Central Government and Frontline Performance Improvement
CENTRAL GOVERNMENT AND FRONTLINE PERFORMANCE IMPROVEMENT: THE CASE OF “TARGETS” IN THE UNITED KINGDOM Steven Kelman, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government For over a decade, there has been a dramatic expansion in use of non-financial performance measures for government organizations. (Talbot 2005) Often, governments have limited themselves to what may be called “performance measurement” -- choosing measures and reporting performance against them. This has frequently, though not always, been the case in the United States, when performance measures have been developed at federal, state, and local levels; it is, for example, all the Government Performance and Results Act of l993 requires. In this situation, the words typically associated with the effort are “accountability” and “transparency.” Agency overseers, and the public, are made aware of whether performance is good or bad, and may then react accordingly (for instance, as with the Performance Assessment Review Team activities of the U.S. Office of Management and Budget, by increasing or decreasing agency budgets). Other times, government organizations have gone beyond performance measurement to “performance management” – using measures as a tool to improve performance along dimensions measured, not just record performance levels assumed to be unchanging.1 The ability of performance management actually to improve performance is important for anyone interested in government working better. A particularly ambitious example of public-sector performance management has been the United Kingdom under the Labour government since l997, and especially after Labour’s first re- election in 200l. Starting in l998, departments negotiated “public service agreements” with the Treasury (the budget ministry) in conjunction with budget settlements.
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