Daf Ditty Eruvin 46: The leniency of Grief (and Eruvin)

Under the wide and starry sky, Dig the grave and let me lie. Glad did I live and gladly die, And I laid me down with a will. This be the verse you grave for me: Here he lies where he longed to be; Home is the sailor, home from sea, And the hunter home from the hill.

Robert Louis Stevenson

1

Rabbi Ya’akov bar Idi said that Yehoshua ben Levi said: The is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri, that one who was asleep at the beginning of may travel two thousand cubits in every direction.

Rabbi said to Rabbi Ya’akov bar Idi: Did you hear this halakha explicitly from Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi, or did you understand it by inference from some other ruling that he issued? Rabbi Ya’akov bar Idi said to him: I heard it explicitly from him.

2

The Gemara asks: From what other teaching could this ruling be inferred? The Gemara explains: From that which Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi said: The halakha is in accordance with the lenient opinion with regard to an eiruv.

The Gemara asks: Why do I need both? Why was it necessary for Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi to state both the general ruling that the halakha is in accordance with the lenient opinion with regard to an eiruv, and also the specific ruling that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri on this issue?

Rabbi Zeira said: Both rulings were necessary, as had he informed us only that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri, I would have said that the

3 halakha is in accordance with him whether this is a leniency, i.e., that a sleeping person acquires residence and may walk two thousand cubits in every direction, or whether it is a stringency, i.e., that ownerless utensils acquire residence and can be carried only two thousand cubits from that place. Consequently, he teaches us that the halakha is in accordance with the lenient opinion with regard to an eiruv, so that we rule in accordance with Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri only when it entails a leniency.

The Gemara asks: Let him state only that the halakha is in accordance with the lenient opinion with regard to an eiruv. Why do I need the statement that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri?

The Gemara answers: This ruling was necessary as well, for had he informed us only that the halakha is in accordance with the lenient opinion with regard to an eiruv, it might have entered your mind to say that this statement applies only to disputes in which a single authority disagrees with another single authority, or several authorities disagree with several other authorities.

But when a single authority maintains a lenient opinion against several authorities who maintain a more stringent position, you might have said that we do not rule in his favor. Hence, it was necessary to state that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri although he disputes the .

whether a sleeping person מכח י ם and the ירונ ןב ןנחוי 'ר of לחמ ו תק we learned a ףד In the previous תבש חת ו ם .– רמא בר י בקעי רב ידיא רמא בר י עשוהי ןב ול י הכלה ברכ י ןנחוי ןב ירונ acquires a

. מא ו ת of 2000 חת ו ם and acquires a, וק הנ בש י הת that a sleeping person is ירונ ןב ןנחוי 'ר We pasken like

offers three explanations of why it was necessary to state this explicitly after we already ארמג The We always follow the more lenient opinion in הכלה ירבדכ מה י לק עב י ר ו ב – have a general rule of . יבוריע ן כלה תו ל

4

And Rabbi Yoḥanan holds like Shmuel, as Shmuel said: The halakha is in accordance with the lenient opinion with regard to mourning practices, i.e., wherever there is a dispute with regard to mourning customs, the halakha is in accordance with the lenient opinion.

From here the Gemara infers: It is only with regard to mourning practices that the Sages were lenient, but in general, with regard to other areas of halakha, even in the case of rabbinic laws there is a difference between a disagreement of a single authority with a single authority and a disagreement of a single authority with several authorities.

5 This being the case, Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi did well to rule explicitly that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri, even though he is a single authority who ruled leniently in dispute with the Rabbis.

Rabbi Maurice Lamm cited this sugya in his treatise on mourning:1

1 Cited in Reality Check: A Handbook of Hashkafa, Yosef Segal. Mosaica Press 2016, and More than a Tear Yigal Segal 2013 Judaica Press.

