The JapaneseAssociationJapanese Association of Indian and Buddhist Studies

(180) Journal ofIndian and Buddhist Studies Vol. 64, No. 3, March 2016

The Sequential Arising of VijnNanas in the Early Yogacara and the Sarvastivada

TAKATSUKASA Yttki

1. Introduction

The Paficavijn-dnaketyasarriprayukta bhamih. (PBh) and the Manobhami (MBh), the first two

sections of the Yogacarabhtimi, present valuable materials for the study of early

YogAcara epistemology; unfbrtunately however, we have fbund some occasional, but

serious, problems in the critically established Sanskrit text of these sections. In Takatsukasa [2o14: 184], therefore, I reconsidered a problematic passage by verifying

the readings of the single extant Sanskrit manuscript and then proposed an

emendation to the edited text. According to the emended text, the MBh postuiates that

only one vijn-ana can arise in one moment, theugh it does not explicitly mention

whether a simultaneity of six vijnNanas is possible or not Instead, the MBh rather

emphasizes the relative subsequence of vijnnyanas: any single sensory perception cannot

arise sequentially in two moments.

On the other hand, as discussed below, the 5arvfistivada, which also denies the

possibility of a simultaneous arising of vV'nNanas, permits that a sensory perception can arise immediately after a sensory perception in the Apidamo da piposha lun Pnj eemeza Jkl *Mahavibhasa, eevai9th (Skt. MVi), Previous studies on this topic only introduce or

exame thiqie shi lttu) em in the MVi, and they do not compare the description directly

i) with other texts, nor do they examine the distinction between the two theories.

In this paper,Iwould like to fbcus on the YbgacarabhUmi as the representative ofthe

early Yogacara and MVi as the representative ofthe Sarvastivada, in order to point out

the difTerent ways in which they expound the sequence of vijnNanas, as well as a

divergence concerning the possibility ofa sequential arising ofsensory perceptions.

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2, The Early Yogic5ra in the PBh and the MBh

The MBh explains the sequential arising ofthe six vijnnyanas as fbllows:

A pentad of sensory perceptions cannot arise sequentially in two rnoments. Nor can there be a mutual arising [efthese five] immediately after each other [ofthese five]. Immediately after the pentad of sensory perceptions has arisen in one moment, mental consciousness arises 2> necessarily.

Thus, any of five sensory perceptions, whether the same kind of or a different kind o £ cannot arise sequentially in two moments. Also a closely related passage from the

PBh elaborates the case where we cognize a visual object as fbllows:

Then, in the case where visual perception has arisen, three minds are perceived. [They are] in order, (1) aupanipatika: the suddenly occurring [mind], (2) paryesaka: the searching [mind], and (3) nis'cita: the determined [mind]. Of these, the first is nothing but visual perception, and the 3) [other] two are mental consciousnesses,

The PBh names each of the three minds according to the sequential processjust as

we usually suppose how we cognize an object. As for the mental consciousness

immediately after the sensory perception in the above MBh, the PBh names it paryesaka.

That is to say; the early Yogacara understands that once a sensory perception suddenly

occurs, a searching mental consciousness necessarily arises immediately thereafter.

3. The Sarvistivida in the MVi

Next, we examine the MVi's exposition. The MVi interprets the Apidamo fozhi lun Pqte

"How rkptrerw wh passage4) many pratyayas for a manadyatana Y Cyichu kal!), does a [given] manadyatana X function as? It functions as [four pratyayas:] a hetu-pratyaya, a

samanantara-, an alambana-, and an adhipati-." And the interpretation continues as fo11ows:

, . , And manadyatana contains six kinds [of vijn-a-nas]. That is to saM from a vi$ual perception up to a mental consciousness, Among these [six vijnltanas], a visual perception X functions as a hetu- pratyaya, a samanantaru-, and an adhipati- for a visual perception Y, but does not function as an alambana- . . . [To function as a] samanantarapratyaya means that a visual perception Y arises immediately after the visual perception X...It is the same as where a visual perception X functions as [. .,a samanantarapratyaya,. .] fbr a visual perception Y, that is to saM a visual perception functions as [a collection ofpratyayas] for perceptions ranging from the auditory to

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the tactile.

A visual perception functions as a hetu-pratyaya, a samanantara-, an alambana- and an adhipati- fbra mental consciousness.,.It is the sarne as where a visual perception functions as [...a samanantarapratyaya . . .] for six vijn-a-nas, that is to saM perceptions ranging from the auditory to the tactile as a 5) [function collection ofpratyayas] for six vijn"'anas , , . .

