MYANMAR DEFENSE COOPERATION to INCREASE ITS INFLUENCE in the INDIAN OCEAN in the CASE of BELT and ROAD INITIATIVE (2013-2017) by Cici Ernasari ID No

THE IMPLEMENTATION OF CHINA’S DEFENSE POLICY IN SINO-MYANMAR DEFENSE COOPERATION TO INCREASE ITS INFLUENCE IN THE INDIAN OCEAN IN THE CASE OF BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVE (2013-2017) By Cici Ernasari ID no. 016201400032

A thesis presented to the Faculty of Humanities President University in partial fulfillment of the requirements of Bachelor Degree in International Relations Major in Strategic and Defense Studies

2018

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ABSTRACT

Cici Ernasari, International Relations 2014, President University Thesis Title: “The Implementation of China’s Defense Policy in Sino-Myanmar Defense Cooperation to Increase Its Influence in the Indian Ocean in the case of Belt and Road Initiative (2013 – 2017)”

The rise of China has been a great phenomenon in the world particularly in this 21st century. This rise has led China becomes the world’s second largest economy and also the world’s largest military. This situation however pushed China to fulfill the increasing demand of energy and to seek for the alternative route. By sharing 2,204 kilometers of its border with China and has direct access to the Indian Ocean, Myanmar becomes a land bridge to get the access to Indian Ocean. Myanmar locates on tri-junction Southeast, South and East Asia and very abundance with natural resources. In the name of Pauk-Phaw, China and Myanmar relations has been existing since the ancient times and both countries have maintained substantive relations. In the context of belt and road initiative, China has implemented its defense policy through the economic and military cooperation with Myanmar. This research therefore explains the implementation of China’s defense policy in Sino-Myanmar defense cooperation to strengthening its position in the Indian Ocean in the context of belt and road initiative from 2013 until 2017.

Keywords: Policy Implementation, China’s Defense Policy, Sino-Myanmar Defense Cooperation, Economic Cooperation, Military Cooperation, Indian Ocean, Belt and Road Initiative

ABSTRAK

Kebangkitan Cina telah menjadi fenomena besar di dunia khususnya di abad ke-21. Kebangkitan ini telah menyebabkan China menjadi negara ekonomi terbesar kedua di dunia dan juga militer terbesar di dunia. Bagaimanapun, situasi ini juga mendorong Cina untuk memenuhi permintaan energi yang meningkat dan mencari rute alternatif. Dengan berbagi 2.204 kilometer perbatasannya dengan Cina dan memiliki akses langsung ke Samudera Hindia, Myanmar menjadi jembatan darat untuk mendapatkan akses ke Samudera Hindia. Myanmar terletak di persimpangan tiga Tenggara, Asia Selatan dan Timur, dan sangat berlimpah dengan sumber daya alam. Dalam nama Pauk-Phaw, hubungan Cina dan Myanmar sudah ada sejak zaman kuno dan kedua negara telah mempertahankan hubungan yang substantif. Dalam konteks inisiatif Belt and Road, Cina telah menerapkan kebijakan pertahanannya melalui kerjasama ekonomi dan militer dengan Myanmar. Oleh karena itu, penelitian ini menjelaskan penerapan kebijakan pertahanan Tiongkok dalam kerja sama pertahanan Tiongkok- Myanmar untuk memperkuat posisinya di Samudera Hindia dalam konteks inisiatif Belt and Road dari tahun 2013 hingga 2017.

Kata kunci: Implementasi Kebijakan, Kebijakan Pertahanan Cina, Kerjasama Pertahanan Cina-Myanmar, Kerjasama Ekonomi, Kerjasama Militer, Samudra Hindia, Inisiatif Belt and Road.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

First and foremost, I would like to express my gratitude to God Almighty for strengthening me to survive in four years study and finally finish this research. I would like to thank my family, especially to my mother Mrs. Erwinawati Gultom and my father Mr. Caong Tobing, my cousins Mr. Donald Tobing and Mrs. Anna Sitorus, for supporting me spiritually throughout my life and to my Dutch special friend Jochem Benjamin Stoof, for his personal support and encouragements. I would like to express my sincere gratitude to my thesis advisor Prof. Anak Agung Banyu Perwita, Ph.D. for guiding me during the thesis writing. I will never be able to finish this thesis writing without his excellence guiding. I would like to thank my internship colleague at Ministry of Foreign Affairs Indonesia particularly the Centre for Policy Analysis and Development for American and European Region, Mr. Dea Kurniawan and Ms. Muthia and at Embassy of the Republic of Indonesia The Hague Netherlands, Ms. Noira Soilani for helping in collecting data. I would like to thank my colleague mates especially Nurafni Damanik, Mita Listya, Syifa Afiah, Sri Ariani, Nuraini Ulandari, Oki Andeni Malta, Darysa Zolla Elpanda, Muhammad Agung Wicaksono, Nisrini Khairani, Dhianaswa Zhafira Mahanani, Ni Made Dian Damayanti, Siti Hendryani Putri, Hanna Uli Maria, Tania Amanda, Riyadh Bawazzir, Haekal Umri, Widya Dwi Rahma, Elsari Primadini, Heydi Tiffani, Anthony Nicholas, Aberson Natanael; to my beloved junior Bella Siallagan, Alfinco Simangunsong and Gleen Mononutu, for the extraordinary support in this research process.

Cikarang, May 2018

Cici Ernasari

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

THESIS ADVISER RECOMMENDATION LETTER ...... Error! Bookmark not defined. DECLARATION OF ORIGINALITY ...... Error! Bookmark not defined. PANEL OF EXAMINERS...... Error! Bookmark not defined. APPROVAL SHEET ...... Error! Bookmark not defined. ABSTRACT ...... v ABSTRAK ...... vi ACKNOWLEDGEMENT ...... vii TABLE OF CONTENTS ...... viii LIST OF ABREVIATIONS ...... x LIST OF FIGURES ...... xi LIST OF TABLES ...... xi CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION ...... 1 1.1 Background of Study ...... 1 1.2 Problem Identification ...... 4 1.3 Statement of The Problem ...... 7 1.4 Research Objective ...... 7 1.5 Significance of the Study ...... 7 1.6 Theoretical Framework ...... 7 1.6.1 Neorealism ...... 7 1.6.1.1 Neorealism vs Classical Realism…………………………………………………………………..……8 1.6.2 Strategic Environment ...... 8 1.6.3 Threat Perception ...... 9 1.6.4 Foreign Policy ...... 11 1.6.5 Defense Policy ...... 12 1.7 Research Methodology ...... 14 1.8 Scope and Limitations of the Study...... 14

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1.9 Thesis Structure ...... 15 CHAPTER II THE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT OF SINO - MYANMAR ...... 17 2.1 Geostrategic Importance of Myanmar ...... 17 2.1.1 Myanmar’s Strategic Position for China’s National Interest...... 19 2.1.2 China’s Strategic Position for Myanmar’s National Interest...... 22 2.1.3 The Dynamic of Myanmar Security ...... 23 2.2 The History of Pauk-Phaw: Sino-Myanmar Relations ...... 29 CHAPTER III BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVE: THE COMBINATION OF CHINA FOREIGN AND DEFENSE POLICY ...... 40 3.1 Belt and Road Initiative from China Foreign Policy Perspective...... 40 3.1.1 Foreign Policy of China ...... 40 3.1.2 Foreign Policy of China to Myanmar ...... 47 3.2 Belt and Road Initiative from China Defense Policy Perspective ...... 49 CHAPTER IV THE ANALYSIS OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVE TOWARD SINO-MYANMAR IN ECONOMIC AND MILITARY COOPERATION ...... 53 4.1 The Implementation of Belt and Road Initiative in Economic Cooperation .... 53 4.2 The Implementation of Belt and Road Initiative in Military Cooperation ...... 60 4.2.1 Joint Military Exercise ...... 63 4.2.2 Arms Transfer ...... 65 CHAPTER V CONCLUSION ...... 68 BIBLIOGRAPHY ...... 71

LIST OF ABREVIATIONS

BCIM Bangladesh China India and Myanmar

CMC China’s Central Military Commission

CNPC China National Petrochemical Corporation

CPPCC Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference

CPS Communist Party of China

IOR Indian Ocean Region

NLD National League for Democracy

OBOR One Belt One Road Initiative

PLA People’s Liberation Army

PLAN People’s Liberation Army Navy

PRC People’s Republic of China

SAARC South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation

SLORC State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC)

SPDC State Peace and Development Council

UNSC United Nations Security Council

WMD Western Military District (Russia)

LIST OF FIGURES Figure 1. China-Myanmar Pipeline ...... Error! Bookmark not defined. Figure 2. String of Pearls Map ...... Error! Bookmark not defined. Figure 3. Threat Perception Approaches ...... Error! Bookmark not defined. Figure 4. Flow Chart of China’s String of Pearls Implementation ... Error! Bookmark not defined. Figure 5. Myanmar Map ...... Error! Bookmark not defined. Figure 6. Interaction between Internal and External Actors in Myanmar ...... Error! Bookmark not defined. Figure 7. Map of String of Pearls ...... Error! Bookmark not defined. Figure 8. BCIM Economic Corridor ...... Error! Bookmark not defined. Figure 9. China-Myanmar Economic Corridor ...... Error! Bookmark not defined. Figure 10. Oil and Gas Pipeline Project ...... Error! Bookmark not defined. Figure 11. Kyaukpyu Port ...... 60 Figure 12. Top 15 Military Spenders in 2017 ...... 61 Figure 13. China Military Expenditure ...... 63 Figure 14. Myanmar Military Expenditure ...... Error! Bookmark not defined. Figure 15. Myanmar Arms Trade ...... Error! Bookmark not defined.

LIST OF TABLES Table 1. Time Table China-Myanmar Bilateral Activities (2013-2017) ...... Error! Bookmark not defined. Table 2. Arms Transfer to Myanmar ...... Error! Bookmark not defined.

CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background of Study The rise of China is one of a great phenomenon in the twenty-first century. Begun with the economic reforms in 1979, China has moved from a command economy to a free market system. This momentum has transformed China become the second world largest economy after the United States.1 Not only economically, but the term of “rise” here also refers to militarily.2 According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) 2016, China is the world’s second largest military after the United States with the total expenditure $215 billion.3

With a huge number of military spending, China indeed wants to secure their interest especially in territorial water. This is due to China is a rich maritime country in history and also a regional maritime power in East Asian. Reflected to China defense white paper 2015, China’s Military Strategy: “The traditional mentality that land outweighs sea must be abandoned, and great importance has to be attached to managing the seas and oceans and protecting maritime rights and interests.”4 This declaration has revealed that “maritime power” is becoming an essential part for Xi Jin Ping to pursue what is it called the “Chinese dream”.5

As China’s rising continues, it constantly spreads the influence to its neighbors and other countries– both land and water. One of the strategic plan is the development of maritime silk road as part One Belt One Road (OBOR) in the Indian

1 World bank databank 2 Christopher Bodeen, US Military Remains Dominant in Asia, but China is Rising, (Beijing: Defense, 2017), https://www.defensenews.com/digital-show-dailies/global-force-symposium/2017/03/07/us- military-remains-dominant-in-asia-but-china-is-rising/ 3 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute 4 Zhang Tao, Full Text: China's Military Strategy, (Beijing: Xinhua, 2015), accessed February 26, 2018, http://eng.mod.gov.cn/Press/2015-05/26/content_4586805_3.htm. 5 Sukjoon Yoon, "Implications of Xi Jinping's "True Maritime Power": Its Context, Significance, and Impact on the region," Naval War College Review 68, no. 3 (Summer 2015):, http://digital- commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol68/iss3/4.

Ocean region (IOR). The Indian Ocean is the third largest among world’s oceanic division.6 This region is very rich with natural resources and it is an important route for linking Asia to Middle East, Europe and Africa.7 For China, the Indian Ocean is a necessity for China to fulfill the economic and security interest. Besides, it supports the People Liberation Army (PLA) and its navy (the PLAN) to build its naval power into a blue water navy by 2030.

In pursuing the maritime power, China recently sees Myanmar as a gate to the Indian Ocean. After the first overseas military base in Djibouti, China is looking to increase their security and economic interest through Kyauk Pyu seaport. By looking at the geographic location, Myanmar indeed has a very strategic position. Myanmar lies on the tri-junction of East Asia, Southeast Asia and South Asia, and one-third of its perimeter being the coast, linking to the Indian Ocean.8 In addition,

Figure 1 China-Myanmar Pipeline

6 Sergei DeSilva-Ranasinghe, "Why the Indian Ocean Matters," The Diplomat, March 2, 2011, https://thediplomat.com/2011/03/why-the-indian-ocean-matters/2/. 7 Ibid 8 Anita E. Mathew, "Sino-Myanmar Relations and Impact on the Region," ORF, last modified February 26, 2011, http://www.orfonline.org/research/sino-myanmar-relations-and-impact-on-the- region/.

Myanmar is blessed by its natural gas9, which becomes essential element for China’s energy security in the future.

