DOCSLIB.ORG

The Significance of Sovereignty and China's "One Country, Two Systems"

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text

Load more

Bard College Bard Digital Commons Senior Projects Spring 2020 Bard Undergraduate Senior Projects Spring 2020 Why Can't We Be Friends: The Significance of Sovereignty and China's "One Country, Two Systems" Harrison R. Malinowski Bard College, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.bard.edu/senproj_s2020 Part of the International Relations Commons, Models and Methods Commons, and the Other Political Science Commons This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 License. Recommended Citation Malinowski, Harrison R., "Why Can't We Be Friends: The Significance of Sovereignty and China's "One Country, Two Systems"" (2020). Senior Projects Spring 2020. 234. https://digitalcommons.bard.edu/senproj_s2020/234 This Open Access work is protected by copyright and/or related rights. It has been provided to you by Bard College's Stevenson Library with permission from the rights-holder(s). You are free to use this work in any way that is permitted by the copyright and related rights. For other uses you need to obtain permission from the rights- holder(s) directly, unless additional rights are indicated by a Creative Commons license in the record and/or on the work itself. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Why Can’t We Be Friends: The Significance of Sovereignty and China’s “One Country, Two Systems” Senior Project Submitted to The Division of Social Studies of Bard College by Harry Malinowski Annandale-on-Hudson, New York May 2020 Acknowledgements First, I would like to thank my advisor, Rob Culp, who has been assisting my research and writing for almost a year. Thank you for your advice and comments and helping me make sense of the complicated relationships between China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan. The evolution of this project is proof enough of how complex a topic you have guided me through. You told me during one of our first meetings that you were a historian, not a political scientist, but I think your guidance and suggestions this year have proven you to know more on politics than you’re willing to admit. I would like to thank Michelle Murray, for her help as one of my board members and one of my past professors. The classes I took with you have provided part of the basis for this project, guiding me to the interesting and complicated world of sovereignty and states. Your comments during the midway board in the Fall helped shape how this project has evolved over the Spring semester and how it has become a project exploring the theory beyond the cases discussed here. Finally, and most importantly, I would like to dedicate the project to both of my parents for their unwavering support as I have worked through this project, the past four years of college, and my life preceding that. Bard has been a transformative experience for my life and education, and without you I would not have gotten the chance to attend Bard. I also want to thank all my close family members, especially those not with us anymore, for all that you have done. A dedication cannot begin to cover my appreciation and gratitude, so all I can say is thank you and I love you. Table of Contents Introduction ....................................................................................................................................... 1 Hong Kong and “One Country, Two Systems” .......................................................................... 9 Formulating the Model ............................................................................................................................................... 11 The Sino-British Joint Declaration ......................................................................................................................... 17 China’s Experiments with Capitalism .................................................................................................................. 18 The Drafting of Basic Law ......................................................................................................................................... 22 The Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region ............................................................ 25 Patten’s Reforms ........................................................................................................................................................... 30 China’s Response to Reforms ................................................................................................................................... 33 The Hong Kong Government .................................................................................................................................... 36 Taiwan and the Battle for Sovereignty ................................................................................... 41 Domestic Political Control ......................................................................................................................................... 42 Economic Sovereignty ................................................................................................................................................ 52 International Recognition ......................................................................................................................................... 60 Negotiating “One Country, Two Systems” .......................................................................................................... 63 Conclusion ........................................................................................................................................ 73 Bibliography .................................................................................................................................... 82 1 Introduction In 1949, the Chinese Nationalist Party/Kuomintang (KMT), fled to the island of Taiwan and established the Republic of China on Taiwan (ROC/Taiwan) after suffering a crushing defeat on mainland China at the hands of the Chinese Communist Party. In 1981, the Communist Party, having formed the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949, reached out to Taiwan with a proposal for reunification. “One country, two systems” was rejected by the Taiwanese then, and the government has continued to refuse unification under that model. Failing with one region, the PRC turned their attention to Hong Kong and Macau. For almost all the 20th century, Hong Kong and Macau had been under the control of the British and Portuguese Empires, and by the end of the century, the PRC were pursuing a policy of complete unification. The goal of the PRC was to return all land that was formerly under China’s control back to China. The failure with Taiwan did not discourage the PRC from pursuing unification under the “one country, two systems” model, however. Instead, they took that idea and applied it to Hong Kong and Macau, with retrocession of the two territories occurring in 1997 and 1999. In the years following unification, many scholars have examined the nature of “one country, two systems,” and what it means. The model was representative of a new form of governance that the rest of the world was not familiar with. Though it vaguely resembled the colonial system of the past, with a semi-autonomous region being overseen by a larger power, the model was ultimately different. The model implemented in Hong Kong showed a system in which a territory was meant to function independently and be self-sufficient. Additionally, the Basic Law designed for Hong Kong allowed for the formation of a semi- 2 democratic system to govern the territory, completely different from the authoritarian political system of mainland China. Many scholars have asked what this system is, what it has meant for Hong Kong, what it means for Taiwan, and more importantly, what it means for the broader international community. “One country, two systems” represents an idea of a hybrid/shared sovereignty, where the PRC is the “sole representative” of China in international organizations and the general global community, yet Hong Kong, as a global city and economic center, holds a separate seat in various international organizations and has its own currency, independent judiciary, and citizenship documents. What does hybrid sovereignty mean? How can a sovereign country function with shared sovereignty between more than one political institution in that country? Though the United States of America has multiple states, all ultimately subservient to the federal government, those states do not have seats in international organizations like Hong Kong does. How does this country function when one body is recognized as the sole legal representative, but is clearly not the sole international representative of that country? What does this mean for the future of regional disputes, like we have seen in the Korean Peninsula, or (and this is rather different) the Arab-Israeli conflict in the Middle East? If China’s model of unification works, then a system of shared sovereignty may be applicable to other conflicts that are still struggling to find an answer. All these questions, and many more come from discussions on the status quo between Hong Kong and China, but the most intriguing question to me concerns why Taiwan has never accepted the model, even as a beginning for negotiations, and how the model would work in Taiwan – could it ever work for Taiwan. Taiwan has developed very differently from Hong Kong, perhaps most importantly because of its 3 political independence
Recommended publications
  • Reviewing and Evaluating the Direct Elections to the Legislative Council and the Transformation of Political Parties in Hong Kong, 1991-2016

