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S-0903-0001-06-00001
Expanded Number S-0903-0001 -06-00001
items-in-Cyprus - general - notes for the files
Date Created 30/11/1971
Record Type Archival Item
Container S-0903-0001: Peackeeping -Cyprus 1971-1981
Print Name of Person Submit Image Signature of Person Submit Secretary-General's meeting with countries contributing contingents to UNFICYP - Wednesday, 11 December 1974 at 9.30 a.m.
Missions Australia Sir Laurence and Mr. Campbell Austria Airib. Jankowitsch and Mr. Christiani
Canada Airib. Rae, Mr. Wang and Col. Harrison Denmark Mr. Eliasen (Amb. Tabor ill) Finland Amb. Karhilo Ireland Airib. Kennedy and Mr. Nason Sweden Amb. Rydbeck and-Col. WaldenstrSm United Kingdom Mr. Moreton (Arab. Richard returning to NY on evening of loth)
Secretariat Mr. Guyer Mr. Urquhart Mr. Shevchenko (or Dr. Banerjee) Mr. Davidson • Mr. Ryan and Mr. Lansky Mr. Sherry (for record) General Koho Amb. Weckmann-Muftoz TO: T4iEls£CRETARY-GENERAL
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Notes for Meeting with UNFICYP TJro6p Contributing/]Countries
The purpose of this meeting is primarily to "consult the Representatives of troop contributing countries as to their Governments' willingness to continue to provide contingents for UNFICYP if the Security Council, as is likely, should extend the UNFICYP mandate. I am very glad to have with me today my Special Representative in Cyprus, Mr. Luis Weckmann Munoz. The report to the Security Council is self-explanatory.
It does not make any recommendations concerning the mandate
of UNFICYP since this clearly will depend on the shape of future political settlements. Nonetheless, the functions of UNFICYP in the present situation are described in some detail, together with the difficulties encountered. As regards the future strength of UNFICYP, I have alluded to this problem in paragraph 82 of my report, and shall maintain close contact with the troop contributing
countries as regards possible reductions... Obviously, it is important from the political point of view to maintain
UNFICYP at an adequate strength. On the other hand, \ j. the financial situation is difficult and I do not wish to keep the strength of UNFICYP at a higher level than is required for its functions. Since the issuance of the report, there have been further encouraging signs of a more positive attitude to UNFICYP in Cyprus itself, especially by the Turkish fcs*^»-^xt^^N^r^;^^ military authorities. As you know, President Makarios - 2 -
has just returned to Cyprus and we are awaiting developments
in the political field which will, it is to be hoped, bring us nearer to the ngjg.Qj^ta.y.ons of a settlement. The Security ^^,^0*****"*"at^^-m^*""""^" " •^"^^w^..4^wft«^Wi:M««^™«»--«>»Oira».-«««-..rt=K Council, apart from dealing with the future of UNFICYP, may well also adopt a resolution in this regard.
Before asking Mr. Davidson (Mr. Ziehl) to give a brief description of the financial situation, I wish to take this opportunity to express again my deep appreciation of the j2A^f ^v spiisdicti-et support which the troop contributing countries have given to the United Nations operation in Cyprus during the very difficult period since July. <; •*- cc: SecGen * GLS/pmw \ Mr. C.V. Narasimhan UN High Coiran. for Refugees Mr. Weckinann-Munoz Lt.Gen. Prem Chand OUSGSPA 7 December 1974
Sir,. -. I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your letter of 21 November 1974 transmitting a communication dated 12 October which you received from a number of Greek Cypriot Employers* and Workers1 organizations. 1 have given careful consideration to both communications* I have noted your view that some of the action proposed by the signatories of the communication from the Greek Cypriot organizations falls outside the competence of the International Labour Organisation, and I agree with you that probably none of the proposals can be divorced from the over-all political settlement of the Cyprus problem, in which the United Nations has a key role to play. In this connexion, I wish to draw your attention to the attached resolutions of the Security Council and the General Assembly on the Cyprus question. In particular it would seem that Security Council resolutions 353 (1974) of 20 July and 360 (1974) of 16 August, as well as <3eneral Assembly resolution 3212 (XXXX) of 1 November, contain provisions relevant to the request in paragraph 3 of the communication from the Greek Cypriot organi2ations. Concerning th© proposal in paragraph 6 of that communication, it is manifest that the proposed "joint Greek Cypriot - Turkish Cypriot Committee of Employers* and Workers' representatives" under the chairmanship of a senior official of the ILO can only be established with the agreement of those concerned, which in the present circumstances may not be easy to achieve. I would also observe that most of the A.. Mr. P. Blanchard Director-General International Labour Office Geneva, Switzerland - 2 - subjects proposed for action by that committee are being dealt with by Acting President derides and Vice- President Benktash in their current talks on humanitarian and other problems. In this connexion, I refer to Chapters I2C-X of my report to the Security Council on the United Nations operation in Cyprus for the current siK-month period, a copy of which is attached (S/11568). I have transmitted a copy of your letter and its enclosures to Mr. Luis Weokmann-Munoa, my Special Representative in Cyprus, who has attended all the talks between Mr. derides and Mr. Denktash. Jfc» Wackmann-Munoa will be in a position to bring to the attention of the leaders of the two communities the substance of the proposal in paragraph 6 of the coseminicsation from the Greek Cypriot organisations, your comment about the potentially valuable contribution which the Employers* and Workers' organizations could make, and the views of the Officers and the Governing Body of the II»0 contained in the third paragraph of your letter. I shall not fail to inform you of the outcome of these approaches. I am forwarding a copy of this letter to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, whose representative in Nicosia, as you may know, also regularly attends the talks between Mr. derides and Mr. Denktash,
Yours sincerely.
Kurt Waldheim Secretary-General cc: HICOMREF, yS&mig&S. Geneva CONFIDENTIAL-
Meeting between the Permanent Representative of Turkey and the Secretary-General on 30 November 1974
Present: Ambassador Olcay Aide ** The Secretary-General Roberto E. Guyer
Ambassador Olcay said that Ankara was very worried about the forthcoming report on UNFICYP. They begged the Secretary- General not to use the expression "Government of Cyprus" when referring to the Greek Cypriotes. They would make an issue out of any affirmation which now referred in that way to what was traditionally considered to be the Cyprus Government. For them, Archbishop Makarios or Clerides were merely the leaders of the Greek Cypriote community. The Secretary-General replied that he was trying to make the report as factual and non-controversial as possible. He would limit references to the "Government of Cyprus" as much as possible, but it will have to be used a couple of times since even the Security Council has recognized Archbishop Makarios as the legal president of that country. With respect to the renewal of UNFICYP, instead of using the formula "the Governments of Cyprus, Greece and Turkey" he would employ a new formula, "the parties concerned". Ambassador Olcay accepted this suggestion. Ambassador Olcay then gave a long exposition of the Turkish position and the necessity of establishing a new set of rules for Cyprus. He also voiced his worries about the consequences of Makarios1 return to Cyprus. The Secretary-General expressed his concern over the rumours that Turkey was about to engage in a third round of military activities in the Island. The Ambassador replied that he was aware that Denktash was intimating this possibility, but that was definitely not Ankara's position. Nevertheless, he would convey the Secretary-Generalfs preoccupation to his Government. - 2 -
On 2 December, at 17OO hours, Ambassador Olcay spoke with Guyer and told him that the formula "all parties concerned" was not acceptable to his side, and that it had to be spelled out that the Turkish Cypriotes had been specifically consulted. Guyer replied that the Secretary- General had already gone a long way in proposing the agreed formula. Both Olcay and Guyer agreed to stay in contact on this matter. * V,
INTERNATIONAL LABOUR OFFICE ^i^^ BUREAU INTERNATIONAL DU TRAVAIL
GENEVE
THE DIRECTOR GENERAL UE DIRECTEUR GENERAL
Sir,
I have the honour to inform you that, on 23 October 1974» I received a communication from a number of Greek Cypriot Employers' and Workers' organisations, including the Employers' and Workers' delegates of Cyprus to the last session (June 1974) of the Inter- national Labour Conference. As you may observe from this communication - a copy of which is attached - the International Labour Organisation is requested to intervene with the Turkish Government to withdraw its troops from Cyprus. It is also proposed that a joint Greek-Cypriot-Turkish-Cypriot Committee of Employers' and Workers' representatives be established, under the chairmanship of a senior ILO official, to work towards the various aspects of the restoration of peace and normality.
Some of the action proposed by the signatories of the above- mentioned communication falls outside the competence of the International Labour Organisation, and probably none of the proposals can be divorced from the over-all political settlement of the Cyprus crisis in which the United Hations has a key role to play. On the other hand, the communication draws attention to the contribution to peace which could be made by non-governmental bodies, in particular by Employers' and Workers' organisations, and I am conscious of the potentially valuable contribution which positive action by these organisations could make.
Having given close consideration to the matters raised in \ the communication, the Officers of the Governing Body of the ILO \ have agreed that I transmit to you the proposal for the direct ] participation of employers and workers in the restoration of peace in Cyprus, and assure you of the ILO's readiness to assist in its implementation in any. manner thought to be appropriate by the governments concerned.
The Secretary-General, United Nations, HEW YORK. K.Y. 10017- I am transmitting a copy of this letter, as well as a copy of the communication from the organisations of Cyprus, to His Highness Prince Sadruddin Aga Khan, High Commissioner for Refugees, in his capacity as Co-ordinator of United Nations humanitarian assistance in Cyprus.
I have the honour to be, Sir, Your obedient Servant,
Francis HLanchard, Director/General. UNITED NATIONS NATIONS UNIES
INTEROFFICE MEMORANDU MEMORANDUM INTERIEUR
TO: The Secretary-Gen 15 November A:
THROUGH: Mr. Bradford Morse, Under-Sfecretary-General S/C DE: for Political and General Assembly Affairs cc : Mr. R. Guyer FROM: Marc Schreiber, Director / DE: Division of Human Rights /
SUBJECT: References to the events in Cyprus in the Third Committee OBJET:
1. As I reported previously, there was a tacit agreement in the Third Committee involving the Turkish, Cypriot and Greek representatives that each of them would avoid references to the situation of the population of Cyprus, in view of the broader discussion held in the Plenary. This agreement held throughout the discussion of the question of violations of human rights under the Report of the Economic and Social Council. There is a danger now of exchanges of statements on this subject by the delegations concerned.
2. On Ik November, the Committee began the consideration of the item "Protection of Journalists in Armed Conflicts". The representative of Turkey, supporting the statement of the French representative who stressed the importance of approving a special Convention on the subject, cited the case of Mr. Aden Yaouz who, together with other Turkish journalists, was captured on 26 August last by the Cypriot Greek Military Force and, apparently, after having been wounded while captive, was operated too late and eventually died.
i J. ! The representative of Turkey acknowledged the assistance given by V_ihe Secretary-General in obtaining the repatriation of Mr. Aden Yaouz to Turkey where Mr. Aden Yaouz died. He referred to the tribute paid to Mr. Yaouz by the Secretary-General in Nicosia, as well as by the President of the Turkish Society of Journalists and the International Press Institute. (Apparently, two Turkish journalists were killed in Cyprus and ten were wounded). The protest of the International Press Institute was apparently not answered by Mr. Clerides. The Cyprus representative interrupted the representative of Turkey on a point of order. He stated that he would comment later on the case of Mr. Aden Yaouz. He said he had abstained from speaking of the violation of human rights in Turkey so far, but now would have to speak of Turkish "bombing, looting, raping and killing". As it was nearly 6 p.m., after some brief but vocal interventions by Turkey, Cyprus and Greece, a motion for adjournment of the meeting was adopted by the Committee. d
Note on Meeting in the Secretary-General's Office on Friday^,_8 November 1974, at 6.15 p.m. Present: The Secretary-General Mr. Kyprianou, Head of Cyprus Delegation to GA Ambassador Rossides, Cyprus Mr. Urquhart
After a general discussion of the situation, Mr. Kyprianou observed that a conference within the United Nations framework should be held at an early stage. It was essential to press for implementation of the General Assembly resolution. He was opposed to a federal solution, which simply meant double enosis. The Secretary-General said that he was fully aware that the Clerides/Denktash talks could not solve the problem, although they could help in preparing the ground. Obviously a conference must be held sooner or later to determine the future of Cyprus. Dr. Kissinger had been negative about such a conference in the past. The Secretary-General would be finding out in the near future what his present position was as regards an enlarged conference of some kind, perhaps consisting of the parties concerned and the Permanent Members of the Council. Mr. Rossides suggested that the conference might consist of the contact group of five non-aligned countries, the Permanent Members of the Council as observers, and the parties. There should be free negotiations within the principles of the Charter. The Secretary-General said that some new approach must be found and that it was his intention to sound out all concerned as to their acceptance of a conference which was wider in membership but not too big to be workable.
2* 0 Note on Meeting in the Secretary-General's Office on Friday, 8' November 1974, at 4.45 p.m. Present: Secretary-General Ambassador Carayannis, Greece Mr. Urquhart
Ambassador Carayannis said that the current situation in Ankara was not helpful. It was evident there had been a very adverse reaction to the General Assembly resolution, which doubtless would also make Mr. Gunes' position more difficult since he had voted for it. The Seeretary-General described his talks with Gunes, who had envisaged a three-stage process starting with the Clerides/Denktash talks, going to a stage where they would be joined by representatives of Greece and Turkey, and finally to a larger conference which would ratify what had been agreed. It was still not clear what the precise nature of the United Nations framework would be in relation to this conference. Ambassador Carayannis said that the Greeks wished the talks in Nicosia to go on and to cover political subjects as far as possible. Foreign Minister Bitsios had asked Gunes to give Denktash the green light to discuss political matters. Clerides had evidently been somewhat embarrassed by some initiatives by Ambassador Weckmann. While Ambassador Weckmann's efforts were much appreciated both in Nicosia and in Athens, it would be a good idea if he did not take initiatives without giving Clerides advance warning of what he was going to suggest. Ambassador Carayannis raised the question of UNFICYP's effectiveness in the Turkish Zone of occupation -• a question which will have to be discussed in the Security Council when the mandate is renewed. He pointed out that it was difficult to justify the co-operation of the Cyprus Government in the south if the Turks did not co-operate in the north. The Secretary-General explained his feelings with the Turkish Government on this question and the undertakings which Gunes had given on co-operation with UNFICYP. He was aware that the - 2 - situation was unsatisfactory, but had felt that the pragmatic approach to this problem was undoubtedly preferable to removing UNFICYP altogether. This view was also shared by the troop- contributing countries. He was continuing his efforts to improve the situation. In the last few days the situation had deteriorated, doubtless reflecting the political situation in Ankara. r\ General Assembly W \S 2275th Plenary Meeting -r- / 1 November 197^ - 3.00 P.M. rj/ x * Brief Summary / ' 1
The GA unanimously approved the draft resolution A/L.739 submitted by a group of non-aligned states. The Assembly also urged speedy with- drawal of all foreign armed forces, a halt to foreign interference, and the return of all refugees to their homes.
The resolution said that constitutional issues were up to the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities. And it urged the continuation of the talks going on between the two communities with the help of the Secretary-General. It also said that other negotiations - not specified - should take place if needed. Continued UH humanitarian aid was requested, and all parties were asked to go on co-operating with the UN peace-keeping force in Cyprus. The resolution requested the Secretary-General to continue lending his good offices to the parties to the conflict.
