DOCSLIB.ORG

Political Marketing

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Political Marketing http://www.diva-portal.org Postprint This is the accepted version of a paper published in Journal of Political Marketing. This paper has been peer-reviewed but does not include the final publisher proof-corrections or journal pagination. Citation for the original published paper (version of record): Simons, G. (2016) Stability and Change in Putin's Political Imageduring the 2000 and 2012 Presidential Elections: Putin 1.0 and Putin 2.0?. Journal of Political Marketing http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/15377857.2016.1151114 Access to the published version may require subscription. N.B. When citing this work, cite the original published paper. This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of Political Marketing on 16 Feb 2016, available online: http:// wwww.tandfonline.com/10.1080/15377857.2016.1151114 Permanent link to this version: http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-277000 Journal of Political Marketing ISSN: 1537-7857 (Print) 1537-7865 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/wplm20 Stability and Change in Putin's Political Image during the 2000 and 2012 Presidential Elections: Putin 1.0 and Putin 2.0? Greg Simons To cite this article: Greg Simons (2016): Stability and Change in Putin's Political Image during the 2000 and 2012 Presidential Elections: Putin 1.0 and Putin 2.0?, Journal of Political Marketing, DOI: 10.1080/15377857.2016.1151114 To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/15377857.2016.1151114 Accepted author version posted online: 16 Feb 2016. Submit your article to this journal View related articles View Crossmark data Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at http://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=wplm20 Download by: [Uppsala universitetsbibliotek] Date: 16 February 2016, At: 22:58 Stability and Change in Putin’s Political Image During the 2000 and 2012 Presidential Elections: Putin 1.0 and Putin 2.0? Greg Simons Swedish National Defence College and Uppsala University, Sweden Address correspondence to Greg Simons. Abstract There has been a lot of research done on ‘Western’ politicians and the political systems with regards to political marketing. But what about other countries, and especially those that possess a different political standard? This article seeks to address one particular Russian politician – Vladimir Putin. He rose from obscurity to become Russia’s second president (after Boris Yeltsin). Two presidential elections form the focus of attention, 2000 and 2012. The aim is to try and discover the consistencies and breaks in the manufacturing of Putin’s political image and Downloaded by [Uppsala universitetsbibliotek] at 22:58 16 February 2016 reputation. A number of breaks and continuities were discovered in terms of how Putin is marketed. This seems to be a reflection of the changes taking places in Russia’s political environment, which then needs to be taken into consideration when political marketing is conducted. Keywords: political image, political reputation management, President Vladimir Putin, presidential elections, Russia 1 INTRODUCTION Political marketing is becoming an essential tool in politics around the globe. It is an indispensable informational tool to present the image and reputation of political figures to the general public. Understanding how this is achieved is an important skill in understanding or at least trying to make sense of the formalities of a democratic system, especially when political marketing is combined with elections. In spite of arguments concerning the level of democracy in Russia (the strength and viability), it does hold elections, which heightens political competition and risk, and the search for a competitive edge over rivals. This paper shall look at and analyse the aspects of consistency and change in the projected political image of Vladimir Putin from his first presidential election campaign in the year 2000 with his most recent election campaign for the 2012 election. A fundamental question shall be analysed in the paper: does a Putin 1.0 and 2.0 exist or not? Political marketing shall be used as the lens with which to view and to make sense of the collected empirical material. In the first election campaign Putin was an unknown figure thrust in to the public light at the end of President Boris Yeltsin’s chaotic rule. What were the projected images of this new comer to Russian politics, and how did these connect with public expectations/hopes? How did he Downloaded by [Uppsala universitetsbibliotek] at 22:58 16 February 2016 interact with the Russian public and what were the narratives and slogans he used to carry his message? By 2012, Putin was a well-established figure in Russian politics. He had served two terms as President and one term as Prime Minister. Yet there were some new challenges to face when he ran for office in the presidential elections, not least of which was the growing voice of political protest in major urban areas. Additionally, he now had a legacy as a political figure, which included 2 his serving eight years as President of Russia. The results were mixed, carrying different meaning for different groups; the decrease in the level of individual freedoms versus a stronger and more assertive Russia on the international stage. POLITICAL MARKETING Before moving to the subject of political marketing, it is necessary to differentiate between two broad categories within the sphere of marketing in general. The first category is transaction marketing, which focuses upon singular purchases and does not build a relationship with its audience. In this scenario, the communicator tries to win the target audience over repeatedly, without regard to any previous contact and/or transactions. The other category is relationship marketing, within the