade balance in the global market. Experts noted that one of the major tasks in the future is to increase imports of products and take into account the demand from consumers to lower tariffs.

April 30 (1) The Vietnam National Administration of Tourism reports that the number of Chinese visitors to Vietnam is nearly 1.8 million in the first four months of this year, up 39.7 percent year on year.

(2) The China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) released new management rules on foreign investment in the securities sector to allow foreign investors to take a controlling stake in joint-venture securities firms. It will also expand the business scope of such firms.

May 3 The ASEAN+3 Macroeconomic Research Office (AMRO) releases the report titled “ASEAN+3 Regional Economic Outlook (AREO) 2018” that predicts the economy of the ASEAN+3 comprising 10 member countries of ASEAN, China, Japan and South Korea will grow 5.4 percent in 2018 and 5.2 percent in 2019. However, they still face the risks of tightening global financial conditions and trade protectionism.

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May 4 Data provided by a travel service platform shows that Thailand becomes hottest destination for Chinese tourists with 350,000 Chinese tourists arriving in Thailand at the beginning of this year, up 113.8 percent from 2017. Chinese tourists brought more than 520 billion baht in revenue to Thailand in 2017, becoming the largest number of arrivals and size of profit.

May 7 The deputy head of the People’s Bank of China (PBOC), Pan Gongsheng, stresses that China will continue to expand cross-border use of its Renminbi (RMB) this year to promote the global use of RMB and meet the market demand.

May 8 (1) The data of the China General Administration of Customs shows that China’s foreign trade goes up 8.9 percent year on year to 9.11 trillion yuan in the January-April period. Goods exports rise 6.4 percent year on year and imports grow 11.7 percent year on year.

(2) Thailand was the second following Hong Kong for the most popular destination of Chinese tourists to spend money via the Alipay platform in the Labour Day holiday period. Average spending per person for Thailand was 1,122 yuan (5,617 baht).

(3) Xinhua reports that the Jakarta-Bandung railway, the first high-speed railway of Indonesia under the Belt and Road Initiative, is now being carried out with full force by China Railway Group Limited. This railway is 142 km long, and will shorten the travel time from 3 hours to 40 minutes.

May 9 Philippine Statistic Authority (PSA) reports that China remains the biggest source of imports with 15.3 percent share in March 2018. Import payments to China is US$ 1.24 billion, decreasing 12.0 percent from March 2017.

May 10 (1) The data from the National Bureau of Statistics shows that China’s consumer index (CPI), the measure of inflation, rose 1.8 percent in April year on

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year which was slower than expected because of the steady decline of food prices. As for producer price index (PPI), the measure costs for goods at the factory gate, rose 3.4 percent year on year in April.

(2) Pingxiang, a town at the China-Vietnam border in Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region, is becoming a major gateway to Southeast Asia supporting Belt and Road Initiative as logistics companies set up their offices in Pingxiang because of the growing border trade between China and Vietnam.

May 24 China holds the conference under the theme “Build New International Land and Maritime Trade Routes for a China-ASEAN Community of Shared Future” in Naning city, Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous region aiming to strengthen the ties between China and ASEAN. The conference proposes a “Southern Transport Corridor” to enhance the infrastructure connectivity particularly in transport and logistics areas.

May 25 The survey by the London and Singapore-based think tank Official Monetary and Financial Institutions Forum showed that the demand for Renminbi assets will increase in next two years as the Renminbi holdings take first place on the overall survey result. It is because China has opened more on the financial sector in 2017 allowing foreign banks, security firms, fund managers, and life insurance companies to own domestic assets.

May 30 (1) The Commerce Ministry of Thailand organises a business matching event between about 70 Thai food and fruit companies and Tmall.com, China’s biggest business-to-consumer retail website under the Alibaba Group. China has high demand for Thai products such as rice-based products, animal feed and fresh and processed fruits, especially Thai longan. Longans are now offered for sale via China’s Tmall.com website.

(2) China’s Yunnan Yun Manganese Group, a latex manufacturer from Yunnan, wants to establish a rubber product factory in Southern Thailand after it

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signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) with the Southern Border Provinces Administrative Center (SBPAC) and Prince of Songkla University to develop health-related products supporting China and the Southeast Asia Health Living Mall in Kunming, Yunnan Province for three years.

(3) A Thai scholar raised an issue on Thai durian which is very popular to Chinese market nowadays. He worried that this positive market maybe in the short term because many ASEAN countries such as Indonesia, Vietnam, Cambodia, and the Philippines also can grow durian in various varieties, affecting the durian price if it is oversupplied. Moreover, the durian market is totally manipulated by the Chinese dealers and buyers. As such, the government should come up with better quality management of durians to cope with future risks.

May 31 (1) China’s Ministry of Commerce reports that China signs trade deals worth US$ 389.1 billion with Belt and Road countries in the first four months of 2018. It represents a growth of 19.2 percent year on year. China had built 75 economic and trade cooperation zones along the Belt and Road countries with more than 3,800 companies generating nearly 220,000 jobs.

(2) China’s National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) says that China contributed more than 30 percent to world economic growth in 2017 as the economy totaled 82.7 trillion yuan, expanding 6.9 percent. The country had solid work in the five priority tasks of cutting overcapacity, reducing excess inventory, deleveraging lowering costs and strengthening areas of weakness.

(3) After the signing of the memorandum of understanding between China and Japan on business cooperation in third countries on May 9, Thailand holds a seminar in Bangkok with Ning Jizhe, vice- chairman of China’s National Development and Reform Commission, Shiro Sadoshima, Japan’s ambassador to Thailand, and panel speakers from both countries. The two countries agree to strengthen

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bilateral cooperation in third-party markets and establish a service trade cooperation mechanism to promote cooperation in service sector. More than 40 Chinese executives will also participate in Sino- Japanese projects in the Eastern Economic Corridor (EEC).

(4) Deputy Prime Minister Somkid Jatusripitak meets with Ning Jizhe, vice-chairman of China’s National Development and Reform Commission to reaffirm that China will participate in the High-speed railway project linking 3 airports of Thailand. Mr. Somkid says that Thai government pledged to ensure fair competition among bidders. He says that China will support the Eastern Economic Corridor (EEC). He also calls on China to invest in the second phase of the double-track rail project linking to EEC.

June 5 The World Bank raises its forecast for China’s year on year GDP growth from 6.4 percent to 6.5 percent as China has progress in implementing reforms and opening-up its economy. China’s economy remains on track as its GDP growth was 6.8 percent year on year in the first quarter. However, China will face some policy challenges such as maintaining stable growth, reducing financial vulnerabilities, and promoting market competition and private sector development.

June 14 (1) The Mekong River Commission (MRC) Secretariat reports that the Lao government proposed the prior consultation with MRC members over the Pak Lay hydropower project. The dam is the fourth hydropower dam on the mainstream Mekong River after the Xayaburi, Don Sahong and Pak Beng dams. It can produce 770 megawatts of electricity and will be located in the Pak Lay area, Xayaburi Province. The prior consultation is a part of the Procedures for Notification, Prior Consultation and Agreement (PNPCA) under the 1995 Mekong Agreement.

(2) China Railway No 2 Engineering Group (CREC-2) finishes the Nam Khone super major bridge along the China-Laos railway which is the longest bridge in Laos. This bridge is 7.5 kilometer long and located in northern Vientiane. The China-Laos railway is one of

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interconnectivity project under the Belt and Road Initiative.

June 14-20 The 5th China-South Asia Expo (CSAEXPO) is held in Kunming, Yunnan Province. This event is co-hosted by China’s Ministry of Commerce and the Yunnan Provincial Government aiming to deepen multilateral cooperation and exchanges in diplomacy, economics, trade and culture with South Asia, Southeast Asia and beyond. 3,825 companies and organisations from 87 countries and regions attend the CSAEXPO this year.

June 18 Jack Ma, Alibaba founder and chief executive officer, meets Prime Minister Tun Dr Mahathir Mohamad in Putrajaya, Malaysia to discuss about poverty alleviation in Malaysia and support more young people and small business. He launches the group’s first office in Southeast Asia at the UOA corporate building in Bangsar South, Malaysia.

June 20 Thailand will have more demand for imports as a result from the US-China trade dispute, according to Commerce Ministry’s trade policy and strategy office of Thailand. Thailand will benefit from exporting certain products to replace the affected products that have higher tariffs. However, it has to be aware of becoming a dumping ground for certain products from the two giant countries.

June 21 Dhanin Chearavanont, senior chairman of Thailand’s largest private company, Charoen Pokphand Group (C.P. Group), has an exclusive interview with the Global Times in Bangkok. He shares his view on the Eastern Economic Corridor (EEC) and indicated that he is willing to work together with both Chinese and Japanese companies to develop the key project for High Speed Rail linking 3 airports. He thinks that Thailand should welcome international investments in this project.

June 22 The first Sino-Thai Joint Think Tank Forum is held in Beijing by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. Over 80 academics and officials from the two countries attend this forum including Gao Peiyong, vice-president of the Chinese Academy of Social

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Sciences and General Surasit Thanadtang, director of the Thai-Chinese Strategic Research Center at the National Research Council of Thailand. They explore the model to sync the Belt and Road Initiative and Thailand 4.0 development program in order to improve regional interconnectivity.

June 25 (1) China’s Haikou Customs says that ASEAN countries become top trade partner of Hainan. From January to May 2018, the imports and exports between both sides amount to 6.41 billion, accounting for 24.1 percent of Hainan’s total foreign trade volume.

(2) Philippine Finance Minister Carlos Dominguez attends the third annual meeting of the Board of Governors of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) in Mumbai, India. He delivers a keynote speech at the Asian Infrastructure Forum (AIF) workshop on “Advancing Together: ASEAN Infrastructure Development”.

June 27 China Tourism Academy (CTA), a think tank under the Ministry of Culture and Tourism, releases a report showing inbound and outbound tourists reach 139 million and 131 million in 2017, up by 0.8 percent and 6.9 percent respectively.

June 27-29 Thai Deputy Prime Minister Somkid Jatusripitak travels to Hong Kong and Shenzen, China. He wants to attract more investors to invest in infrastructure and 10 targeted industries in the Eastern Economic Corridor (EEC), including high-speed rail linking 3 airports of Thailand, and the third phase of Laem Chabang port. He delivers a keynote speech at the 3rd Belt and Road Summit in Hong Kong on June 28. Thailand aims to use Hong Kong as a linkage point to the Great Bay Area which is the Chinese government’s scheme to link nine cities in the coastal provinces of China in order to establish a new business hub.

June 28 (1) The 12th ASEAN-China Forum on Social Development and Poverty Reduction is held in Beijing under the theme “Enhancing Poverty Reduction Partnerships for ASEAN-China Community with a

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Shared Future” to deepen cooperation and discuss new measures to alleviate poverty across the region.

(2) China remains top fruit and vegetable export market of Vietnam according to the Vietnamese Ministry of Industry and Trade. In the first six months of 2018, Vietnam’s fruit and vegetable exports to China rises to US$ 1.2 billion, up 18.1 percent year on year.

(3) China’s State Council Information Office releases a white paper titled “China and the World Trade Organization” to fulfill its commitments to the WTO. The white paper explains China’s principles, stances, policies, and proposition regarding multilateral trading system and visions and actions in advancing higher-level reform and opening-up.

(D) Socio-cultural Affairs

January 3 China has officially banned imported waste to improve its environmental and pollution problem. China decided to accept foreign waste and became the world’s largest waste importer since 1980s. This banning affects many Western countries which are now facing severe recycling incapacity.

January 9 Travel becomes a necessity for Chinese people’s happy life. According to Chinanews.com report, over 129 million Chinese tourists traveled overseas in 2017, an increase of 9.17 percent on the average every year since 2012.

January 10-11 (1) The 2nd Lancang-Mekong Cooperation Leaders’ Meeting is held in Phnom Penh, Cambodia. (See Political Affairs)

(2) The environmental conservationists have been concerned with the negative impact of development projects in the Mekong River after the leaders of the LMC member countries failed to raise environmental issue at the summit. Moreover, the action plan endorsed by the member countries mainly focus on infrastructure development.

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January 15 Datang (Lao) Pak Beng Hydropower Co. Ltd. discusses with the Rak Chiang Khong conservation group about Pak Beng Dam project and its impacts on Thai riparian local community in Chiang Rai Province, Thailand.

January 16 Educational authorities in Chengdu, Sichuan Province announces a plan for two special scholarship programs comprising Belt and Road Initiative Scholarship Scheme and ASEAN scholarship programs to promote cultural exchange and attract talents from Belt and Road countries.

January 18 (1) Xinhua reported that waste exporters target Southeast Asian countries after China bans foreign waste. According to data provided by the Brussels- based Bureau of International Recycling (BIR), the volume of imported plastic waste in Southeast Asian countries has been increasing fast. For example in Thailand, the volume of imported plastic waste increases 117 percent year on year in 2017.

(2) “ASEAN Headlines”, an electronic information platform for the transnational internet project is launched in Cambodia. This platform was created by Zhongxinwenchuang, a Chinese network media company in South China’s Guangxi province. It has Khmer language and Chinese language versions.

January31- The 5th Greater Mekong Subregion Environment February 1 Ministers’ Meeting (EMM-5) is held in Chiang Mai Province, Thailand. The environment ministers from the six member countries endorse the Core Environment Program (CEP) Strategic Framework and Action Plan 2018-2022. The Meeting titled “Inclusive Green Growth: Investing for a Sustainable Future” focuses on policy dialogues and events on green technologies, green energy, sustainable infrastructure, climate resilience, and natural resources investments.

February 1 China implements a new visa policy for Chinese- descent foreigners to improve the previous one-year multiple-entry visa by giving them a five-year

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residency permit for work, study or other purposes. This policy aims to encourage more Chinese-descent people to stay longer and participate in China’s economic development.

February 20 Phanu Woramitr, director of the Tourism Authority of Thailand (TAT) office of Hat Yai, Songkhla, reports that TAT has sent a letter to the Chinese tourism agency asking its help to warn Chinese tourists visiting Thailand to strictly observe Thai laws and regulations and to avoid damaging fragile natural resources in national parks, temples, seas and coral reefs.

February 26 (1) Thanh Nien reports that five Vietnamese men were arrested in northern Cao Bang Province, Vietnam which shares border with China for attempting to smuggle US$ 2.5 million worth of heroin into China. Vietnam is a key trafficking hub for narcotics from Laos, Myanmar and Thailand.

(2) Xinhuanet.com reported that three China- made robot nurses AGVs (Automated Guided Vehicle) were set up for operation recently at a private hospital in Bangkok, Thailand.

February 28 Ambassador Yu Jianhua, Permanent Representative of the People’s Republic of China to the United Nations Office at Geneva and Other International Organizations in Switzerland, delivers a speech entitled “Win-Win Cooperation for the Common Cause of Human Rights” in the General Debate of the 37th Session of the Human Rights Council.

March 2 The international conference on “Transboundary Water Resources and Related Resources Cooperation” is held in Chiang Rai. This is the second conference for a working panel on water resources of the six nations in the Greater Mekong Subregion. Representatives of the six Mekong countries formulate guidelines on how to share information and technology to jointly manage the Mekong river.

March 6 Rak Chiang Khong, local conservation group based in Chiang Rai, Thailand contacts Friends of Nature

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(FON), a renowned conservation group in China to seek advice on Chinese overseas investments in dam projects as the FON has a campaign against dam projects on the Mekong river.

March 9 The water level in the Mekong river has decreased by more than two meters and more than ten cargo boats has been grounded, waiting for Jinghong dam in southern China to release water and raise the downstream water level.

March 13 China agreed to release more water from Jinghong dam after the Marine Department, security agencies and the Foreign Ministry of Thailand contacted it. Therefore, the cargo and passenger boats in Chiang Rai, Southern China, Myanmar and Laos have resumed services.

March 16 Researchers from Michigan State University (MSU) will spend three years conducting research in the lower Mekong River Basin in Thailand, Cambodia and Vietnam. They will analyze how dams impact the flow of rivers, local agriculture, fisheries, irrigations systems and wetland ecosystems.

March 17 (1) The first session of the 13th National People’s Congress approves the reform plan to establish a ministry of ecological environment and will dismantle the Ministry of Environmental Protection.

(2) China establishes the China University Alliance for the Development of Foreign Language and Literature Discipline (CUAFLL) comprising 153 Chinese universities that specialize in foreign languages and literature in Shanghai.

March 18 Reuters reports that Beijing is set to record its biggest improvements in air quality in at least 9 years based on average concentration levels of hazardous breathable particles known as PM 2.5.

March 21 CPPCC members push Chinese traditional culture to go global following Xi Jinping’s suggestion, in order to demonstrate China’s soft power and help the world better understand China.

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March 22 China establishes the Lancang-Mekong Environmental Protection Center in Kunming, capital of southwest China’s Yunnan Province aiming to deepen cooperation in environmental protection between the six Mekong countries.

March 26 The newly established Ministry of Ecology and Environment holds the first executive meeting and approves two action plans comprising the 2018-2020 action plan for implementation of the country’s reform plan to ban waste imports and the 2018 action plan for inspections on pollution caused by processing imported waste.

April 9 The 2018 Media Leaders Summit for Asia is held at Boao Forum in Sanya, Hainan Province to discuss about issues related to increasing connectivity under media cooperation.

April 17 Overseas film and television industry insiders and scholars from countries and regions share experiences in their field at the Film and TV Translation and Communication Roundtable under the Belt and Road Initiative.

April 19 The Ministry of Culture and Tourism of China states that China will continue to regulate the order of the tourism market, and will take stronger action against the problems nationwide.

April 21 The Xi’an City Wall International Marathon is held in Xi’an, China with a total of 5,000 runners out of 30,000 applicants, using sport as a bridge between cultures.

April 23-27 The Bureau for External Cultural Relations, part of the Ministry of Culture and Tourism of the People’s Republic of China holds the first seminar for leaders of key projects in cultural trade and investment under the Belt and Road Initiative to better implement the Belt and Road Cultural Development Action Plan (2016-2020).

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April 24 Shen Changyu, head of the State Intellectual Property Office, says at a press conference held by the State Council Information Office that China will better protect intellectual property rights (IPR) to improve the business environment and attract more foreign investors.

April 25 The Tourism and Hospitality Management Division, Mahidol University International College (MUIC), and Destination Mekong, the executive unit endorsed by the Mekong Tourism Coordinating Office (MTCO) sign a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) at Mahidol University to establish a formal educational partnership aiming to foster collaboration in relation to a development of tourism sector within the Mekong region.

April 30 The Ministry of Education of China says that the number of international students from the Belt and Road Initiative countries increased in 2017 with a total of 317,200 students, up 11.58 percent over 2016.

May 2 President Xi Jinping pays an inspection tour of Peking University (PKU) on the occasion of China’s Youth Day and the 120th anniversary of the PKU on May 4. He calls for the building of world-class universities with Chinese characteristics and enhancing integration among different disciplines.

May 7 China’s State Administration of Religious Affairs releases the guidelines to regulate foreigners’ religious activities in China. The Chinese government wants to manage the religious activities of foreigners to provide services and protect foreigners’ beliefs. It will not interfere or control such activities under the law. This draft rules ask for public comments until June 7.

May 8 Chinese Ministry of Culture and Tourism announces that 35 China Cultural Centers in major cities around the world will host the event, titled “China Week: Inheritance and Innovation”, to promote China- created cultural products, cultural institutions and

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innovative enterprises through exhibitions, lectures and workshops.

May 9 China Mingda Potash Corporation, a Chinese potash- mining company, confronts with the local people protesting against the potash exploration in Wanon Niwat District, Sakon Nakhon Province, Thailand. The company has got the mineral exploration license from the Industry Ministry of Thailand for potash exploration in this area since 2015. However, the locals were kept away from participating. They worry about the impact on the environment and the fertility of their farmland. Therefore they block the company entering the exploration site.

May 10 China delivers the first batch of 20 mobile clinics to Cambodia as it agreed to donate 40 mobile clinics to Cambodia in November 2017. The second batch of the other 20 mobile clinics would be delivered to the country by October this year. These mobile clinics provide medical services to residents in rural communities in 25 cities and provinces in Cambodia.

May 16 The Population Division of the UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA) releases a report stressing that China will account for 35 percent of the projected growth of the world’s urban population between 2018 and 2050. As such, China should have more sustainable urban planning and public services.

May 17 Renmin University of China recently announced the establishment of first Silk Road School which offers a master’s program in Contemporary Chinese Studies to attract students worldwide and support the Belt and Road Initiative.

May 18 (1) A three-year study commissioned by the Cambodian government reported that the Sambor dam, a Chinese-backed plan designed by China Southern Power Grid Co, would affect fisheries and endanger Irrawady river dolphins. It could also increase tensions with Vietnam because of the destruction of sediments moving downstream thus affecting delta farmlands in Vietnam. Cambodia has not publicly commented on this report.

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(2) China holds the first international conference of the Asia-Oceania Global Earth Observation System of Systems (AOGEOSS) Initiative in Deqing, Zhejiang Province and passes the Deqing Action Plan to conduct satellite remote sensing observation along the Mekong River helping research in ecosystem assessment and disaster monitoring.

May 20 Beijing Language and Culture University (BLCU) holds the 15th World Cultural Festival under the theme “Break the Time Bonds, Waltz the World in BLCU” in Beijing, attracting diplomats from more than 30 countries and students from 101 countries and regions. It aims to promote mutual communication among Chinese and international students.

May 22 World Health Organization representatives and Health officials from China, Myanmar, Cambodia, Laos, Thailand and Vietnam sign the Ministerial Call for Action to Eliminate Malaria in the Greater Mekong Subregion before 2030, pledging to develop and implement cross-border elimination strategy and action plan on malaria-related needs.

May 25 China had built 525 Confucius Institutes and 1,113 Confucius Classrooms in 146 countries and regions prior to 2017. These help to strengthen cooperation in education and cultural communication between China and other countries. In Thailand, it has over 3,000 schools with Chinese courses and around 1 million people are learning Chinese. Chinese has become one of the most important foreign languages in Thailand.

May 30 (1) China has become a favorite destination for Vietnamese students according to the data of Viet- Trung Education, a study-aboard consultancy company in Hanoi and the Confucius Institute at Hanoi University. Vietnamese students are seeking for scholarships to study in China because they believe that they will get good jobs and have better opportunities after graduation.

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(2) China’s education ministry is planning to release rules for higher education requirements and raise the bar on international student enrollment. It also denied that the country spends more on foreign students than on domestic primary and high school education.

(3) Thailand is becoming one of the biggest dumping grounds for e-waste after China banned imported waste in 2017. These e-wastes come from Hong Kong, Singapore and Japan. They are imported by companies illegally. Thailand needs measures and laws to solve imported waste problems as soon as possible.

June 5 This day mark the 10th anniversary of the Outline of the National Intellectual Property Strategy issued by the State Council of China. The State Intellectual Property Office shows that the number of patents grew from 96,000 in 2007 to 1.3 million in 2017. China will continue strengthening protection and management of intellectual property by raising legislative standards, improving law enforcement, and promoting innovation in the examination of IPR case according to officials.