The Assembly thus concluded its consideration of agenda item 110. /----.
General Assembly
22T3rd Plenary Meeting f-~s / N
31 October 197** - 3.00 P.M.
Brief Summary
Question of Cyprus (IIP) • ) The Minister for Foreign Affairs of the GDR, Mr. Florin, said that in the opinion of his delegation it •was necessary to bear two points of principle in mind in discussing and endeavouring to solve the Cyprus problem. "First, the restoration of the constitutional order and the estab-- lishment of conditions making it possible for the two communities of Cyprus to live together peacefully were internal matters which could and must be resolved by the people of Cyprus themselves without any intervention from outside;
"Second, the efforts of the W should be directed towards the cessation of foreign intervention and the withdrawal from the territory of Cyprus of all foreign troops and military personnel, and towards ensuring the sove- reignty, independence, and non-alignment of the Republic of Cyprus."
Mr. Saito of Japan expressed his government's particular gratitude for the Secretary-General' s initiative regarding the dialogue between the leaders of the two communities. He also spoke in support of such further initiatives on the part of the Secretary-G-eneral and assured of his government's possible co-operation in a peaceful settlement of the Cyprus problem.
Mr. Maldonado-Aguirre .of Guatemala said that his delegation firmly supported any measure to ensure respect for the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Cyprus, and any effort leading towards the prompt and immediate return of citizens of Cyprus to that country and to their homes. It also condemned any acts that were designed to deprive a State of its institutional regime.
Statements were also made by the representatives of Malta, Poland, and Mepal.
The Assembly adopted, by 87 votes to 3, with 2 abstentions, the draft resolution by the Fifth_Committee in paragraph 8 of its report (A/9825) /^Resolution 3211 (XXIXJ/. CONFIDENTIAL
Meeting between the Foreign Minister of Turkey and the Secretary-General on Thursday, 31 October 1974
Present: Foreign Minister Turan Gflnes Ambassador Osman Olcay
Secretary-General Roberto E. Guyer
The Secretary-General started the meeting by giving a synthesis of some of his conversations with Bitsios and Kyprianou. He then asked Gflnes how he foresaw the outcome of the present Cyprus debate. The Turkish Foreign Minister answered that they were in a flexible mood but that it was very difficult to reach a common ground with Kyprianou. He said that the position of Kyprianou was different to that of Clerides and also of Athens. Kyprianou evidently did not want a resolution that could be approved by Turkey. Olcay then intervened saying that the group of five of the non-aligned were discouraged by Kyprianou's attitude and that the Indian Ambassador had told him that "they can go to hell". Under normal circumstances, he would not have objected but now he encouraged the non-aligned to continue with their efforts to reach an appropriate solution. Gflnes then elaborated on the structure of the peace settlement to be attained. He foresaw three phases: (a) conversations between Clerides and Denktash, actually taking place in Nicosia? (b) participation of representatives of Greece and Turkey in those conversations; and (c) a conference under the auspices of the United Nations. They were not at all insisting on Geneva, and any other city could be the site of the Conference; in this respect he mentioned Vienna. He added that they were against the idea of an enlarged conference with the participation of the permanent - 2 - members of the Security Council. He said it would be impossible for the Americans, Chinese and Soviets to agree on this question. Therefore, there was no sense in having such a type of conference. He advocated a meeting of Greece, Turkey and Great Britain, with the Americans and the Soviets as observers. At variance with the Geneva Conference, he said that the Secretary-General should be an active part of that Conference. Gflnes then touched on the question of the British bases and said that many of the non-aligned were favouring complete withdrawal of all forces, including the Sovereign Base Areas. Kyprianou had a careful position on this issue and was avoiding anything that could be construed as a withdrawal of the bases. That was the reason why he mentioned the "Republic of Cyprus" and not the "island". During the whole conversation, Gflnes constantly advocated a strong participation of the Secretary-General in the solution of the Cyprus question. He even went so far as to ask if the Secretary-General could help with ideas for the reformulation of paragraph 6 of the draft resolution. The Secretary-General then referred to the concrete questions of the freedom of movement for UNPICYP, the problem of refugees and the reopening of Nicosia airport. Gflnes answered that orders had been given to the Turkish forces that UNPICYP should be given freedom of movement in the Turkish zone, but that they should request a Turkish officer to accompany them. It was answered that on various occasions UNFICYP had had practical difficulties in the freedom of movement and the Secretary-General asked if it would not be possible to make an official declaration that freedom of movement did exist. Gflnes said that it was not easy to make such a declaration. He then went on to say, in the strictest confidence and asking that it be kept secret, that in the fortnight after his return to Ankara he would be able to report good news both on the question of the reopening of the airport and the refugees. He could not dwell more on the issue but intimated that the Secretary-General would be satisfied. - 3 -
The Turkish Foreign Minister ended the meeting insisting on the necessity of a General Assembly resolution that would be acceptable to Turkey. He stressed that he was afraid that Makarios and Kyprianou were conducting a policy which was not only anti-Turkish but also against Karamanlis and the present authorities in Athens, wanting to present themselves as champions of panhellenism. During the meeting, and in passing, Gflnes said three times that the third round of military activities in Cyprus was totally out of the question. Meeting in the Secretary-General's Office on Monday, 28 October 1974, at 1.00 p.m. Present: The Secretary-General Foreign Minister Bitsios of Greece Ambassador Carayannis Mr. Urquhart. Minister Bitsios said that the return of the refugees in Cyprus was the first priority and that a resolution in the Assembly must call for their return, not simply for agreement on their return. He was going to talk to Foreign Minister Gunes about this and other matters, and, in particular, the threat of a third round of fighting in Cyprus if there were no negotiations. He was strongly in favour of a continuation of the Clerides/Denktash talks. The Secretary-General mentioned Kyprianou's rejection of a federal constitution. Mr. Bitsios replied that this was a matter for Mr. Clerides to decide, not Kyprianou, and that Mr. Clerides' views were worked out with, and had the support of, Athens. As regards the future, Mr. Kyprianou had said that another forum for negotiations was required. Mr. Bitsios believed that Clerides and Denktash should now discuss constitutional issues and that wider negotiations might be held later on in a larger forum. The United Nations should participate practically in all negotiations in Cyprus, and a wider conference might well be under United Nations chairmanship. It was essential for the talks to start again and for Mr. Denktash to be properly endorsed and authorised by Ankara. Mr. Bitsios felt strongly that an enunciation of principles would open the door to negotiations and that the direct talks could prepare the ground for such negotiations. Mr. Bitsios asked whether the mandate of UNFICYP would be enlarged. The Secretary-General explained the difficulty of changing the mandate in the absence of a basic agreement between the parties in Cyprus. A Under the General Assembly decision on'Cyprus (2237th meeting) three main options to proceed present themselves: (a) G.A. begins to consider the question and decides during the course of the debate to invite the SPG to meet and report to G.A. before given date, whereupon G.A.'resumes its consideration of the question, taking into account the report of the Special Political Committee."
(b) G.A. takes up the question and decides before starting its
debate to invite the SPC to meet and report to G.A. before given date, whereupon G.A. "resumes its consideration of the
question, taking into account the report of the Special Political Committee." (c) G.A. begins to consider the question and decides to invite the SPC to meet simultaneously with the G.A. and report to G.A. before given date. Any one of these three alternatives seems able to serve the purpose of determining the number of meetings of the SPC (e.g. the forumla: minimum two, maximum four meetings).
A draft statement applicable to all three alternatives is annexed. In choosing between the alternatives, (b) seems least conducive to setting a limit to the debate and number of meetings in the SPC. In order to achieve that objective, alternatives (a) and (c) would seem to be equally useful. - 2 -
The choice between these two alternatives is difficult.
Alternative (c) has the advantage of enabling the representatives of the Cypriot communities to be heard at the outset of the debate and also of reducing to a minimum the possibility of having a full-fledged debate on the substance in the SPG. On the other hand objections can be expected against simultaneous meetings of the G.A. and the SPG. Alternative (a) has the advantage of being more in conformity with the two-phase procedure envisaged in the G.A. decision, i.e., first consideration-invitation, and then resumption. (This vould also apply to alternative (b)i)" Before choosing what procedure to adopt, it would be advisable to ascertain the views and preferences of the parties concerned. Draft statement
Members of the General Assembly will recall that at the 2237th meeting the President made the following statement regarding the item now under consideration:
"... it was decided that the item entitled "Question of Cyprus should be allocated to the plenary Assembly. However, an understanding has been reached that the General Assembly, when it considers this item, will invite the Special Political Committee to meet for the purpose of affording representatives of the Cypriot communities an opportunity to take the floor in the Committee in order to express their views. The General Assembly will then resume its consideration of the item, taking into account the report of the Special Political Committee." .-•* The General Assembly decided accordingly. It is obvious that the General Assembly wishes to receive the report of the Special Political Committee mentioned in that decision as soon as possible. I would therefore suggest that the General Assembly now decide to invite the Special Political Committee to meet in accordance with the General
Assembly's decision adopted at the 2237th meeting and to submit its report under that decision not later than . This will leave the Special Political Committee with a maximum of meetings in order to comply with the General Assembly's earlier decision. It is so decided. •*-;-•, 1i?1 v ' - A n c T* / •f^e * . ; 1057^4 "*^"- ""• / ^ '' " 12th October, If - --
1 i
\ tirB F. Blanchard, ~Y Director—General, .'-'".VA jj International Labour Office, ,, ; GENEVA | - Switzerland ! ') Sir, t,' . , , ,-, ...... As you are aware Turkey invaded Cyprus without any provocation and occupied and holds over kO% of the territory of the Independent Republic of Cyprus.
2, Now that all the facts of the Cyprus tragedy are known, we report to you that the Turkish invasion has*™
(a) Destroyed the basis of the economy of the Island, thus creating mass unemployment and undermining the basic social and economic achievements of this Island, such
as9 the Social Security Schemes, the Provident Funds, the Medical Scheme, the Holiday Schemes, affecting the entire workforce of the Island.
(b) Displaced over kO% of the Greek Cypriot population from their homes thus making refugees over 2OO,000 Cypriote.
(c) Occupied or destroyed hundreds of enterprises (industrial, agricultural, commercial, tourist, etc.) thus impoverishing their owners and those dependent upon them.
(d) Killed, captured or hold as hostages thousands of trade union officials and members.
(e) Looted and destroyed trade union property and premises worth hundreds of thousands of pounds.
(f) Made meaningless trade union freedoms and rights and a mockery of human dignity and self—respect.
In these circumstances the trade union movement has been crippled. At the moment, trade union activity is non-» existent in the Turkish occupied territory of Cyprus » which includes 66% of all tourist activities, 65% of all cultivated land, 60% of all industrial activity, 60% of all underground water resources, 60% of all mining and ; quarrying and the main deep port of Pamagusta through
wliich 83?o of all imports and exports were handled. The ,s ; trade union movement in the rest of Cyprus is seriously '[ hampered because of economic inactivity. The catastrophy which ruined hundreds of Greek»Cypriot merchants and S industrialists has made the existence of employer associations problematic,, So much so the main employer associations ia *'" Cyprus have sought assistance from brother associations abroad in order to survive.
3o In the circumstances, we protest strongly to your Organization for these unprecedented acts of violence and destruction; and request you to intervene with the Turkish Government in Ankara to withdraw their forces from Cyprus in order to allow the Cypriots to live in peace, to rebuild their economy and to exercise their trade union activities in conditions of safety and freedom.
*u It is significant to note that the Turkish invasion, has hurt equally the Turkish Cypriots, because thousands of them have been forced by the Turkish invaders to flee from their homes (presumably to find protection in Turkish occupied areas), economic activity in occupied areas has come to a standstill, trade union officials and rank and file members have joined arms with the invaders (willingly or by threats) and the Turkish Cypriot trade union movement is in substance non-existent, for their members are either idle or recruited in the Turkish army of occupation.
5. The Greek-Cypriot trade union movement and the employer associations are convinced that peaceful co«existence between Greek-Cypriots and Turkish«Cypriots is both feasible and absolutely essential for the happiness and material prosperity of all segments of Cypriot society, regardless of race or creed.
6. We, therefore, propose that a joint Greek~cypriot«» Turkish-cypriot Committee of employers* and workers', representatives, under the chairmanship of a senior official of your Organization, be set up, in order to work together in Cyprus towards: - 3
(a) the return of all refugees, Greek-cypriots as well as Turkish-cypriots, to their homes, under conditions j!i ^ of safety; ' ';^?|j;
* (b) the tracing of all missing persons;
(c) the release of all prisoners, by both sides;
(d) the reactivation of the economy;
(e) the return of trade union premises and property to their rightful owners; and
(f) the resumption of tree and unhampered trade union activity.
7. To this purpose we should be obliged if you would exert your influence with the Turkish Government in Ankara and advise us, as a matter of urgency, whether, when and how we can proceed with this joint effort for bringing peace, material prosperity and happiness to all the peoples of Cyprus.
Yours faithfully,
Pancyprian Federation of Labour Cyprus Workers Confede* i ration
Cyprus Civil Servants Cyprus Union of Bank Trade Union Employees
Cyprus Employers Federation Cyprus Chamber of Commerce and Industry
I c.c, All Members of the Governing Body of the I.L.O. 26 September 1974
NOTE FOR THE FILE
Summary of a report by Dr. Karasek, specia of the Council of Europe on his discussions in Nicosia, on 20 September 1974.