Nordic School the customer is seen as an active participant in the process and a potential adder of value. Thus the communicator and the audience have a joint responsibility for the final result (Johansen 2005, 88). The distinction between transaction marketing and relationship marketing is the later centres on value creation and not solely value distribution of the former. “Products are only facilitators of value. Instead, value for customers is created through the relationship and interactions between the customer and service provider” (Johansen 2005, 88). Thus, for the Downloaded by [Uppsala universitetsbibliotek] at 22:58 16 February 2016 purposes of this article, relationship marketing provides a more appropriate variant for understanding the process of communications between domestic audiences and Vladimir Putin. As an initial point of departure, stock needs to be taken of the current debate and understanding of political marketing. There is an inconclusive debate as to whether political marketing is something new or that has existed for some time. Arguments by scholars are divided on the issue. However, what is clear is that political marketing has become an integral part of the 3 political process only recently (since the 1990s) (Wring 1997; Egan 1999; Henneberg and O’Shaughnessy 2007). The discipline is linked to the issue of electioneering, and there has been criticism of the role played by political marketing in the process. One of the primary concerns is the belief that it “is responsible for reducing important messages to glib phrases or soundbites and, potentially, removing rationality from the electorates’ decision-making” However, Egan argues that “successful politicians have always recognised the importance of image over issues” (Egan 1999, 496; Henneberg 2004, 229). Therefore, the situation is dependent upon the perception of the images and the rhetoric, rather than the substance. An example of a definition that is used within political marketing is provided by Wring (1997, 653), who conceives it as “the party or candidate’s use of opinion research and environmental analysis to produce and promote a competitive offering which will help realise organisational aims and satisfy groups of electors in exchange for their votes.” The hook for the communicator is to create something that is attention grabbing, and then draws the audience in to a relationship with the messenger. From an organisational perspective, with the focus being on the audience where the central significance of intellectual capital being a major asset is stressed on a continuous basis, means that a strong organisation should be a decentralised one that is in close proximity to the market. In Downloaded by [Uppsala universitetsbibliotek] at 22:58 16 February 2016 doing so, this brings the audience closer to the ‘production process’ and shall determine the success or otherwise, of the communication (in meeting organisational objectives) (Johansen 2005, 91). In some regards, political marketing is an attempt to project belief to the voting public in the politician’s or political party’s ability to govern (by creating the image of competence and trustworthiness – highlighting intangible assets), something that is emotive in nature and not a clear cut policy platform, but there is a need to remove the perception of risk among sceptical 4 target audiences’ (O’Shaughnessy 2001, 1048; Butler and Collins 1994, 20). Certain issues come to the fore during periods of political tension (such as during elections), which is tailored to the public’s perception in its value symbolism (O’Shaughnessy 2001, 1050; Lock and Harris 1996, 17). One of the mechanisms that are used to highlight key issues is language. However, whilst language is a good tool for directing perception it simultaneously limits it (O’Shaughnessy 2001, 1056) by narrowing the perceived choices in options and opinions. Indeed, politicians and political parties attempt to ‘brand’ policies and ideas, then they try to create barriers in order to ‘own’ certain issues (Butler and Collins 1994, 22). This is a means to try and lever the perception of political product differentiation in order to increase the attractiveness and distinctiveness of the political brand to the electorate.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Russian Public Opinion and the Two Chechen Wars, 1994-1996 and 1999-2002: Formation and Evolution
    Russian Public Opinion and the Two Chechen Wars, 1994-1996 and 1999-2002: Formation and Evolution A PhD Thesis By: Jason Clinton Vaughn School of Slavonic and East European Studies University College London Supervisor: Dr. Peter J. S. Duncan Secondary Supervisors: Dr. Andrew Wilson Dr. Vesna Popovski 1 UMI Number: U592450 All rights reserved INFORMATION TO ALL USERS The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion. Dissertation Publishing UMI U592450 Published by ProQuest LLC 2013. Copyright in the Dissertation held by the Author. Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC. All rights reserved. This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code. ProQuest LLC 789 East Eisenhower Parkway P.O. Box 1346 Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346 I declare that the work presented in this thesis is my own. Jason Clinton Vaughn 2 Acknowledgments: In the production of this thesis, I would firstly like to thank my parents for all of their support over the years. Much appreciation goes to my supervisor, Dr. Peter Duncan for having so much patience in reading through all the drafts of this thesis. Also, I would like to thank Professors Martyn Rady and Trevor Thomas for reading sections (and, on occasion, the entirety) of my drafts and giving their advice over the course of my writing. Thanks to Nadezhda Stoyanova for helping me to translate and sift through so much Russian language material and for always being there with a vote of confidence and support.
