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Doorway to Hell ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS The research and preparation of this narrative would not have been possible without the guidance, assistance, direction, and contributions of Professor Thomas Buckley, University of Tulsa History Department. On behalf of his soldiers' families and loved ones, I wish to extend my personal appreciation to U.S. Army Lieutenant Colonel Robert L. Davis, the last commander of the 43rd Engineer Combat Battalion (Heavy), during both Operations Restore and Continue Hope. He led a total of over a thousand troops through the "doorway to hell" twice, and brought them all back alive. Special acknowledgment is also extended to Major Mark Feierstein, 36th Engineer Group S-4 (Logistics) during Operation Restore Hope and 43rd S-3 (Operations) during Operation Continue Hope; Major Alan Estes, 43rd S-3 (Operations) during Operation Restore Hope; Captain Brian Unwin, Surgeon, 43rd Engineer Combat Battalion (H) during Operation Restore Hope; Captain Dale Forrester, 43rd Chaplain, Operation Restore Hope; Captain Jeffrey T. Bochonok, 43rd S-l (Personnel/Admin) during Operation Continue Hope; First Lieutenant Brian E. Wheeler, the 43rd's Signal Officer and Command Sergeant Major Larence Maxwell, both of whom served during Operations Restore Hope and Continue Hope; and Sergeant Hans Smith, 43rd Operations NCO who served during the Somalian Aid Mission in 1985, and during Operation Continue Hope. These men, who were based at Fort Benning, Georgia and deployed to Somalia with their colleagues of the 43rd Engineers, served unselfishly iv Doorway to Hell and heroically. In doing so, twice they walked through the "Doorway to Hell" for a nation that ultimately wished they hadn't gone at all. It would not have been possible to include as rich a variety of source material without the support and assistance of my mother, Mrs. Eleanore S. Wheeler, Ormond Beach, Florida, who first saw the United States Military Academy at West Point, New York in 1915. Seventy-five years later she returned a second time to see her grandson graduate in 1990. Allied perspectives were also provided through the contributions of British Army Sergeant Terry W. Young, Sutton, Surrey, England, who is in service to the Queen as a member of the London Regiment (Territorial), formerly of the 6/7 Queens (Territorial). I extend my special appreciation to my wife Marcia Jane Largen Wheeler, who is representative of the mothers who supplied the servicemen and women who fought -- and sometimes died -- in a land few Americans could find on a map of the world. Finally, this work is dedicated to the forty-three American Soldiers and Marines and two civilians who were killed in Somalia, East Africa, during Operations Restore Hope and Continue Hope, between December 9, 1992 and March 25, 1994. They have joined other Americans over whom, as Captain John D. McRae so eloquently wrote in his poem In Flanders Fields, "the poppies blow / between the crosses, row on row." BG Ed Wheeler, USA (Ret) v Doorway to Hell FOREWORD Despite an undeniable desperate need for help by numerous other countries throughout Africa, Operation Restore Hope was initiated in Somalia, East Africa in December, 1992 by the United Nations. The mission of the intervention, led by the United States, was--according to official sources--to save the Somalian people from starvation. Tactically, Operation Restore Hope was a success. By the spring of 1993, most of Somalia--outside of the capital city of Mogadishu-- was secured. Protected by U.S. and allied combat forces, American army engineers, fulfilling their assigned mission checklist, rebuilt the Somalian road network to permit the distribution of food supplies to rural areas. Due to this humanitarian rescue mission, tens of thousands of Somalians were saved from dying of starvation and resultant diseases brought about by malnutrition, and other conditions resulting from civil war and the lack of sanitation. Had the intervention ended then, it would have represented a shining example of what mankind was capable of doing when nations worked together. Unfortunately, what would have been recorded as a victory of historical proportions for the nations which united behind the effort to save the Somalian people, deteriorated into an ignoble and humiliating defeat for the United Nations. vi Doorway to Hell Why did the intervention in a fourth-world African country, supported by the United Nations and backed by the leading industrialized nations of the world, deteriorate from a classic humanitarian achievement to a world-class disaster in a matter of months? Why did an American administration--and Congress--allow American forces to be committed to an open-ended mission of "nation building" under the auspices and direction of the United Nations, which was an entirely different mission than that of saving the Somalian people from starvation? Were there other hidden reasons for international intervention in Somalia that nobody