“Paukphaw” is the way China and Myanmar name themselves for each other. Paukphaw itself is a word from Myanmar which can be translated to sibling or intimate. By using this word “Paukphaw”, it refers to how close the ties between China and Myanmar and this specific term is specifically used for China and Myanmar relations.10 For centuries, both countries have maintained its relations especially the substantive relations.11 It can be seen from China’s pragmatic foreign policy where Beijing supports Yangon’s (Rangoon’s) military regime through the full spectrum of political, strategic and economic ties.12 In addition, quoted from former China’s president Hu Jintao on 2005 during the meeting with the Chairman of the Myanmar State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), he stated that “since ancient times, the people of two countries have conducted close exchanges as brothers. To build good – neighborly friendship between China and Myanmar is a major part of China’s foreign policy with neighboring countries.13

Despite of how close the relations they have – Myanmar still remains cautious of its relationship with China. Like any relations between countries, Sino – Myanmar relations have gone through several ups and downs in the past. Moreover, in a modern history of China and Myanmar relations it can be seen that China has posed a threat to Myanmar’s security as well. The threat itself is a result of the defeat of Chinese Nationalist (Kuomintang – KMT) troops in the northern Shan State of Myanmar from China’s Yunnan province.14 On 1967, there was a

9 Ibid 10 Lixin Geng, "Sino-Myanmar relations: analysis and prospects," Culture Mandala: The Bulletin of the Centre for East-West Cultural and Economic Studies 7, no. 2 (January 2007):, http://epublications.bond.edu.au/cm/vol7/iss2/1. 11 Ibid 12 Ibid 13 "Hu Jintao Meets with Chairman of Myanmar State Peace and Development Council Than Shwe," 欢迎访问中华人民共和国外交部网站, last modified April 23, 2005, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/topics_665678/hjtfw_665840/t193711.shtml. 14 Politics of Autonomy and Sustainability in Myanmar Change for New, ed. Walaiporn Tantikanangkul (Singapore: Springer, 2016), Kindle edition

confrontation between Burmese and resident overseas Chinese. These two conditions have cause an anti-Chinese movement riot in Yangon and it’s affecting the relations of two countries. Myanmar has been strict with its sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity and would like to remain neutral during Cold War.15 However, this situation has changed following the decision of changing the name of State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) to State Peace and Development Council (SPDC). Under international pressure, Myanmar had no choice but to accept close relations with China for its survival.16

It is arguable that Sino – Myanmar relations are good at the moment and can be improve more along the way in a long-term basis.17 However, it cannot be denied that there might be a risk of tension could be erupted between two countries in a short-term basis. Myanmar itself is a double-edged sword where internally it has this instability as a major concern that can influence both countries’ ties. While on the other hand, externally Myanmar is receiving pressure from United States and other western countries that might affect its relations with China.18

1.2 Problem Identification Following the changes in some Asia countries, for examples in India with the change of power recently has make the connections between India and its neighboring countries come alive. In regards of this change, some actions have been taken which are courtesy calls, diplomatic visits, exchange of gifts and some promises plus agreements between head of countries to counter China’s influence in Indian Ocean.19

15 Andrew Seth, "Is Naypyidaw Setting the Agenda in US-China-Burma Relations?," Lowy Institute, last modified September 18, 2015, https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/naypyidaw-setting- agenda-us-china-burma-relations. 16 Ibid 17 Mikaela Smith, "The Nuances of Win-Win: China-Myanmar Relations in 2018," China-US Focus, last modified January 30, 2018, https://www.chinausfocus.com/foreign-policy/the-nuances-of-win- win-china-myanmar-relations-in-2018. 18 Ibid 19 Ashay Abbhi, "String of Pearls: India and the Geopolitics of Chinese Foreign Policy," July 2015, xx, http://www.e-ir.info/2015/07/26/string-of-pearls-india-and-the-geopolitics-of-chinese-foreign-policy/.

China, for such a long time, has been accused in pursuing strategic maneuvers to encircling India in the Indian Ocean.20 This accuse was made based on how China eagerly has been reaching out to India’s neighbors such as Nepal in the south east to Myanmar, Bangladesh to Sri Lanka in the south and Pakistan in the west. In against of Pakistan in the UN for the release of the 26/11 mastermind, China has used its veto right and it caused the world’s attention to be back to Sino – Pakistan relations. China and Pakistan are well known as all-weather partner21 since they started the diplomatic relations in 1972. Both countries have shared interest especially in economic and security. Meanwhile, with the other major neighbor of India– Bangladesh, China has expanded its naval bases in Chittagong port and has invested $24 Billion Aid22 to enhance the economic and technical cooperation projects.

From China’s approaches toward India’s neighbor, it can be assumed that China wants choke India diplomatically. It indirectly reduces Indian influence, weakens linkages with its neighbors and as a strategic suffocation. It followed by the match between the theory of China that aims to contain India’s influence over its neighbors and called as the reverse ‘string of pearls’ by PM Mohdi.23

20 Ibid 21 Saibal Dasguptal, "China jumps to all-weather friend Pakistan's defense," The Times of India World, January 2, 2018 22 "China to sign $24 billion in loans to Bangladesh, overtakes PM Modi’s $2 billion credit line," The Indian Express, October 14, 2016, http://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-news-india/china-to- sign-24-billion-in-loans-to-bangladesh-overtakes-pm-modis-2-billion-credit-line-3081974/ 23 Sanjive Sokinda, "India’s Strategy for Countering China’s Increased Influence in the Indian Ocean," Indo-Pacific Strategic Papers, October 2015, http://www.defence.gov.au/ADC/Publications/IndoPac/Sokinda_IPS_Paper.pdf.

China’s string of pearls or ‘reverse’ are both China’s foreign policy which aim massively in one agenda which is to have strong influence in the Indian Ocean.24 The rational of these two foreign policies is Indian Ocean is the choke point for India and China’s energy supplies. For example, Malacca Strait, it has important role in transporting 80% of China’s oil and gas from the Middle East and African producers.25 Knowing that this area (Indian Ocean) is really important for its transportation route, China is constantly pursuing campaign to have friendly relations and more importantly friendly influence in the region, whereas the lack of friendly influence over the region could threatened China’s import oil and gas, which can lead to a possible energy shutdown. As an example of what happened

Figure 2 String of Pearls Map

during the case of military logjam with India, where India cut off China’s chokepoint for oil in the Malacca Straits in 1971 and 1999.

As the demand of energy consumption is increasing and lead to high import activity and dependency, at least until China’s gas production becomes sustainable,

24 Ibid 25 B. A. Hamzah, "Alleviating China's Malacca Dilemma," Institute for Security and Development Policy, last modified March 13, 2017, http://isdp.eu/alleviating-chinas-malacca-dilemma/.

has led China to find alternative way in securing its trade route or handle the situation diplomatically. This can be achieved by having friendly relations or influence or at least cozying the relations with countries. in the Indian Ocean. There are 4 significant countries toward China’s presence in the Indian Ocean which are Myanmar, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, and Pakistan.

1.3 Statement of The Problem - How did China implement its Defense Policy in Sino-Myanmar Defense Cooperation to Increase Its Influence in the Indian Ocean in the case of Belt and Road Initiative (2013-2017)?

1.4 Research Objective The main purpose of this study is to answer the question using qualitative methods and to comprehend the implementation of China’s Defense Policy in Sino- Myanmar Defense Cooperation and how the cooperation strengthens China’s presence in Indian Ocean.

1.5 Significance of the Study The significant study of Sino-Myanmar defense cooperation is to understand the impact of Sino-Myanmar defense cooperation toward China position in Indian Ocean and to produce references for research students who has interest in the same field of study.

1.6 Theoretical Framework

1.6.1 Neorealism Neorealism or also known as structural realism is one of theory in International Politics introduced by Kenneth Waltz. Waltz in his book entitled Theory of International Politics (1979) has defined the nature of International Relations by separating the state level.26 Structural realism believes that states live in anarchic

26 Kimberly Hutchings, "Realism and Idealism," in International Political Theory: Rethinking Ethics in a Global Era (London: SAGE Publications, 2006), Kindle Edition

7 system.27 In this occasion anarchy means the absence of world government. Therefore, every actor (states) in international system should be responsible to look after themselves and consider the international system as a “self-help” system.

1.6.1.1 Neorealism vs Classical Realism Comparing to Hans Morgenthau in school of thought Human nature realist, he emphasizes that all human beings are born with type of personality. When it gets into a power, what are they going to do is to pursue power and end in itself.28 Human nature is the way of human beings are born that causes conflict in the international system.29 This concept is totally different with the structural realist as they believe that it is not human nature that causes states to behave aggressively. The reason of what causes states to engage in security competition because in fact there is no higher authority above state. These factors lead a state to the concept of capability– which is an instrument for a state to survive.

Second, as Classical Realism argues that the ‘historical variability’ of a state and its ontological superiority toward international system as a whole, neorealism comply the ‘continuity’ assumption whereby the anarchical states system is an ‘autonomous and self-constituting realm’ ontologically superior to the units comprising it.

1.6.2 Strategic Environment “Strategy is the art and science of developing and employing instruments of national power in a synchronized and integrated fashion to achieve theater, national, and/or multinational objectives.”

Harry R. Yarger30

27 Ibid. 28 John Mearsheimer, "Structural Realism - International Relations (1/7)," YouTube, October 3, 2014, https://youtu.be/RXllDh6rD18 29 Ibid. 30 Harry R. Yarger, STRATEGIC THEORY FOR THE 21st CENTURY: THE LITTLE BOOK ON BIG STRATEGY, (2006), http://www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil/.

The concept of strategy theory as a method of analysis in international relations study has slowly spread throughout the work of Thomas Schelling and Colin Gray over 40 years ago.31 In a very simple meaning, strategy refers to a way of individual or groups in achieving their common goals or shared objectives, coming up with several possible ways and scenarios that might affect the processes along the way, and in the end confidence enough to execute the plans. However, in the real life, the process of strategy is not that easy as it seems. Having strategic goal(s) are complex and sometimes contradictory. Thus, the process of strategic and decision making begin with an assessment of the environment within the premises.32

Strategy itself can be compared to a plan but the distinctive difference between strategy and a plan is strategy is broader in scale, long term in nature and surrounded by more uncertainties.33 Moreover, strategic choices of an individual or organization(s) may be affected by their environments – thus, environmental factors are influencing capabilities for strategic choices.34

Knowing that environment can affect the strategic choices, the concept of strategic environment arises within the study of international relations. However, in the study of international relations environment is not only limited to physical environment such as terrain, land forms, oceans and seas, and climate – but it also covers the spatial relationship, natural resources, and lines of communications.35 Thus, a good knowledge and understanding of a strategist in perceiving physical environment is necessary.

1.6.3 Threat Perception According to Davis (2000), a threat can be defined as a situation in which an actor or a group has intention to inflict negative consequence toward the other actor

31 M.L.R Smith, "Strategic Theory: What it is...and just as importantly, what it isn't?," April 2011, http://www.e-ir.info/2011/04/28/strategic-theory-what-it-is…and-just-as-importantly-what-it-isn’t/. 32 Ibid. 33 Ibid. 34 Ibid. 35Michael Howard, “The Strategic Environment”. Pg. 22

9 or group.36 Threats can be divided into two categories; threats on individuals and threats on collective of individuals.37 Generally, in the scope of International Relations, threats mostly happen among collective of individuals. It can be in term of military threats, economic threats and also cultural threats.38 Threat was conveniently equated to power, largely to military power and scholars move easily from ‘objective’ measures of power to threat assessment, assuming equivalence between the two. Only in the several decades, scholars begun to look seriously at intention as a source of threat. Thus, the simple definition of threat perception can be described as capability x intention.

Robert O. Tilman, a professor of political science mentions that there are five dimensions that could affect threat perception;39

• The Structural Dimension; involves the consideration of political instrument in executing foreign policy. • The Geopolitical Dimension; measured by the geographic position of a state. • The Historical Dimension; refers to the past relations of a state (can be friends and can be enemies) in which obviously could affect the perception of future. • The Socio-Cultural Dimension; refers to how a culture, ethnic and religious value could shape a foreign policy. • The Economic Dimension; refers to the national expenses such as military expenses.

36 David L. Rousseau and Rocio Garcia-Retamero, "Identity, Power, and Threat Perception," Journal of Conflict Resolution 51, no. 5 (October 2007): xx, doi:10.1177/0022002707304813. 37 Ibid 38 Ibid. 39 Robert O Tilman, Southeast Asia and the Enemy Beyond: ASEAN Perceptions of External Threats (Boulder: Westview Press, 1987), PDF e-book.

Structural Dimension

Economic Geopolitical Dimension DImension Threat Perception

Socio- Historical Cultural Dimension Dimension

Figure 3 Threat Perception Approaches

1.6.4 Foreign Policy “To identify factors is not to trace their influence. To understand processes that affect external behavior is not to explain how and why they are operative under certain circumstances and not under others. To recognize that foreign policy is shaped by internal as well as external factors is not to comprehend how the two intermix or to indicate the conditions under which one predominates over the other’’ Rosenau40

By its concept, foreign policy refers to the management of external relations and activities of state. It involves goals, strategic, measure, methods, guideline, agreements and so on. For a scholar like Modelski (1962), he defines foreign policy as a system of activities or a plan which states attempt to change the behavior of the other states.41 Through this perspective, he sees decision maker as an important element in process of executing a foreign policy. As it involves activities in international system, foreign policy here cannot be separated with the other elements namely power of state and in which formulation foreign policies are being implemented.42 To conclude, foreign policy for Modelski’s concept is all about policy

40 Valerie M. Hudson, "Foreign Policy Analysis: Actor-Specific Theory and the Ground of International Relations," Foreign Policy Analysis 1, no. 1 (2005): xx, doi:10.1111/j.1743- 8594.2005.00001.x. 41 Vinsensio Dugis, "Explaining Foreign Policy Change," Masyarakat, Kebudayaan dan Politik, 2007, http://journal.unair.ac.id/filerPDF/02_Dugis.pdf. 42 Ibid.

