North American Philosophical Publications The Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of Atheism Author(s): William L. Rowe Reviewed work(s): Source: American Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 16, No. 4 (Oct., 1979), pp. 335-341 Published by: University of Illinois Press on behalf of the North American Philosophical Publications Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20009775 . Accessed: 05/11/2011 14:40 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. University of Illinois Press and North American Philosophical Publications are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to American Philosophical Quarterly. http://www.jstor.org American Philosophical Quarterly Volume 16, Number 4, October 1979 IX. THE PROBLEM OF EVIL AND SOME VARIETIES OF ATHEISM WILLIAM L. ROWE was an paper is concerned with three interrelated of divine being or divine reality. Tillich not THIS questions. The first is : Is there an argument for atheist in the broad sense. But he was an atheist in atheism based on the existence of evil that may the narrow sense, for he denied that there exists a an rationally justify someone in being atheist? To divine being that is all-knowing, all-powerful and an answer terms this first question I give affirmative and perfectly good. In this paper I will be using the to answer a try support that by setting forth strong "theism," "theist," "atheism," "atheist," "agnos? for atheism on the existence of evil.1 in the narrow not in argument based ticism," and "agnostic" sense, The second question is: How can the theist best the broad sense. defend his position against the argument for atheism based on the existence of evil? In response to this I to describe what be an question try may adequate I rational defense for theism against any argument for atheism based on the existence of evil. The final In developing the argument for atheism based on question is: What position should the informed the existence of evil, it will be useful to focus on some our atheist take concerning the rationality of theistic particular evil that world contains in consider? belief? Three different answers an atheist may give able abundance. Intense human and animal suffer? to this question serve to distinguish three varieties of ing, for example, occurs daily and in great plenitude in our is a case atheism: unfriendly atheism, indifferent atheism, world. Such intense suffering clear of and friendly atheism. In the final part of the paper I evil. Of course, if the intense suffering leads to some discuss and defend the position of friendly atheism. greater good, a good we could not have obtained Before we the we we consider argument from evil, without undergoing the suffering in question, need to distinguish a narrow and a broad sense of the might conclude that the suffering is justified, but it terms a remains an we must not "theist," "atheist," and "agnostic." By evil nevertheless. For "theist" in the narrow sense I mean someone who confuse the intense suffering in and of itself with the believes in the an to or existence of omnipotent, omnis? good things which it sometimes leads of which it a or cient, eternal, supremely good being who created may be necessary part. Intense human animal a sense mean an the world. By "theist" in the broad I suffering is in itself bad, evil, even though itmay someone who believes in the existence of some sort of sometimes be justified by virtue of being a part of, or divine being or divine reality. To be a theist in the leading to, some good which is unobtainable without narrow sense is also to be a theist in the broad sense, it.What is evil in itself may sometimes be good as a but one may be a theist in the broad sense?as was means because it leads to something that is good in a itself. In a an Paul Tillich?without believing that there is such case, while remaining evil in itself, eternal the intense human or animal supremely good, omnipotent, omniscient, suffering is, neverthe? being who created the world. Similar distinctions less, an evil which someone might be morally must be made between a narrow and a broad sense of justified in permitting. the terms "atheist" and To an as a "agnostic." be atheist Taking human and animal suffering clear in the broad sense is to deny the existence of any sort instance of evil which occurs with great frequency in 1 Some philosophers have contended that the existence of evil is logically inconsistent with the existence of the theistic God. No one, I has succeeded in such an a think, establishing extravagant claim. Indeed, granted incompatibilism, there is fairly compelling argument for the view that the existence of evil is logically consistent with the existence of the theistic God. (For a lucid statement of this argument see Alvin Plantinga, God, Freedom, and Evil (New York, 1974), pp. 29-59.) There remains, however, what we may call the evidential form?as to the form?of the of evil: the view our opposed logical problem that the variety and profusion of evil in world, although not perhaps logically inconsistent with the existence of the theistic God, provides, nevertheless, rational support for atheism. In this paper I shall be concerned solely with the evidential form of the problem, the form of the problem which, I think, presents a rather severe difficulty for theism. 335 336 AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY on not same as an our world, the argument for atheism based evil the permitting evil greater than s^ a state can be stated as follows : And this because the absence of good of affairs need not itself be an evil state of affairs. It is also i. There exist instances of intense which an suffering to that be such that it is omniscient could have important recognize sxmight omnipotent, being prevented OG G some or preventable by without losing (so condition (i) without thereby losing greater good per? some or is not but also such that if OG did mitting evil equally bad worse.2 satisfied) prevent G would be loss unless OG some evil 2. An omniscient, wholly good being would prevent the it, permitted to or worse than If this were it does not occurrence of any intense suffering it could, unless it equal s?. so, could not do so without some seem correct to that OG thereby losing greater require prevent sx. Thus, or some or worse. good permitting evil equally bad condition (ii) takes into account an important possibility not encompassed in condition (i). Is it true that if an an omniscient, wholly good being 3. There does not exist omnipotent, omniscient, the occurrence of some intense it wholly good being. permits suffering could have prevented, then either (i) or (ii) or (iii) are we What to say about this argument for atheism, obtains? It seems to me that it is true. But if it is true an based on the of one sort of argument profusion then so is premise (2) of the argument for atheism. our evil in world? The argument is valid ; therefore, more For that merely states in compact form we its premise if have rational grounds for accepting what we must true an have suggested be if omnis? to that extent we have rational for premises, grounds cient, wholly good being fails to prevent some atheism. Do we, have rational accepting however, intense suffering it could prevent. Premise (2) says for the of this grounds accepting premises argument? that an omniscient, wholly good being would Let be an Let's begin with the second premise. occurrence sx prevent the of any intense suffering it instance of intense human or animal which suffering could, unless it could not do so without thereby an omniscient, wholly being could prevent. We some or some evil good losing greater good permitting will also that are such that j will suppose things equally bad or worse. This premise (or something occur unless the prevented by omniscient, wholly not too distant from it) is, I think, held in common We be interested in good (OG) being. might by many atheists and nontheists. Of course, there what would be a condition of determining sufficient may be disagreement about whether something is OG to But, for our here, failing prevent ^. purpose good, and whether, if it is good, one would be we need to state a condition for OG only try necessary morally justified in permitting some intense suffering so seems to to prevent That condition, it to occur to failing sx. in order obtain it. Someone might hold, me, is this: no to for example, that good is great enough justify an to Either (i) there is some greater good, G, such that permitting innocent child suffer terribly.4 someone mere a G is obtainable by OG only if OG permits ^3, Again, might hold that the fact that or some and would be (ii) there is some greater good, G, such that G is given good outweighs suffering were not a obtainable by OG only if OG permits either s1 loss if the suffering prevented, is morally or some or sufficient reason for the But to evil equally bad worse, permitting suffering.