6 Rabbi Seth Goren writes2

In European history, the phrase “exploding diets” refers to the situation when each member of the Polish legislature had veto power over the body’s actions, leading to governmental atrophy, vulnerability to predatory neighbors, and ultimately the dismemberment of the Polish-Lithuanian commonwealth. Exploding diets are a cautionary tale about the consequences of hamstringing legislative rules.

Fortunately, on today’s daf, we get some more helpful instruction about the mechanics of legal decision making.

Rabba bar bar Ḥana said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Wherever you find that a single authority is lenient with regard to a certain halakha and several other authorities are stringent, the halakha is in accordance with the words of the stringent authorities, who constitute the majority, except for here, where despite the fact that the opinion of Rabbi Akiva is lenient and the opinion of the rabbis is more stringent, the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva.

For a bit of context, yesterday’s daf had the rabbis debating a lenient opinion on an question. Today, they find themselves in a wider discussion about majority rule in Jewish law. In trying to determine the general principles about when the halakha follows the majority and when it doesn’t, the Gemara relates a tradition about the laws of mourning.

If someone received a report that one of their close relatives died, the majority of rabbis say that they should observe both the intense seven-day period of mourning (known as shiva) and the customs of the 30-day mourning period, regardless of when the report was received. But Rabbi Akiva takes a more lenient view, ruling that this is true only if the report arrives within 30 days of the relative’s death. If it comes later, only one day of mourning is observed.

According to Rabbi Yohanan, Rabbi Akiva’s lenient take wins out over the more stringent opinion, even though we generally follow the rule of the majority. Why is that, exactly? The Gemara continues:

It is only with regard to mourning practices that the sages were lenient, but in general, with regard to other areas of halakha, even in the case of rabbinic laws there is a difference between a disagreement of a single authority with a single authority and a disagreement of a single authority with several authorities.

The Gemara doesn’t tell us what’s special about the laws of mourning that we disregard the views of the majority. But it does reaffirm what we know from various other places in the : In general, when there is disagreement between one rabbi and many rabbis, the law follows the opinion of the many. This is true even if a voice calls out from heaven and endorses the minority view, as we’ll see in a famous story in Tractate . (the oven of Achani, Lo bashamayim)

The principle of majority rule, and the concomitant rejection of both divine intervention and individual veto power, have enabled Jewish law to evolve in a relatively steady fashion. This helps

2 Myjewishlearning.org

7 avoid the gridlock and indecision that can prevent communities from responding to new challenges and contribute to ongoing flexibility and deliberate innovation.

The Gemara here lays down a principle: “Halachah k'divrei hameykeil b'eruv” — the Halachah, in an argument concerning matters of eruv, follows the more lenient opinion.3

Rashi notes that although this specific sugya concerns eruvei techumin, the principle applies to all types of eruvin. Unfortunately, this principle is often misapplied. Indeed, some modern authorities even extend this principle to the point of using it to support their own lenient rulings. Although there are some authorities who interpret the principle in its narrow, literal sense, and opine that it only applies to issues that concern the eruvei chatzeiros — the collection of bread that unites the in the eruv (see, for example, Ritva to Eruvin 85b), many authorities maintain that Halachah k’divrei hameikil even in issues that concern the enclosure itself (see Beiur HaGra, Orach Chaim 358:5; see Noam vol. 1 pp. 214-215 and Nesivos Shabbos 15:2 and notes 4-5 for a list of sources that deal with this principle and summaries of their opinions).

Dagul Me'Revavah (Orach Chaim §394; see also Beiur HaGra loc. cit.) derive from our Gemara that the principle applies even when it leads us to rule in accordance with an individual authority against the majority of authorities.

The Chazon Ish, Orach Chaim, 112:10, proves that this principle does not apply to later authorities.

Whenever we deal with an issue discussed by the (any authorities subsequent to the redaction of the ) we follow a weighted majority opinion.

We must weigh the stature and reasoning of each rabbinic authority when considering his views and counting his ruling in the halachic equation.

