RIVISTA INTERNAZIONALE DI FILOSOFIA E PSICOLOGIA ISSN 2039-4667; E-ISSN 2239-2629 DOI: 10.4453/rifp.2017.0020 Vol. 8 (2017), n. 3, pp. 247-258
STUDI
A Pragmatic and Empirical Approach to Free Will Andrea Lavazza(α)
Ricevuto: 10 febbraio 2017; accettato: 24 agosto 2017
█ Abstract The long dispute between incompatibilists (namely, the advocates of the contemporary ver- sion of the illusory nature of freedom) and compatibilists is further exemplified in the discussion between Sam Harris and Daniel Dennett. In this article, I try to add to the discussion by outlining a concept of free will linked to five operating conditions and put forward a proposal for its operationalization and quantifi- cation. The idea is to empirically and pragmatically define free will as needed for moral blame and legal liability, while separating this from the debate on global determinism, local determinism, automatisms and priming phenomena on a psychological level. This is made possible by weakening the claims of de- terminisms and psychological automatisms, based on the latest research, and by giving a well-outlined definition of free will as I want to defend it. KEYWORDS: Compatibilism; Daniel Dennett; Free Will Quantification; Global Determinism; Local De- terminism
█ Riassunto Un approccio pragmatico ed empirico al libero arbitrio – La lunga disputa tra incompatibilisti (va- le a dire i sostenitori della versione contemporanea dell’illusorietà del libero arbitrio) e compatibilisti trova un’esemplificazione nel dibattito tra Sam Harris e Daniel Dennett. In questo articolo cerco di contribuire alla discussione delineando un concetto di libero arbitrio legato a cinque condizioni operative e proponendo la sua operazionalizzazione e quantificazione. L’idea è di definire empiricamente e pragmaticamente il libero arbitrio di cui abbiamo bisogno per trattare di colpa morale e di responsabilità legale, separandolo dal dibat- tito su determinismo globale, determinismo locale, automatismi e fenomeni di innesco a livello psicologico. Ciò è reso possibile indebolendo le pretese di determinismi e automatismi psicologici, che si basano su recen- ti ricerche empiriche, e dando una precisa definizione di libero arbitrio per come voglio difenderlo. PAROLE CHIAVE: Compatibilismo; Daniel Dennett; Quantificazione del libero arbitrio; Determinismo glo- bale; Determinismo locale
THE EXCHANGE BETWEEN DANIEL DEN- pinnings, are often neglected in the academic NETT and Sam Harris about the latter’s book debate on the subject. In my opinion, when it Free Will is very instructive, as it addresses comes to free will, pragmatic aspects related some pragmatic aspects of the ideas of free to our practical life (from interpersonal rela- will and responsibility.1 tions to the law) and scientific/theoretical These pragmatic aspects, albeit based on aspects can and should be considered jointly. rigorous scientific and philosophical under- In this sense, Dennett’s discussion of Harris’
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248 Lavazza book is an excellent starting point.2 sion, we do have genuine free will, so I’ll start with some challenges to the notion of free █ Harris and Dennett on free will will that touch on Dennett’s compatibilism.
Do we have Ultimate Authorship? Do we █ Questioning free will: Determinism have Absolute Responsibility? No, we don’t, says Dennett. And this is his only point of How can determinism and freedom coex- agreement with Harris. Indeed, Dennett’s ist? This question goes back at least 2.500 compatibilism understands free will as follows: years, but it seems to have recently come back to the fore. Freedom involves the ability to have one’s choice influenced by changes in the world If determinism is true, then we are like: that matter under circumstances. Not a billiard balls, windup toys, playthings of perfect ability, but a reliable ability.3 external forces, puppets, robots, victims of a nefarious neurosurgeon who controls Dennett claims that Harris questions us by directly manipulating the brain compatibilism because «what compatibilists states that are the immediate causes of mean by “free will” is not what everyday folk our actions. Billiard balls […] have no free mean by “free will”» – a claim Dennett disa- will. Therefore if determinism is true, we grees with. In fact, he believes that his posi- don’t have free will.6 tion works for what people usually think about free will. Dennett writes: I will not even try to summarize how compatibilists respond to this view – Den- Those eligible for punishment and reward nett does so in his article and so do, at least are those with the general abilities to re- implicitly, the majority of philosophers, ac- spond to reasons (warnings, threats, prom- cording to the survey mentioned by Dennett ises) rationally. Real differences in these himself. But there are at least two types of de- abilities are empirically discernible, explica- terminism that come into play against free ble, and morally relevant. Such abilities can will today, producing arguments like those arise in a deterministic world, and they are used by Harris which lead to the conclusion the basis for a justifiable policy of reward that free will is an illusion. and punishment, which brings society many The first is the classic well-known argu- benefits – indeed makes society possible.4 ment that initial conditions and physical laws