    Reviewing and Evaluating the Direct Elections to the Legislative Council and the Transformation of Political Parties in Hong Kong, 1991-2016

    Journal of US-China Public Administration, August 2016, Vol. 13, No. 8, 499-517 doi: 10.17265/1548-6591/2016.08.001 D DAVID PUBLISHING Reviewing and Evaluating the Direct Elections to the Legislative Council and the Transformation of Political Parties in Hong Kong, 1991-2016 Chung Fun Steven Hung The Education University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong After direct elections were instituted in Hong Kong, politicization inevitably followed democratization. This paper intends to evaluate how political parties’ politics happened in Hong Kong’s recent history. The research was conducted through historical comparative analysis, with the context of Hong Kong during the sovereignty transition and the interim period of democratization being crucial. For the implementation of “one country, two systems”, political democratization was hindered and distinct political scenarios of Hong Kong’s transformation were made. The democratic forces had no alternative but to seek more radicalized politics, which caused a decisive fragmentation of the local political parties where the establishment camp was inevitable and the democratic blocs were split into many more small groups individually. It is harmful. It is not conducive to unity and for the common interests of the publics. This paper explores and evaluates the political history of Hong Kong and the ways in which the limited democratization hinders the progress of Hong Kong’s transformation. Keywords: election politics, historical comparative, ruling, democratization The democratizing element of the Hong Kong political system was bounded within the Legislative Council under the principle of the separation of powers of the three governing branches, Executive, Legislative, and Judicial. Popular elections for the Hong Kong legislature were introduced and implemented for 25 years (1991-2016) and there were eight terms of general elections for the Legislative Council.
  • I Am Sorry. Would Members Please Deal with One Piece of Business. It Is Now Eight O’Clock and Under Standing Order 8(2) This Council Should Now Adjourn