1. In his talks with Mr. derides, Karasek was r."'4-- sounding the possibilities for a negotiated solution of the Cyprus problem. He particularly asked Clerides whether there were pre-conditions for negotiations. Clerides explained that there did not exist formal pre-conditions for intercomraunal talks (he avoided the expression "nego- tiations") however certain conditions should, be fulfilled. He referred to the withdrawal of the Turkish troops from the so-called Attila line to a new line farther to the north and mentioned in this context repeatedly the Gunes line. This new line would become the subject of negotia- tions . He continued to say that after the withdrawal of the Turkish troops, Greek Cypriots would have to be allowed to move quickly into the area evacuated by the Turkish troops. The number of Greek Cypriot refugees affected by this move were"-in the order of SO,000 to 9O,OOO (numbers regarding refugees vary, according to Papadopoulos, there were 23O,OOO Greek Cypriot refugees, on the other hand, in Nicosia, the number of 200,000 was mentioned to Karasek while officers of the Austrian UNFICYP contingent gave estimates of approximately 15O,OOO). 2. Then Karasek relayed the gist of his conversation with Clerides to Denktash. Denktash declared his readiness to negotiate a removal of the demarcation line to the north. He added, however, that any line agreed upon in his talks with the Greek Cypriot side must be regarded as final. There would be no possibility to question or discuss such a line later on in other fora. Denktash did not object to a return of Greek 2 -
Cypriot refugees in the area evacuated by Turkey. Denktash refused any idea of granting autonomy to Turkish Cypriot enclaves in the South. The Turkish Cypriots in the South should have the option of either remaining under the Greek administration or to move to the northern parts of the island. 3. Both Clerides and Denktash were prepared to meet two or three times a week under the auspices of the United Nations and to discuss not only humanitarian but also political matters. 4. Although these developments are encouraging ones, Karasek underlines that they could easily be jeopardised by the slightest adverse event. He added that not all Greek Cypriot politicians have yet resigned themselves to the idea of a federate state as proposed by Turkey. 5/ As to the return of President Makarios, Karasek got the impression that Papadopoulos would favour and even encourage such a development. Clerides, on the other hand, was rather reserved and expressed the view that a return of Makarios at the present stage would certainly upset the intercommunal talks. Clerides continued that it was not up to him to explain this to the Archbishop. He hoped that the Greek government had the necessary understanding of the situation to convey this view to President Makarios. Notes on a meeting held in the Secretary-General's office on Tuesday 24 September 1974, at 9.OO a.m
Present: H.E. Mr. Hans Dietrich Genscher Foreign Minister of Federal Republic of Germany H.E. Mr. von Wechmar Permanent Representative of F.R.G. The Political Director of the Foreign Office The Personal Assistant of the Foreign Minister
The Secretary-General Mr. Georg Hennig
Referring to the dispute between the USSR and China in the Steering Committee the preceding day, the Secretary- General stressed the evergrowing confrontation between the , USSR and China at the United Nations which had replaced to - some extent the cold war atmosphere of the 1950*s. The ; Foreign Minister then spoke of some of his impressions ! during his visit to the USSR and stressed the role of ; Mr. Chiao Kuan-hua in foreign affairs who has a special : relationship with Chou-En-Lai and who was the actual j Foreign Minister. The German delegation had been deeply ; impressed by the great interest that China was taking in j Common market and Nato*s matters. Chinese leaders had \ been surprinsingly well informed about all European problems. \ Concerning Cyprus, the Foreign Minister asked the ' Secretary-General if he felt the two leaders of the communities could solve the Cyprus issue between themselves. The Secretary- General felt that it could be possible if Denktash would get I the necessary power and authorization. He himself had been i told by Caramanlis that the latter could go along with I practically everything acceptable to Clerides. The Secretary- ; General informed Mr. Genscher about his trip to the three I countries and his negotiations with the leaders involved. i He was very satisfied with the progress in the talks between ; Clerides and Denktash in particular since they were also j dealing with political matters. Clerides had told him that I at a later stage, it might be useful to include political I or diplomatical representatives of Greece in Turkey in the f negotiations. Clerides had no objection to also include j representatives of the five permanent members of the Security I Council. This would however be rejected by Turkey. The Foreign , Minister then mentioned the important role of Archbishop I Makarios. The Secretary-General agreed. The Foreign Minister ; also shared the Secretary-General's view that direct talks were the only feasible thing to do at•the present stage. The Secretary-General hoped that it would be soon possible to include a representative of Turkey and Greece. Until then, ) it was particularly important that Clerides and Denktash were respectively fully authorized for their negotiations.
• •«/ • • • - 2 -
The Secretary-General then referred to the Emergency «.*Operation and the cables he had sent to Chancellor Schmidt and President Giscard d'Estaing. He had understanding for the attitude adopted by the Western countries taking into consideration the present economic situation. The Foreign Minister replied that the Common Market countries were, as the Secretary-General was aware, ready to pay but they did not want to contribute without similar contribution by the oil producting countries. In this respect, he underlined that large amounts of revenues from oil were now freely floating in Western Europe. The Common .arket's intention was to channel this money and see as much of it bound to specific purposes. UNITED NATIONS NATIONS UNIES _.
INTEROFFICE MEMORANDUM MEMORANDUM INTERIEUR
TO: The Secretary-GfeiUr DATE: 25 September A:
REFERENCE: THROUGH: Mr. Bradford Morse, Under-Secretary-General for Political and General Assembly Affairs
FROM: Marc Schreiber, Director DE: Division of Human Richts -< CIIQ IPf^T* OBJET: ' Complaint of violations of human rights by Cyprus against Turkey
The enclosed letter from Ambassador Rossides addressed to the Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights through the Secretariat of ECCSOC was handed to me today. It contains a complaint against Turkey of violations of human rights during recent events in Cyprus.
I shall try to find out from Ambassador Rossides whether the Cyprus Government wishes the letter to be distributed as a document of the Commission, whether the letter is merely for the information of the members of the Commission for any initiative they may themselves wish to take or whether it is the intention of the Cyprus Government to have a special item inscribed on the agenda of the forthcoming session of the Commission (next February) or have it considered under the general item on "Violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms, including policies of racial discrimination and segregation and of apartheid, in all countries, with particular reference to colonial and other dependent countries and territories". CjU v2/UX/> ' CONFIDENTIAL §\ " 25 September 1974 Note on meeting in the Secretary-General's office on Saturday, 2O September 1974 at 9.3Q a.m.
Present: The Secretary-General Mr. Kyprianou, Head of Cyprus Delegation to the General Assembly
Ambassador Rossides Mr. Urguhart
Mr. Kyprianou said that there were two essential conditions for a settlement in Cyprus? 1. complete withdrawal of all foreign troops? and 2. that people should be allowed to go back to their homes. His Government did not wish to believe that the United Nations could do nothing and at least it could give guidelines for a settlement. The problem was to get a free negotiation and the wider the forum for that negotiation the better. The Secretary-General mentioned the possibility of adding diplomatic representatives of Greece and Turkey to the talks between Clerides and Denktash in Nicosia. Jr •'W
Notes on a meeting held in the Secretary-Generalfs office,on Thursday 19 September 1974, at 5.3O p.m.
Present: H. E. Mr. George Macovescu Foreign Minister of Romania H. E. Mr. Ion Datcu Permanent Representative of Romania f
The Secretary-General f Mr. Georg Hennig |
I The conversation was mainly devoted to the question on f Cyprus. The Secretary-rGeneral explained to the Foreign Minister t the details of his personal efforts to get direct talks between I the two leaders of the communities. He also gave an account of I his meetings with Prime Ministers Ecevit and Caramanlis as well f as of the following correspondence with the Turkish Prime Minister. | \- Mr. Macovescu replied that Romania was evidently very f concerned about developments in Cyprus due to the geographical | vicinity as well as the strategic importance of the island in an area in which the two major military alliances were very interested. For this reason, Romania had sent Mr. Malitza to the three capitals involved. Mr. Malitza1s impressions fully coincide with the assessment of the Secretary-General. The Foreign Minister agreed with the Secretary-General that for the time being direct talks between the two communities* leaders were the only feasible solution. A conference on a wider scale could follow at an appropriate time. Mr. Macovescu, who had recently been to Syria and Israel, shared the Secretary-General's preoccupations about the seriousness of the situation and confirmed a military build-up in Syria by the Soviet Union. In Israel, he had found no willingness to withdraw significantly of areas occupied in 1967. In spite of the very critical situation, the Foreign Minister was hopeful that a new military confrontation could be avoided. * t
19 September 1974
Mr. Brian Urquhart Virendra Dayal Cyprus - Response to the Secretary-General's 6 September appeal
1« Going on the basis of information presently available to me, here is a brief review of where we stand in relation to the Secretary-General's 6 September appeal for humanitarian assistance to Cyprus. 2. targett | 22 minion, for period 1 September - 31 December 1974.
3. Status of Contributionsf. paid or pledged, as of 19 September 1974 i) through the United Nations (in US dollars) %H Cuba' & 50,687 (cash) France 4?ix^4 (apprx.) - details to be '^ announced today or tomorrow Israel 17,857 (in kind) lichstenstein 3,356 (oash) Netherlands 185,185 (cash) MfrtiT 'Po'A&ttA ^fr? OOO f?innj*ir Y_ United Kingdom 1,162,000 (details to be announced l ii) jsstimates that between 1-19 September 1974, s«mj4 of contributions, in cash and kind, have reacBeaTCyprus towards items included in the Secretary-General*s appeal of 6 September. We are ascertaining the details of these contributions* L ill) We can therefore assume that, against the target of $ 22 million, the total of both multilateraljan«i"bii^teral contributions is, thud far, approximately $fj.0»5 million. 4* Finally, though the U.S. Government has publicly pledged $ 3 million, we ware informed yesterday that - should other multilateral or bilateral contributions together reach two-thirds of the $ 22 million target - the U.S. Government •would cover the remaining one-third, i.e. it would provide, eventually, a total of $ 7*33 million* PERMANENT MISSION OF THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS TO THE UNITED NATIONS G2O SECOND AVENUE NEW YORK. N. Y. 1OO17 Ref: 74/71 18 September 1974 Dear Mr. Chairman, I have the honour to submit the following complaint against Turkey for the consideration of the members of your Commission: The Republic of Cyprus, a member of the United Nations, wishes to complain to the Social and Economic Council of the United Nations - Human Rights Commission - against Turkey for flagrant violations of fundamental human rights committed by the invading forces of Turkey contrary to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. On the 20th July 1974, Turkey, without prior declaration of war, invaded Cyprus and commenced military operations in its territory by means of land, sea and air forces, and until the 30th July 1974 occupied a sizeable area in the northern part of Cyprus. On the 14th August 1974, after a ceasefire was ordered by a number of resolutions adopted by the Security Council, Turkey continued to extend its occupation of the island of Cyprus by further military operations. In the course of the said military operations and occupation, Turkish armed forces have, by way of systematic conduct and adopted practice, caused deprivation of life, including indiscriminate killing of civilians, have subjected persons of both sexes and all ages to torture, inhuman and degrading treatment and punishment, including commission of rapes and detention under inhuman conditions, have arrested . . . . 2/ Chairman Commission on Human Rights United Nations New York, New York 10017 - 2 - and are detaining in Cyprus and Turkey hundred of persons arbitrarily and with no lawful authority, are subjecting the said persons to forced labour under conditions amounting to slavery or servitude, have caused through the aforesaid detentions, as well as by deplacement of thousands of persons from their places of residence and refusal to allow them to return thereto, separations of families and other interferences with private life and have caused destruction of property and obstruction of free enjoyment of property. All the above acts have been directed against Greek Cypriots only, due, inter alia, to their national origin, race and religion. Accept, Mr. Chairman, the assurances of my highest consideration. Zenon Rossides Ambassador Permanent Representative of Cyprus to the United Nations CONFIDENTIAL Meeting between the Secretary-General and UNFICYP Troop Contributing Countries on 5 September 1974 The Secretary-General gave a general exposition of the situation in Cyprus. Mien he had finished he asked that the meeting be confined exclusively to the Heads of Missions present. Guyer also participated. The Secretary-General then proceeded to give & confidential report on the situation. He felt it was necessary to have this restricted talk in order to analyse in depth the situation of UNFICYP and also to enable his interlocutors to give him their frank assessment. He mentioned his trip to Cyprus, Greece and Turkey, highlighting, with reference to UNFICYP, his talks in Ankara. The Secretary-General pointed out his good relations with Ecevit, but said that the Prime Minister was surrounded by hardliners, especially the Defense 1-Iinister. The latter took strong exception to Sadruddin's meeting in Nicosia with the ambassadors of the .five permanent members of the Security Council, and said that this was politicizing the HCR's mandate. By the end of his meeting in Ankara, Ecevit had agreed that, in given circumstances, UNFICYP could move provided they were accompanied by liaison officers. The Secretary-General stressed to Ecevit that if UNFICYP had' to leave Turkish prestige would suffer and this would have an effect on the debate in the next General Assembly session. Mien he returned, the Secretary-General told Ambassador Olcay that the solution offered by Ecevit was not sufficient and that it was absolutely indispensable that UNFICYP should have complete freedom of movement. Naturally they would be accompanied by Turkish liaison officers. The Secretary-General felt therefore that we had to study the situation from the point of view of the existing mandate of 1964 and see if a new mandate was needed. It was evident that the present mandate did not cover the actual situation, and therefore a new solution was necessary. The Secretary-General finished by saying that the Greek side wanted UNFICYP to stay. - 2 - Canada (Hae): The Ambassador thanked the Secretary-General for his exposition. On the substantive part he said that it was necessary to determine -whether the original mandate, as such, had to be modified or whether the modalities of UNFICYP activities had to be redefined. The vital problem now seemed to be the complete freedom of movement of UNFICYP. The support of all interested parties to this effect was needed, (which "he preferred in writing). He felt that the important thing was to have the assurances from the parties for UNFICYP's activities. The Secretary-General agreed with Ambassador Rae. He said that the credibility of the UK v;as at stake and therefore freedom of movement was essential, as it was not possible to admit a reduced role for UNFICYP. He also recalled the 196? withdrawal of UNFICYP as an episode which should not be allowed to happen again. Australia (Duncan Campbell): He had no instructions on the issue but agreed completely with the Canadian Ambassador. The thought of going to the Security Council had to be weighed very carefully. On the one hand Turkey had to feel that it could not ignore world public opinion, but on the other they could not push her too far. U.K. (Ivor Richard): The Ambassador congratulated the Secretary-General for his very skillful handling of the matter. The reputation of UNFICYP was very high in the world. He pointed out the danger of an acrimonious debate in the Security Council and coincided with Eae that there is a difference between the mandate as such and how UWFICYP has to discharge its functions. He felt that the latter was the problem which had to be tackled. There were three Security Council resolutions asking for cooperation with UNFICYP. The question therefore is whether the Turks are going to make sufficient concessions. Nothing will be gained by attacking them openly. Ireland (Kennedy): The The questions the Secretary-General was asking were the same ones his Government was asking. What-would be the new mandate of UNFICYP? Will it be to be interposed between the Turkish Army and the Greek-Cypriote community? In the latter case we would need the acceptance of Turkey for UNFICYP*s role. In this case, however, we -3 - should not appear to be underwriting the partition of Cyprus in two zones. The Secretary-General said that it was