UN Rapid Deployment, As More Difficult Than to Recover from an Initial Percep - Well As Cooperative Efforts to Revitalize the Former Tion of Weakness
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OCTOBER 2014 Improving United Nations Capacity for Rapid Deployment PROVIDING FOR PEACEKEEPING NO. 8 H. PETER LANGILLE Cover Photo: Members of the Pakistani- ABOUT THE AUTHOR led Quick Reaction Force (QRF) at the United Nations Mission in Liberia DR. H. PETER LANGILLE specializes in peace and conflict (UNMIL) conduct a rapid-reaction studies, UN peace operations, and independent analysis of training exercise near Monrovia, Liberia, defense and security policy. on January 25, 2013. UN Photo/Staton Winter. Email: [email protected] Disclaimer: The views expressed in this paper represent those of the author and not necessarily those of IPI. IPI ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS welcomes consideration of a wide range of perspectives in the pursuit of This study was made possible thanks to the expertise of a well-informed debate on critical Adam Smith, Paul Williams, and Alex Bellamy in the policies and issues in international affairs. Providing for Peacekeeping project, and the superb team at IPI. Robin Collins, David Langille, and Fergus Watt also IPI Publications provided helpful ideas and thoughtful support. Similarly, Adam Lupel, Director of Publications Professors Paul Rogers and Tom Woodhouse in the and Senior Fellow Marie O’Reilly, Associate Editor Department of Peace Studies at the University of Bradford Marisa McCrone, Assistant Production continue to inspire with exceptional peace research. Little Editor would be possible without the ongoing support of David and Suzy, Ben, and Genevieve Langille. Within UN DPKO Suggested Citation: H. Peter Langille, “Improving United and DFS, numerous individuals generously provided Nations Capacity for Rapid insights and information. Special thanks go to Dirk Druet, Deployment,” New York: International Andriani Mortoglou, Oliver Ulich, David Haeri, Hannah Peace Institute, October 2014. Davies, Paul Keating, Juha Rauhalahti, Rakesh Malik, © by International Peace Institute, 2014 Rebecca Jovin, Barbara Nieuwenhuys, Kimberly Mentel, All Rights Reserved Marcin Wydra, Victor Louis Hernandez, Catherine Rompato, Col. Willem van Dullemen, Capt. Herve Auffret, L-Col. www.ipinst.org Sarwar, and Col. Singh. Among others who also helped to clarify specific issues were Christopher Coleman, Capt. Brian Walsh, Col. Seamus McDermott, Yoshimitsu Morihiro, Col. Christophe Deherre, Katherine Jolley, and Walter Lotze. Finally, it’s my hope that this report lives up to Sir Brian Urquhart’s standard of “worthwhile.” Providing for Peacekeeping is an independent research project that seeks to help improve the quality of military and police capabilities available for peacekeeping. The project serves as a hub for researchers, governments, and peacekeeping practitioners around the world to deepen their understanding of—and find new solutions to overcome—the capability challenges that imperil the effectiveness of peace operations. The project is implemented in partnership with Griffith University and the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University. IPI owes a debt of gratitude to its partners and to its generous donors whose contributions make projects like this possible. CONTENTS Abbreviations . iii Executive Summary . 1 Introduction . 1 1. Standby Arrangements System . 4 2. Formed Police Unit Standby Initiative . 7 3. Standing Police Capacity . 9 4. Financial Premiums and Incentives . 10 5. Global Field Support Strategy . 12 6. Enhanced Rapidly Deployable Capacities . 14 7. Early Mission Headquarters . 16 8. Parnerships for Rapid Deployment . 17 Conclusion . 23 Recommendations . 26 iii Abbreviations ACIRC African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crisis ASF African Standby Force AU African Union C-34 United Nations Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations DFS Department of Field Support DPA Department of Political Affairs DPKO Department of Peacekeeping Operations EGF European Union Gendarmerie Force EMHQ Early Mission Headquarters (proposal) ERDC Enhanced Rapidly Deployable Capacities EU European Union FPU Formed Police Unit GFSS Global Field Support Strategy IPI International Peace Institute MOU Memorandum of Understanding PCC Police-Contributing Country RDC Rapid Deployment Capacity SPC Standing Police Capacity TCC Troop-Contributing Country UNLB United Nations Logistics Base UNSAS United Nations Standby Arrangements System 1 Executive Summary Friends of Rapid Deployment group. An earlier proposal for national defense transformation to Rapid deployment of large peace operations into support UN peace operations also merits wider conflict zones worldwide is a demanding process. support. Within the United Nations system, the process is In