.I
Annex B to USASMA Memo 672-1
HAINES AWARD PORM 2 PART 1 EVALUATION OF WRITTEN RESEARCH PAPER BY THE COMMANDANT, COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR, & BATTALION COMMANDER TITLE: ****************************** * * * Circle One Poor Fair Avg Good Exc SCORE
ORGAN1ZATION/ LOGICAL DEVELOPMENT 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
RESEARCH/DOCUMENTATION 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
PRESENTATION OF THE 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 OPPOSING POINT OF VIEW
ANALYSIS OF THE SUBJECT 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 IN AN IMPARTIAL MANNER
VALIDITY OF THE CONCLUSION 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
OVERALL IMPRESSION 1 2 3. 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
TOTAL (Max = 60) * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * ...
B-1 Annex B to USASMA Memo 672-1
HAINES AWARD FORM 2 PART 2 EVALUATION OF THE RESEARCH PAPER ORAL PRESENTATION BY THE COMMANDANT, COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR, & BATTALION COMMANDER TITLE: _
* *** * ***** * * * * * *** * * ** **** * * * * * * * Circle One Poor Fair Avg Good Exc SCORE
INTRODUCTION 1 2 3 4 5
ORGANIZATION 1 2 3 4 5
SUPPORT OF THE MAIN POINTS 1 2 3 4 5
PRESENTATION OF THE OPPOSING 1 2 3 4 5 POINT OF VIEW
LOGICAL DEVELOPMENT OF 1 2 3 4 5 THE CONCLUSION
THE SPEAKER'S VOICE/GRAMMAR 1 2 3 4 5
OVERALL IMPRESSION 2 4 6 8 10
TOTAL (Max = 40)
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * ~ * * * * * * * "
B-2 ATSS-BAR (350) 4 February 2000
MEMORANDUM FOR Faculty Advisor, Group Room L02, Fort Bliss, Texas 79918-8002
SUBJECT: The Vicksburg Campaign
1. Thesis Statement: Contrary to popular belief it was Vicksburg rather than Gettysburg that was the decisive battle of the American Civil War.
2. Discussion: Historians argue over which battle was the decisive point of the American civil war. Historians favoring Gettysburg site the grievous loss of Southern men and materials while those who favor Vicksburg credit that campaign with splitting the Confederacy. As Clausewitz stated, "War is an extension of politics by other means". Since neither battle was militarily decisive, we must examine the political aspects of each battle to determine its relative merit.
3. Conclusion: The fall of Vicksburg derailed the Democratic party's hopes for winning the 1863 Congressional elections, forced Britain and France to remain neutral and elevated two Union officers with reputations as drunkards to positions of power they used to destroy the Confederacy.
4. Haines Award: I request that the Haines Award Selection Board ' consider this paper. a~~ ~NN1I JONES SGM, USA Faculty Advisor
MSG T. J. Clancy Chairperson SGM Karl Bailey SGM Dan Hill SGM Quinton Ward MSG Darrell Carlton SETTING THE STAGE:
THE BATTLE OF VICKSBURG
by
SGM Karl Bailey
SGM Dan Hill
SGM Quinton Ward
MSG Darrel Calton
MSG Tim Clancy
SGM Johnie Jones III
Group Room L2
4 February 2000 ------
Outline
Thesis statement: Contrary to popular belief it was
Vicksburg rather than Gettysburg that was the decisive
battle of the American Civil War.