not possible now to give a complete answer to these questions. The Greeks had indicated to him very firmly that they -would accept nothing that would mean a legalization of the present line. Austria (Jankowitsch): The situation is radically different from the one existing in 1964. We must therefore redefine our activities. He thought that there was a connection between the peace negotiations and the future role of UNFICYP. Therefore we should first encourage the negotiations and afterwards redefine the role of UNFICYP, We are in the middle of the process and therefore should act with caution. He was doubtful of the wisdom of taking the matter to the Security Council at this point. We already had a provisional basis for action. He felt that the Secretary-General was acting along the right lines in trying to obtain the support of Turkey. After all, UNFICYP was not an enforcement agency. Finland (Breitenstein): He has instructions from his Government to support the Secretary-General's activities in Cyprus. He insisted that the U.N. mandate must be respected. Denmark (Tabor): Takes note of what has been said and agrees that the freedom of movement problem is an essential one. He feels that the j ! Security Council should be informed frankly of the problem. However, he considered that we had to act with caution with reference to a new mandate, and that it was important to continue the conversations with the Turks. Sweden (Rydbeck): The Secretary-General's views coincided with those of the Swedish Foreign Ministry. He was very doubtful about taking the issue to the Security Council as it could be the opening of a pandora box. One the other hand, one cannot wait indefinitely. In a Security Council meeting, even if Turkey were not specifically mentioned, it would feel the impact of general public opinion, and this in a way could be detrimental at this stage to a solution of the problem. He considered therefore that the question of a new mandate should not be hastened. The Secretary-General said he was in agreement not to push the matter of a new mandate. He felt that we should take a pragmatic attitude in dealing with this matter but that we had to be firm. It was useful therefore to let the Turks know that we do not accept a continuation of the present state of affairs. At this moment we had a compromise but not a solution. It was very useful to know that the Secretary-General had the support from the troop contributing countries. To sun up the situation the Secretary-General felt, in consequence, that there was agreement on three issues: a) There was support for the way the Secretary-General was handling the issue. bj There was support for his negotiations with the Turkish Government. c) It was felt that for the present it was not advisable to seek a new mandate. After the Secretary-General enunciated these three points he kept a short silence to see if there were any comments or dissent. There was a unanimous movement of agreement with the summing up. The Secretary-General ended the meeting by stating that he would keep the troop contributing countries informed of the negotiations with Turkey, either by telephone or fey calling a meeting. ZHMEII2MA AJEY0YNIEJ2I f "'' t/VF/cy? ~-*7-}^Z~v*-<.-^ (/) u A f "-" t>//P i ~ y ^ /^ ^S-ts/L/>0t--%^' 'O o Cu 'cL /^.-r'/^^^f *-*^%-&~y-^-^ .X "' / UNITED NATIONS NATIONS UNIES _ INTEROFFICE MEMORANDUM ~^~ MEMORANDUM INTER1EUR T0. . Mr. Brian E. Urquhart DATE: 13 August 1974 A: Under-Secretary-General ... —, for Special Political Affairs --••.- Mr. Georg Hennig \/{y\P Deputy Executive Assistant to the Secretary-General FROM.- George F. Davidson DE: Under-Secretary-General for Administration and Management SUBJECT: Communications - Nicosia I understand that you have had discussions with Bob Ryan as to the arrangements now completed or under way to ensure improved communications between New York and Nicosia, I would like to know from you whether you consider,in the light of the information given to you, that these new arrangements will raeet requirements and eliminate the causes of complaint re delays in communication between New York and Nicosia. If not, what specific suggestions have you to offer as to additional improvements to be made ? Quote The three Foreign Ministers, reaffirming that resoution 353 \J* should be implemented in the shortest possible time, agreed that within the framework of a just and lasting solution acceptable to all parties concerned, and as peace, security Unquote Received agreement Cannot give instructions to "DNFICYP to implement without at least tacit blessing of Security Council. Has asked Force Commander for assessment of practical implications of agreement. As basis for stabilizing cease-fire, hope Security Council can have necessary meeting today. First task is determination of size and character of Security Zone in consultation with UNFICYP. Geneva negotiations to resume on 8 August. In meantime, most essential task is to maintain cease-fire and to pontinue UNFICYP1s humanitarian role. Question of UNFICYP presence in Turkish zone now under discussion and essential to humanitarian role of UNFICYP. :.^ '- ----;--i - 2 - Simple enabling resolution, tacit consent or consensus of Council would be required in Secretary -General ' s opinion, for him to give necessary instructions to UNPICYP. Note for the File 1. ' Prem Chand called me at OS15 hours Hew York time on 29 July. He has received the following message from the Turkish Corps Commander in Cyprus: (i) lAll United Nations troops, civilians and police, : including thoss in Kyrenia, will be removed from the areas occupied by Turkish forces. (ii) If United Nations troops enter the Turkish forces area, the Turkish Corps Commander can not be responsible for their safety. (iii) All United Nations forces are to be removed from the Turkish controlled area by this evening. 2. The Force Commander of UNFICYP also informed me that the Turks had stopped the food convoy to Bellapais, saying that this sort of activity was the responsibility of the Turkish forces. 3. I told Prem Chand that he should tell the Turkish Corps Commander, through the Liaison Officer, that he had to refer this matter to the Secretary-General for his instructions and that he would do so. I also suggested it might be pointed out that wh_il_e,...the Geneva negotiations are still going on and the Security Council will be meeting this afternoon, it would be important for the Turkish Corps Commander not_t^,,pres.s..,thi.g^matter...... "," 4. I subsequently informed the United Kingdom Mission and I understand that Mr. Callaghan has been informed in Geneva. I also informed Ambassador Schaufele of the United States. 5. I also called Ambassador Olcay to inform him of the situation and to ask him to do whatever he could to hold this matter in abeyance pending the outcome of the Geneva negotiations. Olcay was most helpful and said he would immediately get in touch with Ankara. Brian E. Urquhart Under-Secretary-General 29 July 1974 CONFIDENTIAL • Notes on Meeting with the Permanent Representatives of France, the United Kingdom and the United States 11.3O a.m., 26 July 1974 Present: Ambassador de Guiringaud Ambassador Richard Ambassador Bennett Secretary-General Mr. Urquhart The Secretary-General gave an account of the current situation in Cyprus and discussed what further action could be taken through the Security Council to deal with the dangers of the continued Turkish expansion of the bridgehead. Ambassador de Guiringaud said that it would be dangerous to open a debate on the mandate of UNFICYP and his government believed that the 1964 Security Council mandate was sufficient for UNFICYP to fulfil a useful purpose. The main problem was political and the nine European countries would be making an energetic demarch to Ankara. Perhaps the Security Council could make a firm appeal to Turkey to cease military operations, including a paragraph permitting UNFICYP to delimit the areas of control and to interpose itself. UNFICYP obviously could not oppose the attacking army, but could delimit the lines in agreement with both parties. Ambassador Richard said this was a practical rather than a juridical problem. UNFICYP did not have enough power to stop the Turks and therefore the Turks would have to be contained by diplomatic action and deterrents. If such action failed, UNFICYP could not be of assistance. The deterrent would depend on greater support for the Secretary-General and UNFICYP in the Security Council. The United States would have to lean much harder on Ankara. The United Kingdom could not do it alone. The best action for the Council would be to adopt a short and sharp resolutio: Turkey was violating resolution 353 and if it continued to do so the talks in Geneva would collapse. Heavy bilateral diplomacy, especially from the United States, was the only hope. A.. V- - 2 - Ambassador Bennett said that such bilateral approaches were already being made and Security Council action would not help. The United States was very doubtful about having a Council meeting and even whether Rossides represented Cyprus. He felt that the Turks were going to "link up" with their communities in Cyprus before they stopped and no one else was going to stop them. UN?ICYP's mandate should not be debated in the Council, where some Members even questioned the airport decision. T-he Secretary-General said, that the Turks were quite happy knowing that no one would lift a finger. He recalled the einperience of Austria in 1938 when the Great Powers did not lift a finger to s top the Nazis. The Secretary-General was not ready to take the whole responsibility on his shoulders as Hammarskjold had once tried to do. UHFlCYP's mandate was not sufficient to resist the Turkish army and had been designed to regulate matters between the two communities. To do anything more the Secretary- General would require a much clearer directive from the Security Council. However, if nothing was done about the current situation in Cyprus, there would be repercussions elsewhere, especially in the Middle East where already in Israel there had been widespread, criticism of the weakness of United Nations peace-keeping operations. After this discussion, the Secretary-General suggested that it might be possible to get a resolution urging implementation of the cease-fire, requesting withdrawal to the line of 22 July and reconfirming the mandate of UNFICYP. Conversation with Major-General Prem Chand, 3.1*50 hpil^s, 25 July 1. The situation at the Airport is OK. The Turks are dug in TOO yards from the Airport. 2. The Force Commander is very worried about the cease-fire which has two elements (a) to stop firing, (b) staying in the positions i-—"--.^ ^w^nasSSesWajWWWWft^* t^ ^ _1LWT;h ^.F.tl- -;--Jx.T.,UTTu .^ occupied at the time of the cease-fire. The Turkish forces are moving forward all the time. There is no sign of.the Liaison Officer promised by the Prime Minister to the Secretary-General, nor has ,' • i 1 . I 1- «:••'* it been possible to establish an UWFICYP Liaison Officer with the Turkish forces. At the moment 30 tanks and 15 armoured personnel carriers are moving in the direction of Kythria where there is an encampment of the National Guard who will certainly offer resistance. Kythria is the only obstacle before the Turks arrive at Chatos. Ambassador Inhan has told the Force Commander that he is only an ambassador and has no status in military matters. The Force Commander suggests that the Secretary-General might make a proposal to both sides that in order to limit the possibility of further activities and cease-fire violations, UWFICYP should be permitted to deploy posts between the National Guard and the Turkish forces. The Force Commander is sending a suggested list of such posts which has already been accepted by the National Guard. ;I told the Force Commander that the centre of negotiation has ..now /moved to Geneva and it would probably be best for this proposal to be discussed with the Foreign Ministers who are now there. 5. Ambassador Wecktnann told me that the Turkish reinforcements are constantly pouring in and that this is creating a very grave situation which increasingly threatens the cease-fire. 6. The name of the UNFICYP Liaison Officer to Geneva is Major Bamford :f **tssauuSXtoT*K,-Me« " (Canada). He will be leaving at the earliest possible moment. BEU/pmw 25/7M CONFIDENTIAL 24\July 1974 bf. filing.: AP/TG/WI Note for the File At 5.15 pm today Mr. Daunt from the UK Mission called me to inform me that about 3.3O pm today Ambassador Inhan told the UK High Commissioner that the Turkish Forces only wanted a military takeover of the airport and that they were hoping that UNFICYP would not put up any resistence. According to the High Commissioner, Ambassador Inhan was aware that Prem Chand had instructions to defend the airport. Also at about 3.3O pm today, the British Foreign Minister received a message from the Turkish Foreign Minister that was considered to be highly alarming. The message contained an assurance that the Turkish Forces intended tojrespect the British i i L Mfj****** rights at the airport, could^ however.,, not accept UNFICYP ^s. presence. The_ message ended by s_aying that the airport was under T urk i sh con tro1. Meeting in Washington with Secretary of State Kissinger, 15OO hours 24 July 1974 Present: Secretary of State Kissinger Mr. Sisco Mr. Buff urn Mr. Scali Mr. Blake Secretary-General Mr. Guyer Mr. Urquhart (This meeting took place in a somewhat confused atmosphere. At 1.3O p.m. the Secretary-General received word of the Turkish intention to take over the Nicosia airport. He called Prime Minister Ecevit of Turkey at 2.20 p.m. and the meeting with Dr. Kissinger was punctuated by various calls relating to this situation, including a call from the Foreign Minister of the United Kingdom, Mr. Callaghan, and a call from the Permanent Representative of Turkey in New York to the Secretary-General.) The first part of the meeting dealt with the immediate "profoiem. i!r. •Kl-ssi-nerer -h-a-d recei-ved ••undertakings f.rom the Prime Minister of Turkey that there would be no change of the present situation in Cyprus and no attack on the United Nations forces. The Prime Minister seemed to be under the impression that the Turks were in charge of the airport. The Secretary-General pointed out that this was completely untrue. The future of UNFICYP was discussed and the 5ecretary-General pointed out the difference between the resolution setting up UNEF and that setting up UNFICYP, especially in relation to the composition of the force. Mr. Kissinger said that the United States was in touch with the Turkish Gene'ral Staff but that they merely took messages and never gave replies. The Secretary-Ganeral said that Mr. Guyer would be his representative in the negotiations in Geneva. He asked what the U.S. position was concerning President Makarios. - 2 - Dr. Kissinger said that Makarios had asked him to perform a miracle over Cyprus. He felt that it was important to wait and see what the view of the parties most immediately concerned was about Makarios. The U.S. would not oppose his return if the parties wished it, nor would it fight a civil war for him. He felt that any attempt to bring Makarios back at the present juncture would be hopeless and not in anyone's interest. It was much better not to force the issue until the position was clearer. Dr. Kissinger agreed with the Secretary-General that the Greeks and the Turks were most unlikely to accept Makarios and that Clerides was by far the best bet. The Secretary-General pointed out that UNFICYP had a US $20 million deficit and that a generous American contribution would be a great help. Dr. Kissinger said that the State Department would consider submitting a supplemental appropriation. The Secretary-General raised the question of airlift. Mr. Buff urn said that it was a question of the Secretary of State making a formal request to the Secretary of Defence. The question of paying for the airlift would then have to be considered. The Secretary-General asked about the prospects for the Geneva peace .conference on the Middle East. Dr. Kissinger said that it was impossible to form a useful judgement until he had seen the Arab Foreign Ministers who were coming to Washington in the forthcoming weeks. It seemed likely now that the Geneva Conference-might convene in early or mid- October. He would make sure that the Secretary-General was fully briefed every two weeks on the U.S. efforts in relation to the Middle East. The Secretary-General asked about the situation relating to the Palestinians. Dr. Kissinger said that at present there was no light on the horizon. Dr. Kissinger expressed his warmest appreciation for the - 3 - co-operation of the Secretary-General, both in the Middle East and in Cyprus. The United Nations role was indispensable since it was the only organization which could arrange cease- fires and establish machinery on the ground. He particularly appreciated the Secretary-General" s role in both the Middle East and Cyprus problems and said "You have made a believer in the United Nations out of me. " Note on Meeting in the Secretary-General's Office at 5.15 p.m. on Thursday, 18 July 1974 Present: Archbishop Kakarips Ambassador Deraetriou Ambassador Rossides Secretary-General Mr. Guyer Mr. Urquhart Archbishop Hakarios, described his escape from Nicosia. The Presidential Palace was demolished and when he finally arrived at Paphos he was informed that he was dead. He made several broadcasts from Paphos to be sure that the people knew that he was alive. The Secretary-General's Special Representative and the Force Commander had visited him in Paphos and he had conveyed to them his wish for a meeting of the Security Council. He had spent the night at Ktima. On the following day he had learned that armoured cars were moving from Limassol to Paphos and a small National Guard warship had fired on -tih'e "bishopric -in -Paphos-. He -was obliged to leave Paphos and had at first decided to go to his village in the mountains. Later on, however, he decided that he could do nothing if he went into hiding and could help his people more from the outside. He therefore decided to leave Cyprus. He contacted UNFICYP in Paphos and asked through UNFICYP Headquarters for a U.K. helicopter to take him to the Sovereign Base Area. He waited in the UNFICYP Camp in Paphos until the helicopter arrived to take him to Akrotiri. From there he took a plane to Malta