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Power, Religion and Terror in Indonesia the Religion Article > Research & Reports continued from page 23 > resulting in the preservation of the orig- the crucial articles, including, of course, inal Article 29. The PBB and PDU fac- Power, Religion and Terror in Indonesia the religion article. No agreement was tions and some Islamic parties and reached except that, as far as possible, movements vowed to continue their Why has there been so much conflict and violence in Indonesia over the past few years? A deadlock should be avoided at the annu- struggle into the future. Research > deceptively simple answer is that Indonesia has been experiencing intense power struggles al session. Both Islamic and secular This was not the first taste of failure Southeast Asia since the demise of former President Suharto. Conflict in Indonesia is often related to parties formulated alternative amend- for the proponents of Islamic sharia in power. Just as conflict is extremely diverse, power, too, has many meanings and many ments to the religion article before the Indonesia. The seven words of the Jakar- manifestations in Indonesian society. Conflict over power does not necessarily result in annual session. ta Charter, issued on 22 June 1945, were violence, let alone in an epidemic of bloodshed. Moreover, power conflicts are not the cause then ‘amended’ because of the protest of all violence. However, this study explores the hypothesis that particular conceptions, Article 29: 1 of the ‘people of the Eastern Part of symbols, institutionalizations, and concrete practices of power, play a major role in the Alternative one: The state is based upon Indonesia’. In the Constituent Assem- generation and suppression of violence in Indonesia. the belief in one God (original text). bly between 1956 and 1959, the debate Alternative two: The state is based upon about Islamic sharia reoccurred. By Bernard Adeney-Risakotta defined as: modernity, religion, and the culture of the ances- the belief in one God with the obligation Sukarno, however, issued a presidential tors. Through my work I investigate how each of these sym- to implement Islamic sharia for the decree in 1959 declaring, inter alia, the ince the Bali terrorist bombs of 12 October 2002, a great bol systems generates or controls power, and how they adherents of the religion. re-establishment of Pancasila and the Sdeal of attention has been focused on the connection become enmeshed in violence. Alternative three: The state is based 1945 Constitution. The discussion on between religion and violence. Religion is a powerful force in Indonesians cannot be divided into three groups: those upon the belief in one God with the Islamic sharia and the Jakarta Charter Indonesia and has played a part in much of the violence, as who are modern, religious, or traditional. All Indonesians obligation to implement religious was then officially closed. Finally, dur- well as in attempts to stop it. Over the past four years, terror are modern in the sense that they are shaped by modern insti- teachings for the adherents of each reli- ing the New Order, Suharto issued Law has become ubiquitous in Indonesian society and frequently tutions, ideas, and practices. The remotest farmer knows the gion. No. 8 of 1985 on mass organizations, linked to religious communities. However, religion is never exchange rate of the dollar and depends on globally deter- The proponents of the Jakarta Char- disallowing Islamic sharia and other an autonomous force that acts independently from other fac- mined prices, modern transportation, and modern ideals of ter supported the second alternative. non-Pancasila ideologies. tors. Religion is integral to power in Indonesia, both in its pos- progress, education, and rights. Similarly, all Indonesians The reformation faction supported the itive and negative manifestations. Violent conflict in Indone- are religious. Religious institutions, ideas, and practices third alternative. Along with PDIP and sia is usually precipitated by political, economic, and social shape the identities and practices of all, not least of which Golkar, the PKB supported the original changes that are influenced by volatile tensions between tra- includes those who resist the dominant trends in religion. version. In the midst of the annual ses- ditional power structures, religious world views, and modern Equally, all Indonesians are shaped by the culture of their sion, anti- and pro-amendment move- institutions. Since virtually all Indonesians are religious, vio- ancestors. Culture is not a static, ancient set of ideas, prac- ments emerged inside and outside the lence often appeals to religion for justification. However, vio- tices, and institutions, but rather an evolving, dynamic power MPR. Anti-amendment forces outside lence also includes profound cultural elements that are embed- that determines the life style and perspective of all Indone- the MPR were spearheaded by retired ded in the traditions, stories, rituals, and adat (traditional law) sians. For example, of the three main institutions of law in military elites