affect every single state of the universe at any I agree with Dennett’s “pragmatic” ap- later time. This determinism, which I call proach to free will and responsibility, but global, is used by hard determinists or advo- some important clarifications are needed. cates of free will skepticism against compati- For example, if the abilities approach is bilists, as the adoption of a physicalist natu- strictly related to classical determinism and ralism forces one to trace any observable be- to naturalized psychology where the self is havioural difference back to a specific physi- reduced to a mere narrative fiction – as cal cause that can be at least potentially iden- seems to be the case in Dennett’s position – tified, as belonging to a causal chain deter- then there might be some problems. For rea- mined by initial conditions and natural laws. sons of space I will only briefly outline my The second argument is that of local de- (provisional) idea of how to conceive of free terminism and refers to recent Libet-like ex- will and responsibility for pragmatic purpos- periments, according to which our actions es, noting some differences from Dennett’s start in specific brain areas before we are compatibilism.5 I feel that, at least on occa- consciously aware of them. This type of local
A Pragmatic and Empirical Approach to Free Will 249 determinism is relevant to free will, because functional relations without any intrinsic almost all characterizations of freedom in- direction of determination: rules that al- clude conscious or at least rational choice – low us to calculate the state of a system at as in Dennett’s model. And a rational choice one time from its state at another. And seems to imply a conscious consideration of without an intrinsic direction of determi- the reasons why one should make that choice. nation, we can no more say that our ac- Of course it can be argued that there is no tions are determined by their antecedents need for a thorough examination, minute after than that their antecedents are deter- minute, choice after choice, for an action to be mined by our actions. The relationship free. But it is undeniable that control over the given by the equation has no implicit di- action in its full unfolding cannot be separated rection. The second reason was that the from a period of time, however brief, in which practical function of causal beliefs de- the subject is aware of her decision and execu- pends on the fact that they relate relative- tion. Otherwise, even for pragmatic aspects ly localized events at a temporal distance such as the law, one could not be held respon- from one another, such as the striking of a sible for that action, insofar as it was per- match and the appearance of a flame, or formed by a person who did not have any con- the turning of the key in the ignition of scious control over it. Before proposing my your car and the engine starting. The dy- empirical and pragmatic view of free will, my namical laws, by contrast, relate only aim is to try to weaken these two types of de- states of the world as a whole.10 terminism, in order to make my position more solid with respect to its scientific and theoreti- However, in line with Nancy Cartwright’s cal underpinnings. criticism of Russell, Ismael notes that causal information plays an indispensable role in █ Limitations of Global Determinism practical reasoning.11 The laws of physics cannot play the role of causal relations in sci- The literature on determinism and physical ence because specifically causal information causation, in both science and philosophy, is is needed to distinguish effective and ineffec- immense but, despite the progress made, none tive strategies to achieve the desired results. of the major issues seem to have been settled by Based on natural laws we cannot distinguish unanimous consent.7 An interesting recent at- between cases of correlation between events tempt to unify some lines of research was made and cases in which an event brings about an- by Jenann Ismael. She purports to show «how other event. However, if causes seem to dis- the microlaws create the space for emergent appear from the fundamental level of physi- systems with robust capabilities for self- cal description, they are still required to iden- governance» and to remove «threats to free- tify strategic routes to achieve given effects. dom that come from notions of causal necessity To reconcile the Russellian view of the that physics has outgrown».8 fundamental laws of physics with the appear- Ismael takes her cue from Bertrand Rus- ance and necessity of causation in our lives as sell and his interpretation of physical laws as free agents, Ismael embraces the causalism not implying causal relations. Russell propos- proposed, among others, by Judea Pearl, es two reasons to reject a causal interpreta- Clark Glymour and James Woodward. This tion of natural laws.9 As Ismael explains, is certainly not the position of most scholars, but it is becoming increasingly popular. the first [reason] was that causal relations Based on this new causalism and, specifically, incorporate a temporal asymmetry that on interventionism proposed by Pearl, causal dynamical laws do not. The most funda- information shows how the state of a system mental laws appear in modern science as will be affected by interventions, where “in-