and on to London. In London he saw the Prime Minister and Secretary of State. He was fully satisfied with his talks in London, where much understanding was shown of his position. He had been informed that the United Kingdom would never recognize Mr. Sampson as President of Cyprus. He regretted that he had been unable to come to New York directly. > • - 2 - The Secretary-General said that the Security Council was tentatively scheduled to meet at 3 p.m. on Friday, 19 July. He informed Archbishop Makarios of the resolution that was being discussed and also of the designation by the regime in Nicosia of Mr. Papafillipou as their Permanent Represen- tative to the United Nations. Archbishop Makarios said that he thought that the United States attitude was a great mistake. There was no question who had organised the coup in Cyprus and this was an invasion and not a revolution. The Secretary-General mentioned that it had been announced that Mr. Clerides had accepted to continue as Greek Cypriot representative in the Intercommunal Talks. Archbishop Makarios said that there could be no useful outcome of talks in such circumstances, because no agreement reached would have any validity since there was no elected leadership in power in Cyprus. No agreement would be valid without his "signature ^as President of Cyprus. Enosis would mean the destruction of the State of Cyprus. If the Greek officers were withdrawn, Sampson would be unable to stay. In any case, there could be no political stability until the constitutional machinery was restored. He felt that the U.S. policy was not realistic and that they should take a much clearer position towards the present situation. Ambassador Rossides asked how the United Nations could accept the credentials of the Permanent Representative of the Sampson regime since it had not been recognized by any state, including Greece. The Secretary-General said that the Security Council had agreed that Archbishop Makarios should be received in the Council as President of Cyprus. Ambassador Demetriou asked if this automatically made null and void the appointment of the new Permanent Represen- tative. A.. Wi, - 3 - The Secretary-General pointed out that the Council's decision related specifically to Archbishop Makarios1 appearance in the Council on Friday, 19 July. Ambassador Rossides said that such a decision, however, was valid until a contrary decision was taken. Archbishop Makarios said that as long as he had the confidence of the vast majority of the people of Cyprus, Sampson could not function. What had taken place was not a coup but a foreign intervention. The Secretary-General said that the UNFICYP mandate was designed exclusively to deal with problems between the two communities and that therefore, in the current situation, there was very little that UNFICYP could do. Archbishop Makarios said that he fully agreed and that no one in Cyprus had expected UNFICYP to play a role. The United Nations wanted peace in Cyprus and wished to see positive results emerge from the Intercommunal Talks. He had told the British Secretary of State, Mr. Ennals, to give Mr. Sisco his views on the U.S. attitude. When he had tried to reduce the National Guard the argument had been made by Athens that he should not weaken Cyprus's defences against Turkey. He had commented at the time that the danger from Turkey might be less than the danger from Greece. The Secretary-General mentioned that Ambassador Panayotakos had been appointed by Athens to represent Greece during the Security Council debate. Archbishop Makarios said that he had no esteem for Panayotakos who had played a leading role in organizing the ecclesiastical crisis in Cyprus. He found it hard to believe that the Greek Government would be so foolish as to organize the coup, but he did not think that General loannides was in a normal frame of mind. On one of his visits to Cyprus he had even advised the Archbishop to kill all the Turks. A.- - 4 - The Secretary-General said that while the United Kingdom was playing a key role in the present situation, it needed U.S. co-operation in order to make progress. He felt it important therefore that the Archbishop should be in touch with Washington. The Archbishoo said that it was his intention to see Kissinger and perhaps President Nixon after Mr. Sisco1s return. The Secretary-General said that when he had spoken to Dr. Kissinger he had shown full understanding of the situation, especially in relation to the Secretary-General's request for a meeting of the Security Council. Ambassador Demetriou said that when he had consulted Mr. Sisco about calling the Council, Mr. Sisco had advised extreme caution and had warned against exploitation of the situation by the Soviet Union, He, in his turn, had urged the United States to co-operate with the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom in finding a solution. The Secretary-General briefly explained the protocol for the meeting of the Security Council. Ambassador Panayotakos had asked to speak first, but the President had refused. It would be up to the Archbishop to decide whether he wished to speak and leave or whether he wished to stay in the Council and, if necessary, answer other statements. UNITED NATIONS NATIONS UNIES INTEROFFICE MEMORANDUM MEMORANDUM INTERIEUR ^ October 1973 TO: The Secretary-Gene DATE: A: REFERENCE: THROUGH: S/C DE: FROM: B.F. Osorio-Tafall DE: Special Representative of the Secretary-General in Cyprus SUBJECT: OBJET: The Situation relating to the Intercoinmunal Talks in Cyprus 1. In the intercommunal talks, the Turkish Cypriots have in effect accepted majority rule by the Greek Cypriots at the State (central government) level, and have renounced various rights which they held under the I960 Constitution (Vice President's veto power, the 30 to TO ratio in the civil service, etc.). In exchange for this fundamental concession, the Turkish Cypriots are asking for a large degree of regional autonomy for areas which' are now under Turkish Cypriot control and which are almost exclusively inhabited by Turkish Cypriots. 2. The main difficulty that must be faced at the present stage of the reactivated intercommunal talks relates not to the principle of regional autonomy, which in effect has been accepted by the Greek Cypriot side, but to the degree of such autonomy, and the nature of the supervision to be exercised by State agencies over local government bodies. 3. The Greek Cypriot side has agreed to a bicommunal structure of the State within the framework of the ''sovereign, independent and unitary" state. Although the concept of a "unitary state" had been agreed by the Turkish Cypriots at the initial stages of the intercommunal talks, they have now changed their minds since, in their view, "unitary1 is bound to be interpreted by the Greek Cypriots as signifying Greek majority rule in every aspect of political life. (In paragraph 82 of his report of 31 Hay 1973, the Secretary-General, referring to his concept of an agreed solution, which has included the word "unitary", stated that "the interpretation of these terms as well as the nature of the agreed final settlement should now emerge from the intercommunal talks themselves...."). - 2 - U. The Turkish Cypriots insist on a functional federated system for Cyprus as against a unitary state. Such a system would involve separation of functions between the communities, rather than geographical separation. A federated system of any kind is not acceptable to the Greek side. 5. The Turkish side regards enosis as the main factor dividing the Greeks and Turks of Cyprus. ?or this reason the Turkish side seeks a solemn renunciation of enosis by President ?'akarios - or, if that is not possible, by the Government of Greece. The Special Representative of the Secretary-General feels that such a move by Makarios is out of the question for many reasons, but it is his impression that once the constitutional issue is settled, and if the renunciation of enosis is the sole remaining problem. Greece may be expected to come through in order to facilitate an agreement. It should further be noted that Article 185 of the Constitution, the retention of which has been agreed to by both sides, is explicit on this score though it does not mention either the word enosis or Greece or Turkey by name. That article reads as follows: "1. The territory of the Republic is one and indivisible. "2. The integral or partial union of Cyprus with any other State or the separatist independence is excluded." 6. The Turkish Cypriots contend that the resources allocated by the State - both in the current and in the development budgets - to the Turkish Cypriot community will be insufficient to raise that community to the economic level of the Greek Cypriots. Therefore, the Turkish Cypriots want to ensure that additional financial assistance from Turkey will be available to them to supplement the contribution of the Cyprus State. Such assistance is to flow into several fields of Turkish Cypriot activity (such as, agriculture, industry, commerce, etc.) to supplement, not to supplant, the financial role of the State. - 3 - 7. When a number of points of disagreement between Clerides and Denktash were recently referred to the two experts (Justice Dekleris of Greece and Professor Aldikacti of Turkey), the Turkish expert sought to add to the already agreed functions in the agricultural field a number of new iteras to strengthen the position of the Turkish Cypriot community. These items had never been discussed during the Plenary intercommunal meetings, had not been proposed by either interlocutor and were not listed in the document containing the points of agreement and disagreement between Clerides and Denktash or in the Minutes of the talks. The Greek expert and the Greek Cypriot interlocutor considered that the task'of the experts was to work on the "oasis of the documents submitted to them by the interlocutors and that they were not authorised to present new demands. The Turkish expert arid the Turkish Cypriot interlocutor considered that the experts should be free to formulate additional proposals if this would facilitate an agreed settlement. Osorio-Tafall has suggested a compromise formula to the effect that the experts' primary task is to work on the basis of the materials submitted by the two interlocutors and of suggestions advanced by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and accepted by the two interlocutors. However, the experts may formulate ideas and suggestions aimed at improving their recommendations, but these must be submitted to the Plenary for consideration by the two interlocutors. The Special Representative considers that if the experts can make new demands without limitations, there will never be an end to the intercommunal talks and every point will be reopened continually. 8. Another difficulty relates to the question of the police. It had been agreed by the interlocutors that all Turkish Cypriot policemen were to be formed into a separate division of the Cyprus police under a Turkish Cypriot police coLtmander. They would exercise normal police functions in Turkish Cypriot areas without any interference by the Greek Cypriot police. In addition to this, the Turkish side now has put forward a demand for the establishment of a ''municipal police constabulary", which the Greek side fears will be tantamount to a para-military organization which at short notice can become a core of a new Turkish Cypriot fighters army. 9. If Gsorio-Tafall's reading of the minds of President I'akarios and Mr. derides is correct, they are already thinking in terms of a cost benefit analysis of any possible outcome of the intercommunal talks, 'i'hey know how nuch they will have to give in order to settle the Cyprus problem, and they know that this will constitute a heavy burden on the Greek Cypriot tax payer. They nay be gradually arriving at the conclusion that this would be too high a price for the Greek Cypriot community to pay for the meagre benefits they will derive from a restoration of constitutional normality. Accordingly, the Cyprus Government leaders may prefer to continue to rule under the present de facto situation rather than agree to what they regard as excessive and separatist demands. Qsorio-Tafall has advised the Turkish side that the optimum moment for a settlement has now been reached. If the Turks try to squeeze further concessions from the Greek Cypriots, they may in fact get less in the future than they have achieved now. The Turkish side has ably exploited the recent disarray within the Greek Cypriot community - the schism in the Cyprus-Greek Orthodox Church, the terrorist activities of Grivas, etc. Now that President Makarios has over- come these difficulties and sees his position within his community grow stronger, he is likely to adopt a firmer attitude. 4 October 'I 9 7 "5 Estella - This is Cyprus. to e SG Tena V L "Tfv \l-i 3 October 1973 1. In the inter communal talks, the Turkish Cypriots have in effect accepted majority rule by the Greek Cypriots at the State (central 'f&i>l0tf>i££. 2. The Turkish Cypriots contend the resources allocated by the State - both in the current and in the development budgets - to the Turkish Cypriot community will be insufficient to raise that community to the economic level of the Greek Cypriots. Therefore, the Turkish Cypriots want to ensure that additional financial assistance from Turkey will be available to them to supplement the contribution of the Cyprus State. Such assistance is to flow into several fields of Turkish Cypriot activity (such as, agriculture, industry, commerce, etc.) to supplement, not to supplant, the financial role of the State. 3. The Greek Cypriot side has agreed to a bicommunal structure of the 9 » State within the framework of the sovereign, independent and unitary state. Although the concept of a "unitary state" had been agreed by the Turkish Cypriots at 'the initial stages of the intercommunal talks, they have now changed their mindj since, in their view, "unitary" is bound to be interpreted by the Greek Cypriots as signifying Greek majority rule in every aspect of political life. (in paragraph 82 of his report of 31 May 1973, the Secretary-General, referring to his concept of an agreed solution, stated that "the interpretation of these terms as well as the nature of the agreed final settlement should now emerge from the intercommunal talks themselves..."). U. The Turkish side regards enosis as the main factor dividing the Greeks and Turks of Cyprus. For this reason the Turkish side seeks a solemn renunciation of enosis by President Makarios - or, if that is not possible, by the Government of Greece. The Special Representative of the Secretary-General feels that such a move -by Makarios is out of the question for many reasons, but it is his impression that once the - 2 - constitutional issue is settled, and if the renunciation of enosis is the sole remaining problem, Greece may be expected to come through in order to facilitate an agreement. It should further be noted that Article 185 of the Constitution, the retention of which has been agreed to by both sides, is explicit on this score though it does not mention "1. The territory of the Republic is one and indivisible. "2. The integral or partial union of Cyprus with any other State or the separatist independence is excluded." 5- The main difficulty that must be faced at the present stage of the reactivated intercommunal talks relates not to the principle of regional autonomy, which in effect has been accepted by the Greek Cypriot side, but to the degree of such autonomy, and the nature of the supervision to be exercised by State agencies over local government bodies. 6. When a number of points of disagreement between Clerides and Denktash were recently referred to the two experts (Justice Dekleris of Greece and Professor Aldikacti of .Turkey), t,he Turkish expert sought to / 4fe J*j 7. Another difficulty relates to the question of the police. It had been agreed by the interlocutors that all Turkish Cypriot policemen were to be formed into a separate division of the Cyprus police under a Turkish Cypriot police commander. They would exercise normal police functions in Turkish Cypriot areas without any interference by the Greek Cypriot police. In addition to this, the Turkish side now has put forward a demand for the establishment of a "municipal police constabulary", which the Greek side fears will be tantamount to a para-military organization which at short notice can become a core of a new Turkish Cypriot fighters army. 8. The Turkish Cypriots insist on a functional federated system for Cyprus as against a unitary sta^e. Such a system would involve separation of functions between the community^ rather than geographical separation. This is not acceptable to the Greek side. 9. If Osorio-Taf all ' s reading of., the minds of President Makarios and Mr. Clerides is correct, they are already thinking in terms of a cost benefit analysis of any possible outcome of the intercommunal talks. They know how much they will have to give in order to settle the Cyprus problem, and they know that this will consitute a heavy burden on the Greek Cypriot tax payer. TheyTftV^ a#I e-ir{ _gradually arriving at the conclusion that this ™~* |9L be too high a price for the Greek Cypriot community to pay for the meagre benefits they will derive from a restoration of constitutional normality. Accordingly, the Cyprus . » Government leaders may prefer to continue to rule under the present de facto situation rather than agree to what they regard as excessive and separatist demands. Osorio-Taf all has advised the Turkish side that the optimum movement for a settlement has now been reached. If the Turks try to squeeze further concessions from the Greek Cypriots, they may in fact get less in the future than they have achieved now. The Turkish side has ably exploited the recent disarray vithin the Greek Cypriot community - the schism in the Cyprus-Greek Orthodox Church, the terrorist activities of Grivas, etc. Now that President Makarios has overcome these difficulties and sees his position vithin his community grow stronger, he is likely to adopt a firmer attitude. .NCOMINO CODE CABLE URQUHART FROM: OSORIO-TAFALL/PREM CHAND, NICOSIA ~V^ 1 ...'DATE: 2 August 1973, (Sent 021430Z Rcvd. 0219392) * NUMBER: UNFICY? 652 Reference your 401. 