‘Burnt Skies of Afghanistan: Military Aviation in the Afghan War'

by Viktor Markovsky

"Afghanistan" – a firm word, deeply rooted into our minds inevitably portraying another firm word - war. Indeed, we’re talking about a country that fought for decades without interruption. The Soviet Union’s invasion in Afghanistan started in December 1979, and it ended up being the most extensive military conflict that involved Soviet soldiers after WWII. This war brought down a generation, and whether we like it or not, the word “Afghan” is excessively related to war and conflict.

The war happening at the southern borders of the former Soviet Union is far from being over. Things weren’t always like this though ... For many years, the Soviet Union and Afghanistan were strongly connected; there once was a friendly, mutual relation between the two. It was in 1919 when Afghanistan gained independence, and in that same year, Russia first recognized its sovereignty. In the postwar years, Afghanistan was ruled by King Zahir Shah and Daoud Khan, his successor, who had great respect for the Soviet Union, considering it a reliable ally.

Afghanistan worked for many years with the Soviet specialists. There were roads and enterprises built, as well as various exchanges of goods that brought many benefits to the Soviet Union. Things like blankets, galoshes, and even trucks were traded between the two countries; surprisingly, the Soviet Union was extremely grateful for all the things sent, considering it was considered an impoverished neighboring country. On the other side, items like kitchen utensils and missiles belonging to the Afghan army were of Russian origin. URSS had the best officers, and the whole Soviet army was packed with experts and advisers who helped develop the finest combat techniques, and thus sharpen and organize the service.

There was a “leap into socialism” proclaimed in 1978 when Afghanistan’s relations with the Soviet Union were destroyed. The April Revolution brought along significant changes that led to bloody struggles for power, massive repression and executions.

The party that called itself the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) went to work with the Bolsheviks, thus destroying “the reactionary clergy, merchants and feudal lords"; they relocated in an Islamic country with centuries-old customs and traditions under the guise of "democratic reforms." Hafizullah Amin, one of the leaders of the PDPA and great admirer of Stalin brought into the discussion a radical way of solving the problem: "There are ten thousand landowners in our country. We will destroy them, and the issue has been resolved. "

In the absence of a dictatorship, an army of more than 100,000 people was put together - 650 tanks and 150 combat aircrafts (Air Force possessed then MiG-17, MiG-21, Su-7 and IL-28). However, it was not enough for Kabul, which started facing growing resistance and endless revolt from the opposition. Even more tyranny and repression followed – 12,000 people had to be executed, many of them were from the military. In the spring and summer of 1979 there was nothing but rebellion and revolt. Kabul forces tried their best but couldn’t keep the situation under control. The most notable uprising happened in March, at a garrison in Herat where many Soviet advisers were killed – they were the first victims of the war between Afghanistan and the Soviet Union.

The Soviet Union asked for urgent assistance from partners and allies, and they received troops and weaponry almost weekly. “To support the revolution”, the rulers of Afghanistan needed at least two Soviet divisions, landing parts, Spetsnaz brigades, combat helicopters, crews for combat equipment, personal security battalions and even divisions of the Soviet militia. Additional points were required for the “construction of socialism”, in addition to armor, artillery and helicopter gunships; there was an urgent need to “send napalm and gas bombs” and attack rebellious villages.

The Soviet government remained pretty calm, and it didn’t interfere too much. Military assistance and armament supply was limited, and advisors were sent to deal with the Afghan military. In spite of this measure, in the autumn of 1979 things got out of control – throughout the country there were imminent clashes with the opposition forces and the rebel tribes.

December 23, 1979 - a "Pravda" message says: "Recently, the Western, especially the Americans, spread some rumors that an intervention of the Soviet Union had targeted Afghanistan. Allegedly, the Afghans entered Soviet "combat troops." All this was of course, pure fiction. "However, the order to invade had already been given. A few days later, LI Brezhnev explained in an interview his need to "prevent Afghanistan from becoming an imperialist military foothold at the southern border of the Soviet Union.”

The Kremlin’s choice for a military solution had negative effects for various reasons: they wanted to improve the geopolitical environment, by expanding the number of countries with a socialist orientation and an ideological conviction, thus supporting a “revolutionary process”. Belief in "the only correct doctrine" and the truth of forces pushed the Soviet government to the decree - "to send to Afghanistan limited military contingents to undertake tasks that require the help of the Government of Afghanistan. These tasks had to assist Afghanistan in repelling foreign aggression. "Along the way, the advanced detachment of the Marines was instructed to get rid of the most odious part of the government in Kabul, government suspected for wanting to "surrender the country to the Americans."

After sending the troops, the Kremlin didn’t want Afghanistan, already engulfed in a civil war, to notice that they had to involve Soviet soldiers and officers. The operation itself, seemed grandiose; yet, it was nothing but a set of mobilization measures and redeployment of the army.

The military intervention experienced in Hungary and Czechoslovakia, instilled confidence in the success of the troops. But this time, it played an evil role - the army was in the middle of a conflict, where the foreign military presence had provoked increased insurgency, directed primarily against the Soviet troops; the ignorance portrayed toward the local customs and traditions of the East degraded the situation, many times multiplying enemy ranks.

At the next meeting of the CPSU Central Committee, in June 1980, it was proclaimed: "Bravery, the only true, the only wise step taken towards Afghanistan, was perceived with fulfillment by every Soviet man." Kremlin strategists thought about another historical experience – which was not bound by the success of the three Anglo-Afghan wars, whose outcome is still at the end of the last century summarizes British Ferrier: "An alien who happens to get to Afghanistan, will be under the special protection of the sky, if you come out healthy, intact and with a head on your shoulders. “Following his footsteps, soldiers and officers of the 40th Army move south...

MiG – 21

Among the aircrafts transferred to Afghanistan during the Soviet troops, the most widespread were the fighters. At the start of January 1980, there were only helicopters approved - "for aerial work" in the Army Aviation. The presence of the 40th Army’s fighter aircrafts was triggered by fear of countermeasures on the West’s side. "Aggressive imperialism - officially read "legend"- eager to set on the slopes of the Hindu Kush missiles aimed at the Soviet Union" - so the possibility of a direct collision with the Americans and their allies was taken seriously; on this matter, in a memorandum of the Central Committee of the CPSU it was stated: "... we have to deal with the combined forces of the United States and other NATO countries, China and Australia." Afghanistan’s neighboring Muslim states are ruled out as they could come to the rescue of their “brothers of faith”. Based on these forecasts, an operation to "help the people of Afghanistan in their struggles against foreign aggression" was built. For air cover of the 40th Army, there was an anti-aircraft missile brigade included, and from the DRA airfields, the first fighter and bomber-fighter aircraft flew; they were part of the MiG-21 squadron. The fighter aircrafts belonged to the 115-th Guards. IAP, based on the Kokayty airfield and commanded by Lt. Col. P. Nikolaev. Their colleagues served with the 136th FBAR from Chirchik in Uzbekistan. Leadership in the army was carried out by Colonel VP Shpak, the 40th Army’s deputy commander of the air force. The transfer was carried out in the nearby airfield (Kokayty, which was positioned behind the mountain, about fifty kilometers from the border). The airfield was meant to handle a relatively small force, limiting the involvement of local aviation units from the forces that existed in Turkestan and in the Central Asian Military District (TurkVO and CAMD). The same thing applied to the whole 40th Army, with the exception of airborne units. Just in case a high alert was given, the remaining parts of the Air Force and Air Defense - including the most remote military districts, had to be prepared to protect "the southern borders". They had a heavy interceptor prepared called Tu-128, which came from the north.

At first, they attracted dedicated flights as part of the 34th Mixed Air Corps, which was included in the TurkVO and sent to Afghanistan by the Soviet troops according to the Directive Defense Ministry and General Staff № 312/12/001, which was in charge of guiding the troops in December 24, 1979. This guidance document, signed by the Minister of Defense of the USSR, DF Ustinov and by the Chief of Staff, NV Ogarkov, identified specific objectives for the implicated parties. Within the document, it was also uncovered an explanation to the need of making another move: "In view of the military-political situation in the Middle East, which had the Afghan government deeply involved, a decision was taken. It was centered on several Soviet troops stationed in the southern parts of the country, on the territory of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, and it was meant to offer international assistance to the friendly Afghan people, as well as create favorable conditions for the interdiction of possible anti- Afghan actions by neighboring states ...”

The deployment of the troops in Afghanistan - for an attack that was expected from the south, for which they could have broken the American aircraft carriers with the 7th Fleet by "the Pakistani military clique” – had nearly 200 combat aircrafts. The border with Iran was covered by the Anti-Shah revolution – which had its own problems already, so it was considered relatively safe. Undoubtedly, the military leadership had in mind a thorough assessment of the situation and didn’t believe in the “horror stories” issued by the propaganda – later on, Nikolai Vasilievich Cinders, who was the chief of staff, spoke about some of the arguments, classifying them as "implausible fiction and not very smart." Americans barely recovered from the exhausting Vietnam War, and they couldn’t just hop on a new adventure. Also, Afghanistan's neighbors didn’t want to enter a new conflict so soon, especially with the almighty Soviet state. At least, during the planning of the General Staff entry operations, a 3rd opposing force was considered unlikely and it was not taken into account very seriously.

MiG – 21 Chart

Meanwhile, if the outside threat was real, that would expose the Soviet territory. They wouldn’t have had the necessary fighters to cover the whole area, as they would have needed at least 6 fighter regiments. Needless to say, this sort of event was not planned for the implementation or deployment of the troops, and the fighter forces as part of the 40th Air Army were brought to a regular regiment.

With regards to the policy issued at the beginning of the reform, in 1980, the Air Force and the Air Defense together with the old structure, replaced all air districts which were subordinate to general military command, and the 34 Sak (34 Composite Air Corps) became the Air Force of the 40th Army.

Hence, the 40th Army became the sole part of the Soviet Armed Forces to have its own air force. The decision was quite justified and it proved to be effective (as opposed to a similarly planned transfer of military aviation in weak districts of the Union, which became a bad experience, and subsequently canceled).

115th Guards Orsha Orders of Kutuzov and Alexander Nevsky Fighter Wing was the most decorated aviation unit of the Soviet Air Force. Being formed on the eve of the Great Patriotic War near Odessa, the regiment went through the war with great honors from the first to the last day; it fought in Belarus and in the Baltic States, ending battles in May 1945 in Czechoslovakia. In Memory of the Military Merit, one of the squadrons of the regiment carried the honorary title of "Moscow" and the other called the "Soviet Lithuania." Nevertheless, the involvement of the regiment to participate in the Afghan campaign was by no means dictated by the same services in combat: the choice was in fact, up to the 115th, which at the time was the only fighter regiment tactical aviation throughout TurkVO. Additional forces represented air defense forces, but their involvement was not of significant importance.

When planning an aviation transfer, a major problem arises – distribution of available forces. There were only 4 airfields suitable for the deployment of modern combat aircrafts - Kabul, Bagram, Kandahar and Shindand. They were all located at an altitude of 1500-2500 m above the sea level. All of them got approval, particularly Kandahar and Bagram, for their arrangements with King Zahir Shah.

MiG-21bis from the 115th Guards. One of the squadrons of the regiment carrying the honorary title of "Soviet Lithuania"

The relocation of the 115 fighters was made almost simultaneously at the beginning of the invasion and landing of the paratroopers in Kabul and Bagram. On December 27, 1979, in the middle of the day, the 1st Squadron Regiment flew under controlled demand, from an airfield in Bagram. The squadron had 12 combat MiG-21bis and 2 "Sparky" MiG-21UM. The operation to capture the airfields had been prepared with the utmost care - Marines scattered the air base at night and quickly learned to master the nodal structures; the initial plans were extremely meticulous, considering that they knew exactly where the furniture was placed inside the rooms; also, they were aware of the front door’s opening direction. The engineering staff, management group and all other necessary military facilities for the aviation regiment arrived a few days later on their own.

After the New Year, the headquarters of the 40th Aviation Army moved to a new place of service. It arrived in Kabul, on January 9. The air force’s first commander was Lieutenant-General Martyniuk (he was in charge from February 2, 1980 and then superseded by Major-General B. Lepaevym. Colonel GV Yakunin was the army’s Deputy Air Force Commander for engineering services, and leading authority for the MiG-21 was VP Shilin, who flew for the first time on the 21st, hence the name of the aircraft.

