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The Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of Atheism Author(s): William L. Rowe Reviewed work(s): Source: American Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 16, No. 4 (Oct., 1979), pp. 335-341 Published by: University of Illinois Press on behalf of the North American Philosophical Publications Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20009775 . Accessed: 05/11/2011 14:40

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http://www.jstor.org American Philosophical Quarterly Volume 16, Number 4, October 1979

IX. THE PROBLEM OF EVIL AND SOME VARIETIES OF ATHEISM WILLIAM L. ROWE

was an paper is concerned with three interrelated of divine being or divine reality. Tillich not THIS questions. The first is : Is there an argument for atheist in the broad sense. But he was an atheist in atheism based on the existence of evil that may the narrow sense, for he denied that there exists a an rationally justify someone in being atheist? To divine being that is all-knowing, all-powerful and an answer terms this first question I give affirmative and perfectly good. In this paper I will be using the to answer a try support that by setting forth strong "theism," "theist," "atheism," "atheist," "agnos? for atheism on the existence of evil.1 in the narrow not in argument based ticism," and "agnostic" sense, The second question is: How can the theist best the broad sense. defend his position against the argument for atheism based on the existence of evil? In response to this I to describe what be an question try may adequate I rational defense for theism against any argument for atheism based on the existence of evil. The final In developing the argument for atheism based on question is: What position should the informed the existence of evil, it will be useful to focus on some our atheist take concerning the rationality of theistic particular evil that world contains in consider? belief? Three different answers an atheist may give able abundance. Intense human and animal suffer? to this question serve to distinguish three varieties of ing, for example, occurs daily and in great plenitude in our is a case atheism: unfriendly atheism, indifferent atheism, world. Such intense suffering clear of and friendly atheism. In the final part of the paper I evil. Of course, if the intense suffering leads to some discuss and defend the position of friendly atheism. greater good, a good we could not have obtained Before we the we we consider argument from evil, without undergoing the suffering in question, need to distinguish a narrow and a broad sense of the might conclude that the suffering is justified, but it terms a remains an we must not "theist," "atheist," and "agnostic." By evil nevertheless. For "theist" in the narrow sense I mean someone who confuse the intense suffering in and of itself with the believes in the an to or existence of omnipotent, omnis? good things which it sometimes leads of which it a or cient, eternal, supremely good being who created may be necessary part. Intense human animal a sense mean an the world. By "theist" in the broad I suffering is in itself bad, evil, even though itmay someone who believes in the existence of some sort of sometimes be justified by virtue of being a part of, or divine being or divine reality. To be a theist in the leading to, some good which is unobtainable without narrow sense is also to be a theist in the broad sense, it.What is evil in itself may sometimes be good as a but one may be a theist in the broad sense?as was means because it leads to something that is good in a itself. In a an Paul Tillich?without believing that there is such case, while remaining evil in itself, eternal the intense human or animal supremely good, omnipotent, omniscient, suffering is, neverthe? being who created the world. Similar distinctions less, an evil which someone might be morally must be made between a narrow and a broad sense of justified in permitting. the terms "atheist" and To an as a "agnostic." be atheist Taking human and animal suffering clear in the broad sense is to deny the existence of any sort instance of evil which occurs with great frequency in 1 Some philosophers have contended that the existence of evil is logically inconsistent with the existence of the theistic God. No one, I has succeeded in such an a think, establishing extravagant claim. Indeed, granted incompatibilism, there is fairly compelling argument for the view that the existence of evil is logically consistent with the existence of the theistic God. (For a lucid statement of this argument see Alvin Plantinga, God, Freedom, and Evil (New York, 1974), pp. 29-59.) There remains, however, what we may call the evidential form?as to the form?of the of evil: the view our opposed logical problem that the variety and profusion of evil in world, although not perhaps logically inconsistent with the existence of the theistic God, provides, nevertheless, rational support for atheism. In this paper I shall be concerned solely with the evidential form of the problem, the form of the problem which, I think, presents a rather severe difficulty for theism.