concluding, the report notes that attempts to further complicated and frequently delayed by a develop better arrangements for rapid deployment long list of tasks, including the need to seek the have been repeatedly frustrated by austerity and a support of member states for the deployment of zero-growth budget. Similarly, the Security their national personnel and resources. Yet, rapid Council’s earlier emphasis to develop rapid deploy - deployment remains an important standard with ment reforms within the context of existing specified response times and an objective that standby arrangements limited the range of choice underpins many related reforms. to modest, incremental reforms, which have also This report reviews eight initiatives designed to been insufficient. Aside from slower responses, the help UN peace operations to deploy rapidly, modest reforms of the past twenty years have not providing a list of criteria to assess and improve on provided the required UN capability. A different each. Progress is evident in the standby arrange - approach is overdue. Realigning UN rapid deploy - ments system (UNSAS), the formed police unit ment to the prevention of armed conflict and the standby initiative, the standing police capacity, the protection of civilians may help to generate wider new system for reimbursements and premiums, the appeal and the broader constituency of support Global Field Support Strategy, and partnerships for required. There are options. The need to aim rapid deployment. However, there are inherent higher should now be evident. limitations, particularly in conditional standby arrangements. For example, UNSAS and regional Introduction partnerships such as the European Union Battlegroups and African Union Standby Forces The need to improve the UN’s capacity to rapidly have not yet proven functional. In contrast, deploy peace operations is driven by the twin although understaffed, the UN standing police pressures of responding to complex emergencies capacity has proven to be more rapid, reliable, and and organizational reforms. Recent crises in Mali, cost-effective. As a result of two recent South Sudan, and the Central African Republic “premiums,” troop and police contributors have a have renewed concerns over the available options new financial incentive to deploy rapidly. for prompt responses. Similar anxieties followed Combined, these initiatives should help, but they the end of the Cold War and the 1994 Rwandan are unlikely to be sufficient. genocide. The Agenda for Peace report in 1992 sparked an array of related reforms, as did the Rather than the earlier recommended response report of the Panel on UN Peace Operations in times of thirty days for a traditional peacekeeping 2000 (known as the Brahimi Report). 1 Clearly, operation and ninety days for a complex multidi - rapid deployment has been a long-standing mensional mission, UN officials expect the challenge for the organization. planning and deployment of new operations to entail six to twelve months. While recent initiatives In 2004, then under-secretary-general for peace - may reduce UN response times to four to six keeping Jean-Marie Guéhenno elaborated on this months, this is neither rapid nor likely to offset the recurring problem, with an important note of need for larger, longer operations at higher costs caution: and risks. Resources, mobilizing the world, deploying quickly, and in a timely manner—these are huge challenges to Among fourteen suggestions for improvement, us. We see that if we dribble into a mission, then we this report raises the need for an ongoing dialogue project an image of weakness, and there is nothing in an annual forum on UN rapid deployment, as more difficult than to recover from an initial percep - well as cooperative efforts to revitalize the former tion of weakness. So we are looking for new 1 See United Nations Secretary-General, An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peacekeeping, UN Doc. A/47/277–S/24111, June 17, 1992, and United Nations, Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, UN Doc. A/55/305, August 21, 2000. 2 H. Peter Langille solutions. We see that if we just repeat the solutions thirty days for a traditional peacekeeping operation of the past, it’s not going to work. 2 and ninety days for a complex multidimensional Rapid deployment is a complex, demanding operation, albeit with the following proviso: process, even for the most advanced and best In order to meet these timelines, the Secretariat would prepared member states. Prior preparation and need one or a combination of the following: (a) extensive planning are essential. The prerequisites stand ing reserves of military, civilian police and civi - usually include the immediate availability of highly lian expertise, materiel and financing; (b) extremely trained, well-equipped personnel and dependable reliable standby capacities to be called