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Home , Edith Rosenwald Stern, Voter Education Project

By Sean Dobson Commissioned by the National Committee for Responsive Philanthropy June 2014

seemed very unlikely for almost the entire pe‐ The year 2014 marks the 50th anniversary of riod this paper examines. one of the most far‐reaching emancipatory re‐ forms of American history: the (CRA). In the coming days, the heroes of I. The Need for Sweeping Federal Civil the will be justly cele‐ Rights Legislation brated and its history discussed and debated. This paper examines a mostly overlooked di‐ Severe, endemic and intractable white racism mension of the civil rights struggle: the handful has characterized American society from its ori‐ of foundations that provided modest but useful gins and by the 1950s, it still pervaded almost financial support to the movement’s leadership all aspects of American life. Very few states or organizations. Their courageous and ingenious localities outside the South had passed mean‐ grantmaking offers urgent lessons for a philan‐ ingful laws to outlaw segregation of public fa‐ thropic sector that today is witnessing a re‐ cilities and to safeguard voting rights for people newed assault on American democracy and of color. In the South, racism was much worse, constitutional rights. where the Jim Crow regime was nothing less than a white supremacist reign of terror. To appreciate the wisdom and determination of Executive orders by Presidents Harry Truman these philanthropies requires a brief review of and Dwight Eisenhower had, in purely formal the history of the civil rights movement from terms, desegregated the military and a few 1955–1965, a review that will show that, de‐ other aspects of the federal government. How‐ spite the movement’s momentum, reform

1 ever, employment in these sectors constituted a pose no legislation and instead merely enforce small sliver of American life. These executive federal court orders.5 orders resulted from the contradictions made evident by the civil rights protest among African American military servicemen and women and II. Prerequisite for Federal Legislation: A later veterans. These orders and their progeny Powerful, Mass Civil Rights Movement set the basis for later legislation. Only a massive, exogenous force could oblige By the mid‐1950s, federal court decisions had President to champion civil rights and set important precedents but had not substan‐ also break down the Senate barrier to reform. tially secured equality under law for racial and That force was the heroic phase of the civil ethnic minorities. The Supreme Court’s 1954 rights movement, which began with the Mont‐ decision in Brown v. Board of Education order‐ gomery Bus Boycott of 1955 and achieved ing public school districts to end legally man‐ overpowering momentum after 1960. A moun‐ dated segregation was historic and important. tain of historiography on this movement, nota‐ But the federal government’s lax enforcement bly the magisterial accounts by of the court’s mandate meant that southern and , agree that leadership of the public schools were complying at a rate of only movement was provided mostly by four non‐ 1 percent per year in the decade following profit advocacy organizations that together Brown – i.e., it would have taken a century to achieved a sometimes tensee yet effectiv divi‐ end legal school segregation in the South.1 Be‐ sion of labor: fore 1960, there were few federal court deci‐ sions limiting racial segregation or strengthen‐  Rev. Martin Luther King Jr.’s Southern ing voting rights,2 and federal enforcement of Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) these few court decisions was lax. organized and worked through the mi‐ nority of southern Black ministers will‐ Clearly, then, only sweeping federal civil rights ing to participate personally in the legislation with strong enforcement provisions movement and recruit their own parish‐ could ensure equality under law for Americans ioners to do so. SCLC also staffed King’s of color. But as of the 1959, there was no indi‐ hectic, seven‐day‐a‐week work and cation that federal lawmakers would enact such travel schedule as the movement’s de legislation. During prior decades, civil rights leg‐ facto public leader and spokesman. islation had either died in Congress, usually  The Student Nonviolent Coordinating without a vote in Senate committees controlled Committee (SNCC), composed mostly of by powerful Dixiecrat chairmen, or were passed southern, Black college students and with killer amendments rendering them largely recent graduates, provided most of the inoperative, such as the 1957 Civil Rights Act.3 It tactical leadership for local sit‐ins, was understood that these same Dixiecrats Freedom Rides and voter registration could filibuster to death any serious bill that drives, and also played an important might ever reach the Senate floor in the future.4 leadership role in other demonstrations and marches. The hopes of reformers rose briefly with the  The Congress of Racial Equality (CORE) 1960 election as president of John F. Kennedy, was a biracial group that pioneered the who espoused a strong civil rights platform on Freedom Rides and had enough mem‐ the campaign trail. Soon after his inauguration, bership outside the South to recruit however, Kennedy failed to follow through on helpful battalions of Black and white those promises, making it clear he would pro‐ northern college students to provide

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useful ancillary help on the front lines in always co‐existed in tandem with civil rights Dixie. advocacy seeking racial integration and inclu‐  The National Association for the Ad‐ sion. Eagerly covered by the national media, vancement of Colored People (NAACP), derided King and other civil rights the oldest of the civil rights groups, was leaders as “chumps,” the movement’s goal of a mass membership organization organ‐ racial integration as delusional and nonviolent ized into local chapters. It rarely acti‐ tactics as cowardice. The grew vated this mass base for direct political rapidly during these years and Malcolm X was a action, concentrating instead on civil major public figure. His incendiary pronounce‐ rights litigation and won several impor‐ ments almost certainly had the unintended ef‐ tant victories in federal courts, notably fect of advancing the civil rights movement by Brown v. Board of Education. After making it look comparatively moderate and 1960, as the NAACP Legal Defense and “reasonable” in the eyes of white Americans. In Education Fund (LDF), under the leader‐ 1964, Malcolm had a change of heart; he left ship of , broke away the Nation of Islam, adopted a more main‐ to form a separate organization, the stream interpretation of Islam, forswore racism, NAACP focused ever less on litigation but continued to reject integration in favor of and was drawn ever more into numer‐ Black nationalism. Malcolm X’s oratory and in‐ ous, spontaneous and local grassroots sight elevated the concerns of urban Blacks con‐ protests spreading like wildfire across fronting structural inequality and poverty. Mal‐ the South, where its local chapters of‐ colm X also connected the Black struggle within ten played a useful role. As prospects the to national liberation move‐ for federal legislation grew brighter in ments in Asia, Africa and South America. He was 1963, the NAACP also assumed the lead assassinated in 1965 by gunmen associated role as the movement’s yda ‐to‐day lob‐ with the Nation of Islam.6 Other byist in Washington, D.C. movements, such as the Black Panthers, came to prominence later in the 1960s, after the pe‐ What united these diverse organizations was riod this paper examines. Black leadership, an ironclad commitment to nonviolent tactics and, after 1960, the goal of To be clear, much of the civil rights movement’s inducing the federal government to enact civil impact came not from the four leadership or‐ rights legislation. ganizations listed above but from hundreds of spontaneous, local protests, often spearheaded The Nation of Islam also sought to empower by students, such as the early lunch counter sit‐ African Americans, but not throughe th civil ins. And some of the leadership of these grass‐ rights movement. Nominally led by Elijah Mu‐ roots actions was provided by local Black elites hammad, the group’s most famous and charis‐ independent of the civil rights organizations. As matic spokesman was Malcolm X (also known as hundreds of these actions spread across the El Hajj Malik Shabazz). The Nation of Islam South after 1960, they certainly got the atten‐ preached that whites were inferior “devils” and tion of federal lawmakers. But without at least advocated that African Americans should live some guidance by the leadership organizations, separately from them. This was ebecause th they came nowhere close to generating enough organization believed that African Americans pressure on federal lawmakers to oblige them could better prepare for a return to Africa, the to legislate a systemic solution (nor did these only place where they could live free of Ameri‐ protests even make such a demand). In short, can and European aggression, if they main‐ the movement’s effectiveness flowed from the tained complete separation from whites. Afri‐ felicitous collaboration of these thousands of can American nationalist self‐determination has

3 volunteers quickly trained and loosely led by with him once the protest became a big media the nonprofit organizations. story and secure the partnership of local Black ministers who could supply thousands of volun‐ The movement, which had languished after the teers from the pews and meeting space in the last of the bus boycotts in 1957, came back to sanctuaries. This new approach succeeded bril‐ life in 1960 and gained ever more momentum liantly in the of early thereafter for two reasons. First, in early 1960, 1963, where King also deployed a new wonder southern, Black college students invented a new weapon: the intentional inclusion of school‐ and powerful tactic: mass civil disobedience aged children (not just college students) in the designed to provoke white violence and police nonviolent marches confronting Sheriff Bull arrest. Hundreds of local, Connor’s police. The chil‐ nonviolent sit‐ins, Freedom dren were attacked by po‐ Rides, pickets and demonstra‐ lice dogs and pummeled by tions across the South landed The movement’s water cannons, all wit‐ thousands of demonstrators nessed by millions of horri‐ in jail. These new tactics rep‐ effectiveness flowed fied TV viewers worldwide resented a much more con‐ (including President Ken‐ frontational approach to Jim from the felicitious col‐ nedy himself, who said pri‐ Crowe than th bus boycotts vately that the images made had. The international media laboration of these him “sick”).7 This new ap‐ eagerly covered these dra‐ proach produced more vic‐ matic protests, which put the thousands of volun‐ tories for the movement in movement back in the head‐ 1964 and 1965, notably in lines and transfixed a global teers quickly trained Selma and the to audience with shocking im‐ Montgomery.8 ages of nonviolent, respecta‐ and loosely led by the bly dressed college students Birmingham, the firebomb‐ being harassed and beaten by non‐profit organiza‐ ing of Black churches, the white mobs and police. But tions. murder of little Black girls, the protests were uncoordi‐ the assassination of the nated and lacked a single NAACP’s in demand that might induce Mississippi – all these federal lawmakers to solve the problem events in the first half of 1963 outraged public through legislation. opinion outside the South. Kennedy was hear‐ ing from more and more of his political allies Second, King – who had had no prior political that he needed to “do something about civil experience when the ‐ rights.”9 On trips abroad, he and senior Ameri‐ ers asked him to coordinate their effort – rap‐ can officials almost always faced hostile ques‐ idly matured as a leader. Learning from set‐ tions from foreign journalists about the United backs in the period 1957–1961, he ceased futile States’ hypocrisy of claiming to lead the free negotiations with intransigent southern officials world against communism while at home deny‐ over the details of Jim Crow and instead de‐ ing civil rights to millions of American citizens.10 manded that federal lawmakers abolish it en‐ The pressure on President Kennedy was evident tirely. After 1962, he was determined to choose in his private response to the Evers assassina‐ for himself the time and place of demonstra‐ tion: “Christ, you know, it’s like they shoot this tions, which he alone would lead, confident that guy in Mississippi … I mean, it’s just everything. his national fame and charisma would attract I mean, this has become everything.”11 the media, induce the other groups to work