June 13 Imported waste was increased rapidly in Thailand after China’s banning. According to the Custom Department of Thailand, Thailand imported 212,000 tons of plastic waste in the first five months, up from 145,000 tons for all of 2017. 52,200 tons of e-waste was shifted to Thailand in the first five months, compared with 64,400 tons last year. 90 percent of these wastes were imported through the Laem Chabang port in Chon Buri Province. The Department of Industrial Works (DIW) recently suspended the license of recycling factories and outlined the solutions for this problem.

June 21 The government authorized a new committee led by Natural Resource and Environment Minister Surasak Kanjanarat to take over from the Industry Ministry’s Department of Industrial Works (DIW). This committee will inspect and allow the import of plastic and electronic waste on a case-by-case basis to

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manage the waste and protect environment and locals’ health. There are 7 companies with license to import hazardous waste. However, 5 of them were found breaching regulations and then licenses will be canceled.

June 25 The 2017 China Drugs Situation Report by China National Narcotics Control Commission (CNNC) shows that China found 340,000 new drug addicts and confiscated 89.2 tons of drugs. In Yunnan Province shared borders with the Golden Triangle, the region known for drug production and trafficking, the government has a big data center to help monitor suspects, provide information and analyze the cases. As the International Day Against Drug Abuse and Illicit Trafficking will be held on June 26, President Xi Jinping urged for a path to contain drug-related problems and win the war on drugs.

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Part II

Selected

Documentation

(January-June 2018)

(II) Selected Documentation (January-June 2018)

January

(A) Five-Year Plan of Action on Lancang-Mekong Cooperation (2018- 2022) Source: http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201801/11/WS5a56cd04a3102e5b 17374295.html Released on January 11, 2018

I. Development Goals 1. This Plan of Action is formulated in accordance with documents including the Sanya Declaration adopted at the first Lancang-Mekong Cooperation (LMC) Leaders’ Meeting, which aims at contributing to the economic and social development of sub-regional countries, enhancing well-being of the people, narrowing the development gap within the region and building a Community of Shared Future of Peace and Prosperity among Lancang-Mekong Countries. By synergizing China’s Belt and Road Initiative and the ASEAN Community Vision 2025 as well as the Master Plan on ASEAN Connectivity 2025 and visions of other Mekong sub-regional cooperation mechanisms, the LMC is moving towards a new sub-regional cooperation mechanism with unique features driven by internal strength and inspired by South-South cooperation, which will support the ASEAN Community building and regional integration process, as well as promote the implementation of the UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.

II. Fundamental Principles 2. This Plan of Action will take into account the development needs of the six LMC member countries and the regional integration process, reflect the framework established in the Sanya Declaration, highlighting the leaders’ guidance, all-round cooperation and broad participation, and follow a government-guided, multiple-participation, and project-oriented model so as to further explore the most suitable cooperation model for the Sub-regional cooperation in line with the unique features and specificity of the six countries. The implementation of this Plan of Action will be based on the principles of consensus, equality, mutual consultation and coordination, voluntarism, common contribution and shared benefits, and respect for the United Nations Charter and international laws, as well as in accordance with domestic laws, rules, regulations and procedures of each member country. Years 2018 and 2019 will be the foundation-laying stage, when emphasis should be focused on

53 Selected Documentation strengthening sectorial cooperation planning and implementing small and medium-sized cooperation projects. The years 2020-2022 will be the consolidation and expansion stage, when member countries will further strengthen the cooperation in the five priority areas and may explore new cooperation areas that help respond to the development needs of member countries, optimize cooperation model and gradually explore cooperation on large projects.

III. Working Structure 3. Optimize the multi-layer framework comprising Leaders’ Meeting, Foreign Ministers’ Meeting (FMM), Senior Officials’ Meeting (SOM) and Diplomatic and Sectoral Joint Working Group Meeting. 4. Strengthen communication and coordination among the LMC National Secretariats or Coordination Units of the six member countries, and explore the possibility to set up the LMC International Secretariat. 5. Submit implementation progress report of this Plan of Action to the Foreign Ministers’ Meeting through the Senior Officials’ level Meeting annually. A list of projects proposed by the six member countries for the next year will be submitted to the FMM for adoption. 6. Upon consensus of the six countries, gradually upgrade the Joint Working Groups on the priority areas to senior official’s level or ministerial level. In parallel with enhancing cooperation in the key priority areas, cooperation in other areas are also encouraged. 7. Design LMC logos and other symbols for the LMC. 8. Complement and develop in synergy with other Mekong sub-regional cooperation mechanisms. 9. Coordinate the LMC and ASEAN-China Cooperation by exploring communication with ASEAN-China Joint Cooperation Committee and strengthening cooperation with ASEAN-China Center and other ASEAN-relevant institutions on ad hoc basis.

IV. Practical Cooperation

4.1 Political and Security Issues 4.1.1 Maintain High-level Exchanges 10. Convene the LMC Leaders' Meeting once every two years to map out strategic planning for future LMC development and hold ad hoc Leaders’ Meeting as necessary on the basis of consensus. 11. Hold Foreign Ministers’ Meeting once a year to implement consensus reached at the Leaders’ Meeting, review cooperation progress and provide suggestions for cooperation. 12. Maintain regular contacts among leaders of the six countries through bilateral visits or other international cooperation platforms.

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4.1.2 Strengthen Political Dialogues and Cooperation 13. Hold Diplomatic Senior Officials' Meeting and Joint Working Group meetings in diplomatic and other sectors each year as needed. 14. Support policy dialogues and official exchanges and visits among Lancang- Mekong countries.

4.1.3 Exchanges among Political Parties 15. Promote dialogues and exchanges among political parties of Lancang- Mekong countries in line with the spirit of LMC.

4.1.4 Non-traditional Security Cooperation 16. Deepen law enforcement dialogues and cooperation in combatting non- traditional security issues on mutual interest. 17. Jointly strengthen cooperation in the field of non-traditional security issues, such as combating drug trafficking, terrorism, organized illegal crossing of national border, human trafficking, smuggling and trafficking of firearms and ammunition, cyber crimes and other transnational crimes. 18. Promote exchanges among local/regional governments of border areas as well as border management departments of Lancang-Mekong countries, in line with the spirit of LMC and domestic rules and regulations of each member country. 19. Strengthen cooperation among police agencies, judicial agencies and related colleges and universities among Lancang-Mekong countries. 20. Enhance cooperation in the fields of disaster prevention and mitigation as well as humanitarian assistance, ensuring food, water and energy security. Explore various solutions for supporting people affected by disasters and the impacts of climate change.

4.2 Economy and Sustainable Development 4.2.1 Connectivity 21. Compose a plan on connectivity by synergizing with the Master Plan on ASEAN Connectivity 2025 and other sub-regional plans so as to promote comprehensive connectivity among Lancang-Mekong countries and explore the possibility to establish a Lancang-Mekong cooperation corridor. 22. Promote infrastructure upgrade and construction, such as railway, highway, waterway, ports, power grid, information network and aviation. Increase application of global satellite navigation systems, including the Beidou System, in Lancang-Mekong countries in areas such as infrastructure construction, transportation, logistics, tourism and agriculture. 23. Promote facilitation of visa application, customs clearance and transportation, and discussion on implementing the “single window” model for cross-border clearance. 24. Enhance cooperation in regional power grid planning, construction, upgrading and renovation to promote power connectivity and power trade

55 Selected Documentation among Lancang-Mekong countries toward the establishment of an integrated regional power market. 25. Formulate a broadband development strategy and relevant plans for Lancang-Mekong countries, actively push forward construction and expansion of cross-border terrestrial fiber optic cables and international submarine cables. Explore new cooperation models in terrestrial fiber optic cables across multiple countries, augment the existing regional network utilization, and constantly improve network connectivity among Lancang-Mekong countries. 26. Enhance cooperation in innovative development of digital TV, smart phone, smart hardware and other related products. 27. Promote mutual recognition of standards and credentials, share related development experience and improve capacity building cooperation.

4.2.2 Production Capacity 28. Formulate a Plan of Action on Production Capacity Cooperation among Lancang-Mekong countries in accordance with the Joint Statement on Production Capacity Cooperation among Lancang-Mekong Countries. 29. Enhance capacity building on production capacity improvement, and carry out best practice exchanges and training. 30. Explore the possibility to set up platforms for production capacity and investment cooperation, hold activities including the Production Capacity Cooperation Forum for Lancang-Mekong countries and explore the establishment of an alliance for promotion of production capacity and investment cooperation among Lancang-Mekong countries. 31. Encourage enterprises and financial institutions of Lancang-Mekong countries to participate in production capacity cooperation. 32. Explore the establishment of an LMC production capacity cooperation development fund with multi-lateral participation.

4.2.3 Economy and Trade 33. Promote cross border economic cooperation through construction of pilot cross border economic cooperation zones, and work together to optimize cooperation framework, working mechanism and institutional arrangements. 34. Improve trade and investment facilitation among Lancang-Mekong countries, and work to further reduce non-tariff trade barriers. 35. Establish a Lancang-Mekong business council. Explore the development of a service alliance for small and medium-sized enterprises. 36. Strengthen trade promotion activities among Lancang-Mekong countries such as organizing international trade fairs, exhibitions, and business-matching sessions.

4.2.4 Finance 37. Work together to build a long-term, stable, sustainable and diversified financing system among LMC member countries, taking into account various

56 Selected Documentation financing principles for regional cooperation, including the Guiding Principles on Financing the Development of the Belt and Road. 38. Strengthen cooperation and exchanges among financial authorities of Lancang-Mekong countries to prevent financial risks. 39. Emphasize the importance of a stable financial market and sound financial structure to the development of real economy; support efforts to enhance capacity for and coordination on financial supervision and regulations; continue studies and exchange experiences in order to facilitate the use of bilateral currency swap, local currency settlement and cooperation among financial institutions. 40. Strengthen cooperation with institutions including Asian Development Bank, Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, Asia Financial Cooperation Association, and World Bank. 41. Encourage financial institutions to facilitate business operations in order to support regional trade and investment. Enhance the development of products and services via a diverse set of providers and channels to promote inclusive finance and sustainable growth in the Lancang-Mekong region.

4.2.5 Water Resources 42. Carry out top-level design for cooperation among LMC countries in sustainable water resources utilization, strengthen policy dialogue on water resources, and regularly hold Lancang-Mekong Water Resources Cooperation Forum. 43. Advance the building of Lancang-Mekong Water Resources Cooperation Center with a view to create a comprehensive cooperation platform to support Lancang-Mekong water resources cooperation. 44. Promote technical cooperation and exchanges on water resources management, carry out joint research and analysis related to Lancang-Mekong water resources and influences of climate change, etc. , and implement pilot projects and priority cooperation projects on sustainable water resources development and protection technology. 45. Enhance and promote capacity building on water resources management by carrying out academic programs, programs of exchanges, training, field trips and study tours. 46. Develop and improve water quality monitoring system, which is accessible to all Lancang-Mekong countries, strengthen data and information sharing. 47. Deepen Lancang-Mekong river flood and drought disaster emergency management, carry out joint assessment of flood control and drought relief in Mekong basin, and carry out joint study on the early setting up of communication line/channel for sharing information in emergency case of flood and drought in Lancang-Mekong River. 48. Formulate a Five-Year Action Plan on Water Resources Cooperation in which issues of common concerns will or can be addressed.

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4.2.6 Agriculture 49. Strengthen policy coordination, and strengthen coordination to ensure food and nutrition security, and food safety, promote investment opportunity and enhance cooperation on sustainable agricultural development. 50. Expand exchanges and cooperation in agricultural science and technology. Support research institutions to enhance information sharing, communication and exchange of visits. Build joint laboratories, demonstration bases and technology centers and establish the LMC agricultural information network. 51. Hold the Village Head Forum among Lancang-Mekong countries. 52. Advance quality and safety cooperation for agricultural products, promote trade in agricultural products, create an integrated Lancang-Mekong market for agricultural products, and enhance competitiveness of regional agricultural products. 53. Carry out cooperation in monitoring, early warning, joint prevention and control of animal and plant diseases and epidemic situation. Enhance veterinary cooperation. Cooperation on water resources conservation. Establish the mechanism of exchange and cooperation on ecological conservation along the Lancang-Mekong River and jointly set up wild fish breeding and rescue centers for information sharing, for example, information on fish diversity, fish abundance and fish migration, etc. as well as possibility and opportunity on fishery cooperation, such as strengthening capacity building in aquaculture development. 54. Explore the possibility to jointly build agricultural industry cooperation parks and guide non-governmental sectors to participate in construction and operation of the parks.

4.2.7 Poverty Reduction 55. Formulate the Five-Year Plan of the Lancang-Mekong Cooperation on Sustainable Poverty Reduction and strengthen the experience exchange and knowledge sharing among Lancang-Mekong countries. 56. Enhance various capacity building programmes and experience sharing on poverty reduction, including sufficiency economy philosophy (SEP), launching the village officials exchange and training program for Lancang-Mekong countries. Strengthen the poverty reduction capacity of the Lancang-Mekong countries through multi-level and all-dimensional capacity building activities, such as personnel exchanges, policy consultation, joint research, training, information sharing and technical support. 57. Launch poverty reduction pilot projects in Mekong countries.

4.2.8 Forestry 58. Enhance conservation and use of forest resources, promote integrated management of forest ecosystem along the Lancang-Mekong River. 59. Enhance trade volume of forest products produced from legally acquired raw materials, promote development of small community forest enterprises, strengthen forest law enforcement and governance, promote cooperation in

58 Selected Documentation combating illegal logging and associated trade, enhance scientific and technological cooperation and exchange in the forestry sector, and enhance forest rehabilitation and forest plantation along the Mekong River. 60. Enhance cooperation in prevention and control of forest fire in border areas. 61. Enhance wildlife conservation cooperation and jointly fight against illegal wildlife trade. 62. Improve capacity building of Lancang-Mekong countries in forestry management and scientific research, promote forestry-related higher-education and human resource cooperation, conduct thematic training and carry out scholarship and visiting scholar projects.

4.2.9 Environmental Protection 63. Promote the establishment of Lancang-Mekong Environmental Cooperation Center. Synergize environmental protection development plans of Lancang- Mekong countries and formulate the Lancang-Mekong Environmental Cooperation Strategy. 64. Formulate and implement the Green Lancang-Mekong Plan, with the focus on cooperation in better managing air and water pollution as well as ecosystem management and enhance communication with other related sub-regional mechanisms. 65. Strengthen cooperation on environmental protection capacity building, publicity and education, and enhance public environmental awareness.

4.2.10 Customs and Quality Inspection 66. Explore the formulation of cooperation plans, and gradually promote the convening of meetings among customs and quality inspection departments of the six countries. 67. Improve the speed of clearance for goods, especially agricultural products. 68. Enhance product standardization, promote training, cooperation and mutual recognition on certification and accreditation. Carry out metrology assistance to improve the metrology capacity building in Lancang-Mekong countries.

4.3 Social and Cultural Cooperation 4.3.1 Culture 69. Share information on culture-related policies. Promote cultural dialogue and work to implement the Ningbo Initiative on Lancang-Mekong Cultural Cooperation. 70. Deepen exchanges and cooperation on culture and arts, cultural relics preservation, preservation of intangible cultural heritage, cultural industry, and human resource development in cultural sectors, and encourage interaction and collaboration among cultural institutions, art companies and troupes, and cultural enterprises. 71. Make full use of cultural centers set up by governments of LMC countries to host such cultural activities among LMC member states.

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4.3.2 Tourism 72. Explore the establishment of the Lancang-Mekong Tourism Cities Cooperation Alliance. 73. Promote the training of tourism talents, and encourage Lancang-Mekong countries to participate in relevant tourism events and activities such as ASEAN Tourism Forum, Mekong Tourism Forum and China International Tourism Mart (CITM). 74. Explore the possibility of establishing a medium/long term tourism development vision of the LMC, aiming at enhancing soft-infrastructure and hard-infrastructure tourism development. 75. Enhance the recognition on Promoting ASEAN Tourism Standards.

4.3.3 Education 76. Promote activities to enhance collaboration among Lancang-Mekong Countries during China-ASEAN Education Cooperation Week. 77. Strengthen vocational education and training, support the establishment of Lancang-Mekong Vocational Education Base in China as well as Lancang- Mekong Vocational Education and Training Center in Mekong countries. 78. Promote cooperation among universities and colleges in Lancang-Mekong region, encourage them to conduct joint training and research programs, academic exchanges and explore recognition and transfer of study credits.

4.3.4 Health 79. Strengthen cooperation on the prevention and control of emerging and re- emerging infectious diseases, including dengue fever and malaria. Establish and improve the mechanism for early warning, joint surveillance, prevention and control for cross-border emerging and re-emerging infectious diseases. 80. Enhance cooperation among hospitals and medical institutions to facilitate technical exchanges and health personnel training. Advance cooperation in building hospitals in rural areas among the six countries. 81. Offer short-term medical consultation service, such as Brightness Action, Smile Action (Medical Treatment to Facial Deformation) and medical service for women and children for free. China will dispatch medical teams to Mekong countries in need.

4.3.5 Media 82. Strengthen exchanges and cooperation among mainstream media, and encourage the hosting of TV and film festivals or screening activities. 83. Encourage foreign ministries of the six countries to set up Lancang-Mekong Cooperation official websites or to provide official information about LMC on their websites. Using social media platforms as basic platforms to publish information and handle public affairs as deemed appropriate. 84. Launch a Lancang-Mekong magazine or news brochure, and establish a database for Lancang-Mekong cooperation.

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4.3.6 People-to-people Exchanges and Local/Regional Government Cooperation 85. Through organizing various people-to-people activities, enhance the branding of the LMC and raise public awareness of the LMC in the six countries. 86. Promote youth exchanges and build flagship youth exchange projects among Lancang-Mekong countries. 87. Enhance gender equality, women’s exchanges and cooperation by developing various forms of activities including training courses and exchange of visits. 88. Mobilize the local/regional governments of the six countries in participating in the LMC and encourage their participation in the projects. 89. Encourage non-governmental organizations to participate in the LMC projects as appropriate. 90. Strengthen exchanges among Red Cross Societies, develop community resilience program, and improve the capacity building of the Red Cross Societies in Lancang-Mekong countries. 91. Encourage visits of personnel and communication to support the cooperation on state management of religion and inter-religious affairs as deemed appropriate by member countries.

V. Supporting System

5.1 Funding Support 92. Fully utilize the LMC Special Fund set up by China. Support, as priorities, projects that are adopted by Leaders’ Meeting or Foreign Ministers’ Meeting and are in line with the goals set by the Sanya Declaration and other important documents agreed on by the Leaders and Foreign Ministers. Encourage more financial and resources inputs from the six countries. Actively seek support from financial institutions such as Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, the Silk Road Fund and Asian Development Bank. Leverage social and market resources, and establish an all-round financial support system.

5.2 Intellectual Support 93. Explore a cooperation model that incorporates government, business and academia, work together on establishing the Global Center for Mekong River Studies and gradually form a Track II team and think-tank network on Lancang- Mekong Cooperation.

5.3 Supervision Mechanism 94. Utilize the LMC National Secretariats or Coordination Units of the six countries. Strengthen cooperation in various areas and coordinate resources to form synergy. Supervise and advise relevant departments/agencies of their own countries to participate in cooperation and conduct regular assessment of major

61 Selected Documentation activities. Leverage resources of non-governmental professional institutions, which can play the role of third-party supervision.

(B) Phnom Penh Declaration Source: http://pressocm.gov.kh/en/archives/21699 Released on January 11, 2018

PHNOM PENH DECLARATION of the Second Mekong-Lancang Cooperation (MLC) Leaders’ Meeting “Our River of Peace and Sustainable Development”

We, the Heads of State/Government of the Kingdom of Cambodia, the People’s Republic of China, the Lao People’s Democratic Republic, the Republic of the Union of Myanmar, the Kingdom of Thailand, and the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam, gathered on 10 January 2018 in Phnom Penh, the Kingdom of Cambodia to hold the 2nd Mekong-Lancang Cooperation (MLC) Leaders' Meeting under the theme of “Our River of Peace and Sustainable Development” and to chart the future course of the MLC into the next decade.

1. Recognizing that geographically the six riparian countries share a common sub-region bound by the Mekong-Lancang River; further appreciating that politically within a short time span of some two years the six Mekong- Lancang countries has brought about the realization of an idea proposed in Nay Pyi Taw during the 17th China-ASEAN Summit and transformed it from an embryonic stage into a thriving full-fledged Mekong-Lancang Cooperation or Lancang-Mekong Cooperation.

2. Stressing the vision and importance of the MLC in contributing to the socio-economic development of sub-regional countries and enhancing the wellbeing of their people, narrowing the development gap among countries, supporting the ASEAN Community building as well as advancing South-South cooperation and enhancing the implementation of the UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.

3. Recalling our commitment as embodies in the “Sanya Declaration of the First LMC Leaders’ Meeting” to build a Community of Shared Future of Peace and Prosperity among Lancang-Mekong Countries as the foundation for sustainable development of the sub-region, and resolving to strengthen mutual trust and understanding to address economic, social, environmental challenges and non- traditional security threats faced by the sub-region in order to unleash and realize its enormous development potentials.

4. Welcoming the successful convening of the Second MLC Foreign Ministers' Meeting on 23 December 2016 in Siem Reap Province, Cambodia, and the Third

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LMC Foreign Ministers' Meeting on 15 December 2017 in Dali, Yunnan Province, China, where a number of strategic policy documents, such as the General Principles for the Establishment of the Joint Working Groups (JWGs) on LMC Key Priority Areas, the Joint Press Communiqués of the Second and the Third MLC Foreign Ministers' Meetings were endorsed , and the 5-Year Plan of Action on the LMC (2018-2022) were prepared.

5. Welcoming the concrete institutional achievements of the MLC such as the establishment and launching of the Water Resources Cooperation Center, the Lancang-Mekong Environmental Cooperation Center, the Global Center for Mekong Studies, and the operationalization of the LMC Special Fund.

6. Recognizing the full and complete establishment of the respective MLC National Secretariats/Coordination Units within the six MLC member countries, which constitutes the efficient backbone of the MLC implementation mechanism to effectively coordinate and deliver concrete outcomes on all cooperation areas.

7. Appreciating highly China’s establishment of an LMC Special Fund and launching the application process to support projects aimed at promoting friendly exchanges and cooperation for the benefit of the peoples of the six MLC member countries.

8. Noting with satisfaction that most of the 45 Early Harvest Projects identified at the First LMC Leaders’ Meeting and the 13 initiatives put forward by China at the Second MLC Foreign Ministers’ Meeting have been completed or made substantial progress, thus laying a solid foundation for subsequent rounds of MLC projects.

9. Endeavoring to pursue the MLC spirit of openness, inclusiveness and complementarity with the priority areas of ASEAN Community building and ASEAN-China Cooperation, and in synergy with existing sub-regional cooperation mechanisms.

10. Recognizing the ever changing forces of globalization and the evolving development trend and committing to maximize win-win cooperation by seeking the optimal combination of the MLC with other development strategies like the Master Plan on ASEAN Connectivity 2025 (MPAC), Initiative for ASEAN Integration (IAI) Work Plan III the United Nations 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the Belt and Road Initiative (B&R), all the while carefully dovetailing with the national strategies, development visions and general plans of the respective Mekong-Lancang countries.