11 makers, aims, principles, power to implement, and the context of in which foreign policy is formulated and implemented.

1.6.5 Defense Policy “To develop and maintain assets, including combat forces, which can be used in the support of the security policy of a state, and to ensure that coherent arrangements exist, agreed across government, for their possible employment.” The purpose of defense policy - Clausewitz43 As an impact of growing globalization in governance and security sector, most countries admit that their defense and everything related to security activities should be under a great control.44 This means defense is likened an umbrella which is not necessary unless it’s raining but now it is a main necessity after the rain comes. In this case, a task of defense manager is to ensure all the equipment must be well- maintained, stored and acquired.45 It is not only the equipment which is being managed but also the people are recruited and trained. These activities commonly happen during the peacetime or away from battlefield or in another way this mostly like business space between defense manager with the rest of public sector such as private enterprise.

Referring to these values and interests, defense policy is an essential instrument in order to achieve those objectives. In simple way, defense policy can be understood through what to defend, who to defend and how to defend.46 What to defend can be in term of national values, goals and interest, who to defend refers to government, armed forces and people. Meanwhile, how to defend refers to the strategic such as development, diplomacy and defense.

43 "Policy Formulation and Execution," in Managing Defense in a Democracy, ed. Laura R. Cleary and Teri McConville (Oxon: Routledge, 2006), 44 Ibid. 45 Ibid. 46 Ibid.

National Interest

Strategic Environment (Geostrategic importance of Myanmar)

Threat Perception (India's Influence in Myanmar)

Foreign Policy Belt and Road Initiative Defense Policy

Figure 4 Flow Chart of China’s Belt and Road Implementation

From figure 4, the writer would like to depict the analytical flow of building this research. The first diagram is begun with the national interest of China in securing the interest in territorial water. Refers to China Defense White paper 2015, China indeed wants to defend their identity as a rich maritime country at the past and as regional maritime power in East Asian. To pursue its maritime interest, China has executed the development of maritime silk road as a part of One Belt One Road Initiative (OBOR). Following this maritime silk road, China currently sees Myanmar as an essential gate to Indian Ocean. Looking at its strategic position, Myanmar locates on tri-junction of South Asia, Southeast Asia and East Asia and it is very blessed with natural gas which is very important for China’s future energy security. However, in executing this strategic plan, China should be able to assess with the

13 possibilities happened such as India’s influence in Myanmar. This can be one of obstacle for China since both are emerging power countries and have the same interest in Indian Ocean. In order to counter this issue, one of China strategy is by reaching out to India’s neighbors or known as Belt and Road Initiative. The concept of Belt and Road Initiative that the writer would like to elaborate here is as the combination of foreign and defense policy.

1.7 Research Methodology Following the chosen topic, this research will be written as qualitative research and in a form of explanatory research. Kothari on his book “Research Methodology: Methods and Techniques” wrote that this type of research “its aim is to discover the underlying motives of human behavior and analyze the various factors which motivate people to behave in particular manner”.47 As this is a qualitative research, review of theories, literatures and previous research finding will be the basic source to form a research design and data analysis.

1.8 Scope and Limitations of the Study Following the research question How did China implement its Defense Policy in Sino-Myanmar Defense Cooperation to Increase Its Influence in the Indian Ocean in the case of Belt and Road Initiative (2013-2017)? this research will limit its scope and limitation. Within this research, it will explain and elaborate more on the elements in affecting Sino – Myanmar Relations and how those elements affect toward the policy implementation of China. It will talk mainly about China and Myanmar as the primary actors and a bit of relations with neighboring countries such as India.

To limit the broader time frame of this research, it will discuss the Sino – Myanmar Relations from the moment China formally begun to access Indian Ocean through Pipeline project in Kyaukpyu on 2013. To avoid the future prediction, it will set 2017 as the time stop of this research.

47 C. R. Kothari, "Research Methodology: An Introduction," in Research Methodology: Methods and Techniques (New Delhi, IN: New Age International (P) Limited, Publishers, 2004)

1.9 Thesis Structure 1. Chapter I – Introduction

In this chapter, the writer explains more about background of this research. It mainly discusses about the rise of China, the national interest of China based on China Defense White Paper, the development of maritime silk road as part of One Belt One Road Initiative and China’s presence in Indian Ocean through cooperation with Myanmar.

2. Chapter II – The Strategic Environment of Sino – Myanmar

In this chapter, the writer will discuss about the strategic Environment of Sino-Myanmar. It will include the strategic position of Myanmar and how it becomes beneficial for China to pursue its national interest. Besides that, the writer will also mention earlier about the possibilities threat such as the influence of India in this region.

3. Chapter III – Belt and Road Initiative: The Combination of China Foreign and Defense Policy

In this chapter, the writer will elaborate Belt and Road Initiative as the combination of Foreign and Defense Policy. Foreign policy can be in term of diplomatic relations while defense policy can be in term of military cooperation.

4. Chapter IV – The Analysis of The Implementation of Belt and Road Initiative toward Sino – Myanmar in Economic and Military Cooperation

In this chapter, the writer will analyze the implementation Belt and Road Initiative in Economic and Military Cooperation. It includes the defense policies implemented by China in order to support their presence in Indian Ocean.

5. Chapter V – Conclusion

In this chapter, the writer will conclude and sum up the whole research and answer the research question.

CHAPTER II THE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT OF SINO - MYANMAR 2.1 Geostrategic Importance of Myanmar "In 1994, Myanmar developed a national environmental policy to integrate environmental governance into the national economic development programme. Now, Myanmar needs a new multifaceted national environmental policy and strategic framework that addresses new challenges.” - H.E. U Htay Aung- Permanent Secretary of Ministry of Natural Resources and Environmental Conservation (MNREC)48

Looking at geographical position, Myanmar is a unique place– lies on tri- junction Southeast, South and East Asia. It covers the total area of 678,000 square kilometers.49 Myanmar’s territory touches five different countries including the two giants, China and India. There are India and Bangladesh in the west and northwest part, China in the north and the northeast part, and Laos in eastern most part and Thailand from the southwest to the southern part.50

Myanmar has three coasts with the total length nearly 3,000 kilometers.51 One coast namely the Western Rakhine coast facing the Bay of Bengal and the Indian Ocean, the second one namely Southern Taninthayi coast facing the Andaman Sea and the third coast is Central Delta which lies in between.52 There are 852 various size islands within Myanmar’s water territory and being distributed in the Bay of

48 UNDP Myanmar Press Release 2016 49 John Pike, "Myanmar - Geography," GlobalSecurity.org, last modified January 6, 2017, https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/myanmar/geography.htm. 50 Andrew Seth, Burma: A Strategic Perspective, ([San Francisco, Calif.]: Asia Foundation, 2001), http://www.asiafoundation.org/pdf/wp13.pdf. 51 Christoph Zöckler, Simon Delany, and Janet Barber, "Sustainable Coastal Zone Management in Myanmar," ArcCona Ecological Consultants, last modified November 2013, http://www.lighthouse- foundation.org/fileadmin/LHF/PDF/Myanmar_- _Scoping_Paper_Myanmar_Coastal_Zone_Management_211113_96dpi.pdf. 52 Ibid

Bengal, especially on the Rakhine coast, the southern part of the Ayeyarwaddy Delta, and the forming Myeik archipelago off the Tanintharyi coast.53

Following its geostrategic position, Myanmar’s topography can be divided into four parts; In the north and west, there is a mountain area with the length around 1,830 to 6,100 m and with the altitude 6,000–20,000 ft. and including the coastline of the Arakan Yoma mountain and the Bay of Bengal; in the east, there is a Shan– a deep plateau; in the southeast, there is a main cultivation area surrounded by Irrawaddy river and the Salween River and in the South, there is delta and lower valley regions which is part of Irrawaddy and Sittang rivers.54

Figure 5 Myanmar Map

53 Jürgen Haacke, "Myanmar and Maritime Security," The Asan Forum, last modified February 22, 2016, http://www.theasanforum.org/myanmar-and-maritime-security/. 54 "Topography - Myanmar - Located, Area," Encyclopedia of the Nations - Information About Countries of the World, United Nations, and World Leaders, accessed April 18, 2018, http://www.nationsencyclopedia.com/Asia-and-Oceania/Myanmar-TOPOGRAPHY.html.

Besides that, this strategic location also supports Myanmar with abundance of natural resources such as oil and gas, various minerals, precious stones and gems, timber and forest products, hydropower potential, etc.55 These natural resources have contributed to Myanmar’s national income especially in sector natural gas, rubies, jade and timber logs.56

2.1.1 Myanmar’s Strategic Position for China’s National Interest

With its strategic location and abundance of natural resources, Myanmar has become a strategic point for some countries who wants to build connectivity and cooperation, including its giant neighbor– China. According to Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), China emerged as a main trade partner of Myanmar which has reached $5.5 billion with the total value of Myanmar’s export to China $2.46 billion and the import estimation around $3 billion.57 Besides that, China also has become Myanmar’s arms largest supplier.58

“The traditional mentality that land outweighs sea must be abandoned, and great importance has to be attached to managing the seas and oceans and protecting maritime rights and interests.” Therefore, the PLA Navy shall be focus on the combination of ‘offshore waters defense’ with ‘open seas protection,’. Defense White Paper (2015)59

55 "Myanmar's Natural Resources: Blessing or Curse? | Heinrich Böll Foundation," Heinrich Böll Foundation, last modified December 11, 2013, https://www.boell.de/en/2013/12/11/myanmars-natural- resources-blessing-or-curse. 56 Ibid. 57 Tridivesh S. Maini and Sandeep Sachdeva, "China Faces Increasing Competition in Myanmar," The Diplomat, November 14, 2017, https://thediplomat.com/2017/11/china-faces-increasing-competition- in-myanmar/. 58 Ibid. 59 China Defense White Paper 2015

Refers to China Defense White Paper 2015, it reflects the focus of China interest on maritime domain. As the top exporter and importer country, China is gaining wealth through trade from the ocean. Besides, The growing economic of China has led to the demand of domestic energy needs especially in oil and natural gas.60 To understand the importance of Myanmar for China’s National Interest can be seen through the foreign policy implemented by China at the crossroads of South and Southeast region, which is directly connected to Indian Ocean– a place with plenty of energy and mineral resources.61 These factors are making Myanmar is not only strategically but also economically important for China. Therefore, it can be concluded that Myanmar becomes a strategic interest for China through; Energy Security, Securing access to the Indian Ocean and border security.62

Secondly, the strategic position of Myanmar for China’s growing interest can be seen through China’s dependency on Indian Ocean.63

“One of China’s major construction companies is scheduled to start building a $7.3 billion deep-sea port next year at Kyaukpyu, a port town in Rakhine on the Indian Ocean. Pipelines from the port carry gas and oil through Rakhine to southern China.” -New York Times-64

60 China Defense White Paper 2015. 61 Jash Amrita, "China in India’s ‘Look East’- Myanmar: Strategic Interests and Security Concerns," International Research Journal of Social Sciences 3, no. 6 (June 2014): p.54-57, http://www.isca.in/IJSS/Archive/v3/i6/8.ISCA-IRJSS-2014-81.pdf. 62 Ibid. 63 Jonathan Ward, "The Rise of Asia's Maritime Powers: China and India Compete for Supremecy," The News Lens International Edition, last modified January 19, 2017, https://international.thenewslens.com/article/59611. 64 Jane Perlez, "In China, Aung San Suu Kyi Finds a Warm Welcome (and No Talk of Rohingya"," New York Times, November 30, 2017, xx, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/30/world/asia/china- myanmar-aid-sanctions.html.

As one-third of its perimeter being the coast and linking to the Indian Ocean, China has seen Myanmar as the most convenient land bridge to build access to Indian Ocean. This is not only for the trade routes but also for the security purpose. The various projects have been executed by China including the construction of road, rail and air transport from Yunnan Province in Southwest to Indian Ocean through Myanmar.65 Besides that, China wants to enhance its naval capability which also supports its Sea Lanes of Communication by building naval base in Kyaukpyu. From this view, it can be understood that the current Chinese project on Myanmar has been seen as China’s ‘two-ocean strategy’ in order to gain access to both –Indian and Pacific Ocean.66

Another factor to assess the growing interest of China in Myanmar is the willingness to secure the border area.67 Quoted from Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China official website: “China is ready to continue to play a constructive role in promoting Myanmar's peace process, and make joint efforts with Myanmar to safeguard peace and stability along the border between the two nations.”68 In supporting its rise, China should be able to maintain peace and a stable neighborhood. In fact, there are non- traditional security issue in north and north-east area of Myanmar-China boundary that could harm the stability in the southwest China. These non- traditional issues are including drug trafficking, illegal immigrant, smuggling, gambling and money laundering.69 In order to cope with this problem, security along border has become a major concern of China on Myanmar. In

65 Bai Tiantian, "China Needs Roads, Rail to Link Yunnan to Myanmar’s Kyaukpyu: NPC Delegates," Global Times, last modified March 7, 2017, http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1036494.shtml. 66 Kyaukpyu: Connecting China to the Indian Ocean, (Washington: Centre For Strategic & International Studies, 2018), https://www.csis.org/analysis/kyaukpyu-connecting-china-indian-ocean. 67 Xi Jinping Meets with State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi of Myanmar, (Beijing, 2016), http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1390888.shtml. 68 Ibid. 69 Jash Amrita, "China in India’s ‘Look East’- Myanmar: Strategic Interests and Security Concerns," International Research Journal of Social Sciences 3, no. 6 (June 2014): p.54-57, http://www.isca.in/IJSS/Archive/v3/i6/8.ISCA-IRJSS-2014-81.pdf.

addition, China’s growing interest on Myanmar can be seen through the defense cooperation with Myanmar. For further explanation, the detail of China-Defense cooperation will be elaborated on Chapter 4 in this research.