It was soon discovered that a single fighter squadron was not enough. On February 23, 1980 on the Day of the Soviet Army (Red Army Day), a 2nd Squadron was sent out; it belonged to the 115th regiment. Another squadron was brought to Kabul, at the end of March, but later it returned to Bagram, leaving a single unit in Kabul for air defense implementation. Apart from the fighter aircrafts, there was a MiG-21R squadron and several helicopters present, too. To enhance the southbound fighters, a 2nd Squadron was implemented on May 1980, at the Kandahar Airfield, located on the edge of the Registan desert. Challenge fighters stationed in Bagram, were assigned to cover the central and eastern regions. Bagram had a powerful air force base, 50 miles north of Kabul, which looked impressive and it was best suited for the deployment of fighter aircraft. The airfield dated back to King Zahir Shah and it served as home base and training center for the Afghan Air Force; there were many MiG-21 and Su-7BMK, and all of them played a significant role in April Revolution, in 1978. The unit was first-class and the concrete raceway had a length of 3,300 m. Its width allowed fighter aircrafts to take off instantly.

Navigation systems, communications, and even lighting fixtures were not new, but they satisfied the conditions of the modern aviation. Parking lots were built, powerful aircraft shelters – which were real fortresses made of boulders and stones, poured concrete and packed with lodging, communication, and other necessary facilities.

MiG-21 aircraft flying over Kabul

The planes had full cover standing, and the whole airfield had repair facilities, workshops, warehouses and storage facilities for fuel. Its radio equipment and means of operational control, as everything in the Afghan army was of Soviet origin and all set to receive new "guests."

The Afghan aircraft equipment was internal and could benefit from maintenance and repairs at any given time from its Afghan colleagues. If they needed components or parts, they could have easily borrowed them. Bagram’s proximity to USSR’s border simplified the supply – there was an air base with a large garrison between Afghanistan and the Soviet Union.

After living in the Union’s garrison, first impressions of a new place of service were not joyful. Captain Shevelev, who was the first to arrive in Bagram, wrote: "As far the weapons were concerned, the ones we didn’t use were dismantled on the spot. Upon arrival, I got out of the aircraft, and I came across the most fabulous mountains; they were situated around the steppe, and over the mountains. There was white snow on the top and the day was incredibly sunny for my eyes to bear. Somehow though, the scenery was like ripped from a postcard. On arriving on the racetrack though, a Mi-24 got a bullet from an ANC machinegun; the pilot’s windscreen was shot. Wow! It was all about the weapons. All loaded and with the aim to kill. My mood changed instantly and reality struck – after all, it turns out that people are killed here.

He had to to live in a mud hut on the outskirts of the airport, since arrival spots were not enough for everyone. The ceiling was fissured and the windows had cracks; you could hear the wind blowing as the plywood got hammered. The stove gave heat until it couldn’t anymore, or it went out, and the cold came inside again. At night, everybody woke because of the shooting or random firings.

Upon relocation to Kabul, things didn’t seem to improve at all – people were in tents, it was really cold and damp, and dirt was spread everywhere. The tanks were dragging barrels of water for bathing and drinking. As for the food, only porridge, dried potatoes and frozen Pollock was available.

Kombat announced that they brought extra provisions, but nobody could see a single can. For three days the temperatures were below 40 degrees, and then for another week, the weather was still in terrible condition.

View over Bagram with a fighter aircraft taking off

Behind traces of deadly traps heat protection from missiles

The weather - particularly cold and wet at night, felt like the mountain was really close. Damn you winter, with endless snow and hills buried either on one side or the other, or both. The Afghan soldiers are not working in the snow. They’re probably at home drinking a cup of really hot tea. The aircrafts take off only when the snow ceases and it gets warmer. A very strong wind emerges almost every day, in the evening. It blows at an incredible speed, and it feels as if leather whips are hitting insanely. In this first winter, most pilots had to stay in tents and constantly remain equipped with dugouts (as formulated in the official papers - "with the personnel resources in tent, as well as mobile car-houses"). The engineering department of the 40th Army’s Air Staff was no better place since it was just a shack without a roof and windows.

This reserved shack served as a dormitory and a recreation room. To escape from the snow and from the freezing rain, you had to pull the top cover of the MiG-21. We slept on broken beds, covered in overcoats and sitting near small stoves. We still didn’t have a place to wash our clothes, and to stay warm we had to use the energy from mobile diesel generators, which were water hauled from local sources and newly drilled wells.

Gear up! The garrisons were equipped with stationary diesel power plants, which had a centralized power supply, built-in boilers, water sources and treatment facilities. Close to the tents, towns with residences and office areas emerged. At the same time, as mentioned in the same document, "a large amount of construction work on office- technical buildings, barracks and residential townships was performed by the units deployed on the ground."

In time, house modules, offices and prefabricated sheds for equipment appeared. The famous Afghan house module was formally known to have a "regular collapsible design", and its formal name was Module "K-120"; it hold materials for wood and plywood panels on a metal frame with an already stretched wiring and other household amenities. For the writing staff, training facilities existed and other service facilities, such as designed structures.

For the construction of such facilities, from two to four months had to be allotted (with the caution about the "timely filing of building materials and structures", - all necessary required to carry thousands of miles away from the Soviet Union, despite the fact that priority was to provide transport, weapons and fuel to the army, and other things).

The production was an independent arrangement with the only available material - from beams and planks to rocket ammunition boxes. Over time, these temporary garrisons became genuine boroughs painted in khaki boards; after some more time, they grew so big that they ended up replacing the garrisons. Villages were built with houses that had saunas and baths.

In the first stage, the fighter aircraft of the 40th Army was introduced as MiG-21bis – it contained the honorable “twenty-first”, although by the time the Afghan campaign arrived, the MiG-21 was an innovation. It was not very easy for technology to advance, and at the beginning of the 70s, the MiG-23 fighter aircraft made an entrance. They were in the “first-line”, positioned to the West and Far East, where the border with China created some serious tensions.

The mountains seemed to be approaching the Bagram airfield

The 115th IAP had 75 MiG-21bis manufactured, in two main versions: the 1st squadron flew on machines with a common configuration, while the 2nd squadron had more advanced aircrafts with radio range navigation RSBN, as part of the landing navigation equipment “Flight-1 was interacting with the ground using a course-glide system - the Katetov-SP". The modern equipment significantly improved the accuracy of aircraft triangulation, thus making navigation a lot easier, considering that Afghanistan was going through some pretty tough times. The Sunset instrumental method could reach a height of 50 m at any time and in any weather conditions. Pilots who flew “twenty-first aircrafts” didn’t even know about the improvements. Furthermore, it looks like the MiG was not allowed to use that piece of equipment – it was not because the Afghans couldn’t use the technology, but apparently the systems were not considered necessary. “Encore” maintenance simplified the implementation of an automated aircraft engine control.

That being said, things were relative at the time. We’re talking about an old truth illustrated in a Chirchik neighborhood, populated with MiG-21PFM aircrafts. A fighter was not considered the most innovative plane, and the MiG-21Bis was an excellent machine, yet not suitable in the role of a fighter-bomber, like MiG-21PFM. All these aircrafts aged beautifully; some lasted more than 15 years, until to be upgraded to a strike aircraft. They worked pretty well, and the pilots were able to shoot at ground targets and throw bombs with exceptional precision.

There was a “bisovskuyu” modification performed on the MiG-21PFM to set it apart from its “twin”, the MiG-21Bis. These were only similar in appearance; they were quite different from a technical point of view. MiG-21bis was equipped with a new engine - R25-300 – which weighed 3.5 tons. It had more room than a tank and it featured a different type of equipment, a more qualitative type. It also had a heavy radio system, and a fuel supply that modified its landing quality. Nonetheless, the mere fact that it was heftier played a vital role in the plane’s agility. The MiG-21Bis surpassed all other modifications on the ramp, including takeoff performance and climb rate. The take-off run afterburner only required 830 m, unlike its predecessor which needed 950 m (in thin air, the upstream Afghan airfields required increased distance, although the length of the runway was more than enough for planes to take off, even with normal combat load). The maximum vertical velocity at the surface reached 235 m/s, surpassing the similar quality of the MiG-23. The MiG-21bis reached17, 800 m in 9 minutes.

Peaceful-looking Airfield in Kandahar

Things worked out pretty well in specific Afghan areas, particularly in remote locations: a MiG-21bis with a ventral suspended tank managed to fly at 1480 km, and the duration of the flight was roughly 2 hours. Due to the remoteness of the area, piloting the aircraft with the tank was done smoothly. In some ways, the flight succeeded also because of the navigation system, which gave confidence to the pilot, in spite of the fact that the areas were completely isolated. The equipment maintained the accuracy of the aircraft, which flew across the battle site and returned safely to the airfield.

MiG-21bis was significantly superior from its predecessor, and it was a notable combat machine with great potential for carrying extra weight and payload arsenal. In the MiG-21PF, the combat capabilities were limited to holding only two bombs or rocket blocks UB-16-57. The "Bis" on the other hand, was equipped with a built-in GSh-23L and could carry weapons on four underwing holders, due to the high thrust-weight ratio and reinforced construction. It also had suspension possibilities and could carry bombs that weighed half a ton. On the outside, it could bear two "pyatisotok" on internal nodes of 250 kg.

The aircraft could hold all kinds of weapons, no matter how heavy or new they were, including bomb ranks, which allowed the suspension of 10 stokilogrammovye bombs with 32 charging units UB-32. The use of weapons opened up a new perspective, mainly focused on using automatized ammunition. In case of overload, there was a firing maneuver (the MiG-21PF had a collimator device known as the grandfather ASP-PF-21). As a result, the MiG-21bis was mainly used as a sophisticated and powerful tool for ground targets, which could have easily “cleaned” everything in its way. The MiG-21PF on the other hand, had a more representative impact; it was a fighter-bomb aircraft. In this case, ground attacks, bombings and shootings didn’t involve fighter wonder machines – hard work was required for a desired result including combat training of fighter aircrafts (PCU IA-75) executed by the pilots, appropriate exercises, and proper training to prove they were indispensable. The “Bis” aircraft does feature some drawback, too: it has a potyazhelevshy mechanism meant to increase wing loading - at a normal speed, the takeoff weight of this parameter reaches 380 kg/sq. m vs. 330 kg/sq. m from its predecessor.

From the ground, the bend radius of the MiG-21bis is less than one kilometer, which is 1.5 times higher than the Su- 17 and MiG-23. This can a significant drawback when working at ground level. The reversals impended the construction of combat maneuvers in a big way, too. The pilot had high chances of losing its target objective because of the distance. A 15% difference in loading manifest could have happened as well, because of low speed behavior and rigorous coordination, especially during combat. All these added features of the Mi-G 21Bis had a direct impact on the combat use of the aircraft.

The autopilot had an AP-155 availability to monitor the behavior of the aircraft roll and pitch, maintain the required rate, height and restrained oscillations of the plane. The pilot had to pay attention to the machine’s behavior, too. Pilots had to fly the aircraft close to the horizon, especially since at night or between the clouds they could easily lose their orientation abilities. Switching the plane to autopilot made it return to its normal position. The AP-155 system allowed the pilot to use the withdrawal mode, particularly useful when flying at low altitudes.

For 136th FBAR aviators, some of the Afghan events began at the airport. Shortly after the April 1978 revolution, in Kabul, the regiment raised the alarm several times in the event of unforeseen developments in Kokayty, at the very edge.

Flight map of Kabul and the surrounding areas with the convenience of marked squares for guidance

The commander of the battalion, Colonel Victor Sikorski, didn’t know too much about the plans of command (he was not aware of the direction Afghanistan was heading). He brought the regiment on high alert and changed his home though, and even started practicing with two weeks before the event. Another alert was declared in the early morning of December 11. Further developments were recalled by Commander Vyacheslav Tashtamyshev: “I learned from experienced that pilots shouldn’t be in a hurry. I packed my bags, my equipment, had my breakfast and slowly went to the airfield. It didn’t look like the transport was going to sit and wait for too long. Many didn’t take what they really needed, not even a toothbrush, assuming that their homes were about to be demolished. Afterwards, the anxiety became real and we started sensing that something was going to happen. A bus arrived to take us to the airport. Upon arrival, I waited for the team, and nobody did anything until the commander arrived. When he came, he said that the entire regiments was going to Kokayty. It was not a surprise (since it was not the first time).

Those who didn’t have their personal belongings, were sent back to get them, on foot, running. The training was very simple: set up a radio direction finder and gain control of the MiG-21PFM, which was sitting in the cockpit; the whole setup took about 15-20 minutes to draw with a pencil on a card – straight line, self-distance navigator, rate and time of all navigational calculations, and everything was completed. Things changed unexpectedly on December 25, when several combat areas in Afghanistan were “cut” and the pilots didn’t have work for the upcoming days.

