Thinking Russia: Contemporary Public Intellectuals in the Reviving Political Debate

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Thinking Russia: Contemporary Public Intellectuals in the Reviving Political Debate Thinking Russia: contemporary public intellectuals in the reviving political debate. Dana Filonova S 392352 Bachelor Thesis Fall 2011 Tilburg University, the Netherlands BA Liberal Arts and Sciences – major in Humanities Under the supervision of Dr. O.M. Heynders Read by P.K. Varis Abstract This study is focused on contemporary Russia. In particularly it zooms in on the ongoing public debate and the subsequent contribution by the public intellectuals. Through a historical analysis of the previous century the Russian society is portrayed as apolitical. Yet, the current state of the public debate speaks of an intellectual revival. In this essay the latter is illustrated by the Moscow rallies of last December regarding an election fraud. The study is an endeavour to clarify the historical formation of the Russian’s attitude towards politics. Thereafter, it provides an insight into the ongoing public debate on issues of general concern. Hereby, the emphasis is on the position of the public intellectuals as the active voices in a democratic society. Keywords: Public intellectuals, Public debate, Soviet regime, Apolitical society, December rallies 2 Table of Contents Introduction 5 Defining the public intellectual 7 Part I. Constructing the historical framework: society, the intelligentsia, and the public sphere of the twentieth century Russia 14 1.1 Introduction, aims, and hypothesis 15 1.2 Historical analysis 17 I. Bolshevization of the public sphere 17 II. The public sphere as an ideological front 18 III. Stalinist repressions 20 IV. Towards the de-Stalinization 21 V. Taking the inward turn 23 VI. Denouncing the Homo Sovieticus 25 VII. The turbulent ‘90s 26 1.3 Preliminary conclusion 30 Part II. Contemporary Russia: public intellectuals and the open debate 32 2.1 Aims, remarks, and hypothesis 33 2.2 Analyzing the public debate: the public intellectuals and their ideas 36 I. Natural Science – Sergei Kapitsa 36 II. Religion – Patriarch Kirill I of Moscow 38 III. Television journalism – L. Parfenov, A. Gordon, V. Posner 40 IV. Novelist – Viktor Pelevin 49 2.3 Preliminary conclusion 53 3 Conclusion 55 Concluding remarks 56 List of references 61 4 Introduction In this bachelor’s thesis I endeavour to gain an understanding of the contemporary Russian public debate. My aim is to focus on the contribution of public intellectuals to gain an insight into the ongoing socio-political issues. I will also provide a historical analysis of the Russian social order under the Soviet Union. This is to clarify the present tendencies within the public debate. Besides, the historical background is useful in positioning the place of the contemporary public intellectuals within the Russian society. In order to make clear my motivation to engage on this research, I would like to present myself first. I was born in Lvov, Soviet Union, in 1989. Two years later the Soviet Union fell, and gave rise to the independent state of Ukraine. This way I was growing up in the middle of an economical chaos in a state without a common identity. Moreover, being myself of the Russian background I was soon to learn about the rising Ukrainian nationalism. The rapid closure of Russian schools and my parents’ experience in daily life, undoubtedly affected my understanding of things. Of course as a child I did not see it this clearly. Nevertheless, it did not change the fact that by 1999 my family and I immigrated into the Netherlands. As a result, I have been raised in the west, yet maintaining my ties to eastern Europe. Because of my interest in the Russian culture and knowledge of the language, I have been able to cultivate my own view upon the post-Soviet bloc. Such was possible, amongst others, through reading the Russian literature and the press, following the news, watching Russian television, and of course travelling. Consequently, today I find myself in between the two worlds of east and west. Therefore, in this essay I opt to share my perception of the contemporary Russia through the perspective which I have build up while living in the Netherlands. From my peers and the one-sided message of the media, I have come to understand that Russia remains largely a closed terrain for the western society. In this manner Russia sometimes figures in the news, but more often than not, only from the anti-Putin perspective. Also the import of the Russian cultural product seems to be limited to the thumbed classics. One would almost think nothing worthy of notice has taken place since the fall of the Soviet bloc. 5 Fortunately, however, this is not the case. And for that reason I find it necessary to shed some light onto the present day Russia. Moreover, in sight of the recent demonstrations regarding the parliamentary elections of 04 December 20111, it seems to me more