2.1.2 China’s Strategic Position for Myanmar’s National Interest

“Myanmar thanks China for the valuable help it has provided over time and cherishes its traditional friendship and good-neighborly relations with China. Myanmar is ready to maintain exchanges with China's new leadership, push for mutually beneficial cooperation, and faithfully implement relevant projects, so as to produce new progress in their comprehensive strategic partnership. The Myanmarese president said his country is dedicated to reform and opening up and stable development, hopes to get continuous support from China, and welcomes Chinese enterprises to continue to take part in its economic buildup.” -Thein Sein Keynote Speech on BOAO Forum for Asia 2013-70

Following the relationship between China and Myanmar– it has deserved Myanmar’s interest as well. Myanmar however with its abundance of resources facing difficulties in cultivating those resources. These challenges due to lack of technology and there is still under developed area in Myanmar.71 In this situation, China as a rising power which shares a 2,000- kilometer border with Myanmar has assisted in infrastructure development which is a part of the cooperation between two countries. For instance, 20 out of the 21 hydro-power companies in Myanmar are Chinese company.72 In addition, China also involves in rail, road, tele-communication and airport

70 Xi Jinping Meets with Myanmar's President U Thein Sein Stressing the Importance of Steering the Bilateral Relationship in the Right Direction and Unswervingly Pushing Forward China-Myanmar Friendship, (Sanya: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, 2013) 71 Glenn B. Maguire, Eugenia Victorino, and Warren Hogan, "Myanmar - Asia's Uncut Gem," ANZ Research, last modified February 2015, https://s3-eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/papillon- local/uploads/5/7/AU20519%20IIB%20InDepth%20Report_Short%20form_Myanmar_AW.pdf. 72 Anita E. Mathew, "Sino-Myanmar Relations and Impact on the Region," ORF, last modified February 26, 2011, http://www.orfonline.org/research/sino-myanmar-relations-and- impact-on-the-region/.

development projects in Myanmar.73Through this economic dimension, China has contributed on Myanmar’s GDP growth increasing from 5.5 percent in 2012 to 6.5 percent in 2013.74

Apart of economic sector, China has supported Myanmar’s objective on political aspect in international community especially when it comes to the negotiation of natural resources exploitation with regional or international companies.75Looking at its strategic position, Myanmar is very rich surrounded by developing countries. For a country to develop, they should be able to get access to natural resources. Energy is a main need for a country to keep growing.76 In this purpose, Myanmar sees the close relation with China as a chance to increase its influence with other power such as India and ASEAN to gaining more political support for its development as well as increasing the economic objective.

2.1.3 The Dynamic of Myanmar Security In recent years, Myanmar has caught the world’s attention with various occasions for various reasons. Started from the issue of Aung San Suu Kyi and her fight for democracy and other issues which involves international media and become the headline all around the world. In addition, the lack of proper management on Myanmar's damages due to military regime and the insufficient aid put Myanmar in the international spotlight.77 In 2011, After

73 Ibid. 74 Tang Xiaoyang, "Chinese Investment Is Key to Myanmar's Reforms," Carnegie-Tsinghua Center, last modified January 25, 2014, https://carnegietsinghua.org/2014/01/25/chinese-investment-is-key-to- myanmar-s-reforms-pub-54299. 75 Billy Tea, "China and Myanmar Strategic Interests, Strategies and the Road Ahead," IPCS research Papers, last modified September 2010, https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/120935/RP26-Billy-Sino- Myanmar.pdf. 76 Ibid. 77 Josine E. Legêne, "The World in Myanmar Myanmar in the World," (master's thesis, Aarhus Univeristy, 2013), https://www.dm.dk/~/media/Billeder/DivFormater/FaglighedViden/AdmOrgPol/SpecialeJosineLegen e.pdf.

his sworn as a President, Thein Sein promises the new government which surprised the international community positively. Less than a year, Thein Sein has rolled out to plan about democracy and a political reform.78 During his first year, Thein Sein addresses the government’s objective was to introduce “genuine democracy” and that “there was still much more to be done”.

Following its democratization, this momentum somehow brings the changes for Myanmar. The main factors are because of the economic and political reforms. This also could affect the external actors to further engage with Myanmar. In order to comprehend the dynamic of Myanmar Regional Security, this sub-section heading will divide how the actors play significant roles in Myanmar– both internally and externally.

From internal actor, it can be agreed that the Thein Sein government, as the one who initiates the political reform has played a significant role toward the changes on Myanmar.79 Also, it is strengthened by Aung San Suu Kyi and its NLD to participate in political cooperation with the government. The other internal actor is the people. As what has been written in history, the ethnic groups in Myanmar have fought with the military regime in order to get their rights and territories. Last but not least, the Burmese Buddhist.80 As they are being considered holy and represent the people and stands for the opposition. Thus, they also involve in political stage with its moral concept.

Besides internal factor, the changes on Myanmar happened due to the external factor. With different interests, external actors have long sought to influence and gain access to Myanmar.81 Blessed with abundance of natural resources, Myanmar has drawn world attention including three largest

78Ibid.

79Josine E. Legêne, "The World in Myanmar Myanmar in the World," (master's thesis, Aarhus Univeristy, 2013), https://www.dm.dk/~/media/Billeder/DivFormater/FaglighedViden/AdmOrgPol/SpecialeJosineLegen e.pdf. 80 Ibid. 81 Ibid.

economic countries in the world– US, China and India. The interaction between China, US and India– the power shifting has brought the significant of US- China-India triangular relationship in this 21st century.82

As China reaches out trade, investment, resources, it uses its military capability as well to protect the interest overseas and provide aid to its friends and allies. In fact, countries with abundance resources and strategically naval bases tend to be potential allies for China.83 The purpose of this China long- term strategy is to re-build its dominance in Asia and regain territories it claims as its own. According to report by Goldman Sachs in 2003, China will replace the United States as the world’s largest economy by 2041 while India will become the world’s third largest economy (behind China and the United States).84

MYANMAR

CHINA INDIA Figure 6 Interaction between Internal and External Actors in Myanmar

82 Jewish Policy Center, "The U.S.-India-China Triangle in the 21st Century – Jewish Policy Center," Jewish Policy Center, last modified January 20, 2016, https://www.jewishpolicycenter.org/2015/05/31/us-india-china-triangle/. 83 Mohan Malik, "Balancing Act," World Affairs 179, no. 1 (2016): p.46-57, doi:10.1177/0043820016662742. 84 Bronson Percival, "Policy Brief China, India and the United States: Tempered Rivalries in Asia," S Rajaratnam School of International Studies, last modified 2013, https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/175751/Policy%20Brief%20-%202013-12-31%20- %20China,%20India%20and%20the%20United%20States.pdf.

To understand the interaction between these countries and Myanmar, look at the figure II.2 below:

• US – Myanmar

“The United States supports a peaceful, prosperous, and democratic Burma that respects the human rights of all its people.” -US Department of State-85

After the election in 2010, the United States has occupied an engagement strategy to support further reform of Myanmar. These approaches include supporting Burma’s political and economic reforms; promoting national reconciliation; building the government transparency, and accountability and institutions; empowering local communities and civil society; promoting responsible international engagement; and strengthening respect for and protection of human rights and religious freedom.

Furthermore, in 2016, the two countries launched the U.S.-Myanmar Partnership Dialogue, which has expanded bilateral communication and cooperation in political and economic spheres.

• China – Myanmar

The Chinese government is contrary with the policies of non- interference in Myanmar and intense engagement with the SPDC. China was looking for opportunities to provide the generals support and to counteract their increased isolation from the rest of the international community. Myanmar which is ruled by the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) sees China as its key bilateral partner; as a reliable provider of grants, training, and low interest loans, the regime sought to use the

85 U.S. Department of State, U.S. Relations with Burma, (2017), https://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/35910.htm.

deepening, supportive relationship as evidence of its legitimacy and to counter political pressure by the international community, particularly the United States and the European Union (EU). This has led to China today become the largest trading partner for Myanmar.

• India – Myanmar

Meanwhile for India and Myanmar relations, Myanmar is the gateway to India’s ‘Look East’ policy. India is going all out to enhance its relationship with Myanmar to achieve its stated objective. India has engaged in several rivers and land-based projects in Myanmar. Some of them are: The reconstruction of the Settwe port in Myanmar, Kaladan Multi-Modal Transport project and Tamu-Kalewa-Kalemyo road project are to name a few. The India-Myanmar gas pipeline project is another area where India is deeply involved in Myanmar.

In addition, India recently has signed three important agreements with Myanmar including exploration of natural gas, satellite-based remote sensing and promotion of Buddhist studies in Myanmar. Besides, to extend the cooperation, India is also looking for joint cooperation with Myanmar in several other fields including IT, automobile, textiles, and agro-based industries.

• US – India - China

The relations between US and China is getting intense along with its economic development. After political reform in Myanmar, the United States is gradually remove the sanctions posed by Western countries under junta

rule.86 However, this interaction is gaining traction especially for China considering US’ pivot to Asia strategy. The competition between China and United States in Myanmar can be identified in various field. From the economic perspective, China sees competition more from US’ ally– Japan and not from US directly.87 As world’s fourth largest economy, Japan involves more on economic activity in Myanmar. For example, The Thilawa special economic zone (SEZ), was offered to Japan in 2011 as a return for Japanese support and today, it has become a key destination for Japanese public and private investment.88

As Myanmar is sandwiched between two larger countries– China and India, it can be argued that Myanmar becomes an important battleground. After cutting the bilateral ties during military coup, India re-establish its diplomatic relations with Myanmar in 1990s. The reason is because Myanmar plays a significant role in the context of India’s “Look East Policy,” its policy to advance the economic and strategic relations with Southeast Asian countries.89 Through Myanmar, India also can see the development of its neighbors who becomes the member of South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) (Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Nepal, the Maldives, Pakistan and Sri Lanka). Besides, as an emerging power country in Asia, it can be understood that India will not let China to expand its influence wider in Asian region.90

86 Song Qingrun, "Benign Engagement Between Myanmar, China and the United States," China-US Focus, last modified September 6, 2016, https://www.chinausfocus.com/foreign-policy/benign- engagement-between-myanmar-china-and-the-united-states. 87 Yun Sun, "Myanmar in US-China Relations," Great Powers and The Changing Myanmar, no. 3 (June 2014): p.6-9, https://www.stimson.org/sites/default/files/file- attachments/Myanmar_Issue_Brief_3.pdf. 88 Patrick Strefford, "Japan set to reap returns on investment in Myanmar," Myanmar Times, August 31, 2016, xx, https://www.mmtimes.com/opinion/22240-japan-set-to-reap-returns-on-investment- in-myanmar.html.

89 Ibid. 90 Tridivesh S. Maini, "Myanmar and the India/China Shuffle," The Globalist, last modified October 18, 2015, https://www.theglobalist.com/myanmar-india-china-politics-south-asia.

In response this interaction, Myanmar somehow still upholds its foreign policy of independence and neutrality, and will not take sides between two sides. Myanmar needs to build good neighborly relations with China, and support China’s fast development, and in the meanwhile, it cannot go without the support of the US, as a superpower country in the world. In short, Myanmar plays its geopolitical positon and proximity to major powers in Asia, establish itself as a manufacturing, logistics and trade hub linking Southeast and South Asia.91

2.2 The History of Pauk-Phaw: Sino-Myanmar Relations Pauk-phaw– the way China and Myanmar names their relations. The word itself is coming from Myanmar term which means siblings or intimate.92 Paukphaw can be defined as the foundation of China and Myanmar bilateral relations and as a symbol to gain more support from two peoples and to serve their better interest.93 Back to the history, China and Myanmar relations emerged as the evidence of the founding of Kingdom Bagan (Pagan, ancient Myanmar) in AD 849, (4) which appeared during China’s Tang Dynasty (AD 618 – 907).94 However, this relation was no longer friendly since China was controlled by the Yuan Dynasty (1271-1368) of the Mongols tribe. Kublai khan, who rules Mongol empire at the time claims tribute form Southeast Asian kings. When the Yuan Dynasty invaded Burma in 1283, The Burmese King–Narathipahapati fled to Bassein in the south of Burma and

91 Yun Sun, "Myanmar in US-China Relations," Great Powers and The Changing Myanmar, no. 3 (June 2014): p.6-9, https://www.stimson.org/sites/default/files/file- attachments/Myanmar_Issue_Brief_3.pdf. 92 Lixin Geng, "Sino-Myanmar relations: analysis and prospects," Culture Mandala: The Bulletin of the Centre for East-West Cultural and Economic Studies 7, no. 2 (January 2007): p.1-2, http://epublications.bond.edu.au/cm/vol7/iss2/1. 93 Speech at the Second "China-Myanmar Pauk Phaw Friendship Day" By H. E. Mr. Hong Liang,Ambassador of the People's Republic of China to the Republic of the Union of Myanmar, (EMBASSY OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA IN MYANMAR, 2017), http://mm.china- embassy.org/eng/zggk/zzhjj/t1469543.htm 94 Speech at the Second "China-Myanmar Pauk Phaw Friendship Day" By H. E. Mr. Hong Liang,Ambassador of the People's Republic of China to the Republic of the Union of Myanmar, (EMBASSY OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA IN MYANMAR, 2017), http://mm.china- embassy.org/eng/zggk/zzhjj/t1469543.htm.

