Brexit, Devolution and Economic Development in 'Left-Behind' Regions

Brexit, devolution and economic development in ‘left-behind’ regions

John Tomaney* and Andy Pike+ *University College London, +Newcastle University

https://doi.org/10.18573/wer.231 Accepted: 03/12/18

Introduction attention of policymakers. provide a poor measure of Finally, the politics of local real economic conditions in The Brexit vote in the UK, and regional economic these places. Considering according to Andrés development are considered, their high dependence upon Rodríguez-Pose (2018), is including the kinds of incapacity benefits paid to an instance of the revenge of institutions are required to those classified as unable to the ‘places that don’t matter’. affect a new economic future seek work, Beatty and This expression of discontent in such disadvantaged Fothergill estimate the ‘real’ from places at the sharp end places1. unemployment rates in such of rising social and spatial places to be 7.5% of the inequalities has fostered the The regional political working age population in rapid rise of populism that is economy of de- spring 2017. challenging the hegemony of industrialisation neoliberal capitalism and Educational disadvantage is liberal democracy. This Beatty and Fothergill (2018) concentred in left-behind paper considers the estimate that 16 million places (Education Policy problems of these so-called people live in the former Institute, 2018). This ‘left-behind’ places – typically industrial regions of the UK – disadvantage takes complex former industrial regions. almost one quarter of the and varied forms. For Such places figured national population. While instance, the North East prominently not just among these regions have shared in region consistently has those that voted leave in the the rise in employment in amongst the best primary Brexit referendum in the UK, recent years, growth rates in school results in the country, but also among those who London and other cities have but the lowest average adult voted for Donald Trump in been three times faster. incomes (Children’s the 2016 in the US, and for Despite prolonged and far- Commissioner for England, Marine Le Pen in 2017 in reaching deindustrialisation, 2018). In addition, left-behind France in their respective these places still have a regions experience presidential elections. In this higher than national average disproportionate levels of context, this paper’s aims are share of industrial jobs, lack premature mortality (Plümper fourfold. First, we outline the white-collar and graduate- et al. 2018). Mordechai et al. political economy of ‘left- level jobs, have lower than (2018) have identified higher behind’ regions. Second, we average pay and opioid prescription rates in offer a critical account of employment rates, are more the north of England and in recent efforts to ‘regenerate’ dependent on in-work and areas of greater social deindustrialised regions. especially incapacity deprivation. The highest Third, we describe new benefits, and have ageing incidence of relative urban policy prescriptions for ‘left- populations. Headline decline is primarily located in behind’ regions attracting the unemployment figures Northern England (Pike et al.

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2016). Such places are 2017). There is a geography legacies of inward characterised by lower rates to this; McCann (2016) investment policy include the of net in-migration of shows that regions outside of major industrial complexes economically active age London and the South have built up by Nissan in groups, lower rates of productivity levels akin to Sunderland and Toyota in employment growth in the poorer regions in Central and Derby. But many of these decade to 2008, and a higher Eastern Europe and investments proved fragile; rate of contraction following southern regions in the LG in Newport and Siemens the economic crisis and United States. downturn in 2009-2012. They Deindustrialisation has on Tyneside withdrew their have substantially higher underpinned the long-term investments shortly after rates of poverty measured by growth of regional their high-profile openings. the unadjusted means-tested inequalities in the UK The fragility of such branch benefits rate. The factors (Tomlinson, 2016). Such plant economies is long- most strongly associated disparities have been established (Pike, et al. with relative decline in the UK exacerbated more recently 2017). Stirrings of economic are skill levels, industrial by several geographically nationalism and even ‘de- history and location at city, uneven trends, including globalisation’, have rendered regional and national scales. skill-biased technical change strategies based upon the City size and the reduced which has disadvantaged continued attraction of flows presence of consumer those regions with low mobile manufacturing services in places that are educational attainment; trade over-shadowed by larger shocks arising from greater investment more difficult for neighbours are key international integration of UK regions, especially in the differentiating factors markets (Sandbu, 2016); and uncertain context of Brexit between places in relative the rise of ‘residential and future trading relations. decline. Some places with capitalism’ in which Enterprise policy typically weak economies and lower economic growth is based on stimulated unsustainable value housing markets appreciating assets values market entry by short-lived experience both selective (Ryan-Collins, et al. 2017). businesses, displacing out-migration of higher Left-behind places typically incumbents (Storey et al. educated people and are the wrong side of such 2008), and encouraged selective in-migration of developments. ‘reluctant entrepreneurs’ into disadvantaged, often unwell, starting low-value service people with high levels of Former industrial regions enterprises (Turner 2003). social need (O’Connor, have been subject to waves While rising productivity 2017). of policy innovation and means existing employers intervention. Under the are likely to shed workers to Former industrial regions Thatcher and Major remain competitive; indeed, have presented a persistent governments, priorities problem for public policy some consider the remaining included, first, providing across the developed world jobs in ‘left-behind’ places financial and regulatory for several decades. While especially vulnerable to incentives to attract the rapid decline or automation (Centre for international manufacturing disappearance of Cities, 2018). employment in traditional investment to the former industries has occurred industrial regions, enabled by In this context, there has across North America and the UK’s membership of the been a search for new Europe, the scale of these Single European Market. approaches to economic changes has been especially And, second, encouraging development. Currently, a marked in the UK and adds to entrepreneurship through the powerful orthodoxy suggests the urgency of the issue. The promotion of enterprise that cities offer productivity UK’s ‘productivity puzzle’ based upon self-employment and growth premiums continues to vex and business start-ups. The because they generate policymakers (Haldane,

