Thailand's Automotive Manufacturing Corridor
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Thailand’s Automotive Manufacturing Corridor The economic success of Thailand’s export-oriented automotive industry was based on three factors: public investment in port facilities and related infrastructure, beginning in the 1990s, resulting in the Eastern Seaboard economic corridor; the exchange rate depreciation that followed the 1997–1999 Asian Financial Crisis; and two key policy changes. Restrictions on foreign ownership were abolished in 1997 and local content requirements were dropped in 2000. Neighboring countries, including Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines, also experienced the crisis and were potential competitors in attracting foreign investment in automotive production for export. But they did not adopt these two key reforms. About the Asian Development Bank ADB’s vision is an Asia and Pacific region free of poverty. Its mission is to help its developing member countries reduce poverty and improve the quality of life of their people. Despite the region’s many successes, THAILAND’s AUtomotIVE it remains home to a large share of the world’s poor. ADB is committed to reducing poverty through inclusive economic growth, environmentally sustainable growth, and regional integration. MANUFactURING CORRIDOR Based in Manila, ADB is owned by 67 members, including 48 from the region. Its main instruments for helping its developing member countries are policy dialogue, loans, equity investments, guarantees, grants, and technical assistance. Peter Warr and Archanun Kohpaiboon NO. 519 ADB ECONOMICS December 2017 WORKING PAPER SERIES ADB Economics Working Paper Series Thailand’s Automotive Manufacturing Corridor Peter Warr and Archanun Kohpaiboon Peter Warr ([email protected]) is emeritus professor at the Australian National University. Archanun No. 519 | December 2017 Kohpaiboon ([email protected]) is associate professor, Faculty of Economics at Thammasat University. The study benefited from the kind cooperation of the Royal Thai Government’s National Economic and Social Development Board, the Ministry of Industry, the Industrial Estate Authority of Thailand, the Board of Investment, and the Port Authority of Thailand. In addition, numerous industry representatives generously provided their insights. The authors acknowledge in particular the expert advice provided by Ruth Banomyong, Business School, Thammasat University, and Sanoh Unakul, former Deputy Prime Minister and former Director General, National Economic and Social Development Board. The study also benefited from the assistance of Jayant Menon and the comments of participants at an ADB workshop on 25 May 2017. ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 IGO license (CC BY 3.0 IGO) © 2018 Asian Development Bank 6 ADB Avenue, Mandaluyong City, 1550 Metro Manila, Philippines Tel +63 2 632 4444; Fax +63 2 636 2444 www.adb.org Some rights reserved. Published in 2018. ISSN 2313-6537 (print), 2313-6545 (electronic) Publication Stock No. WPS189284-2 DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.22617/WPS189284-2 The views expressed in this publication are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views and policies of the Asian Development Bank (ADB) or its Board of Governors or the governments they represent. ADB does not guarantee the accuracy of the data included in this publication and accepts no responsibility for any consequence of their use. The mention of specific companies or products of manufacturers does not imply that they are endorsed or recommended by ADB in preference to others of a similar nature that are not mentioned. By making any designation of or reference to a particular territory or geographic area, or by using the term “country” in this document, ADB does not intend to make any judgments as to the legal or other status of any territory or area. 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Notes: In this publication, “$” refers to United States dollars. Corrigenda to ADB publications may be found at http://www.adb.org/publications/corrigenda. CONTENTS TABLES AND FIGURES iv ABSTRACT v I. INTRODUCTION: DETROIT OF THE EAST? 1 II. ECONOMIC CORRIDORS 3 III. THAILAND’S POLICY ENVIRONMENT FOR AUTOMOTIVE DEVELOPMENT 3 A. Trade Policy 3 B. Infrastructure Policy: The Eastern Seaboard Economic Corridor 6 C. Board of Investment Incentive Policy 7 D. Labor Supply and Land Acquisition 8 E. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations Industrial Cooperation Scheme 8 IV. DEVELOPMENT OF THE THAI AUTOMOTIVE INDUSTRY 8 V. ANALYSIS OF THE INDUSTRIAL CENSUS 16 A. Descriptive Summary 16 B. Econometric Analysis 19 C. Productivity Effect of Improved Public Infrastructure 20 VI. GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM MODELING 23 A. The Model 23 B. The Shocks 24 C. Model Closure 24 D. Results 24 VII. CONCLUSIONS 26 A. Lessons from the Thai Experience 26 B. What Is Next for the Automotive Industry? 