Existential Propositions
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EXISTENTIAL PROPOSITIONS A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF DEPARTMENT OF LINGUISTICS AND THE COMMITTEE ON GRADUATE STUDIES OF STANFORD UNIVERSITY IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY Itamar Francez November 2007 c Copyright by Itamar Francez 2008 All Rights Reserved ii I certify that I have read this dissertation and that, in my opinion, it is fully adequate in scope and quality as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. Cleo Condoravdi Principal Co-Advisor I certify that I have read this dissertation and that, in my opinion, it is fully adequate in scope and quality as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. Beth Levin Principal Co-Advisor I certify that I have read this dissertation and that, in my opinion, it is fully adequate in scope and quality as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. David Beaver I certify that I have read this dissertation and that, in my opinion, it is fully adequate in scope and quality as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. Graham Katz iii I certify that I have read this dissertation and that, in my opinion, it is fully adequate in scope and quality as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. Paul Kiparsky Approved for the University Committee on Graduate Studies. iv Abstract This dissertation investigates the semantics of existential sentences (existentials) such as (1). (1) There’s whiskey in the jar. Most semantic literature on existentials has focused on the so-called definiteness effect (DE), namely the observation that certain NP types do not easily occur in the construction. Here it is argued that it is profitable to set the DE aside and ask more directly what propo- sitions are expressed by existentials and how such propositions are formed. In answer to this question an analysis is proposed in which the main predicate of an existential is the post-copular NP (the “pivot”, e.g. whiskey in (1)). This predicate has a single argument which is implicit and which must be interpreted as a set. The value of this argument is determined by context or by contextual modifiers expressed by the constituent following the pivot (the “coda”, e.g. in the jar in (1)). A formal semantics encoding this theory of existential propositions is developed and its advantages in accounting for the range of in- terpretations available to simple existentials is demonstrated. Various phenomena are ana- lyzed, some of which have not been noted or have not been analyzed in the literature. These include existentials with quantified codas and multiple codas, adjectival codas, part-whole readings, codas with free relatives and the licensing of free choice items. An approach to the DE is presented which relates it to the predicative nature of pivots. An analysis of pivots quantifying over kinds (McNally 1992) is sketched out which in turn facilitates an analysis of the diffrential distribution of NP types in English and modern Hebrew. v Glossing conventions 1,2,3 1st, 2nd, 3rd person cop copula cs construct state def definite EX existential lexeme f feminine fut future m masculine neg negation neg-p negative polarity item pl plural prs present pst past sg singular vi Acknowledgments The most welcome outcome of writing this dissertation for me is having worked closely with Cleo Condoravdi. Cleo agreed to become my adviser at a crucial point, when the door of opportunity for rescuing my ideas from the hazy void in which they were hovering seemed to be closing rapidly. Cleo stirred my dissertation back on track, changed my gears and turned my somewhat tormented wandering into a fascinating expedition. I am grateful to her for her dedication and boundless generosity with her time, for the drive she inspired in me, and for sharing my excitements and anxieties throughout the last year. Beth Levin has been a mentor, guide and example from the very beginning of my time at Stanford. I have learned more from Beth than I could hope to acknowledge and probably more than I am aware of. I thank her for all our stimulating interactions, for her undivided attention to my work even as it drifted away from its original goals and motivations, and for the many things she has inculcated in me. Until a relatively late stage of thinking about this dissertation, my relationship with formal semantics had been turbulent to say the least. If today this relationship has moved from angst to harmony, this is largely thanks to David Beaver. David patiently kept a foot in the semantic door for me, calmly humoring all sorts of folly, and when the opportunity arose he lured me back. I thank him for countless hours of conversation and argument, for his friendship, and for the instant coffee. My exchanges with Paul Kiparsky have transformed the way I think about language, linguistics, and many other things, and have breathed much needed new energy and joy into my attitude towards