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Joint Tactical Network Test Environment

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Joint Tactical Network Test Environment Joint Tactical Network Test Environment Networks of Networks Roger Fate NewTec Engineering – WSMR January 2012 JTNTE Compliance • Net-Centric Operations and Warfare • Vice Chief of Staff of the Army’s directive in the integration or combine tests for the purpose to field warfighting capabilities ensuring system of systems are interoperable before fielding to the Warfighter • Augment ATEC’s chartered to plan and execute rigorous and robust integrated Network T&E to provide recommendations to Milestone Decision Authorities (MDA) • GIG Key Interface Profiles • DoD Mandated Net Ready Key Performance Parameter (KPP) • WSMR IA US Army White Sands Missile Range 2 JTNTE Purpose • Provide Persistent Joint Tactical Network to Range Customers for T&E and Training • Provide Exercise Common Operating Picture or Data Transport (anywhere there is a TSN, DREN or SDREN Drop) • Provide Customers with unique needs during T&E or training US Army White Sands Missile Range 3 Requirements Gathering • SoSI Network Integration Evaluation • 1st Armored Division • BCT LUT 1 & 2 Testing Requirements • 49th Fighter Test Wing UAV • TRIAD Regional COP Working Group – WSMR, Holloman AFB, Ft. Bliss • IM Directorate TSN-IP Network and IA Requirements US Army White Sands Missile Range 4 JTNTE Network Diagram US Army White Sands Missile Range 5 WSMR Mobile and Lab Facilities US Army White Sands Missile Range 6 JTNTE Mobile Platform • Purpose – Establish persistent tactical networks in the way they are intended to be used by the Warfighter – Extend the Line of Site for systems being used and provide Last Mile connection to the TSN – Provide tactical network node for: • Link 16 • Blue Force Tracker 1 with KGV-72 (BFT1) • Enhanced Position Location Reporting System (EPLRS) • Joint Tactical Radio System with SRW (JTRS) • Remote Operations Video Enhanced Receiver 4 (ROVER) • Tactical Point to Point Ethernet Radio US Army White Sands Missile Range 7 Link 16 • Military tactical data exchange network • Military aircraft, ground forces and ships may exchange tactical pictures and messaging in near-real-time • TDMA-based secure, jam-resistant high speed data link • Frequency band 960-1215 MHz (LOS) • Mil-STD-6016 data structure • Used on at least 20 different platforms (e.g. F-15, F-16, F-18, F-22, A-10, AWACs, Bombers, tankers, Patriot, THAAD, AD/BDE TOCs) US Army White Sands Missile Range 8 Link 16 Multifunctional Information Distribution System MIDS Low Volume Terminal (LVT2) Air Defense Systems Integrator Quad Element Omni Antenna US Army White Sands Missile Range 9 Enhanced Position Location Reporting System (EPLRS) • Enhance battle space situational awareness fratricide prevention - allows weapons platforms to see where other EPLRS are located – Limited BFT units for SA and some C2, Key Leaders in the EPLRS AOI • TDMA-based secure, jam resistant, computer controlled communications network that distributes near real-time tactical information • Provides platform position information independent of Global Position System (GPS) operating at 420-450 MHz (terrestrial LOS only) • Provide a self-forming, self-healing network • Provides terrestrial connectivity for FBCB2 and a joint link to Marines and Air Force US Army White Sands Missile Range 10 EPLRS FBCB2 V5 EPLRS with ENM Defense Advance GPS Receiver (DAGR) EPLRS/RT-1720G/URO US Army White Sands Missile Range 11 Blue Force Tracker (BFT) • Enhance battle space situational awareness • Two modes of BLOS operation/communication: One-way or Two-way • Two types of systems deployed (BFT 1 and BFT 2) • BFT 1 can now send Type 1 encryption data (KGV-72 