    I Am Sorry. Would Members Please Deal with One Piece of Business. It Is Now Eight O’Clock and Under Standing Order 8(2) This Council Should Now Adjourn

    4920 HONG KONG LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL ― 29 June 1994 8.00 pm PRESIDENT: I am sorry. Would Members please deal with one piece of business. It is now eight o’clock and under Standing Order 8(2) this Council should now adjourn. ATTORNEY GENERAL: Mr President, with your consent, I move that Standing Order 8(2) should be suspended so as to allow the Council’s business this evening to be concluded. Question proposed, put and agreed to. Council went into Committee. CHAIRMAN: Council is now in Committee and is suspended until 15 minutes to nine o’clock. 8.56 pm CHAIRMAN: Committee will now resume. MR MARTIN LEE (in Cantonese): Mr Chairman, thank you for adjourning the debate on my motion so that Members could have a supper break. I hope I can secure a greater chance of success if they listen to my speech after dining. Mr Chairman, on behalf of the United Democrats of Hong Kong (UDHK), I move the amendments to clause 22 except item 12 of schedule 2. The amendments have already been set out under my name in the paper circulated to Members. Mr Chairman, before I make my speech, I would like to raise a point concerning Mr Jimmy McGREGOR because he was quite upset when he heard my previous speech. He hoped that I could clarify one point. In fact, I did not mean that all the people in the commercial sector had not supported democracy. If all the voters in the commercial sector had not supported democracy, Mr Jimmy McGREGOR would not have been returned in the 1988 and 1991 elections.
  • Hong Kong's Endgame and the Rule of Law (Ii): the Battle Over "The People" and the Business Community in the Transition to Chinese Rule

    Hong Kong's Endgame and the Rule of Law (Ii): the Battle Over "The People" and the Business Community in the Transition to Chinese Rule

    HONG KONG'S ENDGAME AND THE RULE OF LAW (II): THE BATTLE OVER "THE PEOPLE" AND THE BUSINESS COMMUNITY IN THE TRANSITION TO CHINESE RULE JACQUES DELISLE* & KEVIN P. LANE- 1. INTRODUCTION Transitional Hong Kong's endgame formally came to a close with the territory's reversion to Chinese rule on July 1, 1997. How- ever, a legal and institutional order and a "rule of law" for Chi- nese-ruled Hong Kong remain works in progress. They will surely bear the mark of the conflicts that dominated the final years pre- ceding Hong Kong's legal transition from British colony to Chinese Special Administrative Region ("S.A.R."). Those endgame conflicts reflected a struggle among adherents to rival conceptions of a rule of law and a set of laws and institutions that would be adequate and acceptable for Hong Kong. They unfolded in large part through battles over the attitudes and allegiance of "the Hong Kong people" and Hong Kong's business community. Hong Kong's Endgame and the Rule of Law (I): The Struggle over Institutions and Values in the Transition to Chinese Rule ("Endgame I") focused on the first aspect of this story. It examined the political struggle among members of two coherent, but not monolithic, camps, each bound together by a distinct vision of law and sover- t Special Series Reprint: Originally printed in 18 U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L. 811 (1997). Assistant Professor, University of Pennsylvania Law School. This Article is the second part of a two-part series. The first part appeared as Hong Kong's End- game and the Rule of Law (I): The Struggle over Institutions and Values in the Transition to Chinese Rule, 18 U.
  • OFFICIAL RECORD of PROCEEDINGS Thursday, 21