intellectual pursuit. His insistence and penetrating insight have done wonders for this dissertation. I thank him for all that he has taught me, for his interest in my work and for providing me with the standards to which I aspire. Graham Katz joined my dissertation committee late and stirred a lot oftroublein ashort vii period. The result was a tremendous improvement in content and also in form, and some wonderful new ideas for the future. I thank him for turning his sharp gaze unto my work and for several long, intense and rewarding meetings. I thank Ivan Sag for many fruitful discussions, for his interest and sincere criticism and for his mentorship and kindness. I thank Stanley Peters and Ed Zalta for discussions and feedback which helped me formulate my thoughts on the topics of this dissertation. My years at Stanford have been a period of maturation in many ways. It is difficult to imagine a more receptive, stimulating and nourishing intellectual environment in which to undergo the kinds of changes I have undergone there. Describing Penny Eckert’s role in this process would require much more space than I have here. I thank her for our won- derful interaction. Peter Sells was at various points a guiding light and a voice of reason, and always an unparalleled teacher. Arnold Zwicky got me interested in many issues and questions I never thought would interest me. I thank him for the opportunity to see things from his unique perspective. Eve Clark provided guidance, advice and patience at various points. My colleagues and friends have been an indispensable source of all sorts of things. I thank Ashwini Deo for teaching me basic science through a contemplation of soap bub- bles, and for many other special things, which are still being counted. I thank John Beavers, Andrew Koontz-Garboden, and Judith Tonhauser for their close engagement and their won- derful friendship. For the latter I have to thank too many to list, but Nik, Inbal, Lis, Jakov, Robert, Enrique, Dima, Nirvana, Andy, Philip, Doug, Lev, Luc, Luis and Veronica have been particularly relied upon. I also thank Scott Grimm and Doug Ball for help with the manuscript, and Doug for more help with the manuscript... Science is often said to be blind to its own conditions of possibility. My dissertation does nothing to alleviate this, but I am not blind to the conditions, material and epistemic, that made it possible for me to write it. I thank David Beaver and Beth Levin for indispensable financial support. I am happily grateful to Galit Hasan-Rokem, Freddie Rokem and Ariel Rokem for being there when we needed them and for providing me (and not only me) with the time and peace of mind needed to complete a dissertation, through their loving care for my (and not just my) daughter. Nissim and Tikva Francez have a very special role in my relation to language, and viii Nissim has had a very special role in my relation to semantics as well as significant impact on the contents of this dissertation. I thank him for this. I thank them both for my love of learning, and I thank my family for a life full of tenderness and generosity. I thank Na’ama for taking me with her, and Alma for coming when she did. There is no greater love. ix Contents Abstract v Glossing conventions vi Acknowledgments vii 1 Introduction: the existential question 1 2 The syntactic space of possibilities 8 2.1 Terminology:theanatomyofexistentials . ...... 9 2.1.1 Excludingexpletives . 11 2.2 Possiblerelationsbetweenpivotandcoda . ...... 13 2.2.1 Pivotandcodaassubjectandpredicate . .. 13 2.2.2 Pivotandcodaasco–arguments . 14 2.2.3 Thebare–NPanalysis . 15 2.2.4 Codasasadjuncts........................... 16 2.3 Anamendeddefinitionofcodas . 17 2.4 Arguments and nonarguments against the bare–NP analysis......... 19 2.4.1 Theargumentfromextraction . 20 2.4.2 TheargumentfromNPdistribution . 21 2.4.3 Theargumentfromrelativization . 23 2.5 Summary ................................... 24 3 The semantic space of possibilities 26 3.1 McNally’sinstantiationanalysis . ..... 27 x 3.1.1 ProblemsforMcNally’sanalysis. 31 3.2 Pivotsasgeneralizedquantifiers . .... 35 3.2.1 Codasaspartoftherestriction . 37 3.2.2 Codasasscopesets. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 39 3.3 ChoosingbetweenGQanalyses . 40 3.4 Summary ................................... 43 4 Semantic desiderata for a theory of existential propositions 45 4.1 Codasvs.predicates ............................. 47 4.1.1 Codaswithquantifiers . 47 4.1.2 Codas withreadings unavailabletopredicates . ...... 51 4.1.3 Licensing of free choice any ..................... 59 4.2 Interimsummary ............................... 60 4.3 Contextdependenceandbareexistentials . ...... 60 4.4 Summary ................................... 64 5 An analysis of existential propositions 65 5.1 Thecorepredicationinexistentials . ...... 65 5.1.1 Pivotsasthemainpredicatesinexistentials . ...... 66 5.1.2 Bareexistentialsandimplicitarguments . ..... 67 5.2 Asemanticsforbareexistentials .