and PDIP members; institutions that are part of the identity of the people. Indonesia, secular, religious, and adat, the most powerful of inside the MPR, by PDIP legislators. It In so far as violence is connected with power (as opposed to the three is adat. I explore the thesis that the relationship appeared that the PDIP was conducting psychosis, rage, frustration, hatred, ideology, misunder- between these three distinct webs of meaning is a useful key a ‘politics of double faces’ with official 2002 August 7 , standing, principles, or more generalized social pathologies) for understanding how power operates in the society and how statements supporting amendment this study is motivated by the desire to understand how power violence is generated out of the tensions between all three. alongside unofficial pronouncements is generated and utilized in Indonesia. My theory suggests that Violence is not primarily caused by evil people, but rather by suggesting otherwise. Post Jakarta The a fundamental form of power lies within the people, as dis- conflict within and between three different kinds of struc- Outside the MPR, supporters of the ‘Rejecting the amendment = traitor of the tinct from the elite. Recent events demonstrate that great cre- tures of power. amendment demanded the inclusion nation.’ The pro-amendment movements out- ative and destructive potential is located within the people, During my past eleven years of teaching and research in of the seven words of the Jakarta Char- side the MPR building. whereas their leaders are generally impotent. Violence destroys Indonesia, I have also been formed by these three worlds of ter. Opposition to the idea also came power. ‘Violence can always destroy power; out of the barrel discourse. Most social scientific studies of Indonesian soci- from moderate Muslims, nationalists, The 2002 annual session of the MPR, of a gun grows the most effective command, resulting in the ety assume a fundamentally modern, Western epistemology and adherents of other religions. The which, it is expected, witnessed the last most instant and perfect obedience. What never can grow out in which the cultures, religions, politics, and history of latter argued that the religion article is of the constitutional amendments, of it is power’ (Arendt 1970:53). State use of violence in cer- Indonesia are viewed as objects to be studied that are fun- a national consensus that should not be showed the religion article to be the tain areas of Indonesia is always both an indication and cause damentally different, or even alien from the researcher. dominated by any particular religion. most controversial and sensitive in the of the weakness of the government in those same areas. The Anthropologists try to see the world ‘from the native’s point Nurcholish Madjid, a prominent Mus- Indonesian constitution. Any effort at more the state uses violence, the weaker the government. of view’, but that world remains eternally distant (Geertz lim thinker, said the inclusion of the Islamization (or ‘religionization’) of Arti- State violence may also destroy the power that lies in the 1976). Social science assumes a modern understanding of Jakarta Charter would allow the state to cle 29 would affect relations between people, especially if they respond with violence, as in Aceh, scientific knowledge, which takes culture and religion as intervene into religious space. For the religion and state, and between religions and for many years in East Timor. Yet, state violence can also objects of research. Even Indonesians are taught to radical- same reason, Nahdlatul Ulama and in the country. The adoption of the arti- galvanize the people’s power, especially if the people are uni- ly separate their culture and religion from modern modes of Muhammadiyah demanded the origi- cle would be deadly expensive, as the fied in non-violent resistance, as finally occurred in many scientific investigation. nal version of the religion article be plurality of Indonesian society and of parts of Indonesia, including East Timor. Governmental In contrast, this research project is written from within the maintained. Muslims themselves, many of whom power is dependent on the power that lies within the people. epistemological assumptions and perspectives of all three of Support for the amendment of Arti- rejected sectarianism and anti-plural- This approach distinguishes power from domination. I these different worlds of discourse. It is a modern analysis of cle 29 inside the MPR weakened before ism, would be at stake. The mainte- understand power as the ability of the people to achieve their Indonesian identity, power, and violence, which adopts many its discussion in Commission A, which nance of the religion article is, indeed, own goals (for better or worse). Government is a powerful Indonesian, religious, and cultural assumptions about the was responsible for the amendment of not the failure of Muslims in the coun- modern institution through which the people hope to achieve nature of reality. I argue for a new theory of power, which oper- this article.
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