11. Standing for the principles of consensus, equality, mutual consultation and coordination, voluntarism, common contribution and shared benefits, and respect for the United Nations Charter and International Laws.

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12. Emboldened by the rapid evolution of the MLC from its nurturing stage into its current growth period, further strengthen the cooperation in the five priority areas, and may explore new cooperation areas that can respond to the evolving and emerging development needs of the Mekong-Lancang countries as well as optimizing the cooperation model aiming gradually at collaborating on larger sub-regional projects so as to jointly build a MLC Economic Development Belt.

WE HEREBY DECLARE:

I. Political and Security Cooperation

Political and Security Cooperation is of crucial importance to the MLC Initiative. Multi-level cooperative mechanisms are effective channels for facilitating communication, strengthening policy coordination and enhancing political mutual trust. As such, we endeavor to support the following measures:

1.1 Promote high-level exchanges and dialogues among political parties, parliaments and government officials in line with the spirit of MLC. 1.2 Strengthen cooperation to safeguard sub-regional peace and stability, while upholding the principle of non-interference in other countries' internal affairs. 1.3 Deepen law enforcement dialogues and cooperation in combatting non- traditional security issues on mutual interest. 1.4 Enhance cooperation in the field of disaster prevention and mitigation, humanitarian assistance, addressing climate change’s impact, ensuring food, water and energy security, including data information exchange.

II. Economic and Sustainable Development Cooperation

The Mekong-Lancang sub-region is known for its strategic location, diverse strengths, rising economic potentials and a strong engine of global growth. In order to continue to act as a catalyst of growth, the MLC calls for enhancing hard and soft infrastructure connectivity and facilities, deepening industrial restructuring and urbanization, unimpeded trade, financial integration, Information and Communication Technology (ICT), science, technology and innovation, environment, energy, and a better cooperation between the government and the private sector. As such, we endeavor to support the following measures:

2.1 Enhance intra Mekong-Lancang countries connectivity and inter regional connectivity by , among others, formulating a MLC plan on connectivity, to spur more development, trade, investment, industry, science and technology,

64 Selected Documentation innovation, infrastructure, transportation facility, tourism and people-to-people linkages in complementarity with the MPAC.

2.2 Explore the possibility to establish an economic corridor in the region so as to promote comprehensive connectivity among Mekong-Lancang countries to accelerate their industrialization as well as to stimulate sub-regional production capacity cooperation taking into account the need to align with the economic and development strategies and the comparative strengths of the respective Mekong-Lancang countries.

2.3 Promote cross border economic cooperation in such areas as trade, investment, e-commerce, economic and technical cooperation, industrial park, cross-border economic cooperation zone and trade facilitation. China invites governments and enterprises from Mekong countries to participate in China International Import Expo and will provide necessary assistance in this regard. The Mekong countries appreciate China’s invitation.

2.4 Formulate a “Plan of Action on Production Capacity Cooperation among Mekong-Lancang countries” in accordance with the “Joint Statement on Production Capacity Cooperation among Mekong-Lancang Countries”, with strong emphasis on the promotion of quality infrastructure investment, social and environment impact assessment, job creation, capacity building, poverty reduction, and transfer of expertise and know-how, enhancing MLC members industrial transformation and their standing in the regional and global value chain as well as optimizing regional productivity distribution, taking into account the principles of mutual benefits and win-win results.

2.5 Strengthen cooperation on sustainable management and utilization of water resources through policy dialogue, sharing of data and information, technical cooperation and exchanges, carrying out joint research and analysis related to Mekong-Lancang water resources, promoting capacity building in water management, deepening Mekong-Lancang river flood and drought disaster emergency management and full usages of the Lancang-Mekong Water Resources Cooperation Forum and Lancang-Mekong Water Resources Cooperation Center as supporting platforms.

2.6 Engage the private sector, especially SMEs and young entrepreneurs, in potential investment and business opportunities in various Mekong-Lancang countries, as well as stimulate better interaction and stronger linkages among Mekong-Lancang business people by way of the formation of a Mekong-Lancang business council and the frequent holding of trade and investment promotion activities such as organizing international trade and investment fairs, roadshows, exhibitions, and business-matching sessions.

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2.7 Encourage further cooperation in finance and continue studying and exchanging experiences on local currencies usage in sub-regional trade and investment in order to promote the healthy growth of the sub-regional economy as well as explore new ways to cooperate in investment financing to support quality infrastructure build-up in the Mekong-Lancang countries, while leveraging with existing financial mechanisms offered by international financial institutions such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, the Asian Development Bank and the World Bank Group and other sources such as the Silk Road Fund.

2.8 Emphasize to accelerate joint research and development projects so as to assure economic growth, to find solutions and provide necessary supports in reducing the environmental risks for economic cooperation and to set the plans for emergence of realistic and fruitful technical transfer in technical cooperation among MLC countries.

2.9 Promote regional green and sustainable development by formulating Lancang-Mekong Environmental Cooperation Strategy and implementing Green Lancang-Mekong Plan, to strengthen policy dialogue and exchange, enhance pragmatic cooperation on environmental industry and technology, and conduct capacity building activities.

2.10 Establish Lancang-Mekong Agricultural Cooperation Center in China, as a platform for MLC member countries to enhance the cooperation in agricultural technology exchanges, capacity building, joint research, investment and trade, promoting the common agricultural development in the region along the Lancang-Mekong River.

III. Social, Cultural and People-to-People Exchanges

The Mekong-Lancang region boasts a wealth of traditions, cultures and local values, the diversity of which presents complementary potentials and strengths that can be harnessed for the collective benefit of the Mekong-Lancang countries. As such, we endeavor to support the following measures:

3.1 Promote greater engagement and cooperation in people-to-people connectivity initiatives, including those relating to human resource development, educational and life-long learning exchanges.

3.2 Support academia and other relevant stakeholders to have a concrete role and contribution in bridging the gap in human resources development and building a future generation of competitive workforce in the Mekong-Lancang region that responds to the needs of the marketplace, in particular in key capacities like language skills, digital, financial literacy, technical, vocational and other soft skills.

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3.3 Intensify cultural exchanges among our six countries through the support of exchanges involving cultural organizations, artists and cultural tourists, as well as explore the possibility of building a Lancang-Mekong cultural exchange platform.

3.4 Strengthen tourism cooperation through establishing a Mekong-Lancang Tourist Cities Cooperation Alliance.

3.5 Explore an intellectual cooperation exchange model that incorporates government, business, academia and think tanks, media, women and youth to provide innovative ideas to support to the long-term development of the MLC.

IV. Cooperation Supports

4.1 Continue to explore ways to optimize the existing multi-layer framework comprising of Leaders’ Meeting, Foreign Ministers’ Meeting (FMM), Senior Officials’ Meeting (SOM) and Diplomatic and Sectoral Joint Working Group Meeting in order to fine-tune and improve policy planning and cooperation coordination as well as shaping the long-term strategic planning of the MLC development.

4.2 Strengthen communication and coordination among the MLC National Secretariats/Coordination Units of the six MLC member countries as well as reinforcing the capacity of their staff so as to ensure the effective implementation of the MLC Projects with a view of exploring the possibility to set up the MLC International Secretariat.

4.3 Endorse the 5-Year Plan of Action on the LMC (2018-2022) which will serve as a guiding document and chart the course for MLC development into a new era, and support the formulation of 5-Year Plan of Action in each priority area by joint working groups to better facilitate related cooperation.

4.4 Welcome the finalization of the Joint Ministerial Statement among Mekong-Lancang Countries on Strengthening Cross Border Economic Cooperation.

4.5 Fully utilize the LMC Special Fund and mobilize other financial resources from the governments, business sector as well as international financial institutions to support priority projects and initiatives that are aligned with the Leaders’ vision and the Foreign Ministers’ directions.

4.6 Build through consensus a brand of MLC as one identity for ease of mass outreach and other public awareness activities and commemorate the annual

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MLC Week in the week of March 23, when the First LMC Leaders’ Meeting was held in 2016 in China.

February

(C) Greater Mekong Subregion Core Environment Program Strategic Framework and Action Plan 2018-2022 For details see, http://www.gms-eoc.org/uploads/resources/1220/ attachment/CEP-Strategic-Framework-2018-2022-web%20version.pdf Released on February 22, 2018

March

(D) Report on the Work of the Government Delivered at the First Session of the 13th National People’s Congress of the People’s Republic of China on March 5, 2018 For details see, http://en.people.cn/n3/2018/0403/c90000-9445262.html Released on April 3, 2018

(E) Joint Summit Declaration: 6th GMS Summit of Leaders Source: https://greatermekong.org/joint-summit-declaration-6th-gms- summit-leaders Released on March 31, 2018

THE SIXTH GREATER MEKONG SUBREGION SUMMIT Ha Noi, Viet Nam 31 March 2018 Joint Summit Declaration Leveraging 25 Years of Cooperation for a Sustainable, Integrated and Prosperous GMS

WE, the Heads of the Governments and delegations of the Kingdom of Cambodia, the People’s Republic of China, the Lao People’s Democratic Republic, the Republic of the Union of Myanmar, the Kingdom of Thailand, and the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam, on the occasion of the Sixth GMS Summit:

Acknowledging the successful results of the GMS Economic Cooperation Program as we celebrate its 25th Anniversary and embracing a new era of development in the subregion;

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Appreciating that success has been achieved with strong ownership and commitment of GMS countries, featuring principles of consensus, mutual respect, equality, mutual consultation and coordination, common contributions and shared benefits, and win-win cooperation;

Recognizing new opportunities and emerging challenges presented by globalization and the importance of relevant development initiatives, such as the United Nations 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, the ASEAN Community, and the Belt and Road Initiative, which generate complementarity and synergy with the GMS Program and provide new platforms for global, regional and subregional cooperation;

Noting that tasks remain to narrow development gaps within and among GMS countries, and to ensure everyone benefits from increased interconnectedness and interdependence;

Recognizing that to effectively support member countries, seize new development opportunities and meet emerging challenges, the Strategic Framework guiding the GMS Program needs periodic refinement;

Appreciating the proactive work of our Ministers, senior officials, and other stakeholders in reviewing experience under the current Framework, and formulating an action plan and investment priorities for the next five years;

NOW THEREFORE REAFFIRM OUR COMMITMENT to the advancement of GMS Economic Cooperation Program and continuing support for the principles underlying the GMS Framework AND ENCOURAGE all stakeholders to begin considering the way forward to address the gap between the success of the past 25 years and full realization of a sustainable, integrated and prosperous subregion.

I. 25 Years of GMS Transformation and Program Achievements

1. As we celebrate the landmark occasion of the GMS at 25 years, it is appropriate to reflect on the subregion’s transformation that has yielded unprecedented favorable outcomes.

2. From having several least developed economies at the beginning, the GMS now has some of Asia’s and the world’s most vibrant middle income economies. Over a quarter century the subregion’s annual economic growth has averaged 6.3 % and per capita growth has been 5%. Intra-subregional trade has increased 90-fold. Our people have a better quality of life and the subregion is heading toward high-quality development.

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3. The policies, project investments and knowledge exchanges under the GMS Program have contributed in practical ways to this transformation. Indicative of the Program’s relevance is the USD 21 billion that has been mobilized to finance these GMS initiatives.

4. Connectivity, competitiveness and community are the core building blocks of the Program. We appreciate the report on recent outcomes, which confirms the appropriateness of focusing on three Cs for delivering our pragmatic, action-oriented and results-focused Program.

5. Physical connectivity, emphasizing rehabilitation and construction of transport and energy infrastructure, has had many notable achievements, including new airports, 80 bridges, 10,000 kilometers of roads, 500 kilometers of railways, 3,000 kilometers of power transmission lines and distribution lines, and installation of 1,570 MW of generation capacity. Since our last meeting in 2014, we note that connectivity has proceeded at a brisk pace with broad scope, including completion of the GMS Transport Sector Strategy 2030.

6. We strongly support the economic corridor approach, adopted in 1998, that transforms transport networks into transnational economic corridors, linking production, trade and infrastructure. Secondary and provincial roads extend the reach of the three flagship economic corridors, thereby contributing to inclusive development. The approach leverages limited resources by focusing on locational advantages that maximize employment and incomes along the corridors, and gives remote areas access to development opportunities.

7. We welcome the decision in 2016 to extend the corridor network as a response to the subregion’s dynamism. Over the past three years the Economic Corridors Forum continued to serve as advocate, facilitator and coordinator, augmented by the Governors’ Forum and Economic Corridors Week. We support these platforms for enhanced policy dialogue among local authorities and to help identify project-based cooperation in priority areas along corridors.

8. Connectivity software is an essential complement to physical infrastructure. Since the previous Summit in 2014, we are pleased that all members have ratified the GMS Cross Border Transport Facilitation Agreement (CBTA), and its Annexes and Protocols, and agreed on the MOU for “Early Harvest” implementation of CBTA, allowing subregional movement of commercial vehicles and containers to begin. We welcome establishment in 2015 of a full single stop inspection at the Lao Bao-Dansavanh border between Viet Nam and Lao PDR. We appreciate contributions from the Greater Mekong Railway Association and GMS Freight Transport Association for advancing cross-border flows and supporting development of the logistics service industry.

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9. We are similarly encouraged by developments in power exchange to facilitate expansion from the current bilateral cross-border connections to multi-country networks through refinements in trading principles and systems, which will contribute to establishing an integrated regional power market.

10. We note that GMS competitiveness has continuously improved through measures that facilitate seamless cross-border movement of people, goods and services and through integration of markets, production and value chains. This is reflected in the subregion’s growing trade with the rest of the world and increasing FDI inflows to the subregion.

11. At the sector level, the Core Agriculture Support Programs has strengthened regional cooperation, increased capacity in agri-food quality management, promoted adoption of gender-responsive and climate friendly agriculture. The agriculture competitiveness has also benefited from the Program to increase the subregion’s producers’ access to international agricultural value chains and promote environment-friendly agricultural practices. We note this will benefit smallholder farmers, rural women, and small and medium enterprises, thereby addressing poverty, reaching marginalized groups and increasing the reach of inclusive development. In tourism, successful campaigns to market GMS as a single destination have helped more than double tourist arrivals from 26 million in 2008 to 60 million in 2016.

12. Innovation, new technologies and digital transformation are critical new sources of growth. We commend the establishment of the GMS Cross-border e- Commerce Cooperation Platform in 2016 and its progress report, including its alliance with private businesses. This facilitates growth of e-commerce for higher efficiency, better connectivity and transformation of micro, small and medium enterprises.

13. To address challenges of increasing urbanization, the GMS Urban Development Strategic Framework 2015-2022 has been operationalized through urban development planning and management projects for several towns along the economic corridors, as well as through the development of special economic zones, including at border areas.

14. We are gratified that the Program has helped build a GMS community with a shared future through projects and programs addressing common social and environmental concerns. Human resource development projects have improved country capacities to respond to disease outbreaks and contain the spread of communicable diseases, supported mutual recognition of skills and qualifications to strengthen the GMS labor force, and facilitated safe cross- border labor migration. The flagship Phnom Penh Plan for Development Management strengthened the capacity of over 2,500 GMS government officials and competencies of our research institutions to support the subregion’s

71 Selected Documentation development agenda. We welcome the contribution made by GMS members through various training and capacity building programs. Environmental cooperation has achieved success under the GMS Core Environment Program and the Biodiversity Conservation Corridors Initiative, in response to critical risks of environmental degradation and climate change and towards green and sustainable development.

15. The Program’s success relies on strong, deep and broad partnerships, primarily at government-to-government level, and also benefits from partnerships among other stakeholders including private sector, local administrations and communities, academia and media. We acknowledge financial and knowledge support from bilateral and multilateral development partners, including ADB which also supports the Program as Secretariat. The private sector is increasingly important in a partnership that began formally with the GMS Business Forum (now Council) in 2000, and expanded with the Mekong Business Initiative, the Freight Transport Association, forums for agriculture and tourism, the e-Commerce Platform and the recent Finance Sector and Trade Finance Conference. We appreciate that thousands of individual farmers and businesses are partners in, and empowered by, the GMS Program.

II. The Way Forward

16. The Program has been delivered under two strategic frameworks, most recently for 2012-2022. A mid-term review of the current framework in 2017 confirmed the continuing relevance of its core principles, but recognized the need for fine tuning to better respond to the needs of member countries in a changing development landscape. Thus, the Ha Noi Action Plan (HAP) 2018– 2022 was developed to provide necessary adjustment and sharpen the focus to ensure maximum effectiveness of the GMS Economic Cooperation Program’s. To support the HAP, Regional Investment Framework 2022 was formulated, identifying a pipeline of 227 projects with an indicative cost of USD 66 billion.

17. We commend our Ministers, development partners and other stakeholders for preparing these documents. We hereby adopt and give full support to the HAP and RIF, which will guide the GMS Program in the medium term. The RIF is a “living pipeline” of projects that will be reviewed and updated regularly to adapt to changing conditions and priorities.

18. We commend the dedicated work of officials, the private sector and other stakeholders for preparing sector studies, strategies and action plans that have been presented to us. They provide essential guidance for the GMS Program development. We especially note recently completed strategies for tourism (2016-2025), safe and enviro-friendly agro-based value chains (2018-2022), environment (2018-2022) and transport (2018-2030). We are committed to

72 Selected Documentation further fostering cooperation in health, urban development, hardware and software connectivity and economic corridors, and doubling related capacity building efforts.

19. While the HAP and RIF will support the Program in the medium term, longer term regional and global developments will alter the landscape, creating new opportunities and challenges and requiring new policies. GMS development will face increasingly rapid change and emerging trends such as increasing impacts of climate change and environmental degradation; an aging demographic profile; cross-border migration creating issues of social protection, especially for unskilled labor; disruptive technologies of the fourth industrial revolution that are radically transforming social and economic systems; socio-economic pressures created by increasing urbanization and establishment of border economic processing zones; and development gaps within and among members countries.

20. A regional approach, on the basis of consultation, joint efforts and shared benefits, is appropriate for addressing these developments. We therefore task our Ministers and senior officials, and encourage other stakeholders, to begin considering the nature of our journey and future directions beyond the 2022 horizon of the current strategic framework and how the framework can be strengthened and reconfigured to remain flexible, responsive and relevant.

21. We reaffirm our commitment to sustainable development of the GMS through full implementation of the UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, in pursuing innovative, coordinated, green, inclusive and open development for everyone, and achieving a balance over its three dimensions of economic, social and environmental development. We also stress the importance of full implementation of the Paris Agreement on Climate Change at regional and national levels. As our countries are linked by land and river, we are committed to strengthening our cooperation in sustainable use and integrated management of natural resources, including land, water resources and forest, through transboundary cooperation and collective efforts, in achieving the subregion’s food, water and energy security.

22. We recognize that globalization brings significant benefits to our countries and the subregion. We are committed to harnessing its positive effects, strengthening it, making it more open, inclusive balanced and sustainable, and ensuring that benefits are enjoyed by all. We are determined to devote more attention to vulnerable groups and to work hard on targeted poverty alleviation so that no one is left behind. Relatedly, we are committed to building open economies for our individual countries and for the subregion by deepening economic integration, boosting trade and investment liberalization and facilitation, and supporting multilateral trading systems and opposing all forms

73 Selected Documentation of protectionism. We encourage greater cooperation among member countries in undertaking trade promotion activities, accelerating the development of economic corridors and cross-border trade infrastructure, and improving trade management capacity. We encourage implementation of China-ASEAN Free Trade Area and early conclusion of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP).

23. We are aware that strengthened connectivity generates new sources of growth and fosters a competitive edge. We commit to take concrete actions to improve infrastructure, policy, trade, financial and people-to-people connectivity among the GMS countries. At the same time, we recognize the significant challenges in generating the required financing, narrowing the financing gap of infrastructure investment, fostering a long-term, diversified and sustainable financing system, enhancing financial infrastructure connectivity and encouraging development financial institutions to play active roles. We are encouraged by the interest expressed in investing in GMS projects by existing partners, including ADB, and new development financing institutions and funds, such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and the ASEAN Infrastructure Fund. We note the intention to expand public private partnerships and other financing modalities in the subregion.

24. A sustainable GMS will be regionally integrated and globally connected. We recognize the crucial development role of regional cooperation and integration and support the principles of open regionalism. Thus, we will seek to tap synergies and complementarities between the GMS program and other global and regional initiatives, including the ASEAN Community, the Belt and Road Initiative, the Mekong-Lancang Cooperation mechanism, the Cambodia-Lao PDR-Myanmar-Viet Nam Cooperation, and the Ayeyawady-Chao Phraya-Mekong Economic Cooperation Strategy and other regional cooperation frameworks. These provide additional impetus for our own efforts for GMS development to build a sustainable, integrated and prosperous sub-region, and the GMS Program will work cooperatively with them. We support the concrete steps being taken towards the full realization of the ASEAN Community and the outcomes of the Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation that enhance regional connectivity.

III. Conclusion

25. Over the past 25 years our joint undertakings and the tangible results have nurtured the strong sense of community with a shared future for GMS countries. The coherent approach of the GMS Strategic Framework and Program has yielded a rich tapestry of transformation.

26. We believe our approach to the way forward is realistic. We are optimistic about our subregion’s future and its capacity to adapt and meet challenges. We

74 Selected Documentation see a brighter future featuring high-quality and sustainable development, enhanced policy coordination, deeper economic integration, greater regional connectivity, closer trade links and financial cooperation, consolidated people to people bonds, and closer links with the rest of the world. We will take concrete actions to achieve this vision and full realization of the GMS 3 Cs.

27. To further underwrite our shared future within the GMS we commit to strengthening our partnerships, based on mutual respect, trust, inclusiveness, and win-win cooperation. The GMS Program will continue to be an essential platform for enhanced connectivity, competitiveness and community and advancement toward a sustainable, integrated and prosperous GMS.

We agree to meet again at the Seventh GMS Summit to be held in Cambodia in 2021.

Endorsed in Ha Noi, Viet Nam on 31 March 2018.