The 115th Guard – the pilots and the aircraft

At this point, the troops entered Afghanistan through the Amu Darya border. The first targeted area was located on the west side of Mazar-i-Sharif, near the road, while the second was at the eastern border of Tashkurgan. In between, there was the road to Kabul. A couple of planes were sent; these had ventral FTB-490 and a couple of C-5 blocks. The whole issue was formulated in general terms: “… you’re in the zone, just in case the aerial controllers on strike start mobilizing their teams”. Because it was never used before, they had a vague idea about what was going to happen – they just didn’t know how it will happen. After all, not even the columns of troops who were on the road didn’t know what to expect. Before the flight, the head of the infantry arrived, who said that the Afghan defense covers Mazar-i-Sharif with anti-aircraft missiles, so anything can happen. The area should have been monitored for possible missile launches. Things seemed pretty intimidating because nobody knew exactly what to expect – possible enemy attack or anti-aircraft gunners firing. During one of the missions, on December 26, an airplane took off from a small aerodromchik located on the North side of Mazar-e Sharif. It had the dustiest launch, and if left behind the most visible dust trail. The introduction of the troops looked more like a parade split in half. There were the losing warriors and the winners that seemed invincible; those were of course, part of the legendary Soviet Army. Those military experts served for more than 40 years in areas such as Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, too. At the time, they were seen daily around the city, wearing their military coats and knapsacks, military junk, and looking unshaved.

As for the military training – it almost didn’t exist. Basically, they were dragged from the cotton fields and sent to war. The machines were not properly equipped either, and there were uncovered columns, which was unacceptable. This happened on the New Year. It was cold, and we were wearing leather jackets and flight suits; nobody bothered to warn us about the weather. We didn’t have special equipment, or at least we couldn’t find it. We only had our unfortunate Makarov pistol, two clips in our pockets and two more under our NAZe seats. There were other aircrafts that had proper installation and a decent supply of ammunition; unfortunately, that was not the case of the MiG-21. Later on, they gave us Stechkin APS, which could shoot bursts. The problem was it didn’t fit well and it was uncomfortable during the flight. Many of us left it at home, lying under the pillow. We were also given grenades, but our pockets had holes in them so we didn’t have where to put them either. We had to live them at home. Camouflage didn’t exist, so our blue clothes had to work. Of course, we had no idea that the fabric burns and melts on the skin if lit (thank God that didn’t happen).

There were departures managed at the airport before the end of December. And then once again, after the New Year; no sign of the enemy. Preparation for flying was not recorded as combat, so we couldn’t apply on the ground what we learned in military training. There was no mentioning on the flight log that the aircrafts flew over enemy territory. We had to guess; probably if we had flight interception we could have known. Everything was part of an exercise – it was purely academic. The father commanders didn’t treat this issue seriously because we were not at war. If the war was declared out loud, our job was to occupy and confirm our position as flight personnel. I thought – and I was not the only one – that those who made the decision to set up a team didn’t think for a second that there will be a war; they thought nothing would happen and that the troops would enter, intimidate and establish some laws, that’s it. Things didn’t turn out as expected, though.

On January 9, there was a column covered from Termez to Faizabad. A motorized infantry regiments walked through, and they were equipped with trucks and armory. The column reached Taloqan and it was directed towards Kisima. There was a gap kilometer though, with no firepower and no armory. The rebels were hit; they started fighting and looked pretty wild on horseback with their antediluvian Berdan rifles. The column witnessed many losses, 42 were killed. The aviation needed assistance. The first crew was a kokaytinskogo regiment, whose political officer got really lucky as they were fighting through the machines.

From our Chirchik regiment, flight commander Captain Alexander Mukhin was up in the sky on his number 1 plane. Behind him, flew the management team. Everyone was excited, the atmosphere was just great. Returning commanders immediately changed planes and opted for the trained fighter aircrafts. Everyone else, had to remain in their booths and wait for their turn. The whole scenario was like ripped from a movie: everyone flew so thrilled up in the sky, in the open countryside.

In early January, the first squadron ruled by deputy Regimental Commander, Lieutenant Colonel VP Monakhov, was sent to reinforce the Air Force of the 40th Army, and infiltrate Afghanistan through Kandahar. When he returned home, to Chirchik, he entered in possession of a newer aircraft – MiG-21SM. A third squadron left Kokaytah and kept moving north of Afghanistan. They had less than a month. On February 23, on the eve of the Soviet Army’s Day, when everybody was ready to celebrate by going to the market, commander Zuzlov came in a “jeep” and said: “I’m going to my plane, I’m flying to Bagram!” Everyone thought: “But Commander, look at the sky – to Bagram, on this weather?” – “Yes, it was the military’s order, to do this immediately”. Everybody thought the flight shouldn’t happen, especially because the weather was extremely unfavorable. The first aircraft to rise was Zuzlov’s; behind him was Squadron Major Sergei Fefelova, followed by Major Alexander Bobkov and senior pilot Captain Ivan Ryzhkov. Bobkov couldn’t make it, and in his place went Commander Captain Tashtamyshev. The whole squadron went to Bagram for the holiday...

Immediately after take-off, the planes went into the clouds and almost got lost; they were stuck in a continuous veil. Echelon had it pretty tough: they were stuck in a jet stream, above the mountains where this phenomenon was rather frequent – the formation was kept intact but the pilots were out of breath. In addition, the navigation system of the MiG-21PFM was like designed for kids; the whole system – clock, speed indicator and aircraft compass – were pretty easy to handle.

Scheme strike dive pair: after detecting the target host (A) it performs a complete rotation of the slip (B) and introduces the poluperevorotom plane into a dive (B), usually with an angle 30-40 degrees or steeper. The drop height of bombs and the lower limit of the output were determined by the Safety Fire defense. Slave (D) appears, before the attack, from behind the leader, increasing the maneuvering distance, and independently aiming at the building combat set.

The scheme bombing group was using the "pinwheel" or "carousel" maneuvers: the target aircraft had to enter the group circle, and start bombing consistently at short intervals. The method provides an almost continuous effect on the target, but demanded attentive calculations and timing – a second bias could have interfered with shrapnel leading bombs. It could have happened anywhere above the mountains, and the flight’s completion could have ended badly; however, the group was rescued by KP Bagram. They were found and only God knows where they had planned on going. Dovorachivat fell 90 degrees and needed 10 more minutes to get to the exit route. In spite of the dreadful route to Bagram, the weather was getting better; the sun was shining and the pilots finally had enough visibility; it was like a well-deserved rewards after everything they’ve been through.

At the beginning of 1980, the 40th Army was ruled by MiG-21 aircrafts. Afghanistan had 52 aircrafts, 37 of those aircrafts were “twenty-first” fighters, scouts and fighter-bombs. They remained dominant in the 40th Army’s Air Force for the first year of the war.

Bombing from pitching: a hit from pitching could be used to hit a target with a known location, usually from a single area; it dimensions allowed coverage with dropped bombs according to calculations. Speeding in a shallow descent (A), the plane carried out a nose-up maneuver (B) with an angle of 25-30 degrees (or up to 45 degrees) with the bomb dropping at the top point, and turned away, staying out of the anti-aircraft defense zone, avoiding entering the narrow ravine. Bombs went up (B) along the trajectory, flying several more kilometers to the target.

Invasion of the imperialists in Afghanistan didn’t take place after all, although the propaganda did its job: many of those who found themselves in the DRA, in December 1979, genuinely believed that they were just a few hours ahead of the Americans, and even "heard" the humming of their planes! Almost the only "fighter" success of the first months was the interception of a Pakistani aircraft over Kabul. The Pakistani were going unscheduled and without making contact and caused suspicion; a couple of MiG-21bis went up to intercept it and forced it to land at the capital's airport. During the clarification it was found that it was a passenger DC-8, and the offender was released back home.

There was no enemy in the air, but soon another job was found for the fighters. With the start of operations of the 40th Army, the target strikes on the ground became the main occupation of the fighter aviation for a long time. Until the spring of 1980, the Soviet command was trying not to conduct large-scale combat warfare. It was assumed that after making their presence in Afghanistan clear and establishing Karmal government, they would soon withdraw the troops. But "the friendly Afghan people" turned out to be not very perceptive to the ideals of socialism, and clumsy attempts to establish a "new life", often conflicting with local customs and Sharia law, only multiplied the number of the discontented.

Residents of mountain villages, poorly versed in politics (many seriously believed that the Soviet Union was taken over by the Chinese, and therefore "shuravi" came to Afghan land), were used to fighting for their freedom, and they have been learning how to use weapons from Pastun people since childhood. The ones dissatisfied with the new government were also found in the army, preferring to take arms and join the rebels and fight against the Kabul government. One of the largest groupings was the unit of the well-known Ismail Turan, who had served in the army before as a captain and led the armed resistance in the eastern provinces. Sometimes whole units with their weapons, and not just rifles, came over to the side of the rebels. In that way the enemy was getting heavy machine guns, and Mujahideen’s favourite DShK and ZGU, mortars and recoilless rifles. More powerful weapons were inconvenient in mountain warfare, and even if armored vehicles and cannons fell into the hands of dushmans with trophies (which also required at least the minimal training and maintenance), they were hardly ever used and abandoned when changing place of deployment unit. The gang of Mohammed Hassan operated in the south near Ghazni; he received military training in the Soviet Union and had previously served in the officer rank in the government army. His troops held five of the surrounding ravines under the control, having a few dozen of DShK and its artillery.

Night attack: the leader (A), having found the target or being guided by its approximate location, drops the parachute SAB from an altitude of 2,000-3,000 m and hits during in the next pass, using the illumination for 6-8 minutes. During the operation in a pair the supporting aircraft (B), following safety conditions for the night flight with an interval of 2-3 minutes, attacks with bombs, NAR or cannon fire from a flat dive from a distance of 1500- 2000 m. For the sake of stealth combat maneuvering was carried out above the SAB torches, where the planes were invisible in the dark.

The need to use the aviation appeared in early January, just a week after the arrival of the MiGs in Kabul. There were no other combat vehicles in that part of Afghanistan, and the fighters had to act as a universal means both to cover airspace and to support ground troops and conduct reconnaissance. In early January, there was a mutiny in the 4th Artillery Regiment of the Afghan army, which was located in the town of Nahrin in the north (south-east of Baghlan).During the mutiny some Soviet military advisors present at the unit were killed. After taking the military town the rebels digged in, erecting obstructions on roads and equipping artillery positions on the approach routes. At the request of the Afghan authorities, the Soviet units were involved in disarming the rebel regiment - motorized rifle battalion of 186th Regiment, supported by a tank company and an artillery battalion. Since the enemy had real power, having artillery and support of local gangs, it was decided to clear the most serious means out of their hands, that’s why an air strike needed to be carried out on the location of storage of weapons and ammunition. First, it was planned to use fighter-bombers from the border airfields in the Soviet Union for the strike, but they could not find the targets among the snow-covered foothills. A MiG-21 echelon of the 115th Regiment of Bagram went up and carried out the bombing. The fighters were not involved in the immediate air support. Soviet units moving forward to Nahrina were accompanied by helicopters, which dispelled the enemy by the fire from air. The operation was conducted on January 9-10 with minimal losses, amounting to two dead and two wounded.

MiG-21PFM from the squadron of the 136th FBAR was engaged literally immediately on the day of the arrival at Bagram. On February 22, 1980 the team of captain Tomin was recruited to strike near Asmara in the north-east of Jalalabad. The target was a fortress at the entrance to the Kunar ravine. A couple of bombs FAB-250 and a belly tank was attached to each airplane (although the target was at a distance of one hundred and fifty kilometers, after the flight they have learned that the store is no sore). The bombing wasn’t the best - the pilots openly admitted that they have yet to learn how to bomb in the mountains. Departures to Kunar became the prelude to the impending military operation, where the aviation was already being used on a large scale.

To eliminate pockets of resistance, the Soviet troops were given an order at the end of February: to begin active military operations together with the units of the Afghan army, especially around the capital and in the border areas with Pakistan. The first major operation was conducted in the Kunar province in March 1980. The task for the strengthened regiment was to pass along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border to north-east of Jalalabad in the direction of Asadabad, where the government garrison was located. The only road to the city stretched along the ravine of the river Kunar, mostly on mountain ledges. The road was saddled by enemy troops, and all winter the city was in blockade, raising of which by having established the supply was the main objective of the operation. At the same time, they had to defeat the opposition formations, which were defiantly active in those areas.