1. Althougii situation within Greek Cypriot community does not show any sign of improvement, we consider it very unlikely that the upsurge of violence will spill over into the Turkish Cypriot community. We do not see any possibility for the government forces to engage in any military action against the Turkish Cypriote. If some attack against the Turks takes place it will cosve from Grivas supporters. But this would only be an act of desparation arising from a realisation that their position is untenable and a preferance to create chaos instead of admitting defeat. 2. One of the reasons that lead us to have the view that the dissention among the Greek Cypriots will not be extended to the Turkish sectors is the following: It is not difficult, utilising the surprise element during the night, to attack gene- rally isolated police stations occupied by a small number of men, or attack the homes or property of private citizens. It would be a much more difficult and risky thing to attack a Turkish village. To begin with, the villagers, who are very very orga- nized for that type of fight, will defend themselves and second, the probability of a Turkish mainland retaliation is ever present. In short, unless the intra-communal violence reaches an extreme, we feel that there will not be inter-communal repercussions. 3. An accurate analysis of the present situation in Cyprus is given by a leader in the London Times of 31 July 1973 under the title "Rules of the game in Cyprus". We agree with that appraisal.. -••1 i 4. The direct beneficiaries from the Greek Cypriot intra-communal violence are the Turkish Cypriots, whose leaders Jussif their demands for more complete administra- tive regional autonomy on the traditional inability of the Greek Cypriote to govern theaselves. The Turkish Cypriot leader-ship is watching the evolution of the situation In Cyprus with an attitude of wait and see in the expectation that eventually their demands will be met wife. 5. The isssiediate caaualty of the new Greek Cypriot uave of violence is our deeonfrontation plan. While the- reaction of the government has been positive all along the line, the Turkish Cypriot leadership has informed us that, the prevailing situation in the Greek Sector of the island, they cannot implement even the modest first stage of UUFXCYP deconfrontation plan. We plan to discuss the matter with Denktash, although with little hope of success., because we fell that Ankara's position is the same. This was conveyed to us a few days apro by Ambassador Inha who considered un- likely any change'in the Turkish Cypriot defence deployment until there are assurances that the Cyprus constitutional problem is approaching a solution. 6. The intercomrrunal talks are proceeding as if law and order were existing all over the island. However, v;e Bonder hoti long this "isolution" of the intercormaunal talks from, an environment of violence isay last. We knou that derides is deeply worried by the abuses perpetrated by uncontrolled groups supporting Makarios and from whose excesses members of derides1 o>m party, \sho support Makarios, are also suffer- ing the consequences* 7« Meanwhile, the Archbishop is implementing the sajor synods' decisions for the purging of the Cypriot church and after the election and enthronement of the new bishop of Paphos he plans to go ahead, not only with electing new bishops for Kit'lum and Kyrenia, but to divide the present ..../ -3- existing dioceses (HIcosla-Fataagustaj Kyreniaj Kitiurri-Llcirnassol and Paphoa). It Is .possible that two more bishoprics will be created to bring the Ecclesiastical Boundaries In line with the administrative division of the Island in six districts. On the political field, President Makarlos said in his. last press conference en 31 July s'the escalation of violence by Grivas1 terrorists makes imperative the escalation of govern- ment measures to stamp out and crush the forces of violence and anomaly1'. 1. SYJ7 S£S KI ET6TPSICRITE .SEW YCSK* USSFICYP £55 / ROH CSCeiQ TAFALL / P^SB CHI m AUGUST |D73 .A LEAFLET U'AS DIST«X IS t!«A£SCL SY EOKA SD3 ?1€VS?2£KT SETTING CtT TERMS FC3 RFLcASS OF TfcE KIDS4PPSD MINISTER OF JUSTICE . TK£ .LEAFLET in2 IS THE FCHH « OF AN OPEB LSTTE& FROM QUOTE G65 .GRIVAS DI6KESIE O^UdE ADDHESfBD TO €UOTE IKE FHESIDEST CF THE .! SSASWE TO WAKE YOU U^DEHST^ND THAT I m DET£H?IIiED TO GO fr •I AHEAD BY ^LL SEA US 1» ffi?DEU TO PURSUE THE mAIRfEHT CF TKE | REfSCS^BLS BH^5A«DS » THE niUIT CF DLOC^Y > 3 ' <' CF THE PEOPLE SO THAI THEY CftH LIVE If? F«EE^C?1 , ' [ ESUftLIT' ' Y' AHF5 JUSTICE ,AS WELL AS * '.. ] dSP^CT FC-? THE HO.? C^tvr CF THE CHURCH . *,~A !* .FCUTK-M. 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MF!«VAX ¥!LL SE T?ELEJSS2D A«D VS SHALL GUSFE?® OlH ACTIVITIES AN!> -- i ,J SHALL SUBMIT TO THE ^ILL OF THE CVFHICT PECPLS * IF THEY AEE IfGT ,WE ARE OET£R?JI»EO TO a ^ P7/!7= CAHRY 0» REGftSDLESS OF SACRIFICES A SO TOO VIUL BEAR RESPOIISIBIMTY FCH WHAT WtLL EflSUE .L'SQUOIE + CCt= ^55 2 1S73 I. 2. 3. 4. 5. * INCOMING CODE CABLE TO: SECRETARY-GENERAL FROM: QSOBXQ-TAFALL, NICOSIA DATSs 2 August 1973, (Sent 0213002 Revd. 0216432)" NUMBER: UHFICYP 65! 1. Yesterday, Wednesday, 1 August, Inter-communal talks resumed. Against all odds, meeting was much better than we could expect. Denktash presented his community's views, reject- Ing administrative control by /state agencies of the local govern- ment bodies. He insisted that If local government authorities exceed their functions the affected individuals or the state agencies may bring the matter to the courts. 2. Furthermore, Denktash criticised the Greek Cypriot stand refusing to accept the bi-coamunal nature of the State and the partnership of the Turkish Cypriot Community in the Indivi- sible aspects of the State such as independence, sovereignty and territorial Integrity. 3. derides challenged Denktash to mention one single country In the world, be It unitary or federal, where the central government does not excercise at least some kind of control over local government bodies to ensure that they are acting within the framework of the constitution and also of the standard laws of the country. 4. Clerldes also refuted Denktash's elates and made clear that the Greek Cypriot side have accepted the bl-communal nature of the State as evidenced by their agreement to the President and Vice-President of the Republic each being elected by his own community; the designation of the Greek members of the Cabinet by the President and of"the Turkish members by the Vice-President; the division of functions between the President and the Vice-President and the general participation of the *•**,*•*/ of the Turkish Cyprlot community In all branches of the State, at least In the proportion 20$ to 80$. derides Insisted that while the Turkish Cypriot community ^111 be completely autono- mous on communal matters defined by the I960 constitution, local government business could not be considered as communal and nust be supervised by the state organs, alt-hough assurance would be given that such a' control would not impede the smooth function- ing of the local government "bodies. 5. I suggested that perhaps a compromise could be achieved separating into two groups the functions to be delegated to the local government bodies (that is the Greek or Turkirh rural or urban municipalities and village councils). The state agencies will have supervision of those functions which are the Joint concern of the State and of the local governnent bodies, while in respect to the residual delegated functions, the local government authorities would be autonomous and subject only to judicial control. 6. I have the feeling that JDenktash ^as very much impressed by all these arguments and perhaps for that reason he decided not to submit the document recently approved by the executive council of the Turkish administration which, accord- ing to the press, reflected the most extremist position of their leadership on the subject of regional autonomy, demanding complete separation of the two administrations. 7. Tomorrow, Friday, 3 August, we shall meet again and it is my belief that the whole matter of local government and state supervision of the local bodies vjill be referred to the two constitutional experts who will try to agree on the manner in which some kind of control -would be exercised by-the State. CODE CABLE TO: GUYER/URQUHART • FROM: OSORIO-TAFALL/PREM CHAND, NICOSIA DATE-. 31 JULY 1973 (SENT 3112532 RECEIVED 31 1351Z) NUMBER: 64?' '' 1. Detailed UNFICYP investigation with close cooperation of national guard has now been carried out into alleged helicopter activity in the area of Galatia (Karpass) on night 'of 13/14 July 1973. Information and observations furnished by members of national guard who were interviewed and questioned by UNFICYP team were scanty but credible. However, UNFICYP team has been unable to elicit any other reports from sources independent of national guard. Therefore in our view while it is not impossible that alleged flights took place we cannot express an opinion either way. The only certain fact is that there were no UN or British helicopters from SBA operating in that area at that time. 2. View expressed by Ankara (as reported by Olcay) that allegations may have been fabricated in preparation for - ' some other unwelcome developments such as a move against Turkish Cypriot community was reflected in similar comment by Orek to Miles/Henn on 28 July.. ¥e discount any such motive and feel that in suggesting it Ankara is endeavouring to turn incident to own advantage. Howeverj it is possible that government is publicising this incident in order to strengthen •? its hand in accusing the Grivas groups of playing into the hands of the Turks. 3. We note contents of "Cyprus government protest. We confirm that in December 1971 HQ national guard complained that three helicopters had landed at dawn near Chatosj but we have no record of any complaints of helicopter activity \ at that time near Mandria. Th^ere was However a complaint that ; arms were landed by sea at Mandria at about that time. We : also confirm that the government reported an alleged helicopter landing at Whamit Mandres in February 1973 but no allegation I has been made to us of such a landing at Kokina the same \ day. Againy however3 there was an allegation that arms were i landed by sea at the same time. Investigation of the cases ; reported to us has invariably led to inconclusive finding. 4. In all cases investigated we have stressed to HQ national guard and government need for reporting immediately to. HQ UNFICYP observations of unidentified helicopters if UNFICYP assistance in investigation is required. Onus must j rest in this respect with government and national guard rather j __ .._ __ | than with us as suggested.by Rossides. In present instance i - ' I although national guard claim first sighting of helicopters I (by radar) at 2150 on 13 July no report was made to HQ j UNFIGYP until mid-morning on 14 July. In any case there is - ( nothing that UWFICYP can do to physically prevent such flights if they are taking place and chances of observing them without provision of .expensive surveillance devices are minimal. Moreover., as vie have told the government, even if we were able to observe them^ we could only confirm the presence of helicopters over Cyprus airspace but would not be able to identify their nationality. 6. In our view if flights are occuring these are part \ " ' ' \ of general plan and not related specifically to any new ' developments on the island. '. • t. REGKNT DEVELOPMENTS I. MIDDLE EAST UIWSO reports no significant nev; developments, II. K/VSHMIR UNMOGIP reports no significant new developments. Ill. CYPRUS 1. Rotation With g^od offices and assistance of UNFICYP. rotation of Turkish national contingent was completed on 27 February 1973. There were two minor problems: three unusua.lly heavy diplomatic bags which the Government believed contained material other than official documents, and. an allegation by the Government that two Turkish torpedo boats escorting the ship carrying the troops had violated Cyprus territorial waters. UKFICYP persuaded the Government to drop its demand for electronic inspection of the bags. UHFICYP also informed the Government that the boats h?d remained outside the J>-mi\e limit and out of sight of the harbour. 2. Turkish Cypriot arms: Orek showed IWICYP officials one of the rocket launchers, with, all identifying mark,1?: obliterated. This wea.pon will be examined, by an UEFICYP expert, but this will not suffice to substantiate leadership's claim that the weapons have not been newly imported 3. Intercommunal talks: The talks resumed on 1 March 19733 but the Denktash-Aldika.chti paper concerning regional autonomy will not be ready until mid-March, apparently as a result of differences within the Turkish Government. Delay is also connected with elections in Turkey scheduled 13 March. As a result, the talks have been slowed down substantially and the timetable agreed upon in November 19?23 which envisaged completion of the experts' work by the end of February, has had to be dropped. UNITED NATIONS NATIONS UNIES INTEROFFICE MEMORANDUM MEMORANDUM 1NTERIEUR February 1973 TO: Mr. Kurt Waldheim DATE: A: Secretary-General REFERENCE: Mr. R. E. Guyer, Under-Secretary-General THROUGH: S/C DE: Mr. B. E. Urquhart, Assistant Secretary-Gerfer Office of the Under-Secretary-General for Special Political Affairs FROM: OE: Robert J. Ryan Assistant Secretary-General SUBJECT: Office of General Services OBJET: UNFICYP - Special Awards of United Nations Medals 1. I refer to "Guiding Principles for Special Awards of the UN (Cyprus) Medal" governing past cases of an award of a United Nations Medal in accordance with Part IV, Paragraph 3 of the "Regulations for the United Nations Medal", Document ST/SGB/119/Rev.l dated 16 February 1966 for cases of service for less than 90 days. A copy of the Guiding Principles marked Annex B is attached for ready reference. 2. The Force Commander of UNFICYP in his memorandum of 19 January 1973 has recommended for approval the award of the United Nations Medal to those names listed on Annex A attached. The listing comprises two categories: a) Posthumous Awards (5 cases) and b. Awards Following Pre- mature Repatriation (2 cases). 3. I have examined the recommendations submitted by the Force Commander for approval of the award of the Medal and concur with him in his recommendation that the Secretary- General approve the award of United Nations Medals to the 7 cases involved under provisions of Part IV, Paragraph 3 of the relevant Regulations and request the Secretary-General's approval thereof. Annex B to Inter Office Memo dated 19 Jan. 73 GUIDING PRINCIPLES FOR SPECIAL AWARDS OF THE UN (CYPRUS) MEDAL 1. All cases for an award of the UN medal for less than 90 days contin- uous service with UNFICYP are to be submitted for the Force Commander's personal consideration (through HQ UNFICYP Pers Branch) before he makes his recommendation to New York. All such cases must finally be approved by UN HQ in New York. 2. Service of less than 90 days which is brought to an end on account of death or evacuation due to wounds or other physical disability contracted while serving in Cyprus with UNFICYP, will qualify for the medal unless the cause of death or wounds was self-inflicted, due to misconduct or culpable neglect or the disability was incurred in circumstances of disrepute. The individual must have been "on duty" in the broadest sense and "not to blame" in the strictest sense. Casualties incurred on leave would not be "on duty" but otherwise the fact that an individual was serving with UNFICYP in Cyprus would qualify him as being on duty. Casualties incurred in any circumstances which bring discredit on the United Nations or the individual or his contin- gent will not be allowed to qualify for the award of the medal. In cases where injury or illness lead to repatriation, there must be some element of disability caused, and the curtailed service must be sufficiently near to the full period to warrant special consideration. 3. Service which is curtailed because of a reduction in the strength of UNFICYP, ordered by UN HQ (as opposed to national MODs) will qualify provided the individual concerned has completed 30 days service in Cyprus with UNFICYP. it-. Broken service will be allowed to count if the break is due to national MOD policy or the grant of compassionate leave of less than 30 days, provided that a total of 90 days in Cyprus has been accumulated. Annex A to Inter Office Memo dated 19 Jan.'73 " AWARDS OF THE UN (CYPRUS) MEDAL FOR WHICH THE APPROVAL OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL IS REQUIRED NO. OF DAYS SERVED NO. RANK NAME CONTINGENT CIRCUMSTANCES WITH UNFICYP 1. POSTHUMOUS AWARDS a. 21*129287 Rfn R P HILL, RGJ British Died on a tent fire in Jan. 71 72 b. 21*106768 Rfn K C CHAVNER, RGJ British Died in a tent fire in Jan. 71 73 c. 81869!* Pte B CUMMINS Irish Died in hospital in Cyprus undergoing an operation in k9 June 71 d. 2l*ll*5702 Pte E MEARNS, RAOC British Died in a fire in Camp in August 85 71 e. 21*121*61*1* Dvr B LOVER, RCT British Died in a fire in Camp in August 39 71 2. AWARDS FOLLOWING PREMATURE REPATRIATION a. 16189 Pte MARTENSSON Swedish Repatriated due to illness in November 70 b. 21*2101*28 Spr P DUNKLEY, RE British Repatriated after serious acci- 75 dental physical injuries sustained in July 72. His record with UNFICYP was excellent. In no case were these casualties incurred in circumstances which would bring discredit on the United Nations or the individual concerned. MATRONS USSS1ES FORCE IN CYPRUS 1Q.Januar y 1973 To: Dr. Roberto E. Guyer Under-Secretary-General for Special Political Affairs, and Mr. Brian E. Urquhart Assistant Secretary-General for Special, Political Affairs PromJ Major General D. Prem Chand Force Commander Subject: AWARD OF THE UN (CYPRUS) MEDAL 1« Your memorandum of S.January 1973 makes the policy for special awards of the UK (Cyprus) Medal quite clear. I should like to confirm that the purpose of the guiding principles is solely to help determine, within the framework of the existing regulations for the UN medal, the exceptional cases for the award of the medal which should be recommended to the Secretary-Generalo The text of the guiding principles will NOT be promulgated within the Force, but will be kept within the Headquarters for use when necessary. 