Performative Speech Act Verbs in Present Day English

Home , Felicity (pragmatics), Performative utterance, Performative verb, Performativity

PERFORMATIVE SPEECH ACT VERBS IN PRESENT DAY ENGLISH

ELENA LÓPEZ ÁLVAREZ Universidad Complutense de Madrid

RESUMEN. En esta contribución se estudian los actos performativos y su influencia en el inglés de hoy en día. A partir de las teorías de J. L. Austin, entre otros autores, se desarrolla un panorama de esta orientación de la filosofía del lenguaje de Austin. PALABRAS CLAVE. Actos performativos, enunciado performativo, inglés. ABSTRACT. This paper focuses on performative speech act verbs in present day English. Reading the theories of J. L. Austin, among others,. With the basis of authors as J. L. Austin, this paper develops a brief landscape about this orientation of Austin’s linguistic philosophy. KEY WORDS. Performative speech act verbs, performative utterance, English.

1. INTRODUCCIÓN

1.1. HISTORICAL THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 1.1.1. The beginnings: J.L. Austin

The origin of performative speech acts as we know them today dates back to the William James Lectures, the linguistic-philosophical theories devised and delivered by J.L. Austin at Harvard University in 1955, and collected into a series of lectures entitled How to do things with words, posthumously published in 1962. Austin was one of the most influential philosophers of his time. In these lectures, he provided a thorough exploration of performative speech acts, which was an extremely innovative area of study in those days. In the following pages, Austin’s main ideas (together with some comments by other authors) will be presented.

1.1.1.1. Constative – performative distinction

In these lectures, Austin begins by making a clear distinction between constative and performative utterances. Constative utterances are basically presented by him as statements which describe the world, or that report or constate some fact. They are subject to truth-

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conditional verification. On the other hand, performative utterances cannot undergo these conditions, since this type of utterances does not describe, constate or report anything. Austin compares the statement or constative utterance and the performative utterance, taking into account the main difference between them, i.e., that the former can be true or false, and the latter can be happy or unhappy. The truth of a statement such as: «‘He is running’» (Austin 1962: 46), relies on the fact that he is running; while it is the happiness of the performative ‘I apologize’ which makes it the fact that I am apologizing: and my success in apologizing depends on the happiness of the performative utterance ‘I apologize’. This is what Austin (1962: 47) calls the «‘performative-constative’» distinction, which is a doing – saying distinction. Austin established that: «(1) the performative should be doing something as opposed to just saying something; and (2) the performative is happy or unhappy as opposed to true or false» (Austin 1962: 133).

1.1.1.2. Description of the performative utterance

In performative utterances, some kind of action is being done at the moment of uttering by the person who utters. Austin gives the following characteristics of performative utterances:

- they are utterances which belong to the grammatical category of ‘statement’. - grammatically, they occur in the first person singular present indicative active. - they are utterances which do not ‘describe’, ‘report’ or constate anything; and which cannot undergo a ‘true or false’ categorization. - the uttering of the ‘statement’ carries out the act named by the verb, that is, it implies something more than just saying some words.

A number of expressions for the type of utterance that he is trying to describe, i.e., the performative utterance, are proposed by AUSTIN (1962: 6): «performative sentence», «performative utterance» or «for short, ‘a performative’». He names this type of utterance in yet another way: «performatories» (Austin 1962: 12); and provides an explanation for these terms:

The name is derived, of course, from ‘perform’, the usual verb with the noun ‘action’: it indicates that the issuing of the utterance is the performing of an action – it is not normally thought of as just saying something. (AUSTIN 1962: 6-7).

1.1.1.3. Conditions on Performative Speech Acts

Austin claims that in order to perform an act:

- the uttering of certain words (and not others) is necessary - the circumstances must be appropriate - the speaker or some other person(s) should also perform other ‘physical’ of ‘mental’ actions accompanying the utterance of the specific words which lead to the performance of the act.

1.1.1.4. Felicity conditions

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There are a number of necessary conditions for «the ‘happy’ functioning of a performative», AUSTIN (1962: 14); and AUSTIN (1962: 14) formulates them thus: (A.1). There must exist an accepted conventional procedure having a certain conventional effect, that procedure to include the uttering of certain words by certain persons in certain circumstances, and further, (A.2) the particular persons and circumstances in a given case must be appropriate for the invocation of the particular procedure invoked. (B.1) The procedure must be executed by all participants both correctly and (B.2) completely. (!.1) Where, as often, the procedure is designed for use by persons having certain thoughts or feelings, or for the inauguration of certain consequential conduct on the part of any participant, then a person participating in and so invoking the procedure must in fact have those thoughts or feelings, and the participants must intend so to conduct themselves, and further (!.2) must actually so conduct themselves subsequently. (AUSTIN 1962: 14-15).

