Admiral Samuel Francis Du Pont
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
Kevin J. Weddle. Lincoln's Tragic Admiral: The Life of Samuel Francis Du Pont. Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 2005. 304 pp. $34.95, cloth, ISBN 978-0-8139-2332-1. Reviewed by John Schroeder Published on H-CivWar (May, 2006) Kevin J. Weddle has written an admirable bi‐ Although Weddle describes Du Pont's varied ography of this well-known antebellum American naval duties over a long career, the author argues naval officer. Born in 1803 to a well-connected that "the true significance of Du Pont's naval ca‐ and prominent family, Samuel Francis Du Pont, or reer" was the "tremendous and positive influence Frank as he was known, entered the navy when he exerted on the transformation of the United he was twelve and served for almost ffty years. States Navy structurally, technologically, and Since the naval officer ranks were cluttered in the strategically from the Mexican War through the years after the War of 1812, Du Pont rose slowly. Civil War" (p. 2). As an exceptionally bright, pro‐ He was promoted to lieutenant at age twenty- gressive and respected officer, Du Pont was an in‐ three after eleven years of service. At age forty, he fluential leader of those reform-minded naval of‐ became a commander after twenty-eight years of ficers who wanted to improve the efficiency of the service, and at age ffty-six a captain after forty navy, revamp the promotion system, introduce years of service. new steam and ordnance technologies, and mod‐ Like other officers he received typical peace‐ ernize the nation's naval strategy. As a result of time assignments in the antebellum navy, but Du his influence in the department and his determi‐ Pont distinguished himself as a exceptionally tal‐ nation to reform the navy's officer personnel sys‐ ented officer. As commander of the Cyane in Cali‐ tem, Du Pont emerged as an extremely controver‐ fornia waters during the Mexican War, Du Pont sial fgure for his role in the naval Efficiency helped blockade Mexican ports, fought briefly, Board of 1855. Du Pont recommended, designed, and embellished his rising reputation. He later and then served on the board that reviewed the commanded the frst-class screw frigate Minne‐ performance and ftness for sea duty of some 250 sota on the diplomatic mission that carried diplo‐ officers. The board eventually recommended that mat William B. Reed to China and resulted in the a total of 111 officers be removed in some way Treaty of Tientsin in 1858. from active duty, thus creating a major political controversy for the Secretary of the Navy and H-Net Reviews President, but unclogging the promotion channels Since Admiral Francis Du Pont was an ad‐ for dozens of long-serving officers like Du Pont. mirable and likeable naval officer, any biographer Once the Civil War began, Du Pont played an would be tempted to defend him against critics invaluable role on the Blockade Board that de‐ and to explain away his shortcomings. But Wed‐ signed the Union's basic naval strategy for the dle is not a hagiographer. While acknowledging war. Then in November 1861, he led the naval ex‐ Du Pont's many attributes, he criticizes his faults pedition that brilliantly attacked and captured and mistakes. For example, with respect to the de‐ Port Royal, South Carolina. Du Pont was now both bacle at Charleston in 1863, Weddle criticizes the a national hero and the navy's most distinguished actions of Secretary Gideon Welles and Assistant officer. In July 1862, he also became one of the Secretary Gustavus Fox in the Navy Department, U.S. Navy's frst three rear admirals. His stature but he also concludes that "at Charleston his [Du and popularity would not last, however. Over the Pont's] demoralized performance was lackluster, next seventeenth months, Du Pont increasingly and he demonstrated little aggressiveness" (p. found himself at odds with the Navy Department 214). Weddle has written a well-informed and bal‐ over the question of whether and how Charleston anced biography which should be of interest to should be attacked and conquered. Eventually, the both American historians as well as to general department ordered Du Pont to proceed with an readers with an interest in the mid-nineteenth- exclusively naval attack instead of a joint army century U.S. Navy. and navy assault that Du Pont advocated. In a rather fatalistic and less than wholehearted man‐ ner, Du Pont did as he was ordered, but the attack failed miserably in April 1863. Subsequently hu‐ miliated and disgraced by the Navy Department, Du Pont did not receive another combat com‐ mand. Du Pont died shortly after the war ended in 1865 with his reputation still tarnished. Lincoln's Tragic Admiral is based on the ex‐ tensive records of the Navy Department and the voluminous Du Pont papers. Clearly organized and well written, the book strikes an admirable balance between descriptive narrative and ana‐ lytical interpretation. The book is also an appro‐ priate length. Given the duration of DuPont's ca‐ reer and the volume of available primary sources, this book could have been much, much longer, but Weddle knows how to distinguish between what is significant and worth writing about, and what is insignificant and not worth telling. As a result, the book is devoted primarily to Du Pont's efforts to transform the navy in the 1850s and to his important role in the frst two years of the Civ‐ il War. 2 H-Net Reviews If there is additional discussion of this review, you may access it through the network, at https://networks.h-net.org/h-civwar Citation: John Schroeder. Review of Weddle, Kevin J. Lincoln's Tragic Admiral: The Life of Samuel Francis Du Pont. H-CivWar, H-Net Reviews. May, 2006. URL: https://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=11759 This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 United States License. 3.