being tested during NIE) • Uses either SATCOM or military satellites (BLOS) • Prevent fratricide, track valuable military assets, provide emergency communication, and allow search and rescue forces to quickly locate, identify, and communicate with at-risk personnel • Provide SA and limited C2 form designated Key Leaders to EPLRS within an Area of Interest (AOI) US Army White Sands Missile Range 12 BFT FBCB2 V5 MT-2011F Satellite Transceiver KGV-72 Defense Advance GPS Receiver (DAGR) US Army White Sands Missile Range 13 FBCB2 Display US Army White Sands Missile Range 14 Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) PRC-117(G) W/PA & VVA (30 to 2000 MHz) AN/PRC-154 Rifleman Radio/ Soldier Radio Waveform (SRW) (225 MHz to 470 MHz) US Army White Sands Missile Range 15 Joint Tactical Radio (PRC-117G) • 30 MHz to 2 GHz frequency range • SINCGARS frequency hopping ECCM • 1.2 MHz and 5 MHz wideband channel • Havequick I/II frequency hopping bandwidths ECCM • JTRS SCA v2.2 operating environment • UHF SATCOM, MIL-STD-188-181B • Adaptive Networking Wideband — JITC Certified Waveform (ANW2) • UHF DAMA, MIL-STD-188-182A • Solider Radio Waveform - Certified (5 kHz) — JITC Certified • In-line network encryption • UHF DAMA, MIL-STD-188-183A • Narrowband AM/FM, 10 watts output (25 kHz) — JITC Certified power • High Performance Waveform (HPW) • SATCOM 20 watts output power • Sierra II Programmable Cryptographic • Wideband 20 W / 50 W with Power Module Amp • Internal VINSON, ANDVT/KYV-5, • Rover L-Band receive KG84C encryption • DS-101 and DS-102 keyfill modes US Army White Sands Missile Range 16 Remote Operations Video Enhanced Receiver (ROVER) US Army White Sands Missile Range 17 ROVER 4 Operating Parameters • C-band Digital • L-band Analog – 5.25 GHz to 5.85 GHz, 1.0 MHz steps – 1.71 GHz to 1.85 GHz, 0.5 MHz steps – 455 Kbps, FSK – FM Demodulation – H.261 Video – NTSC / RS-170 Vide • C-band Digital (466 kbps with • Ku-band Digital RS/Viterbi) – 14.4 GHz to 15.35 GHz, 5.0 MHz steps – 4.40 GHz to 5.85 GHz, 1.0 MHz steps – 10.71 Mbps, OQPSK – 466 kbps, FSK – 3.2 Mbps, OQPSK – Reed-Solomon/Viterbi FEC – 2.0 Mbps, BPSK – MPEG-4 video – 1.6 Mbps, OQPSK • S-band Analog – MPEG-4 / MPEG-2 Video – Receive CDL Rev F Annex B – 2.30 GHz to 2.5 GHz, 1.0 MHz steps – FM Demodulation – NTSC / RS-170 Video US Army White Sands Missile Range 18 Harris 7800 IP Pont-t-Point Radio • IEEE 802.16-Based Technology • 4.4 GHz – 5.0 GHz (Licensed Band) • Designed for IP traffic • Adjustable TX power up to 100mW • 1 MHz channel spacing step size • PtP Channel Width: 10, 20, 40 MHz, • Low Latency: 4 ms PtP • Automatic adjustment of throughput based on link conditions • FIPS 140-2, Level 2 Certified US Army White Sands Missile Range 19 Test Cases NIE 11.2 & 12.1: Air Picture Over JREAP C & RF LINK-16 ATC RADARS Link-16 RF RF Bldg 1554 BDE TOC MIDS x.25 3750 G MIDS x.25 ADSI 3750 G Bldg 2/1 AD 335 KABIC ADAM Cell w/ADSI / MIDS Data Fusion AMDWS /FAAD EO/ TAIS TASNTSN ADSI US Army White Sands Missile Range 20 ADSI Air Picture of ATC Radars US Army White Sands Missile Range 21 Test Cases NIE 11.2 & 12.1: Air Picture Over Remote RF LINK-16 ATC RADARS Link-16 Remote TX at R-455 FSTE TCP/IP MIDS MIDS 3750 G NIE BDE TOC X.25 SENTINEL TCP/IP 2/1 AD Bldg ADAM Cell w/ADSI / MIDS 335 KABIC AMDWS /FAAD EO/ TAIS Data Fusion TASNTSN Bldg TCP/IP 1554 ADSI 3750 G ADSI US Army White Sands Missile Range 22 Test Cases NIE 12.2 ATC & BFT Picture Over Link 16 NIE FBCB2/BFT/L-band Equipped Platforms ATC Link-16 RADARS RF RF Bldg MIDS NIE BDE TOC 1554 X.25 MIDS 3750 G X.25 SENTINEL ADSI 3750 G Bldg JREAP (TCP/IP) 335 ASTERIX KABIC 2/1 AD Data Fusion ADAM Cell w/ADSI / MIDS AMDWS /FAAD EO/ TAIS TASNTSN ADSI US Army White Sands Missile Range 23 .
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