I. Introduction
A. Vicksburg's strategic importance
B. Northern perspective
C. Southern perspective
D. Results of Union seizure of Vicksburg
II. Northern and Southern Strategies
A. Union National Strategy
B. Union Military Strategy
C. Confederate National Strategy
D. Confederate Military Strategy
III. Gettysburg
A. Overview
B. North inflicts irreplaceable casualties and
equipment losses on the south
C. South loses offensive capability
D. Southern tactical errors
E. Impact on morale
IV. Vicksburg
A. Overview
B. The Army of the West consolidates
C. Countering European influence
D. Countering France ii
V. Conclusions
A. Vicksburg as a political victory
B. Changes to Union command structure
C. Countering European ambition
D. Summary Setting the Stage:
The Battle of Vicksburg
Many historians contend the successful Union campaign for
Vicksburg, Mississippi was the decisive campaign of the American
Civil War. A commonly stated opinion is that:
The Union capture of Vicksburg was one of the most
important northern victories of the war. It gave the
north control of the Mississippi River, allowing them
passage straight through the Confederacy. with this
passage, they were able to move supplies and men along
the river. In addition, the capture freed Grant's
armies and allowed the north to use them for other
battles, such as fighting the war in Virginia.
(Campaign 2-3)
Vicksburg sits upon a steep bluff some 300 feet above the
eastern banks of the Mississippi River. The bluff overlooks a
double bend in the river making travel in either direction
observable and controllable. This unique geographical feature
makes control of Vicksburg critical. Seventy years earlier the
Spanish recognized the strategic importance of the location and
established Fort Nogales on the spot that would become the
Confederate Signal Battery of Fort Hill.
After the Union captured Fort Donelson, Tennessee in 1862,
Vicksburg was the only obstacle to federal command of the river.
If the Union could seize Vicksburg the Confederacy would be cut in two. Admiral Farragut wasted no time attempting to take
Vicksburg after he captured New Orleans in April 1862. He sailed 2
north along the Mississippi and, although he was able to get his
fleet past the Confederate batteries, Admiral Farragut was unable to take Vicksburg with warships alone. For the next nine months, the Confederates used the surrounding terrain to their advantage and repulsed five separate attempts to capture Vicksburg.
On the northern approaches, Grant was bogged down by
railroad and all but impassible bayous extending to the
west. Small Calvary detachments and boatmen weaned in
the swamp country picked off Grant's soldiers almost at
will.... The fighters in blue, far from their homes in
the "Old Northwest," the west and border states,
markedly unconditioned to swamp existence, fell prey to
malaria, other fevers, snakes as well as insect bites.
Sickness and mortality rates soared during the cold,
rainy winter and spring. (Hoehling 2)
Although the civil War is usually reduced to absolutes, the fall of Vicksburg may have been just as important politically as it was militarily. Both Presidents Lincoln and Davis constantly expressed strong concerns about the political impact of owning
Vicksburg. In 1862 President Lincoln contended that:
The War can never be brought to a close until that key
[Vicksburg] is in our pocket.... We may take all the
northern ports of the Confederacy and they can still
defy us from Vicksburg.... It means hogs and hominy
without limit, fresh troops from all the states of the
far South, and a cotton country where they can raise
the staple without interference. (Hoehling 1) 3
The southern perspective was similar. "On his western tour
of December 1862 Davis made public speeches pledging himself to
Vicksburg's defense. During the spring of 1863, he repeatedly
stated not only that he was determined to hold Vicksburg, but
it's loss would be disastrous" (Connelly 52). Although the
strategic importance of Vicksburg remains debatable President
Davis' statements established it as the most important point in
the south. "Hence, even if Vicksburg had not possessed a grain of
strategic importance, the Confederacy was bound to lose face if
the city fell (Connelly 52) .
For years historians have claimed the fall of Vicksburg was
the war's deciding moment. There are two central arguments that
support this position. First is the belief that losing Vicksburg
denied the eastern Confederate states access to beef, munitions
and other vital supplies from Texas. Secondly, that vicksburg's
loss severed communications and prevented the Confederacy from
moving troops along or across the Mississippi River. Although the
fall of Vicksburg did interrupt the flow of some supplies and
impede communications between the east and west, there is little
evidence that the Confederacy permanently lost either ability.
