Society – the decisive player in Ukrainian politics?

Grzegorz Gromadzki, Expert cooperating with the Institute of Public Affairs, Warsaw

Łukasz Wenerski, Analyst in the European Programme, Institute of Public Affairs, Warsaw

Society This study is first in a series of pol- The current political development icy briefs on Europe and its neigh- in shows that in 2014 this bours in the east and south. In this country is facing the most difficult

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series we will publish papers com- period in its history of being an in-

the decisive player in Ukrainian politics? missioned or produced by the Ber- dependent state, which began in telsmann Stiftung in the framework 1991. The authorities, which carry of its work in this field. This policy out anti-democratic actions, are de- brief is the product of the Bertels- termined to stay in power using all mann Stiftung’s cooperation with means possible to achieve their the Warsaw-based Institute of Pub- goal. Thus, the next few months will lic Affairs. The text was completed be a battle between the ruling elite on 17 of February 2014. and the political opposition. The main question is: what will the role Society – the decisive player in of society be, in particular its active Ukrainian politics? part, in this difficult and decisive pe- riod for the future of Ukraine? A The scale of the protests that short analysis of Ukrainian society started in November 2013 was a over the last 25 years and some re- surprise even for the most experi- flections on the current political sit- enced observers of Ukraine’s polit- uation are needed to answer this ical and social life. One might think question. that the disillusionment after the Policy Brief provoked grow- ing apathy in society, which wasn’t The phenomena of Ukrainian able to be as active as it was at the society end of 2004 and the beginning of 2005. Why did such an immense Ukrainian society is rather atypical eruption of protest explode in au- in comparison with the societies of tumn 2013? An answer should be many other post-Soviet countries. looked for in the current political sit- The political activity of Ukrainian uation as well as in deeper social society as a whole shouldn’t be and political processes that have overestimated, but in contrast to taken place in Ukraine over the last Russia and Belarus there is a sta- 25 years. It seems to be more and ble critical mass in Ukraine inter- more visible that society is becom- ested in and capable of significantly ing the decisive player in Ukrainian influencing the political situation, politics. One could say that this sometimes even decisively. This should be an obvious situation. It is doesn’t mean that there are no ac- evident in democratic countries, tive and politically motivated however, but not in many post-so- groups in Russian or Belarusian viet countries – Russia and Bela- society, although in the latter they rus, for instance. are very feeble and in the former they are growing but are still too

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Society weak and fragmented to decisively of the people supporters of democ- influence the political situation. One racy, while most of the people from of the reasons for this difference is other parts of Ukraine support a

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that the level of fear and apathy is democratic model for their country.

the decisive player in Ukrainian politics? much lower in Ukrainian society One can risk posing a thesis that than in Belarusian and Russian so- there is growing contradiction be- cieties. tween the expectations of society and the reality of the political sys- The foundations of Ukrainian soci- tem in Ukraine, which is becoming ety over the last two decades of an more and more autocratic. independent Ukraine is an ex- tremely interesting phenomenon. But it should be borne in mind that Society could not be founded on a President Yanukovych and the linguistic, religious, or ethnic basis Party of Regions are still supported as is too heterogeneous. It seems by a significant part of society in that the Ukrainians (the active part Eastern and Southern parts of of society) have become more and Ukraine. According to an opinion more of a political nation based on survey conducted by the Inter- opposition to the authoritarianism national Institute of Sociology in of the rulers, supporting more or November 2013, more than a quar- less European values and democ- ter (27%) of people in Eastern racy. The support for democracy in Ukraine and 21 per cent in South- Policy Brief Ukraine is not very high but much ern Ukraine claim that they will vote higher than the support for the au- for the Party of Region in the next thoritarian system. According to a elections to the Ukrainian parlia- public opinion survey conducted in ment. On the other hand, this party December 2013, 51 per cent of only has four per cent support in Ukrainians support democracy as Western Ukraine and 12 per cent in the best political system for their Central Ukraine.2 This is a sign of country while 21 per cent think that the old division between pro-Euro- autocracy is the best solution. The pean Western and Central Ukraine regional differences for the support and pro-Russian Eastern and of democracy are interesting: Southern Ukraine. However, it Western Ukraine – 77 per cent, should be noted that there are al- Southern Ukraine – 56 per cent, ready visible groups of pro-Euro- Central Ukraine – 52, Eastern pean orientation in Eastern and Ukraine – 36.1 Only in the Eastern Southern parts of Ukraine. There- part of Ukraine – the homeland of fore, one can say that this division Viktor Yanukovych and his Party of of Ukraine between West and cen- Regions – are less than 50 per cent tre on the one hand and East and

