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Russia – Nash Dom Rossiya – URP – Political Violence – Regional Elections – Nizhniy Novgorod

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Russia – Nash Dom Rossiya – URP – Political Violence – Regional Elections – Nizhniy Novgorod Refugee Review Tribunal AUSTRALIA RRT RESEARCH RESPONSE Research Response Number: RUS17643 Country: Russia Date: 8 November 2005 Keywords: Russia – Nash Dom Rossiya – URP – Political violence – Regional elections – Nizhniy Novgorod This response was prepared by the Country Research Section of the Refugee Review Tribunal (RRT) after researching publicly accessible information currently available to the RRT within time constraints. This response is not, and does not purport to be, conclusive as to the merit of any particular claim to refugee status or asylum. Questions Please provide information on the following: 1. The current position of Nash Dom Rossiya, the URP and Edinaya Rossiya; 2. The nature and extent of political violence associated with the 1999 and 2003 elections; 3. Whether regional governors were dismissed in 2004; 4. Whether gubernatorial elections were proposed for 2005; 5. Current treatment of supporters of Nash Dom Rossiya / URP by the Russian government and supporters of other political parties; 6. Information on future gubernatorial elections in Nizhnenovogorod. RESPONSE Please provide information on the following: 1. The current position of Nash Dom Rossiya, the URP and Edinaya Rossiya. Nash Dom Rossiya/Our Home is Russia The sources consulted indicate that Nash Dom Rossiya or Our Home is Russia was disbanded in 2000-2001 and its members absorbed into Unity, which later became United Russia (see below for information on United Russia). The entry in Political Handbook of the World 2000-2002 states: Our Home is Russia (Nash Dom-Rossiya-NDR).The center-right NDR was launched in May 1995 to provide a party base for Prime Minister Viktor Chermomydin and his program of measured economic reform. Supported by business elites, the NDR was quickly branded by the more radical promarket elements and the conservative nationalist opposition alike as being funded by the Gazprom corporation, which Chernomydin, a former ISSR gas minister, had run before joining the Russian government. In the December State Duma balloting it trailed the KPRF, winning only 10.1 percent of the proportional vote and 55 seats in total. In the mid-1996 presidential contest, however, it made a major contribution to Boris Yeltsin’s successful reelection bid, following which Chernomydin was reappointed prime minister. The party was subsequently branded by critics as the party of the oligarchs (and referred to by some wags as the NDG, for “Our Home is Gazprom”). In August 1997 the NDR’s State Duma faction leader, Sergei Belyayev, resigned, claiming that the party was “sliding toward the principles of bureaucratic, nomenklatura leadership”. In late 1998 Chermomydin, who had been dismissed a prime minister in March, ousted another Duma faction leader, Aleksandr Shokhin. Chernomyrdin was rumoured to be joining the Union of Right Forces (SPS, below) in August 1999, but he ultimately declined, choosing instead to cooperate with Boris Fedorov’s Forward, Russia!...for the December State Duma election. The NDR won a mere 1.2 percent of the party list vote and only eight constituency seats. On May 27, 2000, a party congress voted to disband the NDR in favour of Unity (Banks A.S. et al 2003, Political Handbook of the World: 2000-2002, CSA Publications, New York, p. 921 – Attachment 1). A February 2001 news report confirms that the party was disbanded, stating: “Former Prime Minister Viktor Chernomydin, who heads the ‘Our Home is Russia’ movement, officially disbanded the group on 26 February and called on its members to join the pro Kremlin ‘Unity’ party” (‘“Our Home is Russia” is no more’ 2001, IPR Strategic Information Database, 28 February – Attachment 2). An April 2005 report by the Economist Intelligence Unit includes a useful chart of the performance of Russian political parties in the 1993, 1995, 1999 and 2003 elections, with additional detail for the 2003 elections. It shows that Our Home is Russia was not involved in the 2003 elections (‘Russia: Key figures’ 2005, Economist Intelligence Unit, 20 April – Attachment 3). Soyuz Pravyh Sil/Union of Right Forces The party Souze Pravih Sil Rossii, or the Union of Right Wing Power coalition, is probably the one known as Soyuz Pravyh Sil (SPS) or the Union of Right Forces. SPS is referred to in most reports as a party at the liberal end of the political spectrum. It has lost strength in recent years, and won only three seats in the 2003 elections; but still exists as a party and is currently about to contest the Moscow State Duma elections. The entry on this party in Political Handbook of the World 2000-2002 states: Union of Right Forces (Soyuz Pravyh Sil-SPS). The SPS emerged