2. A review of past cases has been conducted, and the list at Annex A is commended to the Secretary-General for his approval of the award of the medal. The list includes five posthumous awards, and two cases of early repatriation. All the cases occurred since your deadline of December 1969 and it would in any case be undesirable to go back further. 3. With a view to keeping the number of special awards to a minimum, a statistical review has been made of the number of premature repatriations which have taken place in a sample period of six months. This has shown that the number of cases to be specially considered before making any recommendation would not be unlikely to exceed one per thousand normal awards of the UN medal. Each of these cases would then be taken on its merits, and it is thought unlikely that the final number recommended to the Secretary-General would be such as to detract from the esteem in which the medal is held, particularly by its wearers. 4. Your formal approval of the award to those listed in Annex A is requested. A copy of the text (amended as you suggest) is attached to this memorandum (Annex B) as a record. Encs: Annex A - Cases submitted for approval Annex B - Agreed text of guiding principles. Annex A to AWARDS OF THE TO (CYPRUS) MEDAL Inter Office Memo FOR MIGH THE APPROVAL 0? THE SECRETARY-GENERAL IS REQUIRED dated 19 Jan 73 NO RAM NAME CONTINGENT CIRCUMSTANCES NO OF DAYS SERVED WITH UNPICYP 1o POSTHUMOUS AWARDS a. 2412928? Rfn R P HILL, RGJ British Died in a tent fire in Jan 71 72 bo 24106768 Rfn K C CHAVNER, RGJ British Died in a tent fire in Jan 71 73 c* 818694 Pte B CUMMINS Irish Died in hospital in Cyprus undergoing an operation in 49 Jun 71 d. 24145702 Pte E MEARNS, RAOC British Died in a fire in Camp in Aug 85 71 e. 24124644 Dvr B LOVER, RCT British Died in a fire in Camp in Aug 39 71 2. AWARDS FOLLOWING PRHMATURE BBPATRIATION a. 16189 Pte MARTENSSON Swedish Repatriated due to illenss in 84 Nov 70 t>. 24210428 Spr P DUNKLEY, RE British Repatriated after serious acci- dental physical injuries sustained 75 in Jul 72. His record with UNFICYP was excellent. In no case were these casualties incurred in circumstances which would bring discredit on the United Nations or the individual concerned* Annex B to Inter Office Memo dated 19 Jan 73 GUIDING PRIIIGIPL3S FOR SPSGIAL AWARDS OF THE! UN (CYPRUS) MEDAL 1. All cases for an award of the TIN medal for less than 90 days contin- uous service with MKEGYP are to be submitted for the Force Commander's personal consideration (through HQ, TJNFICYP Pers Branch) before he makes his recommendation to Hew York. J0.1 such cases must finally be approved by UN HQ in ITew York. 2c Service of less than 90 days which is brought to an end on account of death or evacuation due to wounds or other physical disability contracted while serving in Cyprus with UlTFICYPj will qualify for the medal unless the cause of death or wounds was self-inflietedt due to misconduct or culpable neglect or the disability was incurred in circumstances of disrepute. The individual must have been "on duty" in the broadest sense and "not to blame" in the strictest sense* Casualties incurred on leave would not be "on duty" hut otherwise the fact that an individual was serving with U1TFICYP in Cyprus would qualify him as being on duty. Casualties incurred in any circumstances which bring discredit on the United Nations or the individual or his contin- gent will not be allowed to qualify for the award of the medalo In cases where injury or illness lead to repatriation, there must be some element of disability caused, and the curtailed service must be sufficiently near to the full period to warrant special consideration* 3<> Service which is curtailed because of a reduction in the strength of MKECYP, ordered by UN HQ (as opposed to national MODs) will qualify provided the individual concerned has completed 30 days service in Cyprus with UNFICYP. 4» Broken service will be allowed to count if the break is due to national MOD policy or the grant of compassionate leave of less than 30 days, provided that a total of 90 days in Cyprus has been accumulated* Draft GLG/hr.j 1^ Ilovember 1972 Mr. Osorio-Tafall's message of 11 November 1972 indicates that all the participants in the interconmiunal talks have accepted in principle his formula concerning central communal Authorities, which has beer- one of the main issues in the dispute. Under this formula, the two branches of the House of'Representatives (Greek-Cypriots and Turkish- Cypriots), meeting separately, would each exercise the functions of Central Authority for the communal affairs and local Government business of the respective communities. In other words, each branch would supervise the local Government Authorities in villages and municipalities inhabited by members of its community, and would also deal centrally with its community's affairs. As a consequence of this formula, it will now be necessary to reach agreement on the extent and nature of the authority to be conferred on the two branches of the House. The following issues will have to be decided: (a) Will each Branch exerc.ise legislative or executive authority or both? .(b) Will some of the authority previously exercised by the President and Vice-President (jointly or separately) be given to the two branches of the House? (The Turks want the bulk of executive authority to be exercised by the President and Vice-' President separately, or in a manner requiring agreement between them; the Greeks want executive authority to be exercised by the President alone). , INCOMING CODE CABLE TO: SECRETARY-GENERAL FROM: OSORIO-TAFALL . . DATE: 11 November 1972 (Sent 11/09022, Reed 11/1Q06Z) UNNUMBERED Further to my unnumbered of 28 Octcber. 1. First two plenary meetings of fourth round of inter- communal talks took place on Wednesday 8 and Friday 10 November. The constitutional experts met three times during the week to prepare joint paper stating their views of the Republic, Although a great measure of agreement was reached between Justice Dekleris and Professor Aldikacti they were unable to finalise joint paper. As Professor Aldikacti will be away during next week",, meetings were adjourned until Wednesday* 22 November. The two experts will meet on Tuesday, 21 November, when they expect to finalize their Joint opinion. 2, During the first two rounds of meeting? substantial agreement was reach.e_d_in respect of the ejce^cjjj^ive^JPart I of ,1960 Constitution, Articles' 36-60). However, as result of acceptance in principle of formula giving to the two branches of House ofRepresentatlves functions of Central Authority for I Communal. Affairs andlO£aJ:__goj7e2Tment^ business, It is ^necessary ;o modify (a) the distribution of power and function? branches of the executive, that is, the President and the Vice-President of the Republic jointly and separately: (b) the Legislative and Executive power of the Turkish and Greek branches of the House of Representative in respect of communal affairs as enumerated in part V of the Constitution (Articles 86-111): and (c) the new functionr, with or- without legislative power (this has not yet been decided) but certain- ly Including coordination and supervision of local government a thorities, to be entrusted to both branches of the Hou-^e. 3. In addition to the attribution or not of Authority to the two branches of the House of Representative^ . -2- „••' about which there is not yet agreement between the two rider, there.is the problem of reaching agreement on Article 4? of the Constitution, that is, the/Executive Power exerciged con- jointly by the President and th^Wce^Pr^sident of the Republic. 4. The Greek side say that most of the prerogatives rightly belong to the President of the Republic, while the Turkish stand;is to maintain the article as it is in order to reinforce the bi-communal nature of the state. 5. I hope that when talks resume on 22, some formula will be found ;to solve the two above-mentioned problems. , DISTRIBUTION {/f Secretary-General Sarasirnhan Guyer L] Morse D Tang PI Kutakov .:. . ^l^avropo-alos Urquhart . Sivasankar Lansky n n a ROUTING SLIP FICHE DE TRANSMISSION TO: As TTr. Hennig FOR ACTION POUR SUITE A DONNER FOR APPROVAL POUR APPROBATION FOR SIGNATURE POUR SIGNATURE PREPARE DRAFT PRO JET A REDIGER FOR COMMENTS POUR OBSERVATIONS MAY WE CONFER? POURRIONS-NOUS EN PARLER? . YOUR ATTENTION VOTRE ATTENTION AS DISCUSSED COMME CONVENU AS REQUESTED SUITE A VOTRE DEMANDS NOTE AND FILE NOTER ET CLASSER NOTE AND RETURN NOTER ET RETOURNER FOR INFORMATION POUR INFORMATION Please remind the Secretary-General of the need for a renly to the Turkish Foreign Minister's nfssage. ^S^7-1 . '• Date: FROM: DE: 25.10.72. R. E. 0uyer ]/ CR. 13 (11-64) CONFIDENTIAL Telephone conversation with Ambassador Olcay of Turkey on 25 October 1972 At the request of the Secretary-General I returned a telephone call made to him by Ambassador Olcay. The Ambassador stated that he had been instructed by his Foreign Minister to visit the Secretary- General and to stress the importance his Government gave to the possibility that Mr. Osorio-Tafall should continue in his present position. They had heard that Mr. Osorio-Tafall would be relieved shortly, and Mr. Eayulken was sending a personal message to MJT. ¥aldhein begging him to keep Mr. Osorio-Tafall as long as possible. Mr. Osorio-Tafall enjoyed, the confidence of all the parties and, in view of the -present delicate moment of the inter-communal talks, Kr. Bayulken thought it was better not to change in midstream. I said that I would convey the message to the Secretary-General and that the Ambassador would shortly receive Mr. Vlaldheim's official answer to Mr. Bayulken's personal message. I stressed, personally, that it had never been a question of wanting to replace Mr. Osorio- Tafall, but that since last year Mr. Osorio-Tafall had repeatedly requested to be relieved of his present rjosition. He had stayed this long only due to the personal requests of the Secretary-General. Rote for Secretgry-ggBeral'a meeting vith Mr, Qsorlo-fafall in Sgaeya on frlday 30 June 1* President Makarios asked the Secretary-general on several occasions during his recent visit, to Cyprus to suggest courses of action that the Ctovernraent of Cyprus migfrfc take to improve the situation. At that tiros the Secretary-General suggested that it vas most Important to make reasonable concessions in order to promote progress in the inter-coTHtaunal talks. It -was, and remains, the Secretary-General's view that the President would be very wise to make gestures tovaieda the Turkish Cypriot community ^ftiich •would give impetus to the tntey-cofflmunal talks aad could be the "basis on which reciprocal concessions could "be asked from the Turkish Cypriote. 2. She Secretary-General also undertook to give the President hia impressions after his talks in Ankara and Athena. One of the purposes of the consul- tation -with Mr. Qsorio-fafall is to transmit through him to the President the Secretasy-Oeneral's impressions after these talks. garfciah attitude 3. The attitude of the Turkish Qwerniaeht is undoubtedly very firm and has been strengthened by the apparent agreeiaeat -with Greece to co-operate on Cyprus taattera. fbe Turkish Oovernttent is adataant against enosis^ which it flatly states would be a cause for military intervention by Turkey and possibly of var with Greece aa well «* both of which developments the (Jreek Goverameat -would certainly T?ish to avoid. kt Ibe Turkish Sovemiaent is equaliy adaimnt about maintaining the Treaties, which they regard as the principle support of the Turkish Cypriot position. fhey believe that the key to the future In Cyprus is the co-operation of two autonomous eorajaunitles. furkey is ngti in favour of partition, but would regard partition as an inevitable reaction to any attempt at eaosis. 5. Turkey complains that Makarios is only willing to raake concessions to the Turkish Cypriot a as a minority, fhis cannot "be accepted. It is also a matter of prestige for the Turkish Government, i»hich insists on an independent and balanced partnership of the two communities . Until this is achieved, the struggle will continue. 6. fhe Turkish Oovemtaent, although it wishes for a peaceful solution, maintains that in the present circumstances the security of the Turkish eonmmnity can oniy be preserved by military preparedness. Both the Foreign Minister and the IPriBie Minister of Turkey expressed anxiety that if the Turkish Cypriots were to give up their arms, the Greeks would impose a fait accompli* They emphasize the laek of confidence of the Turkish Cypriot community in the intentions of the Greek Cypriote. They are gratified by the reactivation of the inter-communal talks, which they hope will bring about "better understanding and progress toward a settlement, ?• la response to the view that the Turkish (Jypriots can not have local autonomy as veil as the Treaties, Bayulketi pointed out that if Makarios vas uneasy about the policy of the Greek Government and also realises that enosis is not po$sifcle, he should abide by the treaties, which rule out both partition and enosis. The Turkish Government believes that it should be possible, taking the treaties as an existing legal framework, to devise through the inter-communal talks a revised constitution acceptable to both communities« 8, The Turkish Government also urged measures by which the Turkish community could eater into full partnership in the econoraic life of the Island. Greek attitude 9« From talks in Athens it was clear that the Greek Government takes a realistic view of the Cyprus situation and is very anxious that, through the efforts of the President and through the Inter-communal talks, as well as by the improved relationship between Greece and Turkey, a settlement should be found. The Greek Government realises that enosis is not feasible and wishes Oyprut to retrain as an independent, sovereign, unitary state. The Greek Government believes that President mkarios expresses the view of the majority of the people of Cyprus. 10. Kbe Greek Government is also realistic about the Turkish position and believes that the inter-communal talks should start t&ere they stopped, since a considerable measure of agreement had already been achieved. There are, of course, gaps where new formulas are required, The constitutional experts should be able to help in evolving compromise formulas to fill these gape, 11. While the Greek Government realises that enosis is impractical^ it is apprehensive that the Turks will create an infrastructure for partition. The Sreek Government points out that while there ia no sign of an attempt to bring about enosis, there is on the Turkish side a de facto partition. T-i- " • "' . - A- -*.- 0reek Cfoverrffient regards it as essential that the eoraatunities live together and work out "better relations with each other. 12, The 0reek Government wants the independence of Cyprus recognized and safeguarded. In this regard it Relieves that the Zurich Agreement , which ru£es out "both enosis and partition, should be maintained. It believes in the validity of the Treaties, even though they are not being applied for the time being. . 1$, She Oreek (Government believes that, for the success of the inter- communal talks, it is essential to improve the de facto situation by deconfrontation and by improving the relations between the communities. Here the Turks should show more co-operation, while positive gestures from President Makarios would also be most valuable. In fact, both sides should agree to make further coaee§9ioas and gestures to facilitate a solution, l4, 1!he Greek Foreign Minister pointed out that Article 185 of the old constitution deals with enosis and partition and could be included in a new constitution, .ttereby avoiding the need to have a separate declaration on and partition, which would be psychologically difficult for all parties. &reek Government does sot want the Cyprus problem settled against the interests of Turkey, but it eansot allow it to be settled in opposition to the of Greece. Possible courses of action to be suggested to .President MakarJoa 15« Arising out of the above talks and the Secretary-General 's conversations •with President Makarioa, the following points might be suggested in answer to the President *& request to the Secretary-General for suggestions, (a) 5?o search for actions and gestures which would build up the confidence of the 5?urkish Sypriot eoiaraunity, and especially of the young people, and wMeh would build up friendly contact between the two communities. (b) fo study the possibility of concessions on IJurkish participation in the government and adminietrations, e.g. acceptance of several Turkish ministers in the Cabinet, (e) To study possibility of using the treaties as a legal framework for a revised constitution and thus to provide a basis for asking reciprocal concessions from Sorkisa Cypriote. Obviously the Turkish Cygriot community must be u#ge& to make reciprocal gestures and concessions, e.g. on confrontation, freedom of movement in enslaves> etc. UNITED NATIONS NATIONS UNIES INTEROFFICE MEMORANDUM MEMORANDUM 1NTERIEUR TO: The Secretary-Gener DATE: 23 May 1972 A: • REFERENCE: THROUGH: SIC. DE: FROM: Roberto E. Guyer, Under-Secretary-General DE: for Special Political Affairs SUBJECT: Reactivation of the interconmunal talks OBJET: 1. The Governments of Cyprus, Greece and Turkey have now all accepted your proposal for an early reactivation of the interconmunal talks. 2. Brian and I have cabled to Osorio-Tafall to ask him to secure the responses of derides and Denktash as soon as possible. v-» UNITED NATIONS NATIONS UNIES INTEROFFICE MEMORANDUM MEMORANDUM INTERIEUR TO: The Secretary-General //////- DATE: 12 May 1972 A: f' (-'••''• CONFIDETIAL FROM: S. Guyer DE = Under-Secretary-Gen^al I ^ '•"* for Special Political Affairs / / > ^ SUBJECT: Meeting with the Turkish representatives on the reactivation of the intercomniunal talks 1. I met with the Turkish Charge" d1 Affaires, Mr. Belen, on the morning of 12 May 1972 to discuss the react ivat ion of the intercommunal talks. 