The interpretation continuously mentions and permits the sequential relationship of

the mental consciousness to a mental consciousness, and the sequential relationship of

the mental consciousness to five sensory perceptions, as well. The MVi, therefore,

permits that any kind ofvijn-ana can arise immediately after another vijnana, regardless

of type. As we confirmed above, the MBh does not permit the possibility of a sensory perception arising sequentially in two moments. In regard to this point, therefore,

there is a clear distinction between these two texts. We also notice a further difference

about how to expound the sequence ofthe vijn-anas, The MVi explains this in relation to

four pratyayas. In particulag samanantarapratyqya (dengwnjian yuan gA,!t,, eebi), defines the sequence ef two vijn-a-nas. The PBh's exposition proceeds as if associated with the practical epistemic process just as we usually suppose how we cognize an object,

whereas the MVi, in contrast, only explains the relationship between any two vijn-anas

giving the impression ofa rather abstract and automatic explanation. Further, the MVi continues its argument by considering the problem in the sequence ofsensory perception as fo11ows:

Do five sensor:y; visual, etc., perceptions arise immediately after each other, or not? Yuqie shis `'Five say sensory visual, etc., perceptions cannot arise immediately after each other because all [perceptions] arise from a mental consciousness immediately after that." Apidamo lunshis Nee "The reEvadeBM say five sensory, visual, etc., perceptions can all arise immediately after each other, Otherwise, it contradicts the theory in the Geayun Nrk [in the Apidamo fhzhi lun]. As jt says tA dulpkhe"ndrtya X (kugen g"), functions as a hetu-pratyaya, a samanantara-, and an adhipati- 6) for a duhkhe"ndrtya X but does not function as an alambana-."'

Thus, the YZiqie shis assert that all perceptions arise from mental consciousness immediately after its occurrence. That is to saM a sensory perception necessarily arises

immediately after the mental consciousness. On the other hand, the MBh has

emphasized that a mental consciousness necessarily arises immediately after the

pentad of sensory perceptions has arisen in one moment. Therefbre it seems

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appropriate to differentiate these standpoints, even though they do not both permit

the sequential arising ofsensory perceptions.

The Apidamo lunshis, on the other hand, permit the sequential arising of sensory ') perceptions. The basis they adduce is the theory in the Gertyun in the Apidamo lbuhi lun, and their standpoint is predicated on two points. One is the theory in the Gertyun. A

"L duhkhe"ndrtya X functions as a samanantarupratyaya for a dulpkhendrtya that is to say a

duhkhandrtya Y can arise immediately after a duhkhEndrtya X. The other point is that a

duhkhe"ndrtya can be united (sampiztyukta) with nothing but five sensory perceptions. This is as is shown, fbr instance, in the Apidamo fdyunzu lun pmEmebetlith,EllLth,8)

Apidamojieshenzu lun lliifeemeptmpfi)[Etth,9) etc. Therefbre their standpoint does not

derives straightforwardly from a relation of vijn-anas, but indirectly from a relation of

vedana to vedana" and vedana to vijn-ana, as a result of the examination ofdharrnas.

4. Conclusion

In this papenIhave compared the PBh, the MBh, and the Mvi on the problem of the

sequential arising ofsix vijn-anas, and in so doing clarified the points summarizedbelow.

The early Yogacara (as represented in the PBh and the MBh) and the Sarvastivada (as

represented in the MVi) hold contrary positions: while the PBh and the MBh deny the possibility of the sequential arising of sensory perceptions. the MVi permits that any

kind ofvijnNana can arise immediately after another vijnnyana, regardless of type. Further,

there is an obvious distinction between the means by which they expound the sequence

ofvijn-anas. The early Yogacara in the PBh and the MBh expound a sequence of vijn-anas

that are associated with practical epistemic processes. The Sarvastivada in the MVi, on

the other hand, only expound the rather abstract relationship betJween any two

vijn'a'nas. The standpoint of Apidamo lunshi derives from a relation of vedana to vedana

and vedana to vijfiana. The distinction corresponds to the difference between the

Yogacara, who consider the practice of Yoga important, and the Sarvastivada, who

focus on thoroughly examining dharmas and their systems.