(F) The Hanoi Action Plan 2018-2022 For details see, http://www.greatermekong.org/sites/default/files/SERD%20The%20Ha%20 Noi%20Action%20Plan%20%202018-2022_WEB%20-%2015March2018.pdf Released on March 31, 2018

(G) Greater Mekong Subregion Regional Investment Framework 2022 For details see, (1) Overview of the Regional Investment Framework 2022 http://www.greatermekong.org/sites/default/files/Overview%20of%20Regio nal%20Investment%20Framework%202022.pdf (2) Annex to the Regional Investment Framework 2022: Project Pipeline http://www.greatermekong.org/sites/default/files/Annex%20to%20Regional %20Investment%20Framework%202022.pdf Released on March 31, 2018

April

(H) Siem Reap Declaration Source: http://www.mrcmekong.org/assets/Uploads/Siem-Reap-Declaration- 5-April-2019.pdf Released on April 5, 2018

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Siem Reap Declaration Enhancing Joint Efforts and Partnerships towards Achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals in the Mekong River Basin

5th April 2018

Preamble

We, the Heads of Government of the Kingdom of Cambodia, the Lao People’s Democratic Republic, the Kingdom of Thailand, and the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam, meeting in Siem Reap, Cambodia, for the 3rd Summit of the Mekong River Commission (MRC),

1. Considering the vital importance of sustainable development and management of water and related resources of the Mekong River Basin, and reaffirming the highest political commitment to the more effective implementation of the Agreement on Cooperation for the Sustainable Development of the Mekong River Basin signed on 5 April 1995 (Mekong Agreement);

2. Confirming the MRC's importance as a primary regional cooperation framework and its unique role as regional knowledge hub in enhancing the implementation of a set of Basin-wide strategies, procedures, guidelines, and data and information that fosters peaceful and mutually beneficial cooperation towards the optimal and sustainable development of the Mekong River Basin;

3. Acknowledging that climate change, natural disasters, over-population, unsustainable industrialisation, intensive agriculture, irrigation, hydropower, and other development activities in the basin all constitute major challenges to the Mekong River Basin;

4. Noting that while Mekong River Basin development has been essential for economic growth of riparian countries, it has also yielded adverse environmental and socio-economic impacts including transboundary impacts that need to be jointly addressed;

5. Reiterating the importance of integrated water resources management (IWRM), the need for water-food-energy nexus and gender-sensitive perspective as well as the mainstreaming of climate change and alignment of regional and national efforts in development planning and implementation, the protection against extreme floods and droughts and the preservation of key environmental assets and livelihood of vulnerable communities;

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6. Recognising the importance of enhanced joint efforts and partnerships to address Mekong challenges and opportunities to contribute to achieving the relevant Sustainable Development Goals committed by the MRC Member Countries, especially Goal 6 - “Ensure availability and sustainable management of water and sanitation for all”;

Hereby agree to the following:

Achievements since the 2nd Summit in 2014

7. The preparation and approval of the IWRM-based Basin Development Strategy (BDS) 2016-2020, the Strategic Plan 2016-2020 to implement the BDS by the MRC, and the National Indicative Plans 2016-2020, including the agreement to cooperate on five Joint Projects to implement the BDS by the Member Countries are notable successes.

8. The MRC’s institutional reform, and the approval and implementation of a new MRC Secretariat structure forms a sound platform for continued cooperation. The appointment of a riparian Chief Executive Officer and the consolidation of the Secretariat Headquarters into one location in Vientiane, continued operation of the Regional Flood Management and Mitigation Centre in Phnom Penh, and the operationalisation of the new basket funding mechanism are noteworthy. The efforts and perseverance of the MRC Secretariat and the National Mekong Committees to successfully undertaking this comprehensive reform is worthy of praise.

9. The completion of the Council Study and its findings, knowledge base and tools produced are of value for the Member Countries, the MRC and relevant stakeholders.

10. The continued implementation of the 5 MRC Procedural Rules for Water Utilisation for Data and Information Exchange and Sharing, Water Use Monitoring, Notification, Prior Consultation and Agreement, Maintenance of Flows on the Mainstream, and Water Quality, has uniquely contributed to the sound and cooperative management of the Mekong River Basin. The learned experiences of the Prior Consultation processes for three proposed mainstream hydropower projects are vital for the management of the Mekong river basin, and the agreed Joint Committee’s Statement on the Pak Beng hydropower project has shown strong commitment of the member countries. The approval of Technical Guidelines for the Procedures for Water Quality and the updated knowledge in preparing the Technical Guidelines for the Procedures for Maintenance of Flows on the Mainstream meant that all technical guidelines following implementation experience will contribute to a

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more coordinated and effective implementation of the Mekong Agreement.

11. The approval of the Mekong Climate Change Adaptation Strategy and Action Plan and the Basin-wide Fisheries Management and Development Strategy are commendable. The substantial progress in finalising the Guidelines for Transboundary Environmental Impacts Assessment, the development of the Joint Environmental Monitoring activity for mainstream dams and Regional Drought Management and Mitigation Strategy, and the updating of the Preliminary Design Guidance for Mainstream Dams and Sustainable Hydropower Development Strategy are acknowledged.

12. The recent approval by the Member Countries on the financial contribution formula towards equal sharing by 2030 demonstrates the high commitment by the four governments to the MRC and its future financial sustainability.

13. The cooperation with the Dialogue Partners, China and Myanmar, continues to be strengthened with data and information sharing, joint technical symposiums and exchange of visits, joint observation, and research being conducted on key issues, and the emergency water supplement to the Mekong River during dry season 2016 is highly appreciated.

14. The historical and continuing financial and technical support from Development Partners including but not limited to Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, European Union, Finland, France, Germany, Japan, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Republic of Korea, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States, Asian Development Bank, Association of Southeast Asian Nations, Food and Agriculture Organisation, United Nations Development Programme, United Nations Environment Programme, World Bank and Global Environment Facility, as well as other partners to the MRC is highly appreciated. Recent exchange visits between the MRC with the Mississippi River Commission, Murray Darling Basin Authority, Morocco and others are valuable in terms of world-wide collaboration.

15. Cooperation with ASEAN continues, including participation in each other’s meetings, implementation and development of joint activities.

16. The MRC’s communication, interaction and engagement with stakeholders have seen major improvement, resulting in a significant positive impact on the public’s understanding and perceptions of the organisation.

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17. The outcomes resulted from the International Conference held on 2-3 April 2018 prior to the 3rd Summit are acknowledged with appreciation. We express our thanks to all stakeholders for their input and contribution.

Regional opportunities and challenges

Through its studies and assessment work during the last four years, the MRC has obtained better understanding and a clearer focus of the crucial development and management opportunities and challenges that the Mekong River Basin has faced:

18. The Mekong River Basin offers development opportunities and cooperation for mainstream and tributary water resources development, fisheries, navigation, flood and drought management, tourism and environment including ecosystem management.

19. At the same time, there remain significant challenges such as rapid economic and population growth, increased demand for water, food and energy, urbanization, industrialization, the loss of environmental assets, wetlands and natural fisheries, deforestation, floods and droughts and risks to biodiversity and people’s livelihoods and assets. All these are compounded by the effects of climate change, as well as past and ongoing developments in all water and related sectors. The increasing development in the mainstream and tributaries highlight the increasing need for the sustainability and coordinated operational management of tributary and mainstream water resources development projects.

Priority areas of action

Building on 23 years of achievements and experience, and considering opportunities and challenges, we expect the MRC to foster joint efforts and partnerships, focusing on:

20. Optimising the development opportunities and addressing challenges through a basin-wide, integrated and inclusive multi-disciplinary process, notably the implementation of the BDS within the broader context of regional integration, cooperation and socio-economic development.

21. Considering the key findings from the Council Study, including at both policy and technical levels in order to capture development opportunities and address trade-offs, benefit sharing, risks as a reference for planning and implementation of national plans and

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projects, and in relevant MRC work.

22. Continuing the recent momentum in implementing all the MRC Procedures for Water Utilisation to support the sustainable, reasonable and equitable use of the Mekong water and related resources.

23. Strengthening the MRC basin-wide monitoring networks and forecasting systems for floods and droughts, and the data and information management systems underpinning them.

24. Implementing the MRC Basin Development Strategy, Strategic Plan and the National Indicative Plans with greater efforts focusing on joint projects. Further effort on the implementation of the Decentralization Roadmap including the strengthening of decentralised monitoring activities with secured budget.

25. Continuing to improve the dissemination, uptake and use of the MRC products by relevant line agencies and organizations.

26. Identifying and implementing opportunities for further cooperation with Dialogue Partners, Development Partners, and other partners. Concrete cooperation should be further pursued with ASEAN, Mekong- Lancang Cooperation, and Greater Mekong Sub-region towards a shared future. Regular engagement with relevant stakeholders in the work of the MRC should be continued.

Ways ahead

27. We reaffirm our solidarity and the Mekong Spirit, and our highest political commitment and support to the effective implementation of the Mekong Agreement, we encourage the strengthening of the implementation of the MRC including the roles of the Council, Joint Committee, the MRC Secretariat, the National Mekong Committees and relevant national agencies in the work of the MRC in order for it to become a world class inter-governmental organisation as stated in its vision. Reiterating our support to the MRC’s institutional reform in line with the decisions of the 1st and 2nd Summits, and the recently agreed new contribution formula, we task the MRC to explore opportunities for securing other means of financing through private-public partnerships or other sources including from Development Partners.

28. We task the MRC to ensure and monitor the implementation of this Declaration.

29. We express our sincere gratitude to the Government of the Kingdom of

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Cambodia for hosting the 3rd MRC Summit, and we look forward to the 4th Summit to be held in April 2022 in the Lao People’s Democratic Republic.

Adopted in Siem Reap, Kingdom of Cambodia, on 5th April 2018 in the English language.

(I) Xi Jinping’s Keynote Speech at the Boao Forum for Asia Annual Conference 2018 For details see, https://www.uscnpm.org/blog/2018/04/11/transcript-president-xiaddresses -2018-boao-forum-asia-hainan/ Released on April 11, 2018

June

(J) Bangkok Declaration of the 8th Ayeyawady – Chao Phraya – Mekong Economic Cooperation Strategy Summit Source: https://www.acmecs2018.org/ Released on June 16, 2018

BANGKOK DECLARATION OF THE 8th AYEYAWADY – CHAO PHRAYA – MEKONG ECONOMIC COOPERATION STRATEGY SUMMIT

16 June 2018, Bangkok

“Towards an Integrated and Connected Mekong Community”

1. We, the Heads of State/Government of the Kingdom of Cambodia, the Lao People’s Democratic Republic, the Republic of the Union of Myanmar, the Kingdom of Thailand and the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam, gather on 16 June 2018 in Bangkok, Thailand, for the 8th Ayeyawady – Chao Phraya – Mekong Economic Cooperation Strategy (hereinafter referred to as ACMECS) Summit. The Secretary General of the Association of the Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is also present at the Summit.

2. We note with satisfaction that since the establishment of ACMECS in 2003, ACMECS has made important progress toward promoting socio-economic development in the Mekong Sub-region including the progress made in the implementation of the ACMECS Plan of Action 2016-2018. This demonstrates the shared commitment and spirit of long lasting cooperation among our five

81 Selected Documentation countries to strengthen the relations to promote peace, stability, sustainable and inclusive development in our sub-region based on good neighborliness, friendship, mutual interest and understanding.

3. We share the view that ACMECS remains a sub-region with immense potential acting as a catalyst of Asia that propels regional and global economic growth, given the sub-region’s high annual growth rate, vast market, capable and productive human resources, and strategic location linking economies and markets of the Indian and the Pacific Oceans as well as other economies to mainland Asia.

4. We recognize that the sub-region is witnessing major international geopolitical and economic shift that provides great opportunities for ACMECS to integrate into the global economic value chain. Meanwhile, we are mindful that the sub-region is also facing new emerging challenges posed by slower-than- anticipated global economic recovery, growing trend of trade protectionism and anti-globalization, as well as non-traditional issues such as environmental risks, climate change and natural disasters.

5. We recall that at the 7th ACMECS Summit in Hanoi in 2016, ACMECS Leaders recognized the need to carry forward ACMECS reforms and improve its coordination with other relevant sub-regional cooperation frameworks.

6. We express our appreciation to the Kingdom of Thailand for proposing the concept of the ACMECS Master Plan which aims at optimizing operational structure and utilizing ACMECS’ economic potentials to enhance its inclusion into the regional and global supply and value chain. Specific goals, strategy and practical work plan outlined in this Master Plan reflect the current global and regional situation, priorities and needs of the ACMECS countries as well as to address the challenges facing the sub-region and the world today. The Master Plan, which focuses on multidimensional connectivity and highlights a people- centered approach, aims to complement the Master Plan on ASEAN Connectivity 2025, narrow development gap, contributes to the process of ASEAN community building and the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) as well as the 2015 Paris Agreement on Climate Change. The implementation of the ACMECS Master Plan takes into account the Hanoi Action Plan (2018-2022) of the Sixth GMS Summit and related documents.

7. We welcome the outcome of the three meetings of the Working Group on Drafting the ACMECS Master Plan hosted by the Kingdom of Thailand, which has led to the successful, forward looking ACMECS Master Plan for the next five years (2019-2023) under the vision of “Building ACMECS CONNECT by 2023.”

8. We commend Thailand’s initiative in proposing the establishment of an ACMECS Fund as innovative financing mechanism to address the need for

82 Selected Documentation funding of projects under the ACMECS Master Plan. We agree to task our senior financial officers to discuss the Terms of Reference (TOR) as well as the detailed operation of the ACMECS Fund in Thailand in 2018 and explore possible ways and means to establish this fund preferably by the next Summit, the contribution of which shall be on a voluntary basis.

9. We strongly encourage the active engagement of ACMECS member countries, potential development partners, regional and international organisations, as well as international financial institutions in the setting up of the ACMECS Fund.

10. We adopt the ACMECS Master Plan in which ACMECS cooperation will be carried out through the three goals/pillars operating under each Pillar’s Coordinating Committee, namely (1) Seamless ACMECS to promote seamless connectivity from multi-modal transports links (roads, rails, bridges, ports, air, inland waterway, and maritime connectivity) including but not limited to infrastructures designed for sub- regional digital connectivity and energy infrastructure interconnection. Special emphasis will be on filling all the missing links in the sub-region, and the auxiliary connection lines linking industrial parks and seaports to main corridor routes; complete the missing railway links to enhance operations of sub- regional railway network, particularly the East-West Economic Corridor (EWEC) and Southern Economic Corridor (SEC). (2) Synchronized ACMECS to promote software connectivity namely i) Trade, Investment and Industrial Cooperation emphasizing on ACMECS policy cooperation in the harmonization and simplification of rules and regulations to facilitate movement of people, free flow of goods, services, and investment and with a view to leveraging integrated value and supply chain of ACMECS and ii) financial cooperation including the establishment of the ACMECS Fund and the ACMECS Infrastructure Fund and Trust, promoting financial literacy, capital market cooperation as well as financial connectivity such as payment and settlement, use of local currency, Fintech and cooperation between banks and other financial service providers. (3) Smart and Sustainable ACMECS to promote the development of human capital in strategic areas including entrepreneurship (MSMEs/Startups), agriculture, tourism, medical services and education, while continue to promote environmental cooperation including sustainable water resource management and other strategic fields including agriculture, industry, tourism, health, renewable energy, climate change, disaster-risk management, and natural resources conservation.

11. We recognize that the Action Plan as annexed to the ACMEC Master Plan is a living document whereby ACMECS member countries are encouraged to make improvements, prioritize and submit their plan/project as appropriate.

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12. We task the Ministers and Senior Officials to further strengthen the coordination among member countries in accelerating the implementation of the ACMECS Master Plan through innovative sources of financing including the establishment of the ACMECS Infrastructure Fund and Trust, in line with the needs and readiness of the member states.

13. We encourage development partners and external parties to participate in the implementation of ACMECS projects, and closer coordination between ACMECS and development partners through existing sub-regional frameworks to improve resource mobilization and avoid overlapping activities. Partnership in ACMECS projects should be a win-win alliance, reflecting the real needs and priorities of member countries and a true sense of ownership for our peoples, while leaving no one behind.

14. We agree to retain the existing areas of cooperation established under ACMECS with each ACMECS member country acting as Prime Movers and Co- Prime Movers in the respective areas of interest. Coordinating Committees, chaired by the host country, are to hold their meetings at least once a year back- to-back with Senior Official Meeting (SOM), or as appropriate to review the progress and challenges of the implementation of the ACMECS Master Plan.

15. We welcome the success of the first ACMECS CEO Forum under the theme ‘Connecting our Future: Enhancing ACMECS Cooperation and Integration’, which was organized by Thailand. We encourage authorities concerned in the ACMECS countries to follow the policy recommendations and initiatives proposed at the Forum to further enhance connectivity, trade and investment and financial cooperation, as well as promote closer cooperation with external partners to materialize connectivity projects outlined in the ACMECS Master Plan.

16. We emphasize the need of enhancing the role of the business sector and public-private partnership in the implementation of the projects under the ACMECS Master Plan. We therefore welcome the ACMECS Joint Business Council’s recommendation on the role of the ACMECS governments to promote digital infrastructure, trade, investment and travel facilitation, as well as capacity building for the business sector, especially SMEs, to increase competitiveness and further integrate into regional value chains.

17. We are looking forward to the active participation and important contribution of the Leaders and business circles of ACMECS countries at the World Economic Forum (WEF) on ASEAN, which will be held from 11-13 September 2018 in Ha Noi, Viet Nam, to highlight the Mekong region as an ASEAN’s new dynamic economic engine and promote entrepreneurship in ACMECS countries for a more competitive and integrated Mekong region.

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18. We welcome the offer of the Kingdom of Cambodia to host the 9th ACMECS Summit. The specific date and venue will be coordinated through diplomatic channels.

19. We express our appreciation to the Government of the Kingdom of Thailand for the excellent arrangements of the ACMECS Summit and the warm hospitality accorded to all member delegations during the Summit.

Adopted in Bangkok, the Kingdom of Thailand, on 16 June 2018.

(K) ACMECS Master Plan (2019-2023) For detail see, https://www.acmecs2018.org/ Released on June 16, 2018

(L) The White Paper on China and the World Trade Organization For detail see, http://www.bjreview.com/Documents/201806/t20180628_800133903.html Released on June 28, 2018

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Part III

Selected Analysis

(January-June 2018)

(III) Selected Analysis (January-June 2018)

Foreign Affairs

(A) Fresh impetus for China-Cambodia ties

The year 2018 marks the 60th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and Cambodia. In celebration, Chinese Premier Li Keqiang attended the second Lancang-Mekong River Cooperation (LMC) leaders’ meeting in Phnom Penh and paid an official visit to Cambodia on Wednesday and Thursday.

During the past 60 years, joint efforts have been made by both countries to consolidate the traditional friendship and promote bilateral comprehensive strategic cooperation. Pragmatic cooperation is expanded and strengthened through cooperation mechanisms like the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road and the LMC. New impetus is injected into the development of China-Cambodia relations in the new era.

Diplomatic relations between China and Cambodia started in the mid-1950s. After the Korean War (1950-53), there was an obvious shift in Chinese policy. The government sought to achieve some diplomatic breakthroughs between Asian and African countries so as to enhance the international standing of the People’s Republic of China and open a new chapter for Chinese diplomacy.

On June 20, 1954, the first step of mutual understanding between the two countries was made during the Geneva Conference by former Chinese premier Zhou Enlai and the Cambodian delegation sent by the late Cambodian King Norodom Sihanouk.

Sihanouk was initially wary of the alleged threat posed by communism in China and Vietnam. He even turned to the US for military protection and signed a military defense agreement with the US government in May 1955.

But due to his personal interaction with Zhou during the Bandung Conference in 1955, he was impressed with the friendly attitude of Chinese leaders, which further changed his opinion of China and made him firmly convinced that China would never interfere in the internal affairs of Cambodia. Then in February 1956, Sihanouk paid his first official visit to China. The most critical period before China and Cambodia officially established diplomatic ties was 1956-58, during which the two countries made further progress in political security. When Cambodia was confronted with a diplomatic

89 Selected Analysis dilemma involving then South Vietnam and Thailand as well as problems of border security, the Chinese government repeatedly offered to help Cambodia stand up to the US and South Vietnam.

Before the official establishment of diplomatic ties, relations between China and Cambodia were heavily focused on economic cooperation. China has been providing Cambodia with financial aid since 1956, offering materials, supplies and merchandise for free, aiding in the construction of complete equipment projects. Cambodia was the first non-socialist nation to which China offered non- reimbursable assistance. The sincere attitude of the Chinese government and the substantial progress in China-Cambodia relations strengthened Sihanouk's determination to establish diplomatic ties with China in 1958.

In July 1996, the two countries signed the agreement on trade, investment promotion and protection. According to statistics, as of October 2017, China is the biggest source of foreign investment for Cambodia.

The historical visit of Chinese President Xi Jinping to Cambodia in October 2016 opened a new era for the two countries to develop their comprehensive strategic partnership. With the proposal and implementation of the Belt and Road initiative, great cooperation potential in the fields of global production capacity, trade and investment, infrastructure interconnectivity and energy resources has injected a fundamental impetus to an improvement in China- Cambodia relations. The cooperation mechanism of LMC has offered a brand new opportunity for the development of practical cooperation between the two countries.

The upgrading and elevation of China-Cambodia ties marks an expansion of traditional friendship between the two neighbors and good friends. It also marks a comprehensive development of their political, economic, security and people- to-people relations. The two countries are making joint efforts to strengthen integration of policy and development strategy, connect infrastructure and improve people-to-people contacts.

Featuring pragmatic, high-quality and high-level cooperation, China-Cambodia relations will supply the most remarkable evidence that the two countries are forging a community with a shared future.

Written By: Ge Hongliang Source: Global Times Published: 10 January 2018 The author is a research fellow with the Charhar Institute and the College of ASEAN Studies at Guangxi University for Nationalities.

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(B) Thailand’s place in the ‘Asian Century’

The Kingdom stands to benefit greatly from China’s bold ambitions, which pave the way to interconnection and vast markets

China’s Communist Party held its 19th National Congress in October, charting the development course of the world’s second-largest economy over the next five years. In his address to the assembly, President Xi Jinping said, “China will secure a decisive victory in building the moderately prosperous society in all respects and strive for the great success of socialism with Chinese characteristics for the new era.”

The message was clear and bold, but what does it mean for Thailand? First, China will remain the world’s main engine for economic growth, averaging around 6 per cent of GDP growth over the next several years. Thailand will be benefit from China’s long-term economic stability in terms of both trade and investment expansion. China will also open its vast domestic market of 1.3 billion consumers wider, a key asset for Thailand and other trading partners.

Second, China will continue to take the lead on the Belt and Road development programme, in which more than 50 countries in Asia, Europe and Africa, including Thailand, have been invited to participate. Besides the multiple infrastructure mega-projects spanning the borders of participating countries, China will shortly organise a Belt and Road exposition at which Thailand and other member countries are invited to sell their goods and services to Chinese consumers.

Regarding the Thai-Chinese high-speed railway, construction of the first section from Bangkok to Nakhon Ratchasima was recently kicked off at a ceremony chaired by Prime Minister Prayuth Chan-o-cha. This rail transport project will link Thailand with Laos and southern China, where four special economic zones will be set up to connect Thailand’s Northeast to the two neighbouring countries.

This will also lead to other development projects along the high-speed rail route terminating at Nong Khai, where the system will be connected with another high-speed train system crossing Laos, on which construction is already underway. Later, the southern region and the rest of China will be connected by rail with Laos and Thailand, which is situated at the centre of mainland Southeast Asia.

Given this geographical edge, Thailand can further boost its potential and take advantage of the so-called “Asian Century”, in which global economic growth has been mainly driven by economies in Asia, especially that of China. China’s 2016

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GDP was US$11.2 trillion, second only to that of the United States, the world’s largest economy at $18.5 trillion.

In addition, both China and Thailand are facing the challenges of middle-income countries, with China focusing on innovation as its key strategy to avoid the “middle-income economic trap” and to upgrade its international competitiveness.