27 REFERENCES 29 TABLES AND FIGURES TABLES 1 Thailand’s Automotive Trade and Investment Policies: Import Substitution Phase, 1960–1997 4 2 Thailand’s Automotive Trade and Investment Policies: Export Facilitation Phase, 1997–2015 5 3 Board of Investment Privileges, 1960–2013 7 4 Board of Investment Privileges, 2013 to present 8 5 Thailand: International Trade of the Automotive Industry, 1999–2014 10 6 Thailand: Composition and Destination of Vehicle Exports, 2002–2003 and 2013–2014 11 7 Thailand: Composition and Destination of Completely Built Up Vehicle Imports, 2002–2003 and 2013–2014 12 8 Trade Pattern for Automotive Parts, 2002–2014 13 9 Number of Plants by Sales Volume, 1996, 2006, and 2011 17 10 Automotive Parts Supplier Plants in the Industrial Census 17 11 Automotive Final Assembly Plants in the Industrial Census 18 12 Labor Productivity and Infrastructure: Final Assemblers Inside and Outside Upgraded Regions 21 13 Labor Productivity and Infrastructure: Parts Suppliers Inside and Outside Upgraded Regions 22 14 Test That Firm Labor Productivity Is Raised by Upgraded Public Infrastructure 23 15 Simulated Macroeconomic Effects 25 16 Simulated Effects on Automotive Sector 25 17 Simulated Effects on Poverty Incidence (Headcount Measure) 26 FIGURES 1 Thailand: Vehicle Production (1,000 units), 1960–2015 9 2 Thailand: Export Share of Automotive Output, 1995–2015 9 3 Thailand: Automotive Sector Value-Added Share of Total Manufacturing, 1993–2014 13 4 Thailand: Commercial Vehicle Production and Share of Total Vehicle Production, 1991–2015 14 5 Value of Imported Parts per Locally Assembled Vehicle 14 6 Automobile Production in Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia, 1999–2014 15 7 Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia: Export Value of Automobiles 15 8 Location of Automotive Assembly Industry, 1996 and 2006 18 9 Location of Automotive Parts Industry, 1996 and 2006 19 ABSTRACT Thailand’s export-oriented automotive industry is a recognized economic success story. How did it happen and what lessons might other countries draw? This paper argues that the success of the industry was based on three factors. First was the substantial public investment in port facilities and related infrastructure, beginning in the 1990s, that constituted the Eastern Seaboard economic corridor. Second was the exchange rate depreciation that followed the 1997–1999 Asian Financial Crisis, making manufacturing production for export more profitable. The third factor was two key policy changes adopted by the Thai government shortly after the crisis, and partly in response to it: (a) abolition of restrictions on foreign ownership and (b) abolition of local content requirements. Neighboring countries, including Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines, also experienced the crisis and were potential competitors in attracting foreign investment in automotive production for export. But they did not adopt these two key reforms. Keywords: automotive exports, Eastern Seaboard scheme, final assembly, parts and components, Thailand JEL codes: F14, L62, O18, O24 I. INTRODUCTION: DETROIT OF THE EAST? Thailand’s export-oriented automotive industry is a recognized economic success story. The production of motor vehicles and parts began in the 1960s and expanded from the early 1990s, but it catered primarily for the highly protected domestic market. Production for export has been important only since 2000, but roughly half of the industry’s final output is now exported. Employment within Thailand’s automotive sector—final assembly plus parts—now exceeds a quarter of a million workers.1 In 2015 production exceeded 2 million units, making Thailand the world’s ninth largest automotive producer. According to The Economist, Thailand is now the “Detroit of the East.” The opportunity for rapid development of this form of manufacturing production within middle-income countries like Thailand was stimulated in part by the Plaza Accord of 1985. The United States (US), Japan, and major Western European governments agreed on a steady appreciation of the Japanese yen, but also of the euro, relative to the US dollar. These currency realignments and related labor market developments raised costs of production within Japan relative to the revenues derived from Japanese exports. US negotiators hoped that these cost pressures would induce at least some Japanese manufacturers to relocate to the US. In the years following, some did, but in many instances, other Asian locations proved more attractive to Japanese manufacturers than relocation to the US.