29 surrendered. This was not considered as an honored but instead as a humiliation for those who surrender on foreigners in this context belongs to Mongols.95

After the exchange visit between China’s Premier Chou Enlai and Burma’s premier U Nu in 1954, China and Myanmar relations was getting stable.96 Moreover, Myanmar was very welcoming with the establishment of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). China and Myanmar relations can be understood through five basic principles: 1) mutual respect for each other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty, (2) non-aggression, (3) non-interference in each other’s internal affairs, (4) equality and mutual benefits and (5) peaceful coexistence and peaceful settlement of disputes (Sino-Burmese Joint Declaration of 29th of June 1954).97 According to Myanmar’s perspective, China has noticed the essential of Myanmar to support its security purpose and the importance of China interest which attaches to its peripheral area.98

“May I propose a toast for the long-lasting Sino-Myanmar pauk-phaw friendship” -Li Jinjun- Chinese Ambassador to Myanmar (2005)99

Besides political relations, the turn 1954 also affects the economic relations between China and Myanmar.100 China and Myanmar for the first time signed the

95 Lixin Geng, "Sino-Myanmar relations: analysis and prospects," Culture Mandala: The Bulletin of the Centre for East-West Cultural and Economic Studies 7, no. 2 (January 2007): p.1-2, http://epublications.bond.edu.au/cm/vol7/iss2/1. 96 Fan Hongwei, "China-Burma Ties in 1954: The Beginning of the "Pauk Phaw" Era," ResearchGate | Share and Discover Research, last modified April 1, 2016, https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Fan_Hongwei2/publication/239590734_China- Burma_Ties_in_1954_The_Beginning_of_the_Pauk_Phaw_Era/links/56fde41a08aee995dde569cf/Chi na-Burma-Ties-in-1954-The-Beginning-of-the-Pauk-Phaw-Era.pdf?origin=publication_detail. 97 Geng, loc. cit, p.1-2 98 Tenzing C. Sherpa, "IMPORTANCE OF MYANMAR IN CHINA’S STRATEGIC INTEREST: A CASE STUDY ON SINO-MYANMAR OIL AND GAS PIPELINES," (master's thesis, Sikkim University, 2016), http://14.139.206.50:8080/jspui/bitstream/1/4569/1/Tenzing%20C%20Bhutia.pdf. 99 Speech of Ambassador Li Jinjun on the Reception of Celebrating the 55th Anniversary of the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations Between China and Myanmar, (EMBASSY OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA IN MYANMAR, 2005), http://mm.china- embassy.org/eng/sgxw/t199231.htm.

30 economic trade agreement (within 3 years) on April 22nd, 1954. This agreement including China export on coal, silk, silk fabrics, cotton fabrics, paper, agricultural implements, light industry product, handicraft, porcelain enamel, porcelain, can food, tea, and cigarette to Burma and Burma export on rice, rice product, pulse seedcake, mineral, timber, rubber and cotton to China.101

There are several reasons behind the shifting relations between China and Myanmar in 1954. These factors have triggered the changes of China foreign policy especially toward Burma.102 First are the international situation factors. Earlier on 1950s, U.S signed a series of military agreement with China’s neighboring countries, and arranged a military encirclement against China.103 Some of them are Thailand- U.S. Military Assistance Agreement on October 17th, 1950, Philippines-U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty on August 30th, 1951, Korea-U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty on October 1st, 1953, U.S.-Taiwan Mutual Defense Treaty on December 2nd, 1954, U.S.-Japan Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement on March 8th, 1954, and Manila Pact on September 8th, 1954. Therefore, China with its objective to build a prosperous socialist industrialized country should be able to maintain a peaceful environment and world– one of its strategy is by developing unity and collaboration with the Soviet Union, emphasizing peace collaboration and promoting economic and cultural ties with all countries, particularly Southeast Asian and other neighboring countries.104

The second factor is China’s policy toward Burma. As China pursued foreign policy “leaning to one side”, they insisted that this world consists of two sides;

100 Fan Hongwei, "China-Burma Ties in 1954: The Beginning of the "Pauk Phaw" Era," ResearchGate | Share and Discover Research, last modified April 1, 2016, https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Fan_Hongwei2/publication/239590734_China- Burma_Ties_in_1954_The_Beginning_of_the_Pauk_Phaw_Era/links/56fde41a08aee995dde569cf/Chi na-Burma-Ties-in-1954-The-Beginning-of-the-Pauk-Phaw-Era.pdf?origin=publication_detail. 101 Fan Hongwei, "China-Burma Ties in 1954: The Beginning of the "Pauk Phaw" Era," ResearchGate | Share and Discover Research, last modified April 1, 2016, https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Fan_Hongwei2/publication/239590734_China- Burma_Ties_in_1954_The_Beginning_of_the_Pauk_Phaw_Era/links/56fde41a08aee995dde569cf/Chi na-Burma-Ties-in-1954-The-Beginning-of-the-Pauk-Phaw-Era.pdf?origin=publication_detail. 102 Ibid. 103 Ibid. 104 Ibid.

31 antagonist camps and neutralism.105 In developing this foreign policy, China were gradually shifting western influences from Asia to win Asian neighbors through peace coexistence. Meanwhile, quoted from Chou Enlai speech “for some neutral countries, they will not push them into the enemy camp but instead be friends with them.”106 In this context, China was focusing on breaking US encirclement, walking together with all the countries that want to make peace with China, and creating a peaceful and stable regional environment for supporting the domestic economic development and recovery. Therefore, the new policy is indicated by building "collective peace and security" and expanding the "peace zone" to establish a safe buffer zone between China and the west camp.107

The third is because of Burma policy toward China. Aftesr the independence, Burma was standing for neutralism and shaped non-alignment foreign policy.108 The reason is because Burma was located on between two rival camps and Burma’s military and economic powers were weak. Moreover, China was a major factor. This non-alignment policy aims to ensure China of non-aggression from Burmese land and to avoid Burmese loss in another war. Also, the fear of being China’s opposing has been partially shown the responsible for Burma's policy of neutralism.109

In recent years, the relations between China and Myanmar are getting improve. After political reform, Myanmar, particularly the ruling State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) viewed China as its key bilateral partner.110 Starting from the 1990s, China has participated on some projects in Myanmar such as building its hydropower plants, oil pipelines and key bridges which have supported the

105 Liu Shaoqi, "Internationalism and Nationalism," Foreign Languages Press, last modified 1952, https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/liu-shaoqi/1952/internationalism_nationalism/ch05.htm. 106 Hongwei, loc. cit 107 Ibid. 108 Ibid. 109 Ibid. 110 John Pike, "China - Myanmar Relations," GlobalSecurity.org, last modified April/May 12, 2017, https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/myanmar/forrel-prc.htm.

32 country’s long-term stability.111 And vice versa, Myanmar supports the realization of “Chinese Dream” by participating on China’s Belt Road and Initiative.

The table below shows the chronology of recent China and Myanmar bilateral relations:112

Table 1 Time Table China-Myanmar Bilateral Activities (2013-2017)

Year Diplomatic Activities 2013 • 1 Jan: The Vice President Dr. Sai Mauk Kham accepts personnel from China Three Gorges Corporation (CTGC) and International Group of Entrepreneurs Company (IGOEC), which implements Mong Ton Hydro Power Project. • 15 Jan: The discussion about investment between China trade minister and NLD Chairman Aung San Suu Kyi in Naypyitaw. • 19 Jan: President U Thein Sein receives a special Chinese representative led by the foreign minister Fu Ying at the government office. • 5-7 April: President U Thein Sein meets with Chinese President Xi Jinping in China. He had an interview and discussed about Boao's opening for the 2013 Asian Annual Conference.

111 Yap K. Weng and Sun Xi, "A New Chapter in China-Myanmar Relations," International Policy Digest, last modified November 6, 2017, https://intpolicydigest.org/2016/09/15/new-chapter-china- myanmar-relations/. 112 "Timeline: China-Myanmar Relations," The Irrawaddy, last modified December 26, 2017, https://www.irrawaddy.com/specials/timeline-china-myanmar-relations.html.

• 10 April: Myanmar Armed Forces Chief Snr-Gen Min Aung Hlaing welcomes Chinese Ambassador Yang Houlan for Myanmar. • 23 June: A visit from State Council Member Yang Jiechi in Myanmar. • 23 July: President U Thein Sein receives Deputy Chairman of the Central Military Commission Fan Changlong at Naypyitaw. • 2 September: President U Thein Sein attends the 10th China-Asean Expo which is held in Nanning and meets with Chinese Prime Minister Li Keqiang. • 16 October: A visit from Burmese Armed Forces Chief Snr-Gen Min Aung Hlaing to China and meets President Xi Jinping. 2014 • Feb 19: Vice-President U Nyan Tun receives Chinese Ambassador to Myanmar Yang Houlan in Naypyitaw. • April 7: Parliamentary delegation led by Lower House Speaker Thura U Shwe Mann meets Chinese President Xi Jinping in Beijing. • May 19: Snr-Gen Min Aung Hlaing receives Minister of Defense and State Councilor of China in Naypyitaw and pays a call on President U Thein Sein the following day. • June 23: Chairman of the Union Election Commission U Tin Aye receives Chinese Ambassador to Myanmar Yang Houlan at the commission in Naypyitaw. • June 28-29: President U Thein Sein attends the 60th anniversary of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence (Bandung Principles) with the Chinese President Xi Jinping, Premier Li Keqiang and Indian Vice-President

Mohammad Hamid Ansari. • Nov 14: A paid state visit to Myanmar held by Chinese Premier Li Keqiang. • Dec 16: President U Thein Sein accepts a Chinese goodwill delegation in Naypyitaw. 2015 • April 22: President U Thein Sein meets Chinese President Xi Jinping on Bandung Conference in Indonesia’s Jakarta. • April 26: Myanmar’s Speaker of the Lower House meets vice chairman of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference and director of the International Liaison Department of the Communist Party of China at Diaoyutai State Guesthouse in Beijing. • June 10-14: Daw Aung San Suu Kyi with its position as the chairwoman of the NLD visits China and meets Chinese President Xi Jinping for the first time. • July 30: The release of 150 Chinese citizens who were handed life sentencesfor illegal logging in Myanmar. • Oct 3: Thein Sein attends the 70th Anniversary of Victory of the World Anti-Fascist War at Tiananmen Square in Beijing. • Dec 4: Representative of the Chinese Government and Vice Foreign Minister Liu Zhenmin pays a call on President U Thein Sein in Naypyitaw. 2016 • April 5: Chinese Foreign Minister pays a goodwill visit to Myanmar at the invitation of Myanmar’s de facto leader Daw Aung San Suu Kyi to discuss the strengthening of bilateral ties between China and Myanmar and promoting the interests of citizens of the two countries. • July, 26: China’s Special Envoy, Sun Guoxiang addresses

the summit of ethnic armed organizations in Kachin State’s Mai Ja Yang. • August 12: The Establishment a 20-member commission to assess hydropower projects on the Irrawaddy River by President U Htin Kyaw. • August 17-21: Aung San Suu Kyi visits China due to the invitation of Chinese Premier Li Keqiang. During this trip, Myanmar and Chinese governments sign economic and technical cooperation agreement and Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on a Kunlong Bridge project which would be built with China’s assistance. • November 25: The first high-level meeting between foreign and defense ministries of Myanmar and China. Main focus of this discussion is about border stability and China’s role in Myanmar’s peace process. 2017 • Jan 28: The Yangon government organizes Chinese New Year Celebrations and announced that the grandest Chinese New Year celebrations in more than five decades. • April 6-11: President U Htin Kyaw makes his first goodwill visit to China and holds talks with Xi Jinping and other Chinese leaders. Also, the signer of Kyaukphyu-Kunming oil pipeline agreement. • April 21: Myanmar’s State Counselor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi meets with Chang Zhenming, the chairman of the China International Trust and Investment Company (CITIC) Group in Naypyitaw to discuss further about the group’s involvement in the deep-water Seaport project in Kyaukphyu, Myanmar. • April 25: China offers a help to tackle a diplomatic row

between Bangladesh and Myanmar over the flight of Rohingya Muslims from Myanmar. • April 26: Zhang Dejiang, the Chine lesgislator meets Chairman of the Legal Affairs and Special Cases Assessment Commission U Shwe Mann in Beijing and vow to push forward China-Myanmar ties. Also, he has a meeting with the Chinese Deputy Foreign Minsiter Liu Zhenmin. • May 14-17: State Counselor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi attends the Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation in Beijing, where she holds separate talks with Chinese President Xi Jingping and Premier Li Keqiang. The leaders emphasize about the importance of advancing “Comprehensive Cooperative Strategic Partnership Relations” according to the Five Principles of Peaceful Co- existence and existing “Pauk-Phaw” friendship, maintaining border stability, supporting Myanmar reconciliation, promoting diverse cooperation between the two countries for the benefit of the two peoples. Five Memoranda of Understanding are signed including an MoU on Cooperation within the Framework of the Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st Century Maritime Silk Road Initiative. • May 18: People’s Liberation Army Navy carrying over 550 military personnel pay a goodwill visit to Myanmar. • May 26: People’s Liberation Army presents locomotives and coaches to Myanmar Tatmadaw. • Jun. 1: State Counselor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi receives General Fang Fenghui, member of China’s Central Military