In this context, the private sectors of both China and Thailand have joined forces to expand the digital economy as well as enhancing cross-border cooperation in e-commerce and e-payment, as evidenced by the presence of Alibaba and JD.com in Thailand.

Alibaba, the world’s largest e-commerce platform in terms of sales revenues, has explored business opportunities in e-commerce and logistics in Thailand, while JD.com has entered into a joint venture with the Central group for both online and offline retail businesses.

Written By: The Nation Source: first published on 12 January 2018 in The Nation

Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte allowed China to research with the University of the Philippines at the Benham Rise, an area off the Philippines’ Pacific coast, according to Reuters. The report was later confirmed by Chinese foreign ministry spokesman Lu Kang: China’s scientific research vessel Kexue will be conducting marine activities in waters under Philippine jurisdiction east off the Philippines from January to February.

Given the fact that Beijing and Manila have a long history of maritime squabbles over sovereignty of the South China Sea, Duterte granting permission to China’s scientific activities and accordingly offering facilitation reflects the president’s high-level trust in China, and meanwhile is an embodiment of the concept of “setting aside disputes and pursuing joint development” advanced by former Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping.

Mutual trust is of pivotal significance to future Beijing-Manila maritime cooperation. Duterte’s approval of China’s scientific research in disregard of domestic criticism and opposition set a good beginning for future joint exploration in the South China Sea and created favorable conditions for the steady and sustainable development of bilateral ties.

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Certain Philippine politicians, for instance, Magdalo Representative Gary Alejano, blasted Duterte's decision, arguing “allowing a Chinese national think tank to conduct so-called scientific research over Philippine waters… is careless and absurd.”

Indeed, the Benham Rise is under Philippine jurisdiction, but this should not be regarded as a restriction on Beijing-Manila scientific research in the region. The marine activities of the two countries at Benham Rise are purely for scientific purposes, with no intention to jeopardize the Philippines’ justified interests there. Their cooperation is mutually beneficial. It’s encouraging that Duterte thrust aside dissenting remarks by Alejano, and managed to keep Sino- Philippine relations on the right track.

The significance of scientific research in the South China Sea is much in evidence, considering its huge reserves of oil, gas, fisheries, heavy metals and other resources. Moreover, as a pathway for one-third of the world’s marine shipping traffic, the South China Sea carries tremendous strategic importance. Environmental protection of the waters is for the benefit of our offspring. It’s high time that China and the Philippines put aside disputes and joined hands to conduct scientific research in the region.

Earlier China gave Philippine fishermen access to Huangyan Island despite territorial disputes. With the pursuit of joint development, the two countries may see more cooperation in scientific research, fisheries and so forth. China is willing to work with the Philippines to advance practical cooperation. In the meantime, we hope Duterte can stand up to domestic pressure and focus on cooperation with China rather than strategic calculations.

Written By: Liu Lulu Source: Global Times Published: 18 January 2018 The author is a reporter with the Global Times

(D) Hanoi tactful in developing major power ties

Whether Vietnam will become a part of Washington’s Indo-Pacific strategy has triggered heated discussions worldwide. While observers unanimously take a negative view of it, they believe Hanoi’s hobnobbing with the so-called democratic Quad of Washington, Tokyo, New Delhi and Canberra suggests that the Vietnamese government wants to establish closer ties with these countries. American analysts point out that given Hanoi’s polity, it lacks common values to cooperate with the so-called Quad. Besides polity, many other factors also prevent Vietnam joining the alliance.

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High-level Vietnamese officials have recently become a center of attention for their public remarks on the South China Sea. Hanoi’s relations with Washington and other major powers have been thrust under the media spotlight especially after the aircraft carrier USS Carl Vinson made a historic call at Da Nang. But these just embody Vietnam’s pragmatic, intensive and multifaceted diplomacy.

Since the 12th National Congress of the Communist Party of Vietnam, the Vietnamese government has become more pragmatic in diplomacy and is more willing to send officials to other countries and make its international presence felt. In the process, Vietnam’s cooperative relations with China, the US, Japan, India and Russia have become increasingly comprehensive. Vietnam's expanded diplomatic activities are a result of the country’s Doi Moi (Renovation) policy and are driven by its need for economic and social development.

Vietnam’s Doi Moi policy started in the 1980s and gained impetus in the 1990s as the country got more involved in regional integration and globalization. Hanoi’s participation in the ASEAN in 1995, APEC in 1998 and WTO in 2007 can be regarded as milestones in its integration into the international community.

Since then, Vietnam has accelerated the pace of reform and opening-up. Its Doi Moi policy has seen extraordinary achievements as well, with outstanding progress made in the economy, industrialization and urbanization. In this context, the goal of Vietnam's foreign exchange is clear: to meet the demand of national development and promote reforms and opening-up, for instance, attracting foreign capital and advanced technology to build more factories in the country.

Vietnam’s diplomacy has also become more tactful. This is related to the Beijing- Hanoi row on the South China Sea. Though the Vietnamese government reiterated the need to rein in differences and emphasized the importance of Beijing-Hanoi talks, which apparently can alleviate tensions in the region, the country hasn't changed its intention to internationalize the South China Sea issue. It has become more anxious in expecting the US and Japan to intervene since 2010.

Vietnam also hopes to get support from the US, Japan, India and Russia in developing its navy and air force. Washington’s lifting of a ban on arms sales to Vietnam has created more favorable conditions for the latter to purchase weapons from diverse channels.

A tactful Vietnam will not become a part of Washington’s Indo-Pacific strategy irrespective of the cost it has to pay. There are also objective reasons to keep Vietnam from being a member of the Quad.

To begin with, the Beijing-Hanoi relationship carries much weight for Vietnam.

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Both are developing socialist countries. Their state-to-state and party-to-party relations are pragmatic and stable. The Beijing-Hanoi party-to-party relationship has led to an improvement in bilateral ties and promoted progress in trade, investment, infrastructure, cultural exchange and security cooperation. Vietnam’s relations with the US, Japan, Australia and India cannot be so substantive. For instance, while Sino-Vietnamese bilateral trade volume reached $100 billion in 2017, the figure with India was $7.63 billion.

Washington’s ambiguous Indo-Pacific strategy aims to counter China. Pragmatic dialogue and collaboration among the US, Japan, Australia and India are not often seen. It’s impossible for Hanoi to jeopardize its relations with Beijing for intangible benefits. In addition, there are conflicting values between Vietnam and the West.

All in all, what Hanoi is doing now is nothing more than trying to strike a balance among Washington, Tokyo, New Delhi and Canberra. The only change is that the country has become more tactful with its integration into the international community.

Written By: Ge Hongliang Source: Global Times Published: 25 March 2018 The author is a research fellow with the Charhar Institute and the College of ASEAN Studies at Guangxi University for Nationalities.

(E) China’s rapid development benefits ASEAN, gives new impetus to world

The recently concluded two sessions sent a strong signal that China will deepen reform and opening-up and contribute more to world development along with its own sound growth momentum. The global community will concentrate on how China influences the world in a new era.

An increasing number of countries have recognized the remarkable progress China has achieved and are willing to take a free ride on its high-speed development. China’s rapid rise is often saddled with baseless suspicions and controversies. The term “sharp power,” a new version of the China threat theory, has been conjured up to invoke concern about the growing influence of China. There is also a groundless allegation that the world should be vigilant toward China’s attempt to export its development model.

The 19th National Congress of Communist Party of China last year made clear that major country diplomacy with Chinese characteristics aims to foster a new type of international relations and build a community with a shared future for

95 Selected Analysis mankind. China’s commitments to building a community with a shared future for mankind and to adhering to the peaceful development path and the mutually beneficial strategy of opening-up have been codified into the Constitution, according to a constitutional amendment adopted by the national legislature during this year’s two sessions.

The world is beset by mounting challenges, such as sluggish economic growth, anti-globalization and trade protectionism. Surging unilateralism and a zero- sum mind-set have dealt a blow to mutual benefit and win-win cooperation. Countries are supposed to deal with the increasingly unstable factors through joint efforts, but the fact is that a Cold-War mentality has emerged and military alliances build more presence through wielding the stick of power politics and undermining international trade rules. Those who advocate the China threat theory are actually threatening the world.

China calls for cooperation, win-win results and friendship, and embarks on a new development path in a new era. Different from traditional powers, China strives for mutual respect, mutual benefit and win-win coordination. While delivering considerable benefits for the Chinese people, China's rapid growth in the new era will give a new impetus to world development.

As the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) develops close ties with China, the bloc is a focus of advancing China’s neighborhood diplomacy and the Belt and Road initiative. In an informal dialogue between leaders from the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation and the ASEAN in Da Nang, Vietnam in November, Chinese President Xi Jinping said that China will forge an upgraded strategic partnership between the two sides so as to build a closer China- ASEAN community of a shared future.

Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi remarked at a news conference on the sidelines of this year’s session of the National People’s Congress that the cooperation between China and ASEAN is the most successful and dynamic model in the Asia-Pacific, and China will continue to put the ties with ASEAN high on its agenda of international cooperation.

This year witnesses the 15th anniversary of the establishment of China-ASEAN strategic partnership. The two sides are working on the formulation of a vision for their strategic partnership toward 2030.

We hope the ASEAN states can seize the opportunity, ramp up strategic coordination and deepen cooperation in a bid to make China-ASEAN ties create more benefits for the two sides, boost the regional economy and serve as ballast for regional peace and stability.

Written By: Huang Xilian

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Source: Global Times Published: 29 March 2018 The author is the Chinese Ambassador to ASEAN.

(F) Neighborhood diplomacy works wonders

China’s neighborhood diplomacy has yielded positive results in recent years, including improvement in relations with several countries with whom China has had disputes. This is certainly a positive trend in China's foreign policy, which can be attributed to the country’s diplomacy in the new era, which is totally different from the US’ irresponsible behavior on the global stage.

China’s willingness to share the fruits of its remarkable economic development has been acknowledged worldwide. And President Xi Jinping attaches great importance to globalization, as it allows China and the rest of the economies to achieve mutual development and jointly shoulder the global responsibilities.

In contrast, thanks to US President Donald Trump’s “America first” policy, the United States has withdrawn from several multilateral agreements, such as the Paris climate accord and the Iran nuclear deal, inviting worldwide criticism. The Trump administration's unilateral moves not only violate the principles of global agreements and protocols, but also have harmed global trade, security and politics. But, in a way, the US' protectionist moves have also prompted some countries to seek equal benefits through cooperation.

On the other hand, China’s maritime diplomacy with countries such as Vietnam, the Philippines and Malaysia have proved successful since the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China. Also, negotiations with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea have helped China improve its relations with many of its neighbors. For example, China and Singapore have deepened cooperation and communication in culture, economy and high-tech, including artificial intelligence technology.

Also, Sino-Japanese relations, a thorny issue, have been warming up in recent weeks despite the challenges ahead. In fact, the year 2018, which marks the 40th anniversary of the China-Japan Treaty of Peace and Friendship, has been good for Sino-Japanese ties, though the two countries still have many disputes over territory and history.

Japanese Foreign Minister Taro Kono visited China in January and agreed to make joint efforts to overcome the challenges posed by a fast-changing world. And Premier Li Keqiang, during his official visit to Japan, inked a memorandum on May 9 to strengthen cooperation in service trade.

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Besides, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi's “informal” summit with President Xi in Wuhan, Central China's Hubei province, last month signaled the warming up of Sino-Indian relations after the border standoff at Donglang (Doklam) last year. If the world's two largest developing countries deepen cooperation, they can help further promote stability and development in South Asia.

And the two recent meetings between Xi and Democratic People’s Republic of Korea leader Kim Jong-un, which further strengthened the two countries' ties, complete China’s neighborhood diplomacy. The meetings, for which Kim traveled to China in April and May, showed China remains committed to contributing to the negotiations to resolve the Korean Peninsula nuclear issue.

For the past year, the peninsula had been facing the threat of war. Washington imposed stricter sanctions on Pyongyang for conducting nuclear and missile tests, with Pyongyang upgrading the tests in response. But since Pyongyang sincerely wanted to negotiate the peninsula issue with the Republic of Korea and the US, it helped accelerate the process of restoring peace on the peninsula.

The inter-Korean summit on April 27 issued the Panmunjom Declaration for Peace, Prosperity and Unification of the Korean Peninsula and thus laid a concrete foundation for the planned Kim-Trump meeting in Singapore on June 12.

The improvement in the peninsula situation also promoted China-ROK relations, creating opportunities for the development of Northeast Asia. Now the need for China is to continue working for peninsula peace, and making efforts to restore complete economic cooperation with the DPRK, which suffered because of the tensions on the peninsula.

China’s achievements in neighborhood diplomacy reflect that China has an extended ascent toward, what Carl von Clausewitz described as, the “culminating point of victory”, the moment in a battle that an attacking force, after having achieved success, has to halt its advance and consolidate its gains. Which will influence the development of China’s overall diplomacy in the long run.

Written By: Shi Yinhong Source: China Daily Published: 18 May 2018 The author is a professor at the School of International Studies, Renmin University of China.

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(G) Diplomacy with ‘correct conception’

At the two-day central conference on foreign affairs work in Beijing, which ended on Saturday, President Xi Jinping underscored the importance of keeping in mind both domestic and international imperatives in the nation's foreign affairs work. He said the country's diplomatic work should take national rejuvenation and promoting world peace and common development as the main tasks, strive to build a community with a shared future for mankind and firmly safeguard the country's sovereignty, security and development interests.

He especially emphasized the importance of the “correct conception” of China’s role, which means, to judge China’s role on the international stage and its ties with other countries, and therefore use China’s diplomacy to create an international environment conducive to realizing its goals.

To correctly judge China’s role will be very important for decision-making in China’s diplomacy. In his report to the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, Xi, who is general secretary of the Party, said: “We must recognize that the evolution of the principal contradiction facing Chinese society does not change our assessment of the present stage of socialism in China. The basic dimension of the Chinese context, that our country is still and will long remain in the primary stage of socialism, has not changed. China's international status as the world's largest developing country has not changed.”

Since the 2008 global financial crisis, China has been playing a bigger role on the global stage thanks to its rapid economic development and diplomatic initiatives. But China has also been witnessing more international challenges.

For a long time, “keeping a low profile and hiding its brightness” has been China’s diplomatic guideline. These two principles complement each other, requiring the country to keep a low profile while focusing on its development and not being arrogant about its achievements. This is a perfect example of dialectics, and it should play an important role in the “new type of major-country diplomacy with Chinese characteristics” that the country is advocating and striving to build.

Although great changes have taken place in the international arena, China is not yet strong enough to counter the existing major powers which continue to play important international roles. China's diplomacy needs strategic patience to proceed smoothly and avoid falling into the Thucydides’ trap with existing powers.

China is still a developing country at the primary stage of socialism, and faces many challenges in its peaceful development and phased comprehensive

99 Selected Analysis modernization process -- realizing the “Two Centenary Goals” of building a moderately prosperous country by 2020, by among other things eliminating abject poverty; building on the foundation of the moderately prosperous society to basically realize “socialist modernization” by 2035; and building a great, modern, socialist country by 2050.

More importantly, by correctly judging its role and remaining sober-minded, China will be able to avoid a downhill slide even after realizing the Chinese Dream of national rejuvenation.

In particular, considering the changing international situation over the past decade, China must carefully cope with diplomatic issues. Some Western economies have been blaming China for their poor economic performance. And with the rise of populism in some parts of the world, the theory of a “China threat” has been hyped once again, especially in the West.

The United States, in particular, has made China the target of its foreign strategy and taken measures that could trigger a full-fledged trade war. Given US President Donald Trump’s “America First” policy, and anti-globalization and protectionist moves, China must “hide its brightness” so as to not give other economies excuses to target China for its “aggressive” diplomacy and, ironically, economic achievements.

Since China has a long road to travel before realizing national rejuvenation, it would do better to maintain a low profile to a certain extent.

Although China is a large developing country, the US, which is the world's only superpower, pays close attention to its development, not least because China occupies second position in many fields, which in turn has prompted many observers to say the Thucydides’ trap will be difficult for Washington and Beijing to avoid.

The US has resorted to the zero-sum game of protectionism and unilateralism. But China should act rationally and promote global cooperation, and make efforts to resolve and control disputes to avoid vicious competition and an arms race.

Given the changing international situation, China has to balance the following five aspects: First, internal and external developments notwithstanding, China should keep focusing on domestic development, by deepening reform and opening-up, so it can be a stable and powerful engine for global development. It must also avoid taking rash development measures and, instead, take steady steps toward achieving both internal and external development.

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Second, on the external front, China should weigh its power and capability, and accordingly implement development projects while respecting international rules. For instance, China is capable of shouldering the responsibility of protecting globalization and promoting fair global governance as part of its “new type of major-country diplomacy with Chinese characteristics”. Third, when making efforts to increase its say in the global arena, it should adhere to the diplomatic principles of international relations.

Fourth, while weighing investment and income, China should not take full responsibility for the success of the multilateral cooperation projects it proposes, such as the Belt and Road Initiative, and instead insist on the principle of consultation, joint contribution and shared benefits.

And fifth, to strike a balance between countermeasures and cooperation at a time when anti-globalization and unilateralism are rising in some parts of the world, China should make efforts to manage disputes, take precise and timely countermeasures, promote international cooperation to safeguard globalization, and enhance communication to resolve the misunderstandings and disagreements over its peaceful rise.

Written By: Chen Xiangyang Source: China Daily Published: 26 June 2018 The author is director of Crisis Management Research Center, China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations.

Political Affairs

(H) Mekong countries eye bold new feature

When lead characters in a Chinese kung fu movie drink wine from the same cup, they are considered sworn brothers. They will fight and die together. Will all six riparian countries of the Lancang, or Mekong (Lan-Mei), share the same spirit of camaraderie as they all live on the magnificent river? There may be ominous signs during the Second Summit of the Lancang-Mekong Cooperation (LMC) on Jan 10-11 in Phnom Penh.

At the two-day event, the leaders of China, Myanmar, Laos, Vietnam, Thailand and Cambodia will attempt to transform the Mekong into the river of peace and sustainable development. Although the Beijing-led LMC venture started just 888 days ago, all six countries have committed to work together and move forward both in “speed” and “efficiency”.

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That explains why the LMC process is moving forward so fast, in comparison with 10 other Mekong-related projects proposed by regional and international arrangement at various times and halfheartedly implemented over the past few decades. Some of these projects were described by a senior Chinese official as museum pieces -- referring to their slow implementation.

During the recent LMC foreign ministers meeting in Dali, Yunnan, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi aptly described the LMC process as preparing the ground for the “bulldozer”, or tui tu ji, to denote the mechanism that will promote smooth and uninterrupted cooperation among the LMC members. Among Asean diplomats, the word has already generated some negative feeling regarding China’s assertiveness in the Lan Mei cooperation. At the Dali meeting, the Chinese official insisted on using the term in the joint press statement.

For China, there are a few good reasons to do so now. First of all, China wants to use the LMC as a flagship for South-South cooperation, especially to win the hearts and minds of riparian Asean states. As an upper country along the 4,350- kilometre river, China wants to offer a “win-win” approach to mitigate heavy criticism levied on its record of water management in the Mekong. In recent years Beijing has become more open with information and data about the river. During the drought in the lower countries recently, China released water to alleviate the shortage. At the Dali meeting, China promised to continue working with the LMC members to manage water resources and protect their environment.

Second, China has 15 international rivers flowing through its territory. With such vast experience, Beijing wants to use its technical know-how related to cross-border rivers to come up with a good model for the LMC countries. In the past two years, there has been much progress. A five-year action plan will be approved at the Phnom Penh Summit.

At this juncture, the Lan-Mei cooperation is considered the cornerstone of President Xi Jinping’s new era of diplomacy without so-called “Western meddling”. The Mekong region provides an ideal platform for China to initiate regional rules of law and governance.

At the first LMC summit meeting in Sanya, Hainan Island, China pledged US$300 million to support small and medium-sized enterprise projects. Of course, this amount is a pittance in comparison with mammoth Belt and Road Initiative.

In the past year, a total of 132 of 250 “early harvest” projects submitted were approved and implemented both in part or in full with 83 projects coming from China and the rest from the other member countries.

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Thailand has five projects dealing with capacity-building, logistics, and environment protection. More proposals will be considered at the upcoming summit in Phnom Penh. Recently, Bangkok has submitted 19 additional projects for future funding to promote trade and logistics.

Third, plans for the Mekong sub-region have been on the drawing board of Asean dialogue and international organisations for decades but implementation remains sluggish. China took up a Thai idea with some modifications following numerous incidents of murder, drugs and human trafficking involving citizens and ethnic groups from China and the Golden Triangle region. The idea was simple -- China needed to assume more control over security along the southward stretch of the Mekong river as trade and person-to-person contact became more frequent.

Indeed, political and security cooperation is an important component of the LMC five-year action plan (2018–2022), which encompasses exchanges of official visits; deepened law enforcement; and humanitarian and disaster assistance. The purpose is to “safeguard the sub-region peace and stability”. Senior officials from Asean members managed to tone down China’s extensive offers of security cooperation.

Fourth, the upcoming Phnom Penh Declaration, which will be approved and released on Thursday, stresses the importance of synergising the various Mekong frameworks under the Asean-led mechanism with the LMC, especially those related to infrastructure and connectivity. Apart from a verbal commitment, tangible cooperation between the LMC members and the rest of Asean is still a work in process.

Political pundits have quickly pointed out possible discord among the riparian and non-riparian countries akin to the South China Sea quagmire with splits between the claimant and non-claimant members. Unlike the South China Sea, the Mekong-related issues have not yet become an Asean agenda.

Fifth, China wants to maximise the support of LMC members, which comprise half of Asean countries. Thailand has been one of the biggest supporters and is considered a game changer in the Mekong sub-region. Bangkok has urged Beijing to include these new Asean members into its overall development schemes. The Asean riparian states support a model of cooperation based on equality, mutual assistance and consensus. Thailand-based environmental civil society organisations will play an important role in providing input on the preservation and protection of the Mekong.

Thailand’s stake in the Mekong is high as it envisions itself as a hub of connectivity in mainland Southeast Asia. Busadee Santipitaks, Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokeswoman, said that Thailand wishes to implement linkage

103 Selected Analysis between the LMC and Belt and Road Initiative as well as other economic corridors. As a country moves forward to pursue a 4.0 industrial path, Thailand is pushing the Mekong sub-region as the next base for high-quality production to link with the global value chain.

The forthcoming five-year action plans and the Phnom Penh Declaration will serve as a barometer of President Xi’s commitment to China’s smaller neighbours in Southeast Asia who share many of the same natural resources. The merits and pitfalls of the Lan Mei cooperation will be closely monitored. Failure is not an option. It is bound to provide a better understanding of China’s broader strategic view of the world.

Written By: Kavi Chongkittavorn Source: Bangkok Post Published: 9 January 2018 The author is a veteran journalist on regional affairs.

