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Iso/Iec 18033-3:2010 Dam 2 DRAFT AMENDMENT ISO/IEC 18033-3:2010 DAM 2 ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC 27 Secretariat: DIN Voting begins on: Voting terminates on: 2018-07-19 2018-10-11 Information technology — Security techniques — Encryption algorithms — Part 3: Block ciphers AMENDMENT 2: SM4 Technologies de l'information — Techniques de sécurité — Algorithmes de chiffrement — Partie 3: Chiffrement par blocs AMENDEMENT 2: . iTeh STANDARD PREVIEW ICS: 35.030 (standards.iteh.ai) ISO/IEC 18033-3:2010/DAmd 2 https://standards.iteh.ai/catalog/standards/sist/b9d423fe-1fde-4195-82d8- a232c08c09b0/iso-iec-18033-3-2010-damd-2 THIS DOCUMENT IS A DRAFT CIRCULATED FOR COMMENT AND APPROVAL. IT IS THEREFORE SUBJECT TO CHANGE AND MAY NOT BE REFERRED TO AS AN INTERNATIONAL STANDARD UNTIL PUBLISHED AS SUCH. IN ADDITION TO THEIR EVALUATION AS BEING ACCEPTABLE FOR INDUSTRIAL, This document is circulated as received from the committee secretariat. TECHNOLOGICAL, COMMERCIAL AND USER PURPOSES, DRAFT INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS MAY ON OCCASION HAVE TO BE CONSIDERED IN THE LIGHT OF THEIR POTENTIAL TO BECOME STANDARDS TO WHICH REFERENCE MAY BE MADE IN Reference number NATIONAL REGULATIONS. ISO/IEC 18033-3:2010/DAM 2:2018(E) RECIPIENTS OF THIS DRAFT ARE INVITED TO SUBMIT, WITH THEIR COMMENTS, NOTIFICATION OF ANY RELEVANT PATENT RIGHTS OF WHICH THEY ARE AWARE AND TO PROVIDE SUPPORTING DOCUMENTATION. © ISO/IEC 2018 ISO/IEC 18033-3:2010/DAM 2:2018(E) iTeh STANDARD PREVIEW (standards.iteh.ai) ISO/IEC 18033-3:2010/DAmd 2 https://standards.iteh.ai/catalog/standards/sist/b9d423fe-1fde-4195-82d8- a232c08c09b0/iso-iec-18033-3-2010-damd-2 COPYRIGHT PROTECTED DOCUMENT © ISO/IEC 2018 All rights reserved. Unless otherwise specified, or required in the context of its implementation, no part of this publication may be reproduced or utilized otherwise in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, or posting on the internet or an intranet, without prior written permission. Permission can be requested from either ISO at the address belowCP 401or ISO’s • Ch. member de Blandonnet body in 8 the country of the requester. ISOCH-1214 copyright Vernier, office Geneva Phone: +41 22 749 01 11 Fax:Website: +41 22www.iso.org 749 09 47 PublishedEmail: [email protected] Switzerland ii © ISO/IEC 2018 – All rights reserved ISO/IEC 18033-3:2010/DAM 2:2018(E) Foreword ISO (the International Organization for Standardization) and IEC (the International Electrotechnical members of ISO or IEC participate in the development of International Standards through technical Commission) form the specialized system for worldwide standardization. National bodies that are committeesorganizations, established governmental by the and respective non-governmental, organization in liaison to deal with with ISO particularand IEC, also fields take of part technical in the activity. ISO and IEC technical committees collaborate in fields of mutual interest. Other international ISO/IEC JTC 1. work. In the field of information technology, ISO and IEC have established a joint technical committee, The procedures used to develop this document and those intended for its further maintenance are described in the ISO/IEC Directives, Part 1. In particular the different approval