    [Show full text]
  • A Threat to National Security
    ILYA YASHIN A THREAT TO NATIONAL SECURITY AN INDEPENDENT EXPERT REPORT 1 Ilya Yashin, the author of “Threat to National Security,” says the goal of his report about the Chechen IN troduction..................................................................................................................................2 President is “to open Russian society’s eyes to the fact that Ramzan Kadyrov, with the connivance of the country’s authorities and secret services, has become a figure that CHAPTER 1. RAGS TO RICHES.........................................................................................4 poses a threat to Russia’s national security.” His report 1.1 ETHNIC CLEANSING tells about the regime established by Ramzan Kadyrov in Chechnya, reveals his crimes and corrupt schemes and 1.2 THE FIRST CHECHEN WAR shows how he impacts the current Russian political system. 1.3 SWITCHING SIDES TO JOIN THE FEDERAL FORCES We believe that Ramzan Kadyrov is not only Russia’s 1.4 THE ASSASSINATION OF AKHMAD KADYROV internal threat – he has definitely become a global danger. 1.5 THE POweR STRUGGLE IN CHECHNYA Kadyrov is known not only by his public intimidation of Russian pro-democracy opposition leaders, human rights CHAPTER 2. THE CHECHEN KHANATE...............................................................12 activists and journalists, he’s also known for his countless violations of freedoms and human rights in his republic. CONTENTS 2.1 THE REGIME OF PERSONAL POweR There are not only suspicions, but also clear traces, of his 2.2 ARMING THE UNDERGROUND involvement in the assassinations of Anna Politkovskaya, Natalia Estemirova and Boris Nemtsov. There are also 2.3 KADYROV AND ISLAM known cases when Kadyrov’s opponents were murdered 2.4 RAMZAN’S CULT OF PERSONALITY not only outside Chechnya, but also outside of Russia.
    [Show full text]
  • Corruption of the Fourth Power: the Decline of the Russian Media
    Corruption of the Fourth Power: The Decline of the Russian Media Olga Khvostunova, Ph.D. Visiting Scholar Harriman Institute, Columbia University Abstract Independent and free media are among the key instruments in fighting corruption. But in today’s Russia this instrument itself has been corrupted and misused. Russian government has deliberately taken control over the major national media outlets, including TV channels, radio stations, print press, and some internet resources. Only few publications remain free and are able to fulfill their duties. As competition on the global media market becomes fiercer, traditional media in all the countries are looking for new ways of surviving and are becoming more susceptible to corruption. The problem is universal, but in case of Russia it is aggravated by Vladimir Putin’s corrupt political regime. Corruption has poisoned Russian media on both levels— institutional and individual. The objectives of this research are: to investigate main methods of corrupting the media and the journalists that the Russian government has employed; to trace the effects such a corruption can have on media content and, as a result, on public opinion; and to see whether the few free media can contribute into overcoming this negative trend. The research framework Ten years ago, corruption as a subject of study was quite a small field. Today, numerous academic and media articles on the issue are being published almost daily. The research field on corruption has expanded, and this trend reflects growing public concern for the effects that corruption has on people’s lives. Another reason for the growing interest is development of the new media (mostly, internet) that allowed for better access to information and data exchange and, therefore, led to a greater awareness of the scale of the problem.
    [Show full text]
  • Ideology, Image-Making and the Media in Putin's Russia
    Ideology, Image-making and the Media in Putin's Russia. A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF PhD IN RUSSIAN IN THE UNIVERSITY OF CANTERBURY BY GREGORY J. SIMONS University of Canterbury 2004 L ?_(:1t l )t INDEX. LIST OF ABREVIATIONS ... v GLOSSARY ... VI ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ... Vll ABSTRACT ... Vll INTRODUCTION. ... 1 CHAPTER 0: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE THESIS. 0.0 Chapter Objectives ... 14 0.1 Media Theory ... 14 0.1.1 The Significance of the Mass Media ... 14 0.1.2 Social Functions of the Media ... 15 0.1.3 Requirements for Freedom of the Press ... 16 0.1.4 Political Communication ... 17 0.2 Critical Theory ... 20 0.3 Semiotics ... 22 0.4 Ideology ... 23 0.5 Jean Baudrillard' s Theories of Simulation and Simulacra ... 27 0.6 Image Theory ... 30 0.7 TV and Power ... 32 0.8 Making the News ... 36 0.9 Chapter Summary ... 39 CHAPTER I: VLADIMIR PUTIN AND THE DEBATE ON THE EMERGENCE OF CULT OF PERSONALITY. 1.0 Chapter Objectives. ...41 1.1 Definition of Cult of Personality. .. 42 I 1.2 Cult of Personality in the Soviet Union. ... 45 1.3 Does a 'Cult of Putin' Really Exist? ... 49 1.3.1 Creating Putin. ... 50 1.3.2 Creating an 'Acceptable' Public Personality. ... 51 1.3.3 Reinforcing the Image. ... 52 1.3.4 Putin's Initial Public Profile: A Summary. ... 59 1.3.5 Putin: The Passionate Lover of Literature. ... 60 1.3.6 Putin For Sale: The Industry Dealing in Putin Paraphernalia. ... 61 1.3.7 Cultural Putin: Art and Culture Dedicated to Putin.