335 336 AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY

on not same as an our world, the argument for atheism based evil the permitting evil greater than s^ a state can be stated as follows : And this because the absence of good of affairs need not itself be an evil state of affairs. It is also i. There exist instances of intense which an suffering to that be such that it is omniscient could have important recognize sxmight omnipotent, being prevented OG G some or preventable by without losing (so condition (i) without thereby losing greater good per? some or is not but also such that if OG did mitting evil equally bad worse.2 satisfied) prevent G would be loss unless OG some evil 2. An omniscient, wholly good being would prevent the it, permitted to or worse than If this were it does not occurrence of any intense suffering it could, unless it equal s?. so, could not do so without some seem correct to that OG thereby losing greater require prevent sx. Thus, or some or worse. good permitting evil equally bad condition (ii) takes into account an important possibility not encompassed in condition (i). Is it true that if an an omniscient, wholly good being 3. There does not exist omnipotent, omniscient, the occurrence of some intense it wholly good being. permits suffering could have prevented, then either (i) or (ii) or (iii) are we What to say about this argument for atheism, obtains? It seems to me that it is true. But if it is true an based on the of one sort of argument profusion then so is premise (2) of the argument for atheism. our evil in world? The argument is valid ; therefore, more For that merely states in compact form we its premise if have rational grounds for accepting what we must true an have suggested be if omnis? to that extent we have rational for premises, grounds cient, wholly good being fails to prevent some atheism. Do we, have rational accepting however, intense suffering it could prevent. Premise (2) says for the of this grounds accepting premises argument? that an omniscient, wholly good being would Let be an Let's begin with the second premise. occurrence sx prevent the of any intense suffering it instance of intense human or animal which suffering could, unless it could not do so without thereby an omniscient, wholly being could prevent. We some or some evil good losing greater good permitting will also that are such that j will suppose things equally bad or worse. This premise (or something occur unless the prevented by omniscient, wholly not too distant from it) is, I think, held in common We be interested in good (OG) being. might by many atheists and nontheists. Of course, there what would be a condition of determining sufficient may be disagreement about whether something is OG to But, for our here, failing prevent ^. purpose good, and whether, if it is good, one would be we need to state a condition for OG only try necessary morally justified in permitting some intense suffering so seems to to prevent That condition, it to occur to failing sx. in order obtain it. Someone might hold, me, is this: no to for example, that good is great enough justify an to Either (i) there is some greater good, G, such that permitting innocent child suffer terribly.4 someone mere a G is obtainable by OG only if OG permits ^3, Again, might hold that the fact that or some and would be (ii) there is some greater good, G, such that G is given good outweighs suffering were not a obtainable by OG only if OG permits either s1 loss if the suffering prevented, is morally or some or sufficient reason for the But to evil equally bad worse, permitting suffering. of views not to For or (iii) s1 is such that it is preventable by OG only hold either these is deny (2). (2) an if OG permits some evil equally bad or worse. claims only that if omniscient, wholly good being some It is important to recognize that (iii) is not permits intense suffering then either there is a that would have been or some included in (i). For losing good greater than sl is greater good loss, 2 i reason no matter what ?. we the If there is some good. G. greater than any evil, ( )will be false for the trivial that evil. pick conjunctive E that an could not obtain it without good state of affairs consisting of G and E will outweigh and be such omnipotent being permitting To avoid this we insert into our E. (See Alvin Plantinga, God and Other Minds [Ithaca, 1967], p. 167.) objection may "unreplaceable" 1 "some" If E isn't for and G is better than G then the premises ( ) and (2) between and "greater." required G, plus E, good conjunctive of G alone. For the sake of I will state of affairs composed of G and E would be replaceable by the greater good simplicity, however, ignore of and this complication both in the formulation and discussion premises (1) (2). 3 with I don't mean to exclude the fulfillment of certain Three clarifying points need to be made in connection (i). First, by "good" certain actions the of I shall allow that the moral principles. Perhaps preventing s1 would preclude prescribed by principles justice. a that the evil of even I don't satisfaction of certain principles of justice may be good outweighs s1. Second, though (i) may suggest it, in time the occurrence we should not fault mean to limit the good in question to something that would follow o?s1. And, finally, perhaps were not than but such that and as OG if the good G, that would be loss s1 prevented, is actually greater sx, merely allowing sx G, opposed not reasons of I have left this to preventing s1 and thereby losing G, would alter the balance between good and evil. For simplicity, point a than it should be. out in stating (i), with the result that (i) is perhaps bit stronger 4 IV of The Brothers Karamazov. See Ivan's speech in Book V, Chapter THE PROBLEM OF EVIL AND SOME VARIETIES OF ATHEISM 337