    OFFICIAL RECORD of PROCEEDINGS Thursday, 21

    LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL ─ 21 December 2000 2261 OFFICIAL RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS Thursday, 21 December 2000 The Council met at Nine o'clock MEMBERS PRESENT: THE PRESIDENT THE HONOURABLE MRS RITA FAN HSU LAI-TAI, G.B.S., J.P. THE HONOURABLE KENNETH TING WOO-SHOU, J.P. THE HONOURABLE JAMES TIEN PEI-CHUN, J.P. THE HONOURABLE DAVID CHU YU-LIN THE HONOURABLE CYD HO SAU-LAN THE HONOURABLE ALBERT HO CHUN-YAN IR DR THE HONOURABLE RAYMOND HO CHUNG-TAI, J.P. THE HONOURABLE LEE CHEUK-YAN THE HONOURABLE MARTIN LEE CHU-MING, S.C., J.P. THE HONOURABLE ERIC LI KA-CHEUNG, J.P. DR THE HONOURABLE DAVID LI KWOK-PO, J.P. THE HONOURABLE FRED LI WAH-MING, J.P. DR THE HONOURABLE LUI MING-WAH, J.P. 2262 LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL ─ 21 December 2000 THE HONOURABLE NG LEUNG-SING PROF THE HONOURABLE NG CHING-FAI THE HONOURABLE MARGARET NG THE HONOURABLE MRS SELINA CHOW LIANG SHUK-YEE, J.P. THE HONOURABLE JAMES TO KUN-SUN THE HONOURABLE CHEUNG MAN-KWONG THE HONOURABLE HUI CHEUNG-CHING THE HONOURABLE CHAN KWOK-KEUNG THE HONOURABLE CHAN YUEN-HAN THE HONOURABLE BERNARD CHAN THE HONOURABLE CHAN KAM-LAM THE HONOURABLE MRS SOPHIE LEUNG LAU YAU-FUN, S.B.S., J.P. THE HONOURABLE LEUNG YIU-CHUNG THE HONOURABLE SIN CHUNG-KAI THE HONOURABLE ANDREW WONG WANG-FAT, J.P. DR THE HONOURABLE PHILIP WONG YU-HONG THE HONOURABLE WONG YUNG-KAN THE HONOURABLE JASPER TSANG YOK-SING, J.P. THE HONOURABLE HOWARD YOUNG, J.P. DR THE HONOURABLE YEUNG SUM LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL ─ 21 December 2000 2263 THE HONOURABLE YEUNG YIU-CHUNG THE HONOURABLE LAU KONG-WAH THE HONOURABLE LAU WONG-FAT, G.B.S., J.P.
  • HONG KONG: the PERILS of SEMIDEMOCRACY William H

    HONG KONG: the PERILS of SEMIDEMOCRACY William H

    Overholt.new created saved from e-mail by JB on 7/2/01. (6682 words.) PRE created from NEW by SL on 7/ 18. TXT created from NEW w/ PJC edits on 8/1/01(5644 w/notes); JB edits to TXT entered 8/7, PJC (5683 wds. w/notes). PRE revised with TXT by SL on 8/7. MP changes to TXT by PJC on 8/9/01(5750 words w/ notes); Aas to TXT 8/16, PJC (6149 wds w/notes). PRE revised with TXT by SL on 8/24. PGS created from PRE by SL on 8/24. HONG KONG: THE PERILS OF SEMIDEMOCRACY William H. Overholt William H. Overholt is head of Asia strategy and economics for Nomura International, a Japan-based securities firm with offices in Hong Kong and around the world. He holds a doctorate in political science from Yale University and is the author of five books, including most recently The Rise of China: How Economic Reform Is Creating a New Superpower (1994). At the time of Hong Kong’s 1997 transition from British to Chinese rule, the world saw the city as a laissez-faire enclave that took care of itself, while an able but mostly hands-off civil service did minor maintenance. A successful transition would mean little more than a changing of the guard, with local functionaries replacing colonial functionaries. There was, in this widely held view, no need for any larger reform of the economy or polity. Beijing and London, together with the local business establishment, planned a government that they all hoped would combine representative deliberativeness with authoritarian decisiveness.
  • Chapter 2: the Framework for Change

