Supreme Court Stenographers and Law Clerks, 1910-1940
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Ross E. Davies, Professor, George Mason University School of Law 10
A CRANK ON THE COURT: THE PASSION OF JUSTICE WILLIAM R. DAY Ross E. Davies, Professor, George Mason University School of Law The Baseball Research Journal, Vol. 38, No. 2, Fall 2009, pp. 94-107 (BRJ is a publication of SABR, the Society for American Baseball Research) George Mason University Law and Economics Research Paper Series 10-10 This paper can be downloaded without charge from the Social Science Research Network at http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=1555017 **SABR_BRJ-38.2_final-v2:Layout 1 12/15/09 2:00 PM Page 94 BASEBALL AND LAW A Crank on the Court The Passion of Justice William R. Day Ross E. Davies here is an understandable tendency to date the Not surprisingly, there were plenty of other baseball Supreme Court’s involvement with baseball fans on the Court during, and even before, the period Tfrom 1922, when the Court decided Federal covered by McKenna’s (1898–1925), Day’s (1903–22), Baseball Club of Baltimore v. National League of Pro- and Taft’s (1921–30) service. 13 Chief Justice Edward D. fessional Base Ball Clubs —the original baseball White (1894–1921) 14 and Justices John Marshall Har - antitrust-exemption case. 1 And there is a correspon - lan (1877–1911), 15 Horace H. Lurton (1910–14), 16 and ding tendency to dwell on William Howard Taft—he Mahlon Pitney (1912–22), 17 for example. And no doubt was chief justice when Federal Baseball was decided 2— a thorough search would turn up many more. 18 There is, when discussing early baseball fandom on the Court. -
In Chambers: Effective Writing Tips for the Judicial Interns and Law Clerks
IN CHAMBERS: EFFECTIVE WRITING TIPS FOR THE JUDICIAL INTERNS AND LAW CLERKS © 2017 The Writing Center at GULC. All Rights Reserved.1 Working for and with a judge can be an exciting but intimidating challenge. In many respects, law school is great preparation, and many of the skills you have learned will be invaluable. However, many challenges you will face in chambers can seem quite foreign at first, and there is surprisingly little guidance out there on how to address them. This handout is intended to fill some of those gaps. A lot of the guidance contained in this handout will, like so many things in law, vary depending on facts and circumstances. For example, this handout is intended to be useful both for full-time clerks as well as summer interns and school-term externs. Of course, the roles of each of these positions differs in some respect, so keep that in mind as you read. In addition, as is elaborated further later on, every judge is different. No matter what, respect his or her wishes at all times and never take anything contained herein or elsewhere as advice to the contrary. This handout assumes you have received an assignment from your supervisor in chambers and that you are having a hard time with next steps. The goal is not so much to tell you how to write it (there is simply too much variation out there for that), but, instead, to provide some guidance as to what types of questions you can ask and what next steps might look like. -
Justice Jackson in the Jehovah's Witnesses' Cases
FIU Law Review Volume 13 Number 4 Barnette at 75: The Past, Present, and Future of the Fixed Star in Our Constitutional Article 13 Constellation Spring 2019 Justice Jackson in The Jehovah’s Witnesses’ Cases John Q. Barrett Professor of Law, St. John’s University School of Law, New York City Follow this and additional works at: https://ecollections.law.fiu.edu/lawreview Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, First Amendment Commons, and the Religion Law Commons Online ISSN: 2643-7759 Recommended Citation John Q. Barrett, Justice Jackson in The Jehovah’s Witnesses’ Cases, 13 FIU L. Rev. 827 (2019). DOI: https://dx.doi.org/10.25148/lawrev.13.4.13 This Keynote Address is brought to you for free and open access by eCollections. It has been accepted for inclusion in FIU Law Review by an authorized editor of eCollections. For more information, please contact [email protected]. 10 - BARRETT.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/9/19 6:03 PM JUSTICE JACKSON IN THE JEHOVAH’S WITNESSES’ CASES John Q. Barrett* I. Robert H. Jackson Before He Became Justice Jackson ..................828 II. Barnette in Its Supreme Court Context: The Jehovah’s Witnesses Cases, 1938–1943 ...........................................................................831 A. The General Pattern of the Decisions: The Court Warming to Jehovah’s Witnesses’ Constitutional Claims .......................831 1. The Pre-July 1941 Court ....................................................831 2. The July 1941–May 1943 Court ........................................833 3. The June 1943 Court ..........................................................834 B. Some Particulars of Supreme Court Personnel, Cases, and Decisions, From Gobitis (1940) to Barnette (1943) ................834 III. Justice Jackson on Jehovah’s Witnesses: The Author of Barnette Wrote First, and Significantly, in Douglas .....................................844 IV. -
The Importance of Dissent and the Imperative of Judicial Civility