The movement of the Soviet motorized rifle regiment to Asadabad was supported by fighter-bombers (and this was what caused the urgency of their deployment to Bagram). The specificity of Afghan conditions immediately manifested itself - the movement of troops was accompanied by continuous shooting, and arriving pilots could not find firing points hiding among the rocks and piles of stones - high speed prevented them, and the time of approach (aviation was called by radio) allowed the enemy to change positions. Furthermore, outdated maps had to be used, which hadn’t changed since the 50s, where even some other cities and other areas had different names. Pilots, knowing that the target was supposed to be “somewhere there", had to strike areas covering the squares along the road.

Several times, the fire of aviation battered their own troops; fortunately, without victims. The commander of the 108th Motorized Rifle Division, Colonel B.V. Gromov, who was leading the operation, described the first lessons in the use of aircraft: "Aviation is a powerful force, but it must be managed. In each column there were air controllers but they did not see anything and did not know from where the fire was delivered. Therefore, at first we had to make air strikes around the squares or leave everything to the pilots - if they saw the enemy, they carried out the bombing and striking attack. Sometimes their own troops were hit by aviation fire - due to the fact that it was hard to tell from the high altitude where the dushmans were, and where our soldiers were. Two of these cases occurred in my presence, although the casualties were not numerous - it turned out that they mainly destroyed only the equipment, or even missed altogether."

The phototablet with the image of the point of impact and the data on the target before ...

…and after the hit. The photographing of the target object at the end of strike was meant for accurate assessment of the destruction of the target

Fighter-bombers of the 136th FBAR (Fighter-Bombers Aviation Regiment) were regularly engaged into work in Panjshir which served as a bulwark of Ahmad Shah’s formations. In late February, the MiG-21PFM conducted reconnaissance of enemy targets in the ravine. Immediately, the team of captain Tashtamyshev needed to go up for the work they were called for. The “customer” was the artillery spotter, who was on top of the cliff, but the issuance of target assignments was an unknown thing for him ("their commands “three ten left, two further, sight fifteen” we do not understand"), due to what they had to seek the assistance of colleagues from Army Aviation. Helicopter pilots were occupied with targeting, showing the place on the top of a slope just before the spotter’s post. The team commander told about the attack: “On entering into a nose dive we broke the pair, each one was aiming independently and launching NURS rockets. They went past and flew over the slope. Immediately pushing the control stick, which in itself was a terrible violation - improving the aiming by increasing the angle of the dive is not permitted - one cannot recover from a steep descent, should that happen, heads would roll, if he even survived the flight - had more time to launch shells on the recovery. If it weren’t for the slope, the altitude would not have been enough to recover.”

The zones in Panjshir and along the Kunar ravine were assigned as the main areas of reconnaissance of Bagram fighters. When conducting reconnaissance it was ordered that after the discovery of suspicious objects, first of all, one has to request a ground CP through radio relay aircraft and after their checking of the situation one has to get permission to use weapons. Subsequently, such independent flights for target detection and attack were named reconnaissance and strike action (RUD). In the first stage, however, they were not really effective: the search for mostly small and inconspicuous targets from the high altitude and fighters’ airspeed of 900-1000 km/hour was inconclusive, and there was virtually no possibility to recognize who was in duval or in the village at the bottom. And without that, due to the lack of reliable orienting points during flights to Kunar, they sometimes jumped over the border line. Sometimes such violation was deliberate, being caused by building of the maneuver in the border zone. Sometime, at the end of February. when searching for the fortress at Asadabad which served to the enemy as a shelter, the target was found right on the border line. On the map. its position looked quite obvious. In order to have a better look at it during re-entry they had to approach from the opposite direction making a turn, passing over the mountains on the Pakistani side. Such maneuvers did not cause fears for pilots - the Pakistanis displayed restraint, and their fighters were not yet on duty in that peaceful, until recently, space.

In early March, the MiG-21PFM of Chirchik squadron flew to Kabul. The aircraft was the first combat aircraft in the capital's airport, where other air forces were represented by several helicopters. The arrival of the transport air group and several dozens of helicopters was prepared as a part of the 50th mixed aviation regiment (sap), but the famous later "fifty" was just being formed on Soviet airfields at that time. In Kabul, at the airport. there was no parking for military equipment, and upon arrival the squadron had to take the place right on the main taxiway, lining in a form of a “herring bone" along the concrete strip, in full view of the passenger aircraft of the Afghan “Bakhtar” and neighboring eastern airlines, which were taxiing past. The tasks assigned were the same flights toward the areas bordering with Pakistan, but for the most part they made reconnaissance flights over Kabul itself. The reason for that was the disturbances and anti-Soviet demonstrations in the capital, the Soviet embassy was under fire. The enemy openly showed intentions, and in order to regain control over the situation in Kabul it was necessary to attract not only the troops, but also aviation that looked in the most impressive way.

MiGs, sweeping over the city, made the impression by their roaring and display of power alone. They were also flying at low and extremely low altitudes, where the altimeter was useless, and were only watching out for wires not to dive under them (“one could say, they went over the heads"). For the convenience of orientation, the city was divided into sectors, using maps of the largest scales. The task was as follows: the pair on duty had to go up and was directed to the relevant sector. Being over their sector, the pilots watched the situation, reporting on what was happening. If they noticed a crowd gathering below, they reported to the command post and began "restoring order”. Descending to an extremely low altitude, they passed over the crowd and “ironed” it. Few Afghans had seen a plane close up, so the achieved effect was most deterrent. Behind them, thatched roofs were being scattered in the air, cloth awnings were flying up, and flimsy adobe walls were toppling. It was impossible to bear the shaking roar and whizz of planes flashing by, so the crowd below dispersed after one or two passes. Use of lethal force was not required, and they managed only with “psychological pressure”.

Loading rockets C-24 on the MiG-21bis 115 IAP

Such flights were not considered to be combat-ready, and the very concept of a combat sortie, not really defined by instructions, was interpreted by pilots in different ways. Some thought that any departure with the ammunition load is a combat one, regardless of whether there was a combat use or not. Others objected that only the one in which the weapons were used, there was firing or bombing, can be considered such. As for how to treat reconnaissance flights, there was no single opinion on that at all. Therefore, everyone was trying to “show up” with shooting, confirming the title of a military pilot. In addition, there was a rumor that for 20 combat missions (even if their purpose was not clear) nomination for the Order was promised. Nobody in the regiment had military awards, so the prospect sounded very tempting. Some even reported in flight at any opportunity: "I see the target, permission to attack." Upon return nobody was asking much - what enemy was encountered and what the results were, only recording combat use. During all this time there was no combat damage to the MiG-21PFM.

Technicians loading bombs on trolleys for delivery to the aircraft

Participation of MiG-21PFM in the Afghan campaign was short-lived. The plane, having been in service since 1963, was morally outdated by the beginning of the 80s and had to give way to more modern equipment. On March 13, 1980 136th FBAR squadron was withdrawn from Afghanistan, returning to the unit stationing place in Chirchik. At home, the pilots and technicians were expected to retrain for a MiG-21SM which was new to them. The aircraft was a predecessor of “bis”, also being a representative of the previous generation - the machines inherited by the regiment were produced ten years ago and managed to serve in other regiments, which replaced them for the newly arriving MiG-23. As a fighter-bomber, the MiG-21SM with less fuel capacity was somewhat inferior to "bis" in range, but it was lighter, had the same four-point attachment and a similar range of weapons. Retraining for a similar type took only several weeks, and as of January the pilots of the other two squadrons which were at the base managed to master the MiG-21SM by that time and were engaged in the formation of the group being sent to Afghanistan again. In April-May already two squadrons of the 136th FBAR were sent to the Air Force of the 40th Army, and in September the remaining third squadron was sent after them.

One of the squadrons of the 136th FBAR was transferred to the Shindand airfield - a tiny town in the desert near the Iranian border, where there was a large airfield with a long strip of 2,940 m, which had become a base of the Soviet troops in the area. Shindand became the main place of stationing of fighter-bomber aircraft - the MiG-21SM of Chirchik regiment were substituted by the Su-17 redeployed during bringing of troops. Another squadron of 136th FBAR was put in Kandahar. Shindand, Bagram, and also Kandahar subsequently remained the base airfields, between which the transfer of aircraft was carried out when it was necessary, for concentration of powerful strike groups, serving as a kind of "land aircraft carriers", where other units were concentrated as well. Northern provinces of DRA, Balkh, Dzhuzdzhan and Faryab mostly “serviced" MiG-21 from the Kokayty airfield, whose pilots referred to the local gangs as “the ones under our patronage". The stay of MiG-21SM in the Air Force 40th Army was also short-lived. These machines were in service in the 136th regiment for just over a year, and were in combat for even more limited time, until the instruction was received about transition to new and much more modern equipment - fighter-bombers Su-17M3. Squadrons were being returned to the Soviet Union in turns for retraining. During the first winter of 1981 the 1st Squadron went home, followed by the 2nd in February, and only the 3rd Squadron had to stay until the end of April.

Nevertheless, it was a short-lived operation of MiG-21SM that the first loss of the 136th FBAR was related to. In the course of retraining for the new aircraft on January 29, 1980. senior lieutenant Igor Kopyov crashed while returning to the airfield. Already on approach during the release of the landing mechanization the left flap tore off, the plane immediately rolled over and crashed into the ground. At low altitude it was not possible to recover the machine nor leave the plane, and the young pilot was killed. The papers for some reason had a record of death "while returning from a combat mission". In all likelihood, the reason was the participation of the regiment in the combat operations at that time, which, however, young pilots with lack of experience were not involved in.

When assigning tasks, the Air Force command of the 40th Army did not make much distinction between fighters and fighter-bombers. There was enough work for all, and by level of training fighters were not inferior to fighter aviation pilots, getting the opportunity to practice and test the skills of bombing and assault which were worked through by the course of combat training of fighter aviation. Bombing from a horizontal flight on the MiG-21 was useless due to the unsuitability of the machine for such work, and the main way of combat use were dive attacks. Thus the calculations were built with an entry from the safe altitude in terms of recovery, taking into consideration the large depression of the aircraft upon the recovery from the dive in mountain conditions with large altitude separation and rarefied air. It was also required to take into account the increased acceleration of aircraft with the combat load in a steep dive, which was adjusted to 60°, ensuring accurate placement of bombs.

While aiming equipment of MiG-21bis, equipped only with small gunsight ASP-PFD-21, looked more modest compared to the latest sighting systems of the latest modifications of Su-17 and Su-25 with their computers, laser range finders and Doppler radio systems, but in the mountains, occupying 80% of Afghanistan and serving as the main refuge for the enemy, complex automation made many errors and the skills and individual techniques of pilots came to the fore, who took aim "on the tip of the PVD (pitot-static system)". Effectiveness of strikes in the absence of known by combat training targets - clusters of military equipment, facilities, missiles and artillery positions - remained low.

Afghan MiG-21bis taxiing down the Bagram airfield. The aircraft carries four 100 kg bombs OFAB-100-120

This is how M. Pravdivets, who flew the MiG-21bis as a young lieutenant, recalled his first combat flight: “In the spring of 1980 there were not enough pilots in the regiment and they had to bring squadrons stationed in Afghanistan to numbers of a regular flight unit by transferring people from other units. When I arrived in Afghanistan, I had no experience whatsoever. They explained that we would have to work more "on the ground", and we had never even dropped practical training bombs. Our idea about the theory of bombing and piloting technique during striking was vague. Yet I still knew something - after all, I graduated the training school with honors - but I had no skills whatsoever. So that's what kind of "aces" the fighting squadrons were strengthened with. After a few training flights the squadron commander included me into a fighting element. It was necessary to strike at Parminsk ravine near Bagram (which we called "the diamond ravine” then, there were placers of precious stones everywhere). Loading of aircraft - four bombs OFAB-250-270 each. The attack was directed by an air controller, the target - firing points on the mountain slopes.

The take-off of an Afghan fighter from Bagram

After the task assignment I asked the squadron leader: "And how do I drop bombs?" He explained to me that the main thing is to keep the flight formation and look at him. As soon as his bombs go, I drop mine with the delay of “a- a-and one...", because on the first entry and during the first attack in my life I won’t find where to aim anyway, especially since we needed to strike the “assumed” firing points. And the delay is necessary for bombs to fall with distribution, it makes no sense to put all eight of them in one place, let these two tons cover the area, it’s more reliable that way. The flight was on August 8 in the early morning. We took off with the dawn while it was cool, the take-off in summer heat of the day with four bombs is very difficult. The take-off run of the plane with four bombs indeed took unusually long time. Being over the place, we contacted the air controller, he suggested orienting points and the slope on which we had to work. It was still a bit dark in the ravine in the early morning. Following the leader, we are diving somewhere into the darkness. His "drops” went down, I am also pressing the drop. For the first time in my life I heard the plane shuddering when the bombs went down. Recovery. The air controller says where the bursts fell, and corrects. Switched to the internal attachments and made another entry. Again drop. Recovery. From the ground they ask us “to strike once more", but the leader reports that there are no more “drops”, we finished the work and we are going to the point". One year later, Mikhail Pravdivets was already an experienced air fighter and had 380 combat sorties to his credit.