criteria needed for editorial rules of the ISO/IEC Directives, Part 2 (see www .iso .org/directives). the different types of document should be noted. This document was drafted in accordance with the Attention is drawn to the possibility that some of the elements of this document may be the subject ofIntroduction patent rights. and/or ISO on and the IECISO listshall of patentnot be declarationsheld responsible received for (seeidentifying www .iso any .org/patents or all such). patent rights. Details of any patent rights identified during the development of the document will be in the constitute an endorsement. Any trade name used in this document is information given for the convenience of users and does not as well as informationi aboutTeh ISO's ST adherenceANDA toR theD World PR TradeEV IOrganizationEW (WTO) principles in the ForTechnical an explanation Barriers onto Tradethe meaning (TBT)(s ofseet ISOa then specificd followingard termss. URLit ande hwww expressions.ai .iso) .org/iso/foreword related to conformity .html. assessment, The committee responsible for this document is ISO/IEC JTC 1, Information technology, SC XXX ISO/IEC 18033-3:2010/DAmd 2 https://standards.iteh.ai/catalog/standards/sist/b9d423fe-1fde-4195-82d8- a232c08c09b0/iso-iec-18033-3-2010-damd-2 This second/third/... edition cancels and replaces the first/second/... edition (), [clause(s) / subclause(s) / table(s) / figure(s) / annex(es)] of which [has / have] been technically revised. ISO XXXX consists of the following parts. [Add information as necessary.] © ISO/IEC 2018 – All rights reserved iii iTeh STANDARD PREVIEW (standards.iteh.ai) ISO/IEC 18033-3:2010/DAmd 2 https://standards.iteh.ai/catalog/standards/sist/b9d423fe-1fde-4195-82d8- a232c08c09b0/iso-iec-18033-3-2010-damd-2 ISO/IEC 18033-3:2010/DAM 2:2018(E) Information technology — Security techniques — Encryption algorithms — Part 3: Block ciphers AMENDMENT 2: SM4 — Amendment 2: SM4 AA: Page 1, 1: Change the following sentence of paragraph 1: Ato: total of seven different block ciphers are defined. ABB: total Page of nine1, 1, Tabledifferent 1:iT blockeh ciphers STA areN defined.DARD PREVIEW Replace Table 1 with the following:(standards.iteh.ai) Block lengthISO/IEAlgorithmC 18033-3 :name2010/D (seeAmd #) 2 https://standards.iteh.ai/catalog/TDEAstanda r d s / s is t(4.2)/b9d423fe-1fde128-419 5or-8 1922d8- bits a232c08c09b0/iso-iec-18033-3-2010-damd-2 Key length MISTY (4.3) 64 bits CAST-128 (4.4) 128 bits HIGHT (4.5) AES (5.2) 128, 192 or 256 Camelia (5.3) bits 128 bits SEED (5.4) 128 bits 256 bits SM4 (5.6) 128 bits Kuznyechik (5.5) CC: Page 24, 5.1: Change the following sentence of paragraph 1: Into: this clause, three 128-bit block ciphers are specified; AES in 5.2, Camellia in 5.3, and SEED in 5.4. in 5.5 and SM4 in 5.6. In this clause, five 128-bit block ciphers are specified; AES in 5.2, Camellia in 5.3, SEED in 5.4, Kuznyechik DD: Page 51, After 5.4.5: Add the following new 5.6 to the end of 5.5: 5.6 SM4 5.6.1 The SM4 algorithm © ISO/IEC 2018 – All rights reserved 1 ISO/IEC 18033-3:2010/DAM 2:2018(E) The SM4 algorithm is a symmetric block cipher that can process data blocks of 128 bits, using a cipher key5.6.2 with SM4 length encryption of 128 bits under 32 rounds. A 128-bit block P is transformed into a 128-bit block C using the following procedure. (Xi (i = 0, 1, 