3 https://dafdigest.org/masechtos/Eruvin/Eruvin%20046.pdf

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If the Halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yoĥanan ben Nuri only when he is lenient, and the halakha is in accordance with the Rabbis only where a leniency is involved, such as with regard to ownerless utensils, the result is two contradictory leniencies.

Some commentaries answer that perhaps we rule in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoĥanan ben Nuri, but not for his reason.

Rather, since a sleeping person can establish residence when awake, he can also do so when asleep; a sleeping person establishes residence where he is.

Ownerless objects, however, never establish residence (Rashba; Ritva).

discuss this principle, limiting it in several ways:

They maintain that it applies only to an eiruv, but not to partitions, because the laws of partitions have a source in the Torah (Rivash).

They further state that this principle does not apply to cases of unresolved dilemmas. Since the Sages did not resolve these dilemmas by applying this principle, leniency cannot be presumed (Baĥ, based on the Rif ).

The principle also cannot be applied if the doubt arises from two different explanations of the same statement (Baĥ). Some early commentaries claim that this principle refers only to disputes among the tanna’im, since their statements were known to Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi and he could decide among them, but not to the words of amora’im (Ra’avad; see Hagahot HaRosh; Me’iri).

Steinzaltz (OBM) writes:4

Regarding the disagreement between Rabbi Yohanan ben Nuri and the hakhamim (see 45a-b), Rabbi Ya’akov bar Idi quotes Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi as saying that we follow Rabbi Yohanan ben Nuri.

Rabbi Zeira asks whether this ruling is based on a tradition about this particular case, or if it is based on the general principle taught by Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi that we follow the more lenient position when dealing with questions about eiruv.

4 https://www.steinsaltz-center.org/home/doc.aspx?mCatID=68446

9 Rabbi Yaakov bar Idi responds that he had a specific tradition in this case. This exchange leads the Gemara to bring a series of principles about how halakha is decided in cases of disagreements. For example:

• in a disagreement between Rabbi Akiva and a peer, we follow Rabbi Akiva, • in a disagreement between Rabbi Yose and , we follow Rabbi Yose, • in a disagreement between Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda, we follow Rabbi Yehuda.

The rules that establish final verdicts based on the person who authored the position are the product of extensive research and review done by the Sages themselves.

Generally speaking, such a ruling indicates that a particular basic concept or principle is the foundation for each tanna’s rulings, so following that specific tanna means that we have accepted his principle as the halakha. Nevertheless, these rules are limited in a number of ways.

The Gemara states clearly that if one of the pronounces a decision that stands in contradiction with one of the general rules of pesak, we accept the amora’s decision. In other words, these rules apply only when no other decision has been handed down. Oftentimes, even if there is no clear decision but the discussion of the Gemara seems to favor one opinion over another, that opinion may be the one accepted as the halakha.

Moreover, some say that these rules only apply to areas of halakha that are currently applicable, but regarding other subjects – like rulings about the Temple, etc. – these rules are not accepted at all.

Finally, we occasionally find general rules that apply to a given case (e.g. we follow the lenient opinion regarding the rules of eiruv, or we follow the lenient opinion regarding the rules of mourning) that contradict the rule to follow a specific Sage.

(of Rabbi Shmuel HaNagid (printed in the back of Masseches Berachos מלתה ו ד במ ו א The states that the rule is whenever we have a machlokes of R’ Meir and R’ Shimon, we rule according to R’ Shimon.

Noda BiYehuda (1, Yoreh De’ah #26) notes that this is in variance with our Gemara, which states that we have no definitive answer to rule either according to R’ Meir or according to R’ Shimon.

10 state that the rule is that we go according to R’ Shimon? In מלתה ו ד במ ו א How, then, can the Rabbi Ovadiah Yosef points out a possible solution based upon the Yad Malachi, רמוא עיבי (Klal 580).

Although our sugya concludes with this issue being unresolved, nevertheless, the Yerushalmi (Shevi’is 8:7) states that when we have a machlokes R’ Meir and R’ Shimon, we rule according to R’ Shimon.

