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MYANMAR DEFENSE COOPERATION to INCREASE ITS INFLUENCE in the INDIAN OCEAN in the CASE of BELT and ROAD INITIATIVE (2013-2017) by Cici Ernasari ID No

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MYANMAR DEFENSE COOPERATION to INCREASE ITS INFLUENCE in the INDIAN OCEAN in the CASE of BELT and ROAD INITIATIVE (2013-2017) by Cici Ernasari ID No THE IMPLEMENTATION OF CHINA’S DEFENSE POLICY IN SINO-MYANMAR DEFENSE COOPERATION TO INCREASE ITS INFLUENCE IN THE INDIAN OCEAN IN THE CASE OF BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVE (2013-2017) By Cici Ernasari ID no. 016201400032 A thesis presented to the Faculty of Humanities President University in partial fulfillment of the requirements of Bachelor Degree in International Relations Major in Strategic and Defense Studies 2018 i ii iii iv ABSTRACT Cici Ernasari, International Relations 2014, President University Thesis Title: “The Implementation of China’s Defense Policy in Sino-Myanmar Defense Cooperation to Increase Its Influence in the Indian Ocean in the case of Belt and Road Initiative (2013 – 2017)” The rise of China has been a great phenomenon in the world particularly in this 21st century. This rise has led China becomes the world’s second largest economy and also the world’s largest military. This situation however pushed China to fulfill the increasing demand of energy and to seek for the alternative route. By sharing 2,204 kilometers of its border with China and has direct access to the Indian Ocean, Myanmar becomes a land bridge to get the access to Indian Ocean. Myanmar locates on tri-junction Southeast, South and East Asia and very abundance with natural resources. In the name of Pauk-Phaw, China and Myanmar relations has been existing since the ancient times and both countries have maintained substantive relations. In the context of belt and road initiative, China has implemented its defense policy through the economic and military cooperation with Myanmar. This research therefore explains the implementation of China’s defense policy in Sino-Myanmar defense cooperation to strengthening its position in the Indian Ocean in the context of belt and road initiative from 2013 until 2017. Keywords: Policy Implementation, China’s Defense Policy, Sino-Myanmar Defense Cooperation, Economic Cooperation, Military Cooperation, Indian Ocean, Belt and Road Initiative v ABSTRAK Cici Ernasari, International Relations 2014, President University Thesis Title: “The Implementation of China’s Defense Policy in Sino-Myanmar Defense Cooperation to Increase Its Influence in the Indian Ocean in the case of Belt and Road Initiative (2013 – 2017)” Kebangkitan Cina telah menjadi fenomena besar di dunia khususnya di abad ke-21. Kebangkitan ini telah menyebabkan China menjadi negara ekonomi terbesar kedua di dunia dan juga militer terbesar di dunia. Bagaimanapun, situasi ini juga mendorong Cina untuk memenuhi permintaan energi yang meningkat dan mencari rute alternatif. Dengan berbagi 2.204 kilometer perbatasannya dengan Cina dan memiliki akses langsung ke Samudera Hindia, Myanmar menjadi jembatan darat untuk mendapatkan akses ke Samudera Hindia. Myanmar terletak di persimpangan tiga Tenggara, Asia Selatan dan Timur, dan sangat berlimpah dengan sumber daya alam. Dalam nama Pauk-Phaw, hubungan Cina dan Myanmar sudah ada sejak zaman kuno dan kedua negara telah mempertahankan hubungan yang substantif. Dalam konteks inisiatif Belt and Road, Cina telah menerapkan kebijakan pertahanannya melalui kerjasama ekonomi dan militer dengan Myanmar. Oleh karena itu, penelitian ini menjelaskan penerapan kebijakan pertahanan Tiongkok dalam kerja sama pertahanan Tiongkok- Myanmar untuk memperkuat posisinya di Samudera Hindia dalam konteks inisiatif Belt and Road dari tahun 2013 hingga 2017. Kata kunci: Implementasi Kebijakan, Kebijakan Pertahanan Cina, Kerjasama Pertahanan Cina-Myanmar, Kerjasama Ekonomi, Kerjasama Militer, Samudra Hindia, Inisiatif Belt and Road. vi ACKNOWLEDGEMENT First and foremost, I would like to express my gratitude to God Almighty for strengthening me to survive in four years study and finally finish this research. I would like to thank my family, especially to my mother Mrs. Erwinawati Gultom and my father Mr. Caong Tobing, my cousins Mr. Donald Tobing and Mrs. Anna Sitorus, for supporting me spiritually throughout my life and to my Dutch special friend Jochem Benjamin Stoof, for his personal support and encouragements. I would like to express my sincere gratitude to my thesis advisor Prof. Anak Agung Banyu Perwita, Ph.D. for guiding me during the thesis writing. I will never be able to finish this thesis writing without his excellence guiding. I would like to thank my internship colleague at Ministry of Foreign Affairs Indonesia particularly the Centre for Policy Analysis and Development for American and European Region, Mr. Dea Kurniawan and Ms. Muthia and at Embassy of the Republic of Indonesia The Hague Netherlands, Ms. Noira Soilani for helping in collecting data. I would like to thank my colleague mates especially Nurafni Damanik, Mita Listya, Syifa Afiah, Sri Ariani, Nuraini Ulandari, Oki Andeni Malta, Darysa Zolla Elpanda, Muhammad Agung Wicaksono, Nisrini Khairani, Dhianaswa Zhafira Mahanani, Ni Made Dian Damayanti, Siti Hendryani Putri, Hanna Uli Maria, Tania Amanda, Riyadh Bawazzir, Haekal Umri, Widya Dwi Rahma, Elsari Primadini, Heydi Tiffani, Anthony Nicholas, Aberson Natanael; to my beloved junior Bella Siallagan, Alfinco Simangunsong and Gleen Mononutu, for the extraordinary support in this research process. Cikarang, May 2018 Cici Ernasari vii TABLE OF CONTENTS THESIS ADVISER RECOMMENDATION LETTER ............ Error! Bookmark not defined. DECLARATION OF ORIGINALITY ...................... Error! Bookmark not defined. PANEL OF EXAMINERS........................................ Error! Bookmark not defined. APPROVAL SHEET ................................................ Error! Bookmark not defined. ABSTRACT ............................................................................................................. v ABSTRAK .............................................................................................................. vi ACKNOWLEDGEMENT ...................................................................................... vii TABLE OF CONTENTS ....................................................................................... viii LIST OF ABREVIATIONS ...................................................................................... x LIST OF FIGURES ................................................................................................. xi LIST OF TABLES ................................................................................................... xi CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION ............................................................................... 1 1.1 Background of Study ....................................................................................... 1 1.2 Problem Identification ..................................................................................... 4 1.3 Statement of The Problem ............................................................................... 7 1.4 Research Objective .......................................................................................... 7 1.5 Significance of the Study ................................................................................. 7 1.6 Theoretical Framework .................................................................................... 7 1.6.1 Neorealism ................................................................................................ 7 1.6.1.1 Neorealism vs Classical Realism…………………………………………………………………..……8 1.6.2 Strategic Environment ............................................................................... 8 1.6.3 Threat Perception ...................................................................................... 9 1.6.4 Foreign Policy ......................................................................................... 11 1.6.5 Defense Policy ........................................................................................ 12 1.7 Research Methodology .................................................................................. 14 1.8 Scope and Limitations of the Study................................................................ 14 viii 1.9 Thesis Structure ............................................................................................. 15 CHAPTER II THE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT OF SINO - MYANMAR ....... 17 2.1 Geostrategic Importance of Myanmar ............................................................ 17 2.1.1 Myanmar’s Strategic Position for China’s National Interest..................... 19 2.1.2 China’s Strategic Position for Myanmar’s National Interest..................... 22 2.1.3 The Dynamic of Myanmar Security ........................................................ 23 2.2 The History of Pauk-Phaw: Sino-Myanmar Relations ..................................... 29 CHAPTER III BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVE: THE COMBINATION OF CHINA FOREIGN AND DEFENSE POLICY ..................................................................... 40 3.1 Belt and Road Initiative from China Foreign Policy Perspective................. 40 3.1.1 Foreign Policy of China ...................................................................... 40 3.1.2 Foreign Policy of China to Myanmar .................................................. 47 3.2 Belt and Road Initiative from China Defense Policy Perspective ................ 49 CHAPTER IV THE ANALYSIS OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVE TOWARD SINO-MYANMAR IN ECONOMIC AND MILITARY COOPERATION ................................................................................ 53 4.1 The Implementation of Belt and Road Initiative in Economic Cooperation .... 53 4.2 The Implementation of Belt and Road Initiative in Military Cooperation
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