By the summer of 1863 the north was tired of war. It was
inevitable that the pUblic's war weariness began to manifest as widespread resentment towards the Republican Party. Republican
Congressmen would be defeated in the next scheduled election unless something dramatic happened to change this sentiment.
with Vicksburg's fall conditions improved rapidly for
the Republicans in the northwest. Every source of 4
propaganda was obtained from the reopening of the
river. President Lincoln's statement to a
springfield, Illinois, meeting that "The Father of
Waters again goes unvexed to the sea" .... while
Sherman added that, with the reopening of commerce,
the river was again "the great inland sea." ....
Republican governors and legislators in Iowa,
Minnesota, and Wisconsin were reelected by substantial
margins. (Connelly 53)
After identifying the decisive role capturing Vicksburg had
on the 1864 elections Connelly adds, "The loss of Vicksburg
denied the South its greatest trump card in domestic affairs
control of the mouth of the Mississippi River. The loss of this
propaganda weapon may have been more harmful than any beeves or
trans-Mississippi reinforcements" (53).
Although blockade-runners were able to get limited
quantities of supplies to the Confederacy, the south needed
international recognition so she could trade openly with other
countries. In a compilation of articles from The Southern
Illustrated News published in Richmond, Virginia during the war,
an attempt is made to explain why England would not recognize the
Confederate States of America. First, England adopted the practice to enter " ... no discussion of the right of the government she recognised (sic) to rule the country which it professed to rUle, and to no interference with the internal affairs of such country" (Harwell 134). Secondly England's nineteenth century economy was based largely on the cotton trade. 5
The south's inability to transport cotton to European markets
meant greater demand for Indian and Australian cotton. Given
this financial windfall, a prolonged American civil war was in
England's interest. The Southern Illustrated News expressed this
perception of English political motivation when they wrote "She
feels that intervention would follow recognition, and this she is
by no means disposed to undertake, because it might have the effect of Shortening the war" (Harwell 136). While the
importance of Vicksburg to both sides is unquestioned, we must examine the strategies that led to this decisive point in the war.
The Unions overall strategy was to "re-conquer and re-occupy the national territory, and restore the authority of the central government, and to do so while avoiding the foreign intervention that might make such a task impossible" (James 100). Within the context of international relations, the Union recognized that by emancipating the southern Slaves, they could prevent England from recognizing the south. Additionally, emancipation would allow the northern armies to recruit large numbers of blacks into the force. These reinforcements would prove critical since both sides were waging a war of attrition.
The Union's military strategy was to take the offensive and force the southern states to re-unite with the Union. "The initiative lay with the north; it must conquer the south, and thus it had the luxury, such as it was, of choosing how to go about it" (James 100). President Lincoln expressed the belief that the conquest of the Mississippi River valley was of the 6
highest priority. Lincoln believed that the Mississippi River
valley was more important than the defeat of Virginia.
The Union needed control of Vicksburg to remove Confederate
influence over the Mississippi River. Once Vicksburg fell, the
Federal forces would control the full length of the Mississippi
River valley. The valley could then be used as an obstacle that
split the Confederacy in half and denied them access to cattle,
grain, weapons and other supplies from the west. General Halleck
sent a dispatch to Major General Grant stating, " In my opinion,
the opening of the Mississippi river will be better than the
capture of 40 Richmonds" (James 101).
Major General Grant also believed Vicksburg was the key to the whole Mississippi River. "It was the first high ground coming close to the river below Memphis. Vicksburg was the only channel connecting the two halves of the Confederacy divided by the Mississippi. Free navigation of the river was also prevented as long as the south owned Vicksburg" (Stiles 121). Vicksburg represented "The most important strategic victory of the war, perhaps meriting General Grant's later assertion that the fate of the confederacy was sealed when Vicksburg fell" (Stiles 147).
The Confederate national objective was clearly defined in the Ordinance of Succession. The south's goal was to establish an independent government and "defend it's claimed national territory until it achieved either victory on the battlefield or foreign recognition" (James 100).