In the first period of combat operations, the tactics weren’t very diverse: the aircraft, led by an experienced pilot, were going to the target in the column or vector, striking one by one, and sometimes lining up in a circle. Target assault was performed consecutively alone or in pairs from diving with bombs, NAR and cannon fire. The return fire from assault rifles and antiquated rifles was not taken into account, and in the open area the MiG pilots dared to descend to extremely low altitudes to achieve the surprise attack. Having turned on the afterburner and gone supersonic, they suppressed the enemy with the thunderous burst of the shock wave from which pack horses and camels (the main transport of dushmans) fled in terror to the surrounding areas. Initially they had to be limited almost exclusively to actions in pairs, but with increased air groups pairs were changed into more solid strike groups. The strikes started being made by groups of 4-8 fighters because in an environment where any duval in villages, any rock and cleft in the mountains could serve as shelter for the enemy, an attack by less force was ineffective. If necessary, the bombings of the bases and fortified areas took 12-16 aircraft. The feature of fighter aviation operations was the work on the units located in the highlands, where helicopters and attack planes couldn't "reach". Fighters also participated in following transport columns, forming the "outer ring" protection during shooting attempts and striking the identified firing positions. Directly above the column the immediate cover was ensured by its accompanying helicopters.

Panorama of Bagram base. In the background - the parking of Afghan fighter-bombers Su-22

For a more reliable interaction with the aviation, they began to include spotters and air controllers into the columns. They assigned them from pilots and navigators, who left their flying jobs for various reasons, guided by the considerations that they had quite a good idea about the specifics of the air operations, and they at least knew how the area and the target looked from above. The usual way to conduct a raid operation brought up two battalions of motorized rifle troops or paratroopers with the necessary strengthening by armored vehicles and artillery, and engineer units for mine clearing and removal of debris during the clearing of roads. The operation management group had a representative of the airmen, who was provided with a specially equipped armored personnel carrier equipped with radios for communication with CP Air Force.

Such an air combat operations group (GBU) was assigned to each motorized rifle or airborne battalion for combat operations. Air controllers who were next to the commander of a motorized rifle or airborne units, were sent to companies moving in armored personnel carriers and infantry combat vehicles. Duties of an air controller demanded constant attention, good terrain orientation, tactical abilities - the effectiveness of air support depended on him, and during powerful raids the place in the CP was occupied by the commander of the working regiment. Spotters, who accompanied the troops in combat formations, also had to possess considerable stamina: they had to carry the bulky radio with a bank of accumulators of 23 kg of weight. Usually. two people were appointed for that, including a soldier carrying a pack of accumulators. Sometimes a portable hand-powered generator was used, known as the "soldier-motor". In the mountains, which were shielding passage of radio waves, in order to provide radio communication it became necessary to engage radio relay aircraft An-26RT, which were constantly "hanging" over the place of combat operations. During the first year of war 620 missions with 2150 total flying hours were performed by their crews in order to provide command for the troops.

The position of troops on the assault mission was marked by colored smokes of flare pots, which were also used by the pilots who were searching for targets, guided by commands from the ground. The use of weapons by pilots was allowed only with the permission of air controllers who received the permission from the commander of the ground unit, to whom he was assigned. Thereby, the likelihood of attack on their own people was minimized, which could not be avoided with the independent air operations. To paraphrase a famous remark that "the war is too serious a matter to entrust it to the military," we can also say that fighter aviation it's too formidable a force to entrust its management to pilots themselves.

Pilots of the 27th Guards fighter aviation regiment discuss the flight in pair on MiG-21UM

The enemy quickly assessed the value of “managers" and tried to put them out of action in the first place. Mujahideen prisoners reported that they were specifically instructed to detect and destroy air controllers. Among the pilots the combat control officers carried the heaviest losses, earning the lines in the song:

- The enemy knows exactly - where the smoke is - Lies the spotter, unharmed, - And the force of his fire - He directs to me ... Another tactical novelty was the interaction of aviation and artillery - the pilots hit the bursts, aiming at highly visible clouds of dust at the target. Another essential condition for air operations was the organization of search and rescue operations. Downed crew had to have the firm conviction that it would not be left in danger. At each airfield during flight operations there was a pair of Mi-8 of search and rescue service, waiting for the call. However, such a duty had a disadvantage - it took some time to reach the place of an emergency landing or pilot’s landing, which could end tragically for those who found themselves on the territory controlled by the enemy. The dushmans did not miss the opportunity to get even with the hated aviators, and meeting with ordinary villagers, whose village was just hit by the bomb, did not promise anything good. Efficiency of search and rescue service was the paramount condition for its operation, and there were many tragic cases, when just a ten minutes delay ended tragically for the downed pilot. The most effective measure was helping the victims from the position of being on duty in the air with a helicopter strike group escort. The presence of search and rescue helicopters over the strike place allowed to snatch the downed crew from the ground literally immediately.

During 1980, 57 search and rescue operations were made (there were significantly more flight missions as sometimes in order to pick up one crew a few pairs of helicopters had to go up in a row), 126 people of the crew were rescued."Bis" confidently carried up to a ton of bombs, but took a full load only when operating in the surrounding areas. Typically, the MiG-21 carried the load not exceeding two 250 kg bombs - the rarefied air of high mountains and the heat were taking their toll (even at normal for these areas +35°C the R25-300 engine thrust was reduced by 15%). In these conditions, with the normal take-off weight the aircraft’s take-off run took 1500 m against the usual 850 meters. With “five hundreds" the plane also became difficult to control on takeoff and noticeably lost in climb rate. Taking greater bomb load by reducing the fuel filling was risky - the pilots preferred to have navigational reserve of fuel when returning home. If they couldn’t find the airfield after all, instructions prescribed to set a course to the north, and to catapult over the Soviet territory after running out of fuel.

MiG-21bis in flight for bombing. The aircraft carries a pair of 500 kg bombs

The high-explosive bombs FAB-250 and OFAB-250-270 with the coverage area of a half hectare were the most frequently used ones, as well as cluster bombs and RBC-250 and RBC-250-275, differing in filling. The first could be equipped with small-caliber fragmentation munitions AO 2,5sch or 10 kg AO-10sch. The second type cluster held 150 of fragmentation munitions AO-1sch. Each munition was a small fragmentation bomb of 1 kg of weight with a case made of semi-steel, brittle and giving many pieces with lethal force in a radius of 10-12 m. The dropped cluster fired at a specified altitude, and its contents were thrown out by expelling charge from the regular black shooting powder, providing covering of vast areas. The destructive characteristics of antipersonnel bombs of this caliber allowed not only to deal with manpower, but also they could be used to destruct machines in dushman caravans and shooting positions usually covered with stones, which could be easily demolished by small bomb hits, in a quite satisfactory way.

Even more effective were the "balls" of 500 kg cluster RBK-500, which scattered around at 350-400 m radius upon cluster opening. RBC-500 was carrying 550-560 spherical 0,5 kg small bombs SHOAB-0.5 with steel balls as submunitions. Small caliber of munitions was more than compensated by the vastness of the destruction area and penetration of cluster filling everywhere, whipping manpower and firing positions with the downpour of killing elements - 5.5 mm steel balls, more than a hundred in each cluster. In the open area each such bomb provided “destruction of type A" on an area of 60 sq. m with the complete destruction of manpower. A pair of planes with RBC could fully cover a village, and from the air the affected area was clearly visible - an ellipse of 300-400 m outlined by dusty puffs. The superior version of SHOAB-0,5M silumin spheres were filled with red-hot steel balls, durable and even breaking through barriers, damaging the light equipment and obstacles (for example, thick cotton robes of "targets").The rockets (NAR) were massively used, of C-5 type in different versions, launched from universal blocks UB-16-57 and UB-32. Rockets of 57 mm caliber combined high-explosive and fragmentation effect, for what in their modern versions they were equipped with a fragmentation jacket in the form of steel rings with cuts, which were put on the case and broke into hundreds of killing segments. Against manpower - large and small gangs in places of Mujahideen bases, pack animals in caravans - also special rockets C-5C with flechette were used. Each rocket was carrying 1,000 feathered arrows the size of the nail, which were launched forward by expelling charge on approach to the target and were capable to riddle everything within 10-15 square meters.

The "Godfather" of the new means of destruction was Air Force Commander P. S. Kutahov himself, who followed the news about weapons and never missed an opportunity to ask about the effectiveness of "arrows" in real combat use. As it turned out, the use of C-5C on the aircraft was even a lot more effective than on military helicopters, for which NAR blocks were almost an everyday weapon. As it turned out, the plane speed contributed to this advantage, by far surpassing the speed in helicopter flight modes. As a result, light arrows, weighing little more than a gram, were rapidly losing energy and penetrating power, turning out to be unable to hit the target and even penetrate clothing.

Foliage of trees and bushes, which served as a shelter for dushmans, were an obstacle for them. At the same time at launch from the aircraft the speed of a shot arrow was combined with the speed of the aircraft, the kinetic energy was several times higher, just like the superior damaging effect, which was enough even for breaking branches and planks of buildings.

When shooting NAR, the mere sight of a volley of dozens of rockets had a considerable effect on the enemy, after which the target disappeared in continuous bursts. Another common type of weapons were large-caliber 240-mm NAR C-24, whose large range of launch allowed the pilot to feel more confident in narrow mountain creek valleys which were difficult to maneuver in during the recovery from the attack. The powerful high-explosive warhead C-24 blew to dust the thick mud duvals where the dushmans were hiding, and turned the firing points in the mountains into piles of rocks. In effectiveness the warhead C-24 was not inferior to a heavy shell and gave up to 4000 large fragments upon burst, hitting the enemy at 300-400 m.

Acceleration of MiG-21bis’s afterburner on the Bagram airfield

With the destruction of "hard nuts" type of rock shelters and caves, which served as a safe haven, the best results were given by thick bombs FAB-250ts and especially FAB-500ts, which had a strong cast housing (a conventional fugaskami cave hit could only be in contact with the surface explosions). This solid munition body made of stainless steel and cast warhead thickness had the best penetrating action, in which the power of the explosion was not wasted on the surface and had depth cracks, causing collapse and landslides vaults. Thick-bombs, punching rocks torn in thicker stone caused landslides. These munitions were widely used in the "closed" base mountain range of Lurkoh, in the Farah province, in January 1981, and again in the Black Mountains, in September the same year - where “ghosts” tried to cut the road to Kandahar. The supply was limited, so there was barely a choice of ammunition. Because the stocks were finishing pretty fast, the commander had to cut the rate to a minimum, thus forcing pilots to take no more than one bomb at a time.

The MiG-21bis carried full ammunition for the gun. It was the first time when pilots used cannon fire so often, and thus returned from the mission with empty ammunition boxes. Eventually, when the opposition’s defense became more pronounced, the gun lost value - its use required low altitude and short range. When shooting in the most favorable conditions for the target shooting, a shallow dive had to be made before opening fire from a distance of less than 1500 m, bringing the plane at an altitude of 300-400 m.

A rare shot with the enemy: attacks a MiG-21 and captures a Western journalist; then makes its way to Afghanistan and stops in the camp of Mujahideen

When this happens, bombs instantly become more lucrative than guns. Another reason why they had to stop using guns, was the troublesome outfitting – the guns had to be thoroughly cleaned, they had to be completely dismantled after a shooting, and they had to work with a special machine that needed to be filled with 200 tape cartridges. Each of the cartridges had to be mounted in the gun and prepared accordingly – cleaning and checked for placement within the belt, which by the way had to look perfect and not be distorted in any way. All this took a lot of time and effort. In the beginning, the weaponry used was much simpler – they hung bombs and HAP blocks which didn’t need any special maintenance; these were used by non-specialists, soldiers and technicians.

Thanks to the good skills of the squadron, the bombs were prepared in just 25-30 minutes. Although the guns lost significance, the fighter aircrafts still needed to have the cartridges filled and used as a “personal weapon” by the pilot. It could have been of assistance in unexpected situations. The 40th Army of the Air Force performed 72,000 raids and the pilots flew a total number of 83,000 hours; there were 59,716 hours, at medium and high altitudes and 12,117 hours in the stratosphere. The aircrafts launched 7810 bombings with an ammunition expenditure of 12 639 high-explosive bombs, 1847different types of cluster bombs, 242 concrete bombs, 452 incendiary bombs and tanks, 40 volume-detonating bombs and 1045 flares. High-explosive bombs OFAB-250-270 (36% of the total number of bomber weapons) and OFAB-100-120 (14% of all consumed) were predominantly used. Rockets of all types were employed (C-5, C-8, C-24 and C-25) and there were 634,862 pieces developed.