wished to admit or even discuss publicly? The answers to these questions as well as many others, lie in the enigma of Somalia, the intrigues of the United Nations, the naivete' of a U.S. administration that failed to recognize the political and military whirlpool into which it was being sucked, and the unwillingness of a semi-aboriginal society to allow its own destiny to be dictated by foreigners. As for the United Nations, the dismal track record leaves one to ponder exactly what purpose it actually serves. Its treaties and charters against its definition of Agenocide@ are reflected by its successes, which to date are none. Examples of international catastrophes in which the U.N. was either ineffective, refused to intervene, or was strangely absent even though it was mandated to intervene, include, but are not limited to: Belgian Congo, Massacre at Stanleyville, Uganda, Kenya, Rwanda (800,000 killed), South Africa, Nigeria, Cambodia (3,000,000 killed), Laos (300,000 killed), Chechnya, the Balkans, Afghanistan, Indonesia (600,000 killed), Sri Lanka, China, Ukraine, Tibet, Burundi, Burma, Criatia, East Timor (100,000), Argentina, Chile, vii Doorway to Hell Nicaragua, Stalinist Russia, El Salvador, Vietnam, the Sudan, Kuwait and Ethiopia to name a few. Somalia was one more example of the failure of the United Nations to prove itself as an effective organization for Aworld peace.@ The frightening conclusion is that it was organized, and is growing into, something elseBa supernational world government known as AThe New World Order.@ On March 25, 1994 after the loss of 45 Americans in Somalia during more than a year of operating under dangerous and disease-ridden conditions, the last U.S. force--a rear guard det- achment of United States Marines--pushed off the beach in amphibious vehicles and left Somalia. The remnants of the U.N. force departed a short time later under sniper fire, withdrawing in front of mobs of looters who pounced upon everything left behind. By the spring of 1994, Somalia had become a disaster. Those most responsible, fearing public exposure and repercussions, used their resources to shift the attention of the public to other matters, such as Rwanda and Bosnia- Herzegovina. By playing the standard U.N. trump card--Human Suffering--the media, and consequently the minds of the public, could be politically redirected. In words now known by the American people as meaning psychological redirection, the UN, and the U.S. Government, had become very adept at AWagging the Dog.@ Somalia had also become an enigma. Despite the reluctance of a U.S. President to declare Somalia to be a combat zone, he was forced to issue two posthumous Medals of Honor to American service personnel. viii Doorway to Hell Although the initiation of the operation was humanitarian, no Humane Service Medals were issued to those participating in Operation Restore Hope, despite the issue of such recognition for hurricane relief in Florida. And despite the length of the operation, size of the commitment, and danger to all who served there, the Pentagon went out of its way to avoid issuing any special recognition to those who served in-country, such as the Southwest Asia campaign ribbon granted to Persian Gulf veterans. As a result, the Army and Marine Corps "grunts" who served in Somalia only wear an Armed Forces Expeditionary Medal, with nothing else certifying where they provided such service, almost as if their own country was ashamed of that service--or possibly trying to hide it by lack of recognition. When our units returned home, there were no parades or celebrations except by the families of the men and women on the posts to which they returned. Why were Somalian veterans treated with such disdain as compared to those who enjoyed Saudi-supplied salad bars before they overran the Iraqi army two years before? Is the experience of Somalia the measure of how we treat our servicemen and women based on the popularity of the harm's way in which we send them? Years from now nobody except 25,000 American servicemen and women, several thousand allied troops, a virtual legion of U.N. officials and bureaucrats, Somalian farmers, camel herders, and villagers who survive, and 45 American families will remember this microcosmic chapter of American and U.N. history. Somalia will eventually be overshadowed by current events and those yet to develop. There will also be many in powerful political positions who hope that it will not even be mentioned and will disappear as a conscious subject, ix Doorway to Hell for they don't want their constituents reminded of their in- competence. Except for the record contained herein, and hopefully others like it, perhaps it won't be forgotten. Nor hopefully will the lessons learned there be forgotten as well, nor the mistakes repeated. For those who served, those who performed the mission given them by their leaders--and especially those who paid the supreme sacrifice--only they will understand what so many have learned before.

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