as a reform-minded, pro- Western electoral coalition in July-August 1999. On July 23 Sergei Kiriyenko’s New Force, Konstantin Titov’s Voice of Russia, and Anatoly Chubais’s Just Cause agreed to establish an alliance; Yegor Gaidar’s Russia’s Democratic Choice (DVR), Irnia Khakamada’s Common Cause, and Boris Namtsov’s Young Russia formally joined at a unification conference on August 29. Along with Unity, the SPS received verbal support from Prime Minister Putin going into the December 1999 Duma election, at which it won 29 seats and an 8.5 percent proportional vote share. Although the SPS Coodinating Council announced on February 21, 2000, that it would not endorse any candidate for the upcoming presidential elections, various SPS constituent organizations went their own way. Kiriyenko’s group supported Acting President Putin, the Democratic Russia component of the DVR backed Konstantin Titov, and both Nemtsov and Khakamada campaigned for Yabloko’s Grigori Yavlinsky. The SPS established itself as a national organization at a congress on May 20, 2000, at which time it passed a resolution pledging support for “any actions taken by President Putin that do not run counter to the values of liberalism, are in the interests of a free society and contribute to the country’s economic prosperity”. In addition to the organizations discussed below, participants in the congress included the Lawyers for Human Rights and Decent Life…, the Russian Taxpayers…and New Generation. A future merger with Yabloko…was announced in June but had not occurred by mid-2001. At a founding congress on May 26-27, 2001, however, the SPS formally reorganized as a unified party, its (at that time) nine constituent parties having agreed, in the preceding weeks, to dissolve as independent entities. Support within the nine was not unanimous, however, and key members of Russia’s Democratic Choice, in particular, indicated that they would leave the organization (Banks A.S. et al 2003, Political Handbook of the World: 2000-2002, CSA Publications, New York, p. 922 – Attachment 1). The April 2005 report by the Economist Intelligence Unit shows that SPS won only three seats in the 2003 elections, and only 4% of the vote. The report states: Russia’s two main liberal parties were in disarray after failing to pass the 5% of the vote threshold for parliamentary representation in the 2003 Duma election. Although they did gain a number of single-mandate seats, most of their deputies subsequently joined the United Russia faction. Observers said that the two parties, Yabloko and the Union of Rightist forces (SPS) could have avoided defeat by pooling their resources ahead of the election. However, personal animosity between party leaders – in particular Yabloko’s intransigent Grigory Yavlinsky and the SPS’s unpopular Anatoly Chubais – spoilt any merger attempts. There are also more profound differences that have kept the two parties, and their electorates, apart. Yabloko, which dates back to 1993, represents Russia’s impoverished and disillusioned intelligentsia, whereas the SPS is widely seen as the party of oligarchs, partly because the 2003 election campaign was headed by Anatoly Chubais (once a reformer in Mr Yeltsin’s cabinet and now head of Russia’s electricity monopoly) and partly because it enjoyed the active and financial support of Mr Khodorkovsky, the jailed oil tycoon. In practice, most SPS members belong to the young, urban and Western-oriented middle class – set apart from the traditional intelligentsia by dint of its entrepreneurial ambitions (‘Russia: Key figures’ 2005, Economist Intelligence Unit, 20 April – Attachment 3). A June 2005 report from Freedom House comments that “after the December 2003 State Duma elections, essentially no important parties represented the liberal end of the political spectrum. The two major parties that support this ideology, the Union of Right Forces (SPS) and Yabloko, have largely collapsed. Former presidential candidate and SPS leader Irina Khakamada set up a new party called Our Choice on November 1, hoping to unify liberal voters, but its initial prospects are not bright” (Goehring, Jeannette & Schnetzer, Amanda 2005, ‘Russia’, Nations in Transit 2005: Democratization from Central Europe to Eurasia, Freedom House, June, p.6, http://www.freedomhouse.org/research/nattransit.htm – Accessed 1 November 2005 – Attachment 4). A June 2004 International Helsinki Federation report states that interference by the government was partly responsible for the decline in support for SPS: Prior to the elections, people who supported opposition parties financially were arrested. The most prominent of them was the CEO of the oil company Yukos, Mikhail Khodorkovsky. State media featured widespread criticism of the so-called “oligarchs” during the campaign and also criticized the opposition parties that had received funding from them: the liberal parties
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