Biological Weapons Proliferation: Reasons for Concern, Courses of Action
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Biological Weapons Proliferation: Reasons for Concern, Courses of Action Graham S. Pearson Gillian R. Woollett Marie I. Chevrier Jonathan B. Tucker Amy E. Smithson January 1998 Report No. 18 Copyright© 1998 by The Henry L. Stimson Center 11 Dupont Circle, Ninth Floor, NW Washington, DC 20036 tel 202-223-5956 fax 202-238-9604 e-mail [email protected] http://www.stimson.org Table of Contents Preface and Acknowledgments ................................................. iii About the Authors ............................................................v List of Abbreviations ........................................................ vii List of Tables .............................................................. viii List of Boxes ............................................................... viii List of Charts .............................................................. viii List of Matrices ............................................................ viii Introduction Amy E. Smithson ........................................................1 The Threat of Deliberate Disease in the 21st Century Graham S. Pearson .....................................................11 Industry’s Role, Concerns, and Interests in the Negotiation of a BWC Compliance Protocol Gillian R. Woollett ......................................................39 Doubts About Confidence: The Potential and Limits of Confidence-Building Measures for the Biological Weapons Convention Marie I. Chevrier .......................................................53 Verification Provisions of the Chemical Weapons Convention and Their Relevance to the Biological Weapons Convention Jonathan B. Tucker .....................................................77 Man Versus Microbe: The Negotiations to Strengthen the Biological Weapons Convention Amy E. Smithson ......................................................107 Appendix 1 Parties and Signatories of the Biological Weapons Convention ..................129 ii Appendix 2 PhRMA Member Companies.............................................131 Appendix 3 PhRMA Position on a Compliance Protocol to the Biological Weapons Convention. 135 Preface and Acknowledgments The proliferation and use of biological warfare agents is now widely recognized to be one of the most serious threats to national and regional security. Yet multilateral efforts to deal with this problem proceed at a snail’s pace. This publication highlights ways to strengthen international norms against the development, production, possession, and use of biological weapons. By publishing thoughtful ideas by experts in this field, the Henry L. Stimson Center hopes to lend greater urgency to negotiating efforts in Geneva to adopt strengthening measures for the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), an accord without verification arrangements of any kind. When the Nixon Administration agreed to conclude the BWC in 1972, verification did not seem very important. The passage of time has led most observers to a different conclusion. The Stimson Center hopes the Clinton Administration will play a more constructive role in this essential work. At present, most of the heavy lifting in Geneva is being undertaken by Great Britain, South Africa, and handful of other countries, while Washington strains at the mere task of adopting a formal negotiating position. As noted in the essays that follow, there are significant difficulties associated with strengthening the BWC. Even the voluntary transparency measures now in place for this accord are poorly implemented. As the essays in this report acknowledge, even mandatory transparency may be insufficient to deter and detect cheating. Moreover, many representatives of the bio-technology and pharmaceutical industries are very wary of strengthening measures of any kind, unlike their counterparts in chemical industry who worked diligently with negotiators to craft intrusive verification methods for the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). In other words, there are many reasons for protracted delays in negotiating strengthening measures for the BWC—until a terrible incident of biological weapons use calls attention to the inaction of negotiators, the inattention of governments, and the reluctance of industry leaders to deal more constructively with this clear and present danger. Admittedly, a strengthened BWC is only a partial solution to the problems posed by the threat of biological weapons use. Multiple solutions are clearly needed for a problem this complex and difficult. Diplomatic initiatives to deal with suspected biological weapons production or use will be weakened unless conventional military options are available and unless troops are properly trained, equipped, and led. Conversely, military options are likely to be undermined in the absence of diplomatic initiatives. The argument is sometimes made that strengthening measures for the BWC would compound an already serious problem by lulling the general public into a false sense of security. Yet those who advocate most strongly strengthening measures do so out of a sense of alarm and deep understanding over the magnitude of the problem. If critics and advocates of strengthening measures are united in their belief that more must be done, who, then, would lull the public into a false sense of security? A full court press is needed to deal with the problems posed by biological weapons. Progress on iv Biological Weapons Proliferation: Reasons for Concern, Courses of Action many different fronts is urgently needed, including the adaptation of meaningful strengthening measures for the BWC, many of which are described in the pages that follow. This publication has been conceived and edited by Dr. Amy E. Smithson, director of the Stimson Center’s Chemical and Biological Weapons Nonproliferation Project. Chemical and biological weapons have proliferated more widely than nuclear weapons. The international norms against the acquisition and use of chemical and biological weapons are weaker than those against nuclear weapons. In conjunction with the 1993 signing ceremony for the CWC, the Stimson Center decided to monitor domestic and international preparations to implement the CWC and to strengthen the BWC. We intend to offer constructive solutions, call attention to steps that would weaken proper implementation of these accords, and serve as an information clearinghouse for those interested in chemical and biological weapons proliferation. The Stimson Center is grateful for the support of the Carnegie Corporation of New York, which has funded this work since its inception. In particular, we wish to thank David Speedie and Deana Arsenian for their longstanding support, without which the Center’s work in this area would not be possible. In 1997 and 1998, the Stimson Center welcomed additional grant support from the Ploughshares Fund, the S.H. Cowell Foundation, the Compton Foundation, and from Margaret Spanel. We are grateful to Ms. Spanel, and to Sally Lilienthal and Naila Bolus at Ploughshares, Jess Erikson and Lorna Pimentel at the S.H. Cowell Foundation, and Edith Eddy at the Compton Foundation for allowing the Stimson Center to expand our work in this field. The Chemical and Biological Weapons Nonproliferation Project has released several reports on a wide range of topics associated with the control and elimination of these weapons of mass destruction. In addition, the project issues a periodic newsletter and maintains a site on the World Wide Web, which can be accessed at: www.stimson.org/cwc. Michael Krepon President About the Authors Marie I. Chevrier is the Associate Director of the Harvard-Sussex Program on Chemical and Biological Warfare Armament and Arms Limitation and a Senior Research Fellow at the Center for Science and International Affairs at the John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University. She is on leave from the faculty of the University of Texas at Dallas, where she is an Associate Professor of Political Economy. Her research has been widely published in journals and newsletters. She contributed to Arms Control Toward the 21st Century (Lynn Reinner Press, 1996) and Biological Warfare and Defense in the Era of Genetic Engineering (forthcoming). In July 1997, she served on the faculty and the organizing committee of a NATO Advanced Studies Institute symposium on New Scientific and Technical Aspects of Verification of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention in Budapest, Hungary. She was the recipient of a 1995 research grant from the US Institute of Peace to study the evolution of the neutral and non-aligned group in multilateral arms control negotiations. Dr. Chevrier earned her B.A. from the University of Nebraska and her M.A. and Ph.D. from Harvard University. Graham S. Pearson is a Visiting Professor in International Security in the Department of Peace Studies at the University of Bradford in the United Kingdom. He was previously the Director General and Chief Executive of the Chemical and Biological Defense Establishment at Porton Down. He is engaged in an extensive range of activities relating to the non-proliferation of chemical and biological weapons, including the publication of numerous articles concentrating recently on the importance of strengthening of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention. He co-edited Strengthening the Biological Weapons Convention: Key Points for the Fourth Review Conference. He is a member of the Advisory Board of the Harvard-Sussex Program on CBW Armament and Arms Limitation, of the Research Council of the Chemical and Biological