Valparaiso University Law Review Volume 28 Number 2 Symposium on Civility and Judicial Ethics in the 1990s: Professionalism in the pp.583-646 Practice of Law Symposium on Civility and Judicial Ethics in the 1990s: Professionalism in the Practice of Law The Importance of Dissent and the Imperative of Judicial Civility Edward McGlynn Gaffney Jr. Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr Part of the Law Commons Recommended Citation Edward McGlynn Gaffney Jr., The Importance of Dissent and the Imperative of Judicial Civility, 28 Val. U. L. Rev. 583 (1994). Available at: https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol28/iss2/5 This Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by the Valparaiso University Law School at ValpoScholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in Valparaiso University Law Review by an authorized administrator of ValpoScholar. For more information, please contact a ValpoScholar staff member at [email protected]. Gaffney: The Importance of Dissent and the Imperative of Judicial Civility THE IMPORTANCE OF DISSENT AND THE IMPERATIVE OF JUDICIAL CIVILITY EDWARD McGLYNN GAFFNEY, JR.* A dissent in a court of last resort is an appeal to the brooding spirit of the law, to the intelligence of a future day, when a later decision may possibly correct the errorinto which the dissentingjudge believes the court to have been betrayed... Independence does not mean cantankerousness and ajudge may be a strongjudge without being an impossibleperson. Nothing is more distressing on any bench than the exhibition of a captious, impatient, querulous spirit.' Charles Evans Hughes I. INTRODUCTION Charles Evans Hughes served as Associate Justice of the Supreme Court from 1910 to 1916 and as Chief Justice of the United States from 1930 to 1941. -
Clerk and Justice: the Ties That Bind John Paul Stevens and Wiley B
View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by OpenCommons at University of Connecticut University of Connecticut OpenCommons@UConn Connecticut Law Review School of Law 2008 Clerk and Justice: The Ties That Bind John Paul Stevens and Wiley B. Rutledge Laura Krugman Ray Follow this and additional works at: https://opencommons.uconn.edu/law_review Recommended Citation Ray, Laura Krugman, "Clerk and Justice: The Ties That Bind John Paul Stevens and Wiley B. Rutledge" (2008). Connecticut Law Review. 5. https://opencommons.uconn.edu/law_review/5 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW VOLUME 41 NOVEMBER 2008 NUMBER 1 Article Clerk and Justice: The Ties That Bind John Paul Stevens and Wiley B. Rutledge LAURA KRUGMAN RAY Justice John Paul Stevens, now starting his thirty-third full term on the Supreme Court, served as law clerk to Justice Wiley B. Rutledge during the Court’s 1947 Term. That experience has informed both elements of Stevens’s jurisprudence and aspects of his approach to his institutional role. Like Rutledge, Stevens has written powerful opinions on issues of individual rights, the Establishment Clause, and the reach of executive power in wartime. Stevens has also, like Rutledge, been a frequent author of dissents and concurrences, choosing to express his divergences from the majority rather than to vote in silence. Within his chambers, Stevens has in many ways adopted his own clerkship experience in preference to current models. Unlike the practices of most of his colleagues, Stevens hires fewer clerks, writes his own first drafts, and shares certiorari decisionmaking with his clerks. -
Lessons Learned from Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg
LESSONS LEARNED FROM JUSTICE RUTH BADER GINSBURG Amanda L. Tyler* INTRODUCTION Serving as a law clerk for Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg in the Supreme Court’s October Term 1999 was one of the single greatest privileges and honors of my life. As a trailblazer who opened up opportunities for women, she was a personal hero. How many people get to say that they worked for their hero? Justice Ginsburg was defined by her brilliance, her dedication to public service, her resilience, and her unwavering devotion to taking up the Founders’ calling, set out in the Preamble to our Constitution, to make ours a “more perfect Union.”1 She was a profoundly dedicated public servant in no small measure because she appreciated just how important her role was in ensuring that our Constitution belongs to everyone. Whether as an advocate or a Justice, she tirelessly fought to dismantle discrimination and more generally to open opportunities for every person to live up to their full human potential. Without question, she left this world a better place than she found it, and we are all the beneficiaries. As an advocate, Ruth Bader Ginsburg challenged our society to liber- ate all persons from the gender-based stereotypes that held them back. As a federal judge for forty years—twenty-seven of them on the Supreme Court—she continued and expanded upon that work, even when it meant in dissent calling out her colleagues for improperly walking back earlier gains or halting future progress.2 In total, she wrote over 700 opinions on the D.C. -
Does Eliminating Life Tenure for Article Iii Judges Require a Constitutional Amendment?