250 Lavazza tervention” is understood as the scientist carves a piece from the uni- verse and proclaims that piece in. The rest a formal operation that separates a varia- of universe is then considered out […] ble from its own past causes so that This choice of ins and out creates asym- changes in its values are uncorrelated with metry in the way we look at things and it the values of earlier variables.12 is this asymmetry that permits us to talk about “outside intervention” and hence Human actions, as the expression of self- about causality.13 governing entities, represent a class of effec- tive intervention. At the individual level, says Ismael’s argument, on the other hand, is Ismael, willful manipulations by human much wider, also including an eternalist con- agents effectively randomize the value of var- ception of time related to the idea of a Block iables, separating them from their antecedent Universe and, as Hoefer puts it, to causes. So, causal structures indicate how manipulating the value of one variable in- an emergentism or pluralism about expla- duces changes in others. nation, which allows us to see our selves, The reason why causal information out- our deliberations and decisions as (nor- runs the information contained in the global mally) right factors to cite in explaining laws of evolution is that global laws tell us our actions, rather than something going how the system as a whole evolves if not in- on concurrently at the level of cells, or terfered with, whereas causal knowledge tells chemical compounds, or fundamental us what happens when it is interfered with. particles.14 This is what Pearl refers to as a kind of prac- tical know-how. The structural causal model- Ismael states that: ling framework developed by Pearl deals with type causation (which relates types of events) One event doesn’t bring about another. relative to networks (defined by collections Agents bring about events, and the pro- of variables). Changes in the value of varia- jection of necessary connections into the bles are “interventions”, which explain causa- relations between natural events is an un- tion and knowledge of it. As in scientific ex- derstandable mistake, but not something periments, you can isolate a system, manipu- one should think of as a part of a scien- late external inputs that relate to it and ob- tific worldview. All of science, from phys- serve the effects of this intervention. Global ics to psychology, I believe, is pointing the laws do not provide complete causal infor- other way.15 mation because they take the system as a unit without considering the substructures that █ Limitations of Local Determinism can be isolated in it. In this interpretation summarized by What I call “local determinism” originates Ismael, global laws do not imply strict necessi- from the well known research carried out by ty nor do they impose a specific path on the Libet and Haynes on the beginning of ac- universe given its initial conditions. This is tion.16 The scepticism about the existence of because global laws have neither temporal free will emerges from the comparison be- asymmetry nor direction of influence. And the tween the subjective “time” of a given deci- causal direction is given by modifying a varia- sion and what happens in the brain. In fact, ble in a subsystem that causes changes in an- the readiness potential (the brain wave that is other variable, within a framework in which registered before the subject claims to be there is a choice between exogenous and en- aware of starting the action) begins in the dogenous variables. As explained by Pearl, pre-frontal motor areas of the brain long be-
A Pragmatic and Empirical Approach to Free Will 251 fore the time when the subject thinks he has plain stimulus-response decision as relying made a choice: the volunteers in the above- on the same neural decision mechanism used mentioned experiments became aware of the for perceptual decisions and internal self- intention to act about 500 milliseconds after paced intention and decision as the onset of this potential. The volitional process thus seems to start unconsciously. dominated by ongoing stochastic fluctua- These studies seem to indicate that our ac- tions in neural activity that influence the tions (or, at least, the ones specifically tested) precise moment at which the decision are caused by the activity of the brain, and threshold is reached.21 enter consciousness only at a later time. The fact that we can predict the decision that the The philosophical implications of this ex- subject will take before the latter’s knowledge periment could be that seems to be a potential death blow to the idea of freedom as a conscious deliberation. when one forms an intention to act, one is As is known, many arguments have been significantly disposed to act but not yet brought forward to limit the conceptual scope fully committed. The commitment comes of these experiments.17 The debate doesn’t yet when one finally decides to act. The sto- seem to have reached a conclusion, but recent chastic decision model reveals a remarka- experiments seem to reduce the importance of bly similar picture on the neuronal level, the readiness potential over free will. Schurger with the decision to act being a threshold and colleagues, for instance, stress that the crossing neural event that is preceded by a main new finding about the brain activity pre- neural tendency toward this event.22 ceding the