Commission (CMC) and chief of the Joint Staff Department under the CMC, in Naypyitaw to discuss promotion of bilateral cooperation. • Aug. 4: State Counselor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi holds holds a talk with Director of the International Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CPC) Song Tao about the cooperation between two countries. • Aug. 5: The groundbreaking ceremony of a China-funded renovation project of the Bahan Women’s Hospital which will become the first China-Myanmar Friendship Hospital. • Aug. 30: Britain requests a U.N. Security Council (UNSC) meeting on situation in Myanmar, but China resists stronger involvement by the U.N. in addressing the crisis. • Sep. 4: Sun Guoxiang, a representative from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China, calls on Vice-President 1 U Myint Swe in Naypyitaw, with the former saying that the Chinese government condemns rebel attacks in northern Rakhine State. • Sep. 5: Myanmar Army Chief receives Special Envoy Sun in Naypyitaw and the Chinese envoy believes that Myanmar government and Tatmadaw will be able to solve Rakhine issue. • Sep. 8: The Chinese embassy officially opens its interim liaison office in the capital of Naypyitaw in Myanmar. • Sep. 18: Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi tells U.N. that China supports the Myanmar government to protect its national security in Rakhine State. • Sep. 22: Chinese media travel to Rakhine in order to cover

the situation of militant attacks in Maungdaw. • Sep. 22: An interview of Deputy director of the International Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CPC) speaks out against international intervention in Myanmar’s Rakhine issue. • Nov. 19: A separate talks between Chinese Foreign Minister with Myanmar President U Htin Kyaw, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and Snr-Gen Min Aung Hlaing on peace process toward Rakhine issue. • Nov. 22-24: A goodwill visit to China at the invitation of a member of the CMC and Chief of the Joint Staff Department of the PLA Gen. Li Zuocheng and thank to Chinese President XI Jin Ping for support on Rakhine Issue.

The table above shows the diplomatic activities between China and Myanmar in the last 4 years (2013-2017). From those activities, it can be concluded that China and Myanmar are strengthening their bilateral ties through several aspects such as diplomatic relations, economic cooperation and military cooperation. To understand these activities, the writer will elaborate further on China Foreign and Defense Policy explanation on Chapter III. In this case, the writer will bring the context of String of Pearls Initiative.

CHAPTER III BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVE: THE COMBINATION OF CHINA FOREIGN AND DEFENSE POLICY

"We can no longer accept the Indian Ocean as only an ocean of the Indians,” General Zhao Nanqi China Military Official113

Regardless of China's desire in increasing maritime power, belt and road initiative has an essential meaning to counter US dominance and to emphasize that Indian Ocean is not India’s ocean– by increasing the dependence of littoral states around there on China.114 As the belt and road initiative including diplomatic relations, economic and military cooperation, therefore in this chapter Belt and Road Initiative will be assessed through both– from China Foreign Policy and Defense Policy Perspective through China and Myanmar Defense Cooperation. Foreign policy here refers to the diplomatic relations between China and Myanmar while defense policy refers to economic and military cooperation between China and Myanmar.

3.1 Belt and Road Initiative from China Foreign Policy Perspective 3.1.1 Foreign Policy of China In a simple definition, China’s foreign policy can be defined as a pattern of interaction between China and other states which is determined by

113 Igor Pejic, "China's 'String of Pearls' Project," SouthFront: Crisis News, World Events, Political Survey, last modified October 5, 2016, https://southfront.org/chinas-string-of-pearls-project/. 114 Ajey Lele, "China’s ‘String of Pearls’ in Space | Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses," Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses |, last modified March 21, 2013, https://idsa.in/idsastrategiccomments/ChinasString%20of%20pearlsinSpace_AjeyLele_210312.

national objectives and interest. During his speech in Central Conference on Work Relating to Foreign Affairs 2014 Xi Jinping mentioned that:

“bearing in mind China's domestic and international interests, has maintained continuity and consistency of China's foreign policy, strengthened overall planning and taken bold initiatives, thus achieving notable progress. Keeping in mind new tasks that should be carried out under new conditions, we have worked hard to creatively pursue China's diplomacy in both theory and practice, highlight the global significance of the Chinese dream and enrich the strategic thinking of peaceful development.”115

Refers to document on The Common Program of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) 1949, China's foreign policy supposed to guarantee independence, freedom and territorial integrity of the state, to support world peace and friendly cooperation to all countries in the world, and prevent imperialist policies of aggression and war.116 Then, it has been revised during the First Plenary Session of the Eighth National People's Congress by emphasizing that China foreign policy should obey an independent foreign policy as well as to the five principles of peaceful coexistence.117

3.1.1.1 Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence

"Having been tested by the evolution of international relations in the past six decades, the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, as open and inclusive principles of international law, embody the values of sovereignty, justice, democracy and rule of law"

115 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, The Central Conference on Work Relating to Foreign Affairs Was Held in Beijing, (Beijing, 2014), http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1215680.shtml. 116 "China's Foreign Policy," English--People's Daily Online, accessed May 5, 2018, http://en.people.cn/china/19990914A128.html. 117 Ibid.

Xi Jin Ping118

From the statement Xi Jin Ping above, he emphasized that how the five principles of peaceful coexistence have brought a new type of just and equitable international relations.119 It was firstly introduced by China’s first premier, Zhou Enlai in 1953 at the negotiation China’s Tibet region with Indian government. It later being integrated as an Agreement on Trade and Intercourse Between the Tibet Region of China and India. Five principles of Peaceful Co-existence have become a guidance for China’s policy towards its neighbors in past six decades particularly in developing the region.120 As for the principles consist of:

• Mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity • Mutual non-aggression • Non-interference in each other's internal affairs • Equality and mutual benefit • Peaceful coexistence It can be argued that five principles of peaceful co-existence have given a significant impact toward international relations. Even China, India and Myanmar, these countries share lot of common idea in this regard:121

• Upholding the sovereign equality.

118 Xinhua, "Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence not outdated: Chinese president," People's Daily Online, June 29, 2014, https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/3f6310/pdf/. 119 Ibid. 120 Chinese Consulate General, The Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, (Karachi: Ministry of foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, 2014), http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/zwjg_665342/zwbd_665378/t1179045.shtml. 121 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, "Carry Forward the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence To Build a Better World Through Win-Win Cooperation," 欢迎访问中华人民共和国外交部网站, last modified June 28, 2014, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t1170143.shtml.

“Sovereignty is the most important feature of any independent state as well as the embodiment and safeguard of its national interests. No infringement upon the sovereignty and territorial integrity of a country is allowed. Countries should respect each other's core interests and key concerns. These are fundamental rules which should not be cast aside or undermined at any time.”122 -Xi Jin Ping- • Upholding common security.

“Security should be universal. All countries have the right to participate in international and regional security affairs on an equal footing and shoulder the shared responsibility to maintain security both internationally and in various regions. We should champion common, comprehensive, cooperative, and sustainable security, and respect and ensure every country's security. Meanwhile, Disputes and differences between countries should be resolved through dialogue, consultation and peaceful means. We should increase mutual trust, and settle disputes and promote security through dialogue.”123 -Xi Jin Ping-

• Advancing common development

“The sky, earth and world are big enough to allow the common development and prosperity of all countries. Today, some countries are getting richer while others are locked in poverty and underdevelopment. Such a situation should not be allowed to continue. We should jointly uphold and develop an open global economy, promote strong, sustainable and balanced global growth as well as trade and investment liberalization and facilitation and uphold open regional cooperation. We should oppose protectionism of all forms and any attempt or practice to hurt others' interests or shift crisis to others.”124 -Xi Jin Ping-

122 Ibid. 123 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, "Carry Forward the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence To Build a Better World Through Win-Win Cooperation," 欢迎访问中华人民共和国外交部网站, last modified June 28, 2014, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t1170143.shtml. 124 Ibid.

• Promoting win-win cooperation as the basic policy objective in handling international affairs.

“Countries should align their own interests with those of other countries and expand areas of converging interests. Instead of undercutting each other's efforts, countries should reinforce each other's endeavor and make greater common progress. We should champion a new vision of win-win outcomes for all and reject the obsolete notion of zero-sum game or winner taking all. Countries should respect others' interests while pursuing their own and advance common interests of all.”125 -Xi Jin Ping-

• Striving for inclusiveness and mutual learning.

“Diversity of civilizations is a defining feature of the human society. In today's world, there are 7 billion people of more than 2,500 ethnic groups who live in over 200 countries and regions and speak more than 5,000 languages. Different nations and civilizations are rich in diversity and have their own distinct features. No one is superior or inferior to others. Everything has its strengths and weaknesses. We should promote mutual learning and draw on all that is good created by different countries, nations and civilizations in a joint effort to create a splendid human civilization.” -Xi Jin Ping-

• Upholding fairness and justice. “In the international society, there should be just one law that applies to all. There is no such law that applies to others but not oneself, or vice versa. There should not be double standards when applying the law. We should jointly uphold the authority and sanctity of international law and the international order. All countries should exercise their rights in accordance with the law, oppose bending international law, and reject any attempt to undermine, in the name of "rule of law", other countries' legitimate rights and interests as well as peace and stability. We should jointly promote more balanced international relations, advance reform in global governance in keeping with new changes in the relative strengths of international forces, respond

125 Ibid.

to concerns and aspirations of various parties, and better uphold the legitimate rights and interests of developing countries.” -Xi Jin Ping-126

3.1.1.2 Independent Foreign Policy of Peace Since 1980s under Deng Xiaoping until today, Beijing has pursued an “independent foreign policy of peace” as independent here means that China does not align itself with any other major power. China’s “fundamental” on this foreign policy goals are: “To preserve China’s independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity,” and “To create a favorable international environment for China’s reform and opening up and modernization.” 127

In addition, one of its keynote speech Xi Jin Ping mentioned that:

China remains firm in pursuing an independent foreign policy of peace. ... No one should expect China to [accept] anything that undermines its interests. China pursues a national defense policy that is by nature defensive. China's development does not pose a threat to any other country. No matter what stage of development it reaches, China will never seek hegemony or engage in expansion." -Xi Jin Ping -128

126 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, "Carry Forward the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence To Build a Better World Through Win-Win Cooperation," 欢迎访问中华人民共和国外交部网站, last modified June 28, 2014, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t1170143.shtml. 127 C. F. Bergsten et al., ""China's Foreign & Security Policy: Partner or Rival?"," in China: The Balance Sheet What the World Needs to Know Now about the Emerging Superpower(Peterson Institute for International Economics, n.d. ), PDF e-book, 128 Xinhua, "CPC stresses socialism with Chinese characteristics a s congress opens," China Daily, October 19, 2017, https://www.chinadailyhk.com/articles/189/180/78/1508376573775.html.

Following China’s Independent Foreign Policy of Peace, this policy according to China’s permanent mission to UN aims:

•) to defend China's independence, state sovereignty and territorial integrity;

•) to create a favorable international environment for the reform and opening to the outside world and for the modernization drive;

•) to maintain world peace and promote common development.129

The contents of this policy are as follows:

1. China consistently upholds the principle of independence. This means in dealing with International Affairs, China will judge each case on its own– based on China national interest and other countries. It will never involve any big power of countries, military bloc or even seek for military expansion. 2. China prevents hegemonism and maintain the world peace. According to China, all countries within every aspect (either rich or poor, strong or weak); they are equal in international community. Each country should settle their dispute by using peaceful consultation instead of using force. China also will not enforce other country to follow their ideology. 3. China actively promotes the establishment of a just and rational new international political and economic order. In China perspective, this new order should reflect the universal aspiration and common interests of peoples of all countries in the world or in another word it should be based on the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-Existence and other universally acknowledged norms of international relations.

129 "China's Independent Foreign Policy of Peace," Permanent Mission of the People's Republic of China to the UN, last modified November 7, 2003, http://www.china- un.org/eng/gyzg/wjzc/t40387.htm.

4. China respects the diversity in the world. According to China perspective, the diversity of the world should not be an obstacle to build a relation with countries instead it should work as a mutual exchanges, mutual complement and mutual enrichment. 5. China prefers to build friendship and cooperation with other countries on the basis of the Five Principles of Peaceful Co- Existence; mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence. 6. China seeks an all-dimensional policy of opening to the outside world in order to conduct extensive trade, economic and technical cooperation and scientific and cultural exchanges with all countries and regions on the basis of the principle of equality and mutual benefit. 7. China participates in multilateral diplomacy for the importance safeguarding world peace and regional stability. For instance, as a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, China takes part in UN peace-keeping operations by promoting international arms control, disarmament and preventing proliferation.