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Finally, on June 11, the civil rights movement announcing his intention to support a civil rights broke President Kennedy’s resistance to legisla‐ act in June 1963. In the preceding 10 years, tion. That morning, he told his startled aides meaningful federal court decisions were rare that he would submit sweeping civil rights legis‐ and enforcement was sporadic at best. All pre‐ lation to ban segregation in public facilities and vious civil rights legislative efforts had failed. announce it that evening in a live, national TV Thus, anybody serious about eradicating the and radio broadcast.12 most obvious evil afflicting mid‐20th century America had to face the unpleasant reality that Tragically, Kennedy never lived to attempt to – like victories earlier in that century for female move his bill through Congress. But his succes‐ suffrage and the right to unionize – securing sor, Lyndon Baines Johnson – had come to the civil rights for communities of color would be a conclusion that the civil rights movement was multifaceted affair of massive street protests too strong to oppose. He thus embraced it and strong enough to show reluctant federal law‐ shortly after taking the oath of office began makers that their own reelections depended on planning with King and other civil rights leaders enacting sweeping legislation. The nonviolent how to advance the Kennedy bill. In his first protests that spread across the South after speech to Congress, he announced the legisla‐ 1960 did just that by generating newsworthy tion was his top priority.13 The “Master of the controversy and exacerbating white suprema‐ Senate” personally and obsessively oversaw the cist violence. lobbying effort, coordinating hand‐in‐glove with civil rights leaders to generate outside pressure “Long shot,” “street protests,” “violence,” “leg‐ on persuadable lawmakers. They succeeded in islation,” “elections” – too many foundation enacting the historic legislation in August 1964 executives, more concerned about avoiding – only a few days before the Republican Party controversy than achieving mission, shied away convention nominated right‐wing insurgent from these words. A foundation could fund such Sen. Barry Goldwater of Arizona, a fierce oppo‐ a movement and still clearly comply with IRS nent of the bill.14 President Johnson was re‐ law, but too many executives in philanthropy warded handsomely for supporting civil rights, then (and now) suffered from the misconcep‐ trouncing Goldwater in the biggest landslide of tion that injustice can be overcome entirely by the 20th century. private charitable service provision and without grassroots pressure or capacity investments in One year later, passage of the 1965 Voting grassroots institutions. Rights Act (VRA) followed this same basic script, except the legislation had behind it the added It is therefore not surprising that the vast ma‐ force of Johnson’s landslide victory plus the his‐ jority of the 12,000 foundations operating in toric March to Montgomery, which showed mid‐20th century America16 ignored our soci‐ once again the incontrovertible need for the ety’s most obvious evil, even though many of federal government to safeguard non‐majority them had mission statements pledging to help voting rights.15 the needy. A very small number intentionally targeted their philanthropy to Americans of color. However, the vast majority of those dol‐ III. Foundation Support for the Civil Rights lars went not to organizations seeking civil Movement rights reform, but instead to groups seeking to ameliorate some of racism’s pernicious effects, The preceding review shows that securing for example by promoting Black educational equality under law for African Americans (and in opportunity and economic self‐help.17 particular vanquishing Jim Crow in the South) seemed improbable until Kennedy’s address

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Philanthropy had an opportunity to build on its The New World Foundation history of supporting racial equity and justice. In 1938, The Carnegie Foundation for the Ad‐ The New World Foundation (NWF) was created vancement of Teaching provided substantial in Chicago in 1954 with a $7 million endowment funds for a study of race relations in the United by Anita McCormick Blaine, the elderly heiress States. The study was commissioned to Gunnar of a big fortune whose forebears had founded Myrdal, the Swedish Nobel‐laureate economist the McCormick Harvesting Machine Company.20 and was published in 1942. It played a pivotal Ms. McCormick died the same year she en‐ role in establishing the groundwork for the Su‐ dowed the foundation, but she put her stamp preme Court’s decision in Brown vs. the Board on the institution very strongly. of Education by identifying the problems of ra‐ cial inequity as structured by white privilege to “When Anita chartered the New World keep African Americans in disadvantaged posi‐ Foundation … she was starkly aware of tions and denying them the opportunities the enormous societal injustices of the needed to achieve the American dream. The time – racial segregation, voter disen‐ foundation’s work built on its founder Andrew franchisement, unsafe working condi‐ Carnegie’s legacy of providing funds to African tions resulting from the industrial revo‐ American organizations, and his close alignment lution, disease, educational disparity, with the Hampton Institute and the Tuskegee the languishment of dissenters under Institute that worked to empower Blacks. The the oppressive shadows of McCarthy‐ Carnegie Corporation made grants of more than ism and the overall inequitable experi‐ $2.5 million from the time it was established in ence of those Americans who were 1911 until 1938.18 most flagrantly and persistently denied full participation in society. … Under The following section profiles four foundations Anita’s pioneer leadership, the New that made modest but helpful investments in World Foundation became one of the ways that benefitted the civil rights organiza‐ few foundations then willing to support tions examined above in the years between beleaguered southern efforts to further 1955–1965. A handful of other philanthropies, civil rights and desegregation.”21 such as the Fund for the Republic and Rockefel‐ ler Brothers Fund, also made helpful invest‐ After her death, her sole heir and granddaugh‐ ments in the movement.19 It is more than likely ter, Anne Blaine Harrison, took charge of NWF that other foundations provided important and stuck to Anita’s goals, as did executive di‐ funding to build the movement that led to pas‐ rector Vernon Eagle, who served from 1957– sage of the CRA. But the four foundations re‐ 1974.22 At a later date, NWF moved its offices viewed below were clearly among the most im‐ to New York City. portant and accounted for a substantial portion of the foundation dollars helpful to the frontline Based on the description of its “Purpose and groups listed above during the time period that Activities” in the 1960 Foundation Directory, this paper covers. What follows is an examina‐ NWF set as its goal “promoting mutual under‐ tion of each foundation, followed by a review of standing among persons of different racial, cul‐ the historic project they funded together and tural and national backgrounds as a means to‐ that for most of them constituted their single ward the elimination of intergroup and interna‐ biggest investment in the civil rights movement: tional tensions and conflicts.”23 the Voter Education Project (VEP). From its inception, NWF funded civil rights ad‐ vocacy organizations, notably the LDF’s civil rights litigation. NWF also helped start LDF’s