If the above means of destruction is not possible to specify what proportion of the total number of fighters have used, in respect of cannon armament in reporting can give specific figures. Cartridges for guns GSH-23L on the MiG- 21bis spent during the year - 290,439 (nearly 1,500 full ammo or 60 ammo on the plane). Such gun flow ammunition in the Air Force fighters of the 40th Army was 20 times higher than the consumption of ammunition fighter-bombers Su-17 (!).

The Afghans who flew the MiG-21MF and MiG-21bis fighters, were part of the 322th Fighter Regiment. By the spring of 1980, in Mazar-e-Sharif were 50 MiG-17F/FS aircrafts; they were used for attack but also for educational purposes. Compared to the Soviets, the piloting techniques of the Afghans were superior. It was not because they had a deep “ideological conviction” but because of their patriotism and revolutionary feelings. Most Afghan pilots came from noble families from Pashtun and Tajik, so they felt comfortable up in the air. They paid little attention to the Air Force’s instructions. However, they didn’t have combat material – the Afghans were flying 1-2 days a week, but not on Fridays or weekends because the Koran forbade it.

Final checkups before departure. 145 IAP, Bagram, winter 1983

Every now and then, the gunsmiths forgot to perform safety checks on the bombs, and that often made them useless goods. The headquarters of the 40th Army noted: "The Afghans have no desire to fight and increase the effectiveness of combat operation; the Soviet instructors themselves often had to take seats in the cockpits of the Afghan aircrafts. In one of these departures, on Nov. 12, 1985, an adviser died under the leadership of the Afghan Air Force. His name was Major General NA Vlasov. He was performing a flight from Kandahar to Shindand on a MiG- 21bis when his plane was shot down by the ANC. The pilot was able to eject the plane, but he was taken prisoner and killed by the enemies on the ground.

MiG-21bis of the 145th regiment was getting ready for take-off

The machines were not always prepared accordingly, and if an aircraft had damages, nobody would bother to fix them. The Shindandskogo airfield was packed with aircrafts that couldn’t take off, thus triggering delays. The DRA (Democratic Republic of Afghanistan) Air Force lost 3-4 times more planes than the Soviets. In spite of everything, the Afghan star aircrafts were still in the air, and that was a clear sign that the combat missions were taking place.

Suspension FAB-500M54 bombs placed under the wing of a MiG-21bis

The burden of the battle had to be carried by the Soviet aviators who didn’t have holidays or weekends. In the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, they only had 2.5 – 3 standard “peacetimes”; at the board of their aircrafts, they performed 450-470 missions. In 1984, the share of the fighter aircrafts accounted for 28% of total BSHU and 6% of all razvedreydov. The drive of the combat fighter pilots was a third higher than that of the fighter-bombers, who, by the way, were ahead of the storm troopers.

Over time, a second cast of pilots and technicians arrived to complete the team. There was plenty of time for newbies to acquire combat experience, and the fact that the Force had more aviators made the workload easier to accept (still, working hours began before sunrise and lasted 12-14 hours; the regiment had plenty of time to “practice” and “recycle” 15, 20 even 30 tons of bombs. This was proof that at war people don’t collapse from exhaustion.) Many flights that had to be performed were limited by technology; and still, the MiG-21 considered incredibly reliable. The machine was combat-ready in proportion of 85-90%. As for the more complex systems – navigation and radio equipment, the rate of failure was low. Main complaints were caused by canopies glazing; a ubiquitous, pervasive dust thread threatened to damage the fuel filters and the fuel valve nozzles, thus forcing the pilots to clean them as often as possible.

Pilots Level 927 IAP. From left to right - Chief of Staff Major Squadron VA Skvortsov, Major AN Globa, deputy commander of the regiment, Major NG Karev, and commander Major VV Skvortsov

Purged with compressed air jets, the filters had to be cleaned with a special installation kit. Because the thinner air and heat, the landing speed had to follow a different procedure, which affected the chassis, the shock absorbers and the way the wheels worked. In the heat of summer, the sadivshiesya aircraft had to be watered by a machine or manually cooled off with buckets of water in order to ice the overheated brakes - otherwise the pressure could have spread pneumatics. The brakes wore out several times faster than normal, and the rubber wheels literally "burned" on the ground. There was always trouble when the wind blew, since it brought stones which slashed the pneumatic system. The intensive exploitation affected the state of the art system, not to mention that the maintenance work was poor due to a lack of time. The fighters accumulated numerous defects and eventually, they were ripped of resources. On return to the URSS, the fighters required more checkups. The reports clearly stated that the fighters: were badly injured in combat and couldn’t always put up with enemy fire.

Pilots on duty level 927 IAP. Second from the right - the squadron commander, Major Alfred Kravchenko, Shindand, Fall 1983

The pilots were careless the first time they were sent up in the air to fight with the enemies. They only had tactical training and that was because there was no need for them to have air training as well. The prisoners were told that they were taught the "Chinese method", when the entire squad opened fire with machine guns. The aim was to fly the airplanes and use the available weaponry to take down the enemies. In the 115th regiment, the aircrafts often came back with holes from radiootsek ANC bullets; in some other scenarios, the entire plane would catch fire and burn out. Nonetheless, everything was fixable. It was always sent back for repairs, regardless of its conditions.

January 2, 1980. A fighter aircraft was on fire, and the engine was slowly damaging. The bullet hits reached the mash compressor blades, so the nicks were the size of a finger. In spite of everything, the engine kelp working and could last until it received assistance. Upon departure, on August 26, 1980, a pilot who was at the board of a MiG-21bis felt a blow at the bottom of his aircraft. It had 7 shrapnel holes, some were the size of a fist. The antenna was demolished as well, and the transponder was covered with nicks. August 1st, 1980. Senior Lieutenant Victor Cheshenko was flying a MiG-21bis but couldn’t make it back. He was performing a raid around Jabal Ussaradzh when all of a sudden he was hit by two units. It all happened close to the Bagram Airfield, in the Panjshir Valley.

Poster photo – “aviators depending on the Soviet troops, providing international assistance to Afghan workers in defense of revolutionary gains." Captain P. Dyachenko reporting and fighter aircraft all set for combat

The couple made of Cheshenko, who was in the lead, and Ivan Chernenko, was the second pair of the group. Their planes were charged with C-24 and with two OFAB-250-270 bombs. The other group was placed above them, and they were waiting for their turn to run. When preparing to release the C-24, Ivan Chernenko took some distance, thus aiming with a lot more precision. Following the withdrawal of the attack, he did not find the lead. He requested the commander several times but Cheshenko did not answer. At first, he was extremely persistent, but eventually he stopped. In any case, it was impossible to abort the mission since they were a unit - the master and the slave - they acted together and covered each other, this was the first thing were taught.

The second group’s commander was Major Andrei Tikhonov, who said: “I saw a large explosion on the ground with a bright flash and thought that I hit the ammunition depot.” Together with flight director, Colonel Khokhlov, they announced that they saw Cheshenko. Tikhonov gave the command to rise again up in the air. As the aircraft was aligned, they realized they didn’t actually see Cheshenko’s planes. Everyone else was flying around the site of the impact, hoping for a miracle. Several helicopters went to the impact site to ascertain the situation and find the remains of the plane; they also tried to find the pilot. They were greeted by heavy fire which came from mountains and started shooting at anything that moved.

The pilots of the helicopters had to assess their position first, and then drop the paratroopers. Eventually, they collected Cheshenko’s body and the aircraft’s remains (only those they could pick up). The wreck was inspected thoroughly and they noticed that the cabin was entirely covered in bullet holes. Apparently, they used a slashed automaton machine-gun fire and the pilot was killed in the cockpit at the time of the attack. This was confirmed by the prisoner, who said he fired all at once to create a wall of fire when the plane approached – it was his chance to hit and knock down. There was not time to say farewell to the victims, as they were immediately sent home. When asked, why they are not treated like a human beings, the response was: “it is a decision we have to make because we don’t want to demoralize the other pilots; in this way we minimize the fear of flying”. All the deaths deserved to be given honors, including Lieutenant Cheshenko who was barely 25 years old.

Three months later, on November 12, 1980, when striking in Faizabad district, a plane was hit. It was part of Captain Aleksei Prokazina’s squadron. It featured two yFAV 250-270 bombs and a pair of underwing fuel tanks with a capacity of 490 liters. The squadron’s leading commander, Major B. Mabuza decided to attack first and hit the enemy helicopter. Prokazin, his colleague, was behind him, when all of a sudden went into a dive. His MiG-21bis started declining until it lost control. Everyone else could only hear on the radio: “I’m spinning…” He had one choice left, to separate himself from the MiG and launch his parachute. The remaining pilots covered Prokazina and ensured his safety on the ground.

The wreckage of the aircraft on duty, Level 927 IAP after dushmanskogo fire. Bagram, May 1984

A helicopter was sent to rescue the pilot and also deal with the height of the slope on which he landed, which was 3,500 m. The Mi-8 was not used to low altitudes because the air was too thin; the machine had stabilization issues. Somehow, after 15 minutes it managed to land and pick up Prokazina, who added: “after I applied the safety plan, I landed almost immediately. The slope was steep, I rolled down and started rolling down on the rocks, entangled in a sling, hanging upside down. Heard shots, so I got spooked and climbed up the hill. I did not notice I was at the bottom. I saw the helicopters circling and started climbing with as much energy as possible. Finally, I got the point where the <> saw me.

Aircraft duty level 927 IAP after the bombing, Bagram, May 1984

My heart was pounding, I felt that I couldn’t breathe and I thought to myself – my heart will explode out of my chest. When the helicopter got to the villages, I started running towards it, waving a bag. I was incredibly lucky, had no idea he could see me. But he did. I met the helicopter’s pilot, my Hero. Unfortunately, he was not awarded for his bravery, particularly since he had more regiment combat missions than anyone else”.

Judging by the behavior of the aircraft and the first report of the pilot, Prokazina’s MiG would have broken apart anyway. Making the decision to parachute himself was not that easy either. He had to have good piloting skills; and he did. Before entering into a dive, the pilot had to perform some operations and compensate the plane’s altitude loss using the afterburner and the congestion system. When the plane started falling, its speed was instantly accelerated, which made the external fuel tanks become overly sensitive. The machine also had bombs under the wings which weighed half a ton. The wings became heavier and the aerodynamics of the plane triggered the collision. The incident was assessed by Deputy Air Force Commander of the 40th Army, Major-General Shpak; in spite of everything, they claimed the plane was shot down.

The aircraft’s defense system was harshly criticized, too. According to the pilots, the mountain literally sparked "welding", especially near the bases and strongholds which were all covered by 12.7-mm DShK machine guns, probably manufactured in China; they had 14.5-mm anti-aircraft ZSU settings with a range of up to defeat 2,000 m. In 1985, 62.5% of all aircraft damage was done by these weapons. The Air Force Command acknowledged that the planning operations have shortcomings and that they couldn’t properly protect themselves up in the air.

Afghan MiG-21PFM at the Bagram Airfield

To prevent organized fire and stay away from unexpected surprises, the first attacks are practiced at ultra-low altitudes of up to 60m. Although this tactic worked out for the European operations, it has not met the enthusiasm of the pilots; at such low altitudes, the terrain is difficult and the plane has to reduce speed. There’s also a great risk: the plane can run into an ambush, get hit from above and not be able to take off.

Suspension incendiary tanks ST-500 on the MiG-21bis. On the left - deputy commander of 927 th Regiment, N. Karev Apart from this, they started using “active measures” – they allotted a special group to deal with the suppression of air defense. They couldn’t fight with the anti-aircraft fire, which basically meant destroying the position with a direct hit or replace “knocked out” calculations and renew fire (sometimes, the bombs were replaced one after the other). Every now and then, the enemy anti-aircraft had few spacing points; there was enough space between planes, which meant that the enemy could have opened fire. Moreover, the position of the planes was not always exact and the pilots were not intelligent enough to know the exact point of impact. To reduce the time spent under fire, a strike had to be applied at high speed, with no less than 950-1000 km/h. Only the most distinguished fighters could have done that; armed with NAR or RBC fragmentation equipment, these impetuous MiG-21 were smaller than the Su-17. Nevertheless, it was speedy and easy to maneuver. Some would call the MiG-21 “the merry” because in some ways, it was playful and swift. There was a text that described the MiG-21 that sounded like this: “the fighters had personal peculiarities – they could execute surprise attacks, blind shooters, climb vigorously and sneak without getting caught. They could perform the “star raid” (the Daisy) - if a plane was attacked it could move fast in different directions, thus making it difficult for the enemy to aim fire. Isolated demonstrations were often performed, to simulate and distract attention of anti-aircraft gunners.