3.1.2 Foreign Policy of China to Myanmar 3.1.2.1 Good Neighborly Policy “China will adhere to the good-neighborly policy and ensure that, through its own development, it will benefit surrounding countries including Myanmar. Quoting a Myanmarese saying to the same effect, he said China will promote common development help "lift all boats" in the region. China attaches great importance to its relations with Myanmar. Both sides should work to steer the bilateral ties in the right direction, and, on the basis of mutual respect, equality and

mutual benefit, deepen strategic mutual trust, carry forward win-win cooperation and safeguard shared interests.” Xi Jin Ping130

Since China established its diplomatic relations 67 years ago with Myanmar, China put the basis of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence.131 Following the importance of relations with Myanmar, China emphasizes the fundamental interests of the two peoples by implementing strategic cooperation, and be good neighbors, good friends, good brothers and good partners forever.132 For instance, to promote its bilateral ties, China through the economic cooperation has encouraged its investor to participate in some project in Myanmar. He emphasizes that both countries should:

“conduct and strengthen all forms of people-to-people exchanges, especially friendly exchanges between their youths and students. He also pledged that China will continue to coordinate closely with Myanmar in the United Nations and other multilateral arenas.”133

130 Xi Jinping Meets with Myanmar's President U Thein Sein Stressing the Importance of Steering the Bilateral Relationship in the Right Direction and Unswervingly Pushing Forward China-Myanmar Friendship, (Sanya: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, 2013), http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/topics_665678/boao_665692/t1029016.shtml. 131 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, "Xi Jinping Holds Talks with President U Htin Kyaw of Myanmar The Two Heads of State Agree to Push China-Myanmar Relations for Sustained, Healthy and Stable Development," 欢迎访问中华人民共和国外交部网站, last modified 2017, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1453280.shtml. 132 Ibid. 133 Xi Jinping Meets with Myanmar's President U Thein Sein Stressing the Importance of Steering the Bilateral Relationship in the Right Direction and Unswervingly Pushing Forward China-Myanmar Friendship, (Sanya: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, 2013), http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/topics_665678/boao_665692/t1029016.shtml.

3.2 Belt and Road Initiative from China Defense Policy Perspective 3.2.1 Defense Policy of China “China is committed to a path of peaceful development, and China pursues a defense policy that is defensive in nature,” he said at a news conference. China’s development will not pose a threat to other countries.” -Li Keqiang-134

In this 21st century, China has been pursuing a defensive in nature in their defense policy with the main concern on “enhancing national security, unity, and national development interest, achieving the all-round, coordinated and sustainable development of China's national defense and armed forces; increasing the performance of the armed forces, implementing the military strategy of active defense, pursuing a self-defensive nuclear strategy; and fostering a security environment conducive to China's peaceful development.”135

According to China government white paper, The Chinese government strongly upholds a defensive in nature toward the national defense policy.136 The aspects including within the defense policy are:

• To build up national defense, resist aggression, control armed destruction, and defend the state's sovereignty, unity, territorial integrity and security. • To overwhelm national defense, and put it in the service of, the nation's overall economic development which means the modernization of the national defense of a country requires the support

134 Simon Denyer, "China Boosts Defense Budget in Quest for 'world Class? Military but Tells Neighbors Not to Worry," Washington Post, last modified March 5, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/china-boosts-defense-budget-seeking-world- class-military-but-tells-neighbors-not-to-worry/2018/03/05/17a27efb-2a9d-4508-a06e- f3129bd1ea45_story.html?utm_term=.bbe7619b207e. 135 Ministry of Defense of the People's Republic of China, Defense Policy, (n.d), http://eng.mod.gov.cn/Database/DefensePolicy/index.htm#. 136 Chinese Government White Paper 2010

of its economic and technological forces; and the modernization level of national defense can only be improved gradually along with the increase of the country's economic strength. • To implement an active defense in the military strategy. Strategically China pursues the defensive policy featuring self-defense and gaining mastery by striking after the enemy started, and uphold the principle: ``We will not attack unless we are attacked; if we are attacked, we will certainly counter-attack.'' • To conduct the army with the Chinese way– reducing quantity and improving quality. • As China upholds the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, China puts the priority on safeguarding world peace, and opposing aggression and expansion.

3.2.2 Defense Policy of China to Myanmar “The two sides exchanged views on the situation in northern Myanmar and agreed that properly managing and controlling the situation in northern Myanmar and maintaining peace and stability in China-Myanmar border areas are of great significance in maintaining the steady development of China- Myanmar relations and the smooth advancement of Myanmar’s peace process. To this end, both sides will take good advantage of the existing bilateral exchange and consultation mechanisms involving sectors of diplomacy, militaries, public security and at local levels. “137

Following China’s defense policy to Myanmar, China still upholds the basis of mutual respect, equality and mutual benefit and deepened exchanges and cooperation in political, economic, trade, cultural, people-to-people and

137 "China and Myanmar Hold the Third 2+2 High-level Consultations Led by Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Defence," 欢迎访问中华人民共和国外交部网站, last modified January 17, 2018, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjbxw/t1527057.shtml.

military fields.138 In the context of string of pearls Initiative, China has invested there has invested projects such as ports in Myanmar. Kyaukphyu port in Rakhine State seems to be a prominent position in China’s investment after a deep-water port in Sittwe.139 One of the ongoing project is between the state-owned China National Petrochemical Corporation (CNPC) and the Myanmar government, which is the development of port linking the city of Kumming in Yunnan via oil and gas pipelines.

“Myanmar briefed on the latest progress of its 21st Century Panglong Peace Conference. The country appreciated China's help in steadily promoting Myanmar's peace process. Myanmar will continue steadily pushing forward its domestic peace process and will work with China-Myanmar border areas as well as the safe and safe running of bilateral cooperation projects. Myanmar looks forward to implementing the initiative of the Myanmar-China Economic Corridor at an early date to drive the development in border areas of Myanmar.”140

Not only in term of economic cooperation, China also has involved in Myanmar’s peace process by upholding “persuading for peace and facilitating dialogues” (劝和促谈).141 In this situation, China becomes the mediation between the Myanmar central government and ethnic armed groups.142 To comprehend China

138 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, "China and Myanmar," 欢迎访问中华人民共和国外交部网站, accessed May 5, 2018, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/zzjg_663340/yzs_663350/gjlb_663354/2747_663498/ . 139 Virginia Marantidou, "Revisiting China’s ‘String of Pearls’ Strategy: Places ‘with Chinese Characteristics’ and their Security Implications," Pacific Form CSIS 14, no. 7 (June 2014):, https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/182061/140624_issuesinsights_vol14no7.pdf. 140 "China and Myanmar Hold the Third 2+2 High-level Consultations Led by Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Defence," 欢迎访问中华人民共和国外交部网站, last modified January 17, 2018, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjbxw/t1527057.shtml. 141 Yun Sun, China and Myanmar’s Peace Process, (Washington: UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE, 2017), https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/2017-03/sr401-china-and-myanmar-peace- process.pdf. 142 Ibid.

51 defense policy to Myanmar it will be elaborated further on Chapter IV with focusing on economic and military cooperation between two countries.

CHAPTER IV

THE ANALYSIS OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVE TOWARD SINO-MYANMAR IN ECONOMIC AND MILITARY COOPERATION

4.1 The Implementation of Belt and Road Initiative in Economic Cooperation Refers to belt and road initiative on China defense policy perspective, one of the policy implementation is through the economic cooperation with the littoral countries in the Indian Ocean– in this case with Myanmar. The economic cooperation between China and Myanmar has been established since 1990s until present.143 In fact, China nowadays has become a major supplier of consumer goods to Myanmar particularly through the border trade. In addition, to enhance the economic cooperation, China has been involved in some projects in Myanmar in the areas of infrastructure, state-owned economic enterprises (SEEs) and energy.144

“In fact, there are many sub-regions along the border on the Chinese side which would like to join the zone in order to bolster regional trade activities,” U Than Myint - Union Minister for the Ministry of Commerce145

143 Toshihiro Kudo, "6: Myanmar's economic relations with China: who benefits and who pays?," Research Gate, May 2016, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/237567949_6_Myanmar%27s_economic_relations_with_Ch ina_who_benefits_and_who_pays. 144 Ibid. 145 Su Phyo and Thompson Chau, "China-Myanmar Border Economic Cooperation Zone Location Speculated," The Myanmar Times, last modified June 6, 2017, https://www.mmtimes.com/business/26275-china-myanmar-border-economic-cooperation-zone- location-speculated.html.

Following the statement above, there are five memorandums of understanding (MoUs) which have been signed by China and Myanmar up to present– including China-Myanmar Border Economic Cooperation Zone which involves Myanmar ministries of commerce.

4.1.1 China – Myanmar Economic Corridor

Figure 8 BCIM Economic Corridor

Before the development of China - Myanmar Economic Corridor, China and Myanmar have accelerated its trade and investment route through Bangladesh, China, India and Myanmar (BCIM) corridor. BCIM Economic corridor is a specific trading route which operates common trade agreements and infrastructure of the countries involved– Bangladesh (via Chittagong), China (via Kunming), India (via Kolkata) and Myanmar (via

Mandalay)– in order to increase the trade productivity.146 BCIM Economic Corridor firstly introduced by Chinese scholar from Kunming therefore this initiative was also known as Kunming Initiative.147 During its first meeting in 1999, The ‘Kunming Initiative’ has objectives as follow:148

• To create a platform for stakeholders having discussion on promoting economic growth and trade in the BCIM region; • To specify the great sectors and projects for the collaboration amongst the BCIM nations; and • To strengthen cooperation between BCIM Countries particularly among the stakeholders and to deepen BCIM ties.

Although China and Myanmar has been connected through BCIM economic corridor, China however assumes that a direct economic corridor would be better.149 After the construction China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, China seeks Myanmar as an essential part to support to economic corridor specially to gain access to the Indian Ocean.

“The direct economic corridor, which would help Myanmar's development plan and needs, will start in China's Yunnan Province, extend to the central Myanmar city of Mandalay and then east to Yangon and west to the Kyaukpyu special economic zone, forming a three-pillar giant cooperation pattern”150

146 Asia Briefing, "The Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar Trade Corridor," Asia Business News, last modified June 7, 2013, http://www.asiabriefing.com/news/2013/06/the-bangladesh-china-india- myanmar-trade-corridor/. 147 Pravakar Sahoo, "BCIM Corridor a Game Changer for South Asian Trade," East Asia Forum, last modified July 18, 2014, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2014/07/18/bcim-corridor-a-game-changer-for- south-asian-trade/. 148 Asia Briefing, "The Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar Trade Corridor," Asia Business News, last modified June 7, 2013, http://www.asiabriefing.com/news/2013/06/the-bangladesh-china-india- myanmar-trade-corridor/. 149 "China Plans Economic Corridor With Myanmar For Access To Indian Ocean," NDTV.com, last modified November 21, 2017, https://www.ndtv.com/world-news/china-plans-economic-corridor- with-myanmar-for-access-to-indian-ocean-1778361. 150 Ibid.

Chinese Foreign Minister - Wang Yi

Following the previous statement, the reason why China proposed China- Myanmar Economic Corridor is to strengthen bilateral cooperation and to increase revenue for both countries and to keep an eye on the stability of China- Myanmar border.151 China-Myanmar economic corridor will create Y- shaped which starts from China’s Yunnan province, heading to Mandalay in Myanmar. From there it will extend to the east and west to Yangon New City and Kyaukpyu special Economic Zone, in the Rakhine province.

One of China’s ongoing project in this route is the oil and gas pipelines linking Kunming and Kyaukphyu in Rakhine State which began to operate in 2014. Besides that, China is also negotiating to build a deep-water port at Kyaukpyu. Therefore, A railway between Kyaukphyu and Kunming would be part of Chinese President Xi Jinping’s program Belt and Road initiative to build trade and transport connections linking China and Asia with the Middle East, Africa and Europe.152

Figure 9 China-Myanmar Economic Corridor

151 Zhang Hui, "FM Proposes China-Myanmar Economic Corridor," Global Times, last modified

November 20, 2017, http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1076202.shtml. 152 Sithu A. Myint, "Cars, Railways and Cattle: China's Economic Interests in Myanmar," Frontier Myanmar, last modified January 21, 2018, https://frontiermyanmar.net/en/cars-railways-and-cattle- chinas-economic-interests-in-myanmar.

4.1.2 China-Myanmar Energy Project China’s rapid economic growth has led to the increasing amount of domestic energy needs.153 According to World Energy Outlook (IEA 2010), the total of oil demand increased from 2.3 million barrels per day (mb/d) in 1990 to 8.1 mb/d in 2009.154 Due to the economic boom and its stagnating domestic oil production, it has led Chinese NOCs (national oil companies) to expand the energy resources overseas in the early 1990s.

Regardless the achievements of China’s “going out” strategy for oil and gas, China however facing potential force and rising costs.155 This due to the higher oil dependence on some political unstable country such as African and Middle East countries.156 Therefore, China has to diversify its sources of imported energy resources, and place to get a higher priority on oil and natural gas from as closer to home as possible.