subjective voluntary movement But another recent study has brought is that the apparent build-up of this activity, back to the center of neuroscientific research up until about 200 ms pre-movement, may the space of autonomy that the subject seems reflect the ebb and flow of background neu- to have, as opposed to the idea of free will as ronal noise, rather than the outcome of a an illusion supported by the experiments specific neural event corresponding to a based on the alleged unconscious onset of the “decision” to initiate movement.18 action. Schultze-Kraft and colleagues showed that people are able to cancel movements af- The model used is the bounded-integration ter elicitation of readiness potential if stop process, signals occur earlier than 200 ms before movement onset.23 In the real-time experi- a computational model of decision making ment, «subjects played a game where they wherein sensory evidence and internal tried to press a button to earn points in a noise (both in the form of neural activity) challenge with a brain-computer interface are integrated over time by one or more (BCI) that had been trained to detect their decision neurons until a fixed threshold- readiness potentials in real time and to emit level firing rate is reached, at which the an- stop signals».24 The subjects had to press a imal issues a motor response. In the case of button on the floor with their foot after a spontaneous self-initiated movement there green light flashed: they could do so whenev- is no sensory evidence, so the process is er they wanted after about 2 seconds. Partic- dominated by internal noise.19 ipants earned points if they pressed the but- ton before the red light (the stop signal) The stochastic decision model used by came back. The experiment was composed of Schurger and colleagues20 allowed them to three phases. In the first phase, the stop sig- claim that bounded integration seems to ex- nals were lit at random and the movements
252 Lavazza of the subjects were not predicted. In the even if it is still to be clarified what triggers the second phase, the authors used data taken order that leads to stop the action initiated at from the EEG on the participants in the first a brain level and signalled by the computer. phase. In this way a classifier was trained to predict (with imperfect accuracy) the partic- █ Questioning free will: Empirical psychology ipants’ movements (the When and the Whether, not the What). In this phase, the In line with the research I have just con- BCI could foresee the fact that the subject sidered, cognition sciences (including neuro- would press the button thanks to the detec- science) have been “deconstructing” the uni- tion of the readiness potential and therefore tary conscious and rational self – the subject turned on the red light to earn points against of free will. In particular, individuals seem the subject if the latter could not stop the unaware of the automatic processes that are movement. In the third phase, the subjects at work and the true reasons for our con- were informed that the BCI could “see their duct.26 Essentially, more often than we would preparation of the movement” and they had think, cognitive processing, when examined to try to beat the computer by moving in an more thoroughly, is the result of subpersonal unforeseeable way. (unconscious) processes of which we are un- In all phases of the experiment, there was aware. Those are automatic processes, trig- no difference between readiness potentials. gered by the environment or by a given situa- While in the first phase, in 66.5% of the cas- tion, bound to a repertoire that is partly in- es, subjects won by pressing the button with nate and partly created by past experience the green light on, in stages two and three and education, causing bodily responses due trials in which subjects were able to beat the both to the tendency to homeostasis and to computer, by not pushing the button with the search for whatever is functional to sur- the red light on, decreased to 31%, and warn- vival and physical/mental well-being.27 There ing participants of the prediction of the BCI are several examples of this decomposition of did not help them do any better. The authors the self into cerebral modules that reprocess could thus claim that information outside of consciousness, later reunified as a seemingly united stream of despite the stereotypical shape of the consciousness: one example is language, readiness potential and its early onset at where all the processes leading to choosing around 1000 ms before electromyograph- our words are opaque to consciousness. ic activity, several aspects of our data sug- In general, there are some experiments gest that subjects were able to cancel an supporting our supposed automatism and upcoming movement until a point of no scarce awareness (which would reduce us to return was reached around 200 ms before zombie-like creatures): in particular, those movement onset. If the stop signal occurs based on so-called priming, in which ele- later than 200 ms before electromyo- ments we do not pay attention to actually in- graphic activity onset, the subject cannot fluence our choices. These choices we later avoid moving.25 tend to justify with other reasons, consistent with our preferences, but in reality they are The explanation of the minimum thresh- dictated by factors that we would have tried old of 200 ms could reflect the time necessary to ignore if they had been presented to us ex- for the stop signal to light up, for the subject plicitly. These elements seem to support “situa- to perceive it and to cancel the movement that tionism”, that is, the view that we are much was already being prepared. It is therefore more influenced by context than by our charac- possible to state that there is no univocal un- ter or personality.28 This has brought about a conscious brain process to onset an action, supposed shrinking of the agency or the self.29