The south's military strategy was to wage a war of attrition that would convince the north that attempts to keep her in the 7
Union would not be worth the cost. The Confederates believed
their ability to hold the Union at bay would result in foreign
recognition and possibly European intervention. The south chose
to use the strategic defense to accomplish their two-fold
strategy.
Although the Confederate forces waged a damaging defense
against the Federal forces, President Lincoln never showed any
willingness t~ negotiate a political settlement with the south.
Frustrated by Lincoln's tenacity and their inability to achieve
European recognition, the Confederacy began to consider the
benefits of attacking the north. As the frustration grew and the
noose tightened around Vicksburg, the south came to believe their only hope lay in meeting and defeating the Army of the Potomac on northern soil. They felt that a decisive victory would place them in position to threaten if not actually occupy Washington
D.C. General Lee also believed that European nations would be forced to recognize the Confederacy if the Federal capital fell.
He wrote President Davis several times to express his desire to cross the Potomac, gain tactical advantage and win a decisive victory in northern territory.
President Davis had reservations about Lee's proposal since
Lee failed to win a decisive victory while campaigning the previous year. Despite his previous inability to deliver the coup de main, Lee remained confident he could defeat the Army of the Potomac if he could achieve decisive mass on the battlefield.
Lee sent President Davis a dispatch that requested he activate and redeploy troops from inactive points in north and 8
South Carolina and attach them to the Army of Virginia.
President Davis denied the request and sent a dispatch to Lee
stating that an invasion of the north was not practical at that
time. This dispatch was intercepted by Federal spies and soon
found it's way into the hands of General Meade. Believing that
Lee would proceed with or without the reinforcements, General
Meade led his army west in search of Lee's army. The lead
elements of both armies met and engaged near Gettysburg,
Pennsylvania.
Although Gettysburg is remembered primarily for its'
carnage, the battles' true significance rests in the facts that the south's strategic plan was disrupted, that the south suffered
irreplaceable losses of men and material and that the victory rejuvenated the morale of both the Army of the Potomac and the northern civilian population. Gettysburg was the first industrial battle. For four days 157,000 soldiers participated in intense combat that produced 51,000 killed, wounded, or missing. To this day Gettysburg retains the distinctions of being the largest engagement and having the highest casualties of any battle fought on American soil.
The south entered the battle with General Robert E. Lee and
75,000 men. General Lee's forces were organized into three Corps led by A.P Hill, James Longstreet, and Richard Ewell. Stuart led Lee's calvary. The north, under General George Gordon Meade, entered the battle from the march with 82,000 men.
Before his defeat at Gettysburg, General Robert E. Lee successfully defeated Union forces at Fredericksburg in December 9
1862 and again at Chancellorsville in May 1863. These victories
encouraged Lee to cross the Potomac and drive north through
Maryland into the rich Pennsylvania farmland. By moving into
Pennsylvania Lee hoped to resupply his troops and draw the Army
of the Potomac from its prepared positions around Washington D.C.
and into the field where he could engage and defeat them. Once
he broke the Union Army Lee planned to turn eastwards and hook
towards the Federal capitol from the north.
Instead of gaining needed forage and shoes, the Army of
Virginia was forced to retreat after four days of battle. Before
Lee gave the order to withdraw, the Confederates suffered 2,592
deaths, 12,706 wounded, and approximately 5,150 captured or missing. The material loss is just as severe. The south lost
120 cannon, 12,000 horses and over 50,000 rifles. After their retreat "the Confederates never again reached the military strength that they held at Gettysburg" (Gallagher 42).
Many historians attribute the southern defeat to poor organization and strategy. Civil War era calvary had two primary missions - reconnaissance and screening. Lee sent stuart out to find the Union Army and advise him of their size, location and composition. Instead of doing as he was told stuart chose to seize wagons, horses and forage for Lee's Army. J.E.B. stuart's actions deprived Lee of any early warning of the Federal Army's arrival. On the occasion when his men did make contact with the
Federal forces, stuart rode in circles around them and became disorientated. "stuart's cavalry, Lee's eyes and only source of 10
intelligence, was off on a joy ride to the east of the Army of
the Potomac and not in contact with Lee" (Capozza 98).