Finally, the rule is (see Kesef Mishna, Hilchos Terumos 5:15) that when the Bavli leaves an issue unresolved, and the Yerushalmi comes to a conclusion, we follow the Yerushalmi which presents the information as being definitive.

.states his rule as being conclusive מלתה ו ד במ ו א This is why the

The Boundaries of Shabbat and of the Human Personality

Harav Aharon Lichtenstein (OBM) delivered this analysis5 (1997)

5 https://www.etzion.org.il/en/boundaries-shabbat-and-human-personality. Summarized by Ramon Widmonte

11 See that the LORD hath given you 29 טכ ,וּאְר ִכּי- והְי ָ ה נָ ַת ן ָל ֶכ ם ם the sabbath; therefore He giveth you ַה ַשּׁ ָבּת -- ַעל- ֵכּ ן אוּה תֹנ ֵ ן ָל ֶכ ם ם ;on the sixth day the bread of two days ַבּ םוֹיּ ַה ִשּׁ ִשּׁ ,י ֶל ֶח ם מוֹי ָ יִ ;ם וּבְשׁ וּבְשׁ ;ם abide ye every man in his place, let no ִא שׁי ַתּ תְּח ָ ,וי לאַ -יֵ ֵצ א ִא שׁי שׁי man go out of his place on the seventh ִמ וֹמֹקְמּ -- ַבּ םוֹיּ ַה בְשּׁ ִ עי ִ .י day.'

Ex 16:29

"Let every person stay in his place; let no one leave his place on the day of Shabbat."(Ex 16:29)

Rashi on this verse immediately refers us to the famous dispute between Rabbi Akiva and the Sages. Rabbi Akiva (Sota 27b) states that the law against leaving a city's limits on Shabbat - techum Shabbat - is of biblical origin; the Torah forbids one to walk more than 2,000 cubits outside of his city. The Sages (Eruvin 46a), however, believe that this prohibition is really rabbinic in origin.

The Rambam (Hilkhot Shabbat 27:1) complicates matters by mentioning a third opinion (not held by him): there is indeed a biblical prohibition, but it prohibits one only from going more than twelve mils (one mil = 2,000 cubits) out of the city, i.e. 24,000 cubits. The stricter 2,000-cubit limit, however, is rabbinic in origin.

Bearing all this in mind, we encounter a strange discussion. The Gemara (Shabbat 69a) asks if there is a situation wherein a person on Shabbat could forget all the thirty-nine prohibited acts (melakhot), yet still know it was Shabbat. The assumption here is that Shabbat, halakhically, is characterised by certain prohibitions. This assumption is interesting and debatable in and of itself, but our attention must focus on the answer.

The Gemara replies that such a situation is indeed possible - if one agrees with Rabbi Akiva that the prohibition on leaving the city limits beyond 2,000 cubits is biblical. Thus, if a person were to forget all thirty-nine melakhot, but were to remember the separate prohibition of leaving the city

12 beyond 2,000 cubits, then even though this prohibition is not one of the classic thirty-nine, it would be enough to characterize the day as being Shabbat.

The Amudei Or (Rav Yechiel Heller) asks immediately: according to the Rambam, there is a view that techum Shabbat is biblically prohibited at the twelve-mil mark; why can the Gemara not cite this view also in its answer?

The answer to the Amudei Or's question is clear. There are two separate facets of the idea of Shabbat. One entails a certain list of prohibitions - a list that automatically differentiates Shabbat from other days. The second facet is what we perhaps would call a "positive" side, a list of things one MUST do, proscriptive acts.

According to Rabbi Akiva, the law of techum Shabbat flows from the prohibitive side of Shabbat, even if it is not legislated technically as one of the thirty-nine melakhot. Thus, if one remembers only this law, one still remembers the prohibitive side of Shabbat, which the Gemara assumed to be central here.

