Mark Grimsley. The Hard Hand of War: Union Military Policy toward Southern Civilians, 1861-1865. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995. xii + 244 pp. $29.95, cloth, ISBN 978-0-521-46257-0.
Reviewed by George C. Rable
Published on H-CivWar (April, 1996)
Students of the Civil War are quite familiar Confederates through the seizure and destruction (or so they think) with the subject of this book. of civilian property. How many of us have thoughtlessly described the Grimsley refutes the commonly held assump‐ Civil War as the frst "modern" or even "total" tion that the conciliatory approach grew out of a war? Mark Grimsley will make us revise those old naive sentimentalism doomed to fail. For sure, lecture notes. Lincoln and his military advisers rather blithely Historians, Civil War bufs, and the public assumed that all the seceding states (with the ex‐ generally hold powerful images of the Civil War's ception of South Carolina) had Unionist majori‐ destructiveness. The two most common examples ties, but historical precedent from the American would be the burning of Atlanta and Sherman's Revolution, the Napoleonic wars, and the Mexican March to the Sea. Many historians have long real‐ War also pointed toward conservative treatment ized that the devastation wrought by northern of belligerent peoples. A policy of restraint toward armies has been greatly exaggerated, but Mark civilians and their property might prevent the Grimsley argues that severity and pleas of mili‐ outbreak of a brutal and potentially disastrous tary necessity were also tempered by a sense of guerrilla confict. That sturdy exemplar of a cau‐ moral justice. For the frst ffteen months of the tious approach to war, George B. McClellan, fa‐ war or so, federal authorities adopted a concilia‐ vored defeating Confederate armies while pro‐ tory policy toward southern civilians. Beginning tecting civilian property. However sound this was in the summer of 1862 they turned toward what in theory, Confederate guerrillas and, even more Grimsley has termed a more "pragmatic" ap‐ important, ordinary soldiers in the federal armies proach that included both confscation and eman‐ undermined the conciliatory policy. cipation. By 1864-65, this policy had given way to Enlisted men resented the defance of south‐ "hard war" based on the idea of demoralizing ern civilians, but Grimsley slights the theatrical aspects of many confrontations. One wonders H-Net Reviews how many privates were shocked or surprised by freely, and in the East, John Pope's notorious or‐ the attitudes of southern civilians, and although ders seemed to justify a new and harsher kind of ofcers may have tired of stock acts of defance by war. "secesh females," they often found them amusing But here Grimsley masterfully weighs contra‐ if not charming. Grant and other commanders, dictory evidence to draw ingenious conclusions. however, had to wrestle with the consequences The northern public appeared satisfed that arising from civilian encouragement of guerrilla Pope's orders had been issued and did not seem to depredations and with the difculties of distin‐ care that they were not carried out. And the sol‐ guishing between loyal, actively disloyal, and pas‐ diers themselves often remained ambivalent sively disloyal southern whites. The result was a about pillaging. The Emancipation Proclamation pragmatic policy (followed even by the notorious marked the abandonment of conciliation as a pol‐ Benjamin F. Butler in New Orleans) designed to icy even though conservative attitudes hardly dis‐ keep civilians out of the war while punishing appeared. Ofcers remained reluctant to encour‐ open acts of resistance. age unrestricted plundering, but ofcially sanc‐ To Grimsley's credit, he examines the evolu‐ tioned foraging spread rapidly. As Grimsley notes, tion of northern policy in all the major theaters the seizure of civilian property often grew out of and usually notes exceptions to these general pat‐ logistical necessity as federal armies penetrated terns of conduct. Early in 1862 when the concilia‐ deeper and deeper into hostile territory. Union tory approach still prevailed, for instance, a commanders also increasingly held Confederate brigade in Ambrose E. Burnside's army set fre to civilians accountable for guerrilla raids. The gen‐ the town of Winton, North Carolina. Likewise, erals tried to clear out the guerrillas so that con‐ Grimsley avoids playing of conservative generals ventional war could proceed and throughout 1863 against more radical ones to push his story relent‐ were quite ready to bring the war home to civil‐ lessly forward toward the inevitable adoption of ians. But even then restraint still often prevailed, more destructive practices. Thus, in Kentucky and though Grimsley stretches this insight to its break‐ Tennessee, Don Carlos Buell consistently tried to ing point by trying to ft Sherman's burning of conciliate southern civilians, but so did William T. Randolph, Tennessee, into this pattern of con‐ Sherman. trolled severity. Calls for the abandonment of such a cautious If historians have often oversimplifed the approach and for the adoption of both confsca‐ evolution of northern military policy, their analy‐ tion and emancipation intensifed as McClellan's sis of emancipation has been equally slipshod. army stalled on the Virginia Peninsula. At this Most military men regardless of rank tried to point, Grimsley might have explored an interest‐ avoid the slavery question and generally waited ing paradox in the Army of the Potomac: a body of for Lincoln to act. Indeed, pleas of military neces‐ soldiers who greatly admired McClellan but had sity, Grimsley contends, had little to do with the little use for his eforts to safeguard rebel proper‐ Emancipation Proclamation. The army remained ty. He presents considerable evidence showing deeply ambivalent, and aside from the eventual that McClellan's troops dismissed posting guards use of African-American troops, warring against for farms and plantations as nothing but foolish‐ slavery brought few immediate strategic advan‐ ness. That was "all played out," as they enjoyed tages. telling Confederate women who begged for spe‐ During the important campaigns of 1863, the cial protection. Western soldiers in particular, as Lincoln administration encouraged armies to live Grimsley observes, were eager to forage more of the land --especially in the western theater.
