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OMNI and Omnixi SPECIFICATIONS OMNI and OMNIxi The OMNI™ Secure Terminal provides PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS SECURE DATA APPLICATION Type-1 security for both voice and data Size: 5.1”W x 6.2” D x 1.9”H (12.9cm x 15.7cm x 4.8cm) FNBDT Data Rates (OMNI) Weight: 1.5 lbs (0.7kg) • Synchronous Secure Data Up to 28.8 Kbps communications in a versatile narrow • Asynchronous Secure Data Up to 33.6 Kbps band encryption solution to address desktop ERFORMANCE HARACTERISTICS • Asynchronous Secure Data Up to 56 Kbps when P C other end is attached to a secure digital link and portable wire-line user requirements. Security Features: FNBDT Data Rates (OMNIxi) • Type I Embedded Cryptography: • Synchronous Secure Data Up to 15 Mbps - SBU to Top Secret SCI • Asynchronous Secure Data Up to 128 Kbps • Secure Access Control System (SACS): Windows™ 95, 98, 2000, NT compatible - Access Control List (ACL)[100 Entries] FEATURES OMNI™ PRODUCT DESCRIPTION - Maximum and Minimum Security Levels SPECIAL FEATURES OMNI™ adds NSA certified • Alphanumeric Display for Identification and Authentication • NSA Type 1 Certified • TEMPEST Compliant: NSTISSAM TEMPEST 1/92 User Communities: Type-1 security to any • Telephone Security: TSG-5 • U.S. National • CCEB Countries • Canadian National • NATO Member Nations standard analog telephone, • Key Management: • FNBDT Interoperable personal computer, or secure - SDNS ReKey using FNBDT Signaling • UK National • Coalition User Communities - 4 Level Key Set Support • Australian National fax machine. The OMNI™ - National • CCEB • NATO • Coalition • New Zealand National • Secure Voice, Data and offers toll quality secure • Selectable OMNI™ Modes: Voice Encoders: Fax over PSTN voice as well as secure data - Traditional • MELP @ 2.4Kbps communications using an - Autosecure on Receive • G.729D@ 6.4Kbps - Unattended • High Quality Voice integral V.90 capable modem. Unique Features: FNBDT (Future Narrow Band Interfaces: • Upgrade via Software Download • Local EIA-232E/EIA-530/EIA-530A Selectable • Remote Control via AT Command Set • V.90, V.34, V.32 Modem Digital Terminals) signaling - Data (Async/Sync) • Auto Answer/Unattended Operation ensures interoperability with - Fill • Auto Log Off STE terminals and other - SW Download • Multi User PINs • Data Compression - Remote Control FNBDT devices that have - “AT” Command Set Warranty: received NSA Type-1 certification. Users can connect a • 2 Year Standard • Network RJ • Software Upgradable • 1 Year and 3 Year Extension Options STU-III in conjunction with an OMNI™ to support FNBDT - 11 POTS - Data or Voice voice and data calls as well as STU-III voice and data calls. • Local RJ • US National, This enables legacy interoperability with a STU-III, while at - 11 POTS For Additional Information Contact: CCEB Countries, the same time affording the user improved voice quality and - Voice L-3 Communication Systems-East NATO Member Nations, faster data rates when the OMNI™ interoperates with other • External Power Adapter One Federal Street, Camden, NJ 08103 and Coalition User FNBDT devices. • Digital Network I/F: EIA-232E/EIA-530/EIA-530A Telephone: 856-338-6207 Community Operation Selectable (OMNIxi™) Toll Free: 800-339-6197 Fax: 856-338-2741 Design Compliance: • Crypto Modern • TELECOM: US:FCC part 68, EU TBR-21 or Visit our Website at: OMNI™ APPLICATIONS • EMI/EMC: US:FCC part 15 Sub B, EU:EN55022/EN50082-1 http://www.L-3Com.com/STE Upgradable • Safety: UL, CUL, IEC60950, CB Scheme • Secure Voice over PSTN Power Requirements: • Secure Voice Conferencing Client • External Power Supply included • 91-252 VAC, 47-63 Hz (Autoranging) • Less than 5 Watts (Typical) • Secure Modem Data over PSTN Environmental: • Secure Remote Access Dial-up over PSTN • Operating: - Temperature: 0°C to 40 °C - Rel Humidity: 10% to 90% Non-condensing • Secure Point-to-Point Data File Transfer • Storage: - Temperature: -20 °C to 60 °C • Secure Fax over PSTN (when used with a secure fax) www.L-3Com.com/OMNI Cleared by DoD/DFOISR for Public Release under DFOISR case number 04-S-0388 on August 19, 2004 OMNIxi-06/05 All Data and Specifications Subject to Change APPLICATIONS OMNI / OMNIxi Secure Terminal™ TELEPHONE NETWORK The OMNIxi Secure Terminal provides Type-1 security for high-speed data communications while retaining OMNI’s secure voice and data capabilities to support desktop and portable users. FEATURES • NSA Type 1 Certified OMNIxi™ PRODUCT DESCRIPTION OMNIxi adds NSA certified Type-1 security to data links at • Secure Voice, Data and synchronous rates up to 15 Mbps. The OMNIxi allows users to SATCOM (ANALOG AND DIGITAL) Fax over PSTN inventory one device that supports both the OMNI analog voice and • Secure Voice, Data over data modes of operation, while Digital Networks also supporting high-speed link encryption and secure voice over • 15 Mbps Link Encryption digital networks. The wide array of capabilities makes OMNIxi the best • Data Compression value solution in the Type I approved marketplace. A user can purchase the standard OMNI device as an analog • FNBDT Interoperable voice and data encryptor today and LINK ENCRYPTION (WAN) purchase the OMNIxi as a software • US National, upgrade to unlock the full 15 Mbps CCEB Countries, data and digital voice capability. The NATO Member Nations, OMNIxi supports link encryption and Coalition User capabilities at almost half the price of its competitors. Flexibility, Community Operation performance, and value… All of which can only be found in OMNIxi. • Crypto Modern Upgradable ™ PPLICATIONS OMNI - STU-III Comparison OMNIxi A OMNIxi™ supports all OMNI™ applications plus: Interoperability: OMNI STU-III Data Rates: OMNI STU-III Wireless (GSM/CDMA) Yes No 9.6Kbps Yes Yes • High Speed Link Encryption STE Yes Yes Up To 33.6 Kbps Yes No FNBDT Devices Yes No Up to 15 Mbps (xi mode) Yes No • Secure Video Teleconferencing Data Compression Yes No Voice Quality: 2,400 Bps MELP LPC10 Data Modes: • Secure Voice/Data Over SATCOM 4,800 Bps No CELP Async Yes Yes 6,400 Bps G.729D No Sync Yes Yes www.L-3Com.com/OMNIxi OMNI-06/05.
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