1 http://dif.org.ua/en/polls/2014_polls/ 2 http://www.kiis.com.ua/?lang=ukr&cat dva-misjaci-protestiv-v-ukraini-sho-dali_-- =reports&id=208&page=1 -zagalnonacionalne-opituvannja.htm

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Society South on the other, is a stable phe- A long tradition of protests’ nomenon but with slowly changing movements proportions in favour of pro-Euro-

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pean orientation. Research con- Maidan 2013-2014 can be in-

the decisive player in Ukrainian politics? ducted by the Institute of Public Af- scribed on the list of politically mo- fairs in the middle of 2013 shows tivated protests that have taken that in three out of four regions place in Ukraine in the last 25 (Western, Central, and Southern) years. However, it should be support for EU integration is higher strongly underlined that it is not than for the Customs Union with only the well-known Orange Revo- Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan. lution in 2004-2005 that has taken Only in Eastern Ukraine is the per- place before today’s Maidan. The centage of people willing to inte- list of politically motivated protests grate their country with the Cus- in Ukraine is much longer. toms Union higher than those who support EU integration of Ukraine. At the turn of the 21st century, Nevertheless, the scale of support Ukraine was shaken by massive makes a difference. The support in protests named the Ukraine With- favour of the EU is higher in West- out Kuchma movement. In 1999 ern and Central Ukraine than the Leonid Kuchma, the president of support in favour of the Customs Ukraine at the time, had won his Union in the East of Ukraine.3 second presidential election and Policy Brief was preparing to rule the country It is worth risking the thesis that for the next five years. Harsh eco- pro-European people are rather ac- nomic conditions radicalised the tive and future oriented, while the citizens’ attitude towards the au- pro-Russian (interested in integra- thorities, although this did not esca- tion with Russia, Belarus, and Ka- late into massive demonstrations. zakhstan) part of society is rather The turning point was provoked by passive and past-oriented. One the events of late 2000. In Septem- cannot imagine several hundred ber 2000, Georgiy Gongadze, co- thousands of protesters who would founder and editor of an online spontaneously gather to support in- Ukrainian newspaper Ukrainska tegration with Russia. But this is the Pravda, widely known as a tracer of reality in the case of the pro-Euro- corruption among the most promi- pean and pro-democratic manifes- nent oligarchs and politicians, also tations. from the presidential circle, disap- peared in Kyiv. His beheaded body was found the following November,

3 For complex results please read: J. Fom- der, available at: http://isp.org.pl/up- ina, J. Kucharczyk, J. Konieczna- loads/fi- Sałamatin, Ł. Wenerski, Poland – Ukraine, lemanager/pdf/Spojrzenieprzezgrani- Poles – Ukrainians. A look across the bor- cENGsummary.pdf

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Society and President Kuchma was ac- a massive protest and hunger cused of ordering Gongadze’s kid- strike by students and pupils, or- nap. In turn, this caused citizens to ganised in October 1990. The pro-

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become extremely angry at the testers only spent 16 days on the

the decisive player in Ukrainian politics? supposed ruthlessness and brutal- Square (now ity of the authorities, provoking Maidan of Independence) in Kyiv, people to take to the streets and where they installed a tent city, but start protesting. The first protests this had a crucial influence on fu- started in December 2000, with de- ture internal changes in Soviet monstrators demanding the resig- Ukraine. The aim of the action was nation of President Kuchma and a to reach the authorities of Soviet proper investigation into the Gon- Ukraine with demands including: gadze case. It soon turned into the re-election of the Verkhovna long-lasting campaign supported Rada based on a multi-party ap- by the opposition parties and stu- proach; the resignation of Leonid dents. There were tents on Maidan, Kuchma, who was at that time serv- people living on the main square – ing as the head of the Verkhovna a microscale of which is visible to- Rada, and Vitaly Masol, head of the day on “”. The peak of Council of Ministers of the Ukrain- the protests was on 9 March 2001 ian Communist Party of the Soviet