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The Vicksburg campaign marked a transition be‐ have been (and probably should have been) tween more pragmatic policies and "hard war." longer had he used this common soldier material Grant and Sherman authorized their soldiers to more frequently. In some theaters of the war and seize vitally needed supplies and at the same time for some periods treated in this book, the perspec‐ found it increasingly difcult to prevent wanton tive from the ranks mysteriously disappears. destruction. Building on the strategic insights of Grimsley recognizes inconsistencies and excep‐ Herman Hattaway and Archer Jones, Grimsley lo‐ tions even as he clearly outlines the evolution of cates the real and sustained appearance of "hard northern policy. He sometimes slights the impor‐ war" in the "raids" of the 1864-65 period. From tance of renegade behavior in various regiments Philip Sheridan in the Shenandoah Valley to Sher‐ (and even brigades) and no doubt pushes his ar‐ man's march through Georgia and the Carolinas, guments for restrained behavior too far. But these the destruction of civilian property became a le‐ faws are minor ones, and these rather specifc gitimate military objective quite apart from con‐ criticisms actually highlight the larger achieve‐ ventional battles. But even Sherman and Sheridan ments of this path-breaking study. Indeed, The issued orders against burning private homes, and Hard Hand of War along with Stephen Ash's ex‐ plantations were much more likely to be ran‐ cellent new book, When the Yankees Came: Con‐ sacked than small farms. Thus a kind of restraint fict and Chaos in the Occupied South, 1861-1865, based on a delicately balanced moral calculus per‐ should change both scholarly and popular con‐ sisted even in the midst of destructive raids that ceptions on several contentious issues. After read‐ demoralized Confederate civilians. Grimsley ar‐ ing Grimsley's book, modern war theorists, neo- gues that the politically sophisticated Union sol‐ Confederates, and students of the Civil War in diers could distinguish between various class of general should revise their shopworn notions southern civilians and generally targeted wealthy about "hard war." secessionists, but he also documents in a some‐ Copyright (c) 1996 by H-Net, all rights re‐ what contradictory fashion the Federals' often ex‐ served. This work may be copied for non-proft pressed contempt for poor whites. educational use if proper credit is given to the au‐ In examining the evolution of policy toward thor and the list. For other permission, please con‐ southern civilians, Grimsley ofers a closer read‐ tact [email protected]. ing of the pronouncements made by generals and politicians than any other historian. In nearly ev‐ ery chapter, his careful comparison of words with deeds shatters long cherished myths and assump‐ tions. But his revisionism is fair-minded, sensible, and readable; nor is it based on the all too com‐ mon practice of cannibalizing other scholars. Cre‐ ativity and judiciousness characterize the argu‐ ments. Comparative insights from both earlier and later wars provide a broad context; argu‐ ments grounded in "just war" and other philo‐ sophical traditions makes the analysis morally sensitive without being preachy. Grimsley inter‐ sperses his account of ofcial policy with percep‐ tive and fresh quotations from lower-ranking of‐ cers and enlisted men. In fact, the book might
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Citation: George C. Rable. Review of Grimsley, Mark. The Hard Hand of War: Union Military Policy toward Southern Civilians, 1861-1865. H-CivWar, H-Net Reviews. April, 1996.
URL: https://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=379
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