6 soon‐to‐be‐famous internship program, which Chicago Sun‐Times and grandson of the founder supplied legal firepower to a movement con‐ of the Marshall Field & Company department stantly battling southern officials in court, espe‐ store. Until his death in 1956, the foundation cially to free jailed comrades. The internship invested mostly in child welfare, but also some program helped launch the careers of a number in civil rights, especially litigation.29 Field was of distinguished civil rights lawyers, many of one of the few foundations to fund LDF in the them persons of color, such as Marian Wright 1950s. As LDF’s then‐deputy director Jack and Julius Chambers.24 NWF also funded the Greenberg recalls, “[A] big contribution was useful work of the Southern Regional Commis‐ $100, and $1,000 was a tremendous gift. The sion (SRC), one of the few multiracial institu‐ typical giver was … ’a New England abolitionist tions in the South. SRC documented the abuses type.’ A few smaller foundations like Field and of Jim Crow and provided leadership training for New York and, soon, Norman contributed as movement activists, among other activities.25 early as the 1950s. These were relatively small family foundations that typically made grants NWF funded conferences in the South that not much larger than $5,000 or $10,000 in were vital gatherings for the frontline organiza‐ those days.”30 Greenberg recounts that LDF was tions, especially SNCC, to compare notes and especially cash‐strapped as it litigated the his‐ coordinate strategy.26 toric Brown case and that Field Foundation came through with a $15,000 grant (Marshall Since the 1960s, NWF has embraced the civil Field III himself donated another $50,000 of his rights era as a model for how progressive social personal money). Thereafter, throughout the change can happen. In the 1970s, it funded 1950s, Field gave about $15,000 per year, mak‐ watchdog groups, training centers and policy ing it LDF’s largest foundation supporter in that research. It also provided seed funding for the decade and one of its biggest single donors.31 In Children’s Defense Fund. In the 1980s, it be‐ 1962, a Field grant of $25,000 helped start LDF’s came one of the first foundations to add to its internship program described above. 32 board of directors leading activists in the com‐ munities where NWF funded. The foundation After the death of Marshall Field III, his widow, also was one of the first U.S. foundations to Ruth, became the guiding force on the board of shift its grantmaking toward multi‐year and trustees and significantly increased its focus on general support grants – philanthropic strate‐ civil rights, especially leadership training.33 The gies that research finds to be most effective.27 Foundation Directory of 1960 described the In 1994, the New World Foundation leveraged Field Foundation’s “Purpose and Activities” as: the resources of its endowment by converting “Incorporated for broad charitable purposes, its to a grantmaking public charity. Today, NWF major current interests are child welfare and continues to fund grassroots organizations in intercultural and interracial relations.”34 By the underserved communities working to improve late 1950s, the foundation had become a major public schools, safeguard voting rights, foster supporter of the Highlander Folk School in Ten‐ economic fairness and protect the environ‐ nessee, which was started in the 1930s with a ment. Recent grantees include Kentuckians for focus on training labor organizers in the South, the Commonwealth, the Colorado Immigrant and for decades thereafter, Highlander, along Rights Coalition and the National Day Laborer with SRC, were the region’s only interracial Organizing Network, among others.28 leadership training centers. In 1953, Highlander began to focus more on civil rights and over the The Field Foundation next 15 years trained thousands of movement activists including, , Fannie Lou The Field Foundation was established in Chicago Hamer and . The Field Foundation in 1940 by Marshall Field III, publisher of the was perhaps the biggest single funder of High‐

7 lander during this period.35 Lewis, one of the ants at SCLC. Years later, Young would serve as original , SNCC director and an the United States’ U.N. ambassador nand the influential member of Congress for almost 30 mayor of Atlanta. CEP worked closely with SCLC years, attests to the effectiveness of High‐ and graduated a disproportionate number of lander, where his training in 1958 as a college the Black ministers who formed the backbone sophomore taught him skills, widened his con‐ of SCLC’s power in the South. Decades later, tacts and deepened his resolve to go into the Young recalled of the program, “We trained movement. “I left Highlander on fire,” he re‐ more than 6,000 people from 11 states to run counted.36 In many ways, SNCC was an out‐ classes and learn the tactics of nonviolent ac‐ growth of Highlander in that most of SNCC’s tion, and they became the heroes of the civil founders trained there and SNCC thereafter rights movement.''40 Leslie Dunbar, who as frequently used Highlander as place for confer‐ head of SRC, worked closely with all the move‐ ences and staff retreats. ment’s leadership organiza‐ tions, agrees that CEP was By 1960, Field’s very effective. Dunbar esti‐ endowment had grown to Philanthropy had an op‐ mates the Field Foundation a considerable $33 invested up to $140,000 per million.37 Field used its portunity to build on its year into the program during burgeoning wealth to the early 1960s.41 When increase investments in history of supporting Dunbar became the execu‐ the civil rights movement. tive director of the Field When Tennessee racial equity and justice. Foundation in 1965, he in‐ authorities closed creased those investments Highlander in 1961 on and worked with UCC to trumped‐up charges, the transfer administrative con‐ Field Foundation gave Highlander a special trol of CEP to SCLC, where the program became grant of $40,000 to move to new facilities.38 a major source of King’s budget during the final two years of his life.42 The new facilities would not permit Highlander to continue one of its major initiatives, the Citi‐ Perhaps the simplest proof of the Field Founda‐ zenship Education Program (CEP), because tion’s positive impact on the civil rights move‐ Highlander was under attack. In an effort not to ment was the decision of movement hero John allow the program to perish, and because of Lewis to work there in 1966 as associate direc‐ concerns about its own tax exempt status, Field tor, the first job he took after leading SNCC.43 helped fund transfer of the program’s admini‐ stration to the American Missionary Association In 1988, the Field Foundation, by design, spent 39 of the Congregational Church , most of which’s down the last of its funds and closed its doors. chapters eventually became part of the United Church of Christ (UCC). CEP taught literacy to The Stern Family Fund African American community leaders from across the South so they could pass Jim Crow The Stern Family Fund (SFF) was a family foun‐ hurdles to voting, but focused equally on lead‐ dation based in that operated ership training in nonviolent organizing. A from 1936–1986. The Stern family of New Or‐ young UCC minister named leans was wealthy, bute most of th foundation’s oversaw the project, but his able deputy Sep‐ endowment came from the Rosenwalds of Chi‐ tima Clark appears to have managed the pro‐ cago. was a part owner of gram on a daily basis, which freed Young to si‐ Sears, Roebuck and Company and heavily multaneously work as one of King’s key lieuten‐ funded Black colleges and schools through the

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Rosenwald Fund under de jure segregation. community and other welfare funds.”48 This Julius’ daughter, Edith, married Edgar Stern in mission statement aligned with one of SFF’s the 1930s and brought with her to New Orleans biggest investment in the civil rights movement: the bulk of the money that SFF would subse‐ the Voter Education Project (VEP), examined quently dispense. As the family patriarch, Edgar below. controlled the fund. He was relatively liberal by southern standards in that he spent much of his The fund practiced a kind of philanthropy that philanthropy on charity for African Americans. would be recognized today as best practice. In But as a son of the South (and indeed president terms of process, SFF performed significant due of the New Orleans Cotton Exchange), he basi‐ diligence before dispensing a grant. Explains cally supported segregation, so the fund made David Stern, Edith’s grandson, on the founda‐ no civil rights investments during his lifetime.44 tion's tradition of face‐to‐face interviews with applicants: Edith was much more progressive than her hus‐ band. She was a public leader in New Orleans "Unlike many foundations, the Stern for cleaner government (through activism in the Fund had grant applicants attend the League of Women Voters), integration of public meetings and make presentations to schools and voting rights for minorities, and was the entire board. There was lots of give an activist in the liberal wing of the Democratic and take, with board members asking Party both locally and nationally. Over the tough questions, such as, ‘The problem years, she hosted Eleanor Roosevelt, Sen. Adlai you describe is enormous and we make Stevenson and Sen. John F. Kennedy. Her activ‐ relatively modest grants. What differ‐ ism flowed from a passionate belief in democ‐ ence will our grant make? Explain why racy – that it can work only when all citizens our grant would not just be a pea under may fully participate and especially vote. She 127 mattresses?’ Discussions among persisted in her outspoken support for civil multiple generations and with multiple rights despite hate mail to the family’s home.45 grant applicants brought forth new ap‐ proaches for young philanthropists to When Edgar Sr. died in 1959, Edith and her chil‐ gain a deeper understanding of the is‐ dren changed the direction of the fund by in‐ sues their funding supported.”49 vesting in the civil rights work Edith had publicly supported for many years.46 They hired a young In terms of grantmaking strategy, SFF’s philan‐ staffer from the Ford Foundation, David Hunter, thropy was exemplary in that it focused on high as SFF’s executive director. According to impact, systemic solutions to empower margin‐ Hunter, Edith’s ideals guided the foundation alized communities and refrained from micro‐ thereafter: “Although the direct objects of its managing grantees.50 The Sterns also used their philanthropy have changed with changing considerable social clout in New Orleans to times, it has, from the beginning, been con‐ promote civil rights locally, working to persuade cerned with fostering democracy, helping to the city’s white elites that integration lay in the improve the life of people in the lower reaches city’s own economic self‐interest.51 The Sterns of our society.”47 paid a price for their idealism, especially for promoting school desegregation in New Or‐ The Foundation Directory summarized SFF’s leans; they faced social pressure and sometimes “Purpose and Activities” thus: “Grants have ostracism from other city patricians and even supported city and regional planning and public received anonymous threats of violence. “We administration, including studies of voting re‐ couldn’t let our kids out of the house,” recalled cords, nominating procedures and money in Edgar Stern Jr. “We had to have our phone politics; the fine arts; higher education; and taken out.”52