    Chapter 2: the Framework for Change

    CHAPTER TWO THE FRAMEWORK FOR CHANGE The Sino-British Joint Declaration on the Question of Hong Kong 1984 2.1 In 1982, Britain initiated negotiations with the People's Republic of China on the status of Hong Kong. Despite the fact that the nineteenth century treaties1 were not recognised by China, Britain's adherence to them and to the legal framework they provided necessitated some settlement which would accommodate the shortening leases in the New Territories. Those leases were due to expire in 1997. What began as a limited exercise in seeking an administrative extension to the lease in the New Territories2 quickly developed into a consideration of the whole territory and the redressing of China's humiliations in the nineteenth century. 2.2 For Britain, the 'permanent territories' of Hong Kong island and the tip of the Kowloon Peninsula were not viable without the New Territories which contained the basic necessity of agriculture, the bulk of the industry, the power supply and the airport of Hong Kong. The negotiations lasted two years. The agreement was initialled by Britain and China on 26 September 1984, endorsed by the Legislative Council3 of Hong Kong on 18 October 1984, subsequently debated and approved by the British Parliament, and signed by Britain and China on 19 December 1984. It entered into force on 25 May 1985. On 12 June 1985 it was lodged with the United Nations as a treaty. 2.3 In China, 1982-84 was a period of reformist opening, relatively expansive in its embracing of the West. Deng Xiaoping himself took a special interest in the negotiations over Hong Kong and defined the principle of 'one country, two systems' as a way of allaying British and Hong Kong concerns about the transfer and of preserving the economic prosperity of Hong Kong which he recognised as being so valuable to China's development.
  • HONG KONG LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL-15 July 1987 2027

    HONG KONG LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL-15 July 1987 2027

    HONG KONG LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL-15 July 1987 2027 OFFICIAL REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS Wednesday, 15 July 1987 The Council met at half-past Two o’clock PRESENT HIS EXCELLENCY THE GOVERNOR (PRESIDENT) SIR DAVID CLIVE WILSON, K.C.M.G. THE HONOURABLE THE CHIEF SECRETARY MR. DAVID ROBERT FORD, L.V.O., O.B.E., J.P. THE HONOURABLE THE FINANCIAL SECRETARY (Acting) MR. JOHN FRANCIS YAXLEY, J.P. THE HONOURABLE THE ATTORNEY GENERAL MR. MICHAEL DAVID THOMAS, C.M.G., Q.C. THE HONOURABLE LYDIA DUNN, C.B.E., J.P. THE HONOURABLE CHEN SHOU-LUM, C.B.E., J.P. THE HONOURABLE PETER C. WONG, C.B.E., J.P. DR. THE HONOURABLE HO KAM-FAI, O.B.E., J.P. THE HONOURABLE ALLEN LEE PENG-FEI, O.B.E., J.P. THE HONOURABLE HU FA-KUANG, O.B.E., J.P. THE HONOURABLE WONG PO-YAN, C.B.E., J.P. THE HONOURABLE CHAN KAM-CHUEN, O.B.E., J.P. THE HONOURABLE STEPHEN CHEONG KAM-CHUEN, O.B.E., J.P. THE HONOURABLE CHEUNG YAN-LUNG, O.B.E., J.P. THE HONOURABLE MRS. SELINA CHOW LIANG SHUK-YEE, O.B.E., J.P. THE HONOURABLE MARIA TAM WAI-CHU, O.B.E., J.P. DR. THE HONOURABLE HENRIETTA IP MAN-HING, O.B.E., J.P. THE HONOURABLE CHAN YING-LUN, J.P. THE HONOURABLE MRS. RITA FAN HSU LAI-TAI, J.P. THE HONOURABLE MRS. PAULINE NG CHOW MAY-LIN, J.P. THE HONOURABLE PETER POON WING-CHEUNG, M.B.E., J.P. THE HONOURABLE YEUNG PO-KWAN, C.P.M., J.P.
  • ASIA WATCH OVERVIEW Human Rights Developments While China