A Pragmatic and Empirical Approach to Free Will 253
This was a tricky situation for the sup- we say them. Sometimes we adhere (consent porters of free will, to the point that some a posteriori) to what we have said. At other compatibilists eventually admitted that «free times we regret our choice immediately and will is at best an occasional phenomenon».30 wish we had chosen different words. If we In other words, even if one believes that know a subject well, we will voluntarily let the freedom and determinism can coexist, the speech flow. But there are cases in which we deflationary view of the self and of con- literally choose a word at a time, refusing to sciousness, along with the opacity of the mo- use the first that comes to our mind if we don't tivational states, constitutes a new, different find it appropriate (with a second level con- and, probably, more pressing challenge for scious evaluation). Think of a politician being the defenders of freedom.31 This has also asked an unexpected question on a delicate been described as the bypassing effect, that topic: he will probably choose every word ex- is, the idea that mental states do not play a tremely carefully. Certainly, his education, causal role with regards to our decisions and knowledge of the subject, his temperament, actions. For example, intentions, although the situation, and the other party will influ- considered naturalistically linked to their ence his answer, but we can probably say that neural correlates, would prove ineffective if the politician, if he chooses each word in a the evidence described so far were con- careful way that he feels appropriate, has con- firmed, because these intentions are not ef- scious control of his response and that in this fectively linked to the neuronal processes sense he is free in answering the way he does.32 that cause our conduct. This is a form of em- pirical epiphenomenalism which is still open █ Empirical free will to experimental confirmations or refutations. The (controversial) conclusion is that Although weakened, global and local de- higher mental processes that have been tradi- terminism together with the results of empir- tionally considered the cause of free will ical psychology pose real limitations to the (pursuit of a goal, evaluation and judgment, scope of our free will. The free will that I reasoning and problem solving, personal in- think is plausible to defend may then be lim- teraction and social behavior, as well as the ited to five conditions. initiation and control of one's actions) can The first condition is the “ability to do oth- often occur in the absence of consciousness, erwise.” This is an intuitive concept: to be which therefore exerts less control over our free, one has to have at least two alternatives behavior than we usually think. Of course, or courses of action between which to choose. one may wonder whether the lack of aware- If one has an involuntary spasm of the mouth, ness means that those processes do not ex- for example, one is not in the position to press ourselves and our wishes – the philo- choose whether to twist one’s mouth or not. sophical debate is still open. Provided that The second condition is “control over one’s many phenomena of automatism and prim- choices.” The person who acts must be the ing are undeniable, there are two possible an- same as the one who decides what to do. To swers to the challenge of empirical psycholo- be granted free will, one must be the author gy. The first is that of experimental research of one’s choices, without the interference of itself, because it is still to be ascertained to people and of mechanisms outside of one’s what extent our behaviour is automated. The reach. This is what we call agency, that is, be- second is to distinguish types between the ing and feeling like the “owner” of one’s deci- cognitive processes under consideration. sions and actions. Take the example of language, which I The third condition is “responsiveness to mentioned earlier. Indeed it seems that we reasons”: a decision can’t be free if it is the often don’t know what words we’ll use until effect of a random choice, but it must be ra-
