The Game Changer Without Losing Any More Time, Government Must Sanction Special Operations Command
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Guest Column | Lt Gen. Vinod Bhatia (retd) The Game Changer Without losing any more time, government must sanction Special Operations Command MUCH HAS BEEN WRITTEN AND ing all elements of SOF fully integrated, will need credible military capabilities deliberated by the armed forces and equipped, trained and designated under to project military power, assist friendly defence strategists over the years on a single command and control struc- foreign countries in times of crisis from the need to empower and equip India’s ture, with direct access to the country’s unconventional threats and Humani- Special Operation Forces (SOF) to make highest decision making body, the Cabi- tarian Assistance and Disaster Relief them a force multiplier, a game chang- net Committee on Security (CCS). (HADR). The continuing proxy war with er, a rapid deployment force, a threat in The ministry of defence (MoD) web- Pakistan, the ever increasing and omni- being, and a major component of our site on India’s security environment present threat from terrorists, and the comprehensive national power. Howev- overview defines the strategic space as imperative to safeguard our national er, not enough has been done. ‘India’s size, strategic location, trade in- interests and assets dictate that we en- On 3 November 1988, 50 indepen- terests in a security environment that hance capacities and build capabilities dent parachute brigade/6 battalion, extends from Persian Gulf in the west, to face future threats and challenges. the parachute regiment spearheaded to the Straits of Malacca in the east India boasts of the second largest Operation Cactus (Maldives) to rescue and from the CAR in the north to near army, the fourth largest air force and the then President Maumoon Abdul the Equator in the south, underpin In- a blue water capability for the navy to Gayoom, and restore the duly elected dia’s security response. In view of the ensure our territorial integrity against government of Maldives after Abdullah strategic spread, it is essential for the external threats and internal securi- Luthufi had taken over the island nation country to maintain a credible land, air ty. What the nation lacks is a credible in an early morning coup. The operation and maritime force to safeguard its rapid deployment and effective special launched conjointly by the army, navy security interests.’ operations capability, to meet emerging and the air force was successfully ac- India’s security concerns are impact- security challenges in the regional and complished without a single casualty. ed by a dynamic global and regional global context. Consequent to Operation Cactus, security environment. As India trans- What are special operations? These Time magazine carried a cover story forms from an emerging and rising can be defined as ‘Unconventional mili- on 3 April 1989 acclaiming India as a power to a risen, responsible power, it tary operations, undertaken in a hostile regional power. At home, the success of DEEP ASSETS Indian Army Special Forces during training that prepares them for the this operation mostly went unnoticed as complete spectrum of conflict, ranging from conventional to covert operations did a few important lessons learnt. Had it failed, maybe India too, would have created structures and organisations to exploit the full potential of SOF to safe- guard national interest and assets. The United States (US) established the US Special Operations Command (USSOC) comprising the SOF of the three services and Marines, in the af- termath of the failure of Operation Eagle Claw to rescue American diplo- mats held hostage at the US Embassy at Tehran in April 1980. Ever since, the US SOF, as an integral part of USSOC, has spearheaded and projected US hard power across the world, thus safeguard- ing the national interests. The synergy and the structured jointness of US SOF and command and control also ensured a flawlessly planned and surgically ex- ecuted Operation Geronimo to neu- tralise Osama bin Laden at Abbottabad, Pakistan in May 2011. As Operation Cactus was execut- ed with surgical precision and total success, it failed to highlight the most important lesson, the need for a tai- lor-made joint organisation, compris- 4 FORCE | April 2015 SOC (C-in-C) INSTITUTIONALISED HQ SOC (INTEGRAL INTERFACE WITH MEA, PROCUREMENT AND R&D) MHA, DIA, NTRO, RAW SOF CORE GP INTELLIGENCE WING AND EW IW AND PSY OPS SOF DIVISION SPL OPS SPL OPS MARITIME TRAINING AVIATION DIV FLEET WING MECHINF BN MARINE DBE AIR ASLT BDE TPT WG RECCE AND ROTARY WG SVL WG 2 x AMPHIBIOUS BN 2 x PARA BN 1 x PARA (SF) BN 1 x PARA (SF) BN LST DIV LPH DIV MARCOS MARCOS GARUD or politically sensitive environment, to As India grows in stature theatre commanders with a low cost achieve political and military objectives and economic power, option to target high value military ob- at national, strategic and operational it will become more jectives in depth areas, thus giving the level and to safeguard economic inter- much needed strategic and operational ests. Their arena extends the complete and more vulnerable reach during war. At present, SOF are spectrum of conflict and ranges from to unconventional and assigned missions at the strategic, the- direct action to covert and clandestine terrorist threats on its atre and operational level and tasked operations. These are undertaken most- nationals and assets to execute direct action, intelligence, ly in concert with other elements of na- around the world. It is surveillance and reconnaissance tasks tional power.’ now an imperative to during war to delay, disrupt and de- As such operations have internation- synergise the SOF under a stroy high value targets in depth areas. al and national ramifications, it is es- During peace they are mandated to exe- sential to create an appropriate politi- single command to meet cute counter terrorist (CT) and counter cal understanding. The national polity future challenges insurgency (CI) operations, special re- needs to comprehend the options and connaissance, hostage rescue, capabili- the associated risk sensitivity compared ty building of friendly foreign countries to out-of-proportion results and limit- control. Existing SOF of the armed forc- (FFC), and above all, training for war. ed escalation dynamics. As India has es include nine Parachute (Special Forc- There is a plethora of security forc- grown in stature and economic power, it es) battalions and five parachute battal- es (SF) in the Indian security context. will become more and more vulnerable ions of the army, an 800-strong Marine Without debating on the quality and to unconventional and terrorist threats Commando Force (MARCOS) organised requirement of the over two dozen self- on its nationals and assets around the on the concept of the US Marine SEALS styled and self-proclaimed SF ranging world. It is now an imperative to syner- and a 1,000 strong Indian Air Force from the state police and the Central gise the SOF under a single command (IAF) Garud. Armed Police Forces (CAPF), the focus to meet future challenges. The structure The National Security Guard (SAG) of this article will remain on the SOF of of SOF is a major indicator of a nation’s and the Special Group manned and led the armed forces. will and capabilities to safeguard its by the army for internal security and The air force has enhanced its lift ca- interests, the capability to project hard hostage rescue are under the ministry pability with the induction of the C-130J power and political signalling. of home affairs (MHA). These are elite Hercules and C-17 Globe Master in ad- Each service has its own SOF which forces, where every man is a volunteer, dition to the already in service IL-76 and has grown over the years. These are ser- highly-trained and motivated. This force AN-32 aircrafts, thus giving the country vice specific and more often than not, is among the most battle-hardened and the requisite reach to effectively inter- there is competition and conflict of in- combat-rich, equal to, if not better than, vene and safeguard our national inter- terests, rather than cooperation and the best in the world. ests in the regional and global context. coordination, be it their roles and tasks, The SOF is both force multipliers and The Indian Navy, too, is in the process equipping, training and command and substituters. These forces provide the of acquiring four landing craft/multi FORCE | April 2015 5 Guest Column | Lt Gen. Vinod Bhatia (retd) role support vessels at a cost of USD 2.6 elements within, albeit on invitation, as- mobility. The SOF requirement is of low billion and nine Japanese ShinMaywa sisting in HADR missions in the region population, high technology arms and US2 amphibious aircraft, to upgrade and beyond and capacity building of equipment. Yet, the procedure to pro- the maritime lift capability for SOF and armies of FFC. The SOC should also be cure equipment for SOF is the same as amphibious operations. To fully exploit responsible for development of SOF doc- for all other arms and equipment as per this credible lift capability, the strategic trine and training. Given the envisaged the Defence Procurement Procedure reach and a battle-hardened, combat roles and tasks, the SOC should have a (DPP) 2013. This has obviously resulted rich elite SOF, there is an urgent need direct access to the national decision in near zero procurement. to have integrated structures to effec- making body (CCS) in times of crisis. Indigenous development of high tively safeguard our national interests An accompanying table gives a sug- technology equipment is not attractive as mandated. gested outline organisation of SOC. In enough for Defence Research and Devel- In 2012, the Naresh Chandra Task this model, the SOF have only certain opment Organisation (DRDO) and Ord- Force recommended creation of a Spe- essential elements placed under the nance Factory Board (OFB) due to the cial Operations Command (SOC), Cyber direct command of the SOC, while the limited quantities required.