2, 3) are variables with 32-bit length, rki (i (1) P = X0 || X1 || X2 || X3 = 0, 1, …, 31) are subkeys with 32-bit length): (2) for i = 0 to 31: Xi+4 = F(Xi, Xi+1, Xi+2, Xi+3, rki) (3) C = X35 || X34 || X33 || X32 5.6.3 SM4 decryption The decryption operation is identical to the encryption operation, except that the rounds (and therefore the subkeys)(1) C = X35 are || Xused34 || inX33 reverse || X32 order: (2) for i = 31 to 0: Xi = F(Xi+4, Xi+1, Xi+2, Xi+3, rki) (3) P = X0 || X1 || X2 || X3 iTeh STANDARD PREVIEW 5.6.4 SM4 functions (standards.iteh.ai) 5.6.4.1 Function F ISO/IEC 18033-3:2010/DAmd 2 https://standards.iteh.ai/catalog/standards/sist/b9d423fe-1fde-4195-82d8- a232c08c09b0/iso-iec-18033-3-2010-damd-2 The F(functionX0, X1, XF2 is, X used3, rk) for= X 0both encryptionX1 X2 X3 andrk decryption.) The function F is defined as follows: where Xi (i = 0, 1, 2, 3) and rk⊕T( ⊕ ⊕ ⊕ 5.6.4.2 Permutation areT and bit T’strings of length 32, T is a permutation defined in 5.6.4.2. 5.6.4.2.1 General The permutation T is used both for encryption and decryption. T is a composition of a nonlinear transformation τ and a linear transformation L, that is T(·) = L(τ(·)). The permutation T’ is used for key schedule. T’ is a composition of a nonlinear transformation τ and a linear transformation L’, that is T’(·) =5.6.4.2.2 L’(τ(·)). T(T’), NonlinearL(L’) and τ aretransformation all transformations τ on 32-bit strings. ai (i in 5.6.4.2.4): The nonlinear transformation τ is defined as follows ( = 0, 1, 2, 3) are bytes and S is a S-box defined a0 || a1 || a2 || a3) = S(a0) || S(a1) || S(a2) || S(a3). 5.6.4.2.3τ( Linear transformation L and L’ B is a variable with 32-bit length): The L(linearB) = transformationB B<<<2 B L<<< is 10definedB<<< as 18followsB <<<( 24). ⊕( )⊕( )⊕( )⊕( B is a variable with 32-bit length): The L’(linearB) = transformationB B<<<13 L’B<<< is defined23). as follows ( ⊕( )⊕( 2 © ISO/IEC 2018 – All rights reserved ISO/IEC 18033-3:2010/DAM 2:2018(E) 5.6.4.2.4 S-box S Table 17. The S-box S used in the transformation τTable is presented 17 — SM4 in hexadecimal S-box form in 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 a b c d e f 0 d6 90 e9 fe cc e1 3d b7 16 b6 14 c2 28 2c 05 1 2b 67 9a 76 2a be 04 c3 aa 44 13 26 49 86 06 99 fb 2 9c 42 50 f4 91 ef 98 7a 33 54 0b 43 ed cf ac 62 3 e4 b3 1c a9 c9 08 e8 95 80 df 94 fa 75 8f 3f a6 4 47 07 a7 fc f3 73 17 ba 83 59 3c 19 e6 85 4f a8 5 68 6b 81 b2 71 64 da 8b f8 eb 0f 4b 70 56 9d 35 6 1e 24 0e 5e 63 58 d1 a2 25 22 7c 3b 01 21 78 87 7 d4 00 46 57 9f d3 27 52 4c 36 02 e7 a0 c4 c8 9e 8 ea bf 8a d2 40 c7 38 b5 a3 f7 f2 ce f9 61 15 a1 9 e0 ae 5d a4 9b 34 1a 55 ad 93 32 30 f5 8c b1 e3 a 1d f6 e2 2e 82 66 ca 60 c0 29 23 ab 0d 53 4e 6f b d5 db 37 45 de fd 8e 2f 03 ff 6a 72 6d 6c 5b 51 c 8d 1b af 92 bb dd bc 7f 11 d9 5c 41 1f 10 5a d8 d 0a c1 31 88 a5 cd 7b bd 2d 74 d0 12 b8 e5 b4 b0 e 89 69iTe97h 4aST0cAN96D77AR7eD 65PRb9EVf1 IE09Wc5 6e c6 84 f 18 f0 7d ec(st3aandcda4drds20.it79eh.eeai)5f 3e d7 cb 39 48 5.6.5 SM4 key schedule ISO/IEC 18033-3:2010/DAmd 2 https://standards.iteh.ai/catalog/standards/sist/b9dMK423=fe -MK1fde0- 4||1 9MK5-812 d||8- MK2 || MK3 a232c08c09b0/iso-iec-18033-3-2010-damd-2 The key scheduling part accepts a 128-bit master key , and yields 32 subkeys,(1) K 0as || shown K1 || K 2below.
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