254 Lavazza tionally motivated. If I roll a dice to decide ability, to all human beings as a default condi- whom to marry, my choice cannot be said to tion. Of course, there are still exceptions: for be free, even though I will freely choose to example, people suffering from mental illness say, “I do”. On the contrary, if I choose to and people under the influence of psycho- marry a specific person for their ideas and tropic substances. Nevertheless, the attribu- my deep love for them, then my decision will tion of free will as a general trend does not be free. Obviously, in this case “rationally mo- imply that all decisions are always taken in full tivated” is the decision to get married. For, if freedom, as outlined by the five conditions il- someone were to love two women equally, and lustrated above. We often act on impulse, could not decide which one to marry, they against our interests, without being fully might as a last resort “freely choose” to roll the aware of what we are doing. But this does not dice, and this would be more or less rational. imply that we are not potentially able to act One can add the fact that the reasons by freely or that we are not responsible for what which one makes a choice have to be also we do. recognized by others, otherwise they cannot My view is that a richer conceptualization be used as reasons, since free will in this per- of free will has to be linked to the idea of spective is something that others – with a “capacity”. more or less objective assessment – recognize in us, not something we claim for ourselves By capacity, in the context of free will, we thanks to intuition or introspection (which mean the availability of a repertoire of often fail, as shown by Wegner’s well-known general skills that can be manifested and experiments33). used without the moment by moment These are three classical conditions that conscious control that is required by the have often been accepted or rejected but are second condition of free will we have pre- well represented in literature. In my view, viously seen.35 two more conditions can be added to them. The fourth condition is linked to time. Ac- The concept of capacity is related to that tions that are decided and / or carried out in- of internal control, understood as the agent’s stantaneously or very quickly cannot count as “ownership” of the mechanism that triggers free.34 The reason is given by the fact that ac- the relevant behavior and the reasons-respon- tions that are not consciously weighted can be siveness of that mechanism.36 And reasons- affected by motives we have not evaluated and responsiveness must involve a coherent pat- cannot control. Indeed, in this sense it might tern of reasons-recognition. be possible to distinguish between proximal and distal mechanisms underlying our choices. More specifically, it must involve a pat- The fifth condition is strictly related to the tern of actual and hypothetical recogni- fourth, and consists in being aware – at least tion of reasons that is understandable by roughly – of what research shows about prim- some appropriate external observer. And ing and automatism. This is no self-psychology, the pattern must be at least minimally but simply awareness that one’s decisions grounded in reality.37 might be strongly affected by such factors. If we know why we happen to systematically and Used in this sense, and combined with the unknowingly fall into cognitive traps, we can idea of reasons-responsiveness and with the put in place – at least on some occasions – abovementioned conditions for free will, the countermeasures to increase the freedom of concept of capacity does not necessarily have our decisions and actions. to be seen as part of the compatibilist stanc- Thus defined, free will is a kind of freedom es, because it sets free will as a property that that we are willing to attribute, as a potential manifests itself only under certain condi-
A Pragmatic and Empirical Approach to Free Will 255 tions. In addition, the proposed operationali- processes that support the selection of a sation of free will in a quantifiable way, de- functional response and the modification spite still requiring testing, allows one to con- of the response (behavior) in relation to sider free will empirically and pragmatically, changing environmental contingencies; outside of a metaphysical taxonomy such as the classical one. • attentional control referring to the ability In fact, cognitive abilities may be opera- to inhibit interfering stimuli and to acti- tionalized as a set of neuropsychological tests, vate the relevant information; which can be used to operationalize and measure specific executive functions, as they • working memory referring to the cogni- are strongly linked to the concept of control.38 tive mechanisms that can maintain online Executive functions, also known as control and manipulate information necessary to functions, are essential to organize and plan perform complex cognitive tasks; everyday behavior – which is not the instant behavior found in Libet’s experiments. Those • and, with regards to free will, creativity skills are necessary to perform the greater part and the ability to cope with environmen- of our goal-oriented actions. They allow us to tal changes through new solutions.39 modulate our behavior, control its develop- ment and change it according to environmen- Those of empirical psychology are higher tal stimuli (the environment being both physi- order concepts, which act as a bridge be- cal and social). Also, executive functions allow tween free will, which is something that is us to change our behavior based on its effects, not in the brain but can be observed in be- with a sophisticated feedback mechanism; fi- havior (along with its causes), and the under- nally, they are also necessary for tasks of ab- lying brain processes. It has been convincing- straction, inventiveness and judgment. Those ly suggested that in the construction of a hi- who, for whatever reason, have a deficit in erarchy of mechanisms and explanations, one their executive functions