Notes1) See Nishi [1975: 262-264], Takasaki [1982: 10-11]. 2) MBh 58.13-15, As for the textual emendation, see Takatsukasa [2014: notes 7, 8]. 3) PBh 10.2-3. As fbr the textual ernendation,

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’ （184） The Sequen廿al Msing of vi hanas in the Early Yog百cAra and the Sarv百stiv五da （TAKATsuKAsA）

see Takatsukasa 2014 ：n ・te 3 ． 4 Apidam ・ lun T n ・ ．1544 v ・ 1、 26 984b4−5， MVi T ［ ］ ） fcuhi ， ， 5） − vo1 ，27，682a7 b1：然 意処 有六 種 ． 謂眼 識 乃 至 意識 ． 此 中 眼 識 与眼 識 為因 ，等 無 間，増上 ，非 所縁 … …等無 間者，謂眼 識 等 無聞 眼 識 現 在 前… …如 眼識 与 限 識 ，眼 識 与耳鼻舌 身識 亦爾．眼 … … …… 識 与意識 為 因，等 無間 t 所縁 ．増 上 如眼 識 対 六 識 耳鼻 舌 身識 対 六 亦 爾 ， 6）Mvi

Tvol ．27 682b1−6： ． ．五 ， 問 眼等 識展転 無間現在前不，答，諸瑜伽師説 ．眼 等五 識展転無 間不 現 在 前．皆従 意識 無間 生 故．阿毘達 磨諸論 師 言．眼 等 五 識 展 転皆得無 間 而起．若不爾 者，違 根 ． 蘊説 ．如彼 説，苦根 与苦根 為 因， 等無 間 ，増 上 ，非所縁 ， 7）Tno ，1544 ， vol ，26， gg4a9 −10． There is also an argument on the sequential arising ofsensory perception in Wushi piposha lun五 事 − 毘 婆 沙 論 （Tno ．1555， voL 28 ， 992a25 b2）whose position and basis is the same as the MVi ． ’ However Apidan bajiandu 八 ， iun阿 毘 曇 健 度論 （T no ．1543，vol ，26，869c19），which istranslatedin ‘‘ − − 383 （earlier than Apidamo fazhi lun）， says ： A duhkhEndriya is a hetupraりyaya and an adhipati fbr a ’ − − ” duhkh2ndn but is not a δ and not a samanantara a 7α ． to the ya， lambana ［fbr duれkh6ndrり ］ According

Apidan bajiandu lunApidamo ， lunshilosetheirbasis．lfthepassage isnot misinterpretation ，itmeans

that the theo might have changed ， 8 T no ．1537 voL 26 498bl −3 ． Tno vol 厂y ＞ ， ， 9） ，1540， ． 26，616c23−24．

AbbreViations− amd Primary Sources

Ms Sanskrit manuscript （lts facsimile is preserved in the G6ttingen State and University

Library no ． xc 14 28 and in the IsIAo Library Envelope − ， ／ ； 」 no ．5 6／B），

PBh ， MBh The Ybgごcδ bh便η1ゴqfAcのyα Asariga． Part L Ed ． Vidhushekhara Bhattacharya． Calcutta：

The University ofCalcutta 1957 ． ， ＊ Mvi Mahavibhalia Ch ． Apidamo da 。sha run （ pip 阿毘 達 磨 大 毘 婆 沙 論 ）Tno ，1545， vol ．27 ， − la3 1004a9．・TranS．XUanzang 玄 奘 ．

Secondary L韮teratUres ’ Nishi Giya西 義雄 1975． Abidatsuma Bukkyo no kenkya’ Sono shins δ to shimei 阿 毘達 磨 仏教 の 研 究 ：

そ の 真相 と 使命．Toky α Kokush 。 Kank6kai ．

“ ” − Takasaki Jikid6高 崎 直道 ．1982，Yugagy6 ha no keisei瑜 伽行 派 の 形成 ．ln vol ．8 of K6za Dajijδ

BuklD，6 ：YuiShiki shiS δ 座 1 ed ． Hirakawa Akira Kajiyama 講 大 乗仏 教 唯識思想 ， 平 川彰 ， YUichi 梶 一 − 山雄 ， and TakasakiJikid6 道 1 42． Tokyo ： ShunjUsha ． 高崎直 ， “ Takatsukasa Yilki．2014， The Problem of the Simultaneous Arising of Six Vσ齎 η 矼s： In the ” − Pα匝cα吻 肖dηαkの1α5α7ηρπ〜yuk亡α bhαη 1f and the M αηo とh直mf ．IBκ 62 〔3）： 184 188 ．

− − （This research was supported by a Grant in Aid ofM 重shima Kaiun Memorial Foundation．）

Key words v 顳 ηα Ybgac吾ra Sarv且stiv 巨da perception，ガ ， ，

Graduate Student Kyoto University （ ， ）

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