(I) Developing the Mekong

Prime Minister Prayut Chan-o-cha is in Phnom Penh for the two-day Mekong River summit that begins this morning. The second of its kind, the Lancang- Mekong Cooperation Summit involves the leaders of all six countries touched by the mighty Mekong. The prime agenda item is what Beijing calls The Five-Year Plan of Action, a Chinese-dictated guideline for “development” of the river. One of the prime minister’s most important tasks will be careful monitoring of how this plan impacts Thais.

A most interesting improvement in the plan was revealed at last month’s preparatory meeting for the summit, held at Dali, in China’s Yunnan province. According to Foreign Minister Don Pramudwinai, his Chinese counterpart Wang Yi had a so-called “gift” for Thailand. After two years of strongly pushing for permission to blow up numerous islets and shoals off Chiang Rai province, China has decided to hold off for a while.

Mr Don didn’t or couldn’t say how long this will last. While it takes pressure off Gen Prayut, it also kicks the can down the road. China’s plan to blast and dredge the Mekong deep enough to allow 1,000-tonne cargo boats is delayed, not cancelled. At the moment, the Chiang Rai islets and rapids make the river too shallow for larger boats, while China wants a clear channel all the way to Luang Prabang, far below Chinag Rai.

This has led some to believe that China intends to make the river into the Mekong Canal. Conservationists fear that “development” means removal of anything in the way, between Dali and the Mekong Delta of southern Vietnam.

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They cite two items: China’s extensive dam building on its own section of the river, and the alleged insistence by the Beijing to be the controlling -- perhaps the only -- voice in management of the Mekong. China already has the ability to control the river’s flow, and has insisted releasing water to downstream countries during a dry season is a favour.

All of this is why Gen Prayut must be alert during a technical and grand presentations today and tomorrow. Mr Wang has somewhat unfortunately called Beijing’s desire to get on Mekong development a “bulldozer”. That’s a description that will cause consternation among river bank dwellers and conservationists alike.

China is eager to get on with its gargantuan Belt and Road initiative -- of which the Mekong Plan is actually a small part. But those who live along the Mekong and value the ecology of Southeast Asian’s largest river aren’t yet sold on China- led development. To China, the Mekong is one of the country’s 16 international rivers. To the people of half of the Asean -- citizens of Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, Myanmar and Vietnam -- the river is their bloodvein. A series of dams on the upstream section has already makes their lives difficult.

Gen Prayut must represent at the two-day summit his fellow Thais who are farmers, fishermen, small-business traders, tourist operators and similar. They depend on the Mekong as surely as big-business shippers. Development is always welcome, even necessary. But it must take into account the nature, traditions and people’s businesses.

Credit China for pumping urgency, enthusiasm and energy into Mekong River planning. The regional giant was not included in the previous planning process which was positively sclerotic. But enthusiasm must be tempered, and it is the premier’s job to support planning that benefits Thailand.

By Thursday afternoon, the prime minister and his counterparts from China and Asean should have hammered out both a five-year action plan and an agreement on the principles of development they intend to call “The Phnom Penh Declaration”. They should be as forward looking as they must be respectful of the rights of those who live along the river.

Written By: Editorial Bangkok Post Source: Bangkok Post Published: 10 January 2018

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(J) Securing the future prosperity of the Greater Mekong Subregion

The Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) countries have made stunning progress over the past quarter century. Once plagued by poverty, they are now economic success stories. The GMS Economic Cooperation Program has contributed significantly to this transformation.

Since it was established in 1992 as a means to enhance economic relations and promote regional cooperation, its six member countries -- Cambodia, the People’s Republic of China, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Myanmar, Thailand, and Vietnam -- have built a platform for economic cooperation that has mobilized almost $21 billion for high-priority infrastructure projects. Foreign direct investment into the subregion has surged ten-fold and trade between its countries has climbed from $5 billion to over $414 billion.

But the subregion faces challenges to its prosperity. Further reducing poverty, climate change adaptation and mitigation, energy efficiency, food security, and sustainable urbanization remain priorities of the GMS Program. Countries also face new challenges, including growing inequalities, rising levels of cross-border migration, and the potential impact on jobs of the fourth industrial revolution.

Moreover, GMS countries have agreed to significant commitments under the Sustainable Development Goals and the Paris Agreement on climate change.

There are also emerging opportunities for the region, including incorporating new technologies in various sectors such as education, agriculture, health, and finance. GMS countries are situated at the crossroads of South and Southeast Asia, and hence they can benefit from the increased momentum for growth in South Asia.

As GMS leaders gather this week in Ha Noi to chart the future of the program, it’s a good time to consider how a new generation of initiatives can ensure the GMS Program remains relevant and responsive to the subregion’s needs.

The Ha Noi Action Plan and the GMS Regional Investment Framework 2022, both proposed for adoption at the Summit, provide a platform for countries to strengthen their cooperation through continuous innovation. The latter has identified a new pipeline of 227 projects worth about $66 billion. These two documents will have a sharpened focus on the GMS Program’s strategic goals of enhancing connectivity, competitiveness, and community in the subregion.

Connectivity has been dramatically improved under GMS program. More than 10,000 kilometers of new or upgraded roads and 3,000 kilometers of

106 Selected Analysis transmission and distribution lines have been added under the program. The Ha Noi Action Plan calls for the continued expansion of these economic corridors based upon transport networks to boost connectivity both between and within countries.

The subregion’s competitiveness is improving. Looking ahead, it will be important to continue cutting red tape and to remove remaining barriers to transport and trade.

Finally, communities are being strengthened through cross-border initiatives to control the spread of communicable diseases, expand educational opportunities, protect the subregion’s rich biodiversity, and mitigate the impacts of climate change.

ADB, which has been the program’s secretariat since its inception, expects to provide $7 billion over the next 5 years for a range of projects supporting transport, tourism, energy, climate change mitigation and adaptation, agribusiness value chains, and urban development. This builds on no more than $8 billion in financing provided by ADB so far under the program.

To deliver these projects and achieve these goals in the two documents, strong partnerships are vital. The GMS Program depends on the collaboration of many stakeholders, including local administrations and communities, development partners, academia, and the media.

The GMS will benefit from strengthened partnerships with other regional and global cooperation platforms, leading to new opportunities for future development.

China has been an active player in cooperation at various levels and in all areas under the GMS program, and has made significant contribution to boost economic growth and improve people’s wellbeing in the subregion. To further these gains, I believe the GMS program can deepen its collaboration with the “belt and road” initiative, ASEAN, and other regional and subregional programs.

Partnership with the private sector will also be increasingly important, and it is gratifying to see them deepening through platforms such as GMS Business Council, the e-Commerce Platform, GMS tourism and agriculture forums, and the recent Finance Sector and Trade Finance Conference.

I am optimistic that the subregion will meet its challenges and capitalize on emerging opportunities. By working together, GMS countries can deliver rapid, sustainable, and inclusive growth for another 25 years and beyond. ADB will continue to be an important and trusted partner in that endeavor.

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Written By: Takehiko Nakao Source: People’s Daily Published: 30 March 2018 The author is the President of Asian Development Bank.

(K) Why Xi’s lifting of term limits is a good thing

Western media and the Chinese chattering classes have been in an uproar since China's National People's Congress approved constitutional changes that included lifting the two-term presidential limit. China approves "president for life," proclaimed Western media.

But this misinterprets the nature of the development. And the world appears to be overlooking consequential political reforms taking place in China that will impact our collective future for the better.

The presidential term limit has no bearing on how long a top Chinese leader can stay in power and lifting it by no means allows anyone to rule for life. In fact, the position of real power — the general secretary of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee — has never had term limits. The most recent draft of China's constitution, written in 1982, set the presidency as a symbolic head of state, with no actual power. Although the two offices happened to have been occupied by the same person for more than 25 years since Jiang Zemin, the institutional mechanics of the offices are rather separate.

Formally unifying these two positions at the very top will transform the entire Chinese governance structure by institutionally fusing the party and the state. This reform is good for China simply because the party has developed into the most competent national political institution in the world today.

As to the issue of lifetime rule, the party does have institutional mechanisms, both mandatory and customary, that govern officials' retirement. In fact, the party constitution specifically states that no position has lifetime tenure. This system has been developed over decades and covers the many tiers of the party's organizational structure, from the Politburo to ministerial and provincial positions. Within this framework, it is possible for Xi to lead the country for longer than his recent predecessors. But not for life.

Age limits have varied over time and differ based on position. The custom for most senior leaders in recent years has been to retire at the age of 68, which is often extended to complete a term. Exceptions have been made for the position of general secretary (one served, successfully, through his late 70's). But still, it's always finite.

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However, eliminating the presidential term limit is still significant. It is part and parcel of highly consequential and, in my view, constructive political reforms. These reforms were set in motion at the 18th party congress held in 2012 and were a particular focus at the third plenum in 2013. I wrote then that the fusing of party and state would be the most far-reaching political transformation in Chinese governance. The completion of the current constitutional reform is the culmination of that process.

Since the founding of the People's Republic in 1949, the leadership of the party has been central to China's political DNA. However, institutionally the system has gone through significant growing pains. At first, China adopted the Soviet system that separated, at least on the institutional level, the party and government. The top organs — the party central committee, the National People's Congress and the state council were parallel. But in reality, the party led everything. This produced significant conflicts that some have blamed as partially responsible for the disastrous Cultural Revolution.

When former Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping began his reforms over 40 years ago, he pushed a policy of administrative separation between party and government. But that was due to the particular circumstances of post-Cultural Revolution China. At the time, many senior leaders who were purged by Mao Zedong were rehabilitated and returned to their previous positions.

The party was just emerging from a period of upheaval, and those officials all came from the era of the centrally planned economy. China needed market economics. Deng's policy unleashed younger and more forward-looking governing forces to execute the reform agenda. But more importantly, he also focused great energy on rebuilding the party institution.

In the following decades, the party has developed into one of the most elaborate and effective governing institutions in the world and, I would argue, in history. It is responsible for achieving what's known as the greatest improvement in standard of living for the largest number of people in the shortest amount of time.

The party has now stepped forward to the front and center of Chinese governance. This constitutional reform further enshrines the party's political centrality by extending the wording of party leadership from the preamble to the body of the constitution. At the governing level, the reform creates a super agency, the National Supervisory Commission, to combat corruption. It is an extension of the party's Central Disciplinary and Inspection Commission and will further institutionalize the tremendous anti-corruption drive executed by the party commission over the past five years.

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It is in this context that the removal of a presidential term limit is so significant. While the party's leadership has always been politically paramount, the administrative separation of party and government has produced institutional contradictions and confusion. As China increasingly becomes a major power in the world, the office of the president has assumed greater importance, especially in China's interactions with the rest of the world.

Bringing the presidency's institutional mechanics in line with the office of party general secretary, and for them to be occupied by the same person, will create a more efficient and coherent governing structure and more transparency and predictability in China's dealings with the world. It lifts the veil of pretense that, somehow, the party and state governance are not one, which is untrue and wholly unnecessary and counterproductive at this stage of China's development. It signals the maturing of the Chinese political system that shows the world clearly how decisions are made and who is in charge.

The current Chinese system is a good combination of principle and flexibility. The principle of no lifetime tenure, combined with collective leadership and retirement rules, prevent unchecked rule for life by the wrong person. But a degree of flexibility in the retirement mechanism allows the right leader to govern longer. Xi will retire someday. But as long as he continues to lead successfully, that day will be a long way off.

I dare say that Xi has done more for China in five years than Bill Clinton, George Bush and Barack Obama combined did for the United States in 25 years. On the watches of those three American leaders, with slow and incompetent reforms and major catastrophes such as the Iraq War and the financial crisis, the U.S. managed to squander what was arguably the greatest advantage any nation ever had in history at the end of the Cold War and is now mired in dysfunction and losing its leadership position in the world. Meanwhile, opinion surveys, such as this one by the Harvard Kennedy School, show Xi consistently receiving the highest domestic approval ratings of any world leader.

It would be a mistake to judge that Xi is putting himself above the party and the nation. On the contrary, a major theme of his governing philosophy has been the centrality of the party as an institution. And in today's China, both society and the party are much more robust and pluralistic than the time when Deng came to power.

The feedback mechanisms and channels available to China's leaders to effectively respond to the needs of society are much more abundant today. It was popular discontent with pollution that spurred Xi's administration into action and achieved, in just three years, the extraordinary improvement in air quality that took London and Los Angeles decades to accomplish — and the

110 Selected Analysis latter went through major deindustrialization, while China remains a growing industrial power.

Xi is now beginning his second term. No one knows for sure how long he will serve. But with his impressivelife track record, it is understandable that there are genuine sentiments for him to lead China for a long time. Sadly, liberal democracy in its current state seems incapable of producing a leader half as good.

Written By: Eric X. Li Source: Global Times Published: 3 April 2018 The author is Shanghai venture capitalist and a trustee and chairman of the advisory committee of Fudan University’s China Institute.

(L) Belt and Road carrier of China’s new soft power

The international debate around China’s soft power has been growing constantly since the 2004 publication of The Beijing Consensus by Joshua Cooper Ramo. The term was coined to emphasize China’s alternative developmental path with respect to the political and ideological contents of the “Washington consensus.” Not every analysis agrees with this standpoint. However, along with some influential authors - Giovanni Arrighi, Martin Jacques, John Naisbitt and to a certain extent Daniel A. Bell - I deem that China’s development model has demonstrated an ability to combine capitalist and socialist elements, as well as tradition and modernity, in a unique way. . Therefore, when we engage with social, political, economic and cultural analyses of China’s contemporary experience of development, the “Chinese characteristics” are always at stake. From firms’ ownership to the multilayered and multi-scale planning processes, from land use rights to State-owned enterprises, from welfare state reforms to political cultural values embedded in a combination of Marxism and Confucianism.

It is important to remember the deep roots of China’s new influence, culturally and politically, in the current changes of the international order (http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1098806.shtml). The influence of Chinese thought and words on the international arena has been growing dramatically in recent years, in step with economic and diplomatic successes. China in the new era is also represented by a stronger international soft power - that is the power of ideas and strategies alternative to the status quo - exerted in the most authoritative seats of the established world order: economic and political forums such as the Group of 20 nations, World Economic Forum, International Monetary Fund, World Bank, World Trade Organization and in

111 Selected Analysis other forums shaped by Chinese initiatives such as Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, the New Development Bank and the Belt and Road initiative.

The new Chinese cultural power on the world scale is supported, legitimized and deeply rooted in the material manifestations of the Belt and Road initiative, which includes more than 100 organizations. The initiative is already a reality, in the process of being updated, and it is inclusive, cooperative and open to adaptation, being free from ideological and political discriminants. This reality is the opposite of the old and smaller Marshall Plan.

In spite of this picture, the US National Endowment for Democracy coined for example a term – “sharp power” - to define and discredit China and other competitors. This term has become very popular in the West. Moreover, if we look at European public opinion and authorities, we find that there are divergent voices on the new Chinese influence in relation to the Belt and Road.

It is ironic to hear from the West criticisms of media manipulation and political interference addressed to China and other countries. Turning this accusation to China-and Russia-seems curious in light of the Western long-term history of media domination and interference in the internal affairs of other countries. The history of the National Endowment for Democracy is proof alone of this irony. The responsibilities attributed to these countries could be easily attributed to the accuser.

In the second case, the Mercator Institute for China’s Studies, based in Berlin, has for example offered rising skepticism and criticism in a February 2018 report, maintaining that China is exploiting, in an opaque way, the European Union’s weaknesses to interfere in the internal affairs of member states. On the contrary, other authoritative voices see the new Chinese proactive role in Europe as beneficial and constructively alternative to the current state of affairs, characterized by slow economic recovery, political instability and belligerence under the US-NATO alliance system.

In Italy, for example, Manlio di Stefano - a Member of Parliament of the 5 Stars Movement - has expressed this thought several times. In 2016, he talked about the Belt and Road initiative like this: “It is fascinating the attention of China on developing the project in a different way. The intrinsic principles of the BRI (Belt and Road initiative) adhere to those of the UN Charter. The project is open to new nations and will follow market rules, working actively to satisfy mutual advantages for all the participants.”

My studies and arguments are closer to this constructive interpretation of China’s new soft power, but, as written, in Europe the political and cultural perspectives on this subject are still varying and often divergent.

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At the end of the day, it is important to notice that the Belt and Road initiative is still in its infancy and it will take time to show all its potentialities. It will necessitate protection and trust between many polities and stakeholders in a world that is severely fractured.

Reshaping international relations according to a cooperative and win-win approach will require further engagement from the international community and, each country that adheres to the Chinese initiative should play its own part with a high sense of responsibility. World peace is at stake.

Written By: Fabio Massimo Parenti Source: Global Times Published: 9 May 2018 The author is an associate professor of economic and political geography at the Italian International Institute Lorenzo de’ Medici, Rome and Florence, and member of EURISPES, Laboratorio BRICS.

(M) The Indo-Pacific and Asean centrality

Even though US President Donald Trump repeatedly alluded to it in his speeches at Asean-led summits in Danang and Manila late last year, and despite its reference in both the United States National Security Strategy and National Defence Strategy, the geographic notion of a “free and open Indo-Pacific” (FOIP) straddling both the vast Pacific and Indian oceans has been given short shrift in many capitals. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi suggested last March that the Indo-Pacific was only an “attention-grabbing idea”, akin to “the sea foam in the Pacific and Indian Ocean” that “may get some attention but will soon dissipate”. Asean leaders have paid some attention but have not had a collective and cohesive reaction to it. But now everyone in Asian security circles and beyond will take notice.

The bold and sudden remaining of the United States’ “Pacific Command” into the “Indo-Pacific Command” will surely attract attention. The FOIP is now a living concept and a serious geostrategy to be reckoned with, peddled by a quadrilateral group of countries, led by Japan, in close partnership with Australia, India and the US. A new acronym in Asia’s regional architecture and its contested regional order, the FOIP had its origins just over a decade ago when Japanese Prime Minister Abe invited India to join what was a trilateral strategic dialogue. The consequent “quad” is now seen as the FOIP’s main driver, although the Indo-Pacific strategy is region-wide and multilateral, open to inclusion from other countries.

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It is early days for the Indo-Pacific as a competing framework for regional organisation. But its meanings and implications are already far-reaching for China, Asean and all parties involved in Asia’s evolving future.

First, China will not be pleased with the US focus on the Indo-Pacific. Adding “Indo” to the US Pacific Command will likely rattle security planners in Beijing. Both India and the US are seen as rivals to China in different ways and in different theatres. For India, the arena of contest with China is largely confined to South Asia, particularly Pakistan, which is India’s immediate security concern. For the US, geopolitical and geo-economic competition with China spans the two land masses on both sides of the Pacific.

Thus the US stations 375,000 civilian and military personnel at command headquarters in Hawaii. The Indo-Pacific command will likely see a gravitational shift to South Asia with closer cooperation with India. To Japan, this latest development in the US Indo-Pacific command will likely be taken as encouraging. The same goes for Australia.

Yet the key issue will be how China sees it. If China views the new front of the Quad-led offensive for regional order-making, Beijing may be provoked into pushing back. If so, we will see more tensions in the region. This happened in the past with the “pivot” and “rebalance” strategy of the previous US administration under President Barack Obama. China’s takeover the South China Sea broadly parallels the timeline of the Obama strategy in Asia, and the US at that time had no answer for it.

For Asean. China’s perceived entitlements from history already include land reclamations and construction and “weaponisation” of artificial islands in the South China Sea, not far from Asean’s maritime members, particularly the Philippines and Vietnam. Beijing now practically operates these artificial islands as forward military bases, recently solidified by a naval exercise revolving around the Liaoning, its only carrier strike group at this time, presided over by President Xi Jinping.

For mainland Southeast Asia, China has built upstream dams on the Mekong River at will to the detriment of downstream communities in Cambodia and Vietnam. As with the South China Sea, China offers its own rules around the Mekong via the Lancang-Mekong Cooperation, marginalising the long- established Mekong River Commission. And when President Trump pulled out of the Trans-Pacific Partnership, China became keener to move ahead with the RCEP as a regional free-trade platform which happens to exclude the United States.

Thus Asean is already overwhelmed by China. Now the FOIP poses multiple, different challenges. First, the major and the middle powers in the Quad vis-a-

114 Selected Analysis vis China are likely to ratchet up geopolitical tension, especially if Beijing sees the Indo-Pacific as a provocative encirclement and containment. Asean’s major rationale for existence has been to keep the major powers at bay and in balance, not to overwhelm and dominate Southeast Asia. This goal will be harder to achieve if the major powers ramp up their geostrategic confrontation.

Second, the US geographic expansion of its main military presence in the broad neighbourhood risks escalation. Lest we forget, the Trans-Pacific Partnership began life as a small foursome of cooperation among Brunei, Chile, New Zealand and Singapore. Eventually, when the US hopped on the TPP bandwagon, the trade-liberalisation vehicle took off and became finalised, although the Trump administration ironically withdrew from it in the end. If the US hops on the FOIP, it may similarly take off to the detriment of regional peace and stability in view of China’s reaction.

Finally, the FOIP is a frontal challenge to Asean centrality. The four Quad members will insist that Asean is still front and centre of regional action and architecture building. But the FOIP has the potential to eclipse, overwhelm and bypass Asean by getting regional action done in ways that do not require Asean to be in the driver’s seat at a time when Southeast Asia’s 10-member grouping can find no answers for China’s artificial islands and upstream dams, or even the Rakhine crisis in Myanmar.

Asean’s leaders and bureaucrats will keep up their frequent meetings and comfort themselves that they remain relevant. But if the FOIP becomes more central and effective, Asean’s regional star may dim. If that happens, it will be detrimental not just for Asean but also for the major powers, as there will no longer be the usual reliable bridge and broker for regional peace and security.

Written By: Thitinan Pongsudhirak Source: Bangkok Post Published: 1 June 2018 The author is an associate professor at Chulalongkorn University.

(N) Mutual trust key to peaceful South China Sea

Since the second half of 2016, the situation in the South China Sea has been changing for the better, moving from confrontation to cooperation. In this process, China and ASEAN members are stepping up negotiation on the Code of Conduct in the South China Sea, and pushing forward discussions on practical cooperation, crisis management and confidence building, which actually began before 2016. This is a very positive development and will help maintain regional peace and stability.

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First, the Declaration on Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, the COC and confidence-building measures (or CBMs) are very important for maintaining maritime security in the South China Sea.

China has always held that the COC negotiation should work parallely with the full and effective implementation of the DOC. The COC is not a substitute for the DOC but an updated version. The COC framework has made it clear that just like DOC, in essence, the COC, is not a tool for solving territorial disputes and maritime delimitation, but a mechanism for crisis management, confidence building and maritime cooperation.

Process of building maritime order

In the past year, the COC negotiation has made some major progress. China and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations adopted the draft of the COC framework and started the formal negotiation phase. The aim of the COC is to reach an institutional arrangement acceptable to China as well as ASEAN members, and establish some rules governing the future behavior of the claimants.

So, in a certain sense, the COC will provide institutional guarantee for crisis management and maritime cooperation. And the COC negotiation process is a process of building regional maritime order based on consensus by China and ASEAN. (This order, of course, is different from the "rule-based order" advocated by some outside powers.) This will be very important for long-term peace and stability in the South China Sea.