Under Belt and Road Initiative, the energy project has boosted the economic development of China and strengthen the bilateral relations with its neighbors particularly with Myanmar. As for China, it can fulfill the high demand on energy. Meanwhile, in return for Myanmar it can develop the abundance of resource through the infrastructure development invested by China also provide electricity to some undeveloped city in Myanmar.

153 Zhao Hong, "China-Myanmar Energy Cooperation and Its Regional Implications," Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs 30, no. 4 (2011):p.89-109, www.CurrentSoutheastAsianAffairs.org. 154 Ibid. 155 Zhao Hong, "China-Myanmar Energy Cooperation and Its Regional Implications," Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs 30, no. 4 (2011):p.89-109, www.CurrentSoutheastAsianAffairs.org. 156 Ibid.

4.1.2.1 Oil and Gas Pipeline Project “Kyaukpyu is of considerable strategic and economic value for China as it seeks to speed development of Yunnan and its other inland provinces.”157 -Centre for Strategic and International Studies-

The China-Myanmar pipeline project was initiated in 2004 and took a leap when China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) signed a 30-year hydrocarbon purchase and sale agreement with Daewoo International in December 2008.158 Through this pipeline project, CNPC will be able to import natural gas to China and also assist Myanmar in providing gas locally. The gas pipeline has length 2,520km–793km to Myanmar section and the 1,727km to China section.159

The pipelines location started from Kyaupyu, the west coast of Myanmar, the place of oil being constructed. Meanwhile, for the crude oil pipeline it starts from Maday Island, whereas the gas pipeline begins at Ramree Island in Kyaukpyu. The pipelines projects spread throughout the state of Rakhine, Magway, Mandalay and state of Shan, before entering the Ruli region in the Yunnan province of China.160 The gas pipeline runs through Guizhou, Chongqing and Guangxi and end up at Kunming, Yunnan province. Meanwhile, the crude pipeline will carry the crude oil that CNPC imports from Africa and the Middle East into China, via Myanmar.

Regardless of the energy source development interests in Kyaukpyu, China has an interest to build a deep-sea port to connect the poor

157 Gregory B. Poling, "Kyaukpyu: Connecting China to the Indian Ocean," Center for Strategic and International Studies |, last modified April 2, 2018, https://www.csis.org/analysis/kyaukpyu- connecting-china-indian-ocean. 158"Myanmar-China Pipelines," Hydrocarbons Technology, accessed May 5, 2018, https://www.hydrocarbons-technology.com/projects/myanmar-china-pipelines/. 159Ibid. 160"Myanmar-China Pipelines," Hydrocarbons Technology, accessed May 5, 2018, https://www.hydrocarbons-technology.com/projects/myanmar-china-pipelines/.

southwestern region of China to the strategic position Indian Ocean.161 As in 2016, the China’s CITIC, including China Harbor Engineering Company won the projects of the construction deep-sea port and the creation of an industrial area.

Figure 10 Oil and Gas Pipeline Project

161 Staff Writer, "Yun Sun: China's Latest Megaproject Courts Controversy in Myanmar," Nikkei Asian Review, last modified November 16, 2017, https://asia.nikkei.com/NAR/Articles/Yun-Sun- China-s-latest-megaproject-courts-controversy-in-Myanmar.

Figure 11 Kyaukpyu Port

4.2 The Implementation of Belt and Road Initiative in Military Cooperation

The military cooperation between China and Myanmar has been existing since 1990s, as China’s PLA (People Liberation Army) became the assistance of Myanmar

Army Force or known as Tatmadaw. 162 The cooperation was started with the negotiation of purchase of arms including jet fighters, armored vehicles and naval vessels.163 The military cooperation until today has brought the Chinese presence to India’s eastern flank with the upgradation of infrastructure like dams, bridges, roads and ports.164 Further, the Sino-Myanmar military cooperation designed to achieve their objective of extending their military capability up to the Indian Ocean.

Figure 12 Top 15 Military Spenders in 2017

162 H. Shivananda, "Sino-Myanmar Military Cooperation and its Implications for India," Focus 5, no. 3 (July 2011): p.117-125, https://idsa.in/system/files/5_3_HShivananda.pdf. 163 Ibid. 164 Ibid.

Figure 13 China Military Expenditure

Figure IV-3 has shown the top 15 military spenders 2017 according to data collected by SIPRI 2018. From that figure, China with the total military expenditure around US$ 228 billion become the second largest spender after the United States with the total expenditure around US$ 610 billion.165 Meanwhile from the figure IV-4 it can be seen that the military spending of China is getting increase year by year.166 It increased to 176860 USD Million in 2013. From 2013, it increased to 191917 USD Million in 2014, and increased to 204505 USD Million in 2015. In 2016, it increased to 216031 USD Million and 228173 USD Million in 2017.167

Following China’s military expenditure, it cannot be separated with the growing interest of China in international community. The military modernization program has become more focused on supporting missions beyond China’s periphery,

165 SIPRI Military Expenditure Database 2018 166 Ibid. 167 Ibid.

62 including power projection, sea lane security, counterpiracy, peacekeeping, and humanitarian assistance/disaster relief.168

Figure 14 Myanmar Military Expenditure

Compare to China Military Expenditure, the chart of Myanmar military seems up and down. From 2012 to 2013, the amount increased to 3268.6 USD Million and increased to 3801 USD Million in 2015. Meanwhile in 2016 and 2017, the total expenditure of Myanmar decreased to 3634.3 USD Million in 2016 and 2604.1 USD million in 2017.169 According to The National Defense and Security Council, one of factors affect Myanmar military expenditure is to deal with the rebel group.170 As in 2014, Myanmar with its military powerful voice in parliament, has spent 23.2 percent of its national budget on military spending against the rebel group.

4.2.1 Joint Military Exercise “Chinese military is willing to work with the Myanmar military to further strengthen strategic communication and push forward pragmatic cooperation in various fields”

168 Department of Defense United States of America, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2017, (DoD USA, 2017), https://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2017_China_Military_Power_Report.PDF. 169 SIPRI Military Expenditure Database 2018 170 John Pike, "Myanmar - - Defense Spending," GlobalSecurity.org, last modified February 1, 2015, https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/myanmar/budget.htm.

which includes “reciprocal group visits, personnel training as well as joint training and exercises.” General Xu - vice chairman of CMC171

4.2.1.1 Army Training The exchange of high-level visits between the two armed forces– Tatmadaw and PLA (People Liberation Army) has proven the significant aspect on military relations.172 One of aspect supports this military relation is through the Army Training, such as training programs for weaponry where China involved Myanmar officers at the PLA's Staff College and Defense College.173

4.2.1.2 Border Stability The other aspect of China - Myanmar defense cooperation is security cooperation along the border area. Due to the lawless nature of China - Myanmar border area, there are many notorious for various types of transnational crime such as human trafficking and the drug trade.174 This situation is further exacerbated by the presence of rebel group such as Kokang. However, China in pursuing its peaceful rise should be able to maintain the peace particularly with its neighbor in border area. In cope with this issue, China military will cooperate with Burmese army by deploying

171 Tin M. Than, "Myanmar Security Trend and Outlook: Tatmadaw in a New Political Environment," 防衛研究所WEBサイト / National Institute for Defense Studies, Ministry of Defense, accessed May 7, 2018, http://www.nids.mod.go.jp/english/publication/joint_research/series15/pdf/chapter03.pdf. 172 Aung Myoe, In the Name of Pauk-Phaw: Myanmar's China Policy Since 1948 (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2011), Kindle edition 173 Ibid. 174 Ibid.

troops along the border with Myanmar, and in performed military exercises involving infantry, artillery, tanks and air craft in a full-scale show of force.175

4.2.1.3 Naval Drills China for the first time has conducted its joint naval exercise with Myanmar in 2017. Three Chinese warships, including guided-missile destroyer Changchun, guided-missile frigate Jinzhou and replenishment ship Chaohu and from Myanmar, The F11 Aung Zeya and UMS Anawrahta (771), two Myanmar frigates, also participated in the exercises took part in the joint drills. According to China’s defense ministry, “this event is a part of 180 Day of Goodwill visit and has concern on some subjects including communication, formation maneuver, and joint search and rescue operations.”176

“China will proactively implement the consensus agreed on by Myanmar and China’s leaders, to enhance communication and deepen practical cooperation, to promote military ties and safeguard regional peace and stability. The drill comes in the wake of the China-Myanmar crude oil pipeline began operations last month in hopes of familiarizing the two naval forces that will be expected to deal with potential hazards that accompany the establishment of the pipelines.” -Wu Qian Ministry of National Defense-177

4.2.2 Arms Transfer Since 1989, China plays an important role as a major supplier of weapons for Myanmar.178 Due to the Western sanctions on arms embargo, Myanmar loss its

175 "Military Confrontation or Political Dialogue: Consequences of the Kokang Crisis for Peace and Democracy in Myanmar," Transnational Institute | Ideas into Movement, last modified July 2015, https://www.tni.org/files/publication-downloads/military_confrontation_or_political_dialogue_w.pdf. 176 Prashanth Prameswaran, "China Holds First Naval Exercise With Myanmar," The Diplomat, May 25, 2017, https://thediplomat.com/2017/05/china-holds-first-naval-exercise-with-myanmar/. 177 Ibid. 178 Aung Myoe, In the Name of Pauk-Phaw: Myanmar's China Policy Since 1948 (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2011), Kindle edition

65 traditional weapons supplier during the military forces. The estimation of weapons has been supplied by China achieved US$4 billion. They are including warships, small arms, anti-aircraft guns, combat aircraft, main battle tanks, armored personnel carriers, and so on.179 Besides that, China also supplied trucks of various sizes and capacities and arms procurement training. Therefore, Arms supply has been one of the Chinese strategies to engage Myanmar.

Table 2 Arms Transfer to Myanmar

Figure IV-6 has shown the Arms Transfers Database to Myanmar according to SIPRI in USD millions. From that figure, it can be seen that China has become the largest supplier from Myanmar from 2014 – 2016 with the total US$ 440 millions. With the huge number of arms export, it supports China’s willing to maintain stability around the border area and also the cooperation with Myanmar security organizations– both military and police in the issue of drug trafficking and other illegal cross-border activities.180

179 Ibid. 180 "Defence Cooperation with Myanmar—Australia and Other Countries: a Quick Guide – Parliament of Australia," Home – Parliament of Australia, last modified October 13, 2017,

To comprehend the huge number of arms, transfer from China, from figure IV-7 it can be seen the details about Myanmar Arms Trade from 1990- 2016. China at the figure has become the largest exporter country for arms transfer in Myanmar.181 Moreover, as China is the giant neighbor of Myanmar, it will cost Myanmar less than other country to do arms transfer. The most Myanmar’s military import from China are aircraft, missile, armored vehicles, artillery and naval vessels. From 1990 – 2016 China has transferred: 120 Aircrafts, 1,029 Missiles, 21 Naval Vessels, 125 Artillery and 696 Armored Vehicles.

Figure 15 Myanmar Arms Trade

https://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/pubs/rp /rp1718/Quick_Guides/Myanmar. 181 Shakeeb Asrar, "Who is Selling Weapons to Myanmar?," Breaking News, World News & Video from Al Jazeera, last modified September 16, 2017, https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/interactive/2017/09/selling-myanmar-military-weapons- 170914151902162.html.

CHAPTER V CONCLUSION

The rise of China has been a great phenomenon in the world particularly in this 21st century. This rise not only refers to the economic aspect but also the military aspect. As a second largest military spender in the world, China seeks to secure their interest– both land and water. Moreover, it is essential for the continuity of China Belt and Road Initiative development. China with its status as a rising power country, currently demand lot of energy and seek for the alternative route such as getting access into the Indian ocean. After building its permanent military base in Djibouti, China continuously seek to cooperate with the littoral state in Indian Ocean– including Myanmar.

Looking at its geographical position, Myanmar locates in a very strategic position. It sits on tri-junction Southeast, South and East Asia and one-third of its perimeter being the coast, linking to the Indian Ocean. Besides, Myanmar is very blessed with an abundance of natural resources such as natural gas. With this advantageous, Myanmar becomes the most convenient land for China, linking to the Indian Ocean. Moreover, Myanmar shared 2,204 kilometers of its border with China. Paukphaw which in Myanmar word means siblings– is the way China and Myanmar introduce their close relations. Since the ancient times, both countries have maintained its substantive relations especially during the military regime in Myanmar.

China therefore with its defense policy of peaceful development engage Myanmar through economic and military cooperation. Besides, China also strengthen the bilateral ties through a good-neighboring policy. China have agreed through its development, it will give a benefit to Myanmar particularly in developing the infrastructure in Myanmar and dealing with the border security issue. Meanwhile, in

68 return, Myanmar have agreed to support China’s Belt and Road Initiative by providing access for China to the Indian Ocean.

In the context of belt and road initiative, China therefore, from 2013 until 2017 has implemented its defense policy through the economic and military cooperation with Myanmar. In economic sector, Myanmar and China have agreed to construct the direct economic corridor and energy project particularly on oil and gas pipelines. Meanwhile, for the cooperation sector, China and Myanmar established its military cooperation since 1990s. It includes joint military exercise in army training, border stability, and naval drills and also in arms transfer.

This cooperation has resulted advantageous for both countries. As for Myanmar, it helps Myanmar to develop the infrastructure and to pursue the peace process especially in border area. Meanwhile, in return, China can fulfill the demand of oil and secure their national interest by getting access to the Indian Ocean.

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