CHAPTER FIVE

THE SECOND AND THIRD WARS AGAINST ROME

Mithridates got off lightly from the first war: even 's own troops recognised that (Plut. Sult. 24.4). He was simply confined to the ter­ ritories he possessed before the war. Military defeat must have severely damaged his prestige, but the rich resources of his empire would soon enable him to build up his power again. The had pro­ bably made it clear to the Senate that the only effective neutralisation of a determined native king was death or capture. And the terms of the treaty of Dardanus hardly constituted sufficient revenge for the thousands of Romans and Italians murdered in the Asian Vespers. Even immediately after the war, many must have thought that Rome had unfinished business with Mithridates. Some of the king's Black Sea subjects had taken advantage of his defeat to revolt, and the first thing he did on his return to Pontus was to go to war with these Colchian and Bosporan rebels (App. Mith. 64). 1 The Col­ chians wanted Eupator's son, also called Mithridates, as king, which may imply that they were dissatisfied with the previous administration of their country. When this request was granted they returned to their loyalty. 2 Eupator, however, was suspicious of the young prince and ex­ ecuted him. We do not hear how the Colchians reacted, but presumably another uparchos or dioikitis was sent to govern the region (Strabo 11. 2 .18 c.499). Indeed perhaps it was now that was transferred to another of the king's sons, Machares, ruler of the Bosporan kingdom, who certainly later on controlled it. 3 The causes and participants of the Bosporan revolt are not known, but it was a more serious affair than the Colchian uprising, and Mithridates felt it necessary to fit out a fleet and large army. These preparations provided L. Licinius Murena, whom Sulla had left in charge of Asia with the two legions of Fimbria, 4 with one of the two

1 The bosporan coins of the archon Hygiaenon formerly ascribed to the time of this revolt (e.g. by Reinach, Mith. Eup. 296), are now generally dated to the end of the third century B. C.: see D. B. Shelov, Coinage of the Bosporus VI-II Centuries B. C. (Engl. transl. by H. Bartlett Wells 1978) 159. 2 D. B. Shelov, VDI 1980, No. 153, 37-8 maintains that the younger Mithridates was not installed as a vassal king of Colchis, but as governor or deputy. 3 See D. B. Shelov, VD/ 1978, No. 143, 60. • Memnon 36.1 incorrectly states that Murena was sent by the Senate. THE SECOND AND THIRD WARS AGAINST ROME 133 grounds on which he launched the so-called Second Mithridatic War. 5 For Mithridates' actions were misinterpreted, and it was said that he was preparing for war, not against the Bosporan people, but against Rome (App. Mith. 64; Cic. De Imp. Cn. Pomp. 9). Murena had this on good authority: Archelaus, the senior Pontic general in the first war had recently defected to the Roman side, and now urged Murena to an­ ticipate what he argued was the inevitable Pontic attack. 6 Furthermore, a charge seems to have been laid against Mithridates that he was not abiding by the terms of the Treaty of Dardanus: Appian (Mith. 64), although contradicting himself, reports that the king had not yet given up all of . 7 Glew establishes that this charge was probably not true, but may refer rather to difficulties encountered by Ariobarzanes in reestablishing control over parts of his kingdom that still favoured Pon tic supremacy. 8 Clearly his innocence will have had an important effect on Mithridates' attitude towards Rome: in spite of complying fully with Sulla's peace terms, he was now subjected to the wilful aggression of Murena. In retrospect we can see that he was not yet ready to confront Rome again so soon after his defeat. Even if Murena recognised this, as he probably did, he was a man of action who had already moved against the pirates and annexed the city of Cibyra: 9 booty and a triumph beckoned, and the situation in Pontus and Cappadocia offered scope and at least some excuse for intervention. Once again, however, as with Manius Aquillius' actions at the start of the first war, Murena was not carrying out senatorial or Sullan policy: civil war was already threatening in Italy, and would seen be raging. So in 83, on what Appian calls "trifling occasions for war," Murena marched into Pontus through Cappadocia and attacked Comana, killing some of the king's cavalry. Mithridates objected, and referred to the treaty made with Sulla at Dardanus. In fact this was only a verbal agree­ ment, and had not been ratified in writing. Sulla either did not have time

5 For the best analysis of events between 85 and 73, see now D. Glew, Chiron 11 (1981) 109-130. Also A. N. Sherwin-White, Roman Foreign Policy in the East (1984) 149-152. 6 Mithridates, it seems, had started out by thinking that the Peace of Dardanus, the terms of which had been negotiated by Archelaus, represented the best deal available. Later on, the king came to believe that Archelaus had !reasonably given in to Sulla too easily. Hence the general's flight from the Pontic court: see Glew (supra n. 5) 115. 7 The contradiction lies in App. Mith. 58 where it is said that Mithridates agreed to the terms arranged by Archelaus, and after the meeting with Sulla, "returned to his inherited kingdom alone", clealy implying that he withdrew from all conquered territories, in­ cluding Cappadocia. 8 Glew (supra n. 5) 110-114. 9 See Magie, RRAM 240-243. An inscription from Caunus honours Murena, probably for his anti-piratical activities: see R. Bernhardt, Anadolou 16 (1972) 117-122; Bull. Epig. 1976 No. 660. p. 549-50.