Residential Community Associations: Private Governments in the Intergovernmental System?

Members of the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (May 1989) Private Citizens Daniel J. Elazar, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania Robert B. Hawkins, Jr., Chrrirmnn, San Francisco, California Vacancy Members of the U.S. Senate Dave Durenberger, Minnesota Carl Levin, Michigan Charles S. Robb, Virginia Members of the U.S. House of Representatives Sander Levin, Michigan Larkin Smith, Mississippi Ted Weiss, New York Officers of the Executive Branch, U.S. Government Richard L. Thornburgh, Attorney General Vacancy Vacancy Governors John Ashcroft, Missouri George A. Sinner, North Dakota Vacancy Vacancy Mayors Donald M. Fraser, Minneapolis, Minnesota William H. Hudnut, 111, Indianapolis, Indiana Robert M. Isaac, Colorado Springs, Colorado Vacancy Members of State Legislatures John T. Bragg, Deputy Speaker, Tennessee House of Representatives David E. Nething, North Dakota Senate Ted Strickland, Colorado Senate Elected County Oficials Harvey Ruvin, Dade County, Florida, County Commission Sandra Smoley, Sacramento County, California, Board of Supervisors James J. Snyder, Cattaraugus County, New York, County Legislature Residential Community Associations: Private Governments in the Intergovernmental System? With Papers from a Policy Conference Sponsored by the U.S. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations Preface I This policy report is one in a series of publica- tions from a Commission project on "Rethinking Lo- cal Self-Government in a Federal System." Already published are The Organization ofLocul Public Econo- mies (1987), and Metropolitan Organization: The St. Louis Case (1988). A report on Allegheny County, Pennsylvania, will be published in the near future. Traditionally, the intergovernmental system has been thought to include the national government, state governments, and local governments of all kinds. This report suggests that the concept of intergovernmental relations should be adapted to con- temporary developments so as to take account of ter- ritorial community associations that display many, if not all, of the characteristics of traditional local government. Previous studies indicate that the vitality of local governance lies in part in the kind of diversity and dif- ferentiation among governments that can create op- portunities for genuine self-government in manage- able, human-scale communities. New participants enter the intergovernmental system each year. Every census of governments shows an increase in the num- bcr of municipalities and special districts serving citizens. This ever-growing intergovernmental family now should be seen as overlapping to some extent with residential community associations (RCAs). In this respect, RCAs are part of a growing phenome- non in American society: namely, the proliferation of organizations that lie within the border regions be- tween the public and private sectors. Established by deed covenants attached to real property, RCAs are mandatory membership associations consisting of homeowners in a subdivision or development. Although RCAs are private organizations, typically created by residential developers, they are beginning to play a role in the intergovernmental system because, like local governments, they provide quasi-public services, levy mandatory fees, and regulate resident behavior (sometimes in far greater detail than local government). Because of their func- tions, RCAs, like local governments. develop rela- tionships with neighboring local governments and the state. In addition, KCAs often provide innovative op- portunitics for local self-government on a human scale. RCAs can generate important benefits for their members, for developers, for local governments, and for the community as a whole. RCA members often benefit from steady or increasing home values cre- tute for local government service provision. Yet rela- ated by the land-use restrictions in their communi- tively little is known about their service provision ac- ties. In addition, RCAs often provide their members tivities or how they influence local government. with a wide range of services that are not available RCAs also raise intergovernmental questions re- from local government or that supplement the serv- garding citizenship and governance. RCA member- ices provided by local government. Builders are ship implies very different rights, privileges and obli- benefited by being able to provide more attractive gations than public citizenship. Yet the differences and marketable homes in a stable, livable environ- are not known to most of the public. Indeed, many ment, often at cost savings to both the developer and homeowners appear to be unaware of the implica- the purchaser. Local governments benefit by obtain- tions of living in an RCA community. ing development that is self-financing, features desir- Finally, RCAs pose questions regarding finance able amenities, and adds to the local tax base. The and taxation. RCAs embody the principle of fiscal community as a whole benefits from RCAs through equivalence-you get what you pay for and you pay the increased range of housing choices available to for what you get. By funding their own services potential home buyers. through dues and special assessments, RCA mem- The number of RCAs has exploded during the bers retain exclusive rights to use amenities, such as last 30 years. Informed observers estimate that there swimming pools, tennis courts, play areas, and club are as many as 130,000 RCAs in the United States to- houses, which often are not available in other com- day, compared to fewer than 5,000 in 1960. Much of munities. At the same time, because the RCAs self- this growth results from the dramatic increase in finance many services. members are beginning to call planned unit development (PUD) zoning and condo- on local government for tax consideration. minium ownership projects. Strong proponents of RCAs argue that they pro- Because RCAs are private organizations, they vide for incrcased local self-determination and com- generally have not been recognized as participants in munity control, greater economic efficiency in land the intergovernmental system. Indeed, RCAs cannot use, more efficient and responsive service provision, be regarded as local governments in the same sense more stable neighborhood land values, and more at- as a municipality. Nonetheless, the development of tractive residential neighborhoods. RCAs does raise intergovernmental concerns, par- Critics of RCAs say that many homeowners do ticularly with regard to service provision, citizenship not understand the implications of living in an RCA and governance, and finances and taxation. community and are unprepared for community con- RCAs constitute a privately organized unit for trol, that RCAs do not, in fact, expand consumer the provision of local public services. In recent years, choice, that RCAs can reduce the efficiency of land there has been a major shift in thinking about pat- markets, that their regulations can be excessive, and terns of organization of local government, particu- that RCA service costs may prove a burden to mem- larly with regard to the delivery of services. A new bers, particularly those with moderate or stable in- consensus may be emerging around the idea that a comes. Indeed, critics argue that RCAs raise a num- multiplicity of local governments constitutes a "local ber of important questions for the intergovernmental public economy" for service delivery, which consists system, including the role of local government in of a "provision side" and a "production side." Briefly, regulating these organizations, the extent of tax con- the provision side refers to making arrangements for sideration RCAs may be due, the degree to which the supply of services, and the production side refers RCAs lower the cost of public services for local gov- to creating service outputs. ernment, and the extent to which failed RCAs be- RCAs are clearly provision units in that they de- come a burden on the public sector. cide (1) what goods and services to provide their RCAs, therefore, have a partial role in the inter- members, and their quantity and quality; (2) what private activities to regulate, and the type and degree of governmental system. To explore this role more fully, regulation; (3) the amount of revenue to raise, and the ACIR sponsored a conference in June 1988 and how to raise it; and (4) how to arrange for the produc- conducted a nationwide survey of RCAs in coopera- tion of goods and services. tion with the Community Associations Institute In determining what goods and services to pro- (CAI). This publication reflects the results of those vide, an RCA may decide, for example, to build a ten- activities. We hope it will begin a dialogue on the role nis court. An RCA may decide to regulate private ac- of RCAs in the intergovernmental system. It will be tivities, such as the keeping of pets. An RCA raises followed by another publication, a practical guide to revenue through association fees and special assess- public officials answering the most common ques- ments. An RCA makes decisions about service quan- tions officials ask about RCAs. tity and quality, as when it contracts for snow removal The Findings and Recommendations in this re- and street repair. Finally, an RCA decides how to port were adopted by the Commission at its meeting make arrangements for the production of goods and on September 16, 1988. services, often through contracts with private compa- nies or agreements with local government. The existence of RCAs as community

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