I would like to make a brief comment on the symbol ! used by Austin for the last two types of conditions which have been previously presented. Austin used this symbol and expressly mentioned that he did so in order to make a big difference between the A and B categories as opposed to the ! categories. This symbol corresponds to the letter ‘C’ belonging to the Greek alphabet. This nomenclature is not followed by other authors such as Levinson or Thomas, who use the Roman letter ‘C’ instead when referring to this type of infelicities. Going back to the necessary conditions for the ‘happy’ functioning of a performative, it should be noticed that the unobservance of any of these necessary conditions will result in an unhappy performative utterance.

1.1.1.5. Types of infelicities

Austin classified the different kinds of infelicities by giving them different names. He called infelicities of types A and B misfires. Austin explains that when an utterance is a misfire, we say that the procedure is disallowed or botched, and that the act is void or without effect. If the act is void, then the purported act is not done, but other things may have been done through this act. If the act is without effect, that does not mean that it is «without consequences, results or effects» (AUSTIN 1962: 17). Austin continues expounding that we may speak of the act as being a purported act or an attempt, and that we may say that «we […] ‘went through some form of marriage’ by contrast with ‘married’» (AUSTIN 1962: 16). In the case of an offence against any of the A and B rules (i.e., uttering the words incorrectly, or not being the person appointed for the carrying out of a certain act, or not being in possession of the necessary conditions to perform that act), then the act «is not successfully performed at all, does not come off, is not achieved» (AUSTIN 1962: 16). Infelicities of type A receive the name of misinvocations. Within misinvocations, Austin distinguished two types of infelicity: infelicities of type A.1, which he called non-plays at an early stage, and later rejected that name; and infelicities of type A.2, which Austin called either misapplications or misplays. Regarding the infelicities of type A.2, which he called misapplications, he illustrates the point by saying that «‘I appoint you’» (AUSTIN 1962: 34) will result in a misapplication if uttered when that person (or someone else) has already been appointed, or when the person who appoints is not the one designed to do so, etc. Infelicities of

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type B are called misexecutions or miscarriages. Within these, Austin called infelicities of type B.1 flaws or misexecutions; and with specific reference to flaws (i.e., B.1 infelicities), Austin claims that the procedure is appropriate to persons and circumstances, but it is not executed correctly. On the other hand, he called infelicities of type B.2 hitches or non-executions. In the case of hitches, there is an attempt to execute the procedure, but the act is not completed. For example, in «‘I bet you sixpence’» (Austin 1962: 36), if there is no uptake such as ‘You’re on’ then the bet is «abortive» (AUSTIN 1962: 37). Regarding the infelicities of type !, they receive the name of abuses or disrespects. With respect to the infringement of the ! rules, the act can be ‘professed’ or ‘hollow’, i.e., an act which is not implemented or not consummated. There are two kinds of infelicities of type !, viz. those of type !.1, called insincerities or dissimulations; and those of type !.2, which Austin did not have a name for, but which at some point he called non-fulfilments, disloyalties, infractions, indisciplines or breaches. It is worth noticing that the !.1 and !.2 infelicities go through an unhappy performance, but they are not void. For example, if the person uttering the performative does not have the “requisite feelings” (AUSTIN 1962: 40), the act is not void because it is performed, though insincerely. When the person issuing the performative does not have the «requisite intentions» (Austin 1962: 40), then he/she may utter the following: «‘I promise’» (AUSTIN 1962: 40), without having the intention of doing what he/she promises to do. The fact of having incorrect thoughts instead of insincere ones, leads to a different kind of infelicity: (a) a mistake may result in an «excusable act» (AUSTIN 1962: 42) but will not usually make an act void; (b) when advising someone to do something which is not to their own interest, even if the advisor thinks it is, there is no insincerity, but the act is one of «bad advice» (Austin 1962: 42); and (c) when using verdictives (a class of performatives which will be explained in the corresponding section), a ‘bad’ verdict is possible, in two different ways: the verdict can be “unjustified” (AUSTIN 1962: 43), or it can be “incorrect” (AUSTIN 1962: 43). This is unhappy, but not infelicitous, because it is not void and not insincere. («‘Guilty’» (AUSTIN 1962: 43), as uttered by a jury when they sincerely believe the accused to be guilty, based on evidence, is a happy utterance).

If I say: ‘I apologize’: (1) it is true and not false that I am doing (have done) something –actually numerous things, but in particular that I am apologizing (have apologized); (2) it is true and not false that certain conditions do obtain, in particular those of the kind specified in our rules A.1 and A.2; (3) it is true and not false that certain other conditions obtain of our kind !, in particular that I am thinking something; and (4) it is true and not false that I am committed to doing something subsequently. (AUSTIN 1962:46)

All conventional acts can be affected by some form of infelicity; and, because performatives are utterances, they can be affected by some «kinds of ill which affect all utterances» (AUSTIN 1962: 21). For example, when a performative utterance is said on stage by an actor, or if it belongs to a poem, etc. then this utterance may be «in a peculiar way hollow or void» (AUSTIN 1962: 22). For this reason, AUSTIN (1962: 22) clarifies that «our

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performative utterances, felicitous of not, are to be understood as issued in ordinary circumstances».