Scouting MiG-21R over Hindu Kush - the aircraft carries a pair of external fuel tanks and a photographic reconnaissance container

Modern anti-aircraft weapons appeared to protect the planes against the enemy – they were called MANPADS missiles, and they responded to the warmth of aircraft engines. The MiG-21bis had to undergo some modifications; its installation tapes were switched for ASO-2V systems with heat traps. These cassettes were suspended at the anchor boosters, and placed at the bottom of the fuselage. Several dozen squibs PPI-26 were fitted with cassettes, which, when shot or inflamed, got warmed up diverting homing missiles.

Clearing the areas from anti-craft fire was not accomplished solely through air raids. Helicopters were employed as well. A typical group of attack had to have a specific purpose. At first, they were programmed to attack a group of air defense MiG-21 pair; they had to hit on sight or chase it after the mountain and use RBC equipment or blocks of C-5. Rising above a clear cloud of dust was a group of Mi-8 planes, whose purpose was to use bombs. They often took local gunners who once collaborated with the army (such services, were of course, paid).

The target was a couple of planes from the strike group. The target was hit, and the charging system of the MiG-21 was charging accordingly. When the raid was completed, an objective control was carried out to capture the defeats and establish if there was a re-strike was necessary or not. In January 1982, during a major operation held in the town of Darzab, the aim was to annihilate the gangs sitting at the Soviet Union’s border. MiG-21bis aircrafts were used as defense.

Aircrew 263rd regiment, Kabul, July 1983

Combat work in the 115th regiment of the 40th Army continued until June 12, 1981 when the regiments was substituted by the 27th Guards Red Banner Vyborg Fighter Wing, based in the town of Uch-Aral in the south-east of Kazakhstan, bordering China. The regiment was living there since the 70s in order to strengthen the relations with the Chinese border. Apparently, when recruiting forces of Soviet troops in Afghanistan, the authorities still had hopes that it will cope well with the local forces. Considering they were part of in TurkVO and SAVO, the aviators were accustomed to the climatic conditions, the terrain and the services. The aircrafts replaced the Afghan fighter regiments, and every now and then, reinforcements were needed. Two squadrons with a total of 30-35 aircrafts had to be incorporated. The MiG-21 CM/UM was capable of carrying some pretty large loads. “Sparky” was used in export fights, in which the pilots were acquainted with hostility areas meant for reconnaissance and target designation (an instructor was needs, as well as an experienced pilot to act as a navigator, assess the area, and help with the search).

The 27th Regiment, which was under the command of Colonel Victor Sevastyanovich - the team's future tactical aircraft for combat duty in Afghanistan -, was awarded the title Hero of the Soviet Union. The Commander of the 1st Squadron sent to Kandahar, was Lieutenant-Colonel V. Veropotvelyan, and the 2nd Squadron was placed together with a group from the regiment in Bagram – led by Lieutenant Colonel AK Rybnikov. To help the pilots get to know the combat environment, the future battle field had them fly in groups for a couple of days. In the first combat raid, Cubs realized the complexity of the situation, particularly since the groups had already met with the enemy defense. In a joint raid, on June 9, 1981, a MiG-21bis from the Uch-Aral Regiment was attacked. It was filled with holes – the bullets had pierced the shields, the thrust was slaughtered on the main landing gear, the hydraulics and destroyed pipelines damaged several electrical wires and components of electrical fittings. The plane was commissioned for a few days. When it returned on the battle field, it still had broken hydraulics. The Regiment’s Chief of Staff was informed that when the plane approached a fortress at the south side of Bagram, its ANC control valve was smashed by a bullet.

Aircrew 263rd regiment, Kabul, July 1983

After having almost completed a flight that was defective to begin with, Captain VA Semenov forgot to close and seal the lamp (the pilot opened it because of the heat, thus causing air to get into the cabin). The lantern was opened during the takeoff run, which increased the speed of the plane. The pilot tried to gain control, but he soon realized that his attempts were hopeless (another pilot from a different fighter regiments had recently died under similar circumstances). Eventually, he released his parachute and tightly gripped the wheel brakes. The parachute took off and the aircraft’s tires just burst during the heavy braking. As it hit the ground, the plane lost its outboard tank, which was full of rockets, block-UX 16-57. Upon departure, on April 29, 1982 an ANC bullet stroke the tank’s wing, triggering an explosion of kerosene. The wing had to be completely replaced; the plane was relocated into the repair shop and it was decided that it couldn’t return to the battlefield. A new console had to be installed, and since that had to be done in the factory, the plane needed repairs that lasted over a month.

The 27th Regiment suffered a lot of damage, including damage from anti-personnel mines. On April 26, 1982 several fighters were shot at the Bagram airfield parking. Shrapnel pierced cone mines were used to take down one of the fighters; its windshield had a broken light, not to mention that the bulletproof glass was mutilated, so it had to be completely changed.

Image depicting goals in the "green zone"

During the second combat week, the regiment suffered a loss: a combat raid was performed on June 15, 1981 near the gorge of Tora Bora in the Nangarhar province, when their "Spark" plane was hit. The crew onboard was made of Major Victor Moskovchuk and Captain Michael Korchinsky. The plane took off to monitor impact results of other fighters who were carrying out a raid in the village. When passing over the target, the pilots lowered their plane’s altitude for better visibility, and it was attacked while it standing on the roof of one of the ANC houses. The rescue team was not able to come to the place of the crash because of the dense fire from the ground.

Later on, they managed to pick up the wreckage of the plane, and realized that Moskovchuk, who was flying in the second cabin, was killed while he was still in the air. They found bullet holes in the rear lamp cluster and blood stains. Korchinsky managed to eject; he hid in the mountains for three days but still he was captured and relocated to Pakistan. When contacting the local military, they were surprisingly respectful. The pilot was returned to the Soviet representatives. On his return, he recovered in the hospital, however his fighter couldn’t fly anymore. Moskovchuk’s body was never found, which is why he was never considered dead, only missing. Fellow soldiers repeatedly raised the issue of recognizing his heroic acts in mission. Unfortunately, they couldn’t find convincing arguments to back up their claims.

In the same summer of 1981, the plane of squadron leader V. Veropotvelyana was hit, as well. He was walking a group of two units when he saw how a pilot had to eject his fighter right after stopping the burning engine on take- off. Veropotvelyana came to the rescue of the pilot. But another tragedy was about to happen on May 27, 1982. Captain Andrew Sribnaya’s MiG-21bis was hit during a strike near a village in Avund.

After stopping a burning engine on takeoff the pilot had to eject at the landing site covered it with fire from the other aircraft squadron, and came to the rescue of the Mi-8 took the pilot. At the exit of the attack, Major A. Zhelezov looked through the periscope of his plane and saw the explosion. Sribnaya’s fighter exploded in the air – it was believed that his flak reserve was hit by a bomb.

In mid-June 1982, the 27th Regiment was replaced by the 145th Fighter Regiment. This ‘replacing tradition’ to work in Afghanistan attracted fighters from the European part of the USSR – they came from the Carpathian Military District’s Air Force, from a region called Ivano-Frankivsk. It was simple enough to understand why they wanted to join the 145th Regiment; the end of the war was approaching and considering that at the southern districts there were no fighters left, they had to be sent back to Afghanistan.

The results of the impact level of the MiG-21 from the 927 IAP October 30, 1983. Visible traces of direct "pyatisotok" hits in Duval The waiting lists were set up with one year in advance, according to the directive of the General Staff № 312/4/00239. On April 17, 1981, a group of 145 dvuheskadrilnogo IAP were programmed for departure on June 1, 1982, "at the disposal of the commander of the Air Force TurkVO." The replacement happened ahead of time; the training of the pilots was not completed and the complexity of the initial military activities was severe enough. Nonetheless, they were considered ready for combat. On the appointed day, an armed group of 24 MiG-21bis and four "sparok" MiG-21UM flew from a length of more than five thousand kilometers. Colonel Mikhail Konfindratov was the commander of the regiment; the 1st squadron was led by Nikolay Blinov and the 2nd squadron by Colonel Vladimir Logatchev. The flight lasted a couple of days with several intermediate stops.

What they learned from Afghanistan was duly noted. Upon arrival in Kokayty, the group was not used to that kind of warmth. Then, the combat exercises began. Those in charge didn’t realize that the fighters were modified in the summer, the most unfavorable conditions for acclimatization. Due to increasing heat, the pilots couldn’t give their best. They flew a couple of times along the route in order to get used to the orientation and mountainous terrain, and they employed a couple of bombs and fire rockets. Between June 16 and June 17, 1982, the group was sent to Afghanistan. The 1st squadron was located in Bagram, while the 2nd in Kandahar. One unit was directed to Shindand for combat duty of the air defense system. To perform their destructive tasks, strike groups were sent to patrol the border areas. The MiG-21bis aircrafts were equipped with missiles - four R-13M or two P-13M and two R-60; the planes often had two P-13M and a pair of bombs or RBC-250 in order to help the strike group in case it was required.

Thanks to a proper training, the combat damage was reduced to a minimum. There were no aircrew losses in the regiment. Throughout the whole group’s stay in Afghanistan, only one Mi-G21bis from the 1st Squadron was taken down; it happened on August 18, 1982 in Bagram, and fortunately, Major Gregory Shapoval, was able to eject the plane. On the summer of 1982, things got complicated at the Kandahar airfield, where the enemy was luring through the adjacent roads. Columns with fuel and ammunition to supply the air base had to detour the dushmanskih ambushes. The only way to get to get to the base was through the desert. Several drivers and mechanics were injured by shelling rockets and mortar raids. On July 24, a machine fire gun severely damaged a MiG-21bis; the aircraft was filled with holes and the bullets had managed to tear down the power set, stringers and frames. Three days later, another fighter was filled with bullet holes. The fuel tank was damaged but there was a hole patched Pistone planted, and by the end of the day the aircraft was ready for combat again.

Pilots of the 263rd Regiment after a successful raid. From left to right - Majors A. Sysoev, and O. V. Pobortsev Yaasson. August 1982

The 145th Regiment had been in Afghanistan for exactly 13 months. They left DRA on July 17, 1983, and they arrived home, in Ivano-Frankivsk, after two days, on July 18.

The 927th Konigsberg Order of Alexander Nevsky from the Red Banner Fighter Aviation Regiment of the Birches in Belarus (Osovets Airfield) and of the Air Force of the Belarusian Military District took priority. The regiment’s commander was Colonel PP Tarasevich. There were 28 MiG-21bis and four "Sparky" MiG-21UM aircrafts relocated to Afghanistan. Upon arrival at the airport in Kokayty, on June 15, 1983, the regiment engaged in combat training for ten days. The airfields were tested on June 25 when placement was established in the three airfields. Bagram was the main base, and the rest of the fighters worked with Kandahar and Shindand airfields. Within four days, the pilots carried out joint flights with colleagues from a removable 145 IAP regiment.

The Belarusian regiments delivered a large amount of combat activity. During that period, the army carried out several dozens planned operations, including the famous "Big Panjshir" in the spring of 1984, on an unprecedented scale that involved the air forces. According to the memoirs of the pilots, the flew almost every day (with a sole exception on January 1, 1984), and they only did it because the Bagram airfield was covered in snow. The schedule was very tight, too: they had to wake up at 3 in the morning for routine work; after breakfast, they drove to the airport to receive pre-flight instructions. An aircraft was ready to fly after it was packed with ammunitions, which happened at 4.30-4.40 at dawn. Then, it was time for the first flight. At 5 in the morning the aircrafts already had a target on sight. They stroke the first blow. Upon return, the planes were re-equipped with weapons and all the systems were re-checked. A shift lasted 3-4 flights, and in the afternoon, because of the heat the pilots were allowed to have a break. As the night-time was setting in, the commander was preparing tasks for the following day; he described the mission, the anti-crafts, outfit forces and combat aircraft charge. Given the adverse circumstances of the situation, the high temperatures, excess airbases with rarefied air, take-off weight, refueling, reduction of tactical aircraft and radius of their time in the target area, they did their best.