    [Show full text]
  • Doctoral Dissertation Russia's Nationalist-Patriotic Opposition
    Autonomous University of Barcelona Faculty of Political Science and Sociology Department of Public Law and Legal History Studies PhD Program in International Relations and European Integration Doctoral Dissertation Russia's Nationalist-Patriotic Opposition: The Shifting Politics of Right-Wing Contention in Post-Communist Transition Author Supervisor Sofia Tipaldou Dr. Francesc Serra Massansalvador Barcelona, June 2015 Table of Contents List of Abbreviations............................................................................................................................6 Abstract.................................................................................................................................................8 Abstract (en castellano)........................................................................................................................9 Acknowledgements............................................................................................................................10 1. Introduction....................................................................................................................................11 1.1. The puzzle...............................................................................................................................11 1.2. The outcome variables: emergence and organizational change of the Russian nationalist- patriotic movement........................................................................................................................13 1.3.
    [Show full text]
  • Russia – Nash Dom Rossiya – URP – Political Violence – Regional Elections – Nizhniy Novgorod
    Refugee Review Tribunal AUSTRALIA RRT RESEARCH RESPONSE Research Response Number: RUS17643 Country: Russia Date: 8 November 2005 Keywords: Russia – Nash Dom Rossiya – URP – Political violence – Regional elections – Nizhniy Novgorod This response was prepared by the Country Research Section of the Refugee Review Tribunal (RRT) after researching publicly accessible information currently available to the RRT within time constraints. This response is not, and does not purport to be, conclusive as to the merit of any particular claim to refugee status or asylum. Questions Please provide information on the following: 1. The current position of Nash Dom Rossiya, the URP and Edinaya Rossiya; 2. The nature and extent of political violence associated with the 1999 and 2003 elections; 3. Whether regional governors were dismissed in 2004; 4. Whether gubernatorial elections were proposed for 2005; 5. Current treatment of supporters of Nash Dom Rossiya / URP by the Russian government and supporters of other political parties; 6. Information on future gubernatorial elections in Nizhnenovogorod. RESPONSE Please provide information on the following: 1. The current position of Nash Dom Rossiya, the URP and Edinaya Rossiya. Nash Dom Rossiya/Our Home is Russia The sources consulted indicate that Nash Dom Rossiya or Our Home is Russia was disbanded in 2000-2001 and its members absorbed into Unity, which later became United Russia (see below for information on United Russia). The entry in Political Handbook of the World 2000-2002 states: Our Home is Russia (Nash Dom-Rossiya-NDR).The center-right NDR was launched in May 1995 to provide a party base for Prime Minister Viktor Chermomydin and his program of measured economic reform.
    [Show full text]
  • Russian Nuclear Weapons: Past, Present, and Future
    Russian Nuclear Weapons Russian Nuclear Weapons: Past, Present, : Past, AND future Present, And U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE Stephen J. Blank Editor Future Stephen J. Blank Editor U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE This Publication SSI Website USAWC Website Visit our website for other free publication downloads http://www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil/ To rate this publication click here. Strategic Studies Institute Book RUSSIAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS: PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE Stephen J. Blank Editor November 2011 The views expressed in this report are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the -De partment of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. Authors of Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) publica- tions enjoy full academic freedom, provided they do not disclose classified information, jeopardize operations security, or mis- represent official U.S. policy. Such academic freedom empow- ers them to offer new and sometimes controversial perspectives in the interest of furthering debate on key issues. This report is cleared for public release; distribution is unlimited. ***** This publication is subject to Title 17, United States Code, Sec- tions 101 and 105. It is in the public domain and may not be copy- righted. ***** Comments pertaining to this report are invited and should be forwarded to: Director, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 632 Wright Ave, Carlisle, PA 17013-5046. ***** All Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) publications may be downloaded free of charge from the SSI website. Hard copies of this report may also be obtained free of charge while supplies last by placing an order on the SSI website.