Although the south had numerical advantage when the armies
met, General Ewell did not drive the Union forces from the high
ground. Instead, he chose to plan a deliberate attack. This
delay allowed the Union to dig in and reinforce their positions
as their troops arrived from Washington D.C.
Deprived of intelligence by J. E. B. stuart's misguided
initiative, General Lee made many poor decisions during the
battle. Believing he was not dealing with the entire Army of the
Potomac, Lee opted to fight a series of piecemeal engagements
that drew more and more of his forces into the battle. On the
final day Lee decided that Meade would reinforce his flanks
rather than his center. Based on the assumption Lee ordered his
forces to charge across open ground into the center of the Union
line. Unfortunately for the Confederates, General Meade had
positioned his reserves in the center of the line behind prepared
positions on Cemetery Hill and Cemetery Ridge. The north with
the high ground and crafty rock formations of the Devils Den in
their favor withstood the charges made by the south.
Lee had no chance of victory after Picket's Charge failed.
Realizing that Meade had the advantage, General Lee broke the
engagement and withdrew before his army was destroyed. Although
the Army of Virginia ,withdrew in an orderly fashion, the fact
remains that Lee was never able to take the offensive again.
This fact and Lee's choice to wage a mobile defense during the
Battle of the Wilderness and the Peninsula Campaign proves that 11
the Union victory at Gettysburg not only stopped the Confederate
offensive, it also inflicted high casualties that permanently
took the initiative from the Army of Virginia.
As the broken remnants of the Army of Virginia retreated
through the towns and fields they had pillaged a few days prior,
the northern army celebrated the defeat of the best and largest
southern army ever fielded. This accomplishment fostered a new
belief that the Union Army could defeat Confederate forces any
time and anywhere. "Gettysburg had important psychological
effects also, demoralizing the south and causing the north to
celebrate a great victory with Abraham Lincoln's Gettysburg
Address" (Gallagher 18).
The evidence that supports Vicksburg as the decisive battle
of the Civil War is as compelling as the arguments for Gettysburg
are emotional. Vicksburg was a vital stronghold for both the
Confederate and Federal Armies during the civil War. The bustling river port was a strategic point and its' ownership was the turning point of the war. Control of the Vicksburg Port equated to control of the Mississippi River. This fact became evident as Federal soldiers fought their way down the Mississippi
River from the north and up adjoining rivers from the south. As the Federal Army gained control of the north and the south portions of the Mississippi River, control of Vicksburg became increasingly more significant. The City of Vicksburg was essential to the Confederate Army as both a centrally located hub for critical transfers of railroad and river traffic and the focal point of Rebel resistance. 12
During the 1860's the midwest was considered America's main
agricultural area. The midwest states produced more agricultural
crops than their citizens needed. Before the war this surplus was exported abroad using the Mississippi River. Confederate
control of Vicksburg cut these exports off. For over a year, northern shipments of beef, pork and other crops were seized and routed to Atlanta to support the Confederate cause. The
Confederate closure of the Mississippi River fostered anger and resentment throughout the northwest. "A Wisconsin boy told his father, as he left home to enlist, that the confederacy could have South Carolina, Virginia, and Georgia and whatever else it wanted - he did not care one spit for them. But he was damned if they can have the Mississippi" (Ambrose 67).