According to the view that states that twelve mil is biblically prohibited, this prohibition flows from a different source entirely. It is generated by the POSITIVE side of Shabbat, more specifically, the idea mentioned in the verse above, "Let every person stay in his place." The nature of this law is not a prohibition against walking a certain distance outside the city, but rather a positive command to remain in one's domain during Shabbat.

Philosophically, this idea is captivating. The week is a time for travel, change, growth and development. One leaves a protected shell to venture out beyond stable yet staid environments, to forge one's personality in a world of conflict, change and tension. A muscle will grow weak if there is no demand made upon it to exert itself.

Shabbat, however, is the time when "home is the sailor, home from the sea, and the hunter home from the hill." We return to the blazing hearth, to our base, and there, in a secure, stable environment, we review all that we have encountered, we evaluate all that we have done, and we mold our personalities. "Let no man go out from HIS place..."

We find expression of these ideas in many places; let us mention two of the more revealing sources.

13 Rav Yochanan ben Nuri (Eruvin 42b) on holds that if a person in a moving wagon fell asleep before Shabbat, and woke up after Shabbat had begun, the 2,000 cubit limit applies from the place where he woke up, and not from the place he was when Shabbat began.

There are two contradictory explanations of Rav Yochanan's opinion. One says that the person, while asleep, is just like any other inanimate object, and therefore cannot "acquire" a base-location which he will be prohibited from leaving. The second opinion claims that, on the contrary, since a conscious person can acquire his own personal space, and thus be prohibited from moving beyond that, so can a person who is sleeping. Until he awoke, every second, he was acquiring his own personal space as he travelled, beyond which he cannot go. The fact that he was not conscious of his acquisition or of the prohibition is irrelevant; his mere existence, conscious or otherwise, is enough.

The philosophical assumptions of this debate are clear. On the one hand, human beings are, to a certain extent, molded by their surroundings, as much as any inanimate, unintelligent object. There is a definite place for some form of determinism in our world view; we are shaped by our environments, to a certain extent. This view is carried to its logical, yet absurd extreme, by the first view which claims that a sleeping person, one devoid of the ability to choose, is wholly an object, wholly determined.

On the other hand, the second opinion claims that we are not clay in the hands of unseen forces; we choose, we build, we form ourselves in a manner different from all other beings and things which populate the universe.

The tension between these two views is one which always accompanies us. We acknowledge that when we go out to sail the seas beyond our safe dry shore, we are formed to a certain extent by that which surrounds us, and that we are as vessels in the grasp of the molder. However, when we return on Shabbat, we affirm that it is we who place the final stamp on who we are, that by review and decision, we do indeed create and mold ourselves.

The second place where we find an illustration of this conflict is in a dispute between and Rabbi Meir. Rav Chisda (Eruvin 19a) claims that one should not learn from one teacher only, while Rabbi Meir (Avot De-Rabbi Natan 8:2) disagrees and says that a person should have one mentor alone.

14 Eventually, Rav Chisda moderates his view and says that there is a time when one should learn from only one person, namely, during one's formative years. At that stage, a person needs to receive a tradition, a rooting, a basis upon which he can stand and from which he can venture forward in years to come, and to which he may return after his adventuring.

Again, the dispute centers on whether a person should place himself in a situation where he will be molded entirely by one source alone, or whether he is to draw from as many different wells as possible, secure in the belief that he himself, in the end, is the one who will sculpt it all into the final form of a human being. However, even those who claim that we do have the final say in what and who we are, recognize the need for some inviolable place, beyond even our own touch, to which we can retreat when necessary and where, ironically, we can chisel away to our hearts' content.

General Ruling:

15

Since the Gemara discussed the principles cited with regard to halakhic decision-making, it cites additional principles. Rabbi Ya’akov and Rabbi said: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva in disputes with any individual Sage, and the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei even in disputes with other Sages, and the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi in disputes with any individual Sage.

