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Judicial Corruption in Eastern Europe: an Examination of Causal Mechanisms in Albania and Romania Claire M

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Judicial Corruption in Eastern Europe: an Examination of Causal Mechanisms in Albania and Romania Claire M James Madison University JMU Scholarly Commons Senior Honors Projects, 2010-current Honors College Spring 2017 Judicial corruption in Eastern Europe: An examination of causal mechanisms in Albania and Romania Claire M. Swinko James Madison University Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.lib.jmu.edu/honors201019 Part of the International Relations Commons Recommended Citation Swinko, Claire M., "Judicial corruption in Eastern Europe: An examination of causal mechanisms in Albania and Romania" (2017). Senior Honors Projects, 2010-current. 334. https://commons.lib.jmu.edu/honors201019/334 This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Honors College at JMU Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Senior Honors Projects, 2010-current by an authorized administrator of JMU Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Judicial Corruption in Eastern Europe: An Examination of Causal Mechanisms in Albania and Romania _______________________ An Honors Program Project Presented to the Faculty of the Undergraduate College of Arts and Letters James Madison University _______________________ by Claire Swinko May 2017 Accepted by the faculty of the Department of Political Science, James Madison University, in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Honors Program. FACULTY COMMITTEE: HONORS PROGRAM APPROVAL: Project Advisor: John Hulsey, Ph.D., Bradley R. Newcomer, Ph.D., Associate Professor, Political Science Director, Honors Program Reader: John Scherpereel, Ph.D., Professor, Political Science Reader: Charles Blake, Ph. D., Professor, Political Science Dedication For my dad, who supports and inspires me everyday. You taught me to shoot for the stars, and I would not be half the person I am today with out you. 2 Table of Contents List of Figures…………………………………………………………………..4 Acknowledgements…………………………………………………………......5 Introduction…………………………………………………………………......6 Chapter 1: Literature Review and Hypotheses………………………………....11 Chapter 2: Methodology…………...….…………………………………..........33 Chapter 3: Judicial Corruption in Albania……………………………………...47 Chapter 4: Judicial Corruption in Romania………………………………….....93 Chapter 5: Findings and Comparisons……………………………………........135 Conclusion……………………………………………………………………..155 Appendix………………………………………………………………….........163 References by Chapter……………………………………………………........170 3 List of Figures 1 Global perceived levels of judicial corruption …….........……………………..39 2 Comparative values for the CEE region…………………..................................40 3 Average of comparative values for CEE EU and non-EU member countries….40 4 Average comparative scores for CEE region…………………………………...41 5 Overview of Albanian judiciary………………………………………………...49 6 Final results……………………………………………………………………..155 7 Effect of EU membership and candidate status………………………………...157 4 Acknowledgements I would like to thank my thesis project advisor, Dr. John Hulsey, for his guidance and feedback throughout this process; my readers, Dr. John Scherpereel and Dr. Charles Blake, for providing me with helpful comments and direction; and Dr. Hak-Seon Lee for his guidance and support during our honors thesis colloquium classes. I would also like to thank my friends and family for their constant love and encouragement. 5 Introduction After the fall of communism in 1989, the countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) began their transitions from communist strongholds to pillars of democracy. Each CEE country has undergone (or is in the process of undergoing) its own unique democratization process, but most have encountered a similar problem: eradicating the high levels of corruption that have become endemic within their institutions. Corruption can come in many forms. Transparency International, the leading global organization focused on combating corruption, identifies at least eighteen different forms of corruption on its website. Once corruption takes hold in an institution, it quickly spreads to another, and this pattern continues until it becomes widespread within a society. Literature on corruption is robust, and scholars have identified an extensive list of causes to explain how corruption can take root in a country’s institutions. While corruption is a global phenomenon and certainly is not unique to Central and Eastern Europe, it has become systemic in many CEE countries, causing the gradual weakening of the judiciary and rule of law. Transparency International ranks CEE countries among the most corrupt countries in the world. Many studies on corruption focus solely on countries that are developing or newer democracies. While it is true there are countries in the CEE region that can be classified as developing democracies, I chose this particular region because I am interested in examining corruption in post-communist societies. The beauty of the CEE region is found in its political and economic diversity. The countries of CEE have dramatically transformed since 1989, and though no two countries are alike, the homogeneity across numerous variables commonly associated with high levels of judicial corruption makes this region particularly interesting to research. 6 This study seeks to evaluate causes of judicial corruption in two CEE countries, Albania and Romania, in an effort to better understand why and how judicial corruption can become rampant in certain political and economic climates. This study also attempts to extrapolate causes of judicial corruption at the regional level to account for the region’s high judicial corruption values on Transparency International’s Global Corruption Barometer. My project is qualitative in nature and uses case studies to examine causal mechanisms of judicial corruption in Albania and Romania. I use the method of process tracing to track three independent variables over the following time periods: 2000-2004; 2004-2008; 2008-2012; and 2012- present. The three independent variables in this study are judicial independence, EU membership and candidacy status, and levels of media freedom. The two case studies featured in this project have roughly similar judicial corruption levels. Both can be classified as moderately to highly corrupt using Transparency International’s classification system. However, they do differ on certain political and economic variables, suggesting that there are causes that could be country-specific. Of particular interest in this study is the effect of EU membership and candidacy status on curbing judicial corruption levels. The effect of membership in global institutions on promoting democracy is a hotly debated topic in literature, and is particularly relevant today, as the European Union has come under attack in recent years by those who no longer believe the institution to be effective. A key tenant of democracy is upholding the rule of law and respecting the autonomy of the judiciary. An independent judiciary is vested with the proper authority to carry out its mandate, is free from politicization, and preferences upholding the rule of law over pursuing individual interests. Theoretically speaking, EU member and candidate countries should have lower levels of judicial corruption because they have underwent, or are in the process of 7 undergoing, the EU’s strict accession process. As a result, they have adopted numerous laws that are meant to promote a healthy democracy, a key component of which is an independent judiciary. Conditionality is the EU’s most powerful weapon, and over the years it has appeared to be losing its effect. Many CEE EU member countries have been accused of “democratic backsliding”—or the reversion to authoritarian tendencies and a disrespect for the rule of law. Romania, one of the case studies featured in this study, has followed this trend. Literature on this relationship will be explored in depth in the next chapter of this study, but the general consensus amongst scholars is that the effect of EU membership and candidacy status on curbing corruption levels is positive, but there are limitations to the extent of its effectiveness in different stages of the accession process (see Vachudova, 2009; Garbbe, 2014; Dimitrova, 2010). My findings support those of other scholars. First, I argue that the European Union is moderately effective in lowering judicial corruption levels in the early stages of accession, but is even more effective in lowering corruption levels once a country obtains candidacy status and gets closer to acceding to the Union. I also find that EU conditionality stagnates once a country accedes to the EU, as in Romania, because the “carrot” of membership status has been achieved and the “stick” is no longer effective in persuading political elites to continue reforms. Second, I make the case that the domestic context of the potential member country is important when discussing the effect of EU membership and candidacy status on lowering corruption levels. This study examines the influence of public opinion, the political will of the government to adopt EU reforms, and the possible influence of EU “enlargement fatigue”. Second, I examine the relationship between judicial independence and judicial corruption levels. Judicial independence, as previously stated, is a key tenant of a healthy judiciary. If a 8 judiciary is not autonomous from politicians, businessmen, or organized crime, then it is entirely likely that external actors will place undue pressure on judges and other important members of the judiciary. Due to the overarching nature of judicial independence,
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