– the anniversary of Taras Union; nationalisation of the Com- Shevchenko’s birthday, when units munist Party property as well as as- Policy Brief of the most active demonstrators sets of the Komsol; ensuring that and riot police clashed. Protesters Ukrainian soldiers do their military stormed the building of the presi- service within Ukraine; and disa- dential administration and the Min- greement on signing the new istry of Interior, but without suc- agreement between the Soviet re- cess. Instead, participants were publics. Day by day, the students beaten and prosecuted. The scale gathered more support not only of the March action, and the brutal from their colleagues in the univer- repercussions led to decreasing sities and technical colleges, but support for the movement. Alt- also the wider support of citizens of hough the protest failed in the end, Kyiv. Demonstrations were also or- it can be treated as a trigger for ganised in other Ukrainian cities – crystallising new opposition lead- for example , Luhansk, and Do- ers, who would have played a deci- netsk. The authorities, rattled by sive role in the Orange Revolution.4 the situation and the rising anti- government mood, decided to con- Earlier still, in Soviet Ukraine, the sider the students’ demands. Alt- Revolution On Granite took place – hough in the end the demands

4 To learn more about the Ukraine With- out Kuchma movement please read: http://ukrainianweek.com/Politics/19091

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Society were introduced only partially, the examined to understand the cur- protest showed how great the po- rent political situation in Ukraine tential of civil society in Ukraine is. correctly.

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What is more, the Granite Revolu-

the decisive player in Ukrainian politics? tion was a first step towards adult Maidan was initiated and organised politics for politicians such as Oleg by the younger generation and rep- Tyahnybok and Yuri Lutsenko.5 resentatives of civil society as a manifestation of the pro-European The description of the above-men- aspirations of the protesters. They tioned protest doesn’t mean that were not interested in the participa- there is continuity from one protest tion of political parties in their pro- to another, as well as vivid con- test. The political opposition only sciousness and knowledge about joined the protest later and has these protests, particularly the stu- been represented by three political dents’ revolution in 1990, in Ukrain- leaders and their parties: Vitali ian society, especially among the Klitschko (UDAR), Arseniy younger generation today. But it Yatsenyuk (the Fatherland party of has to be underlined that all these Yulia Tymoshenko), and Oleh protests show a constant readiness Tyahnybok (Svoboda). The Or- of a significant part of the people of ange Revolution was a political

Ukraine to manifest their opposition movement from the beginning with to the undemocratic behaviour of an undisputed political leader – Policy Brief the authorities. Political forces in Viktor Yushchenko, who was the Ukraine, both the authorities and most important representative of opposition parties, have to take this the political opposition at the time. reality into account. It should be strongly underlined that anti-systemic elements absent in the Orange Revolution are visi- The differences between Maidan ble in Maidan. The current protest 2013-2014 and the Orange Revo- is against the ruling elite but also lution keeps a distance towards the oppo- sition parties. Both Maidan 2013-2014 and the Orange Revolution are examples of The Orange Revolution had a clear massive politically motivated pro- goal that might or might not have tests which gathered several hun- been achieved in a few weeks, dred thousand people in Kyiv and namely the re-run of the second provoked actions of support in round of the presidential elections many regions of Ukraine. But there in 2004, which was assessed as is a long list of differences between not-free and unfair not only by the these two protests that should be opposition and its supporters, but

5 To learn more about the Revolution On at: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v= Granite, a documentary film is available 7oDNuDSBaGo

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Society also by the West. In turn, Maidan or less ready for a compromise, had various goals, which have meaning the re-run of the second since changed, without a clear round of presidential elections.

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deadline. At the beginning it was a Now, the authorities have imitated

the decisive player in Ukrainian politics? protest against the decision of the real dialogue with the opposition, Ukrainian authorities that had re- which cannot in fact fully control jected the possibility of signing the Maidan’s actions and mood. There- Association Agreement with the EU fore, the Orange Revolution was a and an attempt to change their po- peaceful protest from the beginning sition. Then, after the Eastern Part- to the end, while Maidan has had a nership Summit in Vilnius (28-29 violent dimension. November 2013) and the brutal ac- tion of the riot militia (Berkut) The long duration of Maidan has against students on the night of 30 provoked its growing radicalism. A November 2013, a new wave of part of the protesters are against protest, which gathered several further negotiations with President hundred thousand people in Kyiv, Yanukovych and the ruling elite as has risen against the autocratic be- a whole. They support revolution- haviour of the authorities, and new ary changes. The Right Sector, a demands have emerged, namely coalition of far-right organisations the dismissal of the government with some of them perceived as and earlier parliamentary and pres- quasi-fascists militia, seems to rep- Policy Brief idential elections. For the protest- resent this group of protesters. This ers, the presidential elections new political movement is consid- scheduled for March 2015 are too ered an initiator of the fight against far ahead in the future. One cannot units of the Ukrainian police and imagine that the massive protest in special forces of the Berkut on 19 the centre of the Ukrainian capital January 2014 on Hrushevsky will last for more than a year, yet Street in Kyiv. The action of Janu- there is still no clear time frame- ary 19 resulted in an unbelievable work. increase in the recognition of the Right Sector. Just after the clash, The difference mentioned above is they had a dozen thousand follow- also an explanation of the differ- ers on the website VKontakte (the ence in the duration of these two Russian version of Facebook); on protests. The Orange Revolution Wednesday 22 January, this had only lasted about two months. Mai- increased to almost 52,000. What dan has already existed for almost needs to be emphasised is that three months. In the case of the Or- even if the general views of the ange Revolution one could see the Right Sector do not find much sup- relatively fast process of political port among society, in the current negotiations in which the authori- circumstances there is a significant ties and the opposition were more number of people who silently