cannot respond to must go from inside to outside and from out- their social environment appropriately, and side to inside. It is possible to go from meas- struggle to plan their behavior or to choose urable skills to their brain basis, and from the between alternatives based on their judgment tentative index of free will to the underlying or interest. Sufferers of these deficits in execu- (real) mechanisms.40 tive functions often fail to control their in- Based on the evidence presented, I believe stinctive responses and to modify their regular that a viable proposal is to construct an index courses of action, or are unable to concentrate related to compatible tests whose relevance or persist in the pursuit of a goal. can be uniformly ascertained. Such index In general terms, executive functions refer would be a kind of IQ-like profile that would to the set of mental processes necessary for allow for the operationalization and quantifi- the development of adaptive cognitive- cation of a person’s cognitive skills. All the behavioral patterns in response to new and tests used (for example, Stroop Test, Wiscon- demanding environmental conditions. The sin Card Sorting Test, Weigl’s Color-Form domain of executive functions includes: Sorting Test, Go-No Go Test) should be re- lated to the subject’s age and education and • the ability to plan and evaluate effective then transformed into new standardized strategies in relation to a specific purpose scores (Equivalent Scores, ES) on an ordinal related to the skills of problem-solving scale, e.g. ranging from 0 to 4, with 0 repre- and cognitive flexibility; senting scores below cut-off point and 4 repre- senting scores equal to or better than average. • inhibitory control and decision-making Specific standardized scores exist in many
256 Lavazza countries or linguistic areas. The subjects Moral judgment and legal liability cannot would get for each test a raw score, given by do without the attribution of freedom, as the sum of the scores obtained in each item rightly pointed out by Dennett, and those are that makes up the test, which would then be things we need both as individuals and as a standardized. society. But Harris’ objection is that this free- A synthetic index such as the one here dom, even if operationalised and quantified, proposed would measure a certain range of remains illusory. It is something else that we cognitive and behavioral control skills that measure, Harris would say, because freedom configure a certain kind of free will at the as we usually conceive it cannot exist (because psychological-functional level. These are po- of the determinism and automatisms I de- tential capacities measured with standard- scribed). And yet it does exist to a certain ex- ized laboratory instruments that do not con- tent, Dennett replies. It does exist, I dare say sider any other factors that may restrict the myself, but the objections of incompatibilists- freedom of a subject in specific situations, illusionists à la Harris must be taken into ac- such as those that are relevant in moral sce- count. That’s what I have tried to do in this narios and legal contexts. The same goes for paper. There is much work left to do, but I do moral judgment. However, an index such as hope the idea I have outlined might pave the the one I’m proposing here could be the first way to outlining some form of freedom that is step, albeit certainly imperfect, towards more more easily researched and handled. objective measures to identify someone’s more or less “free will” or, in other words, █ Notes their capacity for self-control and rational choice (i.e., a reasons-responsive choice). 1 See T. HARRIS, Free Will, Free Press, New York This way, one could have a first, albeit 2012. rough and imprecise, quantification method 2 See D.C. DENNETT, Reflections on Sam Harris’ “Free of the free will potential that each individual Will”, in: «Rivista internazionale di Filosofia e Psi- can have in general terms. The first warning, cologia», vol. VIII, n. 3, 2017, pp. 214-230. almost trivial, is that this index, however re- 3 Ivi, p. 224. 4 Ivi, p. 228. fined, can never fully capture the freedom 5 potential of individuals, and will probably It would be extremely presumptuous, as well as unrealistic, to propose a non-provisional idea of only measure a portion of the spectrum of free will, provided it is not an illusion. Obviously, the capacities underlying decision-making this does not exclude that progress in research and free choice. That said, those who have a may show that some positions deserve more con- “score” of free will over a conventionally es- sideration than others, as is the case with the re- tablished cut-off do not necessarily always flection conducted by Daniel Dennett, regardless act freely: one still has to assess whether they of whether one agrees or disagrees with it. meet the five conditions set out above. It 6 K. VIHVELIN, Arguments for Incompatibilism, in: could however be presumed that the previ- E.N. ZALTA (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of ously described tool, if developed and vali- Philosophy, 2011, available at URL:
A Pragmatic and Empirical Approach to Free Will 257