2» Mr. Belen stated that the six points submitted, "by him on 28 April did not constitute pre-conditions. The Turkish Government did not wish to impose pre-conditions for the resumption of the talks in their broadened form. However, in view of the recent developments in Cyprus which had irarred the already tense atmosphere of mutual distrust, the Turkish Government felt that certain efforts should be made prior to the resumption of the talks with a view to improving that atmosphere. Consequently the Turkish Government considered it appropriate and requested that the Secretary-General should make a statement, in a manner he would consider appropriate, which would cover the following points: "(a) All efforts have been made to resolve the problem of the importation of arms into the Island in a satisfactory manner so as to dissipate the anxiety created by it. There should be no doubt that the agreement reached on this problem will be fully implemented. The necessary assurances have been given to the United Nations on this matter and the United Nations will ensure that this agreement will be carefully implemented. (b) The parties concerned have confirmed the agreement originally reached by all concerned regarding the nature of the inter- communal talks as well as the principles on which those talks were based. (c) It would be appropriate if the Secretary-General would mention in the proposed statement those points among the six listed "by the Turkish Government which are already accepted by the parties ana thus would not create problems/' 3, In reply to my questions Mr. Belen further stated that the contenr,s and the form of the requested statement would be for the Secretary-General to decide. Ke felt that this matter could be best settled between the UNITED NATIONS NATIONS UNIES INTEROFFICE MEMORANDUM MEMORANDUM INTERIEUR TO: The Secretary-General : 12 May 19/T2 A: •( Ci^J^ THROUGH: S/C DE: EfiOM: Roberto E. Guyer DE: Under-Secretary-Gene^ral' for Special Political Affairs SUBJECT: Meeting; with "the Turkish representatives on the reactivation of the intercommunal talks 1, I met with the Turkish Charge" d'Affaires, Mr. Belen, on the morning of 12 May 19T2 to discuss the reactivation of the intercomiaunal talks, 2, Mr. Belen stated that the six points submitted by him on 28 April did not constitute pre-conditions. The Turkish Government did not wish to impose pre-conditions for the resumption of the talks in their broadened form. However, in view of the recent developments in Cyprus which had marred the already tense atmosphere of mutual distrust, the Turkish Government felt that certain efforts should be made prior to the resumption of the talks with a view to improving that atmosphere. Consequently the Turkish Government considered it appropriate and requested that the Secretary-General should make a statement, in a manner he would consider appropriate, which would cover the following points: "(a) All efforts have been made to resolve the problem of the importation of arms into the Island in a satisfactory manner so as to dissipate the anxiety created by it. There should be no doubt that the agreement reached on this problem will be fully implemented. The necessary assurances have been given to the United Nations on this matter and the United Nations will ensure that this agreement will be carefully implemented. (b) The parties concerned have confirmed the agreement originally reached by all concerned regarding the nature of the inter- communal talks as well as the principles on which those talks were based. (c) It would be appropriate if the Secretary-General would mention in the proposed statement those points among the six listed by the Turkish Government which are already accepted by the parties and thus would not create problems." 3, In reply to my questions Mr. Belen further stated that the contents and the form of the requested statement would be for the Secretary-General to decide. He felt that this matter could be best settled between the Secretary-General and the Turkish Mission without being referred to the other parties concerned. Off the record he confided that the Turkish Government was anxious to reach an agreement and had in fact already designated its expert for the broadened talks. 4; I told him that the Turkish new proposal seemed a step forward towards the reactivation of the intercommunal talks and that we would give urgent and serious consideration to it. I expressed the hope that an agreement would be reached so that it could be included in the Secretary-General's periodic report -to the Security Council, or even before then. 5. Brian and I are sending a cable to Osorio-Tafall to inform him of this new development and to request his comments. We are giving careful consideration to the Turkish request and hope to submit our proposed course of action to you for your approval early next week. It goes without saying that before final action is taken we will have to inform the representatives of Cyprus and Greece here of it. UNITED NATIONS t INATIONS UNIES INTEROFFICE MEMORANDUM MEMORANDUM INTER1EUR TO: „ DATE: 17 March 1972 A: The Secretary-Genery REFERENCE: THROUGH: S/C DZ: Roberto E. Guyer FROM: DE: Under-Secretary-General for Special Political Affairs SUBJECT: OBJET: Meeting with Ambassador Eren of Turkey 1. As instructed by you, I met with Ambassador Eren on 17 March. 1972 and conveyed to him the observations made by Ambassador Rossides in his letter to you of 14 March (text attached). ' — •— 2. Ambassador Eren stated that his Government was merely acting in accordance with its Treaty obligations. 3. I told him that the Secretary-General must be guided by the United Nations Charter and the Security Council resolutions on Cyprus. (Article 2 of the Charter mentioned in Security Council resolution 186 (1964) provides that all members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State.) k. Ambassador Eren was, of course, referring to the Treaty of Guarantee of I960, under which Turkey as well as Greece and the United Kingdom reserve the right to take action with the sole aim of re-establishing the state of affairs created by the I960 Constitution of Cyprus. The Government of Cyprus has denounced that Treaty, but Turkey insists that it is still valid. ' ~ TMHE SECRETARY-GENERAL I do not think that the question raised by Ambassador Rossides is urgent, particularly after the recent conclusion of the agreement on arms inspection. In view of Ambassador Rossides1 request we will have to raise it with thj^^rk^h^Repre^ntativeJ?ut I feel "th~at~we should do" so in low key. We might take this opportunity to express the hope that all of the parties will continue to exercise restraint and co-operate for the early reactivation of the intercommunal talks. If you agree I shall raise this question with Ambassador Eren at an early opportunity. "——-»«« -J " 1 "'• ROUTING SLIP n Flg^E DE TRANSMISSION l°- /k • MA/V^w ' > |FOR_ACTION. POUR SUITE A DONNER TFoifAppRovAL POUR APPROBATION / FOR SIGNATURE POUR SIGNATURE / PREPARE DRAFT PRO JET A REDIGER [ , FOR COMMENTS POUR OBSERVATIONS X-AMAY WE CONFER? POURRIONS-NOUS EN PARLER? YOUR ATTENTION VOTRE ATTENTION AS DISCUSSED COMME CONVENU AS REQUESTED SUITE A VOTRE DEMANDE NOTE AND FILE NOTERET CLASSER NOTE AND RETURN NOTER ET RETOURNER FOR INFORMATION POUR INFORMATION /y /' Date; FROM: DE: CR. 13 (11-64) PERMANENT MISSION OF THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS TO THE UNITED NATIONS S2O SECOND AVENUE NEW YORK, N. Y. 1OO17 Ref: 82/71 14 March 1972 Excellency, On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to draw Your Excellency's attention to an official statement made by the Foreign Ministry in Ankara and reported on the 10th of March 1972 by the B.B.C. of London, as follows: "Turkey has made it known that it will intervene in Cyprus if fighting breaks out between the rival Greek factions and embroils the Turkish Cypriot community. An authoritative Turkish source in the Turkish Foreign Ministry said that Turkey has taken the necessary measures for immediate military intervention, if necessary, and has informed all countries concerned, including the United States." On the same day a similar report was given in an Associated Press dispatch from Ankara, also quoting "authori- tative sources". My Government wishes to protest most emphatically against such provocative statements involving a direct threat of the use of force against Cyprus in flagrant violation of the Charter and the relevant Resolutions by the Security Council and the General Assembly. I wish to stress once again, as I had occasion to do in the past (S/8348 and S/10185), that under the Charter of the United Nations and the peremptory norms of contemporary international law, no state has the right to intervene, by force or otherwise, in the internal affairs of another state on whatever grounds. It may be pertinent to remind that Cyprus is not a protectorate. Although a small country, possessing no military power, it is nonetheless a full Member State of the U. N. entitled to equal rights of sovereignty and respect of its territorial integrity and independence under the Charter as well as to United Nations protection against "any foreign intervention or interference". This is specifically recognized by the Security Council Resolution 186 (1964) of 4 March 1964 on Cyprus, and clearly affirmed by General Assembly Resolution 2077 (XX) of 18 December 1965. Ref: 82/71 -2- 14 March 1972 My Government would be grateful if Your Excellency would make, on this matter, the necessary representations to the Turkish Government. Please accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration. Rossides Ambassador Permanent Representative of Cyprus to the United Nations His Excellency Mr. Kurt Waldheim Secretary-General United Nations, N. Y. 4H ,-«>T. U POSITIOMS OF PARTIES CONCERNING "OBSERgarftONS" CHAPTER\OiFTEHk F CYPRUS REPORT 1. Report of 30 November 1971 (S/L0401, para. 101) contained following formulation concerning "peaceful and just settlement" of Cyprus problem: "As I have previously indicated, the basis of such a settlement should be found in the concept of an independent, sovereign and unitary state with the adequate participation of the two communities." 2. Cyprus insists on the inclusion of the Secretary-General's formula, preferably however omitting the reference to "the adequate participation of the two communities". 3. Greece is not happy about the mention of the word "independent". In another context, the Greek Permanent Representative has urged that any mention of the recent controversy between his Government and that of President Makarios should be avoided. 4. Turkey is opposed to the inclusion in the report of substantive prescriptions of any kind concerning the solution of the Cyprus problem, and would like the report to adhere to the approach adopted in the aide- memoire, covering procedural matters only. Turkey takes particular exception to the phrase "unitary state", to the extent of making veiled warnings that its use might jeopardize the atmosphere of the talks and even the Secretary- General's projected visit. 5. We propose that the Secretary-General, in his "Observations", should follow the formula in para, (l) above while covering as far as possible the preoccupations of all sides and preserving the integrity of the - 2 - Secretary-General's own position. This purpose might be achieved by the use of a passage along the following lines: "The Council will recall that in the last report, the Secretary- General expressed the view that, as he had previously indicated, 'the basis of a settlement should thus be found in the concept of an independent, sovereign and unitary state with the adequate participation of the two communities.' The parties concerned each have reservations on different elements of this formulation. For instance, one party has questioned the reference in this context to the two communities. Another party has strongly questioned the use of the word 'unitary1, on the grounds that its precise interpretation has not been agreed upon. Even the use of the word 'independent' has raised certain misgivings by another party." 6. It may be recalled that in its resolution 186 (1964), the Security Council recommended that the Cyprus mediator: "shall use his best endeavours with the representatives of the communities and also with the aforesaid four Governments, for the purpose of promoting a peaceful solution and an agreed settlement of the problem confronting Cyprus, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, having in mind the well-being of the people of Cyprus as a whole and the preservation of international peace and security." -22- IV. INTERCraMJHAL TALKS AND GOOD OFFICES OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL 55« The last meeting between Mr, Clerides and Mr. Benktash in the series of inter communal talks -which began almost three years ago took place on 20 September 1971* Since that meeting, the channel of communications "between the •two communities -which was opened on 24 June 1968 under the good offices of the ~~ /* Secretary-General's Special Representative has remained virtually inactive. Curing this difficult period, UNFICYP has been instrumental in reducing tensions and in assisting the population of the Island as a -whole in the solution of a number of short term and long term problems. The last report on the United nations operation in Cyprus gives an account of the efforts made by the Secretary-General to resolve the impasse in the talks and of his suggestion, in his aide-memoire of 18 October 1971, "to reactivate the intercommunal talks and make them more effective. The report also gives an account of the reactions to the Secretary-General's suggestions (S/K&Ol, Chapter V). 56. It will be recalled that in the course of the 1612th meeting of the Security Council on 13 December 1971, the Foreign Minister of Cyprus? Mr. Kyprianou, stated that his Government had decided to accept the Secretary-General's proposal as it stood. The Permanent Representative of Turkey expressed confidence that further contacts with the Secretary-General would soon produce a consensus upon which the talks might be resumed. The Permanent Representative of Greece re- iterated his Government's acceptance of the aide-memoire, 57- Upon assuming office in 1972, the Secretary-General continued his predecessor's efforts to arrive at an agreement on this subject. He asked Mr. Roberto E. Guyer, Under Secretary-General for Special Political Affairs^ to visit Nicosia, Athens and Ankara in order to convey to all concerned the Secretary-General's earnest wish that the suggestion for the reactivation of the talks should be fully accepted by all concerned. Mr. Guyer visited the three capitals between 30 January and 5 February 1972, His conversations there resulted in agreement in principle for the reactivation of the intercomaunal talks on tne basis of the aide-memoire of 18 October 1971 under a United Nations formula applicable to all concerned. The formula specifies that the participation in the reactivated intercoomunal talks pursuant to the suggestion of the Secretary-General contained in his aide-memoire of 18 October 1971 shall not prejudice the well-known legal and political positions of all concerned. 58". The resumption of the talks was subsequently delayed by certain developments, including the developments referred to in para. 30 of this report/ which were the subject of the Secretary-General's special •f reports to the Security Council of 16 March and 21 and 28 April 1972 (S/10564 and Adds. 1, 2). The firm assurances received by the Secretary- General that the improved arrangements arrived at in this connexion, would continue to be fully observed, and his confidence that their implementation would be insured by UTIFICYP in accordance with the terns of the arrangements reported to the Council, constituted a positive development which encouraged the Secretary-General to resume his efforts aimed at reactivating the intercoromunal talks. .59. Accordingly, the Secretary-General on 2bt April asked the Permanent ~- Representatives of Cyprus jz&H Turkey and He further requested confirmation of the agreement originally arrived atiby gll concerned regarding the nature of the talks and the principles on; which they would be based, On 11 May in Nicosia Mr. Denktash conveyed similar views to thejspecial (!?epr es entati ve. 6l. On the basis of these statements of position, "the Secretary- General considered that the tine had come to call on all concerned to reactivate the intercommunal talks without delay and to resume the search for settlement of the long tern problem of Cyprus. He sub- mitted identical copies of an aide mecioire to this effecir~6n 18 May 1972 to the Permanent Representative^ °£ Cyprus, Greece and Turkey. Copies were also handed/ to "the President of Cyprus, to the Vice President, and to the interlocutors in the talks, Mr. 'derides and Mr.Denktash. ' 62, In his aide m&ioire of 18 May, the Secretary-General expressed the understanding that it was the desire of gll concerned that the re-activated talks should continue, as had been the case since 1968. to be based on the equal status of the representatives of the two communities, to be exploratory in nature and to be limited to the internal situation of the independent state of Cyprus and to the constitutional matters relevant thereto* His Special Representative vould take part in the talks between the representatives of the two communities in the context of the good offices which he had been exercising on behalf of the Secretary-General and subject to "the clarifications mentioned in the Secretary-General's report (S/1C401 paragraph 80), The Secretary-General voiced the hope that with the agreement of all concerned the talks as suggested vould begin shortly. The Special Representative would be at the disposal of those concerned in arranging a convenient tine and place. Lastly, the Secretary-General expressed the hope that the reactivated interccamunal talks would facilitate the achievement of an agreed lasting peaceful and just settlement. 6j. The Permanent Representative of Greece on 22 May and the Charge" d' Affaires of Cyprus and the Acting Permanent Representative -26- of Turkey on 2J May informed the Secretary-General that they accepted his call for the speedy resumption of intercommunal talks in their new form. Mr. derides and Mr. Benktash similarly expressed their agreement on 24 May to the Special Representative in Nicosia. The representatives of Greece and Turkey have also notified the Secretary- Mr. MichaelDekleris and Mr. Orhan Aldikaqti as General that their Governments have designated/the respective 's constitutional experts who will attend the talks in an advisory capacity. The Secretary-General has asked Ms Special Representative to contact those concerned without delay concerning the practical arrangements for the resumption of the talks.