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The Role of the Interchange Fee in Card Payment Systems

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The Role of the Interchange Fee in Card Payment Systems Éva Keszy-Harmath− Gergely Kóczán−Surd Kováts− Boris Martinovic−Kristóf Takács The role of the interchange fee in card payment systems MNB OCCASIONAL PAPERS 96. 2012 Éva Keszy-Harmath− Gergely Kóczán−Surd Kováts− Boris Martinovic−Kristóf Takács The role of the interchange fee in card payment systems MNB OCCASIONAL PAPERS 96. 2012 The views expressed here are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official view of the central bank of Hungary (Magyar Nemzeti Bank). Occasional Papers 96. The role of the interchange fee in card payment systems (A bankközi jutalék szerepe a kártyás fizetési rendszerekben) Written by: Éva Keszy-Harmath, Gergely Kóczán, Surd Kováts*, Boris Martinovic*, Kristóf Takács (Magyar Nemzeti Bank, Payments and Securities Settlement) Budapest, January 2012 Published by the Magyar Nemzeti Bank Publisher in charge: dr. András Simon Szabadság tér 8−9., H−1850 Budapest www.mnb.hu ISSN 1585-5678 (online) * Hungarian Competition Authority (GVH). Contents Abstract 5 1 Introduction 6 2 Development and operation of the interchange fee 7 2.1 The four-party card system 7 2.2 Merchant and interchange fees 7 3 Economic background of the interchange fee 11 3.1 Two-sided markets and network externalities 11 3.2 Usage externalities and interchange fee models 13 4 Competitive assessment of the interchange fee 18 4.1 Competition related problems in connection with the interchange fee 18 4.2 Solutions other than the interchange fee 20 5 Competition proceedings related to the interchange fee 22 5.1 Competition proceedings of the European Commission 22 5.2 Competition proceedings in Member States of the European Union 34 5.3 Competition proceedings and lawsuits in non-EU states 37 6 Regulatory issues and attempts 40 6.1 Regulatory dilemmas 40 6.2 Example of regulation − Australia 42 7 The Hungarian payment card market 45 7.1 Characteristics and development of the Hungarian card business 45 7.2 Development level of the Hungarian card business in international comparison 49 7.3 Domestic interchange fees in Hungary 51 7.4 Comparison of Hungarian and international interchange fees 51 7.5 Profitability of the Hungarian payment card business 54 7.6 Merchant behaviour related to card acceptance 62 mnb occasional papers 96. • 2012 3 MAGYAR NEMZETI BANK 8 Competition proceedings in Hungary 66 8.1 Conclusion of the agreement, parties 66 8.2 Decision of the GVH 67 9 Regulatory attempts in Hungary 71 9.1 Regulation relating to the interchange fee and merchant fee 71 9.2 Regulation relating to surcharging 73 10 Conclusions 74 10.1 Possibility of interchange fee regulation 74 10.2 Few practical examples for the time being, EU regulation is not expected in the near future 74 10.3 Important aspects of the Hungarian card market 74 10.4 Competitive effects on the acquirer market 75 10.5 Possible measures relating to the Hungarian market 75 References 77 4 mnb occasional papers 96. • 2012 Abstract The interchange fee applied in four-party card systems transfers incomes in the payment card business from merchants to cardholders. Assessment of the interchange fee and the interpretation of its role have prompted serious professional debate in recent years. Beyond the professional debate, competition proceedings were also launched in connection with interbank agreements related to the interchange fee and the setting of the fee, but so far specific regulation has been adopted only in a few countries. The first part of the study describes the function of the interchange fee and the related economic theories, followed by a discussion of issues arising in connection with the interchange fee from the point of view of competition authorities and regulators. The second part of the study presents the results of analyses relating to the Hungarian payment card market and interchange fees. On the basis of these results, we conclude that prudent regulatory intervention, taking into account both primary and secondary market effects, may be justified in relation to the interchange fee, due to the structure and level of development of the Hungarian market. JEL: D04, D23, D43, D52. Keywords: interchange fee, merchant fee, payment card, merchant, cardholder, acquirer, issuer, competition law, competition authority, restrictive agreement, four-party card system. Összefoglaló A négyszereplős kártyarendszerekben alkalmazott bankközi jutalék (interchange-díj) a fizetésikártya-üzletágban a keres- kedőktől a kártyabirtokosok felé csoportosít át jövedelmeket. Az elmúlt években a jutalék megítélése, szerepének értel- mezése jelentős szakmai vita tárgyát képezte. A szakmai vita mellett több esetben versenyhatósági vizsgálatok is folytak a bankközi jutalékkal kapcsolatos