Second, in the DOC implementation process and COC negotiation, China and ASEAN have already listed some CBMs, maritime cooperation areas, and preventive measures to be pursued. We should first try to put those measures into practice.

In fact, in the DOC signed by China and ASEAN back in 2002, the fifth article listed four kinds of CBMs: holding dialogues and exchange of views as appropriate between defense and military officials; ensuring just and humane treatment of all persons who are either in danger or in distress; notifying, on a voluntary basis, other parties concerned of any impending joint/combined military exercise; and exchanging, on a voluntary basis, relevant information. But these CBMs have never been effectively implemented.

More recently, China and ASEAN member states stepped up efforts to build confidence in the South China Sea. In April 2015, the statement of the chairman of the 26th ASEAN Summit said: "Pursuant to the full and effective implementation of the DOC in its entirety, and while the work towards the expeditious establishment of the COC are undertaken, we agreed that preventive

116 Selected Analysis measures should be undertaken to address developments in the South China Sea". The meeting also "took note of Indonesia's proposal to establish a hotline of communications at the high level in the government between ASEAN and China to address emergency situations on the ground that need immediate intervention" with the aim to immediately reduce tensions on the ground.

In October 2015, at the 10th China-ASEAN Senior Officials Meeting on the Implementation of the DOC in Chengdu, Sichuan province, China and ASEAN officials identified maritime cooperation as one of the three main areas to pursue in further implementing the DOC. Participants agreed to have greater cooperation on navigation safety, search and rescue, marine scientific research and environmental protection, as well as combating transnational crimes at sea.

Key developments in fields of cooperation

More important, in August 2016, at the 13th China-ASEAN Senior Officials Meeting on the Implementation of the DOC, as "early harvest", both sides adopted the "Guidelines for Hotline Communications among Senior Officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China and ASEAN Member States in Response to Maritime Emergencies and the Joint Statement on Application of Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea in the South China Sea".

Besides the above achievements, the other important development in confidence building and crisis management in the South China Sea are worthy of attention. One is the Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea adopted by ASEAN member states' navies at the Western Pacific Naval Symposium in Qingdao, Shandong province, in April 2014. The other is China-US memorandum of understanding on "Rules of Behavior for Safety of Air and Maritime Encounters" signed in November 2014.

All the above measures are very helpful for enhancing trust and confidence, and for managing risks by reducing the possibility of misunderstanding and misperception between the militaries. So we should first emphasize the full implementation of these documents, so as to avoid confrontation or crisis before the conclusion of the COC and also provide the basis for future discussion on CBMs.

Third, in the process of the COC negotiation, we should grab the opportunity of relative tranquility in the South China Sea to further enhance maritime practical cooperation, so that we can realize the dual objective of improving maritime cooperation mechanisms and building the regional maritime order.

Following the arbitration case, both China and ASEAN leaders now have stronger political will to push forward the COC negotiation. But because both sides still have some different views on the COC, it will be a hard and relatively

117 Selected Analysis long process. Under such circumstances, we should consider how to enhance maritime cooperation as a way to provide a favorable environment for the COC negotiation.

Exploring new channels of mutual benefit

Enhancing pragmatic and functional cooperation can also be seen as one type of CBM, because it will help promote trust and confidence. In fact, due to the turnabout in the situation in the South China Sea, China and ASEAN member states have already begun to explore how to further bilateral or multilateral cooperation.

For example, China and the Philippines established a Joint Committee for Coast Guard Maritime Cooperation in 2017. Under this committee, both countries will deepen cooperation in areas such as combating cross-border crimes, maritime search and rescue, marine environmental protection and emergency response. China and the Philippines have also begun discussing the possibility of joint development of oil and gas resources, and the prospect of cooperation in fishing in the South China Sea. And China and Vietnam have enhanced Coast Guard cooperation.

But we can do more. China recently put forward the idea of building cooperation mechanisms among countries surrounding the South China Sea. Some scholars suggested that China and ASEAN members build a "Pan-South China Sea Economic Cooperation Circle", in order to enhance cooperation in maritime tourism, infrastructure building, and other maritime affairs. All these efforts and initiatives should be encouraged and given more support, because these are quite positive factors for maintaining regional maritime security.

Nevertheless, the COC negotiation, CBMs and maritime cooperation are still facing a number of challenges. Despite the many positive developments in the South China Sea, we should recognize that in the COC negotiation, China and ASEAN member states still have some major differences on the content of the COC, which may pose a challenge to the negotiation process.

Besides, the two sides have different views about the COC negotiation process. China thinks the negotiation process should be gradual, while ASEAN members want a quick conclusion. In addition, although cooperation could proceed even as the disagreements are negotiated at the political level and the sovereignty disputes remain unresolved, a lack of trust between China and ASEAN members as well as the unresolved sovereignty disputes between them will prevent cooperation from time to time. And any external intervention will make the negotiation more complicated.

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In other words, we now have a very good opportunity for cooperation and build confidence in the South China Sea, but we also need to make more efforts to maintain long-term peace and stability in the region.

Written By: Liu Lin Source: China Daily Published: 5 June 2018 The author is an associate research Fellow at War Studies College, Academy of Military Science.

Economic Affairs

(O) Let’s celebrate reform’s 40th anniversary

As momentous historic events go, China’s reform period was relatively unheralded. Little did anyone realize at the time-probably no one, in fact - that 1978 would enter the history books as one of the most important years in modern history.

We should not be surprised. At the time, the Chinese economy was a mere 5 percent of the size of the US economy, with a per capita GDP roughly on a par with that of Zambia, lower than half of the Asian average and lower than twothirds of the African average. China’s impact on the world was very limited.

Although its growth rate had averaged a little more than 5 percent from 1960 to 1978, it compared rather unfavorably with economies such as Japan and the Republic of Korea. For the majority of the world’s population, China was largely forgotten or ignored, usually both. Even in China, there was little anticipation that the country stood on the eve of a remarkable transformation. When Chairman Mao Zedong died in 1976, China was relatively isolated. The “cultural revolution” (1966-76) continued to cast a long shadow, the leadership was divided, and Deng Xiaoping had only begun to emerge as China’s key leader. Notwithstanding the unquestioned achievements made since 1949, the future did not look particularly promising.

How wrong almost everyone was. Think of what have hitherto been regarded as some of the defining moments of the late 19th and 20th centuries: the rise of the United States between 1870 and 1914; the October Revolution; colonial liberation after World War II; and the fall of the Berlin Wall and the disintegration of the Soviet Union.

The reform period that began in 1978, and continues to this day, is at least as historically significant as all of these, if not more so. China’s economic

119 Selected Analysis transformation since 1978 has been on a far greater scale than that of the US between 1870 and 1914. The October Revolution, historically profound as it was, ultimately failed. The reform period, in contrast, has succeeded in transforming not only China but the whole world.

If China’s economic performance between 1960 and 1978 was overshadowed by the early “Asian tigers”, since 1978 the roles have been reversed, with China growing much faster than any of its neighbors between 1978 and the present. China experienced an average GDP growth of close to 10 percent annually until 2014, raising per capita GDP almost 49-fold, from $155 at today’s prices in 1978 to $7,590 in 2014, thereby lifting more than 700 million people out of poverty. Between 1990 and 2005 China was responsible for three-quarters of the world’s poverty reduction. Since 1978, China’s GDP has overtaken that of countless countries, including Britain, France, Germany and Japan, such that today it is second only to the US and closing rapidly.

But numbers alone cannot explain the historical magnitude and novelty of what China has achieved. Since the late 18th century and the beginning of Britain’s Industrial Revolution, the global economy has been dominated by the advanced Western economies together with Japan, which, unlike all other nonWestern countries, began its industrialization in the 19th century. China is the first developing country (which, like a majority of the world’s countries, had been colonized of partly colonized by the Western powers and Japan) to crash the party of the historically privileged and become recognized as one of the two most powerful countries in the world. China has not only transformed itself and the world, it has overturned more than 200 years of history in the process.

Without question, the reform period-which never would have been possible without 1949 and the victory of the Communist Party of China under Mao Zedong - is one of the most important historical events of the past two centuries. It has been responsible for the most remarkable economic transformation in modern history, arguably, indeed, in all of history.

Yet the 40th anniversary of the reform period’s birth will be marked, if at all, in a relatively perfunctory way in Western countries. Part of the reason for this is that economic periods such as this generally receive less attention than their political or military equivalents: they are more protracted and less dramatic than the latter. But it is also because the West feels challenged by China’s transformation.

The West has generally veered toward a negative interpretation of China’s economic rise, for long predicting its unsustainability and ultimate demise. This is hardly surprising; as we can now all see, China’s rise, in reconfiguring the world, is at the same time diminishing the West’s place in that world. The causes of this can hardly be expected to be a reason for celebration in the West.

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There is a further reason that the significance of the reform period has been underestimated, and this belongs rather closer to home: its relationship to the socialist tradition. The sheer novelty of Deng Xiaoping’s thinking and approach has never been given the recognition it deserves. While the West for long belittled the reform period for political reasons, many on the left tended to believe that it represented a turn to the right in an era when neo-liberalism was increasingly ascendant; they regarded it, in some degree or another, as a retreat from socialist principles. But this was a crude and simplistic response. Deng was, indeed, prepared to question some of the previously largely unquestioned assumptions of socialist thought, but he did this because he believed they no longer had a sufficient purchase on reality.

Prior to Deng, the communist movement, together with wider sections of the left, was for the most part committed to two key propositions. First, that socialism meant central planning and the public ownership of most of the economy. Second, the idea of socialism in one country, which first took root in the Soviet Union in the 1920s, came to enjoy widespread influence: it was based on the view that the world was bifurcated between socialist countries and capitalist countries, and never the twain shall meet.

Deng challenge both propositions. He embraced the idea of the market as a necessary part of a socialist economy. And he believed that it was essential for China, rather than being part of an autarchic socialist bloc, to seek to become part of an interdependent with the whole world, including the major capitalist countries.

The idea of socialism in one country emerged in the Soviet Union after the failure or the long-awaited revolutions in the major capitalist countries in the 1920s: as such, it represented a retreat into a defensive bunker. Deng’s embrace of interdependence was based on the recognition that the capitalist world in the post-1945 period had proved rather more dynamic than the socialist world, and that China should not be afraid to extend its horizons and compete with them on a wider global stage.

Deng’s approach was extraordinarily brave and bold. He recognized that the old ways of thinking were no longer working: in Mao’s time-honored phrase, it was necessary to “seek truth from facts”. Rather than choosing to remain a prisoner of one’s own ideological dogma, he reached beyond in order to find a new way.

The consequences could not have been more profound or far-reaching. The turn to pragmatism, or seeking truth from facts, was intellectually enormously stimulating and liberating. Much of the Marxist tradition had become bogged down in the idea that it was invariable right, that history was on its side, that it was simply a matter of time before it triumphed. A mindset based on the

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“guarantees of history” led to ossified and mechanical thinking, a hardening of the intellectual arteries, and an inability to move with the times.

The dynamism that Deng’s intellectual revolution unleashed has become a continuing and fundamental feature of China over the past 40 years. Or, to put it in another way, while the Soviet Union was trapped in its own dogmatic mindset and increasingly turned inward, exactly the opposite happened in China, which reached outward both within China itself and at the same time toward the rest of the world.

While the Soviet Union became ever more timed and defensive, China displayed growing confidence in its attitude toward the world.

There is much that the left around the world can learn from China: its expansive view, its pragmatism, its intellectual courage and ambition, its willingness to learn from anywhere and anyone, and its emphasis on doing and achieving rather than dogma and assertion.

The 40th anniversary of the beginning of the reform period is a cause for celebration and reflection, not only in China but around the world. It has so much to offer us all.

Written By: Martin Jacques Source: China Daily Published: 20 January 2018 The author is a senior fellow at the Department of Politics and International Studied, Cambridge University, a visiting professor at the Institute of Modern International Relations, Tsinghua University, and the author of When China Rules the World.

(P) Toeing Jack Ma’s line easier said than done

Business partnership requires utmost commitment on both sides to benefit all

On paper, the Thai government’s business cooperation agreement with Asian e- commerce king Jack Ma looks very promising. Thailand will purportedly get to penetrate new markets and expand current ones thanks to his increasingly effective online platforms, and his empire will benefit from exotic Thai products with high potential, currently made for limited or modest consumption but certain to register big booms with his know-how.

In reality, the partnership will need strong resolve on both sides so the people they publicly vow to be helping can really reap the gains. Jack Ma’s

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“empowerment” catchphrase is a lot easier said than done, and the amazing growth and power of his business empire is a testament to that.

Conventional business has been functioning under the big-fish-eat-small-fish phenomenon. Changing that in order to allow the people at the bottom of the pyramid to significantly grow requires many reforms, not least in the mindset of big conglomerates and people who literally serve them – the politicians. The Thailand-Jack Ma public agreement features farmers, start-up businesses and all the currently struggling medium-sized entrepreneurs, but the moment of truth is not yet to come.

The rapid sale of Thai durian on his platforms is a solid proof of how online business can do wonders. Soon, the real question will no longer be about how many durians are sold, but about where the money goes. The Thailand-Jack Ma partnership will become truly noble if it can ensure that durian growers benefit the most from the sale, and businessmen in suits who know virtually nothing about growing durian but happen to be “overseeing” the sale benefit the least.

Nothing tests a person’s ideology better than what it brings when it becomes “successful”. An advocate of small retailing businesses that take advantage of the fast-evolving technologies, the founder of the Alibaba Group has seen his wealth and power increase exponentially. Suddenly, he became a man whom a younger Jack Ma would have frowned upon.

Even today, Jack Ma’s uneasiness with his business power and glory appears evident. In talking about the partnership deal with Thailand after a meeting with Prime Minister Prayut Chan-o-cha, he emphasised that he really wanted to help, as his wealth had grown a lot more than he could use. One thing about business, though, is that it has to keep growing, keep expanding, and before one realises it, the need to grow, to expand, becomes the top priority.

As for whoever is the government, helping big business players virtually comes with the territory. In countries like Thailand, the gravitational pull of giant companies is even greater, as skilled labour is limited, political connections are important, and only a small number of people are ready to take “risks”.

So, the recipe for going back to Square One, where the big fish eat and control everything, is also very much there, despite the promises of the Jack Ma partnership. The reason for optimism is that online opportunities are real, and shortfalls of the digital revolution do not affect the people technology is supposed to serve. At least not yet.

In other words, durian growers have never been badly affected by online upheaval, unlike those in the media or entertainment industries. It’s simply because the durian growers knew about the Internet relatively less, or not at all.

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That is about to change, according to the Thai government and Jack Ma. A lot needs to be done, though, for the second mouse to really get the cheese.

Written By: The Nation Source: first published on 23 April 2018 in The Nation

(Q) Commentary: Why is China still a developing country?

Over 40 years of reform and opening-up, China has experienced an unprecedented growth, transforming from a relatively poor country to the world's second largest economy and the largest trader in goods.

But it still has a long way to go before it becomes a "developed economy."

China is a country with booming cities like Shanghai and Shenzhen. But it is also a country with many poor counties and villages.

At the historic 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC), Xi Jinping, general secretary of the CPC Central Committee, said China's international status as the world's largest developing country has not changed.

A government anti-poverty campaign has lifted more than 68 million people out of poverty over the past five years alone. But as of 2017, over 30 million Chinese, the equivalent of half of France's entire population, still lived below the poverty line.

Even for those who have risen out of extreme poverty, many still struggles to meet their basic daily needs, especially rural Chinese.

China's economic growth has been unbalanced, with cities on the coast growing robustly and many other regions remaining underdeveloped.

After a visit to China's west, International Monetary Fund senior consultant Nigel Chalk pointed out in 2010 how remarkably diverse the country was. It was hard to believe China was a developing country if one had only seen Shanghai. But further inland, things looked completely different. In the country's rural areas, many people still struggled to get by.

Eight years on, despite the epic changes that have taken place in China, that observation still applies. China faces the same problems that all other developing countries do: Most Chinese spend a high portion of their incomes just on food, they have a hard time finding good quality health care and have to fight pollution, and welfare benefits are few and far between.

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As Zhu Lijia, a public policy professor at the Chinese Academy of Governance, put it, compared with developed economies, China still lags far behind in important sectors like public services, law enforcement and social welfare.

Assessing GDP per capita is the primary way to determine whether a country is "developed" or not. China has the second largest GDP in the world, but its 1.4 billion people have to share that wealth.

Last year, China's GDP per capita was just over 8,800 U.S. dollars, less than the world average of 10,000 dollars, and just one seventh of that of the United States.

Zhu says that a country must have a GDP per capita higher than 12,700 dollars to be considered a developed economy and higher than 40,000 dollars to be considered a highly developed nation.

China still falls well below that mark.

Written By: Xinhua Source: People’s Daily Published: 5 June 2018

(R) Chinese firms need caution when wading into Southeast Asia’s nationalism

A Financial Times article on Sunday warned China of a need to improve the efficiency of its State-owned companies while making its projects more beneficial to people in Southeast Asian countries along the Belt and Road, as newly-elected Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad decided to review a slew of treaties signed with Chinese companies. It raised the question of stakes that Chinese firms must take in entering Southeast Asia under the initiative.

Five years on, the Belt and Road initiative has gained worldwide attention and interest. Southeast Asia, which sits atop China's diplomacy objectives, expects to get urgently needed opportunities from the initiative that is committed to improving infrastructure and enhancing national and regional connectivity. Better connectivity of countries like Malaysia, Vietnam, the Philippines and Thailand will also facilitate growth of the ASEAN community.

However, the presence of Chinese companies in the region is turning out to be a sensitive issue. With their proximity to China, Southeast Asian nations have seen territorial disputes arising from time to time, as shown by historical tensions in the South China Sea. Some countries with a high proportion of ethnic Chinese within their population have a history of anti-Chinese sentiment, discrimination against ethnic Chinese and vigilance about Chinese firms that are holding the

125 Selected Analysis countries' economic lifelines. Meanwhile, as infrastructure projects involve a slew of crucial domestic issues such as funding and land acquisition, locals are naturally sensitive to the involvement of foreign companies.

A case in point is the latest anti-China protests that broke out earlier this month in Vietnam. Although the country's newly-adopted Special Zone Act, which allows for the creation of special economic zones, didn't specifically mention China, Vietnamese voluntarily connected it with land-grabbing of Chinese investors. This tendency reflects just how alert people in Southeast Asian countries are to Chinese investment.

These entrenched challenges must be faced squarely and be handled delicately by Chinese companies in pushing forward Belt and Road projects. Enterprises have to exercise patience, recognize local needs of economic development and ensure a high standard of quality in building projects. It's also important for Chinese companies to abide by local laws and regulations, play by the rules and work with local companies rather than arrogantly shutting them out. In promoting the Belt and Road initiative, a well-behaved Chinese company can significantly elevate the image of China and win the necessary trust so that people will understand that the initiative indeed brings them opportunities toward development and bright prospects.

It'll take time for Southeast Asian people's doubts and vigilance about China to die away. Even now, some politicians incite nationalism against China to win votes, which hampers Southeast Asia's development and stops these countries from understanding the unselfish rise of China. Both Southeast Asia and China have to leave history behind and embrace the present.

Written By: Su Tan Source: Global Times Published: 25 June 2018 The author is a reporter with the Global Times.

Socio-cultural Affairs

(S) New Narrative on Human Rights

China is constructing its own human rights narrative to counter Western countries’ accusation. These countries often denounce developing countries, such as China, using the pretext of human rights violations. Usually, developing countries are beleaguered by fracas with the developed world over these alleged human rights issue.

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A seminar on the creation of China’s human rights discourse in the new era held in Changsha, central China’s Hunan Province, on April 12, was one of the latest efforts to tell China’s own story. The country’s understanding of human rights is based on its historical development.

Different traditions, cultures and economic conditions have resulted in diverse understandings of human rights in individual countries. As far as China is concerned, the paramount human rights issue is the right to survival and development. This is a crucial demand of the Chinese people, given that China, a country of 1.3 billion people with limited per-capita resources, was long subjected to foreign invasion, looting and oppression.

Since the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, particularly in the past four decades, China has witnessed a surge in its comprehensive national strength. It has achieved a historic leap from poverty to a relatively well-off society. China’s arable land accounts for less than 10 percent of the world’s total; yet it has managed to sustain more than 20 percent of the world’s population. Since the late 1970s, China has lifted more than 700 million people out of poverty, accounting for 70 percent of the world’s total population escaping poverty. China has set up the largest social security system in the world, with the population’s average life expectancy rising from 35 in 1949 to 76.34 in 2015. The Chinese people’s education has also been greatly improved. The enrollment rate for school-aged children in primary school is 99.88 percent, while higher education enrollment almost equals that of moderately developed countries.

In recent years, given the increasing prominence given to the rule of law, legal protection for human rights has been further enhanced. Human rights protection is stressed at all levels of China’s legal system and respect for human rights is regarded as crucial legislative principle. Moreover, awareness of human rights protection is rising among the population. All these are examples of China’s remarkable achievements in human right protection.

The concept of building a community with a shared future for mankind, proposed by President Xi Jinping, provides a theoretical guarantee for China to develop its human rights narrative. The concept covers peace, security, stability, equality, development and the environment, among others. It is not only about international relationships, but also the concept on the development of human rights for all humankind, transcending national borders. The concept stresses the importance of the right to development for countries and individuals, with peace, cooperation and development as the preconditions. In order to build a community with a shared future of mankind, the right to development must be emphasized, not least for those in impoverished countries and regions.

On March 23, 2017, the UN Human Rights Council passed two resolutions on economic, social and cultural rights, and the right to food. This marked the first

127 Selected Analysis time that the concept of community with a shared future for mankind was incorporated into Human Rights Council resolution, showing that this concept has become an important and recognized part of the international human rights theory.

The developing world yearns to shatter the West’s unfair “human rights diplomacy,” which is viewed as a political ploy. A China-sponsored resolution on “mutually beneficial cooperation in the field of human rights” was adopted by the UN Human Rights Council on March 23.

It appealed to all sides to promote cooperation on human rights by strengthening dialogue and pushing forward the development of a new type of international relationship based on mutual respect, fairness and justice and win- win cooperation, guided by the concept of a community with a shared future for mankind.

This is the Chinese approach to fairer and more rational global human rights governance, which represents a common aspiration of the international community. The resolution will not only enhance developing countries’ say on international human rights and relevant agendas, but also help advance the global human rights cause.

China views dialogue and cooperation as the most effective way to promote and protect human rights across the world. China’s human rights theory will not take shape overnight, but requires unremitting efforts. Through international exchanges, China can explain to the wider world its concept of human rights and its achievements in human rights development while responding to concerns. This will help make China’s narrative on human rights better understood and appreciated in the international community.

Written By: Lan Xinzhen Source: Beijing Review Published: 26 April 2018 The author is Beijing Review commentator.

(T) Do Chinese tourists lack respect for local customs and traditions?

Recently, the video of an altercation between two Chinese women and a barbecue restaurant employee in Japan’s Osaka has gone viral in China. In the video, the Japanese staff complained and waved the two female customers away, saying “You don’t need to pay the bill – please leave!” The two women claimed to have been “discriminated” against.