The Gemara asks: With regard to what halakha do these principles apply, meaning, to what degree are they binding? Rabbi Asi said: This is considered binding halakha. And Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said: One is inclined toward such a ruling in cases where an individual asks, but does not issue it as a public ruling in all cases. And Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, said: It appears that one should rule this way, but it is not an established halakha that is considered binding with regard to issuing rulings.

versus individuals only, but not versus many - But we do pasken בר י and like ע"ר We pasken like There are three approaches as to how strongly we follow these בר י ם . even versus יסוי בר י like guidelines:

.we actually pasken this way – הכלה רמא סא י בר י -1- in certain cases we pasken this way but do not declare these rules – טמ י ן רמא אבא רב יח אי בר י -2- publicly. it seems that we should follow these rule – יארנ ן רמא נח י אנ ברב י יסוי בר י -3-

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17

Rabbi Jay Gelman writes:6

While the basis of Jewish law (and much more) is to be found in the Talmud, the Talmud, in and of itself, is not a very good text for determining Jewish law. The legal analysis, the range of views, the tendency to move from one topic to another, and the fact that any given topic may be discussed in a variety of places makes reaching a conclusion on any particular issue a difficult task.

As the Talmud is focused on the process of law, it can discuss, debate and analyze a topic for pages and conclude with...well, no conclusion. It is this fundamental feature of Talmudic study that is so appealing to many, but most frustrating for those who are interested in the bottom line only. For that purpose, one can study the various codes of Jewish law, which remove the debate, analysis and multiplicity of views.

6 https://www.torahinmotion.org/discussions-and-blogs/eiruvin-46b-ignoring-rules

18 Yet the Talmud is a book of Jewish law, and sees itself as guiding Jews in their religious observance--even if not in the most direct manner--and the Talmud does present guidelines on how we are to rule in many of its debates.

"Rav Yaakov and Rav Zreika said: The law is like Rabbi Akiva when he differs from a colleague, like Rabbi Yossi even when he differs from many colleagues, and like Rebbe when he differs with a colleague...Rav Yochanan said: Rav Meir and Rav Yehuda, the law is like Rav Yehuda; Rav Yehuda and Rav Yossi, the law is like Rav Yossi; and there is no need to say Rav Meir and Rav Yossi, the law is like Rav Yossi" (Eiruvin 46b). The Gemara goes on to debate whether or not these rules should really be followed in practice; with the Gemara citing a number of examples where Jewish law rules against these principles, leading to refinements of these rules or even outright rejection. The Gemara's concluding line of the sugyah (discussion) is, "These rules are not universally agreed upon, as Rav does not follow these rules".

The discussion as to whether or not we should accept these (or any) rules of adjudication appears to be a most fundamental debate regarding the determination of the law. It is hard to imagine that every time Rabbi Akiva argues with a colleague, his reasoning is the more correct one; or that Rabbi Yossi's arguments are more cogent than even the majority of his friends. Is it possible that Rav Meir's views are never correct? Why, then, were our Mishnayot set up in such a way that "an anonymous represents the view of Rav Meir"?

Apparently, these rules were meant to simplify the process of applying the law. The Rabbis felt that, generally speaking, Rav Yossi's was the best opinion.And even if, in any given case, the arguments of his colleagues might have been more persuasive on that occasion, so be it; principles had to be instituted to determine the law. Otherwise, we might never come to a conclusion, with generations debating each particular case ad infinitum.

Such a notion is only tenable due to the principle of "these and those are the words of the living G-d" (Eiruvin13b). The vast majority of Jewish law is not black and white, but rather, a nuanced gray. Valid arguments can--and were--made as to whether chicken and milk may be eaten together, or whether there is a need for the laws of muktzaon Shabbat, not to mention a host of contemporary issues. Outside of the few cases explicitly mentioned in the Torah, Jewish law is a series of applications, with each position generally having much merit. Perhaps one is more right, but none is wrong. We can safely follow the views of Rabbi Yossi as even when he is "wrong", he is "right".