    ASIA WATCH OVERVIEW Human Rights Developments While China

    ASIA WATCH OVERVIEW Human Rights Developments While China, Burma and Kashmir exemplified the continuing human rights problems in Asia, the major development in the region was not so much the nature of the abuses but the debate over how to address them. Two factors had a major impact on this debate: the increased visibility of Asian nongovernmental organizations or NGOs and the growing economic power of East Asia. Asian NGOs were able to articulate a vision of human rights that differed radically from that of their own governments and thus called into question the ability of the latter to define what is "Asian." They were more successful than their governments in blurring the traditional sub-regional distinctions of South Asia, Southeast Asia and Northeast Asia. And they helped redefine priorities for the human rights movement in a way that rendered obsolete the old division of labor among human rights, development, women's rights and environmental organizations. These efforts culminated in the issuing of the "Bangkok NGO Declaration on Human Rights" of March 27. Over one hundred NGOs from across Asia and the Pacific gathered in Bangkok on March 23 to coordinate their position for the World Conference on Human Rights, just as Asian governments convened a few days later, also in Bangkok, for the regional preparatory meeting of the World Conference on Human Rights. It was clear from a series of statements they made during 1992 that China, Indonesia, Singapore and Malaysia, at the very least, were determined to promote an "Asian concept of human rights" which downplayed political and civil rights, highlighted the importance of economic development, stressed the need to take cultural, historical and religious factors into account when assessing human rights, and rejected aid conditionality and other forms of "interference in domestic affairs." It was this concept that the Asian NGOs set out to rebut in Bangkok.
  • Prospects for Democracy in Hong Kong: the 2012 Election Reforms

    Prospects for Democracy in Hong Kong: the 2012 Election Reforms

    Prospects for Democracy in Hong Kong: The 2012 Election Reforms Michael F. Martin Specialist in Asian Affairs December 10, 2009 Congressional Research Service 7-5700 www.crs.gov R40992 CRS Report for Congress Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress Prospects for Democracy in Hong Kong: The 2012 Election Reforms Summary Support for the democratization of Hong Kong has been an element of U.S. foreign policy for over 17 years. The Hong Kong Policy Act of 1992 (P.L. 102-383) states, “Support for democratization is a fundamental principle of United States foreign policy. As such, it naturally applies to United States policy toward Hong Kong. This will remain equally true after June 30, 1997.” The Omnibus Appropriations Act of 2009 (P.L. 111-8) provides at least $17 million for “the promotion of democracy in the People’s Republic of China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan …” The democratization of Hong Kong is also enshrined in the Basic Law, Hong Kong’s quasi- constitution that was passed by China’s National People’s Congress (NPC) prior to China’s resumption of sovereignty over the ex-British colony on July 1, 1997. The Basic Law stipulates that the “ultimate aim” is the selection of Hong Kong’s Chief Executive and the members of its Legislative Council (Legco) by “universal suffrage.” However, it does not designate a specific date by which this goal is to be achieved. On November 18, 2009, Hong Kong Chief Executive Donald Tsang Yam-kuen released the government’s long-awaited “consultation document” on possible reforms for the city’s next Chief Executive and Legislative Council (Legco) elections to be held in 2012.
  • THE DECLINE of the DEMOCRATIC PARTY in HONG KONG the Second Legislative Election in the HKSAR

    THE DECLINE of the DEMOCRATIC PARTY in HONG KONG the Second Legislative Election in the HKSAR

    THE DECLINE OF THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY IN HONG KONG The Second Legislative Election in the HKSAR Ma Ngok In September 2000, the Hong Kong Special Administra- tive Region (HKSAR) held its second election for the Legislative Council (Legco). As the results came in, the relative decline that pro-democracy forces experienced was the most striking outcome. The Democratic Party (DP), led by prominent politician Martin Lee, suffered a particularly notice- able loss. The DP received 462,423 votes, 170,000 fewer than it had earned in 1998 or an 8% drop in its overall share. The election also showed that forces that support the People’s Republic of China (PRC) have solid organi- zational support and strong mobilization potential. The pro-China flagship party, the Democratic Alliance for the Betterment of Hong Kong (DAB), increased its overall share of the vote by 4.5% despite a major scandal in- volving the party’s vice-chairman Gary Cheng. The difference in the share of the vote received by the DP and the DAB shrank drastically from 18% in 1998 to 5% in 2000. The results of the 2000 election are symbolic of the situation facing Hong Kong’s democracy movement. It is becoming increasingly fragmented and powerless. The election also demonstrated that the pro-PRC DAB is emerg- ing as a major force on the Hong Kong political scene. This emergence in turn may make China more willing to agree to a further, gradual democratiza- tion of Hong Kong. This article delineates the changes that have taken place since 1997 that have led to the DP’s decline.
  • The Constitutional, Political and Legal Order of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region

