Playing by the Rules? a Philosophical Approach to Normativity and Coordination in Music Performance

Playing by the Rules? A Philosophical Approach to Normativity and Coordination in Music Performance Søren R. Frimodt-Møller Playing by the Rules? A Philosophical Approach to Normativity and Coordination in Music Performance PhD dissertation by Søren Rosenlund Frimodt-Møller Supervisor: Cynthia M. Grund Institute for Philosophy, Education and the Study of Religions University of Southern Denmark Submitted July 2010 For this version of the document, a few minor corrections have been made following the suggestions of the evaluation committee at the PhD defense on October 7, 2010. The committee consisted of Catherine Z. Elgin, Professor of the Philoso- phy of Education, Graduate School of Education, Harvard University, Daniel Bonevac, Professor of Philosophy, University of Texas, Austin, and Lars Ole Sauerberg, Professor of English, University of Southern Denmark (chair). Abstract The purpose of this dissertation is to demonstrate that no matter what level of human interaction we are considering, it is essential for attaining coordination that the individual follows norms (understood broadly). By coordination, I understand some ordering of a group's actions that make these actions fit together in some pattern: This could for example be a pattern that distributes an equal opportunity for reaching one's goals, or it could be a pattern that would look `coherent' or àesthetically satisfying' to an external observer. In at least one of these two senses of the word, we usually strive for coordination with other people as we move about in the world. I have chosen to highlight these points by concentrating on a small society in a specific type of situation as a `microcosmos' of interpersonal relations in general: the performing music ensemble. To be more specific, I focus on composition-based performances by music ensembles. My main reason for this is that an analysis of the way musicians make choices for a performance based on a composition brings out an interesting example of how there may be an interplay between our personal ideals and the norms that are presented to us externally: A situation has certain, often tacit `norms' for which actions can take place within it. Similarly, a composition characterizes a field of possible actions through its instructions (and possible prohibitions). In both cases, it is in the meeting between these external norms and the personal norms of the individual that the decisions are made. (As I will touch upon, improvisation-based performances may also have norms external to the individual musician in the form of genre conventions, performance practices etc. Since the composition is often a more clearly delimited entity than a `tradi- tion', composition-based performances are, however, slightly easier cases to handle in this context.) My method in this dissertation is to lay out a varied spectrum of schemes that may explain different aspects of coordination in a music ensemble (in general relativized to the context of composition-based music) and show how, in each of these schemes, following norms is an essential component in reaching coordination. Although I also discuss how coordination problems may be solved either àutomatically' through internalized routines or via fast choices between such routines, I focus on the type of coordination problems that prompt rational deliberation on the part of a musician regarding the actions of the rest of the ensemble (for example, deciding which theme-carrying player to follow in a situation where the ensemble is not perfectly synchro- nized in relation to an initial plan, such as the score). Questions about the extent to which musicians can be expected to rationally reflect upon their actions, or whether a discussion of coordination in terms of communication (interpreting signals from other musicians and acting directly on these) is more appropriate, are subdiscussions. Before I reach the point of formal analysis, I will devote considerable space to an examination of how we can characterize the composition in terms of rules, and an informal discussion of the interplay between musician and composition in the composition-based performance. This is necessary, because much music philosophy has centered on the ontology of a \musical work", a concept that is often taken to imply a view of the composer's work as a \gestalt", some sort of fixed, objective entity that the musicians try to approximate in the performance, as if they were aptly compared to art stu- dents imitating a famous painting or actors retelling a written story. This view of music performance downplays the role of the musicians and very sel- dom takes the decision processes of a musician into consideration. A subgoal of my dissertation is, thus, to refine a notion of a composition as instructions from some composer to a set of possible musicians, or, more precisely, a set of rules conceived of by the musicians as constituting such instructions. In connection with the latter subgoal, a discussion of what delimits the interpretation of a composition from an entirely new composition also becomes relevant. I will point out that musicians do not just follow a set of rules as presented to them, but prioritize these instructions: In situations where they are unable to follow all of the instructions, some instructions are considered more important than others. The same goes for the interpretation: What is kept of the òriginal' composition is what the musician considers most important. I conjecture that once the order of priority of instructions (as conceived of by the musician) places instructions derived from new material (that is not part of the original composition) above instructions inherent in the original composition, the prioritized set of instructions constitute a new composition (or, put differently, an act of co-composing is taking place). Although I argue that the composition as well as any other set of rules for the performance context is always considered alongside some priority ranking, I also consider how these sets of rules are delimited by the musicians, regardless of differing priority rankings. More specifically, ii I consider how the musicians refine their view of which rules to observe in a performance of a piece (or within a genre) when they experience certain passages as mistakes or as exemplary passages: Some standards are necessary in order to make such classifications, but at the same time, experiencing a mistake or exemplary passage generate norms for further performances (such as \avoid this" or \strive for this"). The announced formal analysis of selected coordination problems divides into three different models: The first is in terms of the musician assuming some set of rules as common knowledge in the ensemble, that is, rules that the musician consider everyone to know that everyone knows that everyone knows etc. This approach utilizes the rich field of epistemic logic. A common awareness of a number of basic principles in relation to the composition will indeed help the musicians navigate through the coordination problem. In other cases, however, such common knowledge is absent, and the musicians have to navigate by other means. I therefore introduce a second explanatory scheme, namely explaining coordination in terms of musicians making decisions based on their (statistically warranted) expectations of how the other musicians might think in the situation. This approach taps into the field of game theory, particularly the variable frame theory of the late Michael Bacharach et al. (2006). A third modeling scheme, inspired by the recent work by Olivier Roy (2008) in the field of decision theory, takes an important aspect of choice formation in the music performance into consideration: The musicians have goals for their endeavors. Due to the fact that they have a certain set of intentions for the performance, they are able to decide on a particular strategy in the first place, at least for their own actions { although they initially hope that everyone else has chosen a strategy belonging to the same \strategy profile.” It is only when the musician perceives incongruence with the possible strategies of the other musicians (given their perceived actions) that he revises his strategy in order to achieve a compromise that may satisfy the entire ensemble's possible intentions. Since this process might repeat itself during the performance, if all the musicians think in the same way, they will gradually rule out possible strategies (and intentions) of other musicians, thus effecting step-by-step the heightening of the possibility of agreement on one strategy profile for the entire ensemble. In each of these schemes, I show that norms are needed in order to achieve coordination: In the model of traditional epistemic logic, common knowledge iii of a `rescue plan' is what ensures coordination. In the game theoretical model, it is tacitly assumed that my expectations are not just shaped by my knowledge of the other persons in the ensemble, but also by the limited amount of actions I consider possible in the context of e.g. `playing the composition' (or ìmprovising within a genre'). Finally, in the intention- based model, the norms of the performance context (the composition, the genre conventions etc.) are what delimit the amount of possible strategy profiles (for the entire ensemble) I can choose from in the first place. In most of the examples here examined by means of formal methods, I have assumed that the musicians do not make mistakes. I conclude my chapters on modeling with an attempt at characterizing an integrated model that takes the possibility of `chance factors' into consideration, including the uncertainty regarding whether an unexpected deviation is intended or a mistake. This model will also serve as a rough map of the different levels at which normativity is at play in the coordination process and how it is at play.

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