DOW & MEHTA_03_15_21 (DO NOT DELETE) 3/17/2021 6:41 PM DOES ELIMINATING LIFE TENURE FOR ARTICLE III JUDGES REQUIRE A CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT? DAVID R. DOW & SANAT MEHTA* ABSTRACT Beginning in the early 2000s, a number of legal academicians from across the political spectrum proposed eliminating life tenure for some or all Article III judges and replacing it with a term of years (or a set of renewable terms). These scholars were largely in agreement such a change could be accomplished only by a formal constitutional amendment of Article III. In this Article, Dow and Mehta agree with the desirability of doing away with life tenure but argue such a change can be accomplished by ordinary legislation, without the need for formal amendment. Drawing on both originalism and formalism, Dow and Mehta begin by observing that the constitutional text does not expressly provide for lifetime tenure; rather, it states that judges shall hold their office during good behavior. The good behavior criterion, however, was not intended to create judicial sinecures for 20 or 30 years, but instead aimed at safeguarding judicial independence from the political branches. By measuring both the length of judicial tenure among Supreme Court justices, as well as voting behavior on the Supreme Court, Dow and Mehta conclude that, in fact, life tenure has proven inconsistent with judicial independence. They maintain that the Framers’ objective of insuring judicial independence is best achieved by term limits for Supreme Court justices. Copyright © 2021 David R. Dow & Sanat Mehta. * David Dow is the Cullen Professor at the University of Houston Law Center; Sanat Mehta, who graduated magna cum laude from Rice University in 2020 with a degree in computer science and a minor in Politics, Law, and Social Thought, is a data analyst at American Airlines. -
Supreme Court Justices
The Supreme Court Justices Supreme Court Justices *asterick denotes chief justice John Jay* (1789-95) Robert C. Grier (1846-70) John Rutledge* (1790-91; 1795) Benjamin R. Curtis (1851-57) William Cushing (1790-1810) John A. Campbell (1853-61) James Wilson (1789-98) Nathan Clifford (1858-81) John Blair, Jr. (1790-96) Noah Haynes Swayne (1862-81) James Iredell (1790-99) Samuel F. Miller (1862-90) Thomas Johnson (1792-93) David Davis (1862-77) William Paterson (1793-1806) Stephen J. Field (1863-97) Samuel Chase (1796-1811) Salmon P. Chase* (1864-73) Olliver Ellsworth* (1796-1800) William Strong (1870-80) ___________________ ___________________ Bushrod Washington (1799-1829) Joseph P. Bradley (1870-92) Alfred Moore (1800-1804) Ward Hunt (1873-82) John Marshall* (1801-35) Morrison R. Waite* (1874-88) William Johnson (1804-34) John M. Harlan (1877-1911) Henry B. Livingston (1807-23) William B. Woods (1881-87) Thomas Todd (1807-26) Stanley Matthews (1881-89) Gabriel Duvall (1811-35) Horace Gray (1882-1902) Joseph Story (1812-45) Samuel Blatchford (1882-93) Smith Thompson (1823-43) Lucius Q.C. Lamar (1883-93) Robert Trimble (1826-28) Melville W. Fuller* (1888-1910) ___________________ ___________________ John McLean (1830-61) David J. Brewer (1890-1910) Henry Baldwin (1830-44) Henry B. Brown (1891-1906) James Moore Wayne (1835-67) George Shiras, Jr. (1892-1903) Roger B. Taney* (1836-64) Howell E. Jackson (1893-95) Philip P. Barbour (1836-41) Edward D. White* (1894-1921) John Catron (1837-65) Rufus W. Peckham (1896-1909) John McKinley (1838-52) Joseph McKenna (1898-1925) Peter Vivian Daniel (1842-60) Oliver W. -
Code of Conduct for Staff Attorneys and Law Clerks Canon 1
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS CODE OF CONDUCT FOR STAFF ATTORNEYS AND LAW CLERKS CANON 1 A STAFF ATTORNEY OR LAW CLERK SHOULD CONDUCT HIMSELF OR HERSELF IN A MANNER AS TO UPHOLD AND PROMOTE THE INTEGRITY AND INDEPENDENCE OF THE JUDICIARY An independent and honorable judiciary is indispensable to justice in our society. A staff attorney or law clerk should observe, and should impart to anyone under his or her supervision, high standards of conduct so that the integrity and independence of the judiciary may be preserved and his or her office may reflect a devotion to serving the public. The provisions of this Code should be construed and applied to further those objectives. CANON 2 A STAFF ATTORNEY OR LAW CLERK SHOULD AVOID IMPROPRIETY AND THE APPEARANCE OF IMPROPRIETY IN ALL HIS OR HER ACTIVITIES A staff attorney or law clerk should not engage in any activities that would put into question the propriety of his or her conduct in carrying out the duties of his or her employment. He or she should not allow his or her family, social, or other relationships to influence his or her judgment or the performance of the duties of his or her employment. He or she should not lend the prestige of his or her position to advance the private interests of others; he or she should not convey the impression that he or she is in the position to influence the Court or any judge, nor permit others to convey the impression that they are in a special position to influence him or her. -