1.1.1.6. Conditions for promises

When dealing with promises, Austin affirms that a promise may be viewed as attempted or void if one of the following conditions does not hold: It is obviously necessary that to have promised I must normally:

(A) have been heard by someone, perhaps the promisee; (B) have been understood by him as promising. (AUSTIN 1962: 22).

AUSTIN (1962: 11) argues that «‘I promise that…’» carries with it a certain intention on the part of the speaker, i.e., to do what he undertakes to do. When there is no such intention, we speak of a ‘false’ promise because, although he does promise, and therefore the promise is not void, it is given in bad faith. This statement in the form of a promise is not a lie or a misstatement. It should be made clear that ‘false’ may be applied to other elements different from statements. I would like to introduce a comment by Levinson in relation to promises which is more focused towards the effect of a promise than to the conditions which make it a promise. Nevertheless, the reason for the insertion of this comment in this section is that it is worth including because it provides a wider understanding of the functioning of promises. Levinson claims that promises (as well as assertions and orders –to which I am not going to make any reference-) produce a change of the context in which they are uttered by adding a number of propositions to that context. Thus, LEVINSON (1983: 277) formulates this in the following way: «A promise that p is a function from a context where S is not committed to bringing about the state of affairs described in p, into one in which S is so committed».

1.1.1.7. Explicit performatives

Any utterance which is in fact a performative should be reducible, or expandible, or analysable into a form, with a verb in the first person singular present indicative active (grammatical). […] ‘Guilty’ is equivalent to ‘I find, pronounce, deem you to be guilty.’ […] This sort of expansion makes explicit both that the utterance is performative, and which act it is that is being performed. (AUSTIN 1962: 62). Austin expounds that the fact of putting the performative utterance in this explicit form frequently allows for no possible non-performative interpretation. When I say ‘I bet’, I perform the act of betting, I do not report on my doing the act of betting. However, when he says ‘I bet’, he performs his own act of betting, and I cannot perform his act of betting by saying ‘He bets’, since this is only a description of his act of betting. Explicit performatives are characterized by “verbs in the first person singular present indicative active” (AUSTIN 1962: 56). However, Austin makes a few comments to clarify that this rule may admit some changes. He begins by saying that this ‘present’ is used here in order to do something. However, it is not essential to the performative utterance that it be in the first person singular, since the first person plural ‘we’ may also be used. This occurs, for example, in prayers: ‘We worship You’, ‘We give You thanks’, etc. (These two last examples are my own). Also, the use of the passive is possible, with «the verb in the second

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or third person (singular or plural), and the verb in the passive voice», (AUSTIN 1962: 57). Examples are: (1) You are hereby authorized to pay… (2) Passengers are warned to cross the track by the bridge only. (3) Notice is hereby given that trespassers will be prosecuted. (Austin 1962: 57).

AUSTIN (1962: 5) provides four examples of ‘explicit’ performatives, of the type later named ‘exercitives’:

a) “‘I do’”, in a marriage ceremony (only later did Austin realize that the actual, correct utterance corresponding to this case should be ‘I will’). b) “‘I name this ship the Queen Elizabeth’”, accompanied by the smashing of a bottle against the hull of the ship. c) “‘I give and bequeath my watch to my brother’”, in a will. d) “‘I bet you sixpence it will rain tomorrow’”.

Later, AUSTIN (1962: 6) explains:

In these examples it seems clear that to utter the sentence (in, of course, the appropriate circumstances) […] is to do it. None of the utterances cited is either true or false: I assert this as obvious and do not argue it.

AUSTIN (1962: 68-69) continues later on the development of this point (with a slightly different point of view, I would say): “Our criterion will not get in all cases of the issuing of an utterance being the doing of something, because the ‘reduction’ to an explicit performative does not seem always possible”. He prefers to refer to “‘explicit performative’” (Austin 1962: 69) as opposed to «‘primary performative’ (rather than to inexplicit or implicit performative)», (AUSTIN 1962: 69). He gives two examples:

(1) primary utterance: ‘I shall be there’. (2) explicit performative: ‘I promise that I shall be there’, and we said that the latter formula made explicit what action it is that is being performed in issuing the utterance: i.e.: ‘I shall be there’. (Austin 1962: 69).