    [Show full text]
  • The Russian Anti-Corruption Campaign: Public Relations, Politics Or Substantive Change? Ethan S
    Georgetown University Law Center Scholarship @ GEORGETOWN LAW 2010 The Russian Anti-Corruption Campaign: Public Relations, Politics or Substantive Change? Ethan S. Burger Georgetown University Law Center, esb34@law.georgetown.edu Rosalia Gitau New York University School of Law Prepared as a discussion paper in connection with a presentation given on March 4, 2010 at Columbia University’s Harriman Institute, 420 West 118th Street, New York, NY 10027, http://www.harrimaninstitute.org/. The uthora s wish to thank Timothy Frye for providing a forum to discuss the ideas contained in this paper with the Columbia community. This paper can be downloaded free of charge from: http://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/fwps_papers/126 This open-access article is brought to you by the Georgetown Law Library. Posted with permission of the author. Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/fwps_papers Part of the International Law Commons, and the Politics Commons GEORGETOWN LAW Faculty Working Papers March 2010 Georgetown Public Law Research Paper No. 10-13 The Russian Anti-Corruption Campaign: Public Relations, Politics or Substantive Change?* Ethan S. Burger Rosalia Gitau Adjunct Professor of Law J.D. New York University Georgetown University Law Center School of Law esb34@law.georgetown.edu rosaliagitau@nyu.edu This paper can be downloaded without charge from: Scholarly Commons: http://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/fwps_papers/126/ SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1569712 Posted with permission of the author * Prepared as a discussion paper in connection with a presentation given on March 4, 2010 at Columbia University’s Harriman Institute, 420 West 118th Street, New York, NY 10027, http://www.harrimaninstitute.org/.
    [Show full text]
  • North Caucasus: the Russian Gordian Knot Abbreviations: N.O
    Theses 1. North Caucasus is the most instable part of the Russian Federation: since the early 90’s, the- re has been going on the military conflict in Che- chnya, which is gradually spilling over into the other republics of the region, terrorism seems to have occupied its regular position in the political life of Caucasus, organised crime is flourishing, the tension persists there and military incidents and attacks are breaking out every now and again. During the recent year, the destabilisation of the region, which affects many fields of Russian political and social life, has grown to an alar- ming size. North Caucasus: 2. There are many reasons for the instability in the region; they stem from numerous political, the Russian Gordian knot religious and socioeconomic problems and con- flicts. They all overlap, interweave and create a complex network. The most difficult problem The key problems and conflicts 43 is the war in Chechnya, lasting since the early in the region and the effect 90’s, which is spilling over the neighbouring re- thereof on the future of Russia publics, takes increasingly more drastic shapes and poses a threat to the security and stability of the entire country. The conflict stimulates dan- Maciej Falkowski gerous tendencies and processes all over Cauca- sus: it is one of the reasons for the intensifying anti-Russian sentiments in the local communities, North Caucasus: the Gordian Russian knot and it accelerates their drifting towards radical Islam, etc. Moreover, the region is a scene of nu- merous ethnic conflicts (the conflicts in Dage- stan, the western part of Caucasus, the Ingush- -Ossetian conflict), religious (mainly inside Islam) and conflicts between the indigenous Russian people and immigrants from Caucasus and Cen- tral Asia in Stavropol and Krasnodar Krais as well as acute socioeconomic problems (poverty, un- employment, overpopulation, growing crime).