equally bad or worse evil that would have occurred, on our part before we could lay claim to knowing that no to the fawn's had the intense suffering been prevented. (2) does there is greater good connected not to what be a in such a manner than an purport describe might sufficient suffering omnipotent, condition for an omniscient, wholly good being to omniscient being could not have achieved that good what a or some permit intense suffering, only is necessary without permitting that suffering evil condition. So seems to a belief or worse. So the case of the fawn's stated, (2) express equally bad that accords with our basic moral not us to principles, prin? suffering surely does enable establish the ciples shared by both theists and nontheists. If we are truth of ( i ). to for it seems we are not a to fault the argument atheism, therefore, The truth is that in position prove we must find some fault with its first premise. that (i) is true. We cannot know with certainty that Suppose in some distant forest lightning strikes a instances of suffering of the sort described in (i) do dead tree, resulting in a forest fire. In the fire a fawn occur in our world. But it is one thing to know or prove is trapped, horribly burned, and lies in terrible that (i) is true and quite another thing to have agony for several days before death relieves its rational grounds for believing (i) to be true. We are So far as we can the fawn's intense our suffering. see, often in the position where in the light of suffering is pointless. For there does not appear to be experience and knowledge it is rational to believe that a statement is even we are any greater good such that the prevention of the certain true, though fawn's would either the loss ofthat not in a to or to suffering require position prove know with certainty or the occurrence of an evil bad or statement our good equally that the is true. In the light of past worse. Nor does there seem to be bad or and it any equally experience knowledge is, for example, very worse so to evil connected the fawn's suffering that it reasonable to believe that neither Goldwater nor occur ever we are would have had to had the fawn's suffering McGovern will be elected President, but been Could an in the of prevented. omnipotent, omniscient scarcely position knowing with certainty being have prevented the fawn's apparently point? that neither will ever be elected President. So, too, answer as even less suffering? The is obvious, the with (i), although we cannot know with certainty theist will insist. An omnipotent, omniscient being that it is true, it perhaps can be rationally supported, could have easily prevented the fawn from being shown to be a rational belief. horribly burned, or, given the burning, could have Consider again the case of the fawn's suffering. Is the fawn it to some spared the intense suffering by quickly reasonable believe that there is greater to ending its life, rather than allowing the fawn lie in good so intimately connected to that suffering that terrible for several Since the fawn's even an not agony days. omnipotent, omniscient being could was so as we intense suffering preventable and, far have obtained that good without permitting that can doesn't it that or some as see, pointless, appear premise (1) suffering evil at least bad? It certainly of the argument is true, that there do exist instances does not appear reasonable to believe this. Nor does an seem of intense suffering which omnipotent, omnis? it reasonable to believe that there is some evil at cient could have without least as bad as an being prevented thereby the fawn's suffering such that some or some losing greater good permitting evil omnipotent being simply could not have prevented bad or worse. it without the even equally permitting fawn's suffering. But if must case It be acknowledged that the of the it should somehow be reasonable to believe either of fawn's does not these of the fawn's we must apparently pointless suffering prove things suffering, then ask true. even we cannot see that (1) is For though how whether it is reasonable to believe either of these to some the fawn's suffering is required obtain things of all the instances of seemingly pointless to some or greater good (or prevent equally bad human and animal suffering that occur daily in our worse it follows that it is not so world. And the answer to more evil), hardly required. surely this general After we are often how we must be no. seems all, surprised by things question It quite unlikely that all to be unconnected turn out to be the instances of intense thought intimately suffering occurring daily in for we some our are connected. Perhaps, all know, there is world intimately related to the occurrence of to or at as familiar good outweighing the fawn's suffering greater goods the prevention of evils least which that is connected in a we do not bad and even more suffering way ; unlikely, should they somehow see. there well be unfamiliar all be so than an Furthermore, may related, omnipotent, omniscient we to goods, goods haven't dreamed of, which the being could not have achieved at least some of those fawn's is connected. it some suffering inextricably Indeed, goods (or prevented of those evils) without would seem to like omniscience the of are require something permitting instances intense suffering that AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL 338 QUARTERLY