    The Constitutional, Political and Legal Order of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region

    LC Paper No. CB(2)1111/99-00(02) The Constitutional, Political and Legal Order of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region By Prof. Joseph Y.S. Cheng City University of Hong Kong The Constitutional, Political and Legal Order of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Since the handover, Chinese leaders have demonstrated to the local and international communities that they intend to follow a strict hands-off policy towards Hong Kong. To show its respect for the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR)'s autonomy, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs has been politely turning down requests by foreign dignitaries to arrange their Hong Kong visits and asking them to approach the HKSAR government directly. At the beginning of 1999, the European Commission, in its first annual report on the HKSAR, acknowledged that "basic rights, freedoms and autonomy have been broadly upheld". The report welcomed steps towards broader suffrage in the legislative elections in May 1998, and appealed that the HKSAR government should announce soon a clear commitment to full democracy and fix a "reasonably early" date for its full implementation. It too noted that there had been regular demonstrations, unbridled press criticism, and no detentions or harassment of political opponents or human rights activists.1 Such assessments are obviously shared by the local community. Hong Kong people's confidence at this stage is mainly based on two assumptions: the first is that the trends of economic reform and opening up to the outside world are irreversible in China, and the second is that the Chinese leadership is determined to maintain the stability and prosperity of the territory.
  • Minutes Have Been Seen by the Administration)

    Minutes Have Been Seen by the Administration)

    立法會 Legislative Council LC Paper No. CB(2)2603/03-04 (These minutes have been seen by the Administration) Ref : CB2/BC/4/02 Bills Committee on Education (Amendment) Bill 2002 Minutes of meeting held on Wednesday, 28 April 2004 from 8:30 am to 12:35 pm in Conference Room A of the Legislative Council Building Members : Hon Cyd HO Sau-lan (Chairman) present Ir Dr Hon Raymond HO Chung-tai, JP Hon LEE Cheuk-yan Hon CHEUNG Man-kwong Hon LEUNG Yiu-chung Hon Emily LAU Wai-hing, JP Hon SZETO Wah Hon Tommy CHEUNG Yu-yan, JP Hon Audrey EU Yuet-mee, SC, JP Member : Hon YEUNG Yiu-chung, BBS absent Public Officers : Mr M Y CHENG, JP attending Deputy Secretary for Education and Manpower (3) Mr Andrew POON Principal Assistant Secretary for Education and Manpower (Quality Assurance) Mrs YU LAW Siu-man Senior Education Officer (School Registration and Compliance) Education and Manpower Bureau - 2 - Mr Gilbert MO Deputy Law Draftsman (Bilingual Drafting and Administration) Department of Justice Mr W L CHEUNG Senior Government Counsel Department of Justice Clerk in : Ms Doris CHAN attendance Chief Council Secretary (2)2 Staff in : Ms Bernice WONG attendance Assistant Legal Adviser 1 Mr Stanley MA Senior Council Secretary (2)6 I. Meeting with the Administration [LC Paper Nos. CB(2)2166/03-04(01) and CB(2)2166/03-04(02)] 1 The Bills Committee deliberated (Index of proceedings at Annex). II. Clause-by-clause examination of the Bill [LC Paper No. CB(2)1964/03-04(01)] 2. The Bills Committee deliberated on Clause 17 of the Bill (proposed sections 40AF to 40AQ under Part III of the Education Ordinance - Index of proceedings at Annex).