frOm claD in irOns tO irOnclaDs The Union Navy and Naval Emancipation, 1861-1863 Adopting a largely unexplored perspective, this article attempts to understand the processes and explanations for naval emancipation during the American Civil War. Te Union Navy accepted and enlisted runaway slaves earlier and in greater relative proportions than the Union Army, even though the latter receives greater attention among proponents of the “self-emancipation thesis.” Tis article ofers three related explanations for why the Navy was more likely to accept runaway slaves. First, a host of practical and legal factors gave the Navy a signifcant man- power defciency. Second, the institutional history of the Navy facilitated emancipation. Tird, the diaries of of- fcers and sailors suggest that the experience of being on blockade signifcantly afected white sailors and persuaded them to endorse naval emancipation. More broadly, this study has implications for students of the American Civil War. It shows that slaves had been liberating themselves long before government ofcials had approved it and were being used directly to fuel the war efort, providing much needed manpower to sustain the ships serving on blockade duty. Tis article thus calls attention to a long-overlooked element of self-emancipation during the American Civil War. By Jonathan Feld Princeton University n January 1, 1863, Abraham Lincoln issued the Proclamation.6 Dudley Cornish has called the reception of Emancipation Proclamation, a document now en- contrabands and their enlistment in the armed forces part shrined in American history. Lincoln declared that of a broader efort to “free the slaves and let them fght to O“all persons held as slaves within said designated States [in preserve the Union.”7 James Oakes also emphasizes military rebellion]…are, and henceforward shall be, free.”1 He in- emancipation as the beginning of an undertaking in which voked the moral authority of the “judgment of mankind and “180,000 black men” would be recruited over the course the gracious favor of Almighty God” and his constitutional of the war, proving “indispensable to northern victory” authority “as Commander-In-Chief of the Army and Navy” and “slavery’s destruction.”8 For historians like Oakes, the to justify the measure.2 While ofen receiving less emphasis, importance of the Emancipation Proclamation is not its Lincoln also directed the “military and naval authority” of language of freedom, but rather its instruction that Union the country to “recognize and maintain the freedom of such soldiers entice slaves to escape, accelerating the enlistment persons” while prohibiting attempts at “repress[ing]…any ef- of black troops.9 forts they may make for their actual freedom.”3 Furthermore, he instructed that “persons of suitable condition will be re- However, a closer examination of the Emancipation ceived into the armed service of the United States,” allowing Proclamation also hints at the underemphasized the freed slaves to enlist in the Union’s armed forces.4 emancipatory role of the Union Navy. President Lincoln specifically mentioned that the emancipated slaves would However, the process of emancipation is ofen be able to “man vessels of all sorts.”10 Historian William mischaracterized in two fundamental ways. First, it is Fowler once lamented that “the nation remembered the ofen claimed that President Lincoln, with the stroke of his Federal soldiers, [but] it did not remember its sailors” pen, established a policy to free Southern slaves through when celebrating the Union’s victory.11 In much the same the Emancipation Proclamation.5 In fact, Union military way, the Navy’s role in emancipatory efforts between ofcers had already been receiving and, in efect, freeing 1861 and 1863 has largely been forgotten. In fact, naval slaves for nearly two years. Runaway slaves, ofcially emancipation represented a distinctly aggressive form called ‘contrabands,’ had been feeing to Union lines since of military emancipation, with the Navy accepting and shots were frst fred at Fort Sumter. Second, historians enlisting contrabands earlier and in greater relative who study this early emancipation ofen emphasize the proportions than the Army. Naval emancipation, and the operations conducted by the Union Army as the focal point riddle of its interpretation, is certainly worthy of further of a “military emancipation” that predated the Emancipation exploration in the broader study of emancipation. 