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Society agree with their method of action. given the people of Ukraine a new These people are simply discour- weapon that was not available dur- aged with the ineffective talks com- ing the Orange Revolution and the

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ing out of Maidan; they are eager to other massive Ukrainian protests –

the decisive player in Ukrainian politics? see direct action and believe that a well developed social networks. physical clash is the only solution. Facebook, Twitter, online brands of the most prominent Ukrainian jour- It should be noted that there is gen- nals, as well as online TV channels erally a stronger presence of far- are readily available and Ukrainian right activists and the visibility of activists tend to exploit then in nationalist symbols in Maidan than every possible way. during the Orange Revolution. But this doesn’t mean that Maidan is a Facebook is the main source. It nationalist protest of extreme serves not only as an information forces, as is frequently described platform where the only thing you by the Ukrainian authorities. And have to do to follow the news about one has to understand that there Ukraine is to “like” the Facebook are significant differences between profiles of the best Ukrainian jour- far-right movements. On the one nals, thematic, or journalists’ pro- hand, Svoboda is treated by the file. Facebook is a place where

Right Sector as liberals and the people communicate their willing- systemic opposition, while on the ness to go out and protest with Policy Brief other, Svoboda is trying to show its each other, seek other people to human face and does not want its join them in protest, and give their activists to be engage in riots and own expression about what is go- be treated as a provocateur of ing on during day and night on Mai- clashes.6 dan. People organise themselves every time it is necessary via Face- And last, but certainly, not least, the book. They did so, for example, difference between the Orange during the the night of 11 Decem- Revolution and Maidan is the role ber 2013, when Ukrainian police of new technology and the growing and Berkut seemed to storm the use of the Internet. It is often noted Maidan – the action Everybody on that the Orange Revolution was the Maidan was spread so widely and first protest of the Internet era in effectively that people even started Ukraine. Maidan, however, is much to discuss who was driving from more deeply linked to new technol- what part of Kyiv and how many ogy than the Orange Revolution. people he/she could carry in his/her Progress in IT technology has car. One could even perceive the

6 http://gazeta.ua/ru/articles/politics/ http://www.nr2.ru/kiev/480770.html; _otvetstvennost-za-sobytiya-na-ulice- http://www.profi-forex.org/novosti- grushevskogo-vzyala-na-sebya mira/novosti-sng/ukraine/entry10 -organizaciya-pr/537135; 08195792.html

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Society Facebook announcement by Ukrainska Pravda journalist Mus- The year 2014 – society against tafa Nayem as a trigger for the en- the authorities and with the op-

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tire Euromaidan and the first pro- position?

the decisive player in Ukrainian politics? tests. It was Nayem who first pub- lished, just after Viktor Yanu- The situation in Ukraine is chang- kovych’s statement that Ukraine ing very quickly and is almost un- would not sign the Association predictable. One can, therefore, try Agreement, the announcement to to write many scenarios, but these take to the streets and start a pro- are just general remarks rather European demonstration.7 Anyone than scenarios. registered on Facebook can also follow Maidaners – a profile con- First, January 2014 has shown that taining the histories of ordinary the protests are not just limited to Ukrainians who have decided to Kyiv, but society is very active in take part in the protest on Inde- many Ukrainian regions manifest- pendence Square, and read about ing their anti-governmental posi- their feelings and motivations, etc.8 tion. This phenomenon has The profile was only available in changed the situation dramatically. Ukrainian at the beginning, but it is It seems that the protests outside now possible to follow it in English, Kyiv were decisive and saved Mai- Russian, Polish, and other lan- dan. The central authorities have Policy Brief guages. Online TV stations such as lost control or have limited control Hromadske.tv9 and Espreso.tv10 over one-third of the country. It will are also very interesting and im- be an extremely difficult for Yanu- portant sources of information. kovych to restore full control over these parts of Ukraine, especially It should also be strongly under- over Western Ukraine. It should be lined that the authorities don’t have strongly underlined that the author- the information advantage over so- ities and the opposition will not be ciety as they had in the past. This able to reach a political solution phenomenon changes the situation without society and its acceptance, dramatically in comparison with the as ignoring society will lead to more pre-IT technology era. protests, which could become un- controllable. It seems that both the ruling elite, part of it at least, and the main opposition forces under- stand this danger more and more.