1.1.1.8. The ‘hereby’ test

AUSTIN (1962: 57), explains that

[…] the word ‘hereby’ is often and perhaps can always be inserted; this serves to indicate that the utterance (in writing) of the sentence is, as it is said, the instrument effecting the act of warning, authorising, etc. ‘Hereby’ is a useful criterion that the utterance is performative. If ‘hereby’ is not inserted, the utterance could be taken to be “the description of what usually happens” (AUSTIN 1962: 58). Thomas agrees with Austin in saying that the ‘hereby’ test is useful; however, she specifies that it is “not infallible” (THOMAS 1995: 32).

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With regard to LEVINSON (1983), he points out that the adverb ‘hereby’ can only occur with the performative usages of performative verbs.

1.1.1.9. What is a performative verb?

According to Austin, a performative verb is one which, in the appropriate circumstances and used performatively, carries out the act it names; performative verbs make explicit the precise action that is being carried out in issuing the performative utterance. VERSCHUEREN (1980: 11), on the other hand, refers to performative verbs as “the group of verbs that satisfy (i) and (ii)”. The first of these two conditions is based on Austin’s definition of performative verbs. The (i) and (ii) conditions are the following:

(i) ‘I (hereby) V [simple pres., ind., act.] (…)’ is a grammatical sentence. (Verschueren 1980: 7). (ii) Under normal circumstances, saying ‘I (hereby) V [simple pres., ind., act.] (…)’ is an act of V-ing {°}. (VERSCHUEREN 1980: 8).

It is also claimed by VERSCHUEREN (1980: 5) that «[…] performative verbs, even in their performative use, also describe or denote types of SAs, in addition to being a linguistic device for the performance of those SAs». According to Verschueren, there is a performativity continuum which extends from one end where the performative verbs are, to the other end where, because of pragmatic constraints, these verbs cannot be used performatively.

1.1.1.10. Test for the pure explicit performative

AUSTIN (1962: 83-84) provides a test for the pure explicit performative, by posing a number of questions:

(1) Does it make sense (or the same sense) to ask ‘But did he really?’ (2) Could he be doing the action without uttering the performative? (3) Could he do it deliberately?; could he be willing to do it? (4) Could it be literally false that, for example, I criticize (as distinct from blame) when I have said that I criticize? (It could, of course, be insincere always).

It may be easier to understand this better after looking at the following example, the case when someone says ‘I postulate that…’ then

(1) we cannot ask ‘But was he really postulating? (2) he cannot be postulating without saying so; (3) one can say ‘I deliberately postulated…’ or ‘I am willing to postulate…’; (4) it cannot be literally false to say ‘I postulate’ (except in the sense already noted: ‘on page 265 I postulate…’). (AUSTIN 1962: 86).

1.1.1.11. Classification of performative verbs.

Austin made the following classification of performative verbs: verdictives, exercitives, commisives, behabitives and expositives, which will now be expounded in detail:

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a) verdictives are typified by the giving of a verdict, as the name implies, by a jury, arbitrator, or umpire. But they need not be final; they may be, for example, an estimate, reckoning, or appraisal. It is essentially giving a finding as to something – fact, or value – which is for different reasons hard to be certain about (AUSTIN 1962:151); b) exercitives are the exercising of powers, rights or influence. Examples are appointing, voting, ordering, urging, advising, warning, etc. (AUSTIN 1962:151); c) commissives are typified by promising or otherwise undertaking; they commit you to doing something, but include also declarations or announcements of intention, which are not promises (AUSTIN 1962: 152); d) behabitives: these are related to social behaviour. «Examples are apologizing, congratulating, commending, condoling, cursing, and challenging» (AUSTIN 1962: 152); e) expositives: they make plain how our utterances fit into the course of an argument or conversation, how we are using the words, or, in general, are expository. Examples are: ‘I reply’. ‘I argue’, ‘I concede’, ‘I illustrate’, ‘I assume’, ‘I postulate’ (AUSTIN 1962: 152). Swearing, promising, and guaranteeing that something is the case work as expositives, as, for example, when you give your word that you have done, not that you will do, something. (AUSTIN 1962: 159).

1.1.2. The performative hypothesis

This is one of the most controversial areas within Austin’s line of thought. Austin himself abandoned this theory quite early, since it could not be maintained. I will be commenting both on the performative hypothesis and on the reasons for its collapse.