bankközi megállapodások, illetve a jutalék mértékének meghatározásával kapcsolatban, konkrét szabályozásra azonban eddig csak néhány országban láthattunk példát. A tanulmány első része ismerteti a bank- közi jutalék működését és a kapcsolódó közgazdasági elméleteket, majd pedig versenyhatósági és szabályozói szempont- ból mutatja be a jutalék kapcsán felmerülő kérdéseket. A tanulmány második része bemutatja a magyar fizetésikártya- piaccal és a bankközi jutalékokkal kapcsolatos elemzések eredményeit. Ez alapján megállapítható, hogy a magyar piac szerkezete és fejlettségi szintje miatt indokolt lehet egy, a bankközi jutalékokkal kapcsolatos, körültekintő és mind az elsődleges, mind a másodlagos piaci hatásokat figyelembe vevő szabályozói beavatkozás. mnb occasional papers 96. • 2012 5 1 Introduction The interchange fee applied in relation to four-party card systems1 has been the object of intense debate recently and remains a contested issue in terms of regulation and competition law. The costs and price of the systems play an important role in relation to the competing payment systems in terms of both consumers and merchants using the systems and social welfare. Payment with payment cards at a system level constitutes an electronic payment system which is likely to produce potential savings. Payment card payments can support the development of the payment system; aside from modernisation of the system, however, it is unclear whether the various incentives in place in the current payment system genuinely orient parties in the direction of a socially optimal payment instrument. In the systems analysed, with the help of the interchange fee, the individual parties can choose to transfer costs, which may serve the interests of the entire system or the interests of particular parties. The interchange fee is the fee paid by the credit institution (acquirer bank) enabling the acceptance of payment cards to the credit institution issuing the card in the course of the card payment transaction. The interchange fee generates income transfer between card users, non- card users, merchants and banks, which may serve the optimisation of the system and also optimise the profit of the individual parties. Due to the high fees, the representative organisations of merchants who finance the system generally campaign to maximise or abolish the interchange fees. Numerous competition proceedings and regulatory initiatives have been launched in relation to the setting of the interchange fee. This study attempts to present the theoretical basis and the related regulatory and competition policy criteria regarding the interchange fee, and, after a brief description of the Hungarian card market, to discuss the development of these issues on this market. In the first part of the study, following the description of the basic concepts and operation of the four-party card system, we present the major results of economic theory relating to card markets. By examining the role and effect of the interchange fee under various assumptions, the models provide information on its assessment from a competition point of view and its possible regulation. In view of the fact that in addition to the many recently conducted competition proceedings, there are many such proceedings and lawsuits currently in progress in connection with the method of setting the interchange fee, it is essential to reference the relevant competition cases. There is special focus on proceedings conducted in the past and currently by the Directorate General for Competition of the European Commission against the major four-party card systems (Visa, MasterCard). The externalities identified in connection with the interchange fee have raised the need for regulation in many legal systems, and we thus consider it important to address the key issues and dilemmas arising in relation to regulation. We describe in detail the example of Australian regulation, which plays a pioneering role in this area. A brief overview of the market is necessary to understand trends observed on the Hungarian payment card market. Our study references the competition proceedings ending in 2009 (Vj-18/2008/341) and attempts at regulation in 2009 and 2010. The study ends with conclusions drawn from the above. 1 The four parties participating in the transaction are the merchant, the merchant’s bank (acquirer), the cardholder and the bank of the cardholder (issuer). 6 mnb occasional papers 96. • 2012 2 Development and operation of the interchange fee The interchange fee functions as a special element of four-party payment card systems.2 Thorough knowledge of the operation of four-party card systems is necessary for the assessment of the interchange fee. This chapter discusses the parties of the system, features of the transaction, function of the interchange fee and the related regulations.
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