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John Lewis describes Stephen Currier as the The fund was a spend‐down foundation, a man “who had steered so much money toward strategy it inherited from Julius Rosenwald’s the movement through the Taconic Founda‐ philosophy of giving, and closed its doors in tion.”58 In 1961, Taconic pledged to LDF one of 1986.53 the biggest grants it had ever received: $75,000 to be paid over three years – a grant exemplary The Taconic Foundation not only for its size but also for the fact it was multi‐year and general operating support.59 Stephen Currier and Audrey Bruce, granddaugh‐ Currier also solicited other foundations to do‐ ter of Andrew W. Mellon, met while under‐ nate to civil rights organizations and succeeded graduate students at Harvard and Radcliffe, re‐ in raising about $200,000 this way.60 But Ta‐ spectively, and married in 1955 during her sen‐ conic’s main contribution to the movement was ior year. Audrey was one of wealthiest women the personal leadership role Currier played in in America, with a fortune estimated at $700 coordinating VEP, examined below. million, and Stephen had inherited significant wealth in his own right. After graduation, they With the exception of LDF, none of the other decided to donate, while living, the bulk of their most important civil rights groups were vast wealth to philanthropic causes, especially (501)(c)(3) (hereafter c3) nonprofit organiza‐ to promote civil rights. Stephen made most of tions and thus they relied mostly on non‐c3 the grantmaking decisions and Audrey mostly funding. For this reason, Currier also raised sig‐ concentrated on raising their three children. nificant non‐c3 dollars for SCLC, SNCC, NAACP, They personally fundraised from their wealthy CORE and the (even friends, and also made grants through the Ta‐ though the latter organization did not engage in conic Foundation, which they created in 1958 civil rights advocacy). As a first step, Currier with an endowment of $7 million.54 The cou‐ convened a meeting in June 1963 of donors and ple’s decision to use Audrey’s inheritance to organizations at the Taconic Foundation’s New fund civil rights caused tension with her conser‐ York office, at which he recommended forma‐ vative parents.55 tion of a Council for United Civil Rights Leader‐ ship (CUCRL) to raise and apportion big non‐c3 The 1960 Foundation Directory describes Ta‐ contributions among the organizations. “No one conic’s “Purpose and Activities” as: “Grants for dissented from his plan,” reports Garrow. “It charitable, educational, scientific and religious was all but certain to provide each of the or‐ purposes; to conduct studies concerning the ganizations with funds they otherwise would above matters and to push or distribute on a not receive.”61 Thereafter, Currier organized nonprofit basis the results of such studies to regular fundraising breakfasts at the Carlyle Ho‐ tax‐exempt organizations and to the general tel. Greenberg, by this time the executive direc‐ public. Present grants emphasize child welfare, tor of LDF, underlined the importance of these mental health and intergroup relations.”56 Ta‐ gatherings: conic’s mission statement explains its pioneer‐ ing status in policies to promote the welfare of “In mid‐1963, when an assassin mur‐ poor children during the same years as it dered Medgar Evers in Jackson and funded civil rights work, notably a program in bombs went off in Birmingham, Harlem that became precursor for Head Start.57 Stephen [Currier] held a fundraising As for civil rights, Taconic was the most impor‐ breakfast for the principal civil rights tant philanthropic partner in VEP, a project that organizations at the Carlyle, one of New fit Taconic’s emphasis on “studies concerning … York’s most elegant hotels, inviting intergroup relations.” people to whom we would not other‐ wise have had access. The event was at‐

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tended by wealthy people we had never group there, from the Urban league to seen before, and others who repre‐ the SCLC, wound up with at least sented corporations and foundations; $100,000. We on the other hand, re‐ the goal was to raise $1.5 million. Noth‐ ceived $15,000. Then again there was ing of this sort ever had come out of the always a current of distrust about ‘establishment.’ Heads of civil rights or‐ money in SNCC. Along with an under‐ ganizations took turns at the podium standing that we needed it, there was and explained nthe situatio of Black always a certain concern about strings people to a group who, until then, had that might be attached, about control been largely oblivious to the problems over ourselves versus control by others. … the breakfasts introduced us to new If it ever came to a choice between audiences and raised the level of giv‐ money or our independence there was ing.”62 no question which we would choose.”65

Pledges at the breakfast and soon thereafter To his credit, Currier did not impose allocations amounted to $565,000.63 During the next two but respectfully let the groups work them out years, it seems that CUCRL raised another $1 among themselves. Lewis terms the money million or so (for a cumulative total of about “significant,” admits SNCC needed it, and states $12 million in current dollars).64 After each that the strings SNCC feared might be attached breakfast, the organizations divvied up the to it were in fact nonexistent. In short, the phi‐ morning’s take, which unavoidably caused ten‐ lanthropy was certainly helpful. sions, as John Lewis of SNCC relates: After passage of the Civil Rights Act and Voting “A series of ‘civil rights breakfasts’ were Rights Act, funds began to dry up and CUCRL set up by a man named Stephen Cur‐ disbanded in 1966.66 Normally, an unincorpo‐ rier, who was president of the Taconic rated coalition that lasts only three years and Foundation. Currier was married to a raises about $1.6 million would not attract member of the Mellon family, he was much historical attention. But some of that very wealthy and he was very enthusi‐ money unquestionably represented funds that astic about the cause of civil rights. would not otherwise have gone to the civil [James] Forman [of SNCC] and I went to rights movement and that $1.6 million ($12 mil‐ the first of these breakfasts. Currier had lion in today’s dollars) helped the cash‐strapped raised $800,000[,] which was pledged leadership organizations in the decisive years of to all our organizations collectively un‐ the struggle. der the banner title of the Council on United Civil Rights Leadership. A for‐ Tragically, Audrey and Stephen Currier died in a mula was worked out, mainly by Roy plane crash in the Caribbean in 1967.67 Zunz Wilkins [executive secretary of the writes, “In their short lives, they had shown NAACP] that determined each group’s how philanthropists could change the American share of the money based on its existing political landscape.”68 budget. This, of course, guaranteed that the groups that already had money – Most of Taconic’s grantmaking was funded not groups like Wilkins’ NAACP – got the by the endowment but by annual contributions biggest chunks. As for us, well, we were from the Curriers into the foundation. Conse‐ at the bottom of the barrel. We were quently, following the Curriers’ death in 1967, considered the kids, the upstarts, and Taconic was forced to decrease its grantmaking we were given peanuts compared with by roughly 75 percent.69 With a shrunken what the others received. Every other budget, Taconic continued to fund some na‐

11 tional organizations but narrowed its focus to mental and social well‐being, and that help con‐ mostly community development in disadvan‐ trol those forces that affect their lives.” taged neighborhoods in New York City. By design, the foundation spent the last of its en‐ The Voter Education Project (VEP) dowment in 2012.70 One of its final grants funded “Taconic Fellowships” at various New These four foundations were the major backers York and national organizations to promote of a very important, collaborative initiative of community development71 and social jus‐ tice.72

As noted earlier, it is likely that there were It is likely that there were many other many other grantmaking institutions that provided important funding for the Civil grantmaking institutions that provided Rights Movement. However in researching the time period examined in this writing, important funding for the Civil Rights these four grantmakers made significant con‐ tributions that were documentable. Many Movement. foundations have internal documents that were inaccessible. The summary of the Nor‐ man Foundation, a family foundation that the civil rights movement called the Voter Edu‐ provided much‐needed funding to the Civil cation Project (VEP). As noted above, when Rights Movement, that follows was one of the Kennedy took office in early 1961, he had no few examples found from documents that are intention of pushing civil rights legislation. But not publically available. during his first six months in office, the fre‐

quency and intensity of white racist violence The Norman Foundation provided support for against peaceful Freedom Riders and against civil rights as early as 1935. Groups that re‐ nonviolent sit‐ins across the South created ceived funding included the NAACP, the Urban enormous pressure on the president to do more League and the ACLU. The foundation’s small for civil rights and to protect nonviolent pro‐ grants provided crucial monies to the Move‐ testers. It was in this context that, in June of ment in its formative stages. It also continued 1961, Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy and funding the NAACP at a higher level over the his team at the Justice Department reached out next 50 years and provided the Congress of Ra‐ to the leading civil rights organizations and to cial Equality (CORE) with a $35,000 loan fund these four foundations, especially Taconic, urg‐ administered by the organization in 1961. In all, ing them to put less effort into protests and the foundation made over $100,000 in grants to more effort into a collaborative voter registra‐ CORE. The Norman Foundation also provided tion drive in the South. critical funding to SNCC, the SRC and the Voter

Education Project (VEP – see below). Southern Unstated in Robert Kennedy’s pitch to the Echo, one of the most prominent civil rights in‐ groups was his expectation that Black voter reg‐ stitutions in the South, was founded in part by istration, unlike demonstrations, would not funding from this grantmaker. The foundation provoke white violence, which in turn would continues to build on its tradition of supporting take political pressure off the administration to equity and justice and supporting community “do something about civil rights.” Also unstated organizing. It’s vision is perhaps best summa‐ was the attorney general’s assumption that rized in its public guidelines: “We support ef‐ most newly registered Black voters in the South forts that strengthen the ability of communities would probably vote Democratic, at least in to determine their own economic, environ‐