supposedly related to them. In the light of our probably false, but only that the reasoning given in and some experience knowledge of the variety and scale of support of it is in way defective. He may do this human and animal suffering in our world, the idea either by arguing that the reasons given in support of that none of this suffering could have been prevented (i) are in themselves insufficient to justify accepting by an omnipotent being without thereby losing a (i), or by arguing that there are other things we or an at as when taken in with these greater good permitting evil least bad know which, conjunction seems an not us extraordinary absurd idea, quite beyond reasons, do justify in accepting (i). I suppose our belief. It seems then that although we cannot some theists would be content with this rather prove that (i) is true, it is, nevertheless, altogether modest response to the basic argument for atheism. reasonable to believe that (i) is true, that (i) is a But given the validity of the basic argument and the rational belief.5 theist's likely acceptance of (2), he is thereby now to our for to 1 not Returning argument atheism, committed the view that ( ) is false, just that seen a we no reasons as true. we've that the second premise expresses basic have good for accepting (1) common to two are at belief many theists and nontheists. The second responses aimed showing that We've also seen that our is to that 1 is false. Since the experience and knowledge it reasonable believe ( ) of the variety and profusion of suffering in our world theist is committed to this view I shall focus the on we provides rational support for the first premise. Seeing discussion these two attempts, attempts which that the conclusion, "There does not exist an can distinguish as "the direct attack" and "the omnipotent, omniscient, wholly good being" follows indirect attack." two seem we a direct Imean an to 1 from these premises, it does that have By attack, attempt reject ( ) rational support for atheism, that it is reasonable for us by pointing out goods, for example, to which to believe that the theistic God does not exist. suffering may well be connected, goods which an omniscient could not achieve II omnipotent, being without permitting suffering. It is doubtful, how? can Can theism be rationally defended against the ever, that the direct attack succeed. The theist out some to argument for atheism we have just examined? If it may point that suffering leads moral and can, how might the theist best respond to that spiritual development impossible without suffering. But it's clear occurs in argument? Since the argument from (i) and (2) to reasonably that suffering often a (3) is valid, and since the theist, no less than the degree far beyond what is required for character more The theist that some nontheist, is than likely committed to (2), it's development. may say suffering can clear that the theist reject this atheistic argu? results from free choices of human beings and might be some measure ment only by rejecting its first premise, the premise preventable only by preventing of are instances of intense that states that there human freedom. But, again, it's clear that much an omniscient intense occurs not as a suffering which omnipotent, being suffering result of human free some could have prevented without thereby losing choices. The general difficulty with this direct attack or greater good or permitting some evil equally bad on premise ( 1 ) is twofold. First, it cannot succeed, for worse. can the theist best to this not How, then, respond the theist does know what greater goods might be and the considerations advanced in its or evils each instance of premise served, prevented, by or support? intense human animal suffering. Second, the are a can own There basically three responses theist theist's religious tradition usually maintains 1 or make. First, he might argue not that ( ) is false that in this life it is not given to us to know God's

5 reasons warrant. For it is one to that One might object that the conclusion of this paragraph is stronger than the given thing argue it i as are is unreasonable to think that ( i ) is false and another thing to conclude that we are therefore justified in accepting ( ) true. There more and are such that about propositions such that believing them ismuch reasonable than disbelieving them, yet withholding judgment : more them ismore reasonable than believing them. To take an example of Chisholm's it is reasonable to believe that the Pope will be in more to on Rome (on some arbitrarily picked future date) than to believe that he won't ;but it is perhaps reasonable suspend judgment on to he will be in it be that the question of the Pope's whereabouts that particular date, than believe that Rome. Thus, might objected, we more while we've shown that believing (i) ismore reasonable than disbelieving (i), haven't shown that believing (i) is reasonable are we i to the that it than withholding belief. My answer to this objection is that there things know which render ( ) probable degree is i are we an more reasonable to believe ( i ) than to suspend judgment on ( ).What these things know? First, I think, is the fact that there is our that of seems enormous variety and profusion of intense human and animal suffering in world. Second, is the fact much this suffering or it. there is the fact that such quite unrelated to any greater goods (or the absence of equal greater evils) that might justify And, finally, or seem so related as to suffering as is related to greater goods (or the absence of equal greater evils) does not, in many cases, intimately an on These I am require its permission by omnipotent being bent securing those goods (the absence of those evils). facts, claiming, make it more reasonable to accept (i) than to withhold judgment on (i). THE PROBLEM OF EVIL AND SOME VARIETIES OF ATHEISM 339

