What Happened in Cyprus? Alexander Michaelides1 Imperial College Business School, University of Cyprus, CEPR, CFS and NETSPAR 15 March 2014 Abstract This is a case study of how a country nearly reached bankruptcy in March 2013, within five years from entering the Eurozone. The magnitude of the requested assistance is extremely large relative to GDP (100%) and studying this event provides useful lessons for avoiding such crises in the future. The crisis resulted from a worsening European economic environment (especially in Greece), bad choices with regards to public finances, weak corporate governance within the local banking sector, inadequate and/or difficult regulation of cross-border banking, worsening competitiveness, and bad political decisions at the European and, especially, the local (Cypriot) level. Local politics, reflected in short term political calculations and/or inadequate understanding of the magnitude of the crisis, delayed corrective action for 18 months until election time, making a bad situation almost impossible to deal with. Overconfidence can be one behavioural explanation for why local politicians ignored the dramatic costs of inaction. 1 Imperial College London Business School, South Kensington Campus, London, SW7 2AZ:
[email protected]. I would like to thank Dimitris Georgiou for excellent research assistance, three anonymous referees and the editor (Nicola Fuchs-Schundeln) for very useful comments. I served as a non- executive member of the Board of Directors of the Central Bank of Cyprus between May 28th 2013 and November 28th 2013. The analysis and opinions herein are not necessarily shared by the Central Bank of Cyprus or the Eurosystem more broadly.