12 presidential elections. Robert Kennedy argued years from 1962–1964 (roughly $8 million in to the groups that voter registration would current dollars), which was tremendously help‐ strike at the root cause of the problem – Black ful for organizations struggling to meet payroll political disenfranchisement – as opposed to and cover legal costs. VEP funds covered fully symptoms like segregated lunch counters and 25 percent of SNCC’s total budget in 1962.80 bus terminals. And he pointed out that the fed‐ eral government had more legal tools to en‐ The funders and organizations decided that the force voting rights than integration, so such ef‐ grants should be administered by the SRC. From forts would enjoy more federal protection in a legal standpoint, nonpartisan voter registra‐ the unlikely event of violence.73 tion was clearly lawful c3 activity and perceived as such at that time. Thus, the four foundations The funders enthusiastically agreed to the at‐ were much more comfortable funding it than torney general’s proposal and thereafter Currier more controversial activities such as sit‐ins.81 played the role of coordinator among the foun‐ But none of the frontline organizations were c3s dations.74 The civil rights groups also agreed to and there seems to have been confusion among participate for three reasons.75 the philanthropic community about whether or not foundations were allowed to fund non‐c3 First, they agreed that voter registration, by organizations directly (under current law, it is building Black political power, would advance clear that foundations can fund non‐c3 organi‐ the goals of the movement. But contrary to zations). The foundations thus believed there Robert Kennedy’s hopes, they had no intention needed to be a c3 intermediary that could dis‐ of letting voter registration divert efforts from pense the money to the groups, not as grantees the sit‐ins and other nonviolent protests they but as contractors. All parties involved believed were already staging with so much success. it would be legal for SRC, as a c3 organization and the sole grantee, to do so. Nevertheless, Second, they understood the South much bet‐ the attorney general obtained from IRS Com‐ ter than did the Bostonian Kennedy and thus missioner Mortimer Caplin a “special dispensa‐ knew that voter registration drives in Dixie tion” for SRC to disburse foundation money to would provoke at least as much newsworthy the non‐c3 contractors. There was nothing fur‐ white violence as did sit‐ins, marches and Free‐ tive about this approach: the parties acknowl‐ dom Rides.76 edged it publicly, and SRC’s Leslie W. Dunbar discussed the matter personally with IRS offi‐ Third, all the groups desperately needed cials in advance of the project as part of the ap‐ money. SCLC was chronically short of cash.77 proval process.82 SNCC was in even worse shape. As John Lewis relates, when he was promoted to director in Another reason the SRC was chosen as the sole the spring of 1963, “SNCC had no money to grantee was that it added value to the project. speak of. We had one full‐time staffer [in Dunbar insisted that not all the money auto‐ SNCC’s Atlanta headquarters], a student from matically go to the four national organizations, Kentucky State named Ed King, who manned a and he in fact gave some to smaller, local tiny, dingy one‐room office.”78 Outside head‐ groups he thought better able to register voters quarters, “SNCC staff members [in the field] in specific localities.83 Moreover, the project commonly only had $30 per month for all per‐ was conceived from the start to have a strong sonal and office expenses for a countywide research component – exactly SRC’s forte. [voter registration] pilot project. Payroll checks, , who was hired at SRC shortly which were sent out sporadically at best, often after VEP’s launch and later headed the Na‐ went to the wrong person.”79 VEP offered tional Urban League and became an influential about $1 million to these groups over the three adviser to President Bill Clinton, reports that,

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“The VEP funded national and local groups that Taconic, Field and SFF put up most of the were trying to register Black voters. Those money for VEP93 and NWF also contributed.94 groups would then report back to us on their Dunbar estimates VEP’s total funding at about efforts: how many people were successfully $325,000 annually from 1962–1964. These registered, how many tried and were thwarted, same foundations also funded SRC with general and why and how they were turned away.”84 operating grants (as did the Rockefeller Broth‐ This strong research component made the pro‐ ers Fund, which gave a single, small contribu‐ ject consonant with Taconic’s mission state‐ tion to VEP to help terminate the program in ment emphasizing “studies concerning … inter‐ 1964).95 Foundation grants accounted for VEP’s group relations.”85 While VEP did not succeed in entire budget and about half of SRC’s budget at registering as many voters as planned, its me‐ that time.96 ticulous research findings helped make the case for the 1965 VRA and informed specific provi‐ Dunbar wanted to achieve the goals of the pro‐ sions of the act because it provided lawmakers ject in a way that built power for the move‐ with more hard facts about the worst localities ment. “Anything we did at SRC was predicated and the mechanics of voter suppression.86 on the conviction that the leadership [of the project] was Black, and that our role was to be Third, foundations and organizations all viewed supportive of their leadership, but somewhat SRC as an honest broker to disburse and admin‐ independent of it, in the sense that we could be ister the money.87 During his many years at critical, and also in the sense that we could SRC, Dunbar, a white West Virginian, had built a sometimes help avoid mistakes. … From the multiracial staff and won the trust of the heads time we set up the Voter Education Project, it of the frontline civil rights organizations.88 seemed very clear to me that the Southern Re‐ Lewis of SNCC described Dunbar as “a political gional Council's main role, during the tough scientist with a tremendous interest in race re‐ days of the early sixties, was to help the Black lations – just a good, decent human being.”89 organizations, specifically through VEP, but in That VEP would be directly managed by Wiley other ways too.”97 Stanton, the Black Arkansas lawyer who had won fame for his skillful legal representation of In its first year, it appeared that VEP might fail the “,” the teenagers who had because the groups had little experience in integrated Central High School in 1957, added voter registration, did a poor job tracking re‐ to the groups’ confidence in SRC.90 At the key sults and faced ferocious white resistance and meeting of funders and organizations where violence. The last was especially the case in VEP was launched, King himself made the mo‐ Mississippi, where dozens of activists were tion to give SRC the role of project administra‐ beaten and some murdered. Thus, the VEP con‐ tor.91 tractors had paltry results to show by the end of 1962 in terms of newly registered voters. To its The funders – mostly northerners with limited credit, SRC worked with grantees to improve knowledge of the South – had the good sense performance and reporting, even temporarily to delegate oversight of this complex grant to cutting off SCLC’s payments until it improved its an indigenous, mostly Black organization with administration.98 King thereafter made VEP deep knowledge of and contacts in the region. more of a personal priority,99 a fact that almost The funders made no effort to micromanage certainly helped improve SCLC’s overall man‐ SRC. “I didn't take direction from foundations,” agement. reports Dunbar. “I can truthfully say that the Field Foundation and Taconic left me com‐ VEP’s experience in Mississippi offers a good pletely alone.”92 example to today’s funders about the impor‐ tance of eschewing rigidly numerical definitions

14 of a project’s success. At the outset of VEP, international media, thus keeping the Stanton worked with the groups to divide voter pressure on a reluctant federal gov‐ registration territory based on local organiza‐ ernment to legislate a solution.102 tional strength. But Mississippi was a special  The 1964 was case because the national leadership of the strongly concentrated in Mississippi, strongest group there, NAACP, opposed trying where hundreds of northern college to register voters in Mississippi, presumably students (many of them white, includ‐ because they viewed it as dangerous and futile ing Schwerner and Goodman), worked work. Yet, NAACP’s own local chapters, led by within COFO, which was dispensing the state branch director Medgar Evers, were al‐ last of its VEP funds. Their presence at‐ ready working closely with SNCC and, to a lesser tracted swarms of media, which in turn extent, CORE to register voters. So these local showed the country an idealistic, multi‐ actors, at the urging of VEP, created in 1962 a racial, all‐American crusade to defend new nonprofit organization in that state, the constitutional rights against mob vio‐ Council of Federated Organizations (COFO), to lence and Klan terror.103 accept funding from VEP to register Black voters  COFO facilitated cross‐organizational, and in this way evade the veto of the national cross‐racial and cross‐generational col‐ NAACP.100 After all, how could the national staff laboration that germinated the Missis‐ at NAACP object if some of its unpaid Missis‐ sippi Freedom Democratic Party sippi members put on a COFO hat to accept VEP (MFDP), led by , and money to register voters? its historic challenge to unseat Missis‐ sippi’s all‐white, segregationist delega‐ NAACP’s national leadership was proved correct tion to the 1964 Democratic Conven‐ about the danger of trying to register voters in tion. The media circus caused by this Mississippi: in 1963, its state director Evers was challenge deeply embarrassed Presi‐ assassinated; in 1964, CORE volunteers James dent Johnson and kept the pressure on Chaney, Andrew Goodman and Michael the Democrats to go further than the Schwerner were murdered there. The NAACP’s CRA, which they had just enacted, by national leadership was also proved correct also enacting the VRA one year later.104 about the impossibility of registering Black vot‐ ers in Mississippi. By late 1963, VEP in effect VEP’s efforts elsewhere in the Deep South met agreed with the NAACP and decided to cease with only slightly less resistance and violence funding COFO for lack of results in terms of than in Mississippi. “There was no separation newly registered voters (but VEP continued to between [direct] action and voter registration,” fund voter registration elsewhere in the explains Lewis. “Southern states were riddled South).101 with legal obstacles to keep Black men and women from voting – poll taxes, literacy tests. Yet, COFO’s seeming failures masked historic But those states were perfectly willing to resort successes for the movement: to terrorism as well … We would learn almost immediately that voter registration was as  COFO furnished yet more ironclad proof threatening to the entrenched white establish‐ – all meticulously documented by ment in the South as sit‐ins or Freedom Rides, SNCC’s and sent to the Jus‐ and that it would prompt the same violent re‐ tice Department – of the impossibility sponse.”105 Besides garnering media attention, of registering African Americans to vote white resistance in the South proved to be a in the Deep South in the face of savage blessing in disguise for the movement in an‐ white violence. The mass arrests, beat‐ other respect. The experience of being denied ings and murders were covered by the registration often had a healthy, radicalizing