agglomeration economies have been ambiguous at globalisation through its through their scale, density best. Widening social and specialisation in financial and diversity. In this way, spatial inequalities between services, the attraction of London acts as the dynamo and within cities and regions multinational companies, that powers the UK are the accepted foreign investment and economy, through its consequence of this international migrants, and benefitting from rising asset financial, digital and approach and, for some, are values, London has knowledge-intensive the sign of a dynamic rather effectively ‘de-coupled’ itself business services (KIBS) than lagging economy from the rest of the UK and provides an economic (Glaeser, 2013). Such economy (see also Beatty development model to which interpretations underline and Fothergill, 2018). Very other places should aspire. views that see efforts to little of London’s growth has The recent growth of revive lagging industrial been driven by migration Manchester, based on the regions as having failed and from elsewhere in the UK expansion of services and being counterproductive; (McCann, 2016) property development, has better to enable migration to been presented as the model London (or other large cities) Similarly, there is little for other city-regions (Moran, where more productive jobs evidence that faster-growing et al., 2018). are plentiful (e.g. Leunig, cities in the North are contributing to the growth of 2008). Public policy now aims to neighbouring places. The facilitate the further growth of economic performance of large cities – typically by The limits of ‘regeneration’ cities is crucially determined easing planning restrictions by the region in which they are located. Cities in to allow more development. Reeves (2018: 30) has southern England and Recently, city-centre cogently summarised the Scotland have tended to regeneration has acted as a limits of recent policies: “[I]ndustrial strategy has grow above the national proxy for industrial strategy tended to concentrate on average, while cities in (Berry, 2018). The Northern cities as engines of growth, northern England grew more Powerhouse, for instance, on property development, slowly (McCann, 2016). operates primarily as a brand technological innovation and Although the gap between for the marketing of Northern the high-productivity trading major cities and their regional England for investment in sectors. This approach to hinterlands has widened, residential and commercial economic growth neglects much of the growth, even in real estate, infrastructure, middle- and low-paid workers relative success stories such and, to a lesser extent, in the low-productivity, non- as Manchester, has been in advanced manufacturing, traded sectors, as well as the low productivity, low wage sectors rather than KIBS. R&D, and culture (Lee, civic infrastructure required Moreover, with their greater 2017). This development to develop research and social needs and higher model lies behind the recent innovation across the whole economy. It also tends to costs of service provision, push to create ‘metro- exclude rural areas and local authorities in ‘left- mayors’ in city-regions as the towns from the very wealth- behind’ places have borne government’s preferred form creating activity it is the brunt of austerity since of devolution based upon promoting.” 2010 (Bounds, 2017). matching decision-making with ‘functional economic McCann (2016) too has The appreciation of asset areas’ (Moran et al., 2018). shown that there is little values – principally land and The implications of this evidence that other regions housing – is major driver of strategy for former mill benefit from London’s the accumulation of wealth in towns, mining villages, growth. Instead, fortuitously London and the south east of England. Allocating land for coastal and rural settlements capturing the benefits of residential development and