1.1.2.1. What is the Performative Hypothesis?

The performative hypothesis is an attempt to prove that language is a means, not just of saying things, but of doing things, i.e., of producing changes in the world. In order to explain the features that make it possible to‘do things with words’, Austin devised a theory which expounded, first, the description of the syntactic and pragmatic properties pertaining only to performative utterances; and second, the characteristics of performative utterances as distinct from those of constative utterances. This idea produced a revolution within Linguistics, due to the new dimension of relevance acquired by language. Since then, many comments have been devoted to the explanation of the performative hypothesis and its collapse; but only those which were found to be particularly relevant will be expounded here. To begin with, LEVINSON (1983: 231) draws attention to the fact that there was actually a development within Austin’s theory which lead Austin to its re-evaluation; Levinson also clarifies which were the main changes (or «shifts», as LEVINSON (1983: 231) calls them) within this theory. Thus, LEVINSON (1983: 231) points out that:

Readers of How To Do Things With Words should be warned that there is an internal evolution to the argument, so that what is proposed at the beginning is rejected by the end. […] there are two crucial sliding definitions or concepts: firstly, there is a shift from the view that performatives are a special class of sentences with peculiar syntactic and pragmatic properties, to the view that there is a general class of performative utterances that includes both explicit

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performatives (the old familiar class) and implicit performatives, the latter including lots of other kinds of utterances, if not all. Secondly, there is a shift from the dichotomy performative/constative to a general theory of illocutionary acts of which the various performatives and constatives are just special sub-cases. Another author who deals with the performative hypothesis is Gazdar. He provides a clear explanation of the performative hypothesis, which helps understand what it is and which are the participating elements in its formulation. GAZDAR (1979a: 18) as quoted in LEVINSON (1983: 250) puts forward, in Levinson’s words, «the strongest version of the PH» (i.e., of the performative hypothesis):

1. Every sentence has a performative clause in deep or underlying structure 2. The subject of this clause is first person singular, the indirect object second person singular, and the verb is drawn from a delimited set of performative verbs, and is conjugated in the indicative active simple present tense (or is associated with the underlying representation thereof) 3. This clause is always the highest clause in underlying structure, or at the very least always occurs in a determinable position in that structure 4. There is ony one such clause per sentence 5. The performative clause is deletable, such deletion not changing the meaning of the sentence 6. Illocutionary force is semantic (in the truth-conditional sense) and is fully specified by the meaning of the performative clause itself

1.1.2.2. Collapse of the Performative Hypothesis

To continue, it would be interesting to look at the main reasons proposed by THOMAS (1995: 44) for the clash of the performative hypothesis, viz.:

(i) There is no formal (grammatical) way of distinguishing performative verbs from other sorts of verbs. (ii) The presence of a performative verb does not guarantee that the specified action is performed. (iii) There are ways of ‘doing things with words’ which do not involve using performative verbs.

Thomas’s contribution is fairly important, since it points out the weakest points of the performative hypothesis. Some of these ‘points’ deserve study and will be discussed in section 3.2. At this point, it would also be interesting to refer to some authors’ reflections (mainly Levinson’s) on the notion that certain adverbs could be evidence for the performative hypothesis.

1.1.2.3. Performative adverbs

First, it should be noticed that there are a number of adverbs which seem to modify performative verbs and which LEVINSON (1983: 255) calls «performative adverbs». It is possible that the semantic meanings of these adverbs are not the same in the explicit performative, the implicit performative and the reported performative usages.

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According to Levinson, the semantic meaning of some of these adverbs (for example, ‘frankly’), should be the same for all three usages: the explicit performative, the implicit performative and the reported performative. However, it does not seem to be so because the modification produced by the adverb varies for the different usages, as can be proved by the following examples found in LEVINSON (1983: 255):

(1) I tell you frankly you’re a swine. (2) Frankly, you’re a swine. (3) John told Bill frankly that he was a swine.

Levinson claims that the adverb ‘frankly’ should modify the verb ‘tell’ equally in all three sentences. So does SEARLE (1979: 166): «[…] syntactically, “frankly” normally co- occurs with verbs of saying […]». Nonetheless, in the second sentence it seems to «warn the addressee that a criticism is forthcoming», as LEVINSON (1983: 255) points out. In the first sentence it appears to modify the verb ‘tell’, while in the third example “it modifies the manner in which the telling was done”, [LEVINSON (1983: 255)]. Other adverbs such as ‘hereby’ can only modify performative verbs (as was previously expounded). Thus, as appears in Levinson (1983: 255):

(1) I hereby order you to polish your boots. (2) ?Hereby polish your boots.

A further example provided by LEVINSON (1983: 256) is that of the adverb (adverbial expression) ‘in brief’. Examples are:

(1) In brief, the performative analysis is untenable. (2) Harvey claimed, in brief, that the performative analysis is untenable.

I would like to clarify that in the first sentence, the adverb ‘in brief’ modifies the whole sentence which follows it, i.e., it serves to indicate in some way that the forthcoming sentence is an abbreviation of what could be a topic for wider discussion. Equally, in the second sentence, ‘in brief’ functions as a modifier of «the current speech act» (LEVINSON 1983: 256), i.e., it modifies the way in which the speaker is explaining the manner in which Harvey claimed. As regards reason adverbials (such as ‘because’), Levinson claims that, since they do not always modify the performative verb in its implicit form, then they do not provide evidence for the performative hypothesis. For example:

(1) John’s at Sue’s house, because his car’s outside. (LEVINSON 1983: 256).