University Press, Oxford 2016. Movement: A New Perspective, cit. 9 B. RUSSELL, On the Notion of Cause, in: «Proceed- 22 Ivi. ings of the Aristotelian Society», vol. XIII, 1912- 23 M. SCHULTZE-KRAFT, D. BIRMAN, M. RUSCONI, C. 1913, pp. 1-26. ALLEFELD, K. GÖRGEN, S. DÄHNE, B. BLANKERTZ, J.- 10 J.T. ISMAEL, How Physics Make Us Free, cit., p. 114. D. HAYNES, The Point of no Return in Vetoing Self- 11 N. CARTWRIGHT, Causal Laws and Effective initiated Movements, in: «Proceedings of the Na- Strategies, in: «Nous», vol. XIII, n. 4, 1979, pp. tional Academy of Sciences», vol. CXIII, n. 4, 2016, 419-437. pp. 1080-1085. 12 J. PEARL, Causality: Models, Reasoning, and In- 24 Ivi. ference, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 25 Ivi. 2009. 26 See T.D. WILSON, Strangers to Ourselves: Discov- 13 Ivi, pp. XIII-XIV. ering the Adaptive Unconscious, Harvard University 14 See C. HOFER, Review of How Physics Make Us Free, Press, Cambridge (MA) 2004; L. MLODINOW, Sub- in: «Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews», 2016, liminal: How Your Unconscious Mind Rules Your available at URL: < http://ndpr.nd.edu/news/70601- Behavior, Pantheon, New York 2012. how-physics-makes-us-free/>. 27 See, for example, J. DORIS, Talking to Our 15 J.T. ISMAEL, How Physics Make Us Free, cit., p. 137. Selves, Oxford University Press, New York 2015. 16 See B. LIBET, C.A. GLEASON, E.W. WRIGHT, 28 See J.M. DORIS, Lack of Character: Personality D.K. PEARL, Time of Conscious Intention to Act in and Moral Behavior, Cambridge University Press, Relation to Onset of Cerebral Activity (Readiness- Cambridge 2002. Potential), in: “Brain”, vol. CVI, n. 3, 1983, pp. 29 See G. CARUSO, Free Will and Consciousness: A De- 623-642; B. LIBET, Mind time: The Temporal Fac- terminist Account of the Illusion of Free Will, Lexing- tor in Consciousness, Harvard University Press, ton Books, Lanham (MD) 2012; G. CARUSO (ed.), Cambridge (MA) 2009; C.S. SOON, M. BRASS, H.J. Exploring the Illusion of Free Will and Moral Respon- HEINZE, J.D. HAYNES, Unconscious Determinants sibility, Lexington Books, Lanham (MD) 2013; T. of Free Decisions in the Human Brain, in: «Nature NADELHOFER, The Threat of Shrinking Agency and Neuroscience», vol. XI, n. 5, 2008, pp. 543-545; Free Will Disillusionism, in: L. NADEL, W SINNOTT- C.S. SOON, A.H. HE, S. BODE, J.D. HAYNES, Pre- ARMSTRONG (eds.), Conscious Will and Responsibil- dicting Free Choices for Abstract Intentions, in: ity: A Tribute to Benjamin Libet, Oxford University «Proceedings of the National Academy of Sci- Press, New York 2011, pp. 173-188; E. NAHMIAS, Is ences», vol. CX, n. 15, 2013, pp. 6217-6222. Free Will an Illusion? Confronting Challenges from 17 A. MELE, Effective Intentions: The Power of Con- the Modern Mind Sciences, in: W. SINNOTT- scious Will, Oxford University Press, New York ARMSTRONG (ed.), Moral Psychology. Vol. 4: Free 2009; A. MELE, Free. Why Science Hasn’t Disproved Will and Moral Responsibility, The MIT Press, Cam- Free Will, Oxford University Press, New York 2014. bridge (MA) 2014, pp. 1-25. 18 A. SCHURGER, M. MYLOPOULOS, D. ROSENTHAL, 30 See R.F. BAUMEISTER, Free Will in Scientific Psy- Neural Antecedents of Spontaneous Voluntary Move- chology, in: «Perspectives on Psychological Sci- ment: A New Perspective, in: «Trends in Cognitive ence», vol. III, n. 1, 2008, pp. 14-19. Sciences», vol. XX, n. 2, 2016, pp.77-79. Here I am 31 See P. CARRUTHERS, The Opacity of Mind: An partly drawing on A. LAVAZZA, Free Will and Neuro- Integrative Theory of Self-Knowledge, Oxford Uni- science: From Explaining Freedom Away to New Ways versity Press, New York 2011. of Operationalizing and Measuring it, in: «Frontiers 32 It would be different to wonder whether the in Human Neuroscience», vol. X, 2016, Art. Nr. 262 politician is free to respond other than following – doi 10.3389/fnhum.2016.00262. the key positions of his party, if he choose to be- 19 Ivi. cause this reflected his personal beliefs. Was Lu- 20 A. SCHURGER, J.D. SITT, S. DEHAENE, An Accu- ther free to retract his critical stance towards the mulator Model for Spontaneous Neural Activity Catholic Church, in Worms in 1521, given his re- Prior to Self-initiated Movement, in: «Proceedings ligious path? (see D.C. DENNETT, Elbow Room: of the National Academy of Sciences», vol. CIX, The Varieties of Free Will Worth Wanting, The n. 42, 2012, pp. E2904-E2913. Mit Press, Cambridge (MA) 1984). 21 A. SCHURGER, M. MYLOPOULOS, D. ROSENTHAL, 33 See D.M. WEGNER, The Illusion of Conscious Neural Antecedents of Spontaneous Voluntary Will, The MIT Press, Cambridge (MA) 2002.
258 Lavazza
34 See P.M. GOLLWITZER, Implementation Intentions: 37 See A. LAVAZZA, S. INGLESE, Operationalizing Strong Effects of Simple Plans, in: «American Psy- and Measuring (a Kind of) Free Will (and Respon- chologist», vol. LIV, n. 7, 1999, pp. 493-503. sibility), cit. 35 A. LAVAZZA, S. INGLESE, Operationalizing and 38 I am here partly drawing on A. LAVAZZA, Free Measuring (a Kind of) Free Will (and Responsibility). Will and Neuroscience, cit. Towards a New Framework for Psychology, Ethics, 39 See A. LAVAZZA, S. INGLESE, Operationalizing and and Law, in: «Rivista internazionale di Filosofia e Measuring (a Kind of) Free Will (and Responsibility), Psicologia», vol. VI, n. 1, 2015, pp. 37-55. cit. 36 See J.M. FISCHER, M. RAVIZZA, Responsibility 40 See C.F. CRAVER, Explaining the Brain: Mecha- and Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility, nisms and the Mosaic Unity of Neuroscience, Ox- Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1999. ford University Press, New York 2009.