    [Show full text]
  • Russian Crisis Management Communications and Media Management Under Putin
    ISRN UU-ÖSTUD-AR—05/2--SE Department of East European Studies Uppsala University RUSSIAN CRISIS MANAGEMENT COMMUNICATIONS AND MEDIA MANAGEMENT UNDER PUTIN Gregory Simons Department of East European Studies Uppsala University a r b e t s r a p p o r t e r W o r k i n g P a p e r s No. 85 ISSN 1103-3541 January 2005 Russian Crisis Management Communications and Media Management Under Putin 1 Russian Crisis Management Communications and Media Management Under Putin. Contents Introduction Changes to State Media Structure and Organisation Sensitive and Non-sensitive Issues and Their Implications Sinking of the Kursk Dubrovka Theatre Siege Media and the Second Chechen War Responses and Reactions to Media and Crisis Management Communications Conclusion This paper was given at the Annual Scientific Meeting of the International Society of Political Psychology held in Lund, Sweden in July 2004. 2 Working Papers, 85, Dept. of East European Studies Introduction. The mass media are a well recognised, important tool of image and identity construction, which has an established tradition in the former Soviet Union. In the contemporary setting of fluid identity and attempts to create a unifying identity and consciousness, the role of the mass media has assumed an important and strategic role. Early on in his presidency, Putin signalled that a leading role was to be assigned to the media through statements such as the creation of a single information space and in the policy document The Doctrine of Information Security.1 Media Minister Mikhail Lesin in his speech while congratulating Russian journalists on their professional holiday (January 13) gave an indication of the envisaged road for the media to take.
    [Show full text]
  • Corruption of the Fourth Power: the Decline of the Russian Media1
    Corruption of the Fourth Power: The Decline of the Russian Media1 By Olga Khvostunova, Ph.D. Published at imrussia.org, an online publication of the Institute of Modern Russia, on January 10, 2014. 1 This research paper was originally presented at 45th ASEEES Annual Convention on November 22, 2013 at the panel titled “Export of Russian Corruption: From Kremlin with Hate.” Corruption of the Fourth Power: The Decline of the Russian Media Olga Khvostunova, Ph.D. Visiting Scholar Harriman Institute, Columbia University Abstract Independent and free media are among the key instruments in fighting corruption. But in today’s Russia this instrument itself has been corrupted and misused. Russian government has deliberately taken control over the major national media outlets, including TV channels, radio stations, print press, and some internet resources. Only few publications remain free and are able to fulfill their duties. As competition on the global media market becomes fiercer, traditional media in all the countries are looking for new ways of surviving and are becoming more susceptible to corruption. The problem is universal, but in case of Russia it is aggravated by Vladimir Putin’s corrupt political regime. Corruption has poisoned Russian media on both levels— institutional and individual. The objectives of this research are: to investigate main methods of corrupting the media and the journalists that the Russian government has employed; to trace the effects such a corruption can have on media content and, as a result, on public opinion; and to see whether the few free media can contribute into overcoming this negative trend. The research framework Ten years ago, corruption as a subject of study was quite a small field.
    [Show full text]
  • The Russian Federation Living up to the Standards of the 2012 Joint Declaration on Crimes Against Freedom of Expression? 14
    Contents Executive Summary 3 Recommendations 5 Foreword by Lydia Cacho, Mexican journalist and ARTICLE 19 Board Member 8 Introduction 10 Methodology 13 Chapter 1. Is the Russian Federation living up to the standards of the 2012 Joint Declaration on Crimes against Freedom of Expression? 14 . What is the Joint Declaration on Crimes against Freedom of Expression? 14 . Interview with Dunja Mijatović, OSCE Representative for Freedom of the Media 16 . Opinion Piece by Nadezhda Azhgikhina, Secretary of the Russian Union of Journalists 17 Chapter 2. Journalists under Attack in the Russian Federation: the Joint Declaration on Crimes against Freedom of Expression in Theory and in Practice 19 . Joint Declaration: (1) General Principles 21 - Spotlight On: Anna Politkovskaya 22 - Spotlight On: Mikhail Afanasyev 27 . Joint Declaration: (2) Obligations to Prevent and Prohibit and (3) Obligations to Protect, featuring the cases of Akhmednabi Akhmednabiyev and Khadijmurad Kamalov 28 . Joint Declaration: (4) Independent, Speedy and Effective Investigations, featuring the case of Natalia Estemirova 31 . Joint Declaration: (5) Redress for Victims 33 - Spotlight On: Mikhail Beketov 34 . Joint Declaration: (6)Role of Other Stakeholders 35 - Spotlight On: Elena Milashina, with interview 36 Chapter 3. The North Caucasus: the most deadly region for journalists 41 . The Republic of Chechnya 42 - Spotlight On: Natalia Estemirova 42 . The Republic of Dagestan 44 - The 2009 “Death List” – ‘Who will be next?’ 44 - Spotlight On: Akhmednabi Akhmednabiyev 45 - Spotlight On: Khadijmurad Kamalov and Chernovik 46 . The Republic of Ingushetia, featuring the cases of Magomed Yevloyev and Maksharip Aushev 47 . The Republic of Kabardino-Balkaria, featuring the case of Kazbek Gekkiyev 49 .
    [Show full text]