ensuring sites are properly (IMF), among others, congestion and densification” supplied with infrastructure is suggests that inequality is (OECD, 2018: 86). perhaps the greatest policy the cause of slow growth challenge in southern rather than its outcome Given this geographical England, which is (Cigano, 2014; IMF, 2017; differentiation of economic experiencing a severe crisis Ostry et al., 2016; see also conditions, place-based of housing affordability. Stiglitz, 2015). In the US, the approaches offer a novel Capturing some of the gains Brookings Institution has approach to local and of rising land values to fund argued that places regional economic the construction of disconnected from economic development. Such infrastructure has emerged opportunity “may hold back approaches aim to release as the focus for urban collective growth and untapped potential in development policy in threaten the social fabric on economically lagging places London. UK planning policy which a healthy democracy by empowering local is mainly focused on depends” (Berube and stakeholders to maximise increasing the supply of Murray, 2018: 2). Growing their skills, talent and housing in places where urban and regional divides capabilities in ways that demand is high, but where are one expression of this. enhance economic local authorities are reluctant But, policy-makers’ performance and potential give permission for continued faith in (Barca et al. 2012). development. But housing agglomeration and densely- and land markets in left- developed cities as the route Such strategies tailor their behind places, outside the to economic development is mix of policies to local major city centres, are in a being challenged by conditions, improving very different position. In research suggesting that opportunities for citizens and weaker markets, large cities are not always workers wherever they live housebuilding is constrained the most dynamic engines of through a combination of by an absence of growth (Dijkstra et al., 2013). targeted development development and mortgage In the UK, the productivity strategies and institutional finance, complex land growth of southern service- and capability improvements viability issues including a based cities has been (Immarino et al., 2018). The surplus of brownfield sites, modest, slowing any World Bank calls for regions lack of subsidies for increases in national average to act as the architects and remediation and negative productivity, despite higher implementers of their own reputations and stigma. levels of skills and the programmes to address their These conditions highlight presence of KIBS. Some locally unique capabilities the limits of ‘national’ smaller and medium-sized and challenges, while planning reforms as a means cities have outperformed acknowledging this will of regeneration in left-behind larger cities (Martin et al. require more intensive, on- places (McGuinness, et al. 2018). Indeed, the OECD the-ground support, including 2018) has cautioned against only technical assistance and focusing on the largest ‘core capacity building at the cities’, suggesting: regional and the local level Developing ‘left-behind’ “Larger cities create benefits, (Farole, et al, 2018: 11). places but as benefits grow, so do Conventional approaches to ‘agglomeration costs’ ... economic development that Geographical inequalities costs and benefits increase focus solely on increasing continue to increase, in parallel, reducing the pull economic growth have had generating social, political of larger cities … a well- limited impact in ‘left-behind’ and economic costs. Recent connected ‘megaregion’ with places. Economic growth has studies from the rural areas and a network of typically not translated into Organisation for Economic smaller, but well-connected rising living standards, with Co-operation and cities, could provide households which have seen Development (OECD) and agglomeration benefits while declining real incomes and International Monetary Fund limiting the costs from people trapped in low value