Confederate control of Vicksburg blocked Federal lines of communication traveling the length of the Mississippi River. The south enjoyed a monopoly on the river until Admiral Farragut seized control of New Orleans. This achievement enabled the
Federal Army to block the primary Caribbean shipment route for weapons arriving from Europe to the Confederate Army. With New
Orleans gone, Vicksburg became the primary route for transporting
European weapons to the east. Weapons shipments would arrive in
Mexico, be bought by the Confederates and transported through
Texas and up the Mississippi River to Vicksburg. President
Jefferson Davis did not exaggerate when he said, "Vicksburg is the nail head that holds the South's two halves together" (Korn
16) . 13
The Federal Army did split the Confederacy in half by taking vicksburg. At the end of the battle the Armies of the West, the
Cumberland, the Ohio and the Tennessee were reorganized into one
Army under General Grant. After this consolidation Grant sent
Sherman to take the Cumberland valley and begin the campaign to take Atlanta. General Grant planned to support Sherman by marching on Mobile. However, when Grant requested permission to move President Lincoln denied the request citing strained resources and more urgent threats.
East Texas loomed large in the eyes of President
Abraham Lincoln and his advisers for several reasons,
some of them barely pertinent to the war effort. One
was intense political pressure from the mill owners of
New England, whose looms had been idle for lack of
Southern cotton almost since the conflict began.
Their clamor for military action to wrest coastal
Texas cotton fields from the confederates reached a
crescendo as the election year of 1864 approached. A
second irritant was the Confederate arms traffic
across the Rio Grande from Mexico into East Texas.
Foreign ships tying up at Bagdad, a Mexican port
immune to the u.S. Navy's blockade, were busily
trading Enfield rifles and other war supplies for
bales of Texas Cotton, needed by the spinning mills of
Europe. Only gaining control of the Rio Grande
crossing points could choke off this traffic. But
most important in Lincoln's view was what appeared to 14
be a dangerous threat from a foreign power. The
invasion of Mexico by Emperor Napoleon III of France
was a growing concern throughout the war. Putting a
Federal army in Texas would help discourage any French
move to aid the confederacy - or to annex Louisiana
and portions of the southwest. (Josephy 46-47)
Mill shutdowns caused by cotton shortages caused President
Lincoln's popularity to plummet in New England. The mill owners
were calling for an end to the war and, with an election year
approaching, President Lincoln was hard-pressed to concede the
issue. The fall of Vicksburg changed this.
Tactically and strategically the results of the
campaign were among the most decisive of the war.
Abraham Lincoln, his cabinet, and the people in the
North were enheartened after the previous long months
of defeat and discouragement. From hindsight, perhaps,
the final outcome of the war was now inevitable. The
commander at Port Hudson, on learning of the fall of
Vicksburg, surrendered to General Banks. President
Lincoln could now say, "The father of waters rolls
unvexed to the sea". (Ambrose 63)
Although the battle of Gettysburg and the siege of Vicksburg were both major northern victories, it is clear that Vicksburg's fall had a greater impact on the conduct and outcome of the war.
Undeniably Gettysburg is a defining moment. One marked by the massive loss of human life and, due to the oratory skill of
Abraham Lincoln, a sense of spiritual renewal for the Union. 15
Vicksburg differs in the sweeping impacts the battle had on
northern morale, the European perception of our civil war, Union
military strategy and the structure of the Union high command.
One of the prevalent myths of the war is that Vicksburg was
a vital Confederate transportation center that linked the east
and west. In Vicksburg: strategic Point or Propaganda Device,
Thomas L. Connelly contends there were no east-west railways
leading through Vicksburg to Texas and, after the loss of the
city, the South retained the ability to exert influence on the
Mississippi (49). Connelly's assertions are supported by the
fact that the Union had to station "at least 15,000 men and the
Mississippi squadron to defend non military commerce on the river" (Berringer 187). These facts demonstrate that losing control of Vicksburg did not sever the south in two nor did it deny the south access to supplies from the west. However, due to
Jefferson Davis' political posturing, the victory did create a psychological dismemberment of the Confederacy.
Prior to the Union victory at Vicksburg the north became increasingly war weary as each day passed. The Democratic Party exploited this sentiment by making a political settlement to the
Confederate secession their primary plank for the 1863 political platform. The Democrats willingness to allow the south to secede contrasted starkly with the Republicans commitment to forced reunification of the Nation. As the people tired of the war they gravitated towards the Democratic Party. The Union victory at
Vicksburg re-energized the northwest's and midwest's commitment 16
to the Union cause and ultimately turned the political tide in
the congressional elections of 1863.
The senior levels of an Army are also subject to political
influence. Impressed by Grant's success and grateful for the
political momentum the victory gave his party; President Abraham
Lincoln developed a close relationship with Major General U. S.
Grant. This relationship and admiration ultimately resulted in
Grants selection as the Union General of the Armies. Grant used
this new position to advance an aggressive calvary officer named
Tecumseh Sherman. In return for his faith, Sherman became the
decisive executor of Grant's will in the west.
Southern losses at Gettysburg did not deprive them of either
the will or ability to reassume the offensive. Confederate
inactivity resulted from President Davis' unwillingness to call
up the state armies and Lee's concern about the newly appointed
Union General of the Armies' intentions.
Confined to inactivity against his temperament and better
jUdgement, Lee spent the winter of 1863 - 1864 helping
formulate the South's grand strategy. In early February,
Lee recommended taking the offensive to "derange" the
enemy's plans. Recognizing the Confederacy lacked the
resources to gain permanent advantage from a foray into
northern territory, Lee aimed to "alarm and embarrass" the
enemy and "prevent his undertaking anything of magnitude
against us". (Rhea 18)
Since 1861 the Confederacy had aggressively sought approval to openly buy arms and ships from England and France. These 17
efforts were foiled by skillful Union maneuvering that applied an
1856 Neutrality Convention to block open European support to the
Confederacy. As the war progressed and the shortage of cotton
shut down European mills, the Union's ability to maintain the
assertion that the south was not a "belligerent power" became
more and more difficult. On 30 June 1863 a Confederate diplomat
sent to London to gain English support, presented a petition to
the House of Commons "in favor of entering into negotiations with
the greater powers of Europe with the object of recognizing the
Confederate states..•. Announcing that secession was now
successful, he stated that if the united States had kept growing
it would have become the greatest bully in the world; and though
he did not favor slavery he was determined to prevent the reconstruction of the Union" (Callahan 187). Although Parliament did not grant the petition it did begin to discuss the potential sale of rifles, artillery and munitions and the possible use of
English shipyards to construct Confederate war ships.
France was much more than willing to openly support the
Confederacy. In addition to allowing the Confederates to build warships in their shipyards, the French Emperor (Louis Napoleon) held many conversations with John Slidell (a Confederate envoy).
"In April 1862, Napoleon freely stated to Slidell that he was ready to send an Anglo-French fleet to the mouth of the
Mississippi to break the blockade, but New Orleans soon fell and postponed the chances of Confederate recognition" (Callahan 204).
The Union victory at Vicksburg was the first failure of the southern strategic defense. The Union's ability to project its 18 will into the deep south caused the English to commit to a policy of unquestionable neutrality and allowed the Army of the West to reallocate its combat power to meet the potential French threat from occupied Mexico. This new political strength, tightened control of the Gulf seaboard and ever increasing naval power allowed Union diplomats to convince France not to release the
Confederate vessels that they had built under commission for the
Confederacy.
with Vicksburg under Union control the Army of the West countered French ambitions by occupying eastern Texas. After positioning a sizable garrison in Texas, the Army of the West reoriented its' operations along the entire western borders of the Confederacy. It remained in that position until Sherman was allowed to concentrate his combat power along a single axis that led from Tennessee to Atlanta, and ultimately to the sea. "Most civilians recognized Sherman's march as the death knell of the
Confederacy. After watching the Union troops pour into Winnsboro a woman recalled: 'The Confederacy seemed suddenly to have changed, a glory had passed from it, and without acknowledging it, we felt the end was near. '" (Glatthaar 154). 19
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