This sentence shows an inferencing process on the part of the speaker and, thus, can be paraphrased as: «I know that John’s at Sue’s house because his car’s outside», (LEVINSON 1983: 256), instead of: «I state that John’s at Sue’s house because his car’s outside», (LEVINSON 1983: 256). A similar example is found in SEARLE (1979: 168):

(1) He must be home by now, because I saw him on his way half an hour ago.

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However, I would like to point out that in this case the paraphrase would be approximately: ‘I believe that he could already be at home, because I saw him on his way half an hour ago’. The original sentence also shows the speaker’s knowledge of the time it takes the person the speaker saw to get from the spatial location where they met to his home. The next examples show that ‘briefly’ is an adverb which behaves in a similar fashion to ‘in brief’ (LEVINSON 1983: 256):

(1) Briefly, who do you think will win the gold medal? (2) I ask you briefly who you think will win the gold medal. (3) Tell me briefly who will win the gold medal.

The first sentence could be paraphrased as number three, since ‘briefly’ is referring to the answer of the hearer, i.e., it is controlling the length of the hearer’s answer (and therefore, it is not saying anything about the way in which the speaker asks the question). To finish, Levinson (1983: 257) claims that

[…] performative adverbs participate in the general problem associated with the truth-conditional assessment of declaratives. The issue is this. If we argue that the adverb in (63) is evidence for an implicit performative clause, as in (64), then (63) should have the same truth-conditions as (64). But as we have seen, (63) seems to be true just in case semantics is a bore, and (64) true just in case I say so.

(63) Confidentially, semantics is a bore. (64) I say to you confidentially that semantics is a bore.

1.1.3. J.R. Searle

John R. Searle was a student of Austin’s at Oxford and later became Professor of Philosophy at the University of California. He was mainly interested in the philosophy of language and, therefore, his investigations and writings were focused in that direction. He wrote works such as An Essay In The Philosophy Of Language and Expression And Meaning, which continued the task begun by Austin and provided a major insight into the field of pragmatics and speech act theory. However, in reading Searle, I have discovered that he is much more concerned with revealing the linguistic mechanisms of the process of communication (which he achieves through a fairly thorough study of illocutionary acts) than with other matters, more related with performativity, which is the actual subject of my study. This is probably the main reason for the conciseness in the exposition of Searle’s theory in this dissertation. Therefore, I will be presenting those features within Searle’s theory which, in my opinion, are the most salient and provide the best background for the theoretical concepts I am here concerned with.

1.1.3.1. Conditions for promises

SEARLE (1969: 57-61) proposes a number of conditions for promises, viz.: “1. Normal input and output conditions obtain”, (i.e., the speaker’s talk is intelligible; and the hearer possesses the necessary conditions for understanding). “2. S expresses the proposition that p in the utterance of T.” “3. In expressing that p, S predicates a future act A of S.”

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“4. H would prefer S’s doing A to his not doing A, and S believes H would prefer his doing A to his not doing A.” “5. It is not obvious to both S and H that S will do A in the normal course of events.” “6. S intends to do A.” “7. S intends that the utterance of T will place him under an obligation to do A.” “8. S intends (i-I) to produce in H the knowledge (K) that the utterance of T is to count as placing S under an obligation to do A. S intends to produce K by means of the recognition of i-I, and he intends i-I to be recognized in virtue of (by means of) H’s knowledge of the meaning of T.” “9. The semantical rules of the dialect spoken by S and H are such that T is correctly and sincerely uttered if and only if conditions 1-8 obtain.”

I thought it could be interesting to include Searle’s set of conditions for promises because they focus on all the elements that participate in a promise and are, thus, fairly precise, not leaving much space for errors.

1.1.3.2. Classification of performatives

SEARLE (1976) [as appears in LEVINSON (1983: 240)] presented the following taxonomy of performatives, based on the types of action that can be performed in speaking:

(i) representatives, which commit the speaker to the truth of the expressed proposition (paradigm cases: asserting, concluding, etc.) (ii) directives, which are attempts by the speaker to get the addressee to do something (paradigm cases: requesting, questioning) (iii) commissives, which commit the speaker to some future course of action (paradigm cases: promising, threatening, offering) (iv) expressives, which express a psychological state (paradigm cases: thanking, apologizing, welcoming, congratulating) (v) declarations, which effect immediate changes in the institutional state of affairs and which tend to rely on elaborate extra-linguistic institutions (paradigm cases: excommunicating, declaring war, christening, firing from employment).

Searle’s taxonomy of performatives includes five types of performatives, like Austin’s, but they only seem to coincide totally on this and on the fact that the ‘commissive’ type (in the name given to it as well as in the type of performatives included within it) is equal for both Austin and Searle.