15 effect on volunteers. A CORE report to VEP de‐ Amount and Patterns of Foundation Support scribing work in Louisiana noted, “[The local for the Civil Rights Movement activists] are moving beyond purely a ‘VEP out‐ look,’ and are beginning to see the necessity for From 1955‐65, the four foundations and, to a using direct non‐violent tactics against the reg‐ lesser extent, a few other philanthropies pro‐ istrar and the white power structure.” Con‐ vided an estimated total of $4 million for the versely, solidarity and relationships created dur‐ civil rights advocacy examined in this paper ing campaigns often led later on to (which in current dollars translates into $31 mil‐ coordinated voter registration efforts.106 lion), with most of that money disbursed after 1961.113 This excludes the approximately $1.6 The VEP helped the movement in other ways. million in non‐c3 dollars Currier raised under Voter registration attempts were key to spark‐ the aegis of CUCRL. ing white backlash against SNCC in Selma, Ala., in 1964, a confrontation that drew King to that These philanthropic pioneers and their modest city and which, in turn, led to the joint but helpful grants were followed later in the SNCC/SCLC decision to launch the historic 1960s by many more grantmakers, notably the March from Selma to Montgomery in early Ford Foundation, and many more millions of 1965, one of the fundamental events ensuring grant dollars invested in civil rights not only for that federal lawmakers would enact the 1965 African Americans, but also Native Americans, VRA. Voter registration drives were also the Latinos and women.114 main sparks that started mass actions in Albany, Ga., and Greenwood, Miss., both hallowed bat‐ The four foundations demonstrated some strik‐ tlegrounds for the movement and heavily cov‐ ing similarities. ered by the media.107 All four were small to midsize family founda‐ VEP did in fact register voters. Despite its slow tions with endowments of less than $10 million start in 1962 and COFO’s inability to register dollars ($77 million in current dollars). Note the voters in Mississippi, VEP registered 287,000 caveat that the Field Foundation’s endowment new voters in the following two years, mostly in began in that range but grew to $33 million by the Upper South.108 The four foundations pro‐ 1960, placing it at the borderline between the filed continued their courageous support of this midsize and big private foundations of that era. hugely controversial and history‐making project This finding does not match the pattern in con‐ until its scheduled termination at the end of temporary philanthropy of bigger foundations 1964.109 VEP was originally conceived as a more often funding social justice organizations three‐year program to run from 1962 through than midsize foundations.115 It follows that 1964, with resumption possible after an ap‐ analyses of large national funders should not be praisal of lessons learned.110 VEP was indeed considered the exclusive method of determin‐ restarted in 1966 and continued to operate for ing success in philanthropic endeavors, particu‐ many years thereafter. In the late 1960s under larly as they relate to movement building. Vernon Jordan111 and the 1970s under John Lewis,112 VEP registered millions of new voters The endowments of the four foundations came and helped ensure proper implementation of from northern, commercial fortunes made in the VRA. the late 19th or early 20th centuries and the grants were dispensed mostly by northerners. These grantmakers, then, fall into one of the best‐known motifs of American history: inter‐ mittent waves of Yankee pressure on a defiant South to abandon political arrangements the

16 rest of the country finds oppressive and abhor‐ But the foundation support examined in this rent. This should serve as a significant incentive paper was helpful for the cash‐strapped organi‐ to regionally focused funders. Recognizing his‐ zations that led the movement. When we con‐ torical patterns offers a significant potential to sider that this funding flowed during the precise bolster impact and address long‐standing struc‐ decade when systemic progress had finally be‐ tural barriers to equity. come possible; that the CRA of 1964 greatly strengthened equality under law not only for In three of the four foundations (Stern, Field African Americans but for all communities of and New World) most of the investments in civil color and women; that this same powerful rights advocacy became possible only after a movement pushed lawmakers to enact the male “head of household” died and control of equally historic VRA one year later; that the the foundation passed to his more progressive VRA protected the suffrage not only for African widow or children. Americans but many other underserved popula‐ tions; and that these two reforms together fig‐ VEP was a complex project that required con‐ ure among the most far‐reaching domestic siderable knowledge and intensive collabora‐ emancipatory victories in American history, it tion with the frontline organizations. Recogniz‐ seems clear that the courageous and intelligent ing their limitations of knowledge and staff, the philanthropy examined in this paper ranks four foundations wisely outsourced this task to among the most effective and strategic domes‐ the SRC, which in turn invested the money in a tic foundation grantmaking of the 20th century. manner surprisingly consonant with the best of today’s “strategic philanthropy.” SRC worked But the longevity of this glorious victory is today with the contractors to formulate numerical in peril. It is cruelly ironic that in this 50th anni‐ goals and then held them accountable while versary year of the enactment of the CRA – a helping them to improve administration, per‐ year when Americans should be celebrating – formance and record‐keeping. we instead witness renewed voter suppression on two ominous fronts. First, ever more states However, at strong variance with the shortcom‐ and localities are passing laws to suppress mi‐ ings of today’s “strategic philanthropy,” these nority voting by creating new hurdles to suf‐ four foundations invested in an uncertain and frage such as requiring valid government‐issued extremely controversial movement of the op‐ photo ID and proof of U.S. citizenship to regis‐ pressed themselves that aimed (and succeeded) ter and to vote, and abolishing same‐day regis‐ through nonviolent civil disobedience to pro‐ tration and voting, among many other new bar‐ voke white violence in the streets as the only riers.118 way to pressure federal lawmakers to enact historic, emancipatory reform.116 Moreover, last year, the Supreme Court in Shelby County v. Holder mostly nullified VRA by striking down its most important clause. Specifi‐ IV. Today’s Foundations and the New As‐ cally, the court ruled unconstitutional the re‐ sault on Voting Rights quirement for the nine (mostly southern) states covered by VRA to obtain “preclearance” from The civil rights movement got most of its money the federal government before instituting from non‐foundation sources such as member‐ changes in local election law. In the majority ship dues,117 and its most effective weapons opinion, Chief Justice John G. Roberts asserted were the thousands of nonviolent protesters, that “largely because of the Voting Rights Act, overwhelmingly African American, who put voting tests [in the covered states] were abol‐ their bodies on the line, in addition to Martin ished, disparities in voter registration and turn‐ Luther King Jr.’s inspired leadership. out due to race were erased, and African

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Americans attained political office in record ter, in 2010, larger family foundations and in‐ numbers."119 But as Justice Ruth Bader Gins‐ dependent foundation gave about 10 and 12 burg rightly points out in the dissent, these percent of grant dollars respectively toward same states had a well‐documented history social justice.122 These percentages likely over‐ ever since enactment of VRA of continually at‐ estimate the proportion of grant dollars that tempting new changes in election law that are specifically for civil rights because Founda‐ would unconstitutionally disenfranchise non‐ tion Center data, the only reliable information whites – gambits thwarted only by VRA. As she available, broadly includes all social action, writes, "The court appears to believe that the community improvement and development, VRA’s success in eliminating the specific devices philanthropy and voluntarism, and public affairs extant in 1965 means that preclearance is no in same category. There is significant need for longer needed. … As the record for [Congress’] funding direct action with and by local commu‐ 2006 reauthorization makes abundantly clear, nities that explicitly addresses structural inequi‐ second‐generation barriers to minority voting ties. rights have emerged in the covered jurisdictions as attempted substitutes for the first‐ Additionally, there is a lack of data around giv‐ generation barriers that originally triggered ing by small‐to‐midsize foundations in support preclearance in those jurisdictions.”120 of civil rights. To effectively support today’s civil rights movement, the sector must work to track Only an act of Congress can reinstate preclear‐ giving from many grantmaking entities as possi‐ ance on these states. But the court’s decision ble to provide a holistic picture of current stipulates that any such reauthorization create trends in institutional philanthropy. a coverage formula different than the old one. Congress seems uncertain how or whether to There are three approaches that today’s foun‐ revive the VRA. dations can learn from the Freedom Funders in our ongoing fight to protect civil rights. First, Today’s grantmakers must build on the legacy grantmakers should intentionally prioritize un‐ begun by the four foundations examined in this derserved communities in developing and im‐ paper, and do their part to help repel this latest plementing strategy. Second, they should in‐ assault on our democracy. volve those most affected by injustice, such as by funding organizations committed to grass‐ A number of civil rights organizations, through roots organizing and advocacy. And third, they litigation and public education, are making a should utilize tools such as equity analysis to vigorous case right now against voter suppres‐ examine structural barriers that keep certain sion at the state level and in favor of reauthori‐ communities from equal life opportunities. Any‐ zation of the VRA. Building on its prior legacy, thing less and foundations risk reinforcing the the Carnegie Corporation is part of a funder very inequities they claim to address. collaborative providing funds to the State Infra‐ structure Fund (SIF) housed at Public Interest Projects. Specifically, Carnegie is funding the Shelby Response Fund which “will promote ef‐ forts that guarantee eligible voters have equal and unburdened access to the ballot.”121

However, data shows that institutional philan‐ thropy’s support of efforts to promote civil rights comprises a mere fraction of overall grantmaking: According to the Foundation Cen‐

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About the Author Sean Dobson, president of Dobson Consulting, holds a PhD in history from Columbia University. Formerly, he served as field director of the Na‐ tional Committee for Responsive Philanthropy (NCRP), executive director of Progressive Mary‐ land and advisor for communications and strat‐ egy in President Bill Clinton’s National Economic Council.

Acknowledgements The author thanks NCRP’s staff, especially Re‐ search and Policy Director Niki Jagpal, for very helpful edits on earlier drafts. A special thanks also to Joe Scantlebury for his thoughtful review of this paper.

Image information: (Clockwise starting from top left) Civil Rights March on Washing‐ ton, D.C. [Leaders of the march posing in front of the statue of Abraham Lincoln, Lincoln Memorial], courtesy of the U.S. National Archives. Volunteers assist with voter registration in Americus, Georgia, on August 9, 1965, courtesy of the U.S. State Depart‐ ment.“Freedom Riders” hang anti‐segregation signs from bus windows, courtest of the U.S. State Department. Congress of Ra‐ cial Equality march in Washington DC on 22 September 1963 in memory of the children killed in the Birmingham bombings, cour‐ tesy of the Library of Congress.President Lyndon B. Johnson sign‐ ing the 1964 Civil Rights Act, courtesy of the National Park Service.

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Endnotes Americans, Black economic self‐help and incubated 1 Michael J. Klarman, "Why Massive Resistance?" anti‐poverty programs that later influenced (and UVA School of Law, Public Law Working Paper No. went to scale in) President Johnson’s Great Society. 03‐7, May 2003, After 1965, when McGeorge Bundy took over as http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id president, Ford invested in civil rights advocacy (and =410062. indeed on a massive scale) and also greatly increased 2 Leadership Conference on Civil Rights, “Key its investments in other programs to benefit Ameri‐ Supreme Court Cases for Civil Rights,” cans of color. Mary McClymont, et al., Many Roads http://www.civilrights.org/judiciary/supreme‐ to Justice: the Law‐Related Work of the Ford Founda‐ court/key‐cases.html. tion Grantees Around the World (New York: Ford 3 On the essential hollowness of the 1957 Civil Rights Foundation, 2000), p. 91; Ford Foundation, Civil Act, see Taylor Branch, Parting the Waters: America Rights, Social Justice and Black America: A Review of in the King Years 1954–63 (New York: Simon & Past and Current Ford Foundation Efforts to Promote Schuster, 1988), p. 143ff., 220–221. Robert A. Caro, Racial Justice for Black Americans in Employment, Master of The Senate: The Years of Lyndon Johnson Housing, Political Participation and Other Areas (New York: Vintage, 2002), p.779, 841ff. (New York: Ford Foundation, 1984), pp. 5–10. For a 4 Caro, Master, Chapters 1‐3. more critical perspective on Bundy’s presidency, see 5 Branch, passim, especially pp. 414–415, 469–470; Karen Ferguson, Top Down: The Ford Foundation, , Standing Fast: The Autobiography of Black Power and the Reinvention of Racial Liberalism Roy Wilkins (New York: Viking, 1982), pp. 272–295; (Philadelphia: University of Penn. Press, 2013), p. John Lewis, Walking With the Wind: A Memoir of the 64ff. 18 Movement (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1998), pp. http://archive.org/stream/AmericanDilemmaTheN 129–198. egroProblemAndModernDemocracy/AmericanDele 6 Taylor Branch, Pillar of Fire: America in the King mmaVersion2_djvu.txt. 19 Years 1963–65 (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1998), Olivier Zunz, Philanthropy in America: A History pp. 3–20, 86ff., 96ff., 131, 163, 184ff., 200 ff., 312ff. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012), p. See also Manning Marable, Malcolm X: A Life of Re‐ 207ff. 20 invention (Penguin Group, 2011) New World Foundation, “Milestones: Founding 7 Branch, Parting, p. 673ff. Story”, http://newwf.org/milestones/founding‐ 8 Branch, Pillar, p. 560ff. story/. 21 9 Branch, Parting, p. 801ff.; Branch, Pillar, p. 88ff. Ibid. 22 10 Branch, Parting, p. 786; Branch, Pillar, p. 69ff. Ibid. 23 11 Branch, Parting, p. 828. Walton, et al., p. 416. 24 12 Branch, Parting, p. 822ff.; Branch, Pillar, p. 114. Jack Greenberg, Crusaders in the Courts: How a 13 Robert A. Caro, The Passage of Power: The Years Dedicated Band of Lawyers Fought for the Civil of Lyndon Johnson (New York: Knopf, 2012), p. 405; Rights Revolution (New York: Basic Books, 1994), p. Branch, Pillar, p. 178, 210. 375. 25 14Caro, Passage, pp. 452ff., 465, 488ff., 564ff., 668– New World Foundation, “1954–1974: Responsible 669. Wealth”, http://newwf.org/milestones/1954‐1974‐ 15 Caro, Passage, pp. 115 ff., 569 ff.; Taylor Branch, the‐founding‐era/. See also Vernon E. Jordan, Jordan At Canaan's Edge: America in the King Years, 1965– Can Read! A Memoir (New York: Public Affairs, 68 (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2006), p. 65ff. 2001), p. 167; and Greenberg, p. 377. 26 16 Ann D. Walton and F. Emerson Andrews, editors, Emily Stoper, The Student Nonviolent Coordinating The Foundation Directory, Edition 1, prepared by the Committee: The Growth of Radicalism in a Civil Foundation Library Center (New York: Russell Sage Rights Organization (Brooklyn: Carlson, 1989), pp. Foundation, 1960), p. X. 81, 177; and , In Struggle: SNCC 17 In the 1950s and early 1960s, 2.5 percent of the and the Black Awakening of the 1960s (Cambridge: Ford Foundation’s total grant dollars went to “mi‐ Harvard University Press, 1995), p. 41. 27 nority rights,” but it appears little or none of that “General Operating Support, Vol. 2: Assessing the went to civil rights advocacy. Instead, this program Impact,” (Washington, DC: Grantmakers for Effective at Ford invested mostly in education for African Organizations, 2008),

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http://www.geofunders.org/storage/documents/ass 38 Glenn T. Eskew, But for Birmingham: The Local and essing_the_impact_vol2.pdf. On multi‐year funding, National Movements in the Civil Rights Struggle see Niki Jagpal and Kevin Laskowski, “The State of (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, Multi‐Year Funding 2011,” (Washington, DC: 1997), p. 40. National Committee for Responsive Philanthropy, 39 John M. Glen, Highlander: No Ordinary School 2013), (Tennessee: University of Tennessee, 1996) . http://www.ncrp.org/files/publications/Philanthropi 40 Teltsch; Briscoe Center for American History. cLandscape‐StateofMultiYearFunding2011.pdf. 41 “Interview with Leslie W. Dunbar, December 18, 28 For NWF’s post‐1960s grantmaking, see New 1978,” Interview G‐0075, Southern Oral History World Foundation, “Milestones: Founding Story,” Program Collection (#4007), http://newwf.org/milestones/. NWF’s grantee list on http://docsouth.unc.edu/sohp/playback.html?base_ its IRS Income Tax Form 990 posted by GuideStar, file=G‐0075&duration=03:34:07. http://www.guidestar.org/FinDocuments/2012/131/ 42 “Interview with Leslie W. Dunbar.” See also 919/2012‐131919791‐0969d837‐9.pdf. “Interview with , July 30, 29 Kathleen Teltsch, "Field Foundation, Civil Rights 1976,” Pioneer, to Die at 49; Survivors Will Be Legion", New Interview G‐0017, Southern Oral History Program York Times, Feb. 19, 1989, Collection (#4007), http://www.nytimes.com/1989/02/19/us/field‐ http://docsouth.unc.edu/sohp/playback.html?base_ foundation‐civil‐rights‐pioneer‐to‐die‐at‐49‐ file=G‐0017; David J. Garrow, : survivors‐will‐be‐ Martin Luther King, Jr. and the Southern Christian legion.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm. See also Leadership Conference (New York: Perennial Classics, description of the Field Foundation’s archive at the 1999), pp. 149, 151, 197, 233. Briscoe Center for American History, University of 43 Lewis, p. 379. Texas, 44 Institute for Media Analysis, The Stern Fund: The http://www.lib.utexas.edu/taro/utcah/00091/cah‐ Story of a Progressive Foundation (New York: 00091.html. Institute for Media Analysis, 1992), pp. 1–15. 30 Greenberg, 23. 45 Gerda Weissmann Klein, A Passion for Sharing: The 31 Greenberg, pp. 23, 179, 211. Life of Edith Rosenwald Stern (Chappaqua, NY: 32 Ibid, p. 375. Rossell Books, 1984), p. 204ff. 33 Teltsch; Briscoe Center for American History. 46 Klein, p. 215ff. 34 Walton, et al., p. 358. The 1960 edition was the 47 Klein, p. 224. first iteration of the Foundation Directory and was 48 Ann D. Walton and Marianna O. Lewis, eds., The published by the Foundation Library Center, which Foundation Directory, Edition 2, (prepared by the had been created a few years previously. The Foundation Library Center) (New York: Russell Sage Directory was the first private effort to compile Foundation, 1964), p. 444. Here I quote from the comprehensive and reliable information about the edition after the inaugural 1960 edition because the approximately 12,000 foundations operating in the latter probably did not reflect SFF’s changed U.S. at that time. It reviewed public records, sent the priorities only one year after the death of Edgar, Sr. foundations questionnaires and then sent the 49 The Community Giving Resource, Neighborhood Directory’s galley proofs back to those foundations Funders Group, Smartlink: Where Donors Go for for edits before publication. Thus, in many cases, the Great Ideas, "Through Multiple Generations, Directory’s information about each foundation’s Rosenwald and Stern Families' Philanthropic “Purpose and Activities” is as close to a Mission Journey", http://archive.is/zBaxd. Many thanks to Statement ase on is likely to find today because Larry Ottinger for supplying this source. See also many of those foundations’ mid‐20th century tax Klein, p. 224. forms and foundational documents are impossible to 50 Institute for Media Analysis, pp. 42, 131. On the obtain. effectiveness of these types of strategies, see 35 Branch, Parting, pp. 121, 130, 207, 263, 289ff., research by the National Committee for Responsive 381, 468, 486ff., 538, 575, 634, 717, 818. Philanthropy (NCRP), http://ncrp.org/campaigns‐ 36 Lewis, p. 88ff. research‐policy. 37 Walton, et al., p. 358. 51 Institute for Media Analysis, pp. 55, 74.

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52 Institute for Media Analysis, p. 36. 74 Garrow, pp. 63, 161ff. 53 Maria Martinez‐Cosio and Mirle Rabinowitz 75 Ibid, p. 162. Bussell, Catalysts for Change: 21st Century 76 Ibid, p. 163. Philanthropy and Community Development (London: 77 Ibid, pp. 149, 151, 197, 233. Routledge, 2013), p. 38. 78 Lewis, p. 181. 54 Robert E. Baker, “Currier Estate to Help Others”, 79 Branch, Parting, p. 712. Washington Post News Service, February 9, 1967; 80 Ibid, p. 575ff. Dennis C. Dickerson, Militant Mediator: Whitney M. 81 Zunz, p. 208. Young Jr. (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 82 “Interview with Leslie W. Dunbar.” 1998), p. 232. 83 Ibid. 55 Zunz, p. 209. 84 Jordan,p. 175. 56 Walton, et al., The Foundation Directory, Edition 1, 85 Walton, et al., The Foundation Directory, Edition 1, p. 453. p. 453. 86 57 Zunz, p. 211. Jordan, p. 177. 87 58 Lewis, p. 271. Garrow, p. 163; Branch, Parting, p. 479ff. 88 59 Greenberg, p. 369. Jordan, p. 167ff. 89 60 Ibid. Lewis, p. 374. 90 61 Garrow, p. 270. Jordan, p. 175. 91 62 Greenberg, pp. 369–70. “Interview with Leslie W. Dunbar.” 92 63 Peter Kihss, "Joint Negro Council Allocates Ibid. 93 $565,000 to Rights Groups", New York Times, July Irving Bernstein, Promises Kept: JFK’s 18, 1963, p. 10. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), pp. 72– 64 August Meier, "Negro Protest Movements and 73. 94 Organizations," The Journal of Negro Education, Vol. New World Foundation, “1954–1974 – 32, No. 4 (Autumn, 1963), pp. 437–450. Responsible Wealth”, 65 Lewis, pp. 231–232. http://newwf.org/milestones/1954‐1974‐the‐ 66 Nina Mjagkij, ed., Organizing Black America: An founding‐era/. 95 Encyclopedia of African American Associations (New “Interview with Leslie W. Dunbar.” 96 York: Garland Publishing, 2001), p. 173–174. Ibid. See also See Jordan, p. 176. 97 67 Baker; Dickerson, p. 232. “Interview with Leslie W. Dunbar.” 98 68 Zunz, p. 210. Pat Watters and Reese Cleghorn, Climbing Jacob’s 69 Harold C. Fleming and Virginia Fleming, The Ladder: the arrival of the Negro in Southern Politics (New York: Harcourt, 1967), p. 48. Potomac Chronicles: Public Policy and Civil Rights 99 from Kennedy to Reagan (Athens, GA: University of Garrow, p. 233ff. 100 Branch, Parting, p. 634ff. Georgia Press, 2010), p. 173. 101 70 Sanford School of Public Policy, Duke University, Branch, Pillar, p. 163; Watters and Cleghorn, p. 48. “List of Spend‐Down Foundations (In Order of 102 Spend‐Down Date),” Branch, Pillar, pp. 50–75, 361–74, 389–95, 407– http://cspcs.sanford.duke.edu/content/list‐spend‐ 416. 103 Ibid, pp. 341–456. down‐foundations‐order‐spend‐down‐date. 104 71 Ibid, pp. 341–477. See for example the website of the Pratt Center, 105 http://prattcenter.net/apply‐now‐pratt‐center‐ Lewis, p. 181ff. 106 Watters and Cleghorn, p. 51. launches‐new‐fellowship‐program. 107 72 See for example the website of the Center for Ibid. 108 Haines, p. 155. Community Change, 109 http://www.communitychange.org/real‐ Branch, Parting, p. 492ff. 110 Watter and Cleghorn, pp. 46–47. people/fellowships/. 111 73 Branch, Parting, p. 479ff.; Herbert H. Haines, Black Jordan, p. 179ff. 112 Lewis, p. 413ff. Radicals and the Civil Rights Mainstream, 1954–1970 113 (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1989), p. Estimating is unavoidable due to the secrecy of 154ff. foundations of that era, rudimentary public tracking

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of grants during that period and poor record‐keeping Critical Perspectives on Philanthropy and Popular and archiving on the part of some of the grantees. Movements (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, On these and other methodological challenges, see 2005), p. 36ff. Haines, p. 112 ff. Jenkins finds that in 1960, 10 117 Haines, Appendix, Tables A2 (p. 190) and ff. foundations gave a total of $268,000 in 1960‐dollars 118American Civil Liberties Union, "The Battle to (which he reports as $874,000 in constant 1982–84 Protect the Ballot: Voter Suppression Measures dollars) to promote “social movements,” a rubric Passed Since 2013," that appears to include mostly civil rights advocacy. https://www.aclu.org/maps/battle‐protect‐ballot‐ Jenkins finds that this amount increased rapidly voter‐suppression‐measures‐passed‐2013. 118 For a every year thereafter during the 1960s and thus his comprehensive list of the status of proposed and finding (bearing in mind the methodological caveats passed legislation by states, see: above) does not contradict the estimate of http://ballotpedia.org/State_by_State_Voter_ID_La approximately $4 million in foundation money for ws. the civil rights movement from 1955–65. See Craig 119 Supreme Court of the United States, “Shelby Jenkins, "Social Movement Philanthropy and the County, Alabama v. Holder, Attorney General, et al.” Growth of Nonprofit Political Advocacy: Scope, (2013), Legitimacy, and Impact,” in Elizabeth J. Reid, Maria http://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/12‐ D. Montilla, eds. Exploring Organizations and 96. Advocacy: Strategies and Finances (Washington, DC: 120 Supreme Court of the United States, Dissent, The Urban Institute, 2001), p. 53. Shelby County, Alabama, Petitioner v. Erich Holder, 114 Haines, passim; Jenkins, p. 53ff. On the Ford Jr., Attorney General, et al., Foundation’s massive post‐1965 entry into civil http://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/12‐ rights funding, see McClymont, et al., p. 91; and Ford 96. Foundation, pp. 5–10. For some of the problematic 121 Raven Pease, “State Infrastructure Fund Expands: aspects of Ford’s investments, see Ferguson, passim. New Leadership and Resources for Voter Protection 115 Niki Jagpal and Kevin Laskowski, “The State of and Civic Engagement Work,” Social Justice Philanthropy 2011,” (Washington, DC: http://www.publicinterestprojects.org/featured/stat National Committee for Responsive Philanthropy, e‐infrastructure‐fund‐expands‐new‐leadership‐and‐ 2013), p.2, Fig. 3, resources‐for‐voter‐protection‐and‐civic‐ http://www.ncrp.org/files/publications/Philanthropi engagement‐work/. cLandscape‐ 122 See StateofSocialJusticePhilanthropy2011.pdf. http://foundationcenter.org/gainknowledge/researc 116 For assessments of contemporary strategic h/pdf/keyfacts_familyfdns2012.pdf. philanthropy see Niki Jagpal and Kevin Laskowski, Real Results: Why Strategic Philanthropy is Social Justice Philanthropy (Washington, DC: National Committee for Responsive Philanthropy, 2013), http://www.ncrp.org/paib/real‐results‐strategic‐ philanthropy; Gara LaMarche, “Speech: Reclaiming the Moral Life of Philanthropy”, http://www.atlanticphilanthropies.org/learning/spe ech‐reclaiming‐moral‐life‐philanthropy; Phil Buchanan and Aaron Dorfman, “'Strategy’ Is Not a Bad Word: It Is Essential Even to Grass‐Roots Movements,”NCRP Blog, June 18, 2013, http://blog.ncrp.org/2013/06/strategy‐is‐not‐bad‐ Freedom Funders: Philanthropy and the Civil Rights word‐it‐is.html. See also Susan A. Ostrander, “Legacy Movement, 1955‐1965 and Promise of Social Justice Funding: Charitable Foundations and Progressive Social Movements, Past © June 2014. National Committee for Responsive and Present”, in Daniel Faber and Deborah Philanthropy. All rights reserved. McCarthy, eds, Foundations for Social Change: www.ncrp.org

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