7 To learn more watch an interview with 8To learn more about Maidaners visit: Mustafa Nayem at: http://video.or- www.facebook.com/maidaners ange.mu/news/the-interview-mustafa- 9 http://hromadske.tv/ nayem-ukrainian-journalist-and-activist- 10 http://espreso.tv/ 2/

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Society Third, the authorities can only mo- Second, actions undertaken by the bilise people from Donbas (the Do- authorities, President Yanukovych, netsk and Luhansk regions) and

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and the government after the be- Crimea against pro-European and

the decisive player in Ukrainian politics? ginning of Maidan in November pro-democratic protesters, but 2013 can be assessed as a long list even in these regions a vivid reac- of enormous mistakes that pro- tion of the inhabitants as a whole voked the escalation of the protests cannot be expected. However, they and tension in society. The ruling can provoke resentment between elite would like to govern Ukraine Western and Central Ukraine on as a whole, just like they ruled Don- the one hand, and Eastern and bas from the 1990s (Yanukovych Southern Ukraine on the other. Ir- was appointed governor of Donetsk respective of their political position, oblast in 1997), but this is simply West Ukrainians could be por- impossible as people in many other trayed as nationalists, fascists, and parts of Ukraine, not only in West- extremists. ern regions, are strongly against the bandit methods used by the Fourth, cooperation between civil current authorities. The authorities society, the younger generation on would like to impose fear as a tool the one hand and the political op- to pacify society, although this will position and its leaders on the certainly not work. What it shows is other, will be one of the most diffi- Policy Brief that the ruling elite is not able to un- cult challenges, especially if the derstand the mood and position of protests are prolonged due to a the majority of Ukrainian society lack of solution at the political level. and want to impose methods used The anti-systemic dimension of by the Russian or Belarusian au- Maidan will probably still exist in the thorities. They don’t understand the subsequent months and could basic rules of democracy and want even grow. This would create neg- to stay in power forever. Thus, they ative circumstances for both the are anachronistic in comparison to political opposition and society. the growing number of Ukrainians. This creates even more trouble for Fifth, the problems in relations be- Ukraine, as the ruling elite (at least tween the political opposition as a the hawks among them) cannot whole and the protesters (the think about a compromise. But it younger generation, representa- doesn’t mean that they cannot win tives of civil society) could provoke and overcome society’s aspira- tension between the three main po- tions, although it seems that they litical leaders and parties. Serious are not able pacify society for a quarrels between opposition lead- long time, and further protests will ers are possible in the upcoming later erupt. months.

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Society Finally, the far-right movement, the Right Sector, will still be visible but cannot achieve much more support

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in Ukrainian society. However, their

the decisive player in Ukrainian politics? visibility could spoil the opposition’s image inside and outside Ukraine. This is certainly a very important challenge for the pro-democratic and pro-European forces in Ukrain- ian society. Nevertheless, despite the radicalism, Maidan in Kyiv and the manifestations in other Ukrain- ian cities have been the protests of the pro-democratic and pro-Euro- pean part of Ukrainian society against the authoritarianism of the authorities.

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Taking into account the growing role of society in the political pro- Policy Brief cess in Ukraine, EU proposals for this country should be oriented not only towards the political opposition and the authorities, but more and more towards society. European Union support for the pro-European part of Ukrainian society should first of all include a clear statement on Ukraine’s European aspirations according to article 49 of the Treaty on the European Union. The EU should make a political statement that a visa free regime for Ukraini- ans will be introduced when the Ukrainian authorities fulfil the obli- gations of the Visa Liberalisation Action Plan. These two statements would enormously increase the EU’s credibility in the eyes of Ukrainian society.

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