They had to find a suitable way to hit the target. They alloyed two MiG-21 units, each with 6 aircrafts. These had two high-explosive bombs FAB-500 and a pair of suspension of two rockets C-24. 10 strike aircrafts made an entrance, as well. 6 of them carried four bombs OFAB-250-270 and 4 had two projectile C-24. The task was to destroy the fortress that was located in the mountains. Proper weaponry was required to make that happen, so 8 MiG-21 aircrafts also had C-5 and C-24 rockets. Two fighters were given the command to approach and strike. They first attacked with high-explosive bombs; then, they used 4 OFAB 250-270 missiles and a pair of suspension units of UB- 32 and two-UX 16-57.

Afghan MiG-21bis ready for landing

They had to send two MiG-21 aircraft units with charging C-5 missiles to “welcome” the enemy. The fighters also had two cluster bombs with shrapnel equipment. The goal was to attack in the valley but they couldn’t use the rockets because they didn’t have enough precision. The air forces needed better weapons, so they employed 6 OFAB-250-270 aircrafts (with four bombs on each) and 4 fighters charged with volume-detonating bombs ODAB- 500, which were used in the canyons. The 927 IAP fighter had 12,000 hours of flight and a performance of 10,000 raids. Each raid had roughly 400 hours per pilot. During the regiment’s stay in Afghanistan, they used 16,000 bombs of different types and caliber – 250, 500 kg, 1800 rockets C-24 and 25,000 rounds of ammunitions to GS-23 guns. There were some really tense days in May 1984, when some pilots had to fly up to 70 hours per month during the Panjshir operation. They performed 150 combat raids. During one of the raid, Captain Alex Gordiyuk said: “In the Chaugani area, there was a large Union column coming from the Salang pass; they were heading to the mountains when they were attacked. The column was trapped, and when a tank caught on fire, other cars in the chair started to burn as well.

MiG-21bis at Kandahar Airfield. Summer 1987

Even though our An-26RT repeater was on day and night, VHF communications with the officer-gunner in the column had been lost. It looked like WWII didn’t teach anyone anything: ground troops should have been supported through the VHF radio system. From an altitude of 3,000m, we didn’t have enough visibility. However, we knew that we suffered a great loss. Considering there was no communication, a senior on board of an An-26 forbade us to “work” and ordered the commander of the group, Major Glowe, to head back to the airfield. Nicholas started to feel sorry, but it was too late. The security measures were out of place, but we were not given any moral support. The major told us it was an order, and that we had to execute it.

After 10 minutes, the order failed. I knew better and decided to take responsibility for my actions. I could hear Glowe say <>. We entered nothing but smoke and fire, and couldn’t see anything. There was a bombing attack on the slopes of the gorge, and if we wanted to make it out alive we had to prick the gunners. We had 4 planes, and each had 4 OFAB-250 bombs. They were enough for two raids. I dropped the first bomb as I approached the enemy, but it only shocked the attackers from a “moral” point of view. It didn’t scare them off. The 4 MiG-21bis aircrafts on site destroyed about 80 enemies out of 160 on their way to support the Panjshir jihad. Some of the survivors didn’t want to move forward, and went back. Our hero was Commander General of Aviation Kolodiy, who fought bravely in our column to bring the Panjshir operation to an end. We were not penalized for disobeying orders.

The most convincing argument – a FAB-500M54 pyatisotkilogrammovaya bomb under the wing of a MiG-21

In March 1984, a MiG-21bis broke apart because of some technical defects. Due to a shortage of aircraft parts, the air valve system had to be replaced, and the technicians had to use parts from another aircraft. Those proved to be defective, and upon departure the plane didn’t have enough air pressure. The braking system didn’t work either, and the when the pilot wanted to eject, the drogue parachute refused to open. The fighter returned to the ground and broke the aerodrome’s fence. Fortunately, the pilot was okay and the aircraft needed serious repairs.

The first combat loss of the 927 Regiment happened on October 29, 1983, when the aircraft regiment of Chief Major General Igor was attacked. They were following a target in the Bamyan province, in a mountainous region of Badakhshan, when a MiG-21bis - conducted by the deputy commander of the regiment Nikolay Karev, had to deal with an extremely difficult situation. They could only attack the fortress from a single position, considering its location was in the gorge. This allowed the enemy to aim fire at the aircraft as it was approaching. Because there were some supply issues, the planes only carried FAB-500SHN bombs. The ammunition had to be used horizontally, at low altitudes. They couldn’t do it because of the topography of the fortress, and since there was no time to take action, the aircraft was hit by a ZSU. The plane was able to obey control and cross the mountain. A minute later, the pilots realized that the hydraulic system started to fail; he kept forcing the aircraft and tried to get to the airfield.

The accompanying link pilots saw how the trail of kerosene from the punctured tank, suddenly turned into a fiery plume with a length of 20 meters. An explosion could have happened, but the pilot catapulted at a 30 km distance from Bagram. The pilot finally reached the ground, where rescuers were waiting. Long story short: "After landing, I unbuckled, looked around and took out my gun. There was a village nearby. I started hearing whispers and knew that an enemy was crawling. I fired the first shot even though I didn’t have an aim. He ran away – probably because he was unarmed. Only he was not alone – I could hear more shots so I fired as well. But I knew my gun was not going to last, so I grabbed a machine-gun. Then I saw a crowd of armed men coming towards my location. Thank God the helicopters came and the pilots immediately picked me up. We flew under attack, and I could even see a few holes in the helicopter. I injured my back so they brought me alcohol for relief. It didn’t work and after 3 months in the hospital, I was able to fly again”.

Before returning home, on June 15, 1984, Captain Alexei Gordiyuk’s aircraft was taken down. Enemy groups hit it 6 km from the airport. The pilot managed to eject at an altitude of 1,000m and the fighter began to rotate. He was immediately picked up by a rescuing helicopter. This was the 193th flight combat for the pilot, and apparently the attack happened because the captain was physically and emotionally exhausted, and couldn’t stay alert.

The first group of aircrafts in Afghanistan - the Reconnaissance MiG-21R

Danger lurked on the ground. In spite of helicopter patrols and a huge number of mines, the enemy was approaching the airfields. They were able strike back with rockets, but it was not enough. The government troops of the aviation had the most to lose. The Afghan people were not properly protected either. On the ground, in the Shindand Mujahideen region, the entire regiment IL-28 was destroyed.

Batters and Soviet aircrafts. In April 1984, during a night bombardment in Bagram, a MiG-21bis duty unit was attacked. The fighters caught on fire and suddenly, the entire parking lot was burning. The pilots started running towards their planes, and without even turning the headlights, they flew them out of the fire. They couldn’t save all, and some were left burning until they turned into ashes. To protect the airfields, they decided to strengthen ground protection. They brought 4 battalions which came in 50-70 armored vehicles. When they got to the airfields, they surrounded and covered the perimeter. They started testing the warning system – which they nicknamed ‘devil’s eye’. It consisted of sensors installed around the airfields, heat reactors and metal reactors (they could hear if people with guns were approaching on foot, in the dark).

Alexei Gordiyuk’s MiG-21 was the last aircraft of this type. It was lost in Afghanistan exactly one month before the return of the regiment in the Soviet Union. The following variants were the MiG-23, although some would still say that the “twenty first” were the best. The Afghans needed new techniques to compensate for the decline of the government aviation technology. In addition to the MiG-21 fighter aircraft, the Air Force 40th Army scouts were MiG-21R, which served in the 263rd Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron separately. The troops were not yet formed, but they were still sent to Afghanistan in one of the 87th squadrons. The scouts were based in Bagram and they were part of the 263rd battalion, which was in charge of completing shifts in different parts of the country. The tasks appointed were:

- Opening the concentration zones of the rebels and directing the movement of opposing groups; - Monitoring the roads and checking the movement of the troops; - Guidance Aviation strike groups; - Monitoring the fotokontrol results of the strikes; - Attacks on opening objects using onboard weapons

The job was to fix the consequences of an attack, and not focus too much on the emotional reports of the pilots for obvious reasons. They couldn’t afford the unnecessary casualties, and they didn’t want to risk compromising the execution of the task forces either. A MiG-21P was used for shooting; it was equipped with a set of hanging containers and an intelligence equipment. Using aerial cameras AFA-39 and ASHFA, they photographed the areas during the day; at night, they used V-47 shooting camera with flares. An exploration was performed with a set of television equipment Tark-2, which was used to transmit images on the ground and provide enough visibility to the fighting regiment. The MiG-21R’s equipment consisted of a tape recorder as well. It was meant to record the pilot ‘travel experiences’, location and noticeable landmarks. During the first year of the war, the squadron carried out 2708 reconnaissance missions (an average of 156 sorties per crew).

In addition to aerial photography missions, MiG-21R was involved in conducting electronic intelligence. It was carried out by means of special equipment, it had a fixed location and characteristics of a radio-emitting vehicle. Its task was to reveal the Pakistani defense areas across the border. From January to December 1980, 607 sorties were carried out on the radio intelligence, resulting in the detection of radar in many parts of Pakistan, on the ground and in the air - defense facilities were spotted in in Peshawar, Rawalpindi, Chitral, Kohat, Chokvale, Milanvali, Miramshahe, Derismailhane, Bath, Tank, Fort Semdimane, Chaman and Quetta.

Intelligence MiGs were used for night shots to highlight the area of plaque "chandeliers" - lighting bombs SAB 100 and SAB-250. They participated in the attacks and searched enemies with weapons, particularly at night. Only the greatest scouts would receive risky night jobs in the mountains. The crews of the MiG-21R knew better than anyone else where to find the target. They were always “hunting freely” – this was an independent search with the aim to destroy the enemy. They were carrying fuel tanks, two RBC 250-275 or two to four large-caliber rockets C-24. The MiG-21R squadron flew until the spring of 1984, when the "twenty-first" in its composition changed the new Su- 17M3R.

In the summer of 1984, the MiG-21 aircraft of the 40th Army was replaced by the more modern MiG-23. However, it kept participating in the “twenty-first” Afghan campaign of the 115th Guards. They continued to fly the MiG-21bis until the end of the Afghan war. The regiment consisted of three squadrons of combat - 32 MiG-21bis and 8 "sparok" MiG-21UM. Kokayty was located so much closer to the site of the operations than the 40th Army’s airbases. The Frontier Province was familiar with the pilots, since they worked in those areas every year. Main zones where the combat missions were performed were - Mazar-i-Sharif, Kunduz, Taloqan, Puli Khumri and Faizabad. The MiGs would appear in just a matter of minutes if they were required, but some flights had to be limited in order to preserve the use of the ventral suspended tank PTB-800. The latest military operation involving the MiG-21 became Kokayty Ramit. It was pursued by area troops near the gorge, in a zone better known as Aibak - Puli Khumri in March 1988. Upon withdrawal of the troops, ground fighting had to be minimized in order to reduce losses.

Things didn’t end after this fighter combat: the pilots of the 115th Regiment continued to perform departures in familiar areas, pursuing objectives of the "psychological impact" and demonstrating a willingness to stop any attempts to active enemy action. The raids were carried out intelligently. Dushmanskim camps were attacked with bombs; Colonel ON Strukov, commander of the 115th IAP Regiment, who accounted 140 sorties, lucidly described the tasks involved: “we couldn’t raise our heads because the enemy would see. Once or twice a week, intended objects were bombed. Due to the increased intensity of the combat, full withdrawal was required; the bombing exposed places adjacent to the tracks, which stretched the column. In the autumn and winter months of the year 1988/89, up to mid-February, the pilots had to perform three or four flights a day. The combat charge of the MiG- 21bis was two bombs of 500 kg or 250 kg. The ammunition made the combat field seem highly-explosive and incendiary, capable of detonating militant bases, fortifications, and mountain shelters.

Since the enemy already had modern weaponry, including MANPADS, appropriate safety measures had to be taken. This didn’t include the radio interception system, as it was seen as an exaggeration; the teams in the air could approximate the enemy group number, and give warnings though. The radio was barely used on the ground because of the noise. To build attacks, the aircrafts had to enter a dive – which was pretty cool because it improved the attack’s bombing accuracy; this attempt was carried out from a height of 8000 m and it lasted 10 seconds. This timeframe was needed to aim and shoot. Reset bombs were launched from 5,000m, beyond the reach of the enemy’s anti-crafts. The attacks were carefully constructed to avoid as much damage as possible. The regiment made roughly 5,000 sorties in combat. 151 heroes were awarded special honors and medals.

In the winter of 1989, the 115th Guards. IAP moved to the latest MiG-29 fighters. Sometimes, ‘for old time’s sake’ they trained above familiar places. The 115th Guards. IAP was the only regiment in the aviation awarded for their participation in the Afghan campaign combat. They were given the Order of the Red Banner award – on March 11, 1981.

Fighter units on MiG-21, involved in the wars in Afghanistan