1.1.3.3. Felicity conditions

I would like to point out very briefly Searle’s suggestion that felicity conditions are not just ways in which utterances can go wrong, as Austin proposed, but that they are the constituing parts of the illocutionary forces of utterances. Searle shall not be further expounded, since that would lead this dissertation away from the area of study with which it is concerned.

1.2. THOMAS’S CATEGORIZATION OF PERFORMATIVES

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1.2.1. Ritual performatives

Ritual performatives constitute a fairly special class of utterances which, as THOMAS (1995: 37) claims, “are highly culturally dependent”. These utterances are very much subject to felicity conditions, since rituals involve extremely specific conditions as regards procedures, circumstances and participants. I will not provide Austin’s felicity conditions in this section, since they have already been presented in section 1.1.1.4 (specifically dedicated to felicity conditions). Some examples provided by THOMAS (1995: 37) are: (i) I sentence you to ten years’… (ii) I absolve you from your sins. (iii) I baptize you. (iv) I name this ship… THOMAS (1995: 37) clarifies that: “Each of these can only appropriately and successfully be uttered by the specified person in a specific situation (e.g. (i) by a judge in a court of law, (ii) by a priest, etc.)”.

1.2.2. Collaborative performatives

With respect to collaborative performatives, THOMAS (1995: 40) puts forward that:

Some writers have observed […] that some performatives do not have felicity conditions in the sense that a specified person must utter the words in particular circumstances, but nevertheless their success is not guaranteed. They require, for their success, the ‘collaboration’ or particular uptake of another person […].

That is, in order for «collaborative performatives» (THOMAS 1995: 40) to be successfully performed, there must be some kind of response on the part of another person. Otherwise, the performance of these «collaborative performatives» [THOMAS (1995: 40)] is not successful. Some examples given by THOMAS (1995:41) are:

(1) I bet/wager you five pounds… (2) I challenge you to pistols at dawn. (3) I bequeath you my gerbil.

Often, a particular collaborative performative has a corresponding response or uptake which is practically, if not totally, of its own, e.g.: ‘You’re on’ as a response to ‘I bet you…’. Thomas (1995: 41) also clarifies that: «As with a bet, a challenge is only successfully made when the other person accepts the challenge». This means that if I make a bet and nobody accepts my bet, then in that case I haven’t succeeded in betting.

1.2.3. Group performatives

This term refers to those performatives which, as Thomas (1995: 41) explains:

[…] are either commonly or necessarily produced by more than one person, e.g. a communiqué from a summit conference, a report from a committee and most obviously, a verdict from a jury (in the high court the judge responds to the

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statement by the foreman or forewoman of the jury by asking: ‘And is that the verdict of you all?’). Thomas continues explaining that group performatives may belong to either the metalinguistic, the ritual or the collaborative categories. Here is an example of a collaborative ritual performative chosen among the examples presented by Thomas (1995: 41): “This example is taken from the findings of the General Medical Council Disciplinary Committee:

(1) We do not judge you to be guilty of professional misconduct.”

1.2.4. Metalinguistic performatives

This category refers to the performative utterances which, as Thomas (1995 :33) puts forward:

[…] are self-referential (the verb refers to what the speaker of the utterance is doing), self-verifying (they contain their own truth-conditions) and non-falsifiable (they can never be untrue). Thomas goes on to explain that the set of metalinguistic performatives in any language is usually quite small and finite. A number of examples are provided in THOMAS (1995: 33):

(1) I say (7) I withdraw (my complaint) (2) I protest (8) I declare (the meeting open) (3) I object 9) I plead (not guilty) (4) I apologize (10) I vote (to abolish vivisection) (5) I deny (11) I move (that exams be abolished) (6) I promise (12) I thank (the audience for their attention)

A further example presented by Thomas (1995: 34) is the following:

(i)a I say that John is a liar. (i)b John is a liar.

There is a difference between these two sentences, which mainly consists in the truth conditions that affect the second sentence (i.e., “John is a liar” [THOMAS (1995: 34)]), but not the first one (i.e., «I say that John is a liar» [THOMAS (1995: 34)]). That is, if John can be proved to be a liar, then the sentence «John is a liar» is true. On the other hand, as THOMAS (1995: 34) explains,

Strictly speaking sentence (i)a is self-verifying. Whatever words follow I say that cannot, in strictly logical terms be untrue: all the speaker is doing is making a statement about what he or she is saying. 1.2.5. Culturally specific performatives

This category refers to a range of performatives which are particular to each individual culture and are, thus, very much linked to rituals belonging to and occurring within those cultures.