and poorly paid jobs that these are aimed at The politics of local and sustain in-work poverty, addressing underlying social regional economic suggesting the need for more problems such as high levels development rounded forms of of morbidity or low levels of development that focus on educational attainment. Deindustrialised places in the human wellbeing (Stiglitz et Strategies might include UK experience concentrated al., 2010). asset-based forms social and economic community development that disadvantage, and this has The pursuit of major inward aim to increase and broaden profound political investments, development of capital ownership to anchor consequences, as the KIBS or advanced jobs locally and strategies of geography of the Brexit vote manufacturing are unlikely to ‘remunicipalisation’ to take revealed. Similar problems create inclusive growth in local infrastructure back into are observable in the US, EU ‘left-behind’ places (Lee, local control (CLES, 2017; and elsewhere. In the UK, 2018). Low-paid and Cumbers, 2016). The existing, top-down policy precarious forms of work in Industrial Strategy frameworks have largely mundane sectors of the Commission (2017) has failed ‘left-behind’ regions economy – what Reeves proposed the notion of and there is an urgent need (2018) calls the ‘everyday Universal Basic for new thinking on future economy’ – have been Infrastructure to ensure development strategies. neglected in debates about appropriate provision of both Place-based approaches can local industrial strategy. But the hard (physical and aim at (re)building and these sectors are present in natural capital) and soft enhancing the everyday and all local and regional (human capital-building) foundational economy, the economies and are infrastructures that increase improvement of basic disproportionately important the productive capacity of all infrastructures, accumulation in ‘left-behind’ places. Such people and places. The of locally-owned assets and sectors typically comprise Joseph Rowntree the stimulation of demand- the ‘foundational economy’ Foundation, (see Crisp et al, side policies. Such that are immobile and 2018), for instance, has approaches will require more relatively protected from shown how reliable and participatory, multi- competition but provide the affordable local bus services stakeholder and deliberative social and material are crucial to the economic models of decision-making infrastructure of civilised life development of left-behind because they are based on that everyone needs to areas, and emphasised the identifying and responding to access irrespective of need for institutional and diverse local and regional income, including water, gas regulatory reform to support conditions. Consequently, electricity, housing, health, improvements in provision. place-based forms of care, and education Easing austerity and fiscal economic development (Foundational Economy stress is a precursor to the require strengthened Collective, 2018). adoption of these institutional frameworks. approaches and Tackling the entrenched Rather than competing for reinstatement of local problems of ‘left-behind’ the next big thing against governments and their places will require more already strong and larger partners to lead, formulate imaginative and flexible urban economies, ‘left- and implement fresh thinking geographies than the behind’ regions would be about local and regional centrally imposed approach better served by policies development. to devolution which has aimed at securing their Complementary demand- fetishised city-regions and foundational economies. side measures can also have implanted metro-mayors Public investments in high positive impacts upon job (Tomaney, 2016). Such quality infrastructures are creation and more inclusive institutional arrangements likely to be important in forms of growth (Pike et al. need to respond to emergent places where the private 2017). international patterns and sector is weak, especially if dynamics of geographical

change, including urban Moreover, 87% of the growth for a range understandable archipelagos, patchworks, in the value of housing over reasons, including the and mosaics rather than the 10 years to 2017 difficulties of relocating from simple binary cores and occurred there (Savills, low value and weak to high peripheries. The new 2018). Quantitative easing value and strong housing theories of urban and and bank bailouts have markets and the social pull of regional development underpinned asset valued community ties suggest the importance of appreciation, and this further (Rodriguez-Pose, 2018; the regional scale in benefitted London and the Sandbu, 2016). Indeed, such addressing links between south (Gordon, 2016). A land strong social bonds are one dynamic and large cities and value tax, which targets of the defining characteristics the ‘left behind’ within urban immobile assets and of former industrial regions hinterlands, smaller cities, unearned gains in wealth, and the loss of identity towns and coastal and rural although politically difficult to associated the areas (OECD, 2017). achieve, with explicit fiscal disappearance of old ways of equalisation measures, life continues to shape Tackling the problems of the would lie at the heart of economic, social, political left-behind places requires a efforts to achieve more and cultural attitudes and new politics of redistribution. regionally balanced economy behaviours in such places Wealth taxes are likely to (Ryan-Collins, et al. 2017). (Warren, 2018). This provide the necessary suggests the case for a new resources. Britain’s wealth is Allowing the continued and ‘economics of belonging’ increasingly tied up in land ‘managed decline’ of left- (Sandbu, 2018) that and property. The value of behind communities or recognises the value of these the UK’s housing stock was exhorting their residents to relationships and builds upon £7.14 trillion in 2017, but migrate (Leunig, 2008) are a them to create new forms of 64% of the UK’s housing political and moral dead end. economic activity. wealth is located in London People have a low propensity and the South East. to move out of such places

Endnotes 1. Jennings and Stoker (2016) identify a distinction between ‘two Englands’ consisting of ‘cosmopolitan’ and ‘backwater’ places. Their focus is on places in southern England, symbolised by the divide between cosmopolitan Cambridge and the backwater, former seaside resort, Clacton. The focus here is on former industrial regions.

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