116 Jonathan Feld Tough relatively few sources directly address the Navy’s Nonetheless, comparing these two sets of policies brings process of formulating a contraband policy, they span a their diferences into stark relief. In reality, while the two wide array of perspectives. For example, contemporary branches’ responses to increasing numbers of fugitive slaves newspapers provide commentary on the fight of slaves may seem quite similar, the Navy was actually accepting and from their masters.12 Other valuable resources such as enlisting runaway slaves much earlier and in greater relative Acts of Congress, Executive Orders, and General Orders proportions than the Army. In this sense, James McPherson mark key moments in the development of the Navy’s rightly emphasizes “the [specifc] role of the Navy in freeing policy. Elsewhere, a closer examination of ofcial and slaves” and the “vital contributions of black sailors” while personal correspondence provides important context for pointing out that “the Navy was a year ahead of the Army in understanding these attempts to articulate a cohesive policy. recruiting contrabands.”21 Not only was the Navy recruiting Letters between Secretary of the Navy Gideon Welles and contrabands earlier than the Army, but it was also doing so naval ofcers reveal the motives behind the Navy’s policies. in far greater proportions. Over the course of the war, up Similarly, other documents contained within the Ofcial to twenty percent of the Navy’s sailors were black, nearly Records of the Union and Confederate Navies in the War of the twice the equivalent proportion in the Army.22 However, Rebellion are invaluable in tracking the historical trajectory there has been no comprehensive explanation of this of the Navy’s policies.13 Other documents provide insights phenomenon and the factors that motivated this form of into the motives of specifc actors and individuals. Andrew early naval emancipation. Hull Foote’s Africa and the American Flag demonstrates the abolitionist sentiment that resulted from the Navy’s activity I will propose three categories of explanations for the in preventing the transatlantic slave trade via the Africa eager incorporation of a doctrine of naval emancipation Squadron.14 Similarly, diaries provide personal insight into that consisted of the acceptance and enlistment of fugitive the mechanics and efects of naval emancipation. Te diary slaves. These categories are complementary and intended and letters of Admiral Samuel Francis Du Pont, most known to organize the many components that drove naval for his failed assault on Charleston in 1863, illustrate the emancipation. First, many practical concerns and needs growth of abolitionist sentiment among naval ofcers that forced the Navy to recruit slaves far more intensively than resulted directly from the war itself.15 Together, these sources the Army did. Chronic manpower shortages coupled with help to explain the important role of the Navy in the reception the rapid growth of the Navy during the early phase of of runaway slaves prior to the Emancipation Proclamation. the war forced officials to look for alternative methods of recruitment, thus facilitating naval emancipation. At The development of the Navy’s policy towards contrabands the same time, contrabands possessed useful experience before the Emancipation Proclamation must be juxtaposed that would lead them to serve as sailors, stewards, with the progress of the Army’s policies during the same engineers, and pilots while denying these same resources period. Thus far, many historians have described the to the Confederacy. Second, for institutional reasons, respective evolutions of these policies in complementary the Navy was more receptive to the notion of accepting terms. For instance, Barbara Brooks Tomblin links the and incorporating contrabands into its ranks. Due to Army receiving “thousands of black fugitives” with naval historical, political, and social precedents, it was easier officers’ surprise that “African Americans also began to for the Navy to enlist contrabands early in the war. For seek freedom and sanctuary on board federal vessels.”16 example, the Navy had a pre-existing tradition of allowing William Gould IV pairs the two branches when he argues blacks into the service. This practice lowered both the that slaves prompted policy decisions “by enlisting, first legal and social barriers to accepting contrabands aboard in the U.S. Navy and later in the U.S. Army.”17 Gould ships. Furthermore, the Navy’s experience in stopping the notes other similarities between the branches, such as the transatlantic slave trade with the Africa Squadron gave the dependence of both policies on the compliance of local branch a prior firsthand encounter with slavery, affecting officers.18 Often, the emancipation of slaves was effected its senior officers and causing some, such as Andrew Hull by joint operations between the branches. Tomblin notes Foote, to embrace plans for emancipation. Third, wartime that, though naval vessels encountered many slaves experiences would