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However, according to an investigation by a Japanese news program, the two women stayed at the table beyond the buffet time limit, ordered a lot of beef but did not eat it, littered the floor with shrimp shells and filmed restaurant staff without permission.

It seems that the behavior of restaurant staff does not have anything to do with “discriminating” against Chinese people. The main reason for the argument was that the women tourists broke etiquette and shot footage violating the privacy of restaurant staff.

Although the Chinese tourists receives a lot of online vitriol, there is no need to make a fuss about the incident and generalize the behavior of the women.

In fact, following the buffet time and avoiding food wastage are common in Japan and China. The women could have been criticized even if it happened in China.

Of course some Chinese people waste food at buffets. But this does not mean that there is no waste among the Japanese, nor does it imply that every Japanese only takes as much food as is needed.

The essence of a buffet is the food variety rather than the amount. I think the women mistook the meaning of buffet. Such people are not in a minority in China.

In fact, showing respect food is an important part of Chinese and Japanese culture. Joining hands and saying “Let’s eat” before the meal has been part of Japanese daily life. In China, although there is no similar pre-dinner ritual, the verse “each grain was hard-earned” can be the earliest enlightenment for all Chinese people to cherish their food.

Unfortunately, such enlightenment does not fully integrate into daily life. The tourist duo seemed to waste food but brought to the fore the need for basic culture education in China and lack of respect for food.

It is true that badly-mannered Chinese tourists have been thrust into media spotlight from time to time during the past two or three years, but such problems are not unique to China.

Looking back at the development process in countries like the US, Japan and South Korea, their citizens have also behaved similarly during overseas trips. Hence, in term of etiquette, we do not need to overly underrate ourselves. We must have the courage to admit our faults and correct them.

Overall, the negative news about Chinese tourists is decreasing. Netizens are becoming increasingly rational and do not link to any criticism to

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“discrimination against the Chinese.” The overall quality of Chinese tourists is constantly improving.

In recent years, the term “Do as the Romans do” has been frequently mentioned. It reminds Chinese tourists traveling overseas to respect the customs and rituals of the host country.

There are few Chinese violators of Singapore’s chewing gum ban and Thailand’s lese majeste law. On the contrary, in many general cases such as avoiding food wastage, queuing and respecting others, Chinese tourists easily step out of line

In my opinion, the misbehavior of the Chinese women at the Osaka restaurant is not a result of lack of understanding of Japanese society, but a lack of discipline.

Thus, I think we do not necessarily need lessons on foreign social and cultural practices. Instead, it’s essential for us to make an effort to be more disciplined.

Written By: Chen Yang Source: Global Times Published: 12 June 2018 The author is an editor at the Global Times and a research fellow on Japan issues.

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Appendices

Appendix I: List of Selected Mekong-China Meetings (January-June 2018)

Name of The Meeting Date and Place Documentation Remarks

The 6th Lancang-Mekong Cooperation 9 January 2018 - - (LMC) Senior Officials’ Meeting In Phnom Penh, Cambodia

133 The 2nd Lancang-Mekong Cooperation 10-11 January 2018 1. Five-year Action Plan 1. See Section 2

(LMC) Leaders’ Meeting In Phnom Penh, Cambodia (2018-2022) Document (A)

Appendices 2. Phnom Penh Declaration 2. See Section 2 Document (B)

The 5th Greater Mekong Subregion 31 January-1 February Greater Mekong Subregion See Section 2 Environment Ministers’ Meeting 2018 Core Environment Program Document (C) (EMM-5) In Chiang Mai Province, Strategic Framework and Thailand Action Plan 2018-2022

Name of The Meeting Date and Place Documentation Remarks

The 6th Greater Mekong Subregion 29-31 March 2018 1. Joint Summit Declaration 1. See Section 2 (GMS) Summit In Hanoi, Vietnam 2. The Hanoi Action Plan Document (E) 2018-2022 2. See Section 2 3. Greater Mekong Subregion Document (F) Regional Investment 3. See Section 2 Framework 2022 Document (G)

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Appendices The 3rd Mekong River Commission 2-5 April 2018 Siem Reap Declaration See Section 2 (MRC)Summit In Siem Reap, Cambodia Document (H)

BOAO Forum for Asia Annual Meeting 8-11 April 2018 Xi Jinping’s Keynote Speech at See Section 2 2018 In Hainan Province, China the Boao Forum for Asia Document (I) Annual Conference 2018

The 8th Ayeyawade-Chao Phraya- 15-16 June 2018 1. Bangkok Declaration 1. See Section 2 Mekong Cooperation Strategy In Bangkok, Thailand 2. ACMECS Master Plan Document (J) (ACMECS) Summit 2018 (2019-2023) 2. See Section 2 Document (K)

Appendix II: Details of Selected Mekong- China Meetings (January-June 2018)

(A) The 2nd Lancang-Mekong Cooperation (LMC) Leaders’ Meeting

The development path of LMC started in 2012 when Thailand proposed the initiative of sustainable development of the LMC and got positive response from China. After that in November 2014, Chinese Premier Li Keqiang proposed the establishment of the LMC Framework at the 17th China-ASEAN Leaders’ Meeting. The member countries are the Kingdom of Cambodia, the People's Republic of China, Lao People's Democratic Republic, the Republic of the Union of Myanmar, the Kingdom of Thailand, and the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam.

The LMC aims to build a community of shared future of peace and prosperity in the basin, narrow the development gap among regional countries, support ASEAN Community building as well as promoting the implementation of the UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, and advance South-South cooperation. It wants to establish its cooperation as an example of a new form of international relations featuring win-win cooperation.

The LMC has three cooperation pillars, namely, (1) political and security issues, (2) economic and sustainable development, and (3) social, cultural and people- to-people exchange. The five priority areas of the cooperation include connectivity, production capacity, cross-border economic cooperation, water resources, and agriculture and poverty reduction.

The LMC covers 4 levels of meeting, comprising (1) LMC Leaders’ Meeting, (2) Foreign Ministers’ Meeting, (3) Senior Officials’ Meeting, and (4) Working Groups’ Meeting.

Leaders’ Meetings

The 1st LMC Leaders’ Meeting was held in Sanya, Hainan province, China on March 23, 2016 under the theme “Shared River, Shared Future”. The six member countries adopted Sanya Declaration and Joint Statement on Production Capacity Cooperation. They agreed to establish a community of shared future among member countries and set up a "3+5 cooperation framework". From the first meeting, the First Batch of Projects of LMC Special Fund has decided to support 132 cooperation projects. The LMC Water Resources Cooperation Center, Environmental Cooperation Center and the Global Mekong River Studies

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Center have been set up and the work has been carried out. The Hotline Platform of LMC National Secretariat/Coordination Units was also built in 2016.

The 2nd LMC Leaders’ Meeting was held under the theme “Our River of Peace and Sustainable Development” in Phnom Penh, Cambodia on January 10-11, 2018. The 4 documents were adopted;

(1) Five-years Action Plan of LMC 2018-2022 (2) The Phnom Penh Declaration (3) Joint list of 2nd batch of cooperation projects which has 214 projects this year (4) Six Joint Working Groups of Priority Areas

At the meeting, the member countries discussed several issues and promoted the increase of application of global satellite navigation systems including the Chinese Beidou System in Mekong countries. For political and security issues, they promoted dialogue and exchange among political parties and focused on non-traditional security threats such as combating drug, human trafficking, smuggling, terrorism, transboundary, cybercrimes, disaster prevention and mitigation. On economic cooperation, they proposed to improve production capacity, cross-border trade and built a long-term and sustainable financing system. They stressed the importance of the cooperation on water resource management, agriculture, poverty reduction, forestry and environmental protection. Lastly, on social and cultural issue, the meeting had agreed to establish the LMC Tourism Cities Cooperation Alliance in order to promote tourism and people exchange in the region.

China made five proposals to develop the LMC cooperation to develop capacity cooperation in water conservancy, infrastructure and other areas, to make the countries’ connectivity and action plan for capacity cooperation to push forward the construction of economic and trade cooperation zones, to expand agricultural cooperation and agricultural technology and to upgrade human resource cooperation by offering short-term training and in-service education for 2,000 people in the LMC countries and providing 100 four-year scholarships for undergraduates in 2018. For the 2nd batch of cooperation projects, China injected 300 million US dollar to fund related projects.

Foreign Ministers’ Meetings

The 1st LMC Foreign Ministers’ Meeting was held on November 12, 2015 in Jinghong, Yunnan Province, China, which issued the Concept Paper on the Framework of the LMC and the Joint Press Communiqué of the 1st LMC Foreign Ministers' Meeting.

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The 2nd LMC Foreign Ministers' Meeting was held in Siem reap, Cambodia, on December 23, 2016. The meeting reviewed and approved three important documents such as the Joint Press Communiqué of the 2nd LMC Foreign Ministers' Meeting, the Matrix of Follow-ups to the Outcomes of the 1st LMC Leaders' Meeting, and the General Principles for the Establishment of Joint Working Groups on the LMC Priority Areas. They also discussed the future development of the LMC.

The 3rd LMC Foreign Ministers’ Meeting was held in Dali, Yunnan Province, China on December 15, 2017. The six foreign ministers of member countries agreed to synergise the LMC with the development strategies of each member country, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and relevant development programs of ASEAN. They considered the Five-year Action Plan (2018-2022) for the 2nd LMC Leaders’ Summit which include list of cooperation projects in key priority sectors.

Senior Officials’ Meetings

The 1st LMC Senior Official's Meeting was held in Beijing, China on April 7, 2015 under the theme “Six Countries, One Community of Shared Destiny: building Lancang-Mekong Dialogue and Cooperation Mechanism to Promote Regional Sustainable Development”. The participants exchanged views on the 1st Foreign Ministers’ Meeting and the concept papers. They approved the goals, visions and key priority areas of the mechanism.

The 2nd LMC Senior Official's Meeting was held in Chiang Rai, Thailand on August 21, 2015. Senior officials prepared for the 1st Foreign Ministers’ Meeting and exchanged views on concept papers and the future development of the LMC mechanism.

The 3rd LMC Senior Official's Meeting was held in Sanya, China on February 24, 2016. Senior officials focused on the preparation of the 1st Foreign Ministers’ Meeting.

The 4th LMC Senior Official's Meeting was held in Siem Reap, Cambodia on December 22, 2016. Senior officials exchanged views on the preparation for the 2nd Foreign Ministers’ Meeting.

The 5th LMC Senior Official's Meeting was held in Kunming, Yunnan Province, China on October 28, 2017 to exchange view on the process of the LMC and future development plans and prepare a series of important meetings.

The 6th LMC Senior Officials’ Meeting was held in Phnom Penh, Cambodia on January 9, 2018 to review important documents such as the Five-year Action

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Plan, the Phnom Penh Declaration and also the list of the second batch of cooperation projects for the 2nd LMC Leaders’ Meeting.

The LMC provides not only benefits for the Mekong region but also supports the building of ASEAN Community, advances South-South Cooperation and enhances the implementation of the UN 2030 Agenda for sustainable development. The LMC’s member countries are also involved in many cooperation schemes such as the Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS), and the Ayeyawady-Chao Phraya-Mekong Economic Cooperation Strategy (ACMECS).

(B) The 5th Greater Mekong Subregion Environment Ministers’ Meeting (EMM-5)

The GMS Environment Ministers’ Meeting is held every three years by the environment ministers of six member countries, including the Kingdom of Cambodia, the People's Republic of China, Lao People's Democratic Republic, the Republic of the Union of Myanmar, the Kingdom of Thailand, and the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam to review progress and set the agenda for environmental cooperation in the region under the GMS. The cooperation aims to develop green growth pathways and address environmental challenges to support the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable development Goals (SDGs), the Paris Agreement on strengthening global responses to climate change, and the ASEAN Community. The Core Environment Program (CEP) is the main initiative of the GMS Economic Cooperation Program to provide strategic framework and action plan to give directions for the cooperation.

There are five GMS Environment Ministers’ Meeting until now as follows;

The 1st GMS Environment Ministers’ Meeting was held in Shanghai, China on May 24-25, 2005. The theme was “Managing Shared Natural Resources for Sustainable Development”.

The 2nd GMS Environment Ministers’ Meeting was held in Vientiane, Laos on January 28, 2008. The theme was “Sustainable Natural Resource Use for Economic Competitiveness”.

The 3rd GMS Environment Ministers’ Meeting was held in Phnom Penh, Cambodia on July 27-28, 2011. The theme was “Sustaining Natural Resources for Green and Inclusive Growth”.

The 4th GMS Environment Ministers’ Meeting was held in Nay Pyi Taw, Myanmar on January 27-29, 2015. The theme was “Increasing Investments in Natural Capital in the Greater Mekong Subregion”.

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The 5th GMS Environment Ministers’ Meeting was held in Chiang Mai, Thailand on January 31-February 1, 2018. The theme was “GMS Environmental Cooperation Toward Inclusive and Sustainable Growth”. The environment ministers endorsed the GMS Core Environment Program Strategic Framework and Action Plan, 2018-2022. The Meeting was organised by the GMS Working Group on Environment (WGE) with the support from the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and Thailand’s Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment.

The GMS was established in 1992 with assistance from the Asian Development Bank (ADB) aiming to support the implementation in priority areas such as agriculture, energy, environment, health and human resource development, information and communication technology, tourism, transport and trade facilitation, and urban development. The six member countries, comprising the Kingdom of Cambodia, the People's Republic of China, Lao People's Democratic Republic, the Republic of the Union of Myanmar, the Kingdom of Thailand, and the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam, launched the GMS Economic Cooperation Program to enhance their economic relations.

The GMS three-pronged strategy (the 3 Cs) are: increasing connectivity, improving competitiveness, and building a greater sense of community. The GMS Summit is held every 3 years for six leaders of GMS countries to (1) review and assess the progress made under the program; (2) renew commitment to cooperation and goals; (3) provide support, projects, and activities; and (4) provide broad directions for key initiatives under the GMS Program.

Six GMS Summits have been held as follows;

The 1st GMS Summit was held in Phnom Penh, Cambodia on November 3, 2002 under the theme “Making it Happen: A Common Strategy on Cooperation for Growth, Equity and Prosperity in the Greater Mekong Subregion”. The leaders endorsed the first GMS Strategic Framework (2002-2012) and launched the Phnom Penh Plan for Development Management.

The 2nd GMS Summit was held in Kunming, China on July 4-5, 2005 under the theme “A Strong GMS Partnership for Common Prosperity”.

The 3rd GMS Summit was held in Vientiane, Laos on March 30-31, 2008 under the theme “Enhancing Competitiveness through Greater Connectivity”.

The 4th GMS Summit was held in Nay Pyi Taw, Myanmar on December 19-20, 2011 under the theme “Beyond 2012: Towards a New Decade of GMS Strategic

139 Appendices

Development Partnership”. The GMS leaders endorsed the GMS Economic Cooperation Program Strategic Framework 2012–2022.

The 5th GMS Summit was held in Bangkok, Thailand on December 19-20, 2014 under the theme “Committed to Inclusive and Sustainable Development in the GMS”.

The 6th GMS Summit was held in Hanoi, Vietnam on March 29-31, 2018 under the theme “Leveraging on 25 Years of Cooperation, and Building a Sustainable, Integrated, and Prosperous GMS”. The GMS leaders adopted the Joint Summit Declaration, the Hanoi Action Plan 2018-2022, and the Regional Investment Framework 2022. The Meeting conducted the final review of joint declaration, deliverables, and arrangements for the 6th GMS Summit. They also organised the GMS Business Summit for GMS leaders and related sectors to share views on the key development issues and discuss how to strengthen cooperation. The Summit highlighted the 25th anniversary of the establishment of the Greater Mekong Subregion Economic Cooperation Program.

(D) The 3rd Mekong River Commission (MRC) Summit

The MRC is an intergovernmental organisation focusing on water diplomacy and regional cooperation. The member countries include the Kingdom of Cambodia, Lao People's Democratic Republic, the Kingdom of Thailand, and the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam. The previous cooperation was the Mekong Committee set up in 1957 and endorsed by the United Nations. After that on April 5, 1995, the member countries signed the Mekong Agreement of 1995 in Chiang Rai, Thailand establishing the MRC. The MRC is a platform for water management with 5 procedures such as exchanging and sharing data and information, monitoring water use, notifying and consulting with other members about diversions and uses of Mekong River, maintaining flow along the Mekong mainstream and water-quality rules. It acts as a regional knowledge hub on water resources management to help inform decision-making processes based on scientific evidence.

The MRC Summit is convened every four years and has 3 summits so far. Ministerial representatives from MRC Dialogue Partners, China and Myanmar, participated in the three Summits.

The 1st MRC Summit was held under the theme “Meeting the Needs, Keeping the Balance” in Hua Hin, Thailand on April 2-5, 2010. It was held on the 15th anniversary of the signing of the 1995 Mekong Agreement. In this Meeting, the member countries endorsed Hua Hin Declaration. They discussed about a range of challenges and opportunities of the Mekong Basin. They also focused on the need of challenge management through the principle of Integrated Water

140 Appendices

Resource Management (IWRM). The members launched the reforms of the MRC and approved the IWRM Basin Development Strategy and the MRC Strategic Plan 2011-2015.

The 2nd MRC Summit was held under the theme “Water-Food-Energy Nexus” in Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam on April 2-5, 2014. The Meeting focused on climate change issue and other challenges in the Mekong River Basin. China and Myanmar attended the Meeting as well to share experiences and discuss relevant issues. Ho Chi Minh Declaration was adopted by the member countries. They prepared and approved the Basin Development Plan 2016-2020, the MRC Strategic Plan 2016-2020, and the National Indicative Plans 2016-2020.

In 2018, Cambodia hosted the 3rd MRC Summit in Siem Reap on April 2-5, 2018 under the theme “Enhancing Joint Efforts and Partnerships towards Achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals in the Mekong River Basin”. The Meeting included 3 objectives, namely, reaffirm highest political commitment, recognise the progress, contribution and achievements, recognise the important role to develop and manage water and related resources and provide directions for enhancing joint efforts and partnerships. The member countries endorsed the Siem Reap Declaration.

(E) BOAO Forum for Asia Annual Meeting 2018

The BOAO Forum for Asia (BFA) was proposed in 1998 by Fidel V. Ramos, former President of the Philippines, Bob Hawke, former Prime Minister of Australia, and Morihiro Hosokawa, former Prime Minister of Japan. It was formally inaugurated on February 27, 2001. The Declaration of BFA and Guidelines of BFA Charter were adopted during the Inauguration Ceremony. The BFA’s permanent headquarters is in Boao, Hainan Province, China where it has been holding the annual conference since 2002. BFA is a non-governmental and non- profit international organization aiming to promote Asian countries to achieve common development through further integration of the regional economy. It wants to deepen the economic exchange, coordination, and cooperation within Asia and between Asia and other parts of the world and also offer the dialogue platform for governments, enterprises, experts, and scholars to discuss and share their views and experiences on the economy, society and relevant issues.

The first BFA annual conference was held on April 12-13, 2002 under the theme “New Century, New Challenge, A New Asia” with more than 1,900 delegates from 48 countries.

BFA 2018 was held on April 8-11, 2018 in Boao, Hainan Province, China under the theme “An Open and Innovative Asia for a World of Greater Prosperity”. It had more than 60 sessions under four key issues, namely globalization and the Belt

141 Appendices and Road Initiative, an open Asia, innovation, and reform. The major topics are as follows;

(1) The Asian Economy: Systemic Risks and Structural Reforms (2) The Future of Transportation, Production, Communication, Logistics, Internet and Finance (3) The Belt and Road Initiative (4) The Development of Emerging Markets (5) The Next Wave of Technological Revolution (6) Asian Economic Integration (7) Digital Economy: Rediscovering the Value of Human Wisdom (8) The Next Phase of Globalisation (9) The Sharing Economy (10) The Era of ABC (Artificial Intelligence, Big Data, Cloud Computing) (11) The New Retail: New Concept or New Trend?

Chinese President Xi Jinping delivered a keynote speech at the forum. He highlighted the need to reduce import tariffs and seek faster progress toward joining the World Trade Organisation Government Procurement Agreement, adopt policies to promote high-standard liberalisation and facilitation of trade and investment, and strengthen protection of intellectual property rights. China will continue its reform and opening-up policy and the Belt and Road Initiative to create a community of shared future for mankind.

(F) The 8th Ayeyawade-Chao Phraya-Mekong Cooperation Strategy (ACMECS) Summit 2018

The ACMECS is a cooperation platform aiming to strengthen ties among member countries including the Kingdom of Cambodia, Lao People's Democratic Republic, the Republic of the Union of Myanmar, the Kingdom of Thailand, and the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam by reducing economic barriers to cooperation. It is a platform bridging the economic gaps among the five countries, generating greater growth and increasing competitiveness along their borders. The six areas of cooperation are: trade and investment facilitation, agricultural and industrial cooperation, transport linkages, tourism cooperation, human resource development, and public health.

The ACMECS was established when Thailand proposed to have an "Economic Cooperation Strategy with leaders of Cambodia, Lao PDR and Myanmar". The First Leaders’ Meeting was held on November 12, 2003 in Bagan, Myanmar. Leaders of Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Thailand attended the Meeting and adopted the Bagan Declaration and the Economic Cooperation Strategy Plan of Action. They agreed to change the name of cooperation to “Ayeyawady-Chao Phraya-

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Mekong Economic Cooperation Strategy (ACMECS)”. Vietnam joined the ACMECS on May 10, 2004.

There are 8 working groups under ACMECS. They are: (1) trade and investment facilitation, (2) public health and social welfare development, (3) human resource development, (4) industrial and energy cooperation, (5) tourism cooperation, (6) transport linkage, (7) agricultural cooperation, and (8) environment.

Eight summits have been held so far. They were:

The 1st ACMECS Summit was held on November 12, 2003 in Bagan, Myanmar. The 2nd ACMECS Summit was held on November 1-3, 2005 in Bangkok, Thailand. The 3rd ACMECS Summit was held on November 3-7, 2008 in Hanoi, Vietnam. The 4th ACMECS Summit was held on November 16-17, 2010 in Phnom Penh, Cambodia. The 5th ACMECS Summit was held on March 11-13, 2013 in Vientiane, Laos. The 6th ACMECS Summit was held on June 22-23, 2015 in Nay Pyi Taw, Myanmar. The 7th ACMECS Summit was held on October 24-26, 2016 in Hanoi, Vietnam.

The 8th ACMECS Summit was held on June 15-16, 2018 in Bangkok, Thailand under the theme “Towards an Integrated and Connected Mekong Community”. The member countries adopted the ACMECS’ Five-year Master Plan for 2019- 2023 with 3 pillars, comprising seamless connectivity, synchronised ACMECS economics, and smart and sustainable ACMECS. The summit endorsed the Bangkok Declaration and pledged the commitment to achieve sustainable cooperation. In this Summit, it invited governments and members of the business sector from China and Japan, the major investors in ACMECS countries and ASEAN. The master plan focused on connectivity along the East West Economic Corridor (EWEC) and the Southern Economic Corridor (SEC).

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ISSN 2630-0885