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT of INDIANA INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION ALLENN PETERSON, Plaintiff, V. JENNIFER FRENCH
Case 1:16-cv-01280-TWP-MJD Document 38 Filed 03/19/18 Page 1 of 6 PageID #: <pageID> UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION ALLENN PETERSON, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) No. 1:16-cv-01280-TWP-MJD ) ) JENNIFER FRENCH, ) MICHAEL THOMBLESON, ) ) Defendants. ) Entry Granting Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment And Directing Entry of Final Judgment For the reasons set forth below, defendants Jennifer French and Michael Thombleson’s motion for summary judgment, dkt. [29], is granted. I. Introduction Plaintiff Allenn Peterson is an inmate in the New Castle Correctional Facility (“New Castle”) in Indiana. In 2015, he had been employed as an offender law clerk in the facility’s law library when he and all of the other offender law clerks lost their jobs following a prison administration inquiry into a perceived security threat. A law library computer server had been reconfigured to allow internet access, something prohibited by prison policy. Authorities conducted an investigation to identify who had reconfigured the server, but they were unable to determine which of the offender law clerks might have done so. Unable to identify the culprit, all fifteen to twenty-five offender law clerks lost their jobs. None were disciplined or otherwise sanctioned. Mr. Peterson believes that his job dismissal was actually a retaliatory move to punish him for bringing previous lawsuits against defendants. He filed this action asserting a violation of his First Amendment free speech rights. Case 1:16-cv-01280-TWP-MJD Document 38 Filed 03/19/18 Page 2 of 6 PageID #: <pageID> II. Summary Judgment Standard Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. -
A Truth About Career Law Clerks Joseph D
Marquette Law Review Volume 98 Issue 1 Symposium: Judicial Assistants or Junior Article 4 Judges: The Hiring, Utilization, and Influence of Law Clerks A Truth About Career Law Clerks Joseph D. Kearney Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr Part of the Judges Commons, Law and Society Commons, and the Legal Profession Commons Repository Citation Joseph D. Kearney, A Truth About Career Law Clerks, 98 Marq. L. Rev. 13 (2014). Available at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr/vol98/iss1/4 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Marquette Law Review by an authorized administrator of Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. A TRUTH ABOUT CAREER LAW CLERKS JOSEPH D. KEARNEY* I want to begin by thanking my colleague, Chad Oldfather, and also Todd Peppers, for organizing this conference. It is an impressive feat, and I would be grateful, as dean, even if it did not present me an opportunity to unburden myself of a point that has been bothering me for some time. Let me begin that unburdening with an apology of sorts—or a refusal to give one, depending on how you look at it. It is best presented, perhaps, in a brief story. A number of years ago, one of my friends, a nationally acclaimed law professor, asked me, “If you were a Supreme Court Justice, how would you select your law clerks?” My response was that, whatever else might be the case, I would not hand the matter over, even for screening purposes, to some panel of former clerks, professors, or judges. -
The Hughes Court Docket Books: the Late Terms, 1937–1940, 55 Am
Notre Dame Law School NDLScholarship Journal Articles Publications 2015 The uH ghes Court Docket Books: The Late Terms, 1937–1940 Barry Cushman Notre Dame Law School, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.nd.edu/law_faculty_scholarship Part of the Supreme Court of the United States Commons Recommended Citation Barry Cushman, The Hughes Court Docket Books: The Late Terms, 1937–1940, 55 Am. J. Legal Hist. 361 (2015). Available at: https://scholarship.law.nd.edu/law_faculty_scholarship/1300 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Publications at NDLScholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal Articles by an authorized administrator of NDLScholarship. For more information, please contact [email protected]. The Hughes Court Docket Books: The Late Terms, 1937-1940 by BARRY CUSHMAN* ABSTRACT For many years, the docket books kept by a number of the justices of the Hughes Court have been held by the Office of the Curator of the Supreme Court. Yet the existence of these docket books was not widely known, and access to them was highly restricted. Recently, however, the Court adopted new guidelines designed to increase access to the docket books for researchers. This article offers the first-ever examination of the available docket book entries relevant to what scholars commonly regard as the major decisions of rendered during the late years of the Hughes Court, from the 1937 through the 1940 Terms. The decisions examined concern the Commerce Clause, the dormant Commerce Clause, substantive due process, equal protection, the general law, anti- trust, labor relations, intergovernmental tax immunities, criminal procedure, civil rights, and civil liberties.