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As Thomas (1995: 43) expounds:

Obviously, if you live in a country/culture which does not have baptism, there will be no performative form I baptize you… Or the verb may exist, but cannot be used performatively. This is the case with the verb to divorce: in Britain divorce exists, and we have a verb to divorce, but (no matter what your religion) you cannot felicitously use the utterance I divorce you to separate yourself legally and permanently from your spouse. And even in countries where Sharia law operates, its interpretation may vary.

The following example, provided by THOMAS (1995: 43) illustrates how a divorce came into being in an islamic soap opera in Pakistan, when one of the characters

(1) […] divorced his television wife in traditional Muslim style, pronouncing Talaq – I divorce thee – three times. The trouble was that his TV spouse was played by his real wife, Samina. Now the ulemas are saying that the divorce is binding, even though the formula was spoken in the interests of art. Their decree maintains that the Prophet ordained that in three matters (marriage, divorce, and the freeing of slaves) words uttered unintentionally or even in jest cannot be withdrawn.[…]

Thomas also comments on the fact that the felicity conditions which govern a performative in one language or culture may not govern it in another.

1.2.6. Explicit vs. Implicit performatives

After having expounded the different types of performatives devised by Thomas, I would like to introduce Thomas’s distinction between explicit and implicit performatives, since I believe it is an important one. Thomas (1995: 47) defines an explicit performative as: «[…] a mechanism which allows the speaker to remove any possibility of misunderstanding the force behind an utterance». The difference between explicit and implicit performatives lies not so much in meaning, but in other elements that make it sometimes necessary to choose either one or the other. This choice depends mainly on the context; and choosing one or other alternative may imply that there is some kind of requirement «[…] that a specific form of language be used, […] while others imply a stylistic difference (e.g. in the degree of formality conveyed) or imply a difference in emphasis». (THOMAS 1995: 47-48). THOMAS (1995: 48) also provides the following examples:

(i) I apologize. (ii) I’m sorry.

And she explains that the main difference between these two sentences seems to be a difference in the degree of formality; i.e., the performative utterance (i) is used in contexts in which a higher degree of formality is required. I believe that its use may also depend on the reason that causes the speaker to have to issue utterance (i); i.e., the reason that leads the speaker to issue (i) may be of a greater magnitude than that which causes the speaker of (ii) to issue utterance (ii). Thus, a higher degree of formality is required in the case of utterance (i).

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On the other hand, however formal «I apologize» may be, Thomas explains that «I’m sorry» appears to be more sincere, probably because it is a description of the feelings of the speaker, and that might be what endows «I’m sorry» with its quality of sincerity. THOMAS (1995: 48) gives further arguments that illustrate the difference between explicit and implicit performatives:

[…] we often find that a speaker will first try an implicit performative and move onto an explicit performative only if the first attempt fails. People often avoid using an explicit performative since in many circumstances it seems to imply an unequal power relationship or a particular set of rights on the part of the speaker.

1.3. PERFORMATIVE VERBS: POTENTIALITY AND HEDGING 1.3.1. Potentially performative verbs

This notion refers to the verbs which are performative in potence, i.e., they are verbs which, because they are not used performatively, are potentially performative, they have the potential to be performative and yet they are not so because their realization in language is not a performative one. Any verb which is potentially performative is not performative if it is used in the past or in the perfect. In such cases, the use of the verb would be an instance of a descriptive use instead of a performative use. (All performative verbs can be used performatively; but all of them can also be used descriptively, in non-performative uses such as those which I have previously mentioned: in the past, in the perfect, etc.) This means that it is the potentiality of these verbs to be performative, i.e., if they were used in the first person singular present indicative active (although the possible slight variations of these features, such as plural instead of singular, or passive instead of active would be taken into account), then they would be performative. Some examples of potentially performative verbs would be the following:

(1) ‘I promised John that I would buy him a lollipop if he behaved properly’1 (2) ‘Passengers are requested to remain seated.’

The first example is potentially performative because the verb ‘to promise’ is in the past (instead of in the present). The second example is also potentially performative because the verb ‘to request’ is in the passive (and not in the active).

1.3.2. Hedged performatives

This term refers to performative verbs which are mitigated by the use of a modal verb which atenuates them. Some of the modal verbs used in these instances of hedged performatives are verbs such as ‘can’ and ‘must’. An example of hedged performative could be the following: ‘I must acknowledge that you are right’2. ––––––––– 1 Theses examples are my own. 2 This example is my own.

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In this example, the performative verb ‘to acknowledge’ is mitigated by the use of the modal verb ‘must’. I believe that the mitigation through the use of the modal verb produces some kind of semantic change in the utterance. Thus, when uttering: ‘I acknowledge that you are right’, the speaker is plainly acknowledging. However, I believe that if the speaker issues the utterance: ‘I must acknowledge that you are right’, although he/she is genuinely acknowledging, the meaning of the utterance is modified in some way. It is as if the speaker were, in a certain way, forced (maybe based on evidence) to acknowledge that the hearer is right about something.

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