important than ever to understand the Russian society, thus to avoid taking for granted poorly grounded opinions. In this way, the second part of my analysis is focused on the contemporary public debate from the perspective of some of the most prominent public intellectuals. I intend to familiarize the reader with several of the public voices of Russia. It shall thus become clear what their view is on a number of issues of common concern. Also their position within the Russian society shall be addressed. To this aim, further in this introduction I devote special attention to the phenomenon of the public intellectuals and my subsequent usage of this term. Furthermore, in order to set a frame for such discussion, in the first part I present a historical research of the twentieth century Russia. I begin this study around the October Revolution of 1917 and finish with the turbulent ‘90s. Thus, the scope of my analysis roughly covers the rise and fall of the Soviet Union. Hereby, I focus on the course of the public sphere in particular. Taking notice of the communist party’s close social surveillance I opt to set out the origins of the apolitical character of the Russian society. Therefore, in my conclusion I return to the subject of political disinterest as the aftermath of the Soviet era. Hereby, I present my personal reflection on the recent December rallies. In this way I want to draw a link between the two parts of this thesis. In doing so, I rely greatly on the knowledge gained in the process of conducting this research. It rests to say, that my findings on the topic of Russian public intellectual life by large remain opinions of my own. Other readers are welcome to disagree with me. Nevertheless, I have tried to build my vision on the basis of a literary investigation and my personal experience. In this way I look forward to share my perspective from my individual position between Russia and the west. 1 On this event see, for example (2011, December 04). Russia election: OSCE sees ‘numerous violations.’ BBC News Europe. Retrieved 17 January 2012 from http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-16037975 6 Defining the public intellectual At the starting stage of my analysis, I opt to define the phenomenon of the public intellectuals as such. I do so by outlining the difficulties in the definition of this term through the views of several acknowledged scholars on this topic. With the help of diverse interpretations of the public intellectuals’ role in the society, their contribution to it and their subsequent reception, I intend to outline a profile of the public intellectual as used hereafter in this paper. Hereby, I argue that the applicability of such profile extends to the Russian public sphere due to the comprehensiveness of this noun. In this manner it constitutes a certain type of contribution to the ongoing (political) debate by using the available (public) means. Nonetheless, I shall proceed with the peculiarities of the Russian public sphere in the later stage of this study. Therefore, I begin this analysis by referring to Stefan Collini.2 He engaged in the persistent debate on the perception and the definition of the concept of public intellectuals in his work Absent Minds. Intellectuals in Britain (2006). Here Collini sets out by pointing out the different senses in which the word “intellectual” is being used, and continues by the underlying notions of such usages present in the contemporary discussion. This way he points out that the linguistic usage of a term is a “largely unconscious social fact” (Ibid.: 46). Thus it deserves special attention for it determines all consequent implementation and the reception of this term. Following Collini’s reception history of the discourse on public intellectuals, below are distinguished three main senses in which the noun ‘intellectual’ is commonly applied in the English language. These are respectively the sociological sense, the subjective sense, and the cultural sense. The first category, the sociological sense, is primarily an occupational distinction and implies a working class that is first and foremost involved in the world of ideas and culture, such as teachers and journalists. To clarify such professional class, Collini cites an American social scientist, Seymour Martin 2 Stefan Collini is professor of English literature and intellectual history at the University of Cambridge. 7 Lipset: “all those who create, distribute, and apply culture – the symbolic world of man, including art, science, and religion.” (Ibid.: 46). However, such categorization soon becomes too broad. Since the scope of professions involving the distribution of culture reaches up to the paperboys, such definition lacks consistency. However, on the other hand the definition is plausible when applied merely to stress the core of the sense, rather than its margins. From here on we can gradually move to the second sense delineated by Collini.
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