Earlier in the mashechet (ibid), the Talmud spells this out when it queries that "since both (the views of Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel) are the words of the living G-d, why did Beit Hillel merit to have the halacha established like them?" The answer of the Talmud has little to do with expertise in the area of law. On that same page, the Talmud explains the reason that we do not follow the

19 view of Rabbi Meir, despite what the Talmud considered his greater expertise in the law. The application of law must take into consideration extra-legal factors; what today we might call social factors, or community dynamics.

Yet despite all this, Rav felt that such an approach is taking the easy way out. True, all Talmudic views have a legitimate leg to stand on. But to accept a legal ruling based on who said it, rather that its intrinsic validity, undermines the exactitude of the law and the incessant striving for truth and accuracy.

Perhaps in this argument, we, too, should invoke the principle, "these and those are the word of the living G-d".

20 Robert Louis Stevenson (born Robert Lewis Balfour Stevenson; 13 November 1850 – 3 December 1894) was a Scottish novelist, poet and travel writer, most noted for Treasure Island, Kidnapped, Strange Case of Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde, and A Child's Garden of Verses. Born and educated in Edinburgh, Stevenson suffered from serious bronchial trouble for much of his life, but continued to write prolifically and travel widely in defiance of his poor health. As a young man, he mixed in London literary circles, receiving encouragement from Andrew Lang, Edmund Gosse, Leslie Stephen and W. E. Henley, the last of whom may have provided the model for Long John Silver in Treasure Island. In 1890, he settled in Samoa, where he died in 1894.7

In 1890, Stevenson purchased a tract of about 400 acres (1.6 km2) in Upolu, an island in Samoa where he established himself on his estate in the village of Vailima after two aborted attempts to visit Scotland. He took the native name Tusitala (Samoan for "Teller of Tales"). His influence spread among the Samoans, who consulted him for advice, and he soon became involved in local politics. He was convinced that the European officials who had been appointed to rule the Samoans were incompetent, and he published A Footnote to History after many futile attempts to resolve the matter. This was such a stinging protest against existing conditions that it resulted in the recall of two officials, and Stevenson feared for a time that it would result in his own deportation. Stevenson grew depressed and wondered if he had exhausted his creative vein, as he had been "overworked bitterly" and that the best he could write was "ditch-water". He even feared that he might again become a helpless invalid. He rebelled against this idea: "I wish to die in my boots; no more Land of Counterpane for me. To be drowned, to be shot, to be thrown from a horse — ay, to be hanged, rather than pass again through that slow dissolution." He then suddenly had a return of energy and he began work on Weir of Hermiston. "It's so good that it frightens me," he is reported to have exclaimed. He felt that this was the best work he had done.

7 Balfour, Graham (1906). The Life of Robert Louis StevensonLondon: Methuen. 264

21 On 3 December 1894, Stevenson was talking to his wife and straining to open a bottle of wine when he suddenly exclaimed, "What's that?", asked his wife "does my face look strange?", and collapsed. He died within a few hours, probably of a cerebral haemorrhage. He was 44 years old.

The Samoans insisted on surrounding his body with a watch-guard during the night and on bearing him on their shoulders to nearby Mount Vaea, where they buried him on a spot overlooking the sea on land donated by British Acting Vice Consul Thomas Trood. Stevenson had always wanted his Requiem inscribed on his tomb: Under the wide and starry sky, Dig the grave and let me lie. Glad did I live and gladly die, And I laid me down with a will. This be the verse you grave for me: Here he lies where he longed to be; Home is the sailor, home from sea, And the hunter home from the hill. Stevenson was loved by the Samoans, and his tombstone epigraph was translated to a Samoan song of grief.

22

Upolu is an island in Samoa, formed by a massive basaltic shield volcano which rises from the seafloor of the western Pacific Ocean.

The island is 75 kilometres long and 1,125 square kilometres in area, making it the second largest of the Samoan Islands geographically

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