two: purpose in allowing particular instances of suffering. Compare, for example, these Hence, the direct attack cannot against premise (i) I. II. not-r succeed and violates basic beliefs associated with p theism. q q The best for the theist to follow in procedure r not-p rejecting premise ( i ) is the indirect procedure. This procedure I shall call "the G. E. Moore shift," so It is a truth of logic that If I is valid II must be valid as are same so as called in honor of the twentieth century philosopher, well. Since the arguments the far E. to G. Moore, who used it great effect in dealing the second premise is concerned, any choice between with the of the them must concern arguments skeptics. Skeptical philo? their respective first premises. To as sophers such David Hume have advanced inge? argue against the first premise (p) by constructing nious to that no one can know of the counter II is to E. arguments prove argument employ the G. the existence of material The of any object. premises Moore shift. their arguments employ plausible principles, prin? Applying the G. E. Moore shift against the first ciples which many philosophers have tried to reject premise of the basic argument for atheism, the theist success. can as : directly, but only with questionable argue follows Moore's was different. Instead procedure altogether an not-3. There exists omnipotent, omniscient, of arguing directly against the premises of the wholly good being. skeptic's arguments, he simply noted that the pre? 2. An omniscient, wholly good being would pre? mises implied, for example, that he (Moore) did not vent the occurrence of intense it know of the existence of a Moore then any suffering pencil. unless it could not do so without the could, thereby proceeded indirectly against skeptic's premises some or some losing greater good permitting by arguing: evil equally bad or worse, I do know that this pencil exists. therefore, are If the skeptic's principles correct I cannot know of not-1. It is not the case that there exist instances the existence of this pencil. of intense suffering which an omnipotent, omniscient being could have prevented with? out thereby some greater or .'. The least must be losing good skeptic's principles (at one) some evil bad or worse. incorrect. permitting equally We now have two the basic Moore then noted that his is as valid arguments: argument argument just for atheism from and to and the theist's as the that both of their contain (1) (2) (3), skeptic's, arguments best the from an<^ to the "If the are correct response, argument (not-3) (2) premise skeptic's principles What the theist then about 1 is that he Moore cannot know of (not-1 ). says ( ) the existence of this pencil," has rational grounds for believing in the existence of and concluded that the only way to choose between the theistic God (not-3), accepts (2) as true, and sees the two arguments (Moore's and the skeptic's) is by that (not-i) follows from (not-3) anc^ (2)- He deciding which of the first premises it is more concludes, therefore, that he has rational rational to believe?Moore's "I do know grounds premise for 1 rational for that this exists" or the rejecting ( ).Having grounds reject? pencil skeptic's premise the theist concludes that the basic that his are correct. ing (1), argument asserting skeptical principles for atheism is mistaken. that own was Moore concluded his first premise the more rational of the two.6 Before we see how the theist may apply the G. E. to Moore shift the basic argument for atheism, we Ill should note the general strategy of the shift. We're an r. a a given argument: p, q, therefore, Instead of We've had look at forceful argument for seems arguing directly against p, another argument is atheism and what to be the theist's best be? to one constructed?not-r, q, therefore, noi-p?which response that argument. If is persuaded by the gins with the denial of the conclusion of the first argument for atheism, as I find myself to be, how its second with one argument, keeps premise, and ends might best view the position of the theist. Of the denial of the first premise as its conclusion. course, he will view the theist as having a false belief, 6 for the two on See, example, chapters Hume in G. E. Moore, Some Main Problems of Philosophy (London, 1953). 340 AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY

just as the theist will view the atheist as having a false to justify his belief by appealing to one or more of the traditional belief. But what position should the atheist take arguments: Ontological, Cosmological, etc. he to concerning the rationality of the theist's belief? There Teleological, Moral, Second, might appeal are an certain of even three major positions atheist might take, aspects religious experience, perhaps we of as some own to positions which may think varieties of his religious experience. Third, he might try no one as a atheism. First, the atheist may believe that is justify theism plausible theory in terms of which we can account for a of rationally justified in believing that the theistic God variety phenomena. us an must exists. Let call this position "unfriendly atheism." Although atheist hold that the theistic God Second, the atheist may hold no belief concerning does not exist, can he not also believe, and be whether any theist is or isn't rationally justified in justified in so believing, that some of these "justifi? believing that the theistic God exists. Let us call this cations of theism" do actually rationally justify some view "indifferent atheism." Finally, the atheist may theists in their belief that there exists a supremely some are omniscient seems to me believe that theists rationally justified in good, omnipotent, being? It believing that the theistic God exists. This view we that he can. shall call "friendly atheism." In this final part of the If we think of the long history of theistic belief and are paper I propose to discuss and defend the position of the special situations in which people sometimes as to no one friendly atheism. placed, it is perhaps absurd think that If no one can be rationally justified in believing a was ever rationally justified in believing that the false proposition then friendly atheism is a paradoxi? theistic God exists as it is to think that no one was cal, if not incoherent position. But surely the truth of ever justified in believing that human being would a not a never walk on the moon. in that belief is necessary condition of someone's But suggesting being rationally justified in having that belief. So in friendly atheism is preferable to unfriendly atheism, holding that someone is rationally justified in believ? I don't mean to rest the case on what some human ing that the theistic God exists, the friendly atheist is beings might reasonably have believed in the elev? not committed to thinking that the theist has a true enth or thirteenth century. The more interesting some belief. What he is committed to is that the theist has question is whether people in modern society, rational grounds for his belief, a belief the atheist people who are aware of the usual grounds for belief rejects and is convinced he is rationally justified in and disbelief and are acquainted to some degree rejecting. But is this possible? Can someone, like our with modern science, are yet rationally justified in friendly atheist, hold a belief, be convinced that he is accepting theism. Friendly atheism is a significant rationally justified in holding that belief, and yet position only if it answers this question in the someone in believe that else is equally justified be? affirmative. lieving the opposite? Surely this is possible. Suppose It is not difficult for an atheist to be friendly when your friends see you off on a flight to Hawaii. Hours he has reason to believe that the theist could not that has to after take-off they learn your plane gone reasonably be expected be acquainted with the sea. a no down at After twenty-four hour search, grounds for disbelief that he (the atheist) possesses. survivors have been found. Under these circum? For then the atheist may take the view that some stances they are rationally justified in believing that theists are rationally justified in holding to theism, you have perished. But it is hardly rational for you to but would not be so were they to be acquainted with believe this, as you bob up and down in your life vest, the grounds for disbelief?those grounds being suf? wondering why the search planes have failed to spot ficient to tip the scale in favor of atheism when to amuse while reasons you. Indeed, yourself awaiting your balanced against the the theist has in support fate, you might very well reflect on the fact that your of his belief. friends are rationally justified in believing that you Friendly atheism becomes paradoxical, however, are now a disbelieve and are when the atheist that the dead, proposition you contemplates believing theist has all the for atheism that the rationally justified in disbelieving. So, too, perhaps grounds he, is in main? an atheist may be rationally justified in his atheistic atheist, has, and yet rationally justified even so belief and yet hold that some theists are rationally taining his theistic belief. But excessively a view as this can be held the justified in believing just the opposite of what he friendly perhaps by believes. atheist if he also has some reason to think that the a for theism are not as as the theist is What sort of grounds might theist have for grounds telling in them to be.7 believing that God exists. Well, he might endeavor justified taking 7 a sum numbers three times and result x. I inform of this so that have much the same Suppose that I add long of get you you pretty THE PROBLEM OF EVIL AND SOME VARIETIES OF ATHEISM 34-1

a In this paper I've presented what I take to be received by many philosophers. Philosophers who strong argument for atheism, pointed out what I are atheists tend to be tough minded?holding that to that are no reasons think is the theist's best response argument, there good for supposing that theism is distinguished three positions an atheist might take true. And theists tend either to reject the view that concerning the rationality of theistic belief, and the existence of evil provides rational grounds for some or to to made remarks in defense of the position called atheism hold that religious belief has nothing aware reason at "friendly atheism." I'm that the central do with and evidence all. But such is the points of the paper are not likely to be warmly way of philosophy.8

Purdue University Received July 13, igy8

evidence I have for the claim that the sum of the numbers is x. then use over You your calculator twice and arrive at result^. You, then, are in that the sum of the numbers is not x. justified believing However, knowing that your calculator has been damaged and is therefore and that have no reason to think it unreliable, you that is damaged, /may reasonably believe not only that the sum of the numbers is x, but also that are in that the sum is not x. a you justified believing Here is case, then, where you have all of my evidence for p, and yet I can believe that are in I have reason to believe as reasonably you justified believing not-/)?for that your grounds for not-/? are not telling as are you justified in taking them to be. 81 am indebted to at Purdue to Ted and my colleagues University, particularly Ulrich Lilly Russow, and to philosophers at The of Indiana State and The of at University Nebraska, University, University Wisconsin Milwaukee for helpful criticisms of earlier versions of this paper.