Page 1 .I Annex B to USASMA Memo 672-1 HAINES AWARD PORM
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
.I Annex B to USASMA Memo 672-1 HAINES AWARD PORM 2 PART 1 EVALUATION OF WRITTEN RESEARCH PAPER BY THE COMMANDANT, COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR, & BATTALION COMMANDER TITLE: ****************************** * * * Circle One Poor Fair Avg Good Exc SCORE ORGAN1ZATION/ LOGICAL DEVELOPMENT 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 RESEARCH/DOCUMENTATION 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 PRESENTATION OF THE 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 OPPOSING POINT OF VIEW ANALYSIS OF THE SUBJECT 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 IN AN IMPARTIAL MANNER VALIDITY OF THE CONCLUSION 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 OVERALL IMPRESSION 1 2 3. 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 TOTAL (Max = 60) * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * ... B-1 Annex B to USASMA Memo 672-1 HAINES AWARD FORM 2 PART 2 EVALUATION OF THE RESEARCH PAPER ORAL PRESENTATION BY THE COMMANDANT, COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR, & BATTALION COMMANDER TITLE: _ * *** * ***** * * * * * *** * * ** **** * * * * * * * Circle One Poor Fair Avg Good Exc SCORE INTRODUCTION 1 2 3 4 5 ORGANIZATION 1 2 3 4 5 SUPPORT OF THE MAIN POINTS 1 2 3 4 5 PRESENTATION OF THE OPPOSING 1 2 3 4 5 POINT OF VIEW LOGICAL DEVELOPMENT OF 1 2 3 4 5 THE CONCLUSION THE SPEAKER'S VOICE/GRAMMAR 1 2 3 4 5 OVERALL IMPRESSION 2 4 6 8 10 TOTAL (Max = 40) * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * ~ * * * * * * * " B-2 ATSS-BAR (350) 4 February 2000 MEMORANDUM FOR Faculty Advisor, Group Room L02, Fort Bliss, Texas 79918-8002 SUBJECT: The Vicksburg Campaign 1. Thesis Statement: Contrary to popular belief it was Vicksburg rather than Gettysburg that was the decisive battle of the American Civil War. 2. Discussion: Historians argue over which battle was the decisive point of the American civil war. Historians favoring Gettysburg site the grievous loss of Southern men and materials while those who favor Vicksburg credit that campaign with splitting the Confederacy. As Clausewitz stated, "War is an extension of politics by other means". Since neither battle was militarily decisive, we must examine the political aspects of each battle to determine its relative merit. 3. Conclusion: The fall of Vicksburg derailed the Democratic party's hopes for winning the 1863 Congressional elections, forced Britain and France to remain neutral and elevated two Union officers with reputations as drunkards to positions of power they used to destroy the Confederacy. 4. Haines Award: I request that the Haines Award Selection Board ' consider this paper. a~~ ~NN1I JONES SGM, USA Faculty Advisor MSG T. J. Clancy Chairperson SGM Karl Bailey SGM Dan Hill SGM Quinton Ward MSG Darrell Carlton SETTING THE STAGE: THE BATTLE OF VICKSBURG by SGM Karl Bailey SGM Dan Hill SGM Quinton Ward MSG Darrel Calton MSG Tim Clancy SGM Johnie Jones III Group Room L2 4 February 2000 ------------------------------------------------------- Outline Thesis statement: Contrary to popular belief it was Vicksburg rather than Gettysburg that was the decisive battle of the American Civil War. I. Introduction A. Vicksburg's strategic importance B. Northern perspective C. Southern perspective D. Results of Union seizure of Vicksburg II. Northern and Southern Strategies A. Union National Strategy B. Union Military Strategy C. Confederate National Strategy D. Confederate Military Strategy III. Gettysburg A. Overview B. North inflicts irreplaceable casualties and equipment losses on the south C. South loses offensive capability D. Southern tactical errors E. Impact on morale IV. Vicksburg A. Overview B. The Army of the West consolidates C. Countering European influence D. Countering France ii V. Conclusions A. Vicksburg as a political victory B. Changes to Union command structure C. Countering European ambition D. Summary Setting the Stage: The Battle of Vicksburg Many historians contend the successful Union campaign for Vicksburg, Mississippi was the decisive campaign of the American Civil War. A commonly stated opinion is that: The Union capture of Vicksburg was one of the most important northern victories of the war. It gave the north control of the Mississippi River, allowing them passage straight through the Confederacy. with this passage, they were able to move supplies and men along the river. In addition, the capture freed Grant's armies and allowed the north to use them for other battles, such as fighting the war in Virginia. (Campaign 2-3) Vicksburg sits upon a steep bluff some 300 feet above the eastern banks of the Mississippi River. The bluff overlooks a double bend in the river making travel in either direction observable and controllable. This unique geographical feature makes control of Vicksburg critical. Seventy years earlier the Spanish recognized the strategic importance of the location and established Fort Nogales on the spot that would become the Confederate Signal Battery of Fort Hill. After the Union captured Fort Donelson, Tennessee in 1862, Vicksburg was the only obstacle to federal command of the river. If the Union could seize Vicksburg the Confederacy would be cut in two. Admiral Farragut wasted no time attempting to take Vicksburg after he captured New Orleans in April 1862. He sailed 2 north along the Mississippi and, although he was able to get his fleet past the Confederate batteries, Admiral Farragut was unable to take Vicksburg with warships alone. For the next nine months, the Confederates used the surrounding terrain to their advantage and repulsed five separate attempts to capture Vicksburg. On the northern approaches, Grant was bogged down by railroad and all but impassible bayous extending to the west. Small Calvary detachments and boatmen weaned in the swamp country picked off Grant's soldiers almost at will.... The fighters in blue, far from their homes in the "Old Northwest," the west and border states, markedly unconditioned to swamp existence, fell prey to malaria, other fevers, snakes as well as insect bites. Sickness and mortality rates soared during the cold, rainy winter and spring. (Hoehling 2) Although the civil War is usually reduced to absolutes, the fall of Vicksburg may have been just as important politically as it was militarily. Both Presidents Lincoln and Davis constantly expressed strong concerns about the political impact of owning Vicksburg. In 1862 President Lincoln contended that: The War can never be brought to a close until that key [Vicksburg] is in our pocket.... We may take all the northern ports of the Confederacy and they can still defy us from Vicksburg.... It means hogs and hominy without limit, fresh troops from all the states of the far South, and a cotton country where they can raise the staple without interference. (Hoehling 1) 3 The southern perspective was similar. "On his western tour of December 1862 Davis made public speeches pledging himself to Vicksburg's defense. During the spring of 1863, he repeatedly stated not only that he was determined to hold Vicksburg, but it's loss would be disastrous" (Connelly 52). Although the strategic importance of Vicksburg remains debatable President Davis' statements established it as the most important point in the south. "Hence, even if Vicksburg had not possessed a grain of strategic importance, the Confederacy was bound to lose face if the city fell (Connelly 52) . For years historians have claimed the fall of Vicksburg was the war's deciding moment. There are two central arguments that support this position. First is the belief that losing Vicksburg denied the eastern Confederate states access to beef, munitions and other vital supplies from Texas. Secondly, that vicksburg's loss severed communications and prevented the Confederacy from moving troops along or across the Mississippi River. Although the fall of Vicksburg did interrupt the flow of some supplies and impede communications between the east and west, there is little evidence that the Confederacy permanently lost either ability. By the summer of 1863 the north was tired of war. It was inevitable that the pUblic's war weariness began to manifest as widespread resentment towards the Republican Party. Republican Congressmen would be defeated in the next scheduled election unless something dramatic happened to change this sentiment. with Vicksburg's fall conditions improved rapidly for the Republicans in the northwest. Every source of 4 propaganda was obtained from the reopening of the river. President Lincoln's statement to a springfield, Illinois, meeting that "The Father of Waters again goes unvexed to the sea" .... while Sherman added that, with the reopening of commerce, the river was again "the great inland sea." .... Republican governors and legislators in Iowa, Minnesota, and Wisconsin were reelected by substantial margins. (Connelly 53) After identifying the decisive role capturing Vicksburg had on the 1864 elections Connelly adds, "The loss of Vicksburg denied the South its greatest trump card in domestic affairs control of the mouth of the Mississippi River. The loss of this propaganda weapon may have been more harmful than any beeves or trans-Mississippi reinforcements" (53). Although blockade-runners were able to get limited quantities of supplies to the Confederacy, the south needed international recognition so she could trade openly with other countries. In a compilation of articles from The Southern Illustrated News published in Richmond, Virginia during the war, an attempt is made to explain why England would not recognize the Confederate States of America. First, England adopted the practice to enter " ... no discussion of the right of the government she recognised (sic) to rule the country which it professed to rUle, and to no interference with the internal affairs of such country" (Harwell 134). Secondly England's nineteenth century economy was based largely on the cotton trade. 5 The south's inability to transport cotton to European markets meant greater demand for Indian and Australian cotton. Given this financial windfall, a prolonged American civil war was in England's interest. The Southern Illustrated News expressed this perception of English political motivation when they wrote "She feels that intervention